

## Chapter 1 : Truth in Contrast to Knowledge and Belief

*This chapter lays out the background to the current debate between correspondence theorists and disquotationalists in the theory of truth: from Tarski, to Field, to Leeds.*

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*Subsidiary questions concern the relation between reference and meaning, reference and truth, and reference and knowledge. Some philosophers have thought that the nature of reference is able to shed light on important metaphysical or epistemological issues.*

The correspondence theory The classic suggestion comes from Aristotle (384–322 BCE): This idea appeals to common sense and is the germ of what is called the correspondence theory of truth. As it stands, however, it is little more than a platitude and far less than a theory. Unfortunately, many philosophers doubt whether an acceptable explanation of facts and correspondence can be given. Facts, as they point out, are strange entities. It is tempting to think of them as structures or arrangements of things in the world. However, as the Austrian-born philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein observed, structures have spatial locations, but facts do not. Thus, there is no enterprise of first forming a belief or theory about some matter and then in some new process stepping outside the belief or theory to assess whether it corresponds with the facts. There are, indeed, processes of checking and verifying beliefs, but they work by bringing up further beliefs and perceptions and assessing the original in light of those. In actual investigations, what tells people what to believe is not the world or the facts but how they interpret the world or select and conceptualize the facts. Coherence and pragmatist theories Starting in the mid-19th century, this line of criticism led some philosophers to think that they should concentrate on larger theories, rather than sentences or assertions taken one at a time. An individual belief in such a system is true if it sufficiently coheres with, or makes rational sense within, enough other beliefs; alternatively, a belief system is true if it is sufficiently internally coherent. Such were the views of the British idealists, including F. H. Bradley, who, like all idealists, rejected the existence of mind-independent facts against which the truth of beliefs could be determined see also realism: Yet coherentism too seems inadequate, since it suggests that human beings are trapped in the sealed compartment of their own beliefs, unable to know anything of the world beyond. Moreover, as the English philosopher and logician Bertrand Russell pointed out, nothing seems to prevent there being many equally coherent but incompatible belief systems. Yet at best only one of them can be true. Some theorists have suggested that belief systems can be compared in pragmatic or utilitarian terms. According to this idea, even if many different systems can be internally coherent, it is likely that some will be much more useful than others. Thus, one can expect that, in a process akin to Darwinian natural selection, the more useful systems will survive while the others gradually go extinct. The replacement of Newtonian mechanics by relativity theory is an example of this process. It was in this spirit that the 19th-century American pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce said: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Office of NOAA Corps Operations The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. Although this approach may seem appealingly hard-headed, it has prompted worries about how a society, or humanity as a whole, could know at a given moment whether it is following the path toward such an ideal. In practice it has opened the door to varying degrees of skepticism about the notion of truth. In the late 20th century philosophers such as Richard Rorty advocated retiring the notion of truth in favour of a more open-minded and open-ended process of indefinite adjustment of beliefs. Such a process, it was felt, would have its own utility, even though it lacked any final or absolute endpoint. Tarski and truth conditions The rise of formal logic the abstract study of assertions and deductive arguments and the growth of interest in formal systems formal or mathematical languages among many Anglo-American philosophers in the early 20th century led to new attempts to define truth in logically or scientifically acceptable terms. It also led to a renewed respect for the ancient liar paradox attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Epimenides, in which a sentence says of itself that it is false, thereby apparently being true if it is false and false if it is true. Logicians set themselves the task of developing systems of mathematical reasoning that would be free of the kinds of self-reference that give rise to paradoxes such as that of the liar. However, this proved difficult to do without at the same time making some legitimate proof procedures impossible. These efforts culminated in the work of the Polish-born logician Alfred Tarski, who in the 1930s showed how to construct a definition of truth for

a formal or mathematical language by means of a theory that would assign truth conditions the conditions in which a given sentence is true to each sentence in the language without making use of any semantic terms, notably including truth, in that language. A T-sentence says of some sentence *S* in the object language the language for which truth is being defined that *S* is true if and only if  $\phi$ , where the ellipsis is replaced by a translation of *S* into the language used to construct the theory the metalanguage. But the weight of philosophical opinion gradually shifted, and eventually this platitudinous appearance was regarded as a virtue and indeed as indicative of the whole truth about truth. It is true that snow is white if and only if snow is white. At most there might be an added emphasis, but no change of topic. Yet, if truth is essentially redundant, why should talk of truth be so common? What purpose does the truth predicate serve? The answer, according to most deflationists, is that true is a highly useful device for making generalizations over large numbers of sayings or assertions. Despite their contention that the truth predicate is essentially redundant, deflationists can allow that truth is important and that it should be the aim of rational inquiry. Indeed, the paraphrases into which the deflationary view renders such claims help to explain why this is so. While deflationism has been an influential view since the 1970s, it has not escaped criticism. One objection is that it takes the meanings of sentences too much for granted. According to many theorists, including the American philosopher Donald Davidson, the meaning of a sentence is equivalent to its truth conditions see semantics: If deflationism is correct, however, then this approach to sentence meaning might have to be abandoned because no statement of the truth conditions of a sentence could be any more informative than the sentence itself. If this is right, then saying what a sentence means by giving its truth conditions comes to nothing more than saying what a sentence means. As indicated above, the realm of truth bearers has been populated in different ways in different theories. In some it consists of sentences, in others sayings, assertions, beliefs, or propositions. Although assertions and related speech acts are featured in many theories, much work remains to be done on the nature of assertion in different areas of discourse. The danger, according to Wittgenstein and many others, is that the smooth notion of an assertion conceals many different functions of language underneath its bland surface. For example, some theorists hold that some assertions are not truth bearers but are rather put forward as useful fictions, as instruments, or as expressions of attitudes of approval or disapproval or of dispositions to act in certain ways. A familiar example of such a view is expressivism in ethics, which holds that ethical assertions are expressions of attitudes. Even if there is this much diversity in the human linguistic repertoire, however, it does not necessarily follow that deflationism "according to which the truth predicate applies redundantly to all assertions" is wrong. The diversity might be identifiable without holding the truth predicate responsible.

