

Chapter 1 : Coercion - Wikipedia

Coercive capacity and democracy. Students of collective action distinguish between a state's capacity and propensity to repress social movements (McAdam MCADAM, Doug.) Conceptual origins, current problems, future directions.

Sandeford as socially stratified and bureaucratically governed societies with at least four levels of settlement hierarchy e. Primary states are those state societies that developed in regions where no states existed before. These states developed by strictly internal processes and interaction with other non-states societies. Examples of early states which developed in interaction with other states include the Aegean Bronze Age Greek civilizations and the Malagasy civilization in Madagascar. Early state formation causation can thus include borrowing, imposition, and other forms of interaction with already existing states. Starting in the s and s, with decolonization processes underway, attention began to focus on the formation and construction of modern states with significant bureaucracies, ability to tax, and territorial sovereignty around the world. Other scholars believe that generalizations are unhelpful and that each case of early state formation should be treated on its own. The argument is that such pressures result in integrative pressure for rational people to unify and create a state. Eventually different agricultural producers would join together in response to population pressure and the arid environment, to create a state apparatus that could build and maintain large irrigation projects. With surplus food stocks created by agricultural development, creation of distinct worker classes and a division of labor would automatically trigger creation of the state form. For example, the increased trade in the 16th century may have been a key to state formation in West African states such as Whydah , Dahomey , and the Benin Empire. A number of different theories rely on conflict, dominance, or oppression as a causal process or as a necessary mechanism within certain conditions and they may borrow from other approaches. In general the theories highlight: Archeologists oftentimes look for evidence of such "large-scale construction projects, trade networks, and religious systems" to identify early states. Morgan and from the sketches of this work by Karl Marx on the Asiatic mode of production. The theory contended that surplus production as a result of the development of agriculture created a division and specialization of labor: Class antagonism and the need to secure the private property of those living on the surplus production produced by agriculturalists resulted in the creation of the state. The theory has its roots in the work of Ibn Khaldun and of Jean Bodin , but it was first organized around anthropological evidence by Franz Oppenheimer The Andes mountains circumscribed much of the region. He concluded that while population pressure and warfare were mechanisms of state formation, they only created states in geographic regions circumscribed, or walled off from the surrounding area. Neoevolutionism A number of different theories, sometimes connected with some of the processes above, explain state formation in terms of the evolution of leadership systems. This argument sees human society as evolving from tribes or chiefdoms into states through a gradual process of transformation that lets a small group hierarchically structure society and maintain order through appropriation of symbols of power. Wright argues that competitive and conflictual environments produce political experimentation leading to the development of the state. As opposed to theories that the state develops through chance or tinkering, experimentation involves a more directed process where tribal leaders learn from organization forms of the past and from the outcomes they produced. It is sometimes claimed that technological development, religious development, or socialization of members are crucial to state development. However, most of these factors are found to be secondary in anthropological analysis. Madanda Ivan who according to this view wondered whether it was truly right to assert that since the Luo were pastoralists so they introduced such centralized states in East Africa, however the Karamajongs and the Iteso were not centralized but they were pastoralist and the fact that the Luo were not a state forming people. Discredited theories[edit] Some theories proposed in the 19th century and early 20th century have since been largely discredited by anthropologists. Carneiro writes that theories "with a racial basis, for example, are now so thoroughly discredited that they need not be dealt with Such explanations are not considered sufficient to explain the formation of the state. These included feudal lords, empires, religious authorities, free cities, and other authorities. However, state formation became a primary interest in the s. The question was often framed as a contest between state forces and society forces

and the study of how the state became prominent over particular societies. Other theories focused on the creation of states in late colonial and post-colonial societies. Other theories contend that the state in Europe was constructed in connection with peoples from outside Europe and that focusing on state formation in Europe as a foundation for study silences the diverse history of state formation. However, Herbst holds that in the case African states, as well as in developing countries of other regions, development need not be the natural step. States that struggle their consolidation could remain permanently weak. Charles Tilly developed an argument that the state developed largely as a result of "state-makers" who sought to increase the taxes they could gain from the people under their control so they could continue fighting wars. The modern state presented the opportunity for them to develop taxation structures, the coercive structure to implement that taxation, and finally the guarantee of protection from other states that could get much of the population to agree. Economist Nicholas Kaldor emphasized on the importance of revenue raising and warned about the dangers of the dependence on foreign aid. According to Herbst, external security threats have had a fundamental role in the development of the South Korean and Taiwanese states. A lower density of urban centers in England and France made it easier for rulers to establish rule over expansive territories. Religious wars between Catholics and Protestants, and the involvement of leaders in the domains of other leaders under religious reasons was the primary problem dealt with in the Peace of Westphalia. The state then is not simply a military or economic authority, but also includes cultural components creating consent by people by giving them rights and shared belonging.

coercive. Voluntaristic theories hold is the old Social Contract theory, which that' the state emerged when the pro-ductive capacity of settled agriculturists.

