

Chapter 1 : Franceâ€™Monaco relations - Wikipedia

4 The French Restoration dispute over mores emerged over the period of interest: apart, that is, from esprit gÃ¢en eralÃ¢, philo- whether a French national.

Bring fact-checked results to the top of your browser search. The disputes over execution of the Treaty of Versailles suggest a continuation of the Great War by other means, while the economic and security arrangements of mid-decade, and the era of good feeling they engendered, were flawed from their inception and collapsed with the onset of the Great Depression. A broken world The failure of democratic consensus But what was normal in a world broken by total war? The pillars of the antebellum systemâ€™the balance of power, the non-interventionist state, the gold standard, and the free-market economyâ€™lay in ruins and in any case reflected a faith in the natural play of political and economic forces that many Europeans had ceased to share. Wilsonians and Leninists blamed balance-of-power diplomacy for the war and fled from such normalcy. Technocrats, impressed by the productivity of regulated war economies, hoped to extend them into peacetime to promote recovery and dampen competition. Finally, the free-market economy that had made high growth rates and technological dynamism seem normal from to was itself challenged by Socialists on the left and corporate interest groups on the right. In every case governments found it easier to try to shift the burden of reconstruction on to foreign powers, through reparations, loans, or inflation, than to impose taxes and austerity on quarreling social groups at home. It soon became clear that the effects of the war would continue to politicize economic relations within and between countries; that the needs of internal stability conflicted with the needs of international stability; that old dreams clashed with new realities, and new dreams with old realities. The search for a new stability The lack of consensus on democracy itself also hampered the quest for a new stability. Wilson expected victory to mean a heyday of democracy in which the will of the people would oblige states to value peace and compromise. Instead, Communists and Fascists alike challenged democratic assumptions and elevated social class, race, and the state to the role Wilson reserved for the individual. In terms of the distribution of world power, the s gave rise to a false normalcy, an Indian summer of European Great Power politics thanks to the peripheral roles played by the United States and the Soviet Union. In diplomacy, affairs of state came to be conducted increasingly by politicians meeting in grand conferences or at the League of Nations rather than by experts communicating with precision through written notes. Inevitably, style replaced substance at such meetings as prime ministers worried as much about their political image at home as about the actual issues at hand. The prime ministers of France and Britain held no less than 23 meetings from to Technological developmentsâ€™the telephone, the wireless, and soon the airplaneâ€™also tended to reduce the role of professional ambassadors to that of messengers. Behind the contradictory mixture of old and new in politics lay a profound cultural confusion. For the cultural shock of the Great War had turned modernist iconoclasm from the conceit of bohemian cliques into a new conventional wisdom. Science and technology, those engines of progress, had only perfected an economy of death, and turned soldiers and civilians into mere cogs in the war machine. In the s Einsteinian relativity, or a debased and popularized notion of it, replaced the comfortable order of the Newtonian universe, offering skeptics a pseudoscientific justification for their rejection of absolute moral values. Popular Freudianism, depicting man as the victim of irrational, subconscious drives, seemed to describe the behaviour of â€™18 better than the old Aristotelian psychology of man as a rational, moral creature. Sociologist Max Weber hoped for charismatic leadership to overcome bureaucracy. Much painting, music, and film of the s illustrated the theme of decline: The intelligentsia of the s leveled a comprehensive assault on bourgeois values, forms, and traditions. Tradition won scarcely more respect in the salons of Paris and London. The decade that was to have spawned a democratic diplomacy prepared the way instead for the totalitarian diplomacy of the s. By they had made a good show of it, as currencies and world trade stabilized and food, coal, and industrial production again reached levels. But the American economy alone boomed following the postwar slump of â€™ Between and , U. Overall, national income soared 54 percent in those years; by the U. Yet the demobilization of American armed forces and United States refusal to make political-military engagements abroad meant that this mighty