*A well-known sermon illustration recalls French philosopher Voltaire. During the Enlightenment, Voltaire, a deist, declared that within 25 years the Bible would be forgotten and Christianity would be obsolete.*

Introduction We use language to talk about the world. Much of what we say about the world appears to be meaningful; some of it, presumably, is even true. For instance, I seem to be saying something true when, in the appropriate sort of setting, I assertively utter: Bush is a Republican. How do we manage to do such things? How, for instance, do I manage to talk about George W. Bush and thereby say meaningful and true things about him? Particular issues arise with regard to each of these, and each will be discussed in some detail below. The central issues, the central questions, concerning reference are four: For instance, is the meaning of a word to be identified with the mechanism by which it refers? Or is the meaning of a referential term perhaps best understood as the referent itself? More specifically, does the reference of a word, or its mechanism of reference, somehow enter into the truth conditions of assertive utterances of sentences containing that word? The primary focus in this article will be on the first two of these questions, those concerning the mechanism of reference and whether there is a single mechanism common to each sort of referring term. However, as will become evident in what follows, addressing these first two questions will prove to be impossible without addressing the latter two as well. Theories of proper names will be considered first, in Section 2, as proper names are considered by many to be referring terms par excellence. Section 3 will focus on indexicals, in large part because the mechanisms by which they refer arguably stand in sharp contrast to the case of proper names. As we will see, however, there is at least some reason to doubt the tenability of this contrast. Section 4 will consist of a brief discussion of two further sorts of expressions which are often classified as referring terms – natural kind terms and singular definite descriptions – along with several sorts of expressions which are typically not conceived of as referring terms – e. Section 5 will canvass some possible connections between both reference and reality and reference and knowledge. Proper Names Proper names are paradigmatic referring expressions. What are proper names? What do these expressions have in common? In virtue of what do they constitute a genuine class of linguistic expressions? They are thus to be counted as proper names for present purposes. There are many theories concerning the means by which proper names refer. We will consider three of the more popular and plausible kinds of theories: Then we will consider two more general issues regarding the reference of names, issues that arise for theorists of any persuasion. In other words, the descriptivist theory of proper names posits that referential success hinges on speakers attaching to each name in their repertoire some descriptive content F which uniquely singles out some specific object in the world. Conversely, when speakers neglect to associate a sufficiently precise description with a name, the descriptivist should predict that reference fails. Classical descriptivists, like Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, were perfectly willing to acknowledge that the descriptive content in question might vary – sometimes quite markedly – from one speaker to the next. Indeed, according to Russell, such content may vary across time for one and the same speaker. When Obama is no longer president, my identifying content will no doubt change – perhaps to something like the U. If George and Laura were to divorce, her identifying descriptive content would no doubt change as well – perhaps to my ex-husband. In particular, the descriptivist theory of meaning as opposed to the more modest descriptivist theory of reference can easily account for the non-triviality of identity statements involving co-referring names, sentences containing empty names, sentences containing true negative existentials, and propositional attitude reports. In short, the descriptivist theory of meaning not only offers a natural pairing for the descriptivist theory of reference; together, they offer an appealing explanation for a wide variety of linguistic phenomena. Let us turn now to the sorts of cases that have proved problematic for Millianism – or the thesis that the meaning of a proper name just is the bearer of that name – in order to come to better understand the appeal of descriptivism. Consider the following four sentences: Santa Claus lives at the North Pole. Vulcan does not exist. Fred believes that Cicero, but not Tully, was Roman. Here is why the Millian view faces problems with these sorts of cases. It would predict that 3, which seems meaningful, is meaningless on account of the meaningless subject term. It would predict that the