Not all social power, however, involves alternative interests. When we persuade another to do something we want because we have made their interest clear to them, this is a form of power. You have not generated an alternative interest; you have clarified his interests to him. We not only persuade people to do or not to do something, but we may persuade them about what is true or false, right or wrong, good or bad, beautiful or ugly. Persuasion may cause another to change their mind, or their preferences among interests, to, say, go to college rather than join the army. The basis of persuasive ability is intellectual. Expertise, logic, intelligence, knowledge, verbal and numerical fluency surely play a role in convincing others of the correctness of our view. Of course, conformity with the evidential norms governing the interests in question is also required. Even an ordained minister can hardly expect to persuade a scientist about the revealed truth of an empirical proposition. Psychologically, persuasion focuses on the interests of another. Recall that an interest is an attitude plus its strength to be manifest. Persuasion, then, works on the cognitive connection between situation, want, and goal, as they are linked to each other and to other attitudes, in order to change the strength of an attitude. The goal of one attitude may persuasively be shown more instrumental to a higher goal than other attitudes "College graduates earn a higher lifetime income than non college graduates" or a particular goal can be argued to be gratified through another attitude "Join the army and see the world". Or attitudes may be brought to life by stimulating the relevant underlying needs. Let me call this ability to persuade another intellectual power. This power is a capability to persuade a person into believing or doing something. Another form of power, beloved of political scientists, similarly affects interests. Authority is often defined relative to a position, such as that of policeman, judge, boss, and so on. One obeys the request or command because it is thought proper--legitimate. The notion of legitimacy is important, for authority is more than balanced power; it is directed power which can be employed legitimately only in channels defined by the norms of the group. A person holding such authority is commissioned; he does not simply have the right to rule or govern--he is obliged to. Thus, authority emerges as a transformation of power in a process called "legitimation". For a drowning person to yell to me for help is legitimate, and I would respond with as much help as I could give. In this situation, he has authority, as does a reader asking that I refrain from disturbing him in a library. It is legitimate for a recognized scholar of classical Greek to demand the evidence for a critical comment I may have made on Plato, and I am obligated by my own values to respond. A mathematician not by position, but by training asking for the derivation of my theorem has the legitimate power to do so. Thus, authority is not only associated with a role but with a situation a drowning person, a library. However, these senses of authority are still independent of the individual. Regardless of who is the police officer or the judge or the drowning person, his request is authoritative. However, authority can also inhere in the individual who because of his particular attainments or image can make legitimate requests or even commands. Consider the charismatic leader. His power comes from promising others a better future which evidently only he can achieve. He connects with the superordinate goals of others and holds out in his person their gratification. His commands are therefore just and proper routes to his, and thus their, success. Of course, such a person soon has an official role as head of a group, party, or government. But this should not mask the source of primary authority that is in the leader and not his position. We thus have three kinds of authority: Since they share a similar basis in legitimacy, they are aspects of authoritative power. Later I will emphasize a particular aspect, as for example in defining class in relation to authoritative roles. However, the more general concept of authoritative power should be seen as encompassing these three kinds and will suffice for my immediate purposes. As described, then, authoritative power is a capability to use legitimacy to convince a person to do something. Psychologically, authority works through the superego. Because of that cluster of attitudes defining what is right and wrong, good and bad, in a moral or ethical sense, we feel that the person should be giving us commands or making requests, and that we have an obligation to obey. Authoritative power thus

comprises two interests. One, which may be positive or negative, is that commanded or requested. The other is the moral or ethic which endows the command or request with legitimacy. Note the difference from bargaining, coercion, and persuasion. Persuasion involves changing the salience of an interest wholly through generating a re-evaluation of its constituents and relationship to other interests; coercion involves two alternative negative interests; bargaining two positive interests. In persuasion and authority, a negative interest may be involved. In authority, one may be commanded to do something undesirable, but will do it anyway because one believes he should. Thus, the prison warden obeys the command to execute the prisoner sentenced to death. Everyone knows we can coerce others. We can use authority. And we can persuade, as too many forget. But what about power of love, perhaps one of the strongest and most prevalent social powers known? All experience it, our literature, poetry, and art manifest its many aspects, but few social scientists have given it scientific status as a power. Yet, when someone you love asks you to do something, you do so not because of persuasion or legitimacy or bargaining or coercion, but because your loved one asks. You want to do whatever helps the other; together you form a whole and whatever interests the other, interests yourself. Two selves are united into one so that an expressed interest--an "I want. Thus, the basis of love power is no other than love itself: It is no stimulation of a need alone, such as sex or security or protectiveness, no simple triggering of superego, no posing of alternative interest, no changing salience in an interest. It is simply love. Altruistic power is then a capability to use love to induce a person into doing something. Now, such power is not necessarily restricted to a person loved by the other. Indeed, such interests are a basic force in social relations that serve as the basis for reform movements, ideologies, politics, and conflict. The person who labors long for a welfare bill, who suffers through deprivations to promote communism, who gives up all he owns to be a missionary in Africa, who demonstrates against the Vietnam War, or who goes to prison to protest a bad law may act from altruism, a basic integrative feeling--a love--for humanity. This love, and not aggression, is one of the roots of mass conflict. It is because people want to do good that they sometimes fight others en masse, and not because they are selfish or evil. For now, however, I simply wish to point out that this love for others is a source of power. Those seeking power for themselves or their ideas can tap this love through a political formula: Whether it be freedom, equality, justice, a communist utopia, democracy, Christianity, Islam, the welfare state, a minimum wage, eliminating tax loopholes, or foreign aid, the formula promises to improve our lot. He who wields the formula then can affect the interest of those who share its vision. We do not exist simply to manifest our selves. We also live to help others. As Adler noted decades ago, our self-esteem, our drive for perfection and completion, is not wholly selfish and egoistic. In the healthy individual it is bound up with a social interest Adler, , with a goal of an ideal community, with a love that reaches out to unite with others. The one who controls the formula for achieving this has altruistic power. For to serve his own ends or satisfy his own vision, he can intentionally induce within others love-based interests. Indeed, what force can never do, what is beyond coercion, and what cannot be bartered away can be affected by love: Love, then, in the service of a higher cause or another person, is the seat of inductive interests: From where does this love come? One of our fundamental needs is protectiveness, the need to help others and protect them. But love is not just a need that is gratified and temporarily satiated. It involves the total self, the gestalt, structure, and process that combine the dynamic psychological field. It manifests itself through the reaching out, the integrating with another, the uniting of selves. It involves the total field. This makes love so fundamentally basic and so powerful, wholly capturing the life--the soul--of a person. A person in love cannot be distracted; a person working for humanity cannot be deflected. Social power, however, may be oriented to another self, invisibly. It may operate offstage, setting the lights, determining the scenery, and selecting the play. Power over perception is also an ingredient in social interaction. It is manifested by the person who does not tell another bad news, who employs symbols to project status e. Indeed, this power is developed to a high degree in the fine arts and theater, where the goal is to create a specific situation influencing the perception, interests, and emotions of viewers in a particular way. Then, of course, there is democratic politics, where the success of a politician and his policies depend in part on the image projected. Not only through manipulating the situation, but also through actual control over opportunities does one affect another. Parents may avoid sending their children to a particular school for fear of the kind of group they may encounter; provide them

