

## Chapter 1 :  Tobacco: U.S. market value | Statistic

*The tobacco industry comprises those persons and companies engaged in the growth, preparation for sale, shipment, advertisement, and distribution of tobacco and tobacco-related products. It is a global industry; tobacco can grow in any warm, moist environment, which means it can be farmed on all continents except Antarctica.*

Philip Morris Companies Inc. In most countries these companies either have long-established dominance, or have purchased the major domestic producer or producers often a former state monopoly. India has its own major player, ITC Limited A small[ quantify ] number of state monopolies survive, as well as some small independent firms. Tobacco advertising is becoming increasingly restricted by the governments of countries around the world citing health issues as a reason to restrict tobaccos appeal[ citation needed ] Industry outlook in the United States[ edit ] This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. July Learn how and when to remove this template message Anti-smoking ad, The tobacco industry in the United States has suffered greatly since the mids, when it was successfully sued by several U. The suits claimed that tobacco causes cancer, that companies in the industry knew this, and that they deliberately understated the significance of their findings, contributing to the illness and death of many citizens in those states. The industry was found to have decades of internal memos confirming in detail that tobacco which contains nicotine is both addictive and carcinogenic cancer-causing. The industry had long denied that nicotine is addictive. Further, since the suit was settled, other individuals have come forth, in class action lawsuits , claiming individual damages. New suits of this nature will probably continue for a long time. During the first 42 years of tobacco litigation between and the industry maintained a clean record in litigation [4] thanks to tactics described in a R. Reynolds Tobacco Company internal memo as "the way we won these cases, to paraphrase Gen. In Florida, the industry has lost 77 of the "Engle progeny" cases that have gone to trial. Lawsuits against the tobacco industry are primarily restricted to the United States due to differences in legal systems in other countries. Many businesses class ongoing lawsuits as a cost of doing business in the US and feel their revenue will be only marginally affected by the activities. Large tobacco companies have entered the electronic cigarette market by either buying some of the small e-cigarette companies or by starting their own e-cigarette companies. This treaty places broad restrictions on the sale, advertising, shipment, and taxation of tobacco products. Most recently, there has been discussion within the tobacco control community of transforming the tobacco industry through the replacement of tobacco corporations by other types of business organizations that can be established to provide tobacco to the market while not attempting to increase market demand. The ruling by the three-judge panel will not allow the suit to be pursued as a class, but instead need proof for why individual smokers chose light cigarettes over regular cigarettes. Figures are in thousands of tonnes.

*Marketing to Hispanics and American Indians/Alaska Natives has included advertising and promotion of cigarette brands with names such as Rio, Dorado, and American Spirit. 7,8 The tobacco industry has targeted African American communities in its advertisements and promotional efforts for menthol cigarettes.*

