

Philosophical anthropology, sometimes called anthropological philosophy, is a discipline dealing with questions of metaphysics and phenomenology of the human person, and interpersonal relationships.

Search Soul of My Body: Barth shifts from the truest expression of anthropology in Jesus Christ to the anthropology of us all in following section: Through the Spirit of God, man is the subject, form and life of a substantial organism, the soul of his body—wholly and simultaneously both, in ineffaceable difference, inseparable unity, and indestructible order. Bussey, Harold Knight, J. Our interpretation of those phenomena, formulated as briefly as possible in four propositions would be as follows. The soul does not act on the body, but the one man acts. And he does it in that as soul he animates himself and is acting subject, but always as soul is soul of his body, animated by himself, determined and enabled to act, and engaged in action. Again, the soul does not suffer from the body, but the one man suffers. And this takes place in that as soul namely, as acting subject he is fundamentally exposed and susceptible to such hindrances and injuries, but as soul of his body must actually experience them. Again, the body does not act on the soul, but the one man acts. He acts in that as body he is animated by himself, determined and enabled to act, and engaged in action, but as body of his soul, animating himself and acting subject. And again, the body does not suffer from the soul, but the one man suffers. When this takes place, it means that as body he really experiences such hindrances and injuries, but that as body of his soul he must really make them his own. The one whole man is thus one who both acts through himself and suffers in himself, but always in such a way that he is first soul ruling, in the subject and then body serving, in the object --always in this inner order, rationally and logically of his whole nature. The Jesus of the New Testament is supremely true man in the very fact that He does not conform to the later definition, and far from existing as the union of two parts of two "substances," He is one whole man, embodied soul and besouled body: As this one whole man, and therefore as true man, the Jesus of the New Testament is born and lives and suffers and dies and is raised again. The Spirit is not another part of man. Man exists in a dichotomy of two parts: Man exists because he has Spirit. Our statement that man is wholly and at the same time both soul and body presupposes the first statement that man is as he has Spirit. It is thus the Spirit that unifies him and holds him together as soul and body. If we abstract from the Spirit and therefore from the act of the living Creator, we necessarily abstract between soul and body. If we consider man for himself, i. And however much we then try to persuade ourselves that this duality is the one man, we stand in the midst of Greek and every other form of heathenism, which sees neither the real God nor real man, and cannot do so, because knowledge of the Spirit is needed for this purpose and this is incompatible with heathenism. Our only relief will then be found in the see-saw movement between ideas and appearance, thinking and speculation and so on, which pervades the history of philosophy in every age. Barth differentiates himself from Pantheism because he does not believe that Creation is in God, but it is the Spirit that is in Creation and brings it into being. It is the movement of the Creator Spiritus towards Creation that makes all things alive, and there is no life or suffering that exists apart from the animation of the Spirit as the next quotation explains: We thus understand the statement that man has spirit and is thereby man as equivalent in content to our first statement, that he is man, and therefore soul of his body, not without God but by God, i. Spirit is, in the most general sense, the operation of God upon His creation, and especially the movement of God towards man. This relation and fellowship cannot proceed from man himself, for God is his Creator and he His creature. He himself cannot be its principle. This is what is meant when Scripture says of man that he has spirit or the Spirit, or that he has done this or that in the Spirit or through the Spirit, or has said or done or suffered from the Spirit. This never signifies a capacity or ability of his own nature, but always one originally foreign to his nature which has come to it from God and has thus been specially imparted to it in a special movement of God towards him. God remains free to give, to take, and to give again. He shows Himself free in the fact that He can also give an evil spirit to man--this too is a kind of commission imposed on the man concerned--as again with Saul 1 Sam Even the "lying spirit in the mouth of all false prophets" is, as we are told in the remarkable passage in 1 King There are other passages Isa 4: Hence we cannot be surprised to hear