with piano and art lessons to broaden their opportunities; and send them to college to ensure their later success. Administrators may set the rules of administrative appeal or hearings, which effectively load the dice in his favor. He who sets the rules has power over the process. Citizens may work to decrease the potentiality for fraud and bribery by new election campaign laws.

Chapter 3 : The Waning of the Communist State

A Theory of the Origins of Coercive Enforcement by the State: Insights from Colonial Mexico Luz Marina Arias April 25, Abstract This paper contributes to our understanding of the factors that lead to the creation.

Bookmark Glossary Absolute poverty The condition of having too little income to buy the necessities-- food, shelter, clothing, health care. Affirmative action The requirement that employers make special efforts to recruits hire and promote qualified members of previously excluded groups including women and minorities. Aggregate A collection of unrelated people who do not know one another but who may occupy a common space--for example, a crowd of people crossing a city street. Agrarian societies Societies in which large scale cultivation using plows and draft animals is the primary means of subsistence. Alienation The separation or estrangement of individuals from themselves and from others. Amalgamation The biological as well as cultural assimilation merging of racial or ethnic groups. Anomalies In science observations or problems that cannot be explained or solved in terms of a prevailing paradigm. Anomie A breakdown or confusion in the norms, values, and culture of a group or a society. A condition of relative normlessness. Anomie theory The theory suggesting that deviance and crime occur when there is an acute gap between cultural norms and goals and the socially structured opportunities for individuals to achieve those goals. Anticipatory socialization The process of taking on the attitudes values and behaviors of a status or role one expects to occupy in the future. Apartheid The recent policy of racial separation in South Africa enforced by legal political and military power. Ascribed status A social position status such as sex, race, and social class that a person acquires at birth. Assimilation The merging of minority and majority groups into one group with a come mon culture and identity. Association A group of people bound together by common goals and rules, but not necessarily by close personal ties. Athletics A form of sport that is closer to work than to play. Authority Power regarded as legitimate. Autocracy Rule or government concentrated in a single ruler or group of leaders who are willing to use force to maintain control. Baby boom The people who were born in the United States between and This group represented a sharp increase in birth rates and in the absolute number of births compared to pre levels. Bicultural The capacity to understand and function well in more than one cultural group. Birth rate Number of births per year per women 15 to 44 years old. Bureaucracy A large-scale formal organization with centralized authority, a hierarchical chain of command, explicit rules and procedures, and an emphasis on formal positions rather than on persons. Capitalism A form of economic organization in which private individuals accumulate and invest capital, own the means of production, and control profits. Caste system A closed system of social stratification in which prestige and social relationships are based on hereditary position at birth. Centrally planned economy An economic system that includes public ownership of or control over all productive resources and whose activity is planned by the government. Charisma The exceptional mystical or even supernatural quality of personality attributed to a person by others. Literally, "the gift of grace. Charter The capacity of certain schools to confer special rights on their graduates. Church A formally organized, institutionalized religious organization with formal and traditional religious doctrine, beliefs, and practices. City A relatively permanent settlement of large numbers of people who do not grow or gather their own food. Civil law The branch of law that deals largely with wrongs against the individual. Civil religion The interweaving of religious and political symbols in public life. Class conflict The struggle between competing classes, specifically between the class that owns the means of production and the class or classes that do not. Class consciousness The sense of common class position and shared interests held by members of a social class. Class system A system of stratification based primarily on the unequal ownership and control of economic resources. Closed system In organizational theory, the degree to which an organization is shut off from its environment. Coercion A form of social interaction in which one is made to do something through the use of social pressure, threats, or force. Cognitive development The systematic improvement of intellectual ability through a series of stages. Cognitive development theory Suggests that individuals try to pattern their lives and experiences to form a reasonably consistent picture of their beliefs, actions, and values. Cohort Persons who share something in common, usually being born in the same year or time period. Commitment