Used by permission of the publisher. For personal use and not for further distribution. Please submit permission requests for other use directly to the publisher. Reynolds Tobacco Company ; W. Duke Sons and Company ; Tobacco Barrels: His son Brodie, seeing little opportunity in a small rural tobacco factory, moved to Durham in 1884. There he began to produce smoking tobacco; five years later, Washington and his two other sons, James B. The Dukes formed the firm of W. Duke, Sons and Company in 1889 to raise needed capital for the growth of their business. Soon substantial profits were pouring in, and the Dukes reinvested the money in the business for continued expansion. During this period, the youngest son, James, emerged as the true leader of the enterprise. The leading manufacturer of smoking tobacco in Durham at the time was the William T. Blackwell Company, with its famous Bull Durham label. The sales of W. Duke, always the visionary, realized the cigarette had great potential for the future if a machine for mass production could be perfected. In the early 1890s, James Bonsack of Virginia invented such a machine. Before the end of the decade, James B. Duke had gained exclusive control of the Bonsack machine and soon had a monopoly on the American cigarette industry. Major firms absorbed in North Carolina included R. Reynolds of Winston-Salem, W. Blackwell of Durham, and F. In Duke reorganized his many tobacco firms into a single corporation. By 1900 American Tobacco controlled four-fifths of the entire domestic tobacco industry other than cigars. In 1911 a federal court ruled that American Tobacco had a monopoly on licorice, a flavoring, and that the company was guilty of violating the Sherman Antitrust Act. After a long trial, the court prohibited the company from enjoying interstate trade until conditions were corrected. The ruling was appealed to the U. Supreme Court, which decided on 29 May that the company had to be dissolved. American Tobacco, Liggett and Myers, and P. The control of R. Reynolds Tobacco Company of Winston-Salem was also relinquished. Duke, a multimillionaire by then, retired from active management of the American companies and turned his attention to other interests, including the generation of hydroelectric power and the creation of Duke University in Durham. After the breakup of American Tobacco in 1911, the restructured company concentrated its tobacco manufacturing in Durham and Reidsville, N. The Durham facility had been built by the Duke family and included the former William T. The Reidsville plant was the former F. Jeff, continued to work for the corporation. Penn became a director of American Tobacco in 1911 and the vice president of manufacturing in 1912. He perfected the blend for a new cigarette known as Lucky Strike, which was later to become one of the leading brands in the history of the industry. American Tobacco Company began to diversify in the 1920s and moved into other fields, including distilled spirits, life insurance, office supplies, cosmetics, and hardware. In the various components of the company were reorganized into a new corporation, American Brands, Inc. As its older tobacco manufacturing plants became outmoded, the company began to concentrate its cigarette production in Reidsville. It closed its Louisville plants in 1928, its Richmond plants in 1930, and its Durham plants in 1932. The manufacturing complex in Reidsville was expanded to accommodate the increased production. In 1932 the American Tobacco Company became a subsidiary of American Brands, making it one of the largest cigarette producers in the United States. Through the work of the Historic Preservation Society of Durham and various developers in the 1970s, the tobacco district of downtown Durham began to be restored and transformed into a thriving urban center featuring apartment complexes, restaurants, and unique retail stores. Durden, The Dukes of Durham, A Life of James B. Michael Orey, Assuming the Risk: American Tobacco Company factory, circa 1900

**Chapter 3 : British American Tobacco - British American Tobacco**

*The American Tobacco Company was a tobacco company founded in by J. B. Duke through a merger between a number of U.S. tobacco manufacturers including Allen and Ginter and Goodwin & Company.*

Since its introduction to Europeans by American Indians, no other agricultural crop has been more thoroughly entwined with the history of the United States than the growing, processing, and manufacturing of tobacco. In addition, no one product has enjoyed deeper ties to the colonization of the New World and to the expansion of international trade between the New World and Europe, Asia, and the Middle East over the last four centuries. The prospect of farming tobacco and selling it to England brought the earliest British colonists to Virginia and Maryland, and at the end of the twentieth century U. For many centuries tobacco has been identified with the New World, especially the United States. In the form of the mass-produced cigarette, U. Indeed, students of the industry have argued that the advent of machine-made cigarettes in the s helped inaugurate in the United States the modern era of mass consumer products, mass advertising and promotion, and the professionally managed modern corporation. However, the last half of the twentieth century saw the U. In response, the industry aggressively pursued expanding into markets in Asia, Eastern Europe , and Africa, prompting the World Health Organization to accuse tobacco manufacturers of fomenting a tobacco epidemic. Cigarette makers faced the prospect of being demoted to the status of a rogue industry in the eyes of U. Production and Consumption Most modern tobacco consumption derives from *Nicotiana tabacum*, which is a species of nightshade plant. The arrival of Europeans in the New World introduced them to tobacco, and by the early seventeenth century commercial tobacco became a driving force of colonization in North America and the Caribbean. The Jamestown colony in Virginia owed its very survival to tobacco. A cash crop requiring very intensive labor from planting to harvesting to curing, its cultivation created a demand for conscripted labor, first in the form of indentured European servants on family farms and soon afterward in the form of African slave labor on large landholdings. Two types of tobacco leaf were grown, principally for pipe smoking and, later on, snuff. They were both dark varieties: In England, demand for tobacco rapidly grew and by the Chesapeake colonies exported , pounds annually to England, procuring substantial tax revenues for the state, which overcame early Crown hostility to tobacco cultivation and consumption. It also extended to two other regions in which cigar Cuban leaf cultivation would come to dominate in the nineteenth century: In exports of raw leaf from the British Chesapeake colonies reached 37 million pounds and by the outbreak of the American Revolution in upward of million pounds. At the end of the eighteenth century, the main producers of tobacco were the United States, Brazil, and Cuba. After a decline following the American Revolution , U. Production then rose sharply to million pounds in and, after a drop due to the Civil War , resumed its growth, averaging million pounds in through , of which one-half was consumed domestically. From to the s, U. Throughout most of their history, Americans overall and men in particular remained the heaviest consumers of tobacco worldwide, principally in the form of chewing and smoking tobacco. Europeans consumed tobacco by smoking it in clay pipes until the eighteenth century, when manufactured snuff became dominant starting in Spain. While chewing tobacco was rare in Europe, it was quite popular in the United States among men and remained so up to the early twentieth century. Pipe smoking was also popular among men and some women in the nineteenth century Women also used snuff. It was taken by New York society women and by women of all classes in the South. In Europe, pipe smoking made a comeback in the nineteenth century at the expense of snuff, but was soon forced to accommodate the new vogues for cigar and cigarette smoking popular both there and in North America. These shifts in consumption patterns stemmed in part from the development in the nineteenth century of new, lighter leaves of the bright and the burley varieties, which were more suitable for chewing and cigarette smoking and competed with the dark leaf grown in Virginia and Maryland. By the end of the nineteenth century, the bulk of U. Industrializing Tobacco and the Rise of the Cigarette Until tobacco manufacturing proper was largely carried out in Europe. New York, a center of snuff production, was the exception. Manufacturing of tobacco also thrived among planters who prepared tobacco for chew. After the Civil War , the introduction of steam-powered shredding and cigarette machines and pressures stemming from