in Job If God condemns a man and through him other men, He can give him such a spirit. The Creator Spiritus movement towards man is the basis of his life as he exists in his "Soul of My Body. The only biblical passage which can be regarded as ambiguous in this regard is 1 Thess 5: Scripture never says "soul" where only "spirit" can be meant. But it often says "spirit" where "soul" is meant; and there is inner reason for this in the fact that the constitution of man as soul and body cannot be fully and exactly described without thinking first and foremost of the spirit as its proper basis. We are nowhere invited to think of these three entities. Even Augustine, when he once gave the almost intolerably harsh formulation: This makes understandable the force with which it was condemned at the Fourth Council of Constantinople in A. Barth believes the results of non-theological anthropology are hypothetical and non-essential, yet he does not prohibit all non-theological anthropological investigations. It is clear that we must here depart from the way taken by the anthropology which sets itself the aim of understanding man without God. It is of the essence of every non-theological anthropology to set itself some such aim. Of course, it is not essential that this aim be set absolutely and so be intended in the sense of atheistic dogma. It can be intended only hypothetically. Man exists in two parts: Man does not pantheistically exist in God, but there is no life apart from through the Spirit.

Chapter 2 : Philosophical anthropology - Wikipedia

Despite the aforementioned continuity between ancient and modern philosophical accounts of the soul-mind, there is in fact a major difference between the two. During the 19th century the long-standing concept of the mind as an entity distinct from the body was challenged, causing it (as well as the.

Thomas Aquinas referenced Avicenna about times in his works. I would say that counts as being very influential on someone, and we will see just how much influence Avicenna had on the Thomistic interpretation of the soul. These divisions are set in a hierarchy: The hierarchy is such that human beings possess all three kinds of soul, irrational animals all other animals besides humans possess both the Sensitive and Vegetative powers, and plants only have the Vegetative. We can see that these divisions and hierarchy are indeed imitative of that of the Avicennian psychology of the soul. As we said, all living beings have at least the Vegetative soul: Yet this transcends the operation of the corporeal nature; because the movements of bodies are caused by an extrinsic principle, while these operations are from an intrinsic principle; for this is common to all the operations of the soul, since every animate thing, in some way, moves itself. Thomas ascribes three powers to the Vegetative soul—Nutritive, Augmentative, and Generative. These powers are, as should be apparent, those which work to keep a living being alive, growing, and continued in existence. The Nutritive power accounts for food and nourishment, without which a living thing would cease to be. The Augmentative power is associated with growth, which is necessary for all living beings in order to reach the third power of the Vegetative soul, the Generative. The Augmentative or growth prepares and readies the animate being for continued existence through reproduction, or self-preservation. We can see that without the Vegetative soul, existence of animate beings would be, well, non-existent. The second division of soul is what St. Thomas Aquinas calls the Sensitive soul: Perception here relies not only on the external senses—“seeing, hearing, smelling, touching, and tasting”—but also on internal senses as well—“imagination, common sense, estimation, and the memorative. As we can see, this delineation is strikingly similar to the Avicennian notion of both external and internal senses associated with the Animal Powers. The use and powers associated with the senses, both internal and external, allow animals irrational and human to go beyond themselves and interact with the world around them. Unlike plants that have only a Vegetative soul, animals use the powers of the Sensitive soul to take care of the basic needs of existence the vegetative. Animate beings endowed with Sensitive souls are able to take in knowledge and conduct willful movement by use of the five external senses. The internal senses represent the ability of those with Sensitive souls to store, use, and process that obtained knowledge and information. It is this soul that accounts for the ability human beings have to reason and engage in higher order cognitive function knowledge of universals. It is indeed what makes us human after all. Human reason, intellect, is inherent in the rational soul. It is a power that goes beyond the mere collection and retention of knowledge through sensory perception—as with the Sensitive soul; it accounts for our non-sensory knowledge, our knowledge of universals, and our ability to be self-aware. It is known to itself by virtue of itself; the Rational soul transcends the corporeal qualities. Again, if we reference the posts on Avicenna, we will see much of the same line of thought regarding the human soul. If we take what we have here on the Thomistic anthropology of the soul and review the posts on the Avicennian psychology, I think it would be very apparent that we can make the connections between the two philosophies. It is indeed the case that St. Thomas Aquinas was greatly influenced by the philosophy of Avicenna.