Willingness of members of a group to do what is needed to maintain the group. Community A collection of people in a geographical area; may also include the idea that the collection has a social structure and a sense of community spirit or belonging. Comparable worth A policy of equal pay for men and women doing similar work, even if the jobs are labeled differently by sex. Competition A goal-directed form of social interaction in which the goals or objects pursued are limited, so not all competitors can attain them. Competitive behavior is governed by rules and limitations restraints. Complementary marriages Marriages in which husband and wife take distinctly separate family roles. Concentric-zone theory A theory of urban development holding that cities grow around a central business district in concentric zones, with each zone devoted to a different land use. Concept A formal definition of what is being studied. Conflict A form of social interaction involving direct struggle between individuals or groups over commonly valued resources or goals. Differs from competition because individuals are more interested in defeating an opponent than in achieving a goal. Conflict approach One of the major theoretical perspectives in sociology: Weberian conflict theorists stress inequality and conflict based on class, status, power; Marxian theorists emphasize conflict and inequality based on ownership of the means of production. Conformity Going along with the norms or behaviors of a group. Conjugal family A form of family organization centered around the husband-wife relationship rather than around blood relationships. There were 21 such cities in the United States in Contact hypothesis The theory that people of different racial groups who became acquainted would be less prejudiced toward one another. Content analysis A research method used to describe and analyze in an objective and systematic way the content of literature, speeches, or other media presentations. The method helps to identify cultural themes or trends. Content of socialization The ideas, beliefs, values, knowledge, and so forth that are presented to people who are being socialized. Contest mobility The educational pattern in which selection for academic and university education is delayed and children compete throughout their schooling for high positions. Context of socialization The setting or arena within which socialization occurs. Continued subjugation The use of force and ideology by one group to retain domination over another group. Controlling for In research, the effort to hold constant factors that might be influencing observed changes in the dependent variable. Convergence theory A theory suggesting that modernizing nations come to resemble one another over time. In collective behavior, a theory suggesting that certain crowds attract particular types of people, who may behave irrationally. Cooperation A form of social interaction involving collaborative effort among people to achieve a common goal. Cooptation A social process by which people who might otherwise threaten the stability or existence of an organization are brought into the leadership or policy-making structure of that organization. Correlation An observed association between a change in the value of one variable and a change in the value of another variable. Counterculture A subculture whose norms and values sharply contradict the dominant norms and values of the society in which it occurs. Creationism A theory that sees all major types of living things, including people, as having been made by the direct creative action of God in six days. Crime A behavior prohibited by law. Criminal law Law enacted by recognized political authorities that prohibits or requires certain behaviors. Criteria for inferring causality Evidence that two variables are correlated and that the hypothesized cause preceded the hypothesized effect in time, as well as evidence eliminating rival hypotheses. Crude birth rate The total number of live births per persons in a population within a particular year. Crude death rate The number of deaths per persons occurring within a one-year period in a particular population. Cult An organized group of people who together act out religious feelings, attitudes, and relationships; may focus on an unusual form of worship or belief. Cultural capital Symbolic wealth socially defined as worthy of being sought and possessed. Cultural determinism The view that the nature of a society is shaped primarily by the ideas and values of the people living in it. Cultural imposition The forcing of members of one culture to adopt the practices of another culture. Cultural relativism The view that the customs and ideas of a society must be viewed within the context of that society. Cultural revolution The repudiation of many existing cultural elements and the substitution of new ones. Cultural universals Cultural features, such as the use of language, shared by all human societies. Culture The common heritage shared by the people of a society, consisting of customs, values, language, ideas, and artifacts. Culture lag The time difference between the introduction of material innovations and resulting changes in cultural practices. Culture of poverty A distinctive culture

thought to develop among poor people and characterized by failure to delay gratification, fatalism, and weak family and community ties. Culture pattern theory In the sociology of sport, a theory that explains aggression and violence in sport as learned behavior that mirrors the degree of aggression and violence in the society. Cyclical theories Theories of social change suggesting that societies follow a certain life course, from vigorous and innovative youth to more materialistic maturity and then to decline. Deduction Reasoning from the general to the specific. Defining the situation The socially created perspective that people apply to a situation. Democracy A form of political organization in which power resides with the people and is exercised by them. Democratic-collective organization An organization in which authority is placed in the group as a whole, rules are minimized, members have considerable control over their work, and job differentiation is minimized. Demographic transition The demographic change experienced in Western Europe and North America since the industrial revolution in which the birth rate has declined so that it is about equal to the death rate. Demography The scientific study of population size, composition, and distribution as well as patterns of change in those features. Denomination One of a number of religious organizations in a society with no official state church. Has some formal doctrines, beliefs, and practices, but tolerates diverse religious views. Dependency theory A theory about the place of developing nations in the world economy suggesting that major industrial nations take advantage of the cheap labor and raw materials of developing nations and hence are reluctant to see them become industrialized. Dependent variable The variable that occurs or changes in a patterned way due to the presence of, or changes in, another variable or variables. Descriptive study A research study whose goal is to describe the social phenomena being studied.

Chapter 4 : State-building - Wikipedia

A close examination of history indicates that only a coercive theory can account for the rise of the state. Force, and not enlightened self-interest, is the mechanism by which political evolution has led, step by step, from autonomous villages to the state.

Carneiro For the first 2 million years of his existence, man lived in bands or villages which, as far as we can tell, were completely autonomous. Not until perhaps B. But, once this process of aggregation began, it continued at a progressively faster pace and led, around B. When I speak of a state I mean an autonomous political unit, encompassing many communities within its territory and having a centralized government with the power to collect taxes, draft men for work or war, and decree and enforce laws. Although it was by all odds the most far-reaching political development in human history, the origin of the state is still very imperfectly understood. Indeed, not one of the current theories of the rise of the state is entirely satisfactory. At one point or another, all of them fail. There is one theory, though, which I believe does provide a convincing explanation of how states began. It is a theory which I proposed once before¹, and which I present here more fully. Before doing so, however, it seems desirable to discuss, if only briefly, a few of the traditional theories. Explicit theories of the origin of the state are relatively modern. However, the age of exploration, by making Europeans aware that many peoples throughout the world lived, not in states, but in independent villages or tribes, made the state seem less natural, and thus more in need of explanation. Of the many modern theories of state origins that have been proposed, we can consider only a few. Those with a racial basis. In my opinion, the origin of the state was neither mysterious nor fortuitous. Moreover, it was not a unique event but a recurring phenomenon: Where the appropriate conditions existed, the state emerged.

