

# DOWNLOAD PDF 9 PREVENTING CATASTROPHIC TERRORISM: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION,

## Chapter 1 : The International Luxembourg Forum on preventing nuclear catastrophe

*37 PREPARE TO PREVENT OR RESPOND TO CATASTROPHIC TERRORIST ATTACKS A terrorist attack in the United States using a biological agent, deadly chemicals, or nuclear or radiological material, even if only partially suc-*

The national debate continues. Countering terrorism has become, beyond any doubt, the top national security priority for the United States. This shift has occurred with the full support of the Congress, both major political parties, the media, and the American people. The nation has committed enormous resources to national security and to countering terrorism. The United States has not experienced such a rapid surge in national security spending since the Korean War. The United States faces a sudden crisis and summons a tremendous exertion of national energy. Then, as that surge transforms the landscape, comes a time for reflection and reevaluation. Some programs and even agencies are discarded; others are invented or redesigned. Private firms and engaged citizens redefine their relationships with government, working through the processes of the American republic. Now is the time for that reflection and reevaluation. The United States should consider what to do—the shape and objectives of a strategy. Americans should also consider how to do it—organizing their government in a different way. From terrorism to global disease or environmental degradation, the challenges have become transnational rather than international. That is the defining quality of world politics in the twenty-first century. National security used to be considered by studying foreign frontiers, weighing opposing groups of states, and measuring industrial might. To be dangerous, an enemy had to muster large armies. Threats emerged slowly, often visibly, as weapons were forged, armies conscripted, and units trained and moved into place. Because large states were more powerful, they also had more to lose. They could be deterred. Now threats can emerge quickly. An organization like al Qaeda, headquartered in a country on the other side of the earth, in a region so poor that electricity or telephones were scarce, could nonetheless scheme to wield weapons of unprecedented destructive power in the largest cities of the United States. But the enemy is not just "terrorism," some generic evil. The catastrophic threat at this moment in history is more specific. It is the threat posed by Islamist terrorism—especially the al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology. That stream is motivated by religion and does not distinguish politics from religion, thus distorting both. It is further fed by grievances stressed by Bin Ladin and widely felt throughout the Muslim world—against the U. Bin Ladin and Islamist terrorists mean exactly what they say: It is not a position with which Americans can bargain or negotiate. With it there is no common ground—not even respect for life—on which to begin a dialogue. It can only be destroyed or utterly isolated. It has attracted active support from thousands of disaffected young Muslims and resonates powerfully with a far larger number who do not actively support his methods. The resentment of America and the West is deep, even among leaders of relatively successful Muslim states. The United States must support such developments. But this process is likely to be measured in decades, not years. It is a process that will be violently opposed by Islamist terrorist organizations, both inside Muslim countries and in attacks on the United States and other Western nations. The United States finds itself caught up in a clash within a civilization. That clash arises from particular conditions in the Muslim world, conditions that spill over into expatriate Muslim communities in non-Muslim countries. Our enemy is twofold: The first enemy is weakened, but continues to pose a grave threat. The second enemy is gathering, and will menace Americans and American interests long after Usama Bin Ladin and his cohorts are killed or captured. Thus our strategy must match our means to two ends: Islam is not the enemy. It is not synonymous with terror. Nor does Islam teach terror. America and its friends oppose a perversion of Islam, not the great world faith itself. Lives guided by religious faith, including literal beliefs in holy scriptures, are common to every religion, and represent no threat to us. Other religions have experienced violent internal struggles. With so many diverse adherents, every major religion will spawn violent zealots. Yet understanding and tolerance among people of different faiths can and must prevail. The present transnational danger is Islamist terrorism. What is needed is a broad political-military strategy that rests on a