Chapter 3 : Study of Man (Biblical Anthropology)

'Joshua Farris's The Soul of Theological Anthropology is a bold, brilliant defense of Cartesian philosophy of mind in the context of Christian theology. This much-needed challenge to contemporary secular and theological materialism is advanced with great clarity, insight, and rigor.'

Translated into English by Diogo Rosas Gugisch 1. In fact, thinking about Psychology today means thinking about counseling, therapy or intelligence or personality tests etc. All this can be very interesting, but is not the Psychology which concerns us. What actually concerns us is another Psychology, that which must be understood in its old, classical sense: And this Psychology of life is basically concerned with the living being that is man. We call attention to the fact that throughout this study there will be other words whose classical meaning does not coincide with their modern meaning: For man, according to Plato, is primarily spirit - and the body, according to this point of view, is something like the prison of the spirit [2]. From the Aristotelian point of view, this platonic dualism goes against the intrinsic substantial unity of man when it despises the material dimension of human beings and exaggerates the separation between body and spirit. To the Platonists man is essentially spirit in extrinsic union with matter: For Aristotle, on the other hand, there is in man an intrinsic union between spirit and matter. An extrinsic union is the kind of union that takes place, for instance, between a man and his clothes; while an intrinsic union is that which takes place, for instance, between an object and its color there is no color without the object nor object without color. And this because human reality presents itself to the philosopher as a very complex phenomenon, integrating in itself spirit and matter in harmonic unity. Thus, on the one hand, corporal dimension is fully recognized by Aristotle as a part of human nature: However, on the other hand, we have the equally vehement statement of a transcendence from the merely biological sphere: Aristotle and cosmic unity: It is very important to emphasize such a unity. Spiritual reality is plainly stated, but intimately connected to matter. In the present work it is not our intention to examine in depth the philosophical concepts we are dealing with. Nonetheless, such concepts are worth mentioning, even if we have to do it rather cursorily. Let us begin with potency and act. Potency and act are two fundamental and distinct modes of being. As fundamental modes of being they are, strictly speaking, undefinable. Aristotle merely describes them: The being-in-act is what really is, whereas the being-in-potency may become being-in-act. Thus, prime matter should be understood simply as potentiality, as the pure possibility of being a physical being. A potency actualized through the union with the act that substantial form is. Thus, any physical being, for example a diamond, is made of matter and form intrinsically united. Thus, if our diamond is a physical being, it is because it has the possibility, the potentiality of being a diamond "and so all physical beings have a prime matter, the potentiality of being a physical being. The substantial form actualizes this potentiality of the prime matter: The diamond, the cat, the orchid and man have something in common, they are all physical beings, therefore constituted of that pure indeterminate possibility which prime matter is. But their form distinguishes them from each other and it is precisely the form that makes them what they are: On this point, a short explanation is necessary as to how philosophy developed these concepts. In such cases of substantial change, the new being Y did not come out of nothing, it came out of X, and the being X was not reduced to nothing, it became Y. When we examine examples of substantial change we see that there is something that remains as well as something that changes "which shows that the substance is a composite of two elements, one that changes and one that remains. What is left is the prime matter, actualized in each case by a determinant act on this potency that makes X to be X and Y to be Y: Prime matter and substantial form intrinsically united produce the substance of the physical being. A diamond is a physical being because of matter and it is a diamond because of its form. Prime matter is the weak mode of being called potency; substantial form, on the other hand, is the decisive component in the constitution of a being: Thus, all physical beings are composed of an intrinsic union between matter and form. Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas hold such a unitary view of the cosmos because they employ the same concept of matter and form to indicate both the substantial composition of a stone and of a man, who is a spiritual being. The soul as the substantial form of the living being. In this context, it is very easy to understand the central concept of Psychology, the