the rise of national markets led to the concentration of tobacco manufacturing in that sector. Cigar manufacturing underwent a similar evolution somewhat later. Cigars first became popular in the United States after the Mexican-American War, and their manufacture was fairly dispersed in cigar leaf-growing regions. In the United States, the convenience and simplicity of smoking cigarettes made from the bright variety of tobacco was discovered by Union and Confederate troops alike during the Civil War. Ready-made cigarettes using mixtures of bright and burley tobacco allowed U. The growth of the U. With this growth arose new aggressive methods of packaging striking colors, designs, logos, brand names, promoting gifts, picture cards, free samples, discounts and rebates to jobbers, retailers, etc. In 1880 James Bonsack patented a new cigarette-making machine that turned out over 100,000 cigarettes per day. Until then, factory workers rolled up to 3,000 cigarettes a day. The Bonsack machines made the fortune of James B. Duke, who adopted them in 1881. That same year Duke pressured his rivals into forming the American Tobacco Company with Duke as president. The trust did not own any tobacco farms, and employed its considerable leverage to depress the price of tobacco leaf. This unequal relationship to the detriment of growers reached a crisis point forty years later during the Great Depression, necessitating the tobacco price support program of 1938, still in place at the end of the twentieth century, which rescued tobacco growers, many of them tenant farmers, from certain ruin. The trust also proceeded to absorb important rivals as well as manufacturers of chew, snuff, smoking tobacco, and cigars including R. J. R. The geometric increase in cigarette production spurred the trust to make a major innovation in modern corporate practices: At the turn of the century, upward of one-third of the U. S. By 1911, the year before its demise, the trust accounted for 75 percent of U. S. In 1911, the Supreme Court found the American Tobacco Company in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and ordered its breakup into four major companies: In 1911 machine-made cigarettes still accounted for only 3 to 4 percent of U. S. Their greatest growth lay ahead: In the newly independent R. J. R. Reynolds launched Camels, the "first modern cigarette. All three brands stressed their mildness and catered their appeal to men and women alike. Between them the three brands enjoyed 65 to 80 percent market share through the 1920s. The 1920s saw the "conversion" of many tobacco consumers to the cigarette in the United States, United Kingdom, Europe, China, and Japan. Between 1914 and 1918, U. S. Smoking and Health As in the previous century, war was to prove a boon to U. S. The rations of American soldiers and sailors included tobacco. With each world war, U. S. Per capita consumption in the United States reached almost 3,000 per year by 1918, a rate matched only by the United Kingdom and Canada. It would be twenty years before nations in continental Europe and East Asia would achieve similar rates. By 1920 in the United States, 57 percent of men and 28 percent of women smoked. A veritable culture of cigarette smoking had arisen. Estimates vary, but by around 1920 around 16 percent of women smoked cigarettes, a figure that rose to 25 to 35 percent in the late 1920s and peaked at around 30 to 35 percent in the early 1930s. At the very moment cigarettes took off as a popular consumer product in the 1920s and 1930s, antismoking crusaders were waging successful campaigns banning the sale or consumption of tobacco in seventeen states, but their success was short-lived: World War I undid most of the legislation. Prior to World War II, cases of lung cancer were relatively rare in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, the heaviest-smoking countries, but rates in men were rising fast, prompting medical researchers to initiate the first statistical studies of the disease. Results of early studies in the United States and the United Kingdom appeared in 1929 just as the Federal Trade Commission was castigating the tobacco industry for making false health claims for their products. Reports of other studies followed over the next two years resulting in a health scare that precipitated a temporary 10 percent drop in consumption. The industry responded in two ways: Under pressure from health organizations, the government published in 1929 a landmark report of the Surgeon General warning the American public of the dangers of smoking. It was the first in a long series of Surgeon General reports that reviewed existing studies on tobacco-related diseases and, beginning in the 1930s, on women and smoking, nicotine addiction, modified cigarettes, cessation, secondhand smoke, youth initiation, and smoking among racial and ethnic minority groups. The political and economic picture of the domestic market for the tobacco industry had changed. In 1938, the industry had to work vigorously to keep the new cigarette warning labels watered down, and in 1939 the industry withdrew all radio and television ads voluntarily in order to eliminate free broadcast time awarded by the Federal Trade Commission starting in 1938 for antismoking public service announcements. Segregation of smokers in airplanes and other forms of public

