

# DOWNLOAD PDF ANALYTIC TRUTHS AND GRAMMATICAL PROPOSITIONS SEVERIN SCHROEDER

## Chapter 1 : Items where Author is "Schroeder, Dr Severin" - CentAUR

*Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman* *runtext V1 - October 17, pm Page 83 Analytic Truths and Grammatical Propositions SEVERIN SCHROEDER* | There is a well-known view that analytic statements are true simply in virtue of the meanings of the ingredient words.

Hugh Knott *Philosophical Investigations* Oxford University Press, Knott This is a collection of thirteen essays by distinguished philosophers written in honour of P. I shall not comment on all of these essays but on those that have especially caught my attention. This has left Hacker, in his more literal approach, perhaps the more exposed to carrying forward egg-shells which Wittgenstein may have hoped others would shed on his behalf. For these reasons, there is scope to regard Hacker either as a robust presenter of the essential Wittgenstein, or as standing to it in a less stable tension. Our essayists are therefore offered a diversity of standpoints from which to write in his honour. One response is for the essayist to echo Hacker with complementary exegesis of his own. Another response is to side-step Hacker and to pursue a more speculative exegesis of topics only touched on by Wittgenstein. In reality, the ethical attaches to the living agent in the world and employing practical reason in ethically charged situations—a view consistent with the later Wittgenstein. However I did not find myself convinced of this further step. *Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation*. Cambridge University Press, especially Chapter 1. This is the egg-shell to be jettisoned. For we must distinguish judgements of sameness comprising the application of a rule for the identity of a sensation from superficially similar judgements where sameness is to be understood in terms of indistinguishability—which involve no such rule. It is also an important general observation, for such spontaneous responses belong to concept-formation. In learning to speak, we are not merely passive recipients of a linguistic system, but bring ourselves to it with new and unanticipated kinds of responses. This is the burgeoning of the human mind. Schulte describes how names can function outside usual linguistic contexts—to call people, for example, or as labels. We can become attached to a name as symbolising a loved one, or be hurt by its misuse. These are natural, intrinsic and essential characteristics of language—as indeed are the ways we experience meaning, such as in fusing the name, the face, and the works of Schubert. Rundle and Schulte describe dimensions in the way language enters into our lives that are not reducible to rule applications. Mulhall regrets the polarisation between the account of language as essentially normative and the best from those who would otherwise minimise the comparison with rules. Moreover, this normativity is closely linked to his conception of the autonomy of grammar, and he argues further that, whilst this does not displace the autonomy of grammar, it does imply that we should acknowledge a more complex relation between grammar and reality in accounting for linguistic sense. Rather, the unity of a language comes from the way that the various modes of discourse come together in the service of our interests and in the growth of understanding in our lives. This is exemplified at the practical scale in the ways people engage in conversation—in following the direction of a conversation, or in understanding the relevance of a remark, or in the way ideas flow through a conversation, etc. Mulhall then opens this out into reflections upon the nature of philosophy. But because of his attachment to the language-game based conception of the unity of language—which also held back Wittgenstein—Hacker is prevented from entering this conversation.

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*Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman* *runtext V1 - October 17, pm Page 83 Analytic Truths and Grammatical Propositions SEVERIN SCHROEDER* | There is a well-known view that analytic statements are true simply in.