concept of soul. To Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, soul means simply form: It is, of course, a very special form "bearing, as a consequence, a special name" but it is nonetheless a form. We can say that the soul is a form, but a very special one because it acts, it in-forms the living being, constituting the principle of life. We wish to say a word here concerning the philosophical definition of life and of living being. How can life be defined? Certainly it is something related to movement - "movement" understood here in the broader sense employed in antiquity, meaning not only the changing of place but in fact of any change in general. However, it may be objected that movement is not a trait peculiar to life only; it is a constant in the cosmos. The response of Classical philosophy to this objection is the statement that what is peculiar to life is the spontaneity and immanence in movement. Let us take, for instance, the example of the growth of a living being. There are, in the living being, operations that not only have their principles in the living being spontaneity, but that have and end in him. Such is the case of nutrition. The nutrition process ends by the assimilation, the transformation in the living being itself of that exterior object that was fed to him. Both spontaneity and immanence mean a special degree of inwardness in the living being, by which he nurtures himself, he moves himself etc. Hence, we can talk about a vegetal soul, the soul of a fern, the soul of an ant, the soul of a dog and the soul of a human being in this case it is a spiritual soul. The soul like all the substantial forms is a principle of the substantial composition of living beings. To put it in a better way, it is a co-principle "intrinsically united with the other co-principle, prime matter. It is through the soul that the living being is constituted and integrated as such, and it [the soul] is also the first source of its actions and operations. These are the two definitions of soul presented by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. The soul is the first act of the organized natural body. This definition plainly states that the soul is the substantial form of the living being: The soul is that by which we first live, feel, move and understand A dog bites or barks because he has a mouth, but in the end he does so because he is alive, because he has a substantial form, the soul of a dog. The soul and its potencies: The soul does not operate directly and that is the reason why Aristotle says: Thus, it is necessary to distinguish the several factors involved in any given operation of a living being. The same living being may be performing such and such an operation or he may be not, however he is continuously alive, he is being informed by the soul. Hence it is necessary to distinguish the soul substantial, always working from its faculties that may or may not be working. The visual or the motor faculties are not always working "for instance when I am asleep" but the soul, the vital principle, is always present as the substantial form of the living being. The subject, for example Joe, who performs this or that operation hearing or seeing, for instance. If Joe performs this or that operation it is because he is a living being, that is, because he has a soul. If he were a stone he would not be able to see or hear anything. For it is not the soul in itself that sees, hears, walks etc. It performs these operations through its faculties. The soul possesses a visual faculty, which performs the act of seeing; the auditive faculty performs the act of hearing, etc. We know that the soul possesses different faculties precisely because the living being performs different acts: We can say that if the act of seeing is different from the act of hearing that is because their objects are different: It is clear that the same material object "a bonfire, for instance" can be apprehended by several faculties, but each faculty apprehends it by means of its own formal object the visual faculty apprehends the color of the fire, the auditive faculty apprehends its cracking, the olfactory faculty apprehends the smell of smoke, etc. The three degrees of life. Life, as we have been saying, is the capacity to perform spontaneous and immanent operations, that is, from the subject himself and ending in the subject himself. Such spontaneity and immanence admit three degrees and hence determine three degrees of life, namely, the vegetative life the one that pertains to the plants, the sensitive life the one that pertains to the animals and intellectual life the one that pertains to man. They also correspond to three kinds of souls: The first degree of life "the vegetative life" has only a very small degree of spontaneity and immanence: It should be noted that, as we climb the ladder of life and the soul grows in immanence and spontaneity there is also a widening in the range of its relationships: The soul in each degree of life is one and performs all the functions of the lesser degrees: Beyond the mere performance of the characteristic operations of the vegetative life, the sensitive soul of the animals is also responsible for sensitive knowledge: Thus, it is through knowledge "which is clearly an important factor in its operations" that the animal possesses more spontaneity and immanence than the vegetable. Thus, the level of life of animals is