transportation began in and was extended to public buildings in Arizona and Minnesota. New studies on the dangers of secondhand smoke in the s and s galvanized the anti-smoking movement to pressure federal, state, and local governments to ban smoking completely in public buildings, public transportation, stores, theaters, and schools, establish smoking sections in workplaces and restaurants, and, in the case of California, ban smoking in all indoor public areas including workplaces, restaurants, and bars. By , the rates had dropped precipitously to 28 and 23, respectively, and by to 26 and 22 percent. Per capita cigarette consumption peaked in the early s at around 4, and steadily dropped from 3, to 2. Meanwhile, tobacco-related diseases lung cancer, emphysema, coronary heart disease, stroke became the leading preventable causes of death—over , deaths in. For women, the number of deaths due to lung cancer surpassed those due to breast cancer in . Industry adjusted by offering low-tar and nicotine cigarettes a 40 percent drop in yields between and , cheaper brands, and promotion gimmicks such as coupons and giveaways and by opposing systematically growing legal challenges. In a changing market, one company that rose to preeminence was Philip Morris, thanks to its innovative marketing. Its market share surpassed that of previous leader R. Reynolds in , and it also took the lead in industry sponsorship of cultural institutions, concerts, and national sporting events. To cover declining U. With the help of the U. Reynolds, forced open East Asian markets previously dominated by state monopolies, and in the s snapped up privatized state-run companies in former communist countries in Eastern Europe. By the end of the century, Philip Morris held 50 percent of the U. Although faced with a changing market, leading U. In the s and s they repositioned themselves by diversifying into the beverage and food industry Nabisco, Kraft Foods, blurring their corporate identities. The threat of successful lawsuits resulted in the Master Settlement Agreement signed on 23 November with forty-six states attorneys general. Down from a high of 75, in , in cigarette manufacturing in the United States directly employed 41, people; the number dropped to 26, by . In through , debt-ridden RJR Nabisco sold off its overseas tobacco operations to Japan Tobacco and its food products company to Philip Morris, and spun off its domestic tobacco operations as R. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Tobacco Information and Prevention Source.