intuitively true and meaningful 4 is absurd as its meaningfulness presupposes the existence of what it denies exists. And it would predict that 5, which attributes seemingly consistent beliefs to Fred, attributes to him beliefs that no minimally rational agent could possibly entertain simultaneously – namely, the beliefs that x was Roman and the belief that one and the very same x was not Roman. Of course, Millians have offered various responses to these concerns. Thus, although what is literally expressed by 2 is trivial, what it serves to communicate is not. Although there may be no proposition literally expressed by 3 or 4, propositions can nonetheless be communicated by utterances of those sentences. In particular, the descriptivist might claim as many such theorists have that the reference-fixing descriptive content associated with a proper name constitutes the meaning of that name. So long as we allow that proper names that are co-referring can have different descriptive meanings, then we can account for the informativeness of 2 and for the fact that 5 ascribes consistent beliefs to Fred. Then 2 expresses the informative claim or proposition that the brightest evening star is the brightest morning star. Then 5 ascribes consistent beliefs to Fred: Moreover, if we allow that proper names that fail to refer may nevertheless have associated descriptive meanings, then we can account for the meaningfulness of sentences like 3 and 4. By claiming that the reference-fixing descriptive content of an expression is its meaning, descriptivist theories of reference are thus able to straightforwardly account for a variety of cases that have proven to be enduringly problematic for Millians. While the theory can be supplemented with an answer to this question by adopting, say, the causal theory of reference discussed in the next section, this pairing may seem less natural than the package offered by the expanded version of descriptivism. Expanded descriptivism offers a tight parallel between the theory of meaning and the theory of reference: Millians, in contrast, can hardly aspire to such theoretical elegance. The central challenge to the descriptivist theory is that there is reason to suspect that proper names are not semantically equivalent to singular definite descriptions. To say that proper names are tags is, for Marcus, to say that they have no linguistic meaning and are therefore not semantically equivalent to any singular description of their referents. Proper names do not, on this sort of view, refer by way of the descriptions they allegedly stand for; they refer directly to their bearers. Important consequences of this theory include, as Marcus notes, the necessity of identity statements between co-referring proper names – something which, though highly intuitive, is not guaranteed by many descriptivist theories of proper names. Nearly a decade later, Saul Kripke, in a trio of lectures subsequently published as *Naming and Necessity*, proposed a similar view of proper names. And Kripke, like Marcus before him, makes note of the fact that this sort of view guarantees the necessity of identity statements containing co-referring proper names. To get these problems more clearly in view, consider assertive utterances of the following sentences: Aristotle if he existed was a philosopher. Aristotle was fond of dogs. Einstein was a genius. Then, if expanded descriptivism is correct, a sentence like 6 should sound to Fred at least trivial, necessary, and analytic. Had things been different, Aristotle might for instance have died in infancy or pursued a career in the theater. Suppose that this possible world is, in other respects, pretty much like the actual world. And suppose, for the moment, that we adopt the descriptivist theory. Then, sentence 7, as used by English speakers in the actual world, would arguably be true of such a possible world just in case Plato was in that possible world fond of dogs! All this suggests that names are rigid: Definite descriptions, in contrast, do not appear to be rigid: This suggests that names are semantically different from descriptions, which in turn suggests that the mechanism by which a name refers cannot be identified with some definite description. Suppose that Fred believes of Einstein only that he was a physicist. Suppose now that Fred believes that Einstein was the inventor of the atomic bomb. According to Kripke many speakers believe this, or used to at least. The descriptivist theory would then predict what is surely false – that when such a speaker utters a sentence like 8, he refers not to Einstein but to Oppenheimer the person who did in fact invent the atomic bomb. For these and other reasons, many perhaps most philosophers of language have rejected descriptivist theories of proper names in favor of either causal or hybrid theories. Not everyone, though, has rejected descriptivism. For there is no reason to insist that reference-determining content must be expressible linguistically. Once these amendments are made, the problems noted by Kripke are easily avoided – according to Searle at least. In response to the problem of unwanted necessity, Searle effectively bites the bullet. In response to the rigidity problem, Searle points out that intuitions of rigidity are easily enough

accommodated: Finally, in response to the problems of ignorance and error, Searle points out that once all of the relevant intentional content is taken into consideration, these problems simply do not arise. Such theories appear according to these philosophers to imbue the mind with a rather curious property: Michael Devitt , echoing Hilary Putnam , makes this very complaint. He first makes the general point that nothing inside an object is sufficient to determine its relation to something outside it. He then applies this principle to the case at hand, asking pointedly p. How can something inside the head refer to something outside the head? Searle sees no problem: What makes it one rather than another of a pair of identical twins that you are in love with? Certainly not some specification blue printed in your mind! If God had looked into your mind, he would not have seen with whom you were in love, and of whom you were thinking. The basic idea is this: See the entry on externalism about mental content. More recently, a different offshoot of descriptivism has come to the fore in philosophical inquiries regarding names, an offshoot that itself subsumes two closely related views: Thus, for predicativists like Burge and Fara, the semantic value of a name in the subject place is equivalent to that of a complex demonstrative or an incomplete definite description. How such terms refer will, therefore, depend whether and how one thinks that complex demonstratives or incomplete definite descriptions refer. Bach, for one, claims that definite descriptions do not refer at all, at least semantically speaking.