superior to that of plants: These faculties of feeling, or faculties of knowledge of sensible realities are the senses: They are present in animals as well as in man. The first intellectual potency: In the case of man, which is the case of the intellectual life, the soul performs not only the higher operations but all the operations pertaining to the lesser degrees of life. Thus, the human soul is responsible for the operations of the faculties of the vegetative life – for example circulation of blood, digestion, etc. The human soul possesses two spiritual faculties: We shall begin with intelligence. While sensible knowledge deals with particular and concrete realities, human intelligence transcends the realm of the particular and the material and is capable of dealing with the universal. Geometry, as a human intellectual knowledge, is not concerned with this particular paper triangle that I have here before my eyes; it is concerned with abstract triangles. This capacity that the intelligence has to apprehend the universal and the abstract unfolds a boundless world for knowledge, since it is not limited to the surrounding reality, but it reaches all being.

Chapter 4 : Saint Augustine (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Christian anthropology has implications for beliefs about death and the afterlife. The Christian church has traditionally taught that the soul of each individual separates from the body at death, to be reunited at the resurrection.

Christian anthropology Augustine of Hippo was one of the first Christian ancient Latin authors with a very clear anthropological vision,[need quotation to verify] although it is not clear if he had any influence on Max Scheler , the founder of philosophical anthropology as an independent discipline, nor on any of the major philosophers that followed him. Augustine has been cited by Husserl and Heidegger as one of the early writers to inquire on time-consciousness and the role of seeing in the feeling of "Being-in-the-world". In no wise are the bodies themselves to be spurned. For these pertain not to ornament or aid which is applied from without, but to the very nature of man. After the fall of humanity they are now experiencing dramatic combat between one another. They are two categorically different things: It sufficed for him to admit that they were metaphysically distinct. To be a human is to be a composite of soul and body, and that the soul is superior to the body. The latter statement is grounded in his hierarchical classification of things into those that merely exist, those that exist and live, and those that exist, live, and have intelligence or reason. Immanuel Kant " taught the first lectures on anthropology in the European academic world. He specifically developed a conception of pragmatic anthropology, according to which the human being is studied as a free agent. At the same time, he conceived of his anthropology as an empirical, not a strictly philosophical discipline. Although the majority of philosophers throughout the history of philosophy can be said to have a distinctive " anthropology " that undergirds their thought, philosophical anthropology itself, as a specific discipline in philosophy, arose within the later modern period as an outgrowth from developing methods in philosophy, such as phenomenology and existentialism. From Scheler laid the foundation for philosophical anthropology as a philosophical discipline, competing with phenomenology and other philosophic disciplines. Husserl and Martin Heidegger " , were the two most authoritative philosophers in Germany at the time, and their criticism to philosophical anthropology and Scheler have had a major impact on the discipline. Scheler defined the human being not so much as a " rational animal" as has traditionally been the case since Aristotle but essentially as a loving being. He breaks down the traditional hylomorphic conception of the human person, and describes the personal being with a tripartite structure of lived body , soul , and spirit. Love and hatred are not psychological emotions , but spiritual , intentional acts of the person, which he categorises as "intentional feelings. From the s[edit] Ernst Cassirer , a neo-Kantian philosopher, has been the most influential source for the definition and development of the field from the s till the s. In , future pope Karol Wojtyla based his dissertation thesis on Max Scheler, limiting himself to the works Scheler wrote before rejecting Catholicism and the Judeo-Christian tradition in Wojtyla used Scheler as an example that phenomenology could be reconciled with Catholicism. Anthropology of interpersonal relationships[edit] A large focus of philosophical anthropology is also interpersonal relationships, as an attempt to unify disparate ways of understanding the behaviour of humans as both creatures of their social environments and creators of their own values. It analyses also the ontology that is in play in human relationships " of which intersubjectivity is a major theme. Intersubjectivity is the study of how two individuals, subjects, whose experiences and interpretations of the world are radically different understand and relate to each other. Jackson is another important philosophical anthropologist. His research and fieldwork concentrate on existential themes of "being in the world" Dasein as well as interpersonal relationships. His methodology challenges traditional anthropology due to its focus on first-person experience. In his most well known book, *Minima Ethnographica* which focuses on intersubjectivity and interpersonal relationships, he draws upon his ethnographic fieldwork in order to explore existential theory. In his latest book, *Existential Anthropology*, he explores the notion of control, stating that humans anthropomorphize inanimate objects around them in order to enter into an interpersonal relationship with them. In this way humans are able to feel as if they have control over situations that they cannot control because rather than treating the object as an object, they treat it as if it is a rational being capable of understanding their feelings and language. Good examples are prayer to gods to alleviate drought or to help a