power existed in semi-isolation from the rest of the world. France and Britain, though engaged, lacked the resources and the will to run the risks inherent in trying to reintegrate Germany and Russia into the European order. A world with such disparities in the distribution of power and responsibility could not be returned to normal. It could only be given the appearance of normalcy by pasting paper constitutions, paper money, and paper treaties over the absence of common values, common interests, or a true balance of power. To be sure, Germany was exhausted and in the shackles of Versailles, but its strategic position actually improved in the war. If and when Germany escaped Versailles, therefore, it might pose a greater threat to Europe than in This danger obsessed postwar French leaders, but they quarreled among themselves over the proper response: In late the French electorate returned a staunchly conservative decision. Belgium shrugged off neutrality, which had failed spectacularly to shelter it in , and concluded a military alliance with France in September But these states, while wedded to the Versailles system, needed more protection than they offered. France could come to their aid only by a vigorous offensive against Germany from the west, which in turn required access to the bridgeheads over the Rhine. Thus, not only French security but that of east-central Europe as well depended on German disarmament and Allied occupation of the Rhineland. To the extent that Germany reneged , France would face deficits imperiling its currency. Britain found itself in the midst of a postwar economic slump magnified by its wartime losses in ships and markets. The war had accelerated the decline of the aging British industrial plant and the economy more generally. Unemployment never dipped much below 10 percent during the decade before the onset of the Great Depression, and in the early s the pressure was on the British government to boost employment by reviving trade. Keynes argued persuasively that while Europe could never recover until the German economy took its natural place at the centre, virtually every clause of the treaty seemed designed to prevent that particular return to normalcy. To be sure, the British needed the reparations debt from Germany on the books to balance against their own war debts to the United States. But soon after the war Lloyd George came to favour German recovery in the interest of trade. The entente with France became strained as early as over the issues of reparations, Turkey, and the coal shortage of that year, from which Britain garnered windfall profits at the expense of the French. German politics and reparations Germany, meanwhile, weathered both the leftist agitation of and the right-wing Kapp Putsch of March But elections showed a swing to the centre-right in German politics away from the parties that had voted to ratify Versailles. The insecure coalition cabinets of the early s, therefore, found themselves with little room to maneuver on the foreign stage. They dared not rebel openly against Versailles, but dared not endorse fulfillment too eagerly in the face of domestic opinion. Nor could the weak Berlin government take forceful measures to end inflation, impose taxes, or regulate big business. The industrial magnates of the Ruhr thus acquired a virtual veto power over national policy by dint of their importance to the economy, a fact the embittered French did not fail to notice. German leaders themselves differed over how to win relief from the treaty. Army chief Hans von Seeckt and the eastern division of the foreign office thought in Bismarckian terms and favoured close ties with Russia, despite its obnoxious regime. But other economic and foreign policymakers preferred to rely on Britain and the United States to restrain France and revise the treaty. German diplomats soon synthesized these approaches, threatening closer ties with Moscow in order to win concessions from the West. The Reparations Commission bickered throughout over the total sum to be demanded of Germany and its distribution among the Allies. Finally, on May 5, , the London conference presented Berlin with a bill for ,, gold marks, to be paid in annuities of 2,, plus 26 percent ad valorem of German exports. But the May schedule was less harsh than it seemed, for the bill was divided into three series—A bonds totaling 12,, marks, B bonds for 38,, and the unlikely C bonds in the amount of 82,,. Nevertheless, Chancellor Konstantin Fehrenbach resigned rather than accept this new Diktat, and his successor, Joseph Wirth , acquiesced only under threat of occupation of the Ruhr. They were aided in this by the continuing deterioration of the paper mark. The prewar value of the mark was about 4. By the end of it reached 63, and after the first payment of 1,, marks under the London plan, the mark fell to to the dollar. The French argued that the inflation was purposeful, designed to feign bankruptcy while allowing Berlin to liquidate its internal debt and German industrialists like Hugo Stinnes and Fritz Thyssen to borrow, expand, and dump exports on the world market. Recent research suggests, however, that the government did not fully

understand the causes of the inflation even though it recognized its social utility in stimulating employment and permitting social expenditures. Of course, the reparations bill, while not the cause of inflation, was a strong disincentive to stabilization for Berlin could hardly plead bankruptcy if it boasted a strong currency, a balanced budget, and a healthy balance of payments. And insofar as the German government was dependent on those who benefited most from inflation—the industrialists—it was incapable of implementing austerity measures. This financial tangle might have been avoided by a program of reparations-in-kind whereby German firms delivered raw and finished goods directly to the Allies. By December, Berlin was granted a moratorium. He approached London for a security pact, only to learn that the British were not willing to guarantee the Rhenish demilitarized zone and demanded French concessions on reparations in return. In June a conference of international bankers in Paris recommended loans to stabilize the German mark, but only if Germany were granted a long moratorium on reparations. The grand economic conference promoted by Lloyd George was held at Genoa in April and May and was the first to bring German and Russian delegations together with the Allies on a status of equality. Innocuous or not, Rathenau was assassinated by German rightists on June 24; Erzberger, signer of the Armistice, had also been murdered in French representatives also bargained directly with the Ruhr magnates late in, hoping for a coal-for-iron exchange and market-sharing, but the German price was evacuation of the Rhineland and substantial revision of the Treaty of Versailles. Meanwhile, the German mark tumbled to 7, to the dollar in December. If England refuses I will act alone. The German industrialists conspire to destroy the mark. They hope to ruin France. Secretary of State Hughes responded on December 29 with an offer to convene a committee of experts to study means of stabilizing the mark, but he held out no hope that the United States might relent on war debts. If the Germans resisted, the French might take whatever measures seemed fit, up to and including political change in the Rhineland. German workers protested the occupation of the Ruhr with an immense sitdown strike that proprietors and the government quickly joined. The railroads, mines, factories, and public services in the Ruhr and Rhineland ground to a halt. The Allied Rhineland Commission Britain dissenting seized all executive, legislative, and judicial power in the occupied territories, expelled 16, uncooperative German officials and more than, persons in all, and sequestered all German government property, energy resources, and transportation. France began covertly subsidizing separatist agitation. The Ruhr adventure thus became an economic war of attrition with stakes potentially as high as in a shooting war. If France retreated, the Treaty of Versailles was as good as dead; if Germany collapsed, the Rhineland might be lost. The paper mark reached 4,, to the dollar in August, and the Reich treasury was at the end of its tether. Business in non-occupied Germany was choking, and social unrest was spreading. Bavarian rightists called for war or separatism, while the Communist Party made gains in the cities. Troops expelled Communists from the governments of Saxony and Thuringia, a Communist putsch in Hamburg misfired, and Bavarian police quashed the Nazi putsch led by Adolf Hitler and Ludendorff. In October, meanwhile, rowdy bands supported by the French occupation began to seize public buildings from Aachen to Speyer and to proclaim a Rhineland Republic. These separatists had no support from the population or from genuine Rhenish notables like the mayor of Cologne, Konrad Adenauer, and their actions only further discredited French policy in the eyes of Britain. By January the separatists had been driven out or murdered by fellow Germans. Finally, the French franc also succumbed to the pressure it had been under since the war.