*Entry for 'Truth' - Thompson Chain Reference - One of 6 Bible concordances freely available, this timeless classic, with over 3, entries, is THE concordance guide for serious students.*

The discovery of the liar paradox is often credited to Eubulides the Megarian who lived in the 4th century BC. The liar paradox belongs to the category of semantic paradoxes, since it is based on the semantic notion of truth. Say a predicate is heterological if it is not true of itself, that is, if it does not itself have the property it expresses. The question that leads to the paradox is now: Definitions such as this which depends on a set of entities, at least one of which is the entity being defined, are called impredicative. The contradiction is that this description containing 93 symbols denotes a number which, by definition, cannot be denoted by any description containing less than symbols. The description is of course impredicative, since it implicitly refers to all descriptions, including itself. Assume an enumeration of all such phrases is given  $e$ . Now consider the phrase: Thus we have a contradiction. The defining phrase is obviously impredicative. The particular construction employed in this paradox is called diagonalisation. Diagonalisation is a general construction and proof method originally invented by Georg Cantor to prove the uncountability of the power set of the natural numbers. The Hypergame paradox is a more recent addition to the list of set-theoretic paradoxes, invented by Zwicker. Let us call a two-player game well-founded if it is bound to terminate in a finite number of moves. Tournament chess is an example of a well-founded game. We now define hypergame to be the game in which player 1 in the first move chooses a well-founded game to be played, and player 2 subsequently makes the first move in the chosen game. All remaining moves are then moves of the chosen game. Hypergame must be a well-founded game, since any play will last exactly one move more than some given well-founded game. However, if hypergame is well-founded then it must be one of the games that can be chosen in the first move of hypergame, that is, player 1 can choose hypergame in the first move. This allows player 2 to choose hypergame in the subsequent move, and the two players can continue choosing hypergame ad infinitum. Thus hypergame cannot be well-founded, contradicting our previous conclusion. This is a contradiction, and thus we have a paradox. The paradox of the knower is just one of many epistemic paradoxes involving self-reference. See the entry on epistemic paradoxes for further information on the class of epistemic paradoxes. For a detailed discussion and history of the paradoxes of self-reference in general, see the entry on paradoxes and contemporary logic. In the case of the paradoxes of Grelling and Russell, this can be seen as follows. Define the extension of a predicate to be the set of objects it is true of. The only significant difference between these two sets is that the first is defined on predicates whereas the second is defined on sets. What this teaches us is that even if paradoxes seem different by involving different subject matters, they might be almost identical in their underlying structure. Thus in many cases it makes most sense to study the paradoxes of self-reference under one, rather than study, say, the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes separately. Assume to obtain a contradiction that this is not the case. However, we now obtain a contradiction, since the following holds: The idea behind it goes back to Russell himself who also considered the paradoxes of self-reference to have a common underlying structure. If these conditions are satisfied we have the following contradiction: Priest shows how most of the well-known paradoxes of self-reference fit into the schema. From the above it can be concluded that all, or at least most, paradoxes of self-reference share a common underlying structure—“independent of whether they are semantic, set-theoretic or epistemic. Priest argues that they should then also share a common solution. Priest calls this the principle of uniform solution: The Sorites paradox is a paradox that on the surface does not involve self-reference at all. However, Priest b, argues that it still fits the inclosure schema and can hence be seen as a paradox of self-reference, or at least a paradox that should have the same kind of solution as the paradoxes of self-reference. This has led Colyvan, Priest and Weber b to all advance a dialethic approach to solving the Sorites paradox. This approach to the Sorites paradox has been attacked by Beall a, b and defended by Weber et al. The central role of negation will become even clearer when we formalise the paradoxes of self-reference in Section 2 below. This is exactly what the Curry sentence itself expresses. In other words, we have proved that the Curry sentence itself is true! Instead,

it consists of an infinite chain of sentences, each sentence expressing the untruth of all the subsequent ones. We can then derive a contradiction as follows: This is again a contradiction. When solving paradoxes we might thus choose to consider them all under one, and refer to them as paradoxes of non-wellfoundedness. Given the insight that not only cyclic structures of reference can lead to paradox, but also certain types of non-wellfounded structures, it becomes interesting to study further these structures of reference and their potential in characterising the necessary and sufficient conditions for paradoxicality. This line of work was initiated by Gaifman , , and later pursued by Cook , Walicki and others. Significant amounts of newer work on self-reference has gone into trying to make a complete graph-theoretical characterisation of which structures of reference admit paradoxes, including Rabern and Macauley , Cook and Dyrkolbotn and Walicki . A complete characterisation is still an open problem Rabern, Rabern and Macauley , but it seems to be a relatively widespread conjecture that all paradoxical graphs of reference are either cyclic or contain a Yablo-like structure. If this conjecture turns out to be true, it would mean that in terms of structure of reference, all paradoxes of reference are either liar-like or Yablo-like. Yablo himself argues that it is non-self-referential, whereas Priest argues that it is self-referential. Butler claims that even if Priest is correct, there will be other Yablo-like paradoxes that are not self-referential in the sense of Priest. To formalise it in a setting of propositional logic, it is hence necessary to use infinitary propositional logic. How and whether the Yablo paradox can truthfully be represented this way, and how it relates to compactness of the underlying logic, has been investigated by Picollo .