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firm tripod of policies to attack terrorists and their organizations; prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism; and protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks. More Than a War on Terrorism Terrorism is a tactic used by individuals and organizations to kill and destroy. Our efforts should be directed at those individuals and organizations. Calling this struggle a war accurately describes the use of American and allied armed forces to find and destroy terrorist groups and their allies in the field, notably in Afghanistan. The language of war also evokes the mobilization for a national effort. Yet the strategy should be balanced. But long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power: If we favor one tool while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort. Certainly the strategy should include offensive operations to counter terrorism. Terrorists should no longer find safe haven where their organizations can grow and flourish. Our effort should be accompanied by a preventive strategy that is as much, or more, political as it is military. The strategy must focus clearly on the Arab and Muslim world, in all its variety. Our strategy should also include defenses. America can be attacked in many ways and has many vulnerabilities. No defenses are perfect. But risks must be calculated; hard choices must be made about allocating resources. Planning does make a difference, identifying where a little money might have a large effect. Defenses also complicate the plans of attackers, increasing their risks of discovery and failure. Finally, the nation must prepare to deal with attacks that are not stopped. Measuring Success What should Americans expect from their government in the struggle against Islamist terrorism? The goals seem unlimited: Defeat terrorism anywhere in the world. But Americans have also been told to expect the worst: An attack is probably coming; it may be terrible. With such benchmarks, the justifications for action and spending seem limitless. Yet effective public policies also need concrete objectives. Agencies need to be able to measure success. These measurements do not need to be quantitative: But the targets should be specific enough so that reasonable observers-in the White House, the Congress, the media, or the general public-can judge whether or not the objectives have been attained. Vague goals match an amorphous picture of the enemy. Al Qaeda and its affiliates are popularly described as being all over the world, adaptable, resilient, needing little higher-level organization, and capable of anything. The American people are thus given the picture of an omnipotent, unslayable hydra of destruction. This image lowers expectations for government effectiveness. It should not lower them too far. Our report shows a determined and capable group of plotters. Yet the group was fragile, dependent on a few key personalities, and occasionally left vulnerable by the marginal, unstable people often attracted to such causes. We do not believe it is possible to defeat all terrorist attacks against Americans, every time and everywhere. A president should tell the American people: History has shown that even the most vigilant and expert agencies cannot always prevent determined, suicidal attackers from reaching a target. But the American people are entitled to expect their government to do its very best. They should expect that officials will have realistic objectives, clear guidance, and effective organization. They are entitled to see some standards for performance so they can judge, with the help of their elected representatives, whether the objectives are being met. But to catch terrorists, a U. Bombings like those in Bali in or Madrid in , while able to take hundreds of lives, can be mounted locally. Their requirements are far more modest in size and complexity. They are more difficult to thwart. A complex international terrorist operation aimed at launching a catastrophic attack cannot be mounted by just anyone in any place. Such operations appear to require time, space, and ability to perform competent planning and staff work; a command structure able to make necessary decisions and possessing the authority and contacts to assemble needed people, money, and materials; opportunity and space to recruit, train, and select operatives with the needed skills and dedication, providing the time and structure required to socialize them into the terrorist cause, judge their trustworthiness, and hone their skills; a logistics network able to securely manage the travel of operatives, move money, and transport resources like explosives where they need to go; access, in the case of certain weapons, to the special materials needed for a nuclear, chemical, radiological, or biological attack; reliable communications between coordinators and operatives; and o opportunity to test the workability of the plan. The organization cemented personal ties among veteran jihadists working together there for years.

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### Chapter 2 : Partnership for a Secure America - Wikipedia

*at least three measures are needed to prevent and deter catastrophic terrorism: an international legal initiative outlawing the development or possession of weapons of mass destruction, a National Information Assurance Institute, and stronger federal support for strategic risk analysis.*

