

### Chapter 1 : Polarity (international relations) - Wikipedia

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Published on February 5th, 3 A Unipolar World: Lundestad and Tor G. Jakobsen In the Berlin Wall fell, the first of a series of events bringing the period known as the Cold War to an end. From a state of military multipolarity, the world had progressed to one of bipolarity, to the current situation of unipolarity. It is difficult to see whether or not the world has become more secure following the end of the Cold War. In , Kenneth Waltz presented his hypothesis stating that the world is more stable if dominated by fewer numbers of great powers. His argument was that alliances become more diffuse in a multipolar world than in a bipolar world. In the multipolar era of world history six states competed for influence and the distribution of power was changing constantly. The Cold War period was stable because domination was shared between two superpowers. Much has changed during the years since Waltz presented his hypothesis. A Period of Multipolarity – A system of multipolarity increases rivalry in world politics, the reason being that many states of similar strength compete for power and influence. Also, the power balance in this type of system is changing constantly, as a result of changing alliances. The Hellenistic World Multipolarity denotes the fundamental power structure in an international system dominated by several large powers, and is characterized by antagonism between these. What we know as the classical era of power balance came as a result of planned big power politics. The Napoleonic Wars had led the great powers desiring to prevent similar events taking place in the future. After the defeat of France, the Congress of Vienna determined that five states should dominate world politics together, namely Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, France, and Austria-Hungary. This power-sharing functioned well for 40 years, until other powers came into play and try to dominate politics. The instability of this system became manifest during the Crimean War –’56 when Russia invaded the Ottoman Empire and Britain and France joined forces to counter the Russians. Yet, the hardest blow to peace came with German power ambitions which ended in the First World War. This marked the end of Austria-Hungary. This became the end of the European golden age. The end of multipolarity meant that a new challenger was to enter world power politics. Together with the Soviet Union, the United States was to dominate the global arena for the next half century. A Period of Bipolarity –’89 Bipolarity is used to denote the basic structure in the international system when it is dominated by two superpowers. This means that other states must ally themselves with one of the two major powers, which again limits their room to maneuver and thus result in more stable international politics. Athens versus Sparta The Cold War is considered as a relatively peaceful period of history, taking into account the absence of wars between the major powers. The bipolar balance of power was also a superpower rivalry between the East and the West, where fear and suspicion characterized the relationship between the two major powers, and confrontation although not direct war between the two was commonplace. The superpowers supported different sides in conflicts during the Cold War, especially in Africa and Asia which often were the battlegrounds for rivalry between the two blocks. The total number of armed conflicts in this period was The Cold War ended after the Soviet economy had stagnated following their participation in the arms race with the USA, and also as a result of declining oil prices in the s. A later attempt to introduce a market economy failed, the power of the communist party was undermined, East European countries declared independence, the Warsaw Pact dissolved, and finally the world saw the fall of the Berlin Wall in When the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned in it marked the end of the bipolar era in world politics. A Unipolar Future –present Unipolarity is used to describe the power structure when one superpower dominates alone. West conflict, at least not the way it had been earlier in the 20th century. The Roman Empire The United States surfaced as the sole dominating power in world politics as there were no real challengers to their hegemonic position. This allowed greater room for the superpower to maneuver and to get involved in international issues that not necessarily coincided with national interest. We can describe this new political situation as being unipolar. Has the world become less stable following the end of the Cold War? According to structural realists unipolarity is unstable because it is