## Chapter 4 : CDC - Fact Sheet - Tobacco Industry Marketing - Smoking & Tobacco Use

*Tobacco products are one of the most heavily marketed consumer products in the U.S. In , the latest year for which information is available, the five largest cigarette manufacturers spent a total of \$ billion " or more than \$25 million dollars a day " to promote and advertise their products.*

What do the major cigarette companies spend their advertising dollars on? The largest single category of marketing and promotional expenditures in was price discounts paid to cigarette retailers to reduce the cost of cigarettes to the consumer. This category accounted for Every 10 percent increase in the price of cigarettes reduces youth consumption by 7 percent. The second and third largest expenditure categories were price discounts and promotional allowances paid to cigarette wholesalers. After the start of the R. Certain tobacco products are advertised and promoted disproportionately to specific racial or ethnic groups. For example, advertising and promotion of cigarette brands with names such as Rio, Dorado and American Spirit have been marketed toward Hispanics, American Indians and Alaska Natives. Advertising for tobacco products historically has been more prevalent in African-American communities. It seems to work well; a study of boys and men in Appalachian Ohio found that the participants viewed smokeless tobacco use as a rite of passage in the development of their masculine identity, and a key to acceptance into male social networks. Women also have been extensively targeted by tobacco marketing. Such marketing is dominated by themes of an association between social desirability, independence, weight control and smoking messages conveyed through advertisements featuring slim, attractive and athletic models. Tactics included offering discounts by mail and at the point of sale, and using literal language in advertising and marketing materials. These tactics are or could be still in use today. In , the U. Food and Drug Administration FDA issued a final rule that placed several restrictions on marketing and promotion of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco, including prohibiting brand name sponsorship of athletic, musical, or other social or cultural events and prohibiting the sale or distribution of certain items with cigarette and smokeless tobacco brands or logos. Cigarette Report for Smokeless Tobacco Report for A National Longitudinal Analysis. Department of Health and Human Services. A Report of the Surgeon General, Pediatrics ; 4: May ; 5: Tobacco Use Among U. A Report of the Surgeon General. Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis. Sep-Oct ; 5: Stevens P, et al. Strategies for Mainstream Tobacco Control and Prevention. Journal of Community Health. Dec ; 37 6: A Report of the Surgeon General , Tobacco industry marketing to low socioeconomic status women in the USA.

## Chapter 5 : CDC - Fact Sheet - Economic Trends in Tobacco - Smoking & Tobacco Use

*The tobacco industry ' s main tobacco products are smoking tobacco (including cigarettes, cigars, and pipe tobacco), chewing tobacco, and snuff. The use of cigarettes as a means of consuming tobacco is relatively recent, beginning around the start of the twentieth century.*