Voluntaristic Theories Serious theories of state origins are of two general types: Voluntaristic theories hold that, at some point in their history, certain peoples spontaneously, rationally, and voluntarily gave up their individual sovereignties and united with other communities to form a larger political unit deserving to be called a state. Of such theories the best known is the old Social Contract theory, which was associated especially with the name of Rousseau. We now know that no such compact was ever subscribed to by human groups, and the Social Contract theory is today nothing more than a historical curiosity. According to this theory, the invention of agriculture automatically brought into being a surplus of food, enabling some individuals to divorce themselves from food production and to become potters, weavers, smiths, masons, and so on, thus creating an extensive division of labor. Out of this occupational specialization there developed a political integration which united a number of previously independent communities into a state. This argument was set forth most frequently by the late British archeologist V. We know this because many agricultural peoples of the world produce no such surplus. Virtually all Amazonian Indians, for example, were agricultural, but in aboriginal times they did not produce a food surplus. In certain arid and semi-arid areas of the world, where village farmers had to struggle to support themselves by means of small-scale irrigation, a time arrived when they saw that it would be to the advantage of all concerned to set aside their individual autonomies and merge their villages into a single large political unit capable of carrying out irrigation on a broad scale. The body of officials they created to devise and administer such extensive irrigation works brought the state into being. We see this inability manifested again and again by political units ranging from tiny villages to great empires. Indeed, one can scan the pages of history without finding a single genuine exception to this rule. Thus, in order to account for the origin of the state we must set aside voluntaristic theories and look elsewhere.

Coercive Theories A close examination of history indicates that only a coercive theory can account for the rise of the state. Force, and not enlightened self-interest, is the mechanism by which political evolution has led, step by step, from autonomous villages to the state. The view that war lies at the root of the state is by no means new. This theory, however, has two serious defects. First, it fails to account for the rise of states in aboriginal America, where pastoral nomadism was unknown. Second, it is now well established that pastoral nomadism did not arise in the Old World until after the earliest states had emerged. Regardless of deficiencies in particular coercive theories, however, there is little question that, in one way or another, war played a

decisive role in the rise of the state. Historical or archeological evidence of war is found in the early stages of state formation in Mesopotamia, Egypt, India, China, Japan, Greece, Rome, northern Europe, central Africa, Polynesia, Middle America, Peru, and Colombia, to name only the most prominent examples. But is it really true that there is no exception to this rule? Might there not be, somewhere in the world, an example of a state which arose without the agency of war? Until a few years ago, anthropologists generally believed that the Classic Maya provided such an instance. The archeological evidence then available gave no hint of warfare among the early Maya and led scholars to regard them as a peace-loving theocratic state which had arisen entirely without war. Recent archeological discoveries have placed the Classic Maya in a very different light. First came the discovery of the Bonampak murals, showing the early Maya at war and reveling in the torture of war captives. Then, excavations around Tikal revealed large earthworks partly surrounding that Classic Maya city, pointing clearly to a military rivalry with the neighboring city of Uaxactun. After all, wars have been fought in many parts of the world where the state never emerged. Thus, while warfare may be a necessary condition for the rise of the state, it is not a sufficient one. Or, to put it another way, while we can identify war as the mechanism of state formation, we need also to specify the conditions under which it gave rise to the state.

Environmental Circumscription How are we to determine these conditions? One promising approach is to look for those factors common to areas of the world in which states arose indigenously—areas such as the Nile, Tigris-Euphrates, and Indus valleys in the Old World and the Valley of Mexico and the mountain and coastal valleys of Peru in the New. These areas differ from one another in many ways—in altitude, temperature, rainfall, soil type, drainage pattern, and many other features. They do, however, have one thing in common: Each of them is set off by mountains, seas, or deserts, and these environmental features sharply delimit the area that simple farming peoples could occupy and cultivate. In this respect these areas are very different from, say, the Amazon basin or the eastern woodlands of North America, where extensive and unbroken forests provided almost unlimited agricultural land. But what is the significance of circumscribed agricultural land for the origin of the state? Its significance can best be understood by comparing political development in two regions of the world having contrasting ecologies—one a region with circumscribed agricultural land and the other a region where there was extensive and unlimited land. The two areas I have chosen to use in making this comparison are the coastal valleys of Peru and the Amazon basin. Our examination begins at the stage where agricultural communities were already present but where each was still completely autonomous. Looking first at the Amazon basin, we see that agricultural villages there were numerous, but widely dispersed. Even in areas with relatively dense clustering, like the Upper Xingu basin, villages were at least 10 or 15 miles apart. Thus, the typical Amazonian community, even though it practiced a simple form of shifting cultivation which required extensive amounts of land, still had around it all the forest land needed for its gardens. Warfare was certainly frequent in Amazonia, but it was waged for reasons of revenge, the taking of women, the gaining of personal prestige, and motives of a similar sort. There being no shortage of land, there was, by and large, no warfare over land. The consequences of the type of warfare that did occur in Amazonia were as follows. A defeated group was not, as a rule, driven from its land. Nor did the victor make any real effort to subject the vanquished, or to exact tribute from him. This would have been difficult to accomplish in any case, since there was no effective way to prevent the losers from fleeing to a distant part of the forest. Indeed, defeated villages often chose to do just this, not so much to avoid subjugation as to avoid further attack. With settlement so sparse in Amazonia, a new area of forest could be found and occupied with relative ease, and without trespassing on the territory of another village. Moreover, since virtually any area of forest is suitable for cultivation, subsistence agriculture could be carried on in the new habitat just about as well as in the old. It was apparently by this process of fight and flight that horticultural tribes gradually spread out until they came to cover, thinly but extensively, almost the entire Amazon basin. Thus, under the conditions of unlimited agricultural land and low population density that prevailed in Amazonia, the effect of warfare was to disperse villages over a wide area, and to keep them autonomous. With only a very few exceptions, noted below, there was no tendency in Amazonia for villages to be held in place and to combine into larger political units. In marked contrast to the situation in Amazonia were the events that transpired in the narrow valleys of the Peruvian coast. The reconstruction of these events that I present is