progressing toward multipolarity, as other powers will seek to break the hegemony of the superpower. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau so eloquently put it: The USA has as an example, tried to clinch hegemonic power by keeping , troops stationed in Asia and Europe. By guaranteeing the safety of its allies, the USA has subdued the need for security for other states. This has prevented these states from participating in an arms race. In the longer term this will decrease U. At present time no state seems able to challenge the USA militarily. One of the reasons is that the USA is in a geographically advantageous situation compared to other countries. Relevant challengers like China, Japan, India, and Russia hold less favorable strategic positions as they are amidst more multipolar regions. Yet, we also agree with Waltz that the USA will become weakened over time due to its over-commitment. Unless something unexpected happens, the unipolar balance of power could have a long lifetime. Conclusion A whole range of conflicts erupted in the years following the end of the Cold War. Even so, in sum there has been a strong decline in the number of armed conflicts since The problem of terrorism has not been easy to solve for the USA. Serious terror attacks are the only form of armed conflicts that have increased in numbers. It is difficult to draw any real conclusions as to whether or not the world has become more stable after The multipolar system was less stable than the bipolar, and resulted in two world wars. The bipolar era meant more stable international politics due to the dominance of the USA and the Soviet Union. The total number of armed conflicts has decreased, despite the increase in number of terror attacks. However, it can be argued that the world could again become militarily multipolar, with China and Russia as possible challengers to U. Theory of International Politics.

**Chapter 2 : A Multipolar Peace?: Great Power Politics In The Twenty First Century by Charles W. Kegley J**

*The book is valuable to anyone that studies international relations and the different theories on how nation-states behave. It is easy to see that a lot of work went into the book from a research standpoint and as a reference source this book is an excellent resource.*

Unipolarity[ edit ] Unipolarity in international politics is a distribution of power in which one state exercises most of the cultural, economic, and military influence. Monteiro, assistant professor of political science at Yale University , argues that three features are endemic to unipolar systems: Anarchy results from the incomplete power preponderance of the unipole. The power projection limitations of the unipole is a distinguishing characteristic between unipolar and hegemonic systems. Unipolar systems possess only one great power and face no competition. If a competitor emerges, the international system is no longer unipolar. This idea is based on hegemonic stability theory and the rejection of the balance of power theory. The clearer and larger the concentration of power in the leading state, the more peaceful the international order associated with it will be. Monteiro argues that international relations theorists have long debated the durability of unipolarity i. Rather than comparing the relative peacefulness of unipolarity, multipolarity, and bipolarity, he identifies causal pathways to war that are endemic to a unipolar system. He does not question the impossibility of great power war in a unipolar world, which is a central tenet of William C. Wohlforth in his book *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy*. Put another way, the first two decades of unipolarity, which make up less than 10 percent of U. Paradoxically, the Father of the German nationalism and convinced adherent of the balance of power, he appears to be the path-breaker. Back in , Fichte wrote *Characteristics of the Present Age*. It was the year of the battle at Jena when Napoleon overwhelmed Prussia. The challenge of Napoleon revealed to him the precarious nature of the balance of power and a much deeper and dominant historical trend: There is necessary tendency in every cultivated State to extend itself generally Such is the case in Ancient History â€¦ As the States become stronger in themselves and cast off that [Papal] foreign power, the tendency towards a Universal Monarchy over the whole Christian World necessarily comes to lightâ€¦ This tendency Whether clearly or notâ€¦it may be obscurelyâ€¦yet has this tendency lain at the root of the undertakings of many States in Modern Times Although no individual Epoch may have contemplated this purpose, yet is this the spirit which runs through all these individual Epochs, and invisibly urges them onward. In , Gladstone wrote: While we have been advancing with portentous rapidity, America is passing us by as if a canter. Finally, the present Powers of the world were formed. This process [of coalescing and forming fewer, larger units] has all taken place among the 10, countries over several thousand years. The progression from dispersion to union among men, and the principle [whereby] the world is [gradually] proceeding from being partitioned off to being opened up, is a spontaneous [working] of the Way of Heaven or Nature and human affairs. This will hasten the world along the road to One World. He knew how in his civilization it emerged and several times reemerged. Naturally, his theory is very realist, deep, and developed relatively to his Western contemporaries convinced in the universality of the balance of power or, at most, having abstract ideas of the "Parliament of men, the Federation of the world. *Son Role Social* published in Similarly to de Tocqueville, he guessed the Cold War contenders correctly but he went one step further. He estimated the chances of the United States as favorite in the final confrontation: The latterâ€¦ is the true adversary of Russia in the great struggle to comeâ€¦ I also believe that the United States is appealed to triumph. Otherwise, the universe would be Russian. Wells and William Thomas Stead were borne out. The United States is the only country in the early 21st century that possesses the ability to project military power on a global scale, providing its full command of the global commons. With no viable challenger on the horizon in the short term, the current distribution of power overwhelmingly favors the United States, making the world order it set out to construct in more robust. Two, he stated Within twelve years, unipolarity emerged. War is rooted in the anarchic structure, or a self-help environment, of the international system, Waltz argues. Simply changing the domestic political structure of countries will not eliminate war, Waltz notes. The second challenge to realist theory argues that economic interdependence promotes peace. Waltz believes this