Chapter 2 : Latest news reports on FRANCE, French politics and culture - France 24 - France 24

4 - *The French Restoration Dispute Over Mores and Tocqueville Great Britain* * 5 - *Between Whiggism and the Science of Manners: Britain*,

The spread of American corporations abroad has various consequences on local cultures, some very visible, and others more subtle. First, food itself is in many countries an integral aspect of the culture. Because of their pride in their cuisine, some French people are concerned that U. Some French people would argue that fast food does not belong in the French society and is of lower quality than their own. Starbucks causes cultural concerns in Italy because of the association that Italians make between coffee and leisurely sidewalk cafes. Coffee in Italy is more than a drink; it is part of the way of life and Italian mores. While in the United States it is common for people to buy takeaway coffee for drinking in the street or office, in Italy people usually prefer to relax and chat with peers while drinking coffee. Coffee shops offer a personal, friendly atmosphere that many Italians believe a large chain could not provide. Similarly, many people would prefer to frequent coffee shops that are each unique, while Starbucks offers a standard formula. Fittingly enough, the sociologist George Ritzer coined the term McDonaldization. McDonaldization, Ritzer argues, is a result of globalization and, ultimately, leads to global uniformity, influencing local habits and traditions. Take, for example, the previously mentioned example of Starbucks coffee disrupting the traditional coffee culture in Italy. This sometimes leads to negative reactions, such as in the case of the Starbucks coffeehouse in the Forbidden City in central Beijing. This particular Starbucks branch, which opened in , was shut down in due to heavy protests. Concerns that globalization leads to a dominance of US customs and values are also present with regard to films and the entertainment industry more broadly. This is the case with French films in France, for example. As will be discussed later in the brief, governments from countries like France have attempted to intervene in the functioning of the market to try to protect their local cultural industries, by taking measures such as restricting the number of foreign films that can be shown. But if a government imposes domestic films, TV shows, or books onto its people, it limits their choice to consume what they prefer. In other words, the government is effectively saying that it does not trust its people to make the choices that are right for them. Throughout history, cultures have changed and evolved. Globalization may accelerate cultural change. However, because change is driven by the choice of consumers, the elements of a particular culture will inevitably reflect consumer choice. For information on globalization and obesity, click here. Retrieved June 22, , from: Interview with George Ritzer May , October McDonaldization theory of George Ritzer. Retrieved June 22, , from http:

Chapter 3 : Tavern Night - Old Barracks Museum

Monarchism in France is the advocacy of restoring the monarchy (mostly constitutional monarchy) in France, which was abolished after the defeat by Prussia, arguably before that in with the establishment of the French Second Republic.