Why the Paradoxes Matter After having presented a number of paradoxes of self-reference and discussed some of their underlying similarities, we will now turn to a discussion of their significance. The significance of a paradox is its indication of a flaw or deficiency in our understanding of the central concepts involved in it. In case of the set-theoretic paradoxes, it is our understanding of the concept of a set. If we fully understood these concepts, we should be able to deal with them without being led to contradictions. In this paradox we seem able to prove that the tortoise can win a race against the 10 times faster Achilles if given an arbitrarily small head start. Zeno used this paradox as an argument against the possibility of motion. It has later turned out that the paradox rests on an inadequate understanding of infinity. More precisely, it rests on an implicit assumption that any infinite series of positive reals must have an infinite sum. The later developments of the mathematics of infinite series has shown that this assumption is invalid, and thus the paradox dissolves. In analogy, it seems reasonable to expect that the existence of semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes is a symptom that the involved semantic and set-theoretic concepts are not yet sufficiently well understood. The reasoning involved in the paradoxes of self-reference all end up with some contradiction, a sentence concluded to be both true and false. Priest is a strong advocate of dialetheism, and uses his principle of uniform solution see Section 1. See the entries on dialetheism and paraconsistent logic for more information. Currently, no commonly agreed upon solution to the paradoxes of self-reference exists. They continue to pose foundational problems in semantics and set theory. No claim can be made to a solid foundation for these subjects until a satisfactory solution to the paradoxes has been provided. Problems surface when it comes to formalising semantics the concept of truth and set theory. A substantial amount of research in self-reference concentrates on formal theories of truth and ways to circumvent the liar paradox. There are two articles that have influenced the work on formal theories of truth and the liar paradox more than any other: Tarski gives a number of conditions that, as he puts it, any adequate definition of truth must satisfy. The central of these conditions is what is now most often referred to as Schema T or the T-schema or Convention T or the Tarski biconditionals: What is being said in the following will apply to any such first-order formalisation of arithmetic. Tarski showed that the liar paradox is formalisable in any formal theory containing his schema T, and thus any such theory must be inconsistent. In order to construct such a formalisation it is necessary to be able to formulate self-referential sentences like the liar sentence within first-order arithmetic. This ability is provided by the diagonal lemma. In the case of truth, it would be a sentence expressing of itself that it is true. It is therefore possible to use sentences generated by the diagonal lemma to formalise paradoxes based on self-referential sentences, like the liar. A theory in first-order predicate logic is called inconsistent if a logical contradiction is provable in it. We need to show that this assumption leads to a contradiction. The proof mimics the liar paradox. The liar sentence is true if and

only if it is not. Compare this to the informal liar presented in the beginning of the article. The central question then becomes: How may the formal setting or the requirements for an adequate theory of truth be modified to regain consistency—that is, to prevent the liar paradox from trivialising the system? There are many different answers to this question, as there are many different ways to regain consistency. In Section 3 we will review the most influential approaches. The set-theoretic paradoxes constitute a significant challenge to the foundations of mathematics. They show that it is impossible to have a concept of set satisfying the unrestricted comprehension principle also called full comprehension or unrestricted abstraction: In a more formal setting they would be formulae of  $\mathcal{L}$ . This sounds as a very reasonable principle, and it more or less captures the intuitive concept of a set.

**Chapter 5 : Self-Reference (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)**

*The Difference Between System of Record and Source of Truth (SOT): Let us take the example of items (or parts). An item is a component of a product that our organization.*

Explanation is presenting the meaning of a specific biblical text, application shows how to put the principles of Scripture to work in our lives, and illustration is a reference, a quote or a short story that is intended to help people to better understand the text. Jesus used many illustrations in His preaching and teaching. He often used Parables to help His audience better understand His message. In our selected text he gives 6 examples of apostasy in the past. Remember, apostasy speaks of a departure from the faith. The 3 groups that Jude mentions are: The 3 people that Jude mentions are: Cain, Korah and Balaam. This week we will focus on the 3 groups that are mentioned and we will consider the 3 individuals in a later message. In doing so he refers to 3 cases of rebellion. Notice that Jude says "I will therefore put you in remembrance", he is referring to a truth that they all knew about. Here he uses a history lesson as an illustration. God delivered His people from bondage in Egypt. He gave them the Law at Mt. Sinai and they traveled through the wilderness to Kadeshbarnea. There they stood at the very border of the promised land. The spies return with a good concerning this land but the Israelites refused to go forward. Listen to what Moses said in Deuteronomy 1: They said that "The people are stronger and taller than we are; and the cities are large and fortified up to heaven, and "our hearts melt". They reached a place where they did not believe God and they turned from Him. It is a departure from the faith Jude goes on to give another illustration of apostasy in the story of the rebellious angels. Jude states that there were certain angels that "did not keep their first estate". This means that they were caught up in a rebellion against God. As a result of their rebellion they have been bound and are currently "reserved or kept in chains". The "chains" that Jude speaks of are not literal chains. Angels are spiritual creatures so a literal chain would not matter hold them. The idea here is that they are kept in bonds. These angels rebelled, they departed from God. Again this is the very definition of apostasy. Consider the fact that these angels lived in the very presence of God, they spent countless ages ministering before Him, they experienced His glory and majesty, but they followed Satan in his rebellion! Pride and lust caused them to turn away from God, and you can be certain that the apostates that have infiltrated the church, that turn the grace of God into lasciviousness and deny the Lord Jesus Christ are filled with pride and lust. These apostates have crept into the church. On the outside they appear to be godly, but they are actually servants of the Devil! And the apostates who are present in the church today will be revealed for the same reasons!