causal logic is backward: Peace can promote economic interdependence. Peace abounds when a political monopoly on force, or a favorable balance of power, prevents revisionist powers from altering the status quo. After all, Waltz argues, strong economic interdependence did not prevent war in The third challenge that Waltz confronts is the rise of international institutions as primary actors in international politics. Waltz argues that the structure of power in the international system determines the role of institutions. NATO , for example, is often cited as an institution that has outlived its original mandateâ€”preventing a Soviet onslaught of Western Europe. With no great power to check its adventurism, the United States will weaken itself by misusing its power internationally. In conclusion, the U. An Unbalanced Future Our discipline has tarried too long in the wreckage of history, spent too long trying to recover something familiar from the ruins We must complete the realist theory, integrating an understanding of unipolarity into our knowledge of multipolarity and bipolarity. Realists expect states to balance against rising powers, which would prevent a unipolar distribution of power from developing. To states with a proud past as an international actor, unipolarity seems intolerableâ€¦ To those who wish to teach history and international relations, unipolarity seems Fukuyamish. In particular, some have advanced the concept of soft balancing â€”balancing that does not balance at all. In his view, realist predictions of power balancing did not bear fruit because the United States engaged in strategic restraint after World War II, thereby convincing weaker states that it was more interested in cooperation rather than domination. The liberal basis of U. The Military Foundation of U. A key to U. Posen believes that the Bush Doctrine was problematic because it not only created unease among U. Bipolarity[ edit ] This section possibly contains original research. Please improve it by verifying the claims made and adding inline citations. Statements consisting only of original research should be removed. September Learn how and when to remove this template message Bipolarity is a distribution of power in which two states have the majority of economic, military, and cultural influence internationally or regionally. After this, the two powers will normally maneuver for the support of the unclaimed areas. Which in the case of the Cold War means Africa, etc. The " First World ": NATO members dark blue and their " Western " allies light blue.

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Additional Information In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Friedberg I R e c e n t rhetoric notwithstanding , the dominant trend in world politics today is toward regionalization rather than globalization, toward fragmentation rather than unification. The weakening of the liberal economic order and the apparent emergence of embryonic trading blocs is only one indication of this larger tendency. The acceleration of technological progress and the intensification of international economic competition among the most advanced states are rendering large portions of the less developed "periphery" even more peripheral and isolated than they have been in the past. With the end of the Cold War, conflicts in areas where outside powers might once have felt their vital interests to be engaged are now left to proceed uninterrupted. In strategic terms, bipolarity is giving way, not to unipolarity with the United States bestriding the world like a colossus nor yet to simple multipolarity with a group of roughly equal, globally engaged "great powers" , but to a set of regional subsystems in which clusters of contiguous states interact mainly with one another. This is nothing new. Despite advances in weapons and communications technology, most states have historically been concerned primarily with the capabilities and intentions of their neighbors. Those that could afford to worry about far-flung enemies and to inject themselves into distant conflicts have been the exception rather than the rule. With the end of the superpower rivalry, the collapse of the Soviet empire and, as seems likely, a substantial retraction of American power, these more traditional patterns of strategic interaction always present, even during the Cold War will again become dominant. One recent study concludes similarly that "regional multipolar processes are likely to become a more and more important feature of international politics. For another analysis that also foresees a movement toward regionalization see Joseph A. In this new and more fragmented world, the United States will still be the single richest and strongest nation although the size of its economic and military leads will diminish as others grow faster and as the United States reduces its armed forces , but it will be less inclined to project its power into every corner of the globe. Meanwhile, other nations will become more capable of acting independently in pursuit of their own interests and, whether out of ambition or necessity, more inclined to do so. What are the likely implications of these developments and, in particular, what will they mean for the chances of war and peace? In western academic circles, and especially among American experts on issues of international security, discussion of the impending return to regional multipolarity has thus far centered almost exclusively on Europe. Here, predictably enough, adherents of the two main contending schools of international relations theory come to strikingly different conclusions about what the future will hold. Neo-realists believe, first, that the structure of an international system i. The end of the Cold War, in their view, means a return to multipolarity and therefore the beginning of a new era of conflict among the major European powers. You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