admittedly inferential, but I think it is consistent with the archeological evidence. Here too our account begins at the stage of small, dispersed, and autonomous farming communities. However, instead of being scattered over a vast expanse of rain forest as they were in Amazonia, villages here were confined to some 78 short and narrow valleys. Nowhere else, perhaps, can one find agricultural valleys more sharply circumscribed than these. As with neolithic communities generally, villages of the Peruvian coastal valleys tended to grow in size. Since autonomous villages are likely to fission as they grow, as long as land is available for the settlement of splinter communities, these villages undoubtedly split from time to time. This increase in the number of villages occupying a valley probably continued, without giving rise to significant changes in subsistence practices, until all the readily arable land in the valley was being farmed. At this point two changes in agricultural techniques began to occur: Even before the land shortage became so acute that irrigation began to be practiced systematically, villages were undoubtedly already fighting one another over land. Prior to this time, when agricultural villages were still few in number and well supplied with land, the warfare waged in the coastal valleys of Peru had probably been of much the same type as that described above for Amazonia. With increasing pressure of human population on the land, however, the major incentive for war changed from a desire for revenge to a need to acquire land. And, as the causes of war became predominantly economic, the frequency, intensity, and importance of war increased. Once this stage was reached, a Peruvian village that lost a war faced consequences very different from those faced by a defeated village in Amazonia. There, as we have seen, the vanquished could flee to a new locale, subsisting there about as well as they had subsisted before, and retaining their independence. In Peru, however, this alternative was no longer open to the inhabitants of defeated villages. The mountains, the desert, and the sea—to say nothing of neighboring villages—blocked escape in every direction. A village defeated in war thus faced only grim prospects. If it was allowed to remain on its own land, instead of being exterminated or expelled, this concession came only at a price. And the price was political subordination to the victor. This subordination generally entailed at least the payment of a tribute or tax in kind, which the defeated village could provide only by producing more food than it had produced before. But subordination sometimes involved a further loss of autonomy on the part of the defeated village namely, incorporation into the political unit dominated by the victor. Through the recurrence of warfare of this type, we see arising in coastal Peru integrated territorial units transcending the village in size and in degree of organization. Political evolution was attaining the level of the chiefdom. As land shortages continued and became even more acute, so did warfare.

Chapter 5 : An Introduction to Sociology

We measure coercive capacity as military size, and argue that this is a valid and reliable metric of the institutionalized coercive force used by dictators to consolidate their authority.

See Article History Coercion, threat or use of punitive measures against states, groups, or individuals in order to force them to undertake or desist from specified actions. In addition to the threat of or limited use of force or both, coercion may entail economic sanctions, psychological pressures, and social ostracism. The use of coercion has, of course, been one of the key tools for acquiring dominion and sustaining governance by states, political groupings, and individuals. Vivid historical examples include the failed Athenian attempt at coercing Melos into giving up its neutrality during the Peloponnesian War by threatening the death and enslavement of the Melian population. While Thucydides recounted how the Athenians infamously carried out this threat, the attempt at coercion failed because it did not get the Melians to modify their behaviour, short of their total defeat and destruction. A more successful use of such coercive threats was dramatized by William Shakespeare in *Henry V*. Henry V threatened to subject the French port of Harfleur to pillage, rape, and massacre if it did not surrender in short order to his army. In this case, the use of coercion was successful in getting the city to surrender without a last-ditch fight. Coercion in political theory The use or threat of coercion has been central to international relations and domestic politics. Max Weber drew directly upon Hobbes in providing his famous definition of the state as a political entity that enjoyed a monopoly of legitimate violence or coercion over a given territory. Following Weber, the contemporary sociologist and historian Charles Tilly has compared the process of state formation to organized crime. According to Tilly, at the core of state formation is the concentration of coercive power over a given territory and the subjugation of rival centres of coercive capacity. Coercion in the study of international relations In addition, the concept of coercion has been central to the postwar studies on deterrence, crisis management, and statecraft in the political science subfield of international relations. However, international relations theorists have not used the concept of coercion in a consistent and well-defined manner, leading to unfortunate confusion and contradiction in the literature. Pioneering work on the use of coercion in strategies of conflict was done by the American economist and Nobel Prize laureate Thomas Schelling. Schelling coined the term compellance to define the coercive threat or use of power in order to get an adversary to change its behaviour. Here the attempt to coerce or compel an adversary involves a bargaining and signaling process whereby, it is hoped, the adversary can be convinced that the cost of compliance is less onerous than that of defiance. Coercion is different from the use of brute force to completely defeat an adversary, because it aims to modify the behaviour of an opponent, ideally through threats and, at most, the limited and demonstrative use of force. Schelling further drew a clear distinction between the coercive use of compellance and that of deterrence. The strategy of deterrence seeks to maintain a particular status quo and mode of behaviour on the part of a potential adversary, rather than seeking its modification. However, his work evinces some of the prevailing contradictory and confusing uses of the terms coercion, persuasion, compellance, and deterrence. Rather, the use of coercive diplomacy is a defensive strategy to deter encroachments on the status quo. However, this definition begs the question of perception and how what one party may view as a defensive preservation of the status quo may be viewed by another as aggressive and aggrandizing behaviour. The success of coercive strategies has had a mixed record in the modern era. The United States sought to use gradually escalating strategic bombing in order to coerce North Vietnam into giving up its attempt to forcibly reintegrate South Vietnam. However, the government of Ho Chi Minh, with wide popular support throughout Vietnam, was willing to bear the terrible costs of American bombing in order to reunify the country under its leadership. In the subsequent cases of South Africa under apartheid and of Libya, the use of economic sanctions as a tool of coercive diplomacy did manage to bring about the desired change in behaviour after a prolonged period. However, it should be noted that the resort to coercive force may prove counterproductive and invite countercoercive actions. American-led military interventions in the Middle East radicalized nationalist forces in the Muslim world, for instance, and some of these radical forces attempted punitive and coercive attacks

against the United States.