*Logical truth is expressive of the relation between the knower and that which is known, and depends upon the arrangement of ideas with reference to a central or composite idea. Truth in this sense involves the correspondence of concepts with facts.*

The Truth of God Introduction Just before giving in to the pressure of the crowd and ordering the crucifixion of our Lord Jesus Christ, Pilate asked one of the most tragic questions of the Bible: For this I have been born, and for this I have come into the world, to bear witness to the truth. Everyone who is of the truth hears My voice. He could not answer otherwise because of His nature. He was serving as the judge who was to pass judgment on our Lord. Was Jesus a dangerous revolutionary who intended to overthrow Roman rule and establish His own kingdom? Judgment must be according to truth: How sad to hear the judge himself disdain the truth. His judgment was most surely not according to truth. Pilate seems to doubt that one can know the truth or even that truth exists. Truth for Pilate was whatever one wished to believe is true. Jesus believed He was a King; the scribes and Pharisees claimed He was a fraud and a traitor, a menace both to Judaism and to Rome. Pilate doubted that the truth could be known or that it really matters. Sadly, we must acknowledge that it is also the viewpoint of our own age. The Shaping of Modern American Evangelicalism, 97 from which I have cited several distressing quotations. Horton reminds us that the secular world has come to trust more in science than in the Scriptures when discerning truth, but that science can never fulfill the task of answering the deepest questions for which men need to learn the truth: Sir John Eccles, a Nobel Prize-winning pioneer in brain research, observes that science, in trying to answer questions beyond its competence, becomes reduced to superstition. Why am I here? How did I come to be at a certain place and time? What happens after death? These are all mysteries beyond science. This relativism is especially evident in the realm of education: Reason has been replaced by mindless commitment, consciousness-raising and trashy sentimentality. But Horton points out the tragic truth that even evangelicalism has succumbed to cultural pressures and now views truth in the same relativistic way as the secular world: Huxley spoke as a prophet. In other words, most of the students at evangelical institutions have already accepted the relativism of their culture, and with that, the liberal and neo-orthodox concession that faith in Christ is a spiritual matter, not dependent on external, objective facts of history. The weak-kneed, emasculated preaching so typical of our own time was also the norm in the days just before the Reformation. Martin Luther and John Calvin, paraphrased, put it in these words: In fact, on the eve of the Reformation, there were twelve theological schools of thought competing for control at the University of Paris. We need a renewed commitment to the truth as found in the Scriptures and as summarized in theological and doctrinal propositions. Truth finds its origin in God, its incarnation in Jesus Christ, and its present manifestation in the written Word of God, the Bible. Our lesson will consider the fact that truth comes only from God, because God is truth and the source of all truth. The Truth of God and the Fall of Man I have always thought the fundamental issue underlying the fall of man in the Garden of Eden was authority. Authority does play a significant role in the fall, and both creation 1 Corinthians Nevertheless, I now see that the foundational issue in the fall of man in the Garden of Eden for Eve at least was the issue of truth. Who spoke the truth, God or Satan? Who was to be believed? Who was to be obeyed? The answers to these questions depend upon who was thought to be speaking the truth. How incredible that Eve would believe a serpent and not God! Satan took the form of a serpent, a created being. He distorted the command, and in so doing implied that God was withholding much that was desirable. By inference, He raised a question concerning the goodness of God. And so Eve must choose who to believe—“who is telling the truth. Eve made the wrong choice. God is the source of truth; Satan is the source of lies and deception. We find at the very beginning of the Bible a lesson to be learned. God is true, and He always speaks the truth. Satan is a liar, who can be relied upon to lie. Satan is the great deceiver, who from the Garden of Eden onward has been seeking to lead men and women astray, turning them away from the truth, and deceiving them into believing his lies. When He did speak, time proved that His promises were true and reliable. Abraham and Sarah did have a child in their old age, just as God had said Genesis Israel did spend years in Egyptian bondage, just as God had