### Chapter 4 : Multipolar World

*The authors try to understand what international relations would look like in a future world of multipolarity, that is, a relatively equal division of power among several large states (or power blocs like the European Community). Evaluating earlier historical periods of multipolarity, they consider.*

Towards the end of the George W. Thinking and Rethinking on Unipolarity, Bipolarity, Multipolarity, Today, world opinion is essentially unanimous about the end of unipolar or bipolar ideology of the Neo-conservative spectrum. Multi-polarity appears to many as the obvious alternative to both. But before mistaking the multi-polar alternative for a scientific certainty, it is worthwhile to retrace the thinking and rethinking of an acknowledged pragmatic voice of the Bush Administration about the sequence of changing world-views between and . Not much needs to be said about the passage from unipolar to multi-polar analysis. The interesting aspect is the post-Iraq war, search for realist alternative by the Head of Policy Planning of the State Department of the Bush Administration. Almost inevitably, one might say, the search resulted in finding the classical balance of power prescription of the 18th and 19th centuries applied to the perceived situation of the 21st century. Both realists and idealists in the traditional sense had difficulties suppressing their dismay at how the Neo-conservative rhetoric of a bipolar conflict between democracy and autocracy misled Georgia into military action in South Ossetia in August , inviting massive Russian intervention and certain Georgian defeat. Since the US was unable to come to the rescue of Georgia, the final effect of the bellicose rhetoric was to evidence the powerlessness of its authors. The fundamental problem of multi-polarity is that it only gains attraction as the negation of unipolarity, as resistance to an existing empire or hegemonic state. This was the case with the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the universal claim of the Holy Roman Empire and established the international system of sovereign nation-states that henceforward bore its name. But this says nothing about its suitability as a positive strategy for preserving the peace between states. They used this freedom with gusto, and mostly with the aim to expand their own power, state territory and access to economic resources at the expense of other states in the system or colonies not possessing statehood. Respected realists such as Henry Kissinger and Richard Haass have praised the European pentarchy Great Britain, Russia, France, Prussia and Austria as an exemplary world order, but in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there were no fewer than 52 wars among the five members, not to mention wars with other states or in territories outside Europe not recognized as states. Even after the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, it can make no decisions concerning war or peace without the approval of its member states. Germany will always remain the biggest hurdle , since any German consent for military missions needs prior democratic legitimization by the Bundestag. Beyond polarity This does not mean, however, that a multipolar world order along the lines of a globalized Westphalian system had won the day. For the very nations considered by proponents of realism as the three new Asian power centers are also the driving force behind a renaissance of multilateralism and are pursuing a forward-looking strategy of functional integration in Asia. The North Korean nuclear crisis marked the first time China voted in favor of sanctions in the UN Security Councilâ€”targeting a neighbor that has long been considered its charge. They have drawn their own conclusions from evidence of both the strengths and the weaknesses of the European model. As in Europe, the functional integration of Asia produces such large advantages for one-time warring parties that there is no reasonable cost-benefit relationship to justify wars. Moreover, it is an example that cannot be criticized as an outgrowth of Euro-centrism or an aggressive expansion of western values. Fortunately, cost-benefit analysis can be performed using trans-cultural math. The integration of the Chinese national economy into the world economy, especially the supply chains between Chinese, American and Japanese companies , suggests that the Chinese see no contradiction of such a process to Confucian norms. Russia, which thus far has profited mainly from rich natural resource deposits and is much less integrated into the world economy than China, is already feeling challenged to learn lessons from this example.