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of Science at the University of Exeter, and since he has been Director of the Centre for xiv contributors and abstracts Genomics in Society Egenis. His publications include *The Disorder of Things: What Evolution Means Today* He has written more than forty books on philosophical and historical topics, of which the most recent are the four volumes of *A New History of Western Philosophy* 7. Against materialist conceptions of mind he argues that the brain is not identical with the mind, but is merely the vehicle of mental capacities and abilities. The essay ends with the question whether Wittgenstein was right to suggest that there may be psychological phenomena that are unmediated by any physical vehicle. *Semantik und Ontologie* , second edition His *Conceptions of Truth* was published in His research interests include Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. He has also written on logic, ethics, psychology and philosophy of science. He is the author of three books on the philosophy of Wittgenstein: He is the contributors and abstracts xvii editor of *Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind* and of *Philosophy of Literature Analytic Truths and Grammatical Propositions* In this essay, Severin Schroeder defends the traditional account of analytic truth as truth in virtue of meaning against eight current objections. He has published a number of articles and four books on the philosophy of Wittgenstein: *Wittgenstein im Kontext* , *Wittgenstein: An Introduction* , *Experience and Expression* and *Wittgenstein: Leben, Werk, Wirkung* Twelve Lectures on the Philosophy of Morality xviii contributors and abstracts He is a foreign honorary member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has published two books, *Tolerance: Human Tools and Human Values* , as well as articles in moral philosophy and legal philosophy. Wittgenstein provides a fresh look at nearly every topic he touches, with the notable exception of ethics. In his *Lecture on Ethics* Wittgenstein warns that talking and writing on ethics runs up against the boundaries of language. *Abbreviations for Works by Wittgenstein* Reference to works by Wittgenstein including *Nachlass*, lectures, correspondence and dictations is by abbreviations using the familiar capital letter system. NB *Notebooks* 16 [German-English parallel text], ed. Cited according to date. McGuinness, with an introduction by G. Routledge and Kegan Paul, References are to numbered sections. PR *Philosophical Remarks* [16-30], ed. BT *The Big Typescript: Luckhardt* Oxford, Blackwell, PG *Philosophical Grammar*, ed. Rhees, *Synthese*, 17 , 53; references are to the version in PO. EPB *Eine philosophische Betrachtung* [], ed. Rhees, *Schriften* 5 Frankfurt am Main: Rhees, *Philosophical Review*, 77 , Winch, *Philosophia*, 6 , ; references are to the version in PO. Blackwell, ; 1st edn Z *Zettel* [1-8, German-English parallel text], ed. Moore, *Philosophical Papers* London: Allen and Unwin, References are to the reprinted version in PO. University of Chicago Press, Blackwell, , 35-62; expanded version in PO, The Bergen Electronic Edition Oxford: Oxford University Press, Nedo Vienna and New York: MS Manuscripts from the *Nachlass*. References are by MS number 82 followed by page number. TS *Typescript from the Nachlass*. References are by TS number 45 followed by page number. There are those who put Wittgenstein in the Pantheon, and those who put him in the Pandemonium. But he leaves no one indifferent: Peter Hacker served successfully as apprentice to the master-craftsman Wittgenstein, as attested by his book *Insight and Illusion*. He then spent many years as a journeyman, at the end of which he submitted to the guild a masterpiece in four volumes dedicated to the work of the master.

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## Chapter 3 : Severin Schroeder, Analytic truths and grammatical propositions - PhilPapers

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They are typically used as linguistic explanations. The two sentences have the same use, fulfil the same function in language, and hence have the same meaning. But as 1 functions in the same way as the corresponding analytic statement 2, the same can be said about 2. So just like 1, 2 is true in virtue of the meaning of the whole sentence. However, this account of analyticity is widely regarded as untenable owing to a number of objections. I shall consider them in turn. The weakness of this line of FN: The idea that legitimate concepts must be translatable into a purely extensional language presupposes that intensional notions FN: We could resolve the conflict in numerous ways, even by abandoning some of our logical or mathematical statements. Hence no statement is a priori and immune from revision in the light of new experience, not FN: Harvard University Press, Cambridge University Press, ; ch. Another radical attack on the traditional account of analyticity is: It may require some calculations or reasoning to work out that a given statement is indeed analytically true, calculations in which one may easily make a mistake that would not betoken linguistic incompetence. Just as one can easily get an arithmetical calculation wrong without any misunderstanding of the mathematical symbols involved. Anyway, this can be set aside, as the standard examples of analytic truths are indeed claimed to be self-evident. Williamson argues as follows: *Semantik und Ontologie* Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, ; ff. Peter and Stephen both understand the meaning of 3. However, Peter takes universal quantification in English to be existentially committing and he believes FN: Hence, Stephen argues, 3 is also neither true nor FN: Peter takes 3 to have empirical content. On his understanding, it has the logical form: By contrast, those who take 3 as an example of an analytic truth, construe it as: Perhaps both readings are possible. Then, 3 is ambiguous. Similarly, someone might reject the statement: But, obviously, this would have no tendency to show that on another, more natural, reading, 4 is a self-evident analytic truth. In both cases, rejection of the analytic statement betokens a divergent understanding. Williamson seems to think that Peter is actually mistaken in his belief FN: By asserting 3 I do not make or commit myself to any such empirical claim. The claim at issue is that one cannot understand a trivially analytic statement without ipso facto understanding it to be true. Stephen can obviously not provide a counterexample to that claim if he misunderstands the statement in question. Williamson, however, tries to resist the diagnosis that Stephen and Peter assuming that Peter too is mistaken about 3 have a deviant understanding of the meaning of the sentence. Though, why he should resist it, is not so easy to make out. Some semantic misunderstandings are big, some are small and hardly ever noticeable. Still, Williamson labours the point: Peter and Stephen defend FN: This, I suppose, is what one calls an *argumentum ad misericordiam*. After all, we can easily imagine, or even create, a language in which the corresponding word the word used to make a claim about everything of a certain kind does have an existential implication. Consider some real examples. Is it a logical fact about the negation sign that two negation signs in succession cancel each other out? That depends on the language, and thus on the meaning of the words used as negation signs. Many languages, or dialects, allow for double negation to be used as a straightforward or emphatic negation. Again, consider the English sentence: In fact the latter means: It is of course true that there are logical mistakes that are not semantic mistakes. For instance, the fallacy of denying the antecedent is not a semantic error: For this diagnosis to be plausible it is not enough that their deductions lead to the wrong result, since that, of course, also happens when one is wrong about the meaning of words. In order to make out that it was deductive incompetence, we would have to establish first that both premises were correctly understood: If the disagreement about an argument can be traced back to a disagreement about the truth conditions of one of its premises, a simple conditional, it is obviously a semantic disagreement, and not distinctively logical. Similarly in the case of our disagreements with Peter and Stephen: It is simply that in a given situation viz. Obviously, it is not a typical analytic statement in that it is a logical