But their location in the middle of Persian Gulf shipping and tanker lanes near the Strait of Hormuz gives the islands huge strategic importance. And this importance extends not only to the United Arab Emirates and Iran -- both of which claim the islands -- but far beyond. The dispute over who has sovereignty over the islands dates back more than a century. Until recently, the debate was a regional matter. In 1971, Britain announced it would withdraw from the Gulf region by the end of the year. It had taken control of the islands in the 18th century, but because they had been ruled by the Arab Qassimi family dynasty for at least two centuries, Britain decided to hand them over to Sharjah, slated to join the United Arab Emirates. Iran disputed the decision, claiming its own historic rights to the islands. Eventually, Britain brokered a deal between Iran and Sharjah giving them joint control of Abu Musa and equal shares in any future oil reserves. No agreement, however, was reached on the two Tunbs islands. But on November 30, 1971, a day after British forces left the region and just two days before the UAE was to become an official federation, the Iranian military moved quickly and took the three islands by force. It has occupied them ever since. The Tunbs and Abu Musa. He says Sharjah signed the memorandum of understanding MOU under duress, therefore making it invalid. The Islamic Republic of Iran stands firm in defense of its territorial integrity. In a statement he provided VOA, also published on the internet, he wrote: Security Council to discuss the situation. Energy Information Administration, a statistical and analytical agency within the U. S. Department of Energy, says 17 million barrels of oil pass through the Strait every day, which is nearly 20 percent of all oil traded worldwide. If any party wanted to interrupt oil shipments, it could do so from these islands. The Federation of American Scientists says Iran has built up a military presence on the islands that includes anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles. Last April, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Abu Musa, a move that, when viewed alongside repeated Iranian threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, was interpreted as a warning to the U. S. General Assembly in New York, U. S. Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed reiterated an appeal for the dispute to be settled through negotiations or at The Hague. Iran subsequently warned the UAE it was considering severing diplomatic ties with its neighbor over the dispute, then later retracted. More Middle East News.

Chapter 4 : NPR Choice page

A crowdfunding project to restore the medieval French chateau of Ebaupinay, in the Deux-Sevres region of western France, is offering shares in the crumbling landmark in exchange for funds to help.

It mentions the Orleans principle of foreignness only in the context of dismissing it. Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it". In short, there are many issues relevant to "French dynastic disputes" which are not addressed at all or are addressed from a pro-Legitimist bias in this article. Thus I tag it POV. This is how the French cancelled the legitimacy of Henry VI of England, since no treaty could divert the throne from the customary heir. Subsequent historical changes brought about by Utrecht, the undesirability of France-Spain union, and the Revolution overthrew the foundations of those ancient laws, so the Orleans line has an equally valid claim. If the issuance of letters patent is enough to disinherit an heir, then Charles VI could have done just that for his son, who became Charles VII. Catholicism seems a novelty requirement, since Henry IV was still Protestant at that point. A custom, even when articulated by jurists, which says merely what "should" be is not an assertion of law, but an opinion about law. Opinions vary and they change: The notion that the letters can or should simply be dismissed reflects a Legitimist dismissiveness which presumes the point it seeks to prove: That pov biases this article. Because visiting abroad and emigrating are both possible, the distinction turns upon "leaving without intention to return". It is reasonable and possible for those intentions to be expressed in advance, ergo lp. This pov about French nationality, its importance to dynastically and how to preserve it is expressed in the lp, and the issue was not manufactured by Orleanists when Louis XIV sent Philippe to reign in Spain in , it had been raised in when Henri went to Poland, yet in the intervening years no interpretation of French "fundamental law" had rendered the issue moot or obviated the need for lp. Intention exists only in the mind. It would be impossible to evaluate whether every would-have-been descendant of Henry of Valois would have the "intent to return" just because a lp said so. It is a "novelty" because there was then no law that required the king to be a Catholic. Most of the French just thought that he "should" be. Catholicism became a precedent because Henry IV converted. In other words, religion did not exclude him from the throne, because it was not yet a precedent law during his time, but it became a precedent law after him. Had the Orleans line succeeded to the French throne after the Bourbon-Artois became extinct, the principle of nationality would have a valid precedent, and therefore a valid claim to inclusion among the fundamental laws. This smacks of original research , because most of what I have read of Legitimist argumentation treats Catholicity as one of the so-called fundamental laws to which Henri had to adhere, not to which he happened to adhere. If it was not a requirement, and since he became king in rather than after his conversion in , then why, how and when did it become retroactively a precedent? It is inconsistent with the other fundamental laws in this crucial regard, and can be deemed to conform to them only by falsifying history. It is relevant because 1. Legitimists insist that Capetian agnates not born of Catholic marriage as distinct from being Catholic -- like Henri IV are excluded from the line of succession to the French throne right up to the present day. If Legitimists no long adhere to that assertion, true, that excuses them from defending the illogic and inconsistency of , but at the expense of admitting that the fundamental laws are not so clearly "known" and agreed upon as they have previously insisted; it potentially impugns the integrity of their chain of argumentation. Again, this is just one more example of why more balanced and sourced statements are needed in the article. When the French foresaw that Navarre would be a king, his religion was unacceptable to them, so they formed the notion that he should be Catholic. They knew he was the king under the old laws then in existence; hence, the hesitation around to elect a new king. But the Parisians insisted that they would not accept a non-Catholic king. Hence, since Henry IV converted , it became a fundamental law that the king had to be Catholic. They did this with Troyes, and could apply it to Utrecht. I have never heard Legitimists argue that the Orleans "should" be the rightful heir under the fundamental laws. But again it sounds like original research: No Senior Capetian had ever been excluded based on his foreignness, so there is no precedent for this claim. Note that all laws on the French