**Chapter 5 : Are Nuclear Weapons in a Multipolar World Order a Guarantee for Peace?**

*A multipolar peace? by Kegley, Charles W., , St. Martin's edition, in English.*

In this second article I intend to explain why nuclear-armed powers decrease the likelihood of a nuclear apocalypse, as counterintuitive as it seems. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in , the power that had hitherto counterbalanced the US ceased to exist. The world order changed again, this time becoming unipolar, bringing in its wake 30 years of death and destruction to practically every corner of the globe, particularly to the Middle East, Europe and Asia. For policymakers in Washington, the world was transformed into a battlefield, and the quest for global hegemony was the new unrealistic goal to be achieved. Further chaos was wrought on the globe through the Arab Spring, armed coups and color revolutions. Every means was used to spread the influence of the United States across the globe, from the financial terrorism of bodies like Wall Street and the IMF, to the real terrorism of battalions of neo-Nazi extremists in Ukraine or fanatical Islamists in Syria and Libya. Iran and North Korea have been living under this pressure for decades. Until only recently, Washington did not even recognize any peer competitors. The focus of this analysis therefore concerns the current state of international relations that is passing into a new phase. Rather than focusing on the two Eurasian powers as has been done in the past , attention is brought to the entirely new multipolar world order together with the need to take into account the existence of nuclear weapons. This is a new situation never seen before: In fact, if we look at the world since the introduction of nuclear weapons, we recognize three distinct periods. The first one goes from to ; the second from to ; and the third from to . Undoubtedly the greatest danger existed during the first phase, even if history has managed to hide it well. Fortunately, the Soviet acquisition of its own nuclear weapons took this option away from the United States. The new era before us opens up many risks, with the rivalry between Russia and the United States escalating and with Beijing and Washington at loggerheads in Southeast Asia. But it could also be the beginning of an era of absolute strategic parity. The major point is that we have never seen a similar situation in history, where contending powers have the ability annihilate each other in the space of a few minutes, probably bringing humanity to extinction in the process. Such a destructive scenario is improbable precisely because of its destructiveness. If it is not to be outright excluded as a possibility, then it ought to be considered highly unlikely. The famous One Percent ruling over and controlling much of our lives would have a hard time thriving with five to six billion less human beings on the planet. The prospect of Armageddon cannot be contemplated by countries whose primary objective is survival. Trump, Putin and Xi Jinping must ensure the survival of their societies at any cost, and the use of nuclear weapons against other nuclear powers does not cohere with the natural instinct for survival. Given that national survival is the priority of states, it is easy to see why counterweights to American domination have arisen in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Small countries have seen the need to rely on more powerful countries like Russia and China to help protect them from the playground bully. Recent developments in the Middle East, Europe and Asia have had something to do with the confrontation between Washington and Beijing or Moscow and its regional allies. In Europe, countries that are politically close to Moscow are frowned upon. The tension has continued to build up in recent years, with Moscow and Beijing responding with various countermeasures, especially in the field of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons and anti-ballistic missile systems. The efforts of Beijing and Moscow have been notable in the creation of nuclear systems able to overcome any recent missile-defence systems. Likewise, US nuclear deterrence is being questioned in the recently released US nuclear doctrine. In the experimental field are included such things as the Russian nuclear-powered underwater drone, as well as other systems as yet unknown to the public. This is a military program that Russia, the United States and China have worked hard on, given the importance of advancing technologically with anti-ballistic missile ABM systems. The primary objective of governments is the defence of their country. In a context where other nations are armed with nuclear devices, ABM systems become a priority to impede foreign aggressions with nuclear weapons. Fortunately for the human race, the ability to stop a nuclear attack is not the sole reserve of any one nation, and it will be difficult to change certain balances of power in the short term. Acquiring a fully