Abstract Confronted by compelling peer-reviewed scientific evidence of the harms of smoking, the tobacco industry, beginning in the s, used sophisticated public relations approaches to undermine and distort the emerging science. The industry campaign worked to create a scientific controversy through a program that depended on the creation of industryâ€™academic conflicts of interest. This strategy of producing scientific uncertainty undercut public health efforts and regulatory interventions designed to reduce the harms of smoking. A number of industries have subsequently followed this approach to disrupting normative science. Claims of scientific uncertainty and lack of proof also lead to the assertion of individual responsibility for industrially produced health risks. This, of course, is not to argue that the approach and strategy undertaken by big tobacco are necessarily typical of conventional industryâ€™science relationships. But the steps the industry took as it fashioned a new relationship with the scientific enterprise have become a powerful and influential model for the exertion of commercial interests within science and medicine since that time. As a result, industrial influence on scientific research and outcome has been a powerful legacy of the tobacco story. In this sense, the tobacco industry invented the modern problem of conflicts of interest at midcentury. Smoking had been categorically linked to the dramatic rise of lung cancer. Although health concerns about smoking had been raised for decades, by the early s there was a powerful expansion and consolidation of scientific methods and findings that demonstrated that smoking caused lung disease as well as other serious respiratory and cardiac diseases, leading to death. These findings appeared in major, peer-reviewed medical journals as well as throughout the general media. As a result, the tobacco industry would launch a new strategy, largely unprecedented in the history of US industry and business: But this would be no simple matter. After all, in the immediate postwar yearsâ€™the dawn of the nuclear ageâ€™science was in high esteem. The industry could not denigrate the scientific enterprise and still maintain its public credibility, so crucial to its success. The tobacco industry already had a long history of innovative advertising, marketing, and public relations that had centered on making smoking universal. Starting in the late 19th century, the industry transformed itself to become a model of modern industrial organization and consumer marketing. The industry took a product that had existed at the cultural periphery and remade it into one of the most popular, successful, and widely used items of the early 20th century. The basic tenet of the highly articulated public relations approach the companies deployed centered on the notion that if the current cultural context was inhospitable to the product, one couldâ€™through shrewd and creative public relations interventionsâ€™change the culture to fit the product. In the course of this transformation, the tobacco companies successfully defined and exploited critical aspects of a new consumer culture. And yet, as subsequent history would show, the management of culture and social meaning was considerably different from the management of science. It moved aggressively into a new domain, the production of scientific knowledge, not for purposes of research and development but, rather, to undo what was now known: In the conduct of this public relations campaign, the tobacco industry would markedly alter the historical trajectory of industryâ€™science relationships. Although medicine and science had never been sacrosanct from a range of social and commercial interests, 8â€™11 the tobacco industry campaign crossed into new terrain to build a powerful network of interests and influence. Today, as a result of litigation, journalistic exposure, and historical investigation, this story is relatively well known. Indeed, the tobacco industry constructed a program that had a number of effects within the broader culture of science, knowledge, and policy. For this reason I make the somewhat provocative claim that the industry invented the modern conflicts of interest that now are the subject of such intensive contention in the world of science and medicine as well as media, politics, law, and policy. The industry well understood the power of interests and the levers of influence. Indeed, the ability to use interests and influence had been key aspects of its past success. Earlyth-century tobacco advertisements centered on the endorsement of public figures of influence and

authority who would help to bring smoking into the mainstream. In this respect, the tobacco industry played an important role in constructing a culture of celebrities who would help influence social mores and consumer spending through brand endorsements. They realized that the threat they now faced was unprecedented and would require new, collaborative approaches and expertise. Not surprisingly, given their history, they turned again to the field of public relations that had served them so well in the past. They called upon John W. Hill. The public confidence the industry required could not be achieved through advertising, which was self-interested by definition. It would be crucial for the industry to assert its authority over the scientific domain; science had the distinct advantage of its reputation for disinterestedness. To those schooled in public relations, advertising ran the risk of exposing corporate self-interest. Good public relations relied on scrupulous behind-the-scenes management of media. As Bernays had demonstrated in the 1920s and 1930s, the best public relations work left no fingerprints. Hill understood that simply denying emerging scientific facts would be a losing game. This would not only smack of self-interest but also ally the companies with ignorance in an age of technological and scientific hegemony. So he proposed seizing and controlling science rather than avoiding it. If science posed the principal "even terminal" threat to the industry, Hill advised that the companies should now associate themselves as great supporters of science. The companies, in his view, should embrace a sophisticated scientific discourse; they should demand more science, not less. Of critical importance, Hill argued, they should declare the positive value of scientific skepticism of science itself. Knowledge, Hill understood, was hard won and uncertain, and there would always be skeptics. What better strategy than to identify, solicit, support, and amplify the views of skeptics of the causal relationship between smoking and disease? Moreover, the liberal disbursement of tobacco industry research funding to academic scientists could draw new skeptics into the fold. The goal, according to Hill, would be to build and broadcast a major scientific controversy. The public must get the message that the issue of the health effects of smoking remains an open question. Hill was above all a cynic, deeply committed to the instrumental ideals of public relations. He was profoundly confident that public relations strategies, well developed and implemented, could effectively serve the needs of his clients. Although he had quit smoking himself, he had no interest in examining and assessing the data or the emerging science. For Hill, science would be a means to a public relations end. Dismissing as shortsighted the idea of mounting personal attacks on researchers or simply issuing blanket assurances of safety, they concluded instead that seizing control of the science of tobacco and health would be essential to seizing control of the media. It would be crucial to identify scientists who expressed skepticism about the link between cigarettes and cancer, those critical of statistical methods, and especially those who had offered alternative hypotheses for the causes of cancer. Hill set his staff to identifying the most vocal and visible skeptics of the emerging science of smoking and disease. These scientists many of whom turned out to be smokers themselves would be central to the development of an industry scientific program in step with larger public relations goals. Hill understood that simply denying the harms of smoking would alienate the public. His strategy for ending what the tobacco CEOs called the hysteria linking smoking to cancer was to insist that there were 2 sides in a highly contentious scientific debate. Just as Bernays had worked to engineer consent, so Hill would engineer controversy. This strategy "invented by Hill in the context of his work for the tobacco industry" would ultimately become the cornerstone of a large range of efforts to distort scientific process for commercial ends during the second half of the 20th century. Executives and staff canceled all holiday plans as they worked to frame and implement a full-scale campaign on behalf of the industry. Their role was exclusively limited to serving the public relations goal of their collective clients. Because of the serious nature of the attack on cigarettes and the vast publicity given them in the daily press and in magazines of the widest circulation, a hysteria of fear appears to be developing throughout the country, Hill wrote in an internal memorandum. Ultimately, he concluded, the best public relations approach was for the industry to become a major sponsor of medical research. The call for new research implied that existing studies were inadequate or flawed. It made clear that there was more to know, and it made the industry seem a committed participant in the scientific enterprise rather than a self-interested critic. This was a public relations masterstroke. Hill understood that simply giving money to scientists "through the National Institutes of Health or some other entity, for example" offered little opportunity to shape the public relations environment. However, offering