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truth an instance of a theorem of the predicate calculus. Later on in his paper Williamson moves on to a related analytic truth that is not a logical truth, namely: If, as he has tried to argue, the understanding of the meaning of a trivially analytic statement does not bring with it an understanding of its truth, the question arises of how else we are to know that it is true. How, according to Williamson, do we know that all vixens are vixens? When the man at the garage says to me: To the extent that the understanding of a word is shared, so is the knowledge of trivial analytic truths that constitutes this understanding. Disagreement over an analytic truth indicates a misunderstanding. If all I know about furze and gorse is that they are yellow-flowered shrubs, I am in no position to know that furze is gorse, but neither can I have reason to deny it. If somebody were to deny the analytic truth that furze is gorse, he would thereby betoken a misunderstanding of at least one of the terms, not just an only partial understanding. More common than the radical denials of analyticity discussed so far is the view that analyticity, although an undeniable phenomenon, cannot be explained as truth in virtue of meaning. It is a curiously widespread prejudice among analytic philosophers that when a linguistic expression is mentioned presented in inverted commas it cannot at the same time be used. The truth is that mentioning, or quoting, a word or sentence is one "quite common" way of using that expression. I can utter the words: Anyway, it is a mistake to think that one can generally fully understand a statement without understanding any of the expressions it contains in inverted commas. It is of course true in the case where what is presented in inverted commas is not a meaningful expression: Who would seriously maintain that these two statements are fully understandable without any knowledge of foreign languages? But clearly, the same is true of: Just as the sentences: Argument from the Contingency of Meaning Analytic propositions are necessary propositions. But to suppose an analytic statement to be a statement about linguistic meaning amounts to saying that it is not a necessary truth. The negation of a true statement about linguistic meaning is contingently false, whereas the negation of an analytic statement is self-contradictory, i. First of all, it is worth noting that in ordinary conversation the negation of an analytic statement would not in fact be regarded as self-contradictory. Rather, it would be treated as a linguistic error: Rather, we would take the speaker as having confused two different words. What he means is obviously a sickle. We would not take him to express a self-contradictory belief, but a false linguistic claim a false association of sound and meaning. However, it is of course true that, disregarding linguistic error and insisting on the correct meanings of the words, it is inconsistent for it implies that a swan of a certain description is not a swan. But the same inconsistency can be found in a negation of 1: Here it is important to remember that a word is not just a sound or a sequence of letters. A word is essentially a word of a language: That is to say, the meaning is part of the word: A word with a different meaning could at most be a homonym: That is to say, it must not be confused with: This is a contingent statement. The same sequence of letters might have been given a different meaning and still be the same sequence of letters. By contrast, the correct statement that a given word partly defined by its meaning has a certain meaning is as much a necessary truth as the claim FN: No, our criteria of diachronic identity are not as pedantic as that. A word may change slightly in meaning and still remain, recognisably, the same word; just as a word may change slightly in spelling. On the other hand, a radical semantic change produces a new word. In other words, a different and unrelated meaning makes a different word. However, one may prefer to say that some words have more than one meaning. That does not affect the point I am stressing: We can explain this necessity by citing the rules of chess the form of the chessboard, the way the pieces are set up, the way they are allowed to move. Different rules would make a different game. But then of course, moving now to the external perspective we could have invented and played a different game or a variant of the same FN:

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*Analytic Truths and Grammatical Propositions*, Severin Schroeder, (University of Reading) 5. *Back to the Rough Ground: Wittgenstein and Ordinary Language*, Jack Canfield, (University of Toronto).

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Severin Schroeder, University of Reading, Philosophy Department, Faculty Member. *Studies Philosophy, Wittgenstein, and Aesthetics.*

## Chapter 9 : Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy - Hans-Johann Glock; John Hyman - Oxford University Press

13 leading contributors offer essays in honour of Peter Hacker. They discuss issues in the interpretation of Wittgenstein, investigate central topics in the history of analytic philosophy, and explore and assess Wittgensteinian ideas about language, mind, action, ethics, and religion.