functional missile shield as the ABM intend to be is understandably on the bucket lists of Moscow, Beijing and Washington. Contrary to what one would think, it is precisely because ABM systems are unable to stop nuclear strikes that a nuclear war is highly improbable. The multipolar world order exists in an environment that contains nuclear weapons, representing an unprecedented situation for humanity, one that could entail a new balance between powers. The same reason that led NATO not to participate directly in the Ukrainian crisis of also led Washington to be reluctant to arm its Islamist proxies on the ground in Syria with particularly effective weapons like surface-to-air missiles. The reason was to avoid entering into a direct conflict with Moscow in both Ukraine and Syria. The prospect of such a clash raises fears of an escalation that could easily get out of hand and become nuclear. Such a prospect of a clash between powers that could lead to an escalation that is unacceptable highlights what has been discussed thus far. But when nuclear weapons are a factor, uncertainty is replaced with certainty, such that a decapitating strike by Washington on Moscow or Beijing would certainly entail a nuclear response by the latter. With such certainties, the likelihood of direct or indirect contact between peer competitors becomes highly unlikely. Even when involving smaller countries, confrontation can advance only to a certain level, becoming untenable once it threatens the involvement of bigger, nuclear-armed powers. The recent shooting down of an Israeli aircraft, and the exchange of missiles between Israel and Syria, shows how a regional clash, even if limited, is ruled out by the danger of Russia and America becoming involved. Mutually assured destruction is certainly an effective means of keeping a lid on things and maintaining regional balances. The next fifty years are likely to continue under a multipolar world order, with the four possible poles of Beijing, Moscow, New Delhi and Washington. These four great powers, with strong nationalistic sentiments, reminds one of the situation in the early twentieth century. Normally we would be in a World War I scenario, with powers struggling with each other for dominance. But because of the likely escalation of confrontation between powers into nuclear warfare and Armageddon, the contemporary world order seems to promise a return to political realism and the balance between powers. We are facing an unprecedented situation for humanity, one where a stability lasting several decades may be achievable. As long as the principle of MAD remains intact, we will avoid a global catastrophe. Which is fortunate for humanity.

**Chapter 6 : Multipolar World against War – Solidarity all nations that stand for Peace & Diplomacy.**

*Are Nuclear Weapons in a Multipolar World Order a Guarantee for Peace? In the previous article I explained how the invention of the nuclear device altered the balance of power after WWII and during the cold war era.*

Peace operations in a multipolar world: Despite such pessimism, the preliminary results from an ongoing SIPRI research project suggest that consensus remains possible in the future peace operations landscape. The aim of the initiative is to better understand the points of view of emerging powers and troop-contributing countries TCCs , and stimulate discussion on peace operations. This has been achieved through a series of regional dialogue meetings with diplomats, military representatives and academics in eight locations: The search for clarity on the limitations and opportunities for international conflict management in an increasingly multipolar world is particularly relevant in light of the recently announced review of UN peace operations. In contrast to the commonly feared and expected paralysis in the international system, and in light of the highly politicized and polarized debate at the UN in New York, some of the preliminary findings from the regional dialogues reveal a surprising convergence of views on the potential for future cooperation between emerging and established powers. Competition between the USA and China has led to increased tensions in the South China Sea, while the recent events in Ukraine also demonstrate how the conflict between Russia and the West has escalated. Beyond great-power politics, traditional conflicts also persist within certain regions, such as between Pakistan and India in South Asia. However, focusing on these challenges tends to overshadow international progress in Africa and in the area of non-traditional security threats, such as crime, terrorism and piracy. In fact, participants in our dialogue meetings welcomed the idea of peace operations to manage conflicts and address common security concerns in Africa and, to a certain extent, in the Middle East. In this sense, perceptions of common future threats can help facilitate cooperation and consensus. Affirming the norms that underpin peace operations Despite the debate about overarching principles at the UN in New York, the dialogue meetings pointed to an increasing global convergence on international norms that underpin peace operations. For example, participants generally agreed on the importance of the protection of civilians POC. However, some took issue with how certain norms and concepts have been operationalized. Nevertheless, in the context of Africa, a clear sense of urgency was expressed for the greater use of force in peace operations, when needed. Furthermore, while some participants raised the issue of how to deal with local ownership and democratization as part of the broader peacebuilding agenda, the importance of democracy was never questioned – although the means towards that end were often the subject of debate. Military interventions are not as contested as they often appear Although the international disagreement following the intervention in Libya and the deadlock within the UN Security Council on how to respond to the situation in Syria would suggest otherwise, there is also increasing international convergence on the need for military intervention. Emerging powers are still more reluctant to intervene, but increasingly recognize the limitations of absolute sovereignty in specific cases. Rather than refuting the responsibility to protect R2P , emerging powers instead struggle with the question of why the concept is applied in some cases and not others. Brazil proposed the concept of responsibility while protecting RWP as a step towards operationalizing R2P. At the same time, in Europe and North America the appetite to intervene appears to be declining, particularly in the absence of a UN Security Council mandate or if the support of the host nation and regional organizations is absent. Interestingly, both these criteria are highly valued by China. In fact, recent French interventions in Mali and the Central African Republic demonstrate that there is a growing consensus on the need for military interventions, particularly in cases where there is no clash of interests between Security Council members. Troop-contributing countries are not only after money and power The tendency in the West to view calls by emerging powers and major TCCs for greater influence on peace operations as an attempt to gain greater power in the international system – and perhaps make more money – is a simplification. While it is true that these actors seek more equitable representation within the UN system and desire a greater say in the direction of future operations, they do not necessarily call for alternative strategies, concepts or norms, and often have high stakes in maintaining their contributions to the current system. Moreover, the call for greater