Chapter 7 : SOCIAL POWER: COERCION, AUTHORITATIVE, BARGAINING, INTELLECTUAL, ALTRUIS

Firmly grounded with the public policy literature, Ellerman offers a theory of divergent outcomes in 'socially coercive' public policy, one emphasizing the basic importance of bureaucratic actors. This book should be required reading for anyone interested in immigration, bureaucracy, and public policy."

Definition[edit] There are two main theoretical approaches to definitions of state-building. First, state-building is seen by some theorists as an activity undertaken by external actors foreign countries attempting to build, or re-build, the institutions of a weaker, post-conflict or failing state. The result saw work commissioned by donor countries on definitions, knowledge and practice in state-building, this work has tended to draw heavily on political science. It has produced definitions that view state-building as an indigenous, national process driven by state-society relations. This view believes that countries cannot do state-building outside their own borders, they can only influence, support or hinder such processes. Illustrations of this approach include a think-piece commissioned for OECD[citation needed] and a research study produced by the Overseas Development Institute. Across the two streams of theory and writing there is a broader consensus that lessons on how to support state-building processes have not yet been fully learned. Some believe that supporting state-building requires the fostering of legitimate and sustainable state institutions, but many accept that strategies to achieve this have not yet been fully developed. Little of the post-conflict support to state-building undertaken so far has been entirely successful. From an exogenous perspective, it can be argued that sustained focus on supporting state-building has tended to happen in states frequently characterized by brutalized civilian populations, destroyed economies, institutions, infrastructure, and environments, widely accessible small arms, large numbers of disgruntled soldiers to be demobilized and reintegrated, and ethnically or religiously divided peoples. These obstacles are compounded by the fundamental difficulty of grafting democratic and human rights values onto countries with different political, cultural, and religious heritages. Pluralizing societies is theoretical in its viability for immediate political and economic stability and expediency; ideological overtones can be met with opposition within host nations and issues of self-determination and external state trusteeship and stewarding of nascent institutional reform, or its creation, could damage a tenuous post-conflict national self-identity for critical analyses of neotrusteeship, see e. Both schools of thinking have generated critiques and studies seeking to test the propositions made. A more developmental approach with an emphasis on composite state-building processes would have implications for donor programmes, diplomacy and peace-keeping. Some research has tried to test some of the ideas involved [5] and at least one donor agency issued a guidance note for its own programmes. There have also been attempts to test out the thesis by looking at individual areas of state provision, particularly the area of healthcare. Further research on state-society relations has also been undertaken by groups including the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium and the Crisis States Research Centre. As a result, much of the literature on state-building is preoccupied with post conflict issues. Critiques common to both schools include inadequate strategy and a lack of coordination, staffing weaknesses, and that funding is insufficient or poorly timed. Moreover, it is increasingly recognized that many of the tasks sought to be achieved are extremely complex and there is little clarity on how to best proceed. For instance, it is extremely difficult to provide security in a conflictual environment, or to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate armies successfully. It remains practically impossible to address vast unemployment in states where the economy is destroyed and there is high illiteracy, or to strengthen the rule of law in a society where it has collapsed. Moreover, the unintended negative consequences of international aid are more and more evident. These range from distortion of the economy to skewing relationship of accountability by the political elite towards internationals rather than domestic population. Assist in the acquisition of new technologies ii. Mobilize and channel resources to productive sectors iii. Enforce standards and regulations iv. Establish social pacts v. Fund deliver and regulate services and social programmes [10] States must be able to create the Political Capacity to address the extent to which the necessary coalitions or political settlements can be built Resource Mobilization Capacity to generate resources for investment and social development Allocate Resources To Productive And

Welfare-Enhancing Sectors [10] When developing this infrastructure a state can meet several roadblocks including policy capture from powerful segments of the population, opposition from interest groups, and ethnic and religious division. Developing countries have tried to implement different forms of government established in advanced democracies. However, these initiatives have not been fully successful. Scholars have looked back at the development of Europe to determine the key factors that helped create bureaucracies that were sustainable throughout the centuries. Application of state-building theories[edit] The predatory theory[edit] War making[edit] When studying the development of European states, Charles Tilly identified that European countries engaged in four activities: However, extraction also economically strengthened the states, allowing them to expand their hold over the use violence. Lane argued that "governments are in the business of selling protection This, he argued, was due to the fact that competition within a monopoly raised costs, and that producing violence renders larger economies of scale. External threats to the state produce stronger institutional capacities to extract resources from the state. The driver can be state personnel, a dominant class, or a charismatic individual. Without these drivers, the political and military machine of the state has no direction to follow and therefore, without this direction, war and the increased resources extracted from war can not be used for growth. Rivals usually will bargain with the state to lower their tax burden, gain economic or political privileges. In limited access orders, entry is restricted in both economic and political systems to produce rents which benefit the ruling elites. In open access orders, entry is open to all. The logic of the open access state is based in impersonality. Both systems are interdependent and are only stable when both have similar access frameworks, either limited or open. Transitioning from a limited access order to an open access order involves difficult, radical changes based on three "doorstep conditions": Once all three initial conditions are satisfied, more incremental changes can be made to move the state further in the direction of an open access order. Social changes and social order[edit] In his study on countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, Joel Migdal presented the necessary and sufficient conditions for establishing a strong state. Furthermore, he listed the sufficient conditions as follows: World historical timing when exogenous political forces were in favor of concentrated social control; Existence of military threat from outside or other groups in the country; A group of skillful and independent people to build an independent bureaucracy; Skillful top leadership that would take advantage of the above conditions. Differentiating "nation-building", military intervention, regime change[edit] Some commentators have used the term "nation-building" interchangeably with "state-building" e. However, in both major schools of theory the state is the focus of thinking rather than the "nation" nation conventionally refers to the population itself, as united by identity history, culture and language. The issues debated related to the structures of the state and its relationship to society and as result state-building is the more broadly accepted term. Similarly, state-building nation-building has at times been conflated with military intervention or regime change. This derives in part from the military actions in Germany and Japan in World War II and resulting states, and became especially prevalent following the military interventions in Afghanistan October and Iraq March However, the conflation of these two concepts has been highly controversial, and has been used by opposing ideological and political forces to attempt to justify, or reject as an illegal military occupation, the actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Hence, regime change by outside intervention should be differentiated from state-building. There have been some examples of military interventions by international or multilateral actors with a focus on building state capacity, with some of the more recent examples including Bosnia, East Timor, and Sierra Leone. Such interventions are alternatively described as "neotrusteeship" or "neoimperialism". Under this framework, strong states take over part of all of the governance of territories with underdeveloped existing governing structures, often with the backing of international legal authority. Unlike the classic imperialism of the 19th and early 20th centuries, this type of intervention is aimed at re building local state structures and turning over governance to them as quickly as possible. Weinstein proposes autonomous recovery exists as a process that offers "lasting peace, a systematic reduction in violence, and post-war political and economic development in the absence of international intervention. External support undermines the creation of a self-sustaining relationship between rulers or political leaders and its constituents. Foreign aid promotes governments that maintain the same leaders in power and discourages developing a revenue extraction plan that would bind local politicians and