royal succession are based on, and validated by, historical precedents. Foreignness is debunked, for reasons I have already stated; its origin is spurious and anachronistic; The Orleans claim is just as valid as the Bourbon claim, depending on the legal norm: The Legitimist legal norm is an idealist legal norm, since it believes the ancient laws of the French succession are unbreakable; The Orleans legal norm is a practical legal norm, since it believes that between the laws of French before and after the Revolution, the laws of the latter supersedes that of the former, and changes in the succession law are perfectly acceptable modifications. The Orleans claim has been complicated by its claim to an idealist legal norm, which it pursues by the introduction of the foreignness principle. This is a translation from French wikipedia, so I may be unfamiliar with most of the sources they used or omitted. I have not attempted to write a complete, neutral article on French succession because I do not have all the sources or time necessary to do so. That is what NPOV requires, at the least -- since far more sources treat the Orleanist rather than the Legitimist Head of House as the relevant candidate for the French throne in the event of restoration, and have done so since I think only that section has a Legitimist bias. The rest seem fine to me. If you could still find some biases, please point them out; thanks for your meaningful input. Hence, foreign could be "dynastic" or "national", and it was re-framed like that in the article, as if it was uncertain, though I am inclined it meant the former. So it is not distinct from "foreign" in the ordinary meaning of that word: The purpose of the article is to explain the disputes, not to promote the Orleanist branch. The French Constitution of 1830 described the succession law of the kingdom of France. This can be confirmed in English versions of the text, which may be found in public domain. Note that the sentence "Nothing is prejudged on the effect of renunciations in the race on the throne" meant that in there were still Frenchmen who thought that: Utrecht itself betrays the nationality requirement; if it existed at that time, then it should have been invoked in the treaty itself, instead of, or in addition to, the renunciations, which Louis XIV, Philip V and the contemporary Parliament thought of as non-binding. These are among the discrepancies which show that the article continues to unfairly cast the Legitimist interpretation in the most coherent light while leaving that of the Orleans to appear less cogent. From the fundamental laws of France named the King of Navarre as the rightful monarch; the principle of Catholicity was in its embryonic stages, and applied to Navarre only in the sense that it prevented him from gaining complete mastery over the kingdom, instead of excluding him completely. His position as heir by the Salic law maintained him in the interim. Legitimism requires birth from Catholic marriage since it was then the sole recognized form of legitimate birth. I have already added a section on the letters patent, with an explanation of how the Orleanists and Legitimists viewed them. The Orleanist violations on the fundamental laws made by the late Count of Paris suggests that he did not understand the theoretical position of his Legitimist Unionist supporters There is actually a section in the article that deals with the actions of Charles X: The principle of the unavailability of the crown since - subsection, House of Bourbon There was in the ancien regime no legal way to change the succession law. This was only possible with the change of regime circa 1792, when Louis XVI was overthrown and the old order was abolished, and the fundamental laws were no longer fully respected. But please understand and accept that others may not and some do not share the assessment that your pov is either accurate or, more relevantly, neutral. Recall that NPOV on Wikipedia does not require and is not satisfied by either "truth" or "equal treatment" of viewpoints: Rather, it requires articles to reflect prevalent POVs, and do so proportionate to their relative prominence in reliable sources. The article could be published as "Legitimism" and serve as an uncontradicted apologia therefor. The first relies on the change of the national order. The ancien regime is no longer; the succession law could then be changed freely, so the validity of Utrecht becomes acceptable. If the fundamental laws can tolerate that falsification of reality they are not and have not been indisponible "indisposible". The translation "unavailable" does violence to English as a neologism and would need to be sourced. Technically never, since the principle of Catholicity did not emerge until 1563, when Henry IV converted. It is an error to think that all of the succession laws emerged at the same time; the exclusion of women emerged only in 1527, of distaff descendants in 1544, etc. This principle may be more relaxed than the others, with regard to the period from 1792, since religion is a "mutable" quality, whereas descent is "immutable". It is undeniable that there is indeed a change in the national order; after the overthrow of Louis XVI the laws of the ancien regime no longer applied. It was in this environment, after the collapse of the old order, that Orleanism