Nicholas Grono In the difficult fight against the new menace of international terrorism, there is nothing more crucial than timely and accurate intelligence. With this new comprehension has come the realization that significantly improved collection and use of intelligence will be required to prevent catastrophic terrorist attacks in the future. Accordingly, in the United States, the role of the intelligence community has been scrutinized like never before. US intelligence agencies have received increased resources and powers, and important modifications have been made to the rules governing intelligence collection and dissemination. In Australia, equally significant changes have taken place. After September 11, the Australian government further strengthened its intelligence capabilities through legislative and funding adjustments. If many Australians thought that their relative isolation distanced them from the immediate threat of large-scale terrorism, any such complacency was shattered by the Bali bombings on 12 October , which claimed the lives of 89 Australian citizens. It also collects foreign intelligence within Australia. This structure of separate domestic intelligence collection and law enforcement agencies is one of the more significant differences between the US and Australian approaches, and will be considered further below. ASIS collects foreign intelligence, relying primarily on human resources to obtain information. It produces and disseminates intelligence reports to key government decisionmakers. It also reports to the Minister for Defence. Australia has two intelligence assessment agencies. One is the Office of National Assessments ONA , which is responsible for producing analytical assessments of international developments. In doing so, it draws on secret intelligence collected by other agencies, as well as diplomatic reporting and open source material. Instead, the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency carry out assessments of intelligence in addition to their collection roles. In Washington, the National Intelligence Council is also responsible for mid-term and long-term strategic thinking and analysis. Australia does not have a formally appointed head of its intelligence community. Policy Framework Each Australian intelligence agency reports to its respective minister. Ministers are responsible for policy proposals relevant to their agency. The Attorney General has general portfolio responsibility for domestic national security policy. Coordination of intelligence policy across the government takes place through two mechanisms: The NSC is the senior policymaking body in the Australian government on national security matters. It comprises the senior federal ministers with national security responsibilities: Official documents specify that: The NSC [shall] also consider policy issues in relation to: In Australia, secretaries of departments are generally career bureaucrats, and not political appointees. With respect to intelligence matters, its terms of reference are: To provide coordinated advice to the NSC on the activities of departments and agencies in connection with intelligence and domestic security matters, including: Security for the Olympic Games The security operation for the Sydney Olympic Games was the largest ever to take place in Australia. The Australian government and the intelligence community were acutely conscious that, in the words of the Attorney General, "these events could provide an international stage on which some groups could seek to advance their cause through acts of violence. The intelligence effort in the lead up to the Olympics demonstrated the importance of cooperation with intelligence agencies worldwide. Overseas agencies also shared basic data on known terrorists. The ASIO Amendment Act, passed in November , authorized, for the first time, the use of tracking devices under warrant and remote access to computers. Additional powers were granted in Under the Telecommunications Interception Legislation Amendment Act, intelligence agencies gained the power to obtain named-person warrants. These warrants differ from traditional interception warrants in that they do not apply to a specific telephone number or service, but instead allow the agency to intercept any telecommunications service used by the person named in