indicated to Abram Genesis Thus, when the Law was given through Moses, it was given as truth from God, and this is the way godly Jews viewed it: The prophets were sent from God, not just to give further revelation concerning future events, but to interpret the Law and to show men how the Law was to be applied. Moses warned the Israelites about such false prophets. Indeed, he indicated that the response of the Israelites to false prophets was a test of their love for God: It was assumed that some false prophets would have the ability to perform false signs and wonders. One might conclude from this that the prophet must be a spokesman sent from God, but Moses indicates this is not necessarily so. Not only must a prophet be able to fulfill the things which he promises, his revelation must conform to the Law which God had already revealed. Prophets may indeed give new revelation, but it must always conform to the old, that which God had already revealed. No prophet who turns men from loving and serving God is a true prophet, and no true Israelite dare fail to see that a false prophet be put to death. Those who truly love God with all their heart and soul will hate falsehood, and all those who proclaim it in an effort to lead the people of God astray from Him. Love for God means a hatred of evil see Romans A little later in the Book of Deuteronomy, Moses has more to say about prophets. God had revealed truth through Moses, the great prophet through whom the Law was given, but God was to reveal even greater things through the Messiah, a prophet like Moses, who was yet to come: Listen is a key word in this passage. The pagans listen to their false prophets, and they are led astray. The people of God are not to listen to false messengers. In verses , Moses says the test of a prophet is whether his words come true. Those whose prophecies do not come true are false prophets. The central person of this passage is our Lord Jesus Christ. His coming is foretold by likening Him to Moses, His predecessor. He is the One who is even greater than Moses. When He appears, raised up by God, people are to listen to Him. This Deuteronomy 18 passage is fascinating. Moses reminds the Israelites of what their father had requested at the base of Mount Sinai. They were not only afraid to see the glory of God as manifested in the great fire, They requested that they not hear God speak and that Moses be their intercessor. Let Moses speak to God face to face and then tell them what he had heard. I am amazed that God commended the people for making this request see The broader context of Deuteronomy helps explain the prophecy of verses And yet Moses indicates that God had spoken of Him at that time Deuteronomy Here is yet another example of progressive revelation, even within the Pentateuch the first five books of the Bible. This we shall now see fulfilled as we pass over the rest of the Old Testament and focus our attention on the coming of Jesus as the promised Messiah in the New Testament. The Lord Jesus perfectly fulfilled all of these prophetic requirements. On the mount of transfiguration, who should appear there, with Jesus, but Moses and Elijah? Consider in somewhat greater detail other ways in which the Lord Jesus clearly fulfilled the prophecy of Deuteronomy Moses told the people that when the prophet like him appeared, He would be raised up by God. The accounts of the miraculous virgin birth of our Lord make it clear that Jesus was raised up by God. The apostle John wants us to know that Jesus is the truth, who was sent from God: Jesus is the Word of God, the Word who existed with God from eternity past, and who then was sent to men by God. He is the Creator of all things. He is the source of life. Sinners love the darkness error, falsehood , because they suppose it conceals their sin. Though He made the world, the world does not recognize Him because men are evil and despise the light of the truth, which reveals our sin. It is He who explains or reveals the Father to men. When Jesus went out of His way to pass through Samaria John 4: And then Jesus spoke these words:

Chapter 7 : Sense and reference - Wikipedia

*reference of a sentence is a certain special sort of object – a truth-value – but this is not essential to the view.) If the reference of an expression is that expression's power to affect the truth-value of.*

Phosphorus Frege introduced the notion of "sense" German: Sinn to accommodate difficulties in his early theory of meaning. First, if the entire significance of a sentence consists of its truth value, it follows that the sentence will have the same significance if we replace a word of the sentence with one having an identical reference, as this will not change its truth value. If the evening star has the same reference as the morning star, it follows that the evening star is a body illuminated by the Sun has the same truth value as the morning star is a body illuminated by the Sun. But it is possible for someone to think that the first sentence is true while also thinking that the second is false. Therefore, the thought corresponding to each sentence cannot be its reference, but something else, which Frege called its sense. Second, sentences that contain proper names with no reference cannot have a truth value at all. Nor can a thought about Etna contain lumps of solidified lava. John McDowell supplies cognitive and reference-determining roles. Sense and description[ edit ] In his theory of descriptions , Bertrand Russell held the view that most proper names in ordinary language are in fact disguised definite descriptions. This is known as the descriptivist theory of names. Because Frege used definite descriptions in many of his examples, he is often taken to have endorsed the descriptivist theory. However, Saul Kripke argued compellingly against the descriptivist theory. According to Kripke, [15] proper names are rigid designators which designate the same object in every possible world. For example, someone other than Richard Nixon , e. Hubert Humphrey , might have been the President in Hence a description or cluster of descriptions cannot be a rigid designator, and thus a proper name cannot mean the same as a description. Evans further developed this line, arguing that a sense without a referent was not possible. And both point to the power that the sense-reference distinction does have i. Translation of Bedeutung[ edit ] As noted above, translators of Frege have rendered the German Bedeutung in various ways. But according to Frege, a common term does not refer to any individual white thing, but rather to an abstract Concept Begriff.

Chapter 8 : Frame of reference - Wikipedia

APA Reference List Examples Book with Single Author: Gore, A. (). *An inconvenient truth: The planetary emergency of global warming and what.*