local populations. War or military victories create conditions for self-sustaining and representative institutional arrangements through the domestic legitimacy and capacity of state revenue extraction that are by-products of war. In practice, foreign and security policy making still largely treat them as separate issues. Moreover, academics often approach the subjects from different angles. The underlying informal understanding among elites "that their privileges and hold on power are not to be touched" appears to remain. Such political settlements could also enshrine power and authority with certain factions within the military, allowing them to carve up state resources to the detriment of state-building exercises. Yet, these alliances are successful if the agreement is mutually beneficial for the parties e. Afghanistan since , is an example of a beneficial pact between government and elites; entitling some select set of warlords as governors yielded a strongman brand of governance in two key provinces. The state also may be part of the problem and over-reliance on the state by international actors can worsen security inside the country. Conversely, state corruption can mean that state building efforts serve only one ethnic, religious or other minority group, exacerbating tensions that could escalate towards violence. In the s and s due to a series of economic crises and unsuccessful attempts in intervention programs in Africa , Latin America , and Eastern Europe , the international community shifted towards a market-oriented model of foreign aid. Moreover, international donors became concerned over seriously malfunctioning states in the s, i. Sierra Leone and Afghanistan. Taxing is the most common form of extraction. Tilly argues that state-building was not intended, but once it has begun, extraction capacity was necessary. Regulatory-Productive Capacity is the capacity of the state to provide output for the citizens. This output can include the enforcement of laws and the setting of policy for the citizens. State capacity is widely cited as an essential element to why some countries are rich and others are not: They claim that many countries are in a capability trap "countries are, at most, converging at a very low pace to the same levels of state capacity. They estimate that on average, it would take years for the bottom 15 countries to reach the state capability level of the best performer if their capabilities keep growing at the same average rate with which they have grown since their political independence. The authors argue that the capability trap shows that external assistance to increase state capacity have not been successful in accelerating the development process. They identify that this implementation failure may occur through two techniques: State structures within the concept of state-building[edit] The term "state" can be used to mean both a geographic sovereign political entity with a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with the other states, as defined under international law Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, December 26, , Article 1 , as well as a set of social institutions claiming a monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory Max Weber, For the purposes of state-building in environments of instability, the sub-structures of states can be defined as a political regime or system of government , a governance framework or constitution , and a set of state institutions or organizations such as the armed forces, the parliament, and the justice system. State capacity refers to the strength and capability of the state institutions. Nation conventionally refers to the population itself, as united by identity, history, culture, and language. Authoritarian regime[edit] Governments that have implemented the top-down method present the idea that there is a great external threat that can diminish the capabilities of a state and its citizens. The perceived threat creates an incentive that focuses policy, make elites cooperate, and facilitates the adoption of a nationalistic ideology. In an authoritarian government , political, military, and ideological power is concentrated to be conducive to policy continuation. The bureaucracies implemented are well trained, well paid, and highly competitive in recruitment and promotion. However, most governments are non-developmental and unstable. Furthermore, even when countries have tried to pursue authoritarian strategies that have worked, specifically Brazil, a divided military, regional oligarchs in power, and vast disparities in inequality delegitimized the regime. It respects the right of citizen to contest policies. Successful democracies developed political capacities by nurturing active citizenship, maintaining electoral competitiveness that gave value to the votes of the poor, fostered political parties that were strongly oriented towards equality, and had strong party-social movement ties. Approaches[edit] While many specific techniques exist for creating a successful state-building strategy, three specific approaches have been identified by the recent UNRISD report. These include, in particular, the capabilities to protect stable property

rights, enforce the rule of law, effectively implement anti-corruption policies and achieve government accountability. This approach involves enforcing the rule of law, creating stronger property rights, and reducing corruption.

Chapter 8 : Robert L. Carneiro, "A Theory of the Origin of the State"

The paper then discusses the concept of state capacity, arguing that for conceptual clarity a parsimonious understanding of the concept based on the state's extractive, administrative and coercive capacities, provides the most useful framework for the comparative analysis.

Chapter 9 : States Against Migrants : Antje Ellermann :

State capacity is widely cited as an essential element to why some countries are rich and others are not: "It has been established that the richest countries in the world are characterized by long-lasting and centralized political institutions"; "that poverty is particularly widespread and intractable in countries that lack a history of.