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the warrant--the typical situation being where an individual uses multiple mobile phones to avoid interception. The legislation also introduced a new kind of warrant known as a foreign intelligence warrant. This warrant provides broad powers to intercept "communications that are being made to or from any telecommunications service that a person or foreign organization is using, or is likely to use, for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence," subject to certain restrictions. Post-September 11 Threat Environment The September 11 attacks in New York and Washington were acts of terrorism on a scale the world had not previously experienced. They fundamentally changed the way terrorism is perceived by the United States and its allies and underscored the critical necessity of significantly improving the collection and use of intelligence. We have operated for many years in the very-low to low zone of the threat spectrum, with levels occasionally broaching medium level. Our normal operating level is now low-to-medium, with threat levels occasionally reaching high. We now have a sustained, high-level level of threat to the US, the UK and the Israeli interests in Australia and a higher level of threat to some other diplomatic missions and government visitors. The threat from chemical, biological and radiological terrorist attacks has been raised from low to medium. Likewise, the threat to aviation interests has been raised from low to medium. Also, attention is now paid to threats to national symbols and infrastructure. Since September 11 the threat to Australian interests abroad has also increased. In early November a grenade was thrown into the grounds of the Australian International School in Jakarta. In December, Singapore authorities uncovered advanced terrorist planning for an attack against largely US interests. The planning also included the Australian High Commission in Singapore. Not all the latter are in US military custody. The Unit has access to the databases of all relevant agencies, and is designed to ensure the effective sharing and coordination of intelligence information across agencies. A number of those were of relevance to the collection and use of intelligence. The federal criminal code was amended to include a new offense of terrorism and offenses relating to membership and other specified links with a terrorist organization. The Telecommunications Interception Act was adjusted so that offenses involving terrorism now fall within the most serious class of offenses for which interception warrants are available. Because of potential jurisdictional ambiguities in terrorist situations, the federal government reached an agreement with state governments that federal authorities would have lead responsibility for "national terrorist situations. Important new legislation, the Intelligence Services Act, was passed in late September This legislation placed ASIS, which had existed under executive orders, on a statutory basis for the first time. The act specifically proscribed paramilitary activities or activities involving personal violence or the use of weapons in connection with the planning and conduct of all the functions of ASIS. The bill proposed that ASIO be given the power to obtain warrants to detain and question persons aged 14 or over for a period of up to 48 hours--extendable for up to seven days--for the purposes of investigating terrorism offenses. Questioning would take place before specified current or retired judges or legally qualified members of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. People detained under this power would not necessarily have to be suspected of having committed any offense--the possibility of possessing information about terrorism offenses would be sufficient. There would be no right to silence and, in exceptional circumstances, detainees could be denied access to a lawyer for the first 48 hours of detention. Warrants would be approved by the Attorney General and a federal magistrate or a judge. This bill was strongly opposed in parliament--opposition members and minor parties combined in the senate to block its passage throughout The government rejected the proposed amendments. A compromise was finally reached, and the bill became law in June The minimum age for potential detainees was changed to 16, detainees were given the right to have a lawyer present as soon as questioning began, and limitations were imposed on the length of time a person could be questioned--no more than eight hours at a time, for a total of 24 hours over seven days. In early November , Indonesian police detained a suspected member of the Islamic fundamentalist Jemaah Islamiyah in connection with the bombings. On 9 November, the Indonesian Defense Minister stated: But the alleged mastermind of the Bali bombings, Riduan Isamuddin, alias Hambali, remains at large. One person was arrested as a result of the raids and charged with planning to blow up the Israeli Embassy in Australia. In the broadcast, bin Laden states: But it ignored this warning until it

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woke up to the sounds of explosions in Bali. Its government subsequently pretended, falsely, that its citizens were not targeted. ASIO received additional funding immediately after the bombings, and further funding was provided in the budget, handed down in May. In a key provision, the legislation strengthened protections for intelligence sources, providing the same protection to information from non-Australian intelligence agencies as that provided to Australian-sourced information. This provision was enacted to reassure intelligence partners that classified information provided to Australian counterparts would be properly guarded. Australia has also signed memorandums of understanding on counter-terrorism with Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand. The agreements promote increased bilateral co-operation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies and defense officials of Australia and the signatory countries. This is just the beginning. You will not find any American, British, or Australian soldiers desecrating our land. Shortly after the commencement of the war, the Prime Minister stated: A key element of our close friendship with the United States and indeed with the British is our full and intimate sharing of intelligence material. In the difficult fight against the new menace of international terrorism there is nothing more crucial than timely and accurate intelligence. This is a priceless component of our relationship with our two very close allies. There is nothing comparable to be found in any other relationship--nothing more relevant indeed to the challenges of the contemporary world. I know that some people are saying that what we have done makes it more likely that terrorists will attack Australia. Australia has been a terrorist target at least since the 11th of September. Australia is a western country with Western values. Nothing will or should change that. That is why we are a target. Remember that bin Laden specifically targeted Australia because of our intervention to save the people of East Timor. That will never be the Australian way. We believe that so far from our action in Iraq increasing the terrorist threat it will, by stopping the spread of chemical and biological weapons, make it less likely that a devastating terrorist attack will be carried out against Australia. As a consequence, it is not surprising that the intelligence responses to terrorism by the two countries bear many similarities. Each country has reacted to the threat of catastrophic terrorist attacks by significantly enhancing intelligence collection capabilities. Each has allocated additional resources to intelligence agencies, strengthened powers, and legislated harsher penalties for terrorism.