Note how much easier the problem becomes by choosing a suitable frame of reference. The third possible frame of reference would be attached to the second car. It would have been possible to choose a rotating, accelerating frame of reference, moving in a complicated manner, but this would have served to complicate the problem unnecessarily. It is also necessary to note that one is able to convert measurements made in one coordinate system to another. For example, suppose that your watch is running five minutes fast compared to the local standard time. If you know that this is the case, when somebody asks you what time it is, you are able to deduct five minutes from the time displayed on your watch in order to obtain the correct time. Additional example[ edit ] Figure 2: Simple-minded frame-of-reference example For a simple example involving only the orientation of two observers, consider two people standing, facing each other on either side of a north-south street. A car drives past them heading south. For the person facing east, the car was moving towards the right. However, for the person facing west, the car was moving toward the left. This discrepancy is because the two people used two different frames of reference from which to investigate this system. For a more complex example involving observers in relative motion, consider Alfred, who is standing on the side of a road watching a car drive past him from left to right. In his frame of reference, Alfred defines the spot where he is standing as the origin, the road as the x-axis and the direction in front of him as the positive y-axis. To him, the car moves along the x axis with some velocity  $v$  in the positive x-direction. Now consider Betsy, the person driving the car. Betsy, in choosing her frame of reference, defines her location as the origin, the direction to her right as the positive x-axis, and the direction in front of her as the positive y-axis. In this frame of reference, it is Betsy who is stationary and the world around her that is moving "for instance, as she drives past Alfred, she observes him moving with velocity  $v$  in the negative y-direction. If she is driving north, then north is the positive y-direction; if she turns east, east becomes the positive y-direction. Finally, as an example of non-inertial observers, assume Candace is accelerating her car. As she passes by him, Alfred measures her acceleration and finds it to be  $a$  in the negative x-direction. Frames of reference are especially important in special relativity , because when a frame of reference is moving at some significant fraction of the speed of light, then the flow of time in that frame does not necessarily apply in another frame. The speed of light is considered to be the only true constant between moving frames of reference. Special theory of relativity and General theory of relativity It is important to note some assumptions made above about the various inertial frames of reference. Newton, for instance, employed universal time, as explained by the following example. Suppose that you own two clocks, which both tick at exactly the same rate. You synchronize them so that they both display exactly the same time. The two clocks are now separated and one clock is on a fast moving train, traveling at constant velocity towards the other. According to Newton, these two clocks will still tick at the same rate and will both show the same time. Newton says that the rate of time as measured in one frame of reference should be the same as the rate of time in another. That is, there exists a "universal" time and all other times in all other frames of reference will run at the same rate as this universal time irrespective of their position and velocity. This concept of time and simultaneity was later generalized by Einstein in his special theory of relativity where he developed transformations between inertial frames of reference based upon the universal nature of physical laws and their economy of expression Lorentz transformations. It is also important to note that the definition of inertial reference frame can be extended beyond three-dimensional Euclidean space. As an example of why this is important, let us consider the geometry of an ellipsoid. In this geometry, a "free" particle is defined as one at rest or traveling at constant speed on a geodesic path. Two free particles may begin at the same point on the surface, traveling with the same constant speed in different directions. After a length of time, the two particles collide at the opposite side of the ellipsoid. Both "free" particles traveled with a constant speed, satisfying the definition that no forces were acting. This means that the particles were in inertial frames of reference. Since no forces were acting, it

was the geometry of the situation which caused the two particles to meet each other again. In a similar way, it is now common to describe [32] that we exist in a four-dimensional geometry known as spacetime. In this picture, the curvature of this 4D space is responsible for the way in which two bodies with mass are drawn together even if no forces are acting. This curvature of spacetime replaces the force known as gravity in Newtonian mechanics and special relativity. Fictitious force, Non-inertial frame, and Rotating frame of reference Here the relation between inertial and non-inertial observational frames of reference is considered. The basic difference between these frames is the need in non-inertial frames for fictitious forces, as described below. An accelerated frame of reference is often delineated as being the "primed" frame, and all variables that are dependent on that frame are notated with primes, e. The vector from the origin of an inertial reference frame to the origin of an accelerated reference frame is commonly notated as  $R$ . From the geometry of the situation, we get  $r$ .

**Chapter 9 : Truth Definition and Meaning - Bible Dictionary**

*One of my presentations was on using stories, objects and illustrations to explain your faith. Let me give you a sample of something I shared about the biblical concept of faith. In this post, I'll show you a simple way to contrast the pop culture definition of the word, "faith" with the biblical definition of the word, "faith."*

Themes are the fundamental and often universal ideas explored in a literary work. The Use of Technology to Control Society Brave New World warns of the dangers of giving the state control over new and powerful technologies. One illustration of this theme is the rigid control of reproduction through technological and medical intervention, including the surgical removal of ovaries, the Bokanovsky Process, and hypnopaedic conditioning. Soma is a third example of the kind of medical, biological, and psychological technologies that Brave New World criticizes most sharply. It is important to recognize the distinction between science and technology. Whereas the State talks about progress and science, what it really means is the bettering of technology, not increased scientific exploration and experimentation. The Consumer Society It is important to understand that Brave New World is not simply a warning about what could happen to society if things go wrong, it is also a satire of the society in which Huxley existed, and which still exists today. The Incompatibility of Happiness and Truth Brave New World is full of characters who do everything they can to avoid facing the truth about their own situations. The almost universal use of the drug soma is probably the most pervasive example of such willful self-delusion. Soma clouds the realities of the present and replaces them with happy hallucinations, and is thus a tool for promoting social stability. What are these two abstract entities that Mond juxtaposes? It is less clear what Mond means by truth, or specifically what truths he sees the World State society as covering up. These two types of truth are quite different from each other: Yet both kinds of truth are united in the passion that an individual might feel for them. As a young man, Mustapha Mond became enraptured with the delight of making discoveries, just as John loves the language and intensity of Shakespeare. The search for truth then, also seems to involve a great deal of individual effort, of striving and fighting against odds. The very will to search for truth is an individual desire that the communal society of Brave New World, based as it is on anonymity and lack of thought, cannot allow to exist. But a major difference between the two is that, whereas in control is maintained by constant government surveillance, secret police, and torture, power in Brave New World is maintained through technological interventions that start before birth and last until death, and that actually change what people want. The government of maintains power through force and intimidation. In Brave New World the consequences of state control are a loss of dignity, morals, values, and emotionsâ€”in short, a loss of humanity.