arose, after the French learned to change kings in the fashion of the English. Indisposible does more violence to English, because it gets a red underline by spell check. But in the ancien regime the ability to change the succession law belongs to no one, hence the Treaty of Utrecht is void. But if this principle existed, then it should have been invoked in Utrecht, so as not to produce a change in the law of succession. Hence the principles by which the Orleans claim the throne contradict each other, so I am having a difficult time on how to include this in the article. Help me around this point. From on, the exclusion of the Anjou Bourbons is treated as a unique exception to the "indisposability" principle because that is, in fact, how French law, French policy, the French state and the international order treated it. But that interpretation cannot be presented as fact merely because Legitimism declares it so. This law of survival is no longer necessary, since the monarchy no longer exists, hence the purely legal power of the principle of unavailability as understood in the ancien regime reaches a juristic high ground. Even more novel i. The letters patent of retracting those of is sufficient proof that France was obliged to and did officially recognize that the assertion of a preserved right of French succession for Anjou was retracted. The letters patent of actually clarifies that the law of aubain does not apply to princes of the royal blood; the descendants of the Kings of France cannot be excluded from the succession to the throne based on a law that prohibited lower-ranked Frenchmen from succeeding to estates after becoming foreigners. The laws of succession to fiefs do not apply to the Crown; the Crown has its own succession laws. The letters patent serve only as a record of succession rights, rather than a source of those rights, which were ultimately derived from the fundamental laws. A one time mention is minimizing and distortionate. But at the French Constitution of , the rights of the Spanish Bourbons were reserved, despite Orleanist claims that their exclusion should already have been assured for having spent at least 78 years in Spain. This is not an anecdotal evidence, but an evidence from a legal document, from a constitution no less, and one formed right after the abolition of the old order, when the succession laws of the preceding regime were still remembered. This undeniable historical fact denies the existence of the nationality requirement as late as ; had it existed, there would be no need to protect the rights of the Spanish Bourbons, since they had lost their French nationality anyway. Nothing is prejudged as to the effect of renunciations in the house currently reigning. This wording was adopted following three days of bitter debate among more than men, with many amendments to the motion, for which there survives no verbatim transcript. Rather, in the context of fearing either to offend their neighbor, the king of Spain, or the European parties to the treaty, they opted to reserve to the French nation the explicit right to decide the validity of dynastic renunciations to the throne if and when the line of Capetians senior to the Spanish branch becomes extinct which would not occur until Certainly, the decision indicated that the NA foresaw the possibility of revoking the exclusion of Utrecht -- but it did not do so then, and France never explicitly did so afterward. By "reserved rights" I meant that their rights were not immediately dismissed a surprising result, since the Orleanists claim that a nationality requirement exists; if it did, it could immediately have quashed the pretensions of the Spanish branch in I agree, however, that the clause "Nothing is prejudged Nothing but the affection for the laws of the old regime could have pushed them to take this course of action; there was more to fear from England and the Empire whom policy would render hostile to this act , than from Spain, whose only powerful ally was France.

Chapter 5 : Own part of the French chateau of Ebaupinay for less than \$60

Jacques Cousteau's famed research vessel has languished in a coastal French warehouse as a monetary dispute over its restoration and future drags on. In its day, the Calypso was more than an oceanographic research vessel. It was the constant companion of the famed French explorer Jacques Cousteau.

The Orleans The Bonapartes , although Prince Charles Napoleon , "Head of the Imperial House of France" does not claim the restoration of the Empire, some groups are considering this and support the Bonapartist party, sometimes for him, sometimes for his eldest son, Prince Jean-Christophe Napoleon. The descendants of Karl Wilhelm Naundorff , who still have their supporters. The Fundamental Laws of the Kingdom of France[edit] To better understand three of the four dynastic disputes regarding the succession to the French throne, it is necessary to have an understanding of the ancient constitution of the Capetian monarchy. The fundamental laws of the Kingdom of France referred to certain fixed rules that the French public law has placed above the sovereign will. They were the unwritten laws which were invoked during the ages when serious difficulties arose: Their origin coincides with the development of the House of Hugh Capet ; they are related to that house, they existed as long as it reigned, and when the old French monarchy disappeared, they disappeared with it. They could not be ignored, nor modified, even by the king himself, since it is to these very laws to which he owes his succession. In the French monarchy, they are the foundation of any right of succession to the throne. They have developed during the early centuries of the Capetian monarchy, and were sometimes transferred to other countries linked to the dynasty. The early Capetians had their heirs crowned during their lifetime , to prevent succession disputes. The first such coronation was in favor of Robert II , in This principle was strengthened in , when Henry , the eldest surviving son of Robert II , was crowned despite the protests of his mother, Constance of Arles , and younger brother, Robert. This issue was not raised until , as the Capetian kings did not lack sons to succeed them for the preceding three centuries. This was invoked by Philip V of France to exclude his niece, Joan , daughter of his elder brother. Continuity of the Crown or immediacy of the Crown: Philip III , who was in Tunis when his father died, was the first to date his reign from the death of his predecessor , instead of his own coronation. Orders made under Charles VI , in and , anxious to avoid any interregnum, declared that the heir to the throne should be considered King after the death of his predecessor. But even after these decisions, Joan of Arc persisted in the old position by calling Charles VII, whose father died in , the "Dauphin" until his coronation at Reims in Inalienability of the Crown or unavailability of the Crown: He cannot appoint his successor, renounce the crown, or abdicate. This principle arose circa , in anticipation of the Treaty of Troyes , which sought to exclude the Dauphin Charles from the succession. The succession can no longer be regulated by the king, and would rely only on the force of custom. Since the baptism of Clovis, the kings of France were Catholic. The Protestantism of Henry of Navarre led to a civil war wherein the king had to reestablish his legitimacy. It is clear that the constitution of the fundamental laws is empirical: It also appears that the role of parliaments is essential in these various clarifications, the fourteenth to the eighteenth century or the nineteenth century if we add the episodes from the history of the French Capetian dynasty in , , and The throne of the Valois[edit] Main article: It is noteworthy that, although the Valois dynasty reigned in France since , the dispute related to this succession cannot be extinguished until The problem of the succession of Navarre was set more than a hundred years later, as the heir to the throne who was to inherit the crown of France in Note, however, the period of the years when, according to the Treaty of Troyes , the kings of England, and of Great Britain and the United Kingdom are considered legitimate heirs because of a legal act. The Valois succession[edit] Further information: The legal basis of this outcome is a corollary to the masculinity principle established in Women do not have a right to the throne; hence, no right of succession can be derived from them Nemo dat quod non habet. Edward III had to give in, and for nine years the matter seemed resolved. In doing this, he was only following the actions of his Capetian predecessors, who took over most of the Plantagenet inheritance in this manner. The treaty was ratified by the Estates General the next year, after Henry entered Paris. The Treaty of Troyes threw the French in an uncomfortably humiliating position. To accept its terms meant that a defeated King of France could be