funds directly to university-based scientists would enlist their support and dependence. The very nature of controlling and managing information in public relations stood in marked contrast to the scientific notion of unfettered new knowledge. Hill and his clients had no interest in answering a scientific question. Their goal was to maintain vigorous control over the research program, to use science in the service of public relations. Hill also advised the industry that continued competitive assertions about the health benefits of particular brands would be devastating. Instead, the industry needed a collective research initiative to demonstrate its shared concern for the public. Rather than using health research to create competitive products as they had been doing, the companies needed to express "above all else" their commitment to public well-being. No one would look for serious information about health from an industry that was making unsubstantiated claims about its product. The future of the industry would reflect its acceptance of this essential principle. From December forward, the tobacco companies would present a unified front on smoking and health; more than 5 decades of strategic and explicit collusion would follow. We believe the products we make are not injurious to health. We always have and always will cooperate closely with those whose task it is to safeguard the public health. Hill carefully outlined the plans for a research program before a single scientist was consulted. The utility of such a strategy was its apparent commitment to objective science and its search for the truth. As one colleague argued, A flamboyant campaign against the anti-smoking propagandists would unquestionably alienate much of the support of the moderates in both scientific and lay publics. The TIRC, from its inception, was dominated by its public relations goals. He noted, Of course, the critical areas of investigation, as every research scientist knows, have to do with the problem of how to make smoking a less lethal agent in lung cancer incidence and a less deadly killer in heart disease. Hoyt, executive director of the TIRC, came to the position with no scientific experience whatsoever. In early , he assumed a dominant role in the day-to-day operations of the tobacco industry research program. Ultimately, Hoyt would become a full-time employee, remaining integral to the TIRC until he retired in The press release announcing his appointment read, in part, as follows: It is an obligation of the Tobacco Industry Research Committee at this time to remind the public of these essential points: There is no conclusive scientific proof of a link between smoking and cancer. Medical research points to many possible causes of cancer. The millions of people who derive pleasure and satisfaction from smoking can be reassured that every scientific means will be used to get all the facts as soon as possible. Little came to the position as an aggressive and uncompromising skeptic of the epidemiological work that had demonstrated the relationship of smoking to lung cancer. He had strong a priori views that cancer must be essentially genetic and that ultimately this would be demonstrated. Given his scientific pedigree, national standing, and propensity for public conflict, he was extremely well chosen from a public relations perspective.