representation is not driven merely by national and political interest but also by a justified concern for how mandates are operationalized. During most of the dialogue meetings, participants from TCCs called for greater consultation on the rules of engagement, scope and flexibility of mandates. Apart from making mandates more achievable, such consultation is justified since it affects the deployment and safety of their own troops. Furthermore, while many TCCs call for higher troop reimbursements, some of these calls—particularly in Africa—are made within the context of a perceived lack of respect for TCCs. Africa and the future of peace operations In regions where great-power tensions persist, future peace operations will likely be limited in number, and have a traditional peacekeeping character. In areas that emerging powers claim as their own spheres of influence, operations will likely be more regional or unilateral. Africa is the exception in this regard. Not only is it a region where the emerging and traditional powers perceive the most common security threats and where they have the least conflicting interests, Africa as a region is also more open to robust and intrusive peace operations and interventions on its soil. The consensus that emerged from the dialogue meetings was that there is more room for pragmatism in Africa, and less need to talk about the principles of peace operations. There are greater possibilities for operating on a case-by-case basis without setting precedents, and looking instead at the requirements of each new mission area. With these findings in mind, and with the first phase of the New Geopolitics of Peace Operations Initiative drawing to a close, SIPRI intends to continue investigating the direction of future peace operations with a special focus on African sub-regional security dynamics, and the international capacity and institutional arrangements for future operations in Africa.

### Chapter 7 : The Santos Republic | Peace Warriors for a Multipolar World

*Get this from a library! A multipolar peace?: great-power politics in the twenty-first century. [Charles W Kegley; Gregory A Raymond] -- Offering a consistent, future-oriented perspective, this important new study considers the positions of the United States and other world powers in a changing international system and outlines the.*

### Chapter 8 : Peace operations in a multipolar world: a surprising consensus | SIPRI

*The search for clarity on the limitations and opportunities for international conflict management in an increasingly multipolar world is particularly relevant in light of the recently announced review of UN peace operations. In contrast to the commonly feared and expected paralysis in the international system, and in light of the highly.*

### Chapter 9 : A Unipolar World: Systems and Wars in Three Different Military Eras

*"In a multipolar world order, instability is a constant factor, the actions of one's opponents being unpredictable. But when nuclear weapons are a factor, uncertainty is replaced with certainty, such that a decapitating strike by Washington on Moscow or Beijing would certainly entail a nuclear response by the latter.*