coerced to hand over his kingdom to the enemy. To counter this act, the French developed the principle of the inalienability of the crown. The succession is to be governed by the force of custom alone, rather than by the will of any person or body. From that moment the succession to the French throne was firmly entrenched in the Capetian lineage. As long as it continued to exist, the Estates cannot elect a new king. Charles VII of France directly succeeded his father, not his nephew. Curiously, the French kings never asked the English monarchs to drop their nominal claim to France, which they persistently retained until the Bourbon succession[edit] Main articles: The laws of succession designated the head of the next branch of the Capetian family as heir presumptive. Normally this would not have been controversial; but the 16th century was a period of religious discord in France, and Henry of Navarre was the chief of the Protestant party. For the Catholics, France is the eldest daughter of the Church; the anointing of the king implied that he must belong to the Catholic faith. Ultra-Catholics rejected Henry of Navarre as a relapsed heretic; they would not accept him even if he converted again. Moderate Catholics supported Navarre, provided that he would convert. He was the legitimate successor designated by the Salic law, but his authority was rejected by most of Catholic France. But despite their similar names, the French Parlement is not an equivalent of the British Parliament, which had the power to choose the king and regulate the succession. The French Parlement is a court of justice, not a sovereign legislative body. Events favored the cause of Henry IV. He won brilliant victories at Arques and Ivry. In 1610, the Cardinal de Bourbon died. The remaining Bourbons supported the claim of their chief. The Catholic League were left without a plausible successor to the throne. Henry converted to Catholicism in 1610, and was anointed at Chartres the next year. The proclamation of Charles, Cardinal de Bourbon, as King Charles X, went against the principle of primogeniture, and was therefore void. By the principle of continuity of the crown, the reign of Henry IV is dated from 1610, immediately after the death of his predecessor, and not from 1614, when he was crowned, or in 1626, when he became a Catholic. Contrary to the interpretation of the League, the late conversion of the "relapsed heretic" Henry IV was not enough to exclude him from the succession. Masculinity could be fulfilled by any male; Male collaterality could only be fulfilled by an agnate of the royal line; Primogeniture could only be fulfilled by one person, the head of the royal line; Inalienability meant that no member of the royal line can be deprived of his position, since it would break the order of primogeniture; Catholicity can be fulfilled by any Catholic. Hence, at any point in time only one person has the potential of fulfilling all the conditions of French kingship – the chief of the Capetian dynasty. His non-fulfillment of the only remaining condition, Catholicism, will not necessarily exclude him, such being contrary to the inalienability principle. By not being a Catholic, what he actually does is to delay the full acquisition of his royal powers, which would be exercised by other persons, as happened during the Protestantism of Henry IV. France returned to republicanism briefly before the Bonapartes again took power and proclaimed an empire under Napoleon III until 1870. Most followed Orleans, but a few turned to the Spanish branch. Their arguments, now purely academic, rests on the interpretation of the fundamental laws and the renunciations in the Treaty of Utrecht. Kingship is indivisible and delegated hereditarily to the race on the throne, from male to male, by order of primogeniture, to the perpetual exclusion of women and their descendants. Followed by a parenthesis: Nothing is prejudged on the effect of renunciations in the race on the throne. The last statement was inserted in September 1713, during the development of the 19 original articles, following heated debates on the meaning and value of the renunciations of Philip V of Spain in Utrecht. Catholics reject him because he is Protestant, and they believe the coronation of the Kings of France makes Catholicism intrinsic to the French monarchy. Many, however, are willing to accept him provided he converted to Catholicism. But this requirement does not appear yet in the fundamental laws. Other competitors for the throne of France are certainly Catholics but descendants of kings by women: Yet inheritance by agnatic primogeniture and male collaterality are among the fundamental laws of the French succession. The question then, is whether the principle of masculinity must be subordinated to the principle of Catholicity estimated to have been previously implied by the fundamental laws as intrinsic to the French monarchy or the reverse, with masculinity fundamental and Catholicity optional. The Infanta of Spain, Isabella Clara Eugenia is best placed in the contest to the throne of France as many members of the ultra-Catholic League seemed willing to accept her as long she married a French prince. Favoring the conversion of Henry of Navarre to Catholicism, an act