### Chapter 6 : American Tobacco Company | NCpedia

*In , tobacco industry's profit was equivalent to US \$6, for each death caused by tobacco. 43 trillion cigarettes have been smoked in the last decade. The Tobacco Atlas, Fourth Edition, and its companion website calendrierdelascience.com, were unveiled by the American Cancer Society and World Lung Foundation at the 15 th World Conference on.*

Used by permission of the publisher. For personal use and not for further distribution. Please submit permission requests for other use directly to the publisher. American Tobacco Company by James L. Hunt, United States v. American Tobacco Company was a U. Watts , and Benjamin N. Duke, as well as the American Tobacco Company , the R. The ruling was among the earliest Supreme Court decisions applying the Sherman Act. Duke, a member of W. Duke, Sons and Company of Durham. Duke, Sons and Company. From the moment it was formed, the American Tobacco Company possessed a near monopoly on sales of manufactured cigarettes. By , when the government began the federal lawsuit that led to the Supreme Court decision, the company had extended its monopoly in the United States to most other branches of the tobacco industry, including plug tobacco, smoking tobacco, snuff, and little cigars. The antitrust case was commenced in a New York federal court. After that court held that the American Tobacco Company was guilty of violating the Sherman Act, but found other defendants not guilty of any violation, both the United States and the American Tobacco Company appealed. The Supreme Court effectively extended the finding of guilt to all parties and remanded the matter to a federal circuit court in New York, with instructions to dissolve the combination. Lorillard Company , and the R. Reynolds Tobacco Company, in , introduced its Camel brand, which eventually captured a substantial share of the cigarette market. The Supreme Court decision did not end monopolistic practices among cigarette manufacturers. By the R. The Court affirmed a conviction against them for violating the Sherman Act by unlawful price fixing and monopolizing both the purchase of raw tobacco and the marketing of cigarettes. Durden, The Dukes of Durham, Reynolds Tobacco Company American Tobacco Co Et. North Carolina Museum of History.

## Chapter 7 : Tobacco Industry Marketing | American Lung Association

*The tobacco industry has used mainstream fashion and beauty to sell cigarettes for about a century. There are many examples of the tobacco industry targeting women this way.*

In the 1880s, while Duke was beginning to machine-roll all his cigarettes, he saw that growth rates in the cigarette industry were declining. Duke controlled the cigarette market, and his trust caught the attention of legislators in the United States, a country with historical aversion to monopolies. The company also maintained an interest in producing other tobacco products in case fads shifted; Duke wanted to be sure that he would be prepared with a multitude of tobacco styles. The Supreme Court ordered the company to dissolve in on the same day that it ordered the Standard Oil Trust to dissolve. The American Tobacco Company had combined many prior companies and processes. One department would manage a certain process for the entire organization, producing brands previously owned by other companies. Investors, holding millions of dollars of securities, also needed to be considered. A large question was how to distribute trademarks and brands between the resulting companies. American Tobacco Company, the existing R. The monopoly became an oligopoly. Liggett and Myers, St. Lorillard[ edit ] P. Lorillard retained the Lorillard properties in addition to S. Reynolds Tobacco Company in American Tobacco left Durham in the late 1950s. Developed by Capitol Broadcasting and reopened as the American Tobacco Historic District , phase 1 consisted of the Fowler, Crowe, Strickland, Reed, and Washington Buildings, and included the construction of two new parking garages and a waterfall feature through the center of the campus designed by Smallwood, Reynolds, Stewart, Stewart of Atlanta, Georgia and constructed by W. Phase 2, consisting of the remaining buildings and expansion of the water feature at the north end of the site, was under construction as of late 2010. It follows the route of the railroad Norfolk Southern Railway former Durham Branch that once served the factories, but was later abandoned when these facilities were shut down. Advertising[ edit ] In the golden age of radio, as well as early television, American Tobacco was known for advertisements featuring a fast-talking tobacco auctioneer named L. Boone, was often heard in tandem with Riggs.

## Chapter 8 : Tobacco & Cigarette Industry Sales Statistics - Statistic Brain

*In November the circuit court, seeking to destroy unified control over the affected branches of the tobacco industry, divided the monopoly's assets among several corporations, including a new American Tobacco Company, the Liggett and Myers Tobacco Company, the P. Lorillard Company, and the R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company.*

## Chapter 9 : The Top 5 Biggest Tobacco Companies

*Profits are booming for cigarette companies, despite government regulation, huge legal settlements and a decline in smoking rates. The secret: A consolidated industry has been able to boost the.*