that would solve everything, the Duke of Mayenne convened the Parliament to decide the issue when on May 17, Henry of Navarre announced his intention to convert. Ordered that no treaty is to be passed to transfer the crown to foreign princes Recall that the fundamental laws must be observed to declare a Catholic and French king Remember that religion should not be an excuse to transfer the crown to foreign hands in a manner contrary to the fundamental laws Remember that although the relief of the people must be sought because it is in a state of extreme necessity, treaties for the establishment of foreign princes would be null and void if they are made to the prejudice of the Salic law and other fundamental laws. The decision betrays a visceral attachment to the fundamental laws and a concern no less keen to keep Catholicism and have a French sovereign. The third point notes that these three principles should not oppose each other but must be harmoniously applied to declare a Catholic and French king. This is an address pointing directly to Catholic applicants to the French crown, which were a woman Isabella Clara Eugenia, daughter of the King of Spain and male descendants of the kings of France, but by the distaff line: The parliament then expressed its concern that these fundamental laws, heredity, primogeniture, male collaterality, inalienability of the crown combine with Catholicism and the French character to declare a king "declare" and not "designate"; for the Parliament has no sovereignty, it can only declare that the king is legitimate based on the laws of the kingdom. Philip II had agreed to have his daughter married to the Duke of Guise if he could be raised to the throne of France. In addition, his French possessions were more important than his Navarrese possessions, the kingdom of Navarre being divided into two parts by the Pyrenees since For Orleanists, the only thing that needs to be examined is the French quality of the successor, not the fact that he owns property outside of the realm, which is separate. Legitimists argue, that the interpretation of "French" and "foreign" is anachronistic; a "French" prince meant a prince of the royal house of France, in contrast to a "foreign" prince , such as the House of Lorraine to which Guise and Mayenne belonged. Had it referred to nationality, rather than dynasty, then it would have been meaningless, for the Guise were Frenchmen and there was no prince of the blood who was not a Frenchman. The only question is the correct interpretation of "French" and "foreign" – whether it referred to the dynasty or the nationality. The election of Hugh Capet meant that a national monarchy had replaced the dynastic monarchy of the Carolingians. They say that when Adalberon, Archbishop of Reims , anointed Hugh Capet, he declared "the kingdom of France can not be governed in Aachen. In , they rejected the King of England, of the illustrious House of Plantagenet , in favor of a French count, the first of the Valois. For Orleanists, the Royal House of France is not international. The Head of the House of France is not the eldest of the Bourbons of the world, but the eldest of the national dynasty, which had been in France since the death of the Count of Chambord in , the Bourbon House of Orleans. The nationality of the prince is the guarantor of the independence of the Crown, the strength and pride of France in Europe, that the French throne was never occupied by a foreigner, unlike most of the other monarchies and principalities of Europe. The blood right in this instance overcame the law of aubain by which foreign-born heirs forfeited their rights of succession; that is to say, being "capable of the crown" was a unique kind of birthright which transcended all usual legal regulations. Similar letters were issued for Philip, Duke of Anjou , when he was about to assume the crown of Spain

Chapter 6 : The Influence of U.S. Corporations on Local Mores | Globalization

middle portions of the United States. Mid 18²s, a new territorial dispute came up between England and France ultimately England gained control over much of North America after the French and Indian War (Norton,).

Chapter 7 : France grounds Ryanair plane with on board over long-running subsidies dispute

That is what NPOV requires, at the least -- since far more sources treat the Orleanist rather than the Legitimist Head of House as the relevant candidate for the French throne in the event of restoration, and have done so since

Chapter 8 : Talk:French dynastic disputes - Wikipedia

Approximately two-thirds of Monaco's 30, jobs are filled by workers from neighbouring French and Italian towns. Resident diplomatic missions. France has an embassy in Monte Carlo.

Chapter 9 : George Washington Remembers: Reflections on the French and Indian War

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