sick person or cursing at a computer that has ceased to function.

Chapter 5 : The Sciences of the Soul: The Early Modern Origins of Psychology, Vidal, Brown

Of the two, the soul is the more important for it is the soul which gives life to the body. When the soul is withdrawn, the body is dead for the soul is the seat of the personality. Consciousness of these things can lead to a favorable view of the dichotomy: individuals know themselves to be body and soul.

Sitemap What is the spirit and the soul in man? The Bible teaches that humans have a body and a spirit. This body and spirit are one soul. The Bible writers are not using dogmatic definitions every time they convey a thought; so, words need to be interpreted according to its usage. And the LORD God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul. Thou dost hide Thy face, they are dismayed; Thou dost take away their spirit, they expire, And return to their dust. It is better to be of a humble spirit with the lowly, Than to divide the spoil with the proud. And do not fear those who kill the body, but are unable to kill the soul; but rather fear Him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell. This is because of the Greek language usage. Now when the unclean spirit goes out of a man, it passes through waterless places, seeking rest, and does not find it. Even so the thoughts of God no one knows except the Spirit of God 1Co 2: That the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory, may give to you a spirit of wisdom and of revelation in the knowledge of Him. Sometimes they are used separately like in 1 Th 5: Both these views are taught by many over the entire existence of the church. There are two general views of this. The first is the soul is the combination of both spirit and body. The other is the spirit and the soul are the same. Both the Orthodox Reformed and the Roman Catholics teach that humans are only a spirit and a body. The Orthodox Presbyterian Church " Are soul and spirit the same? In this view the spirit and soul are two separate parts of a human being. This view can be found throughout church history. Tripartite theology The Soul, Spirit, and Mind and the Trinity Some try to use the following passages to prove that the soul, spirit, and body are how we are created in the Trinitarian image of God. Now may the God of peace Himself sanctify you entirely; and may your spirit and soul and body be preserved complete, without blame at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. Please see, Quotes from the Early Church Fathers:

Chapter 6 : Homebrewed Theology: Anthropology 1 - I'm a Soul, Man

Augustine's Philosophical Anthropology: Immortality of Human Soul in a Composite Soul-Body. In The City of God, Saint Augustine presents Varro as his representative who holds his two-substance dualistic anthropology.

Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body: Wright University of St Andrews An exegete among philosophers! When I was teaching in Oxford twenty years ago, I had a student who wanted to study Buddhism; so I sent her to Professor Gombrich for tutorials. After a week or two he asked her to compare the Buddhist view of the soul with the Christian view. Now of course that was a slightly polemical stance, but I still think it was justified. The problem is that there are a great many things which have become central topics of discussion in later Christian thought, sometimes from as early as the late second century, about which the New Testament says very little; but it is assumed that, since the topic appears important, the Bible must have a view of it, and that this view can contribute straightforwardly to the discussions that later thinkers, up to the present day, have wanted to have. We should also pay attention to the question of whether the word may, in its original scriptural context, carry other meanings which we may simply be screening out. This came home forcibly to me eight years ago when I published a little book called *For All the Saints*, a precursor to *Surprised by Hope*. I pointed out that in scripture ultimate salvation is not in heaven but in the resurrection into the combined reality of the new heaven and new earth. I hope this more sophisticated audience today will not make the same mistake. There is indeed a reality to which that language is trying to point. But continuing with the language when it is bound, now, to convey a very different meaning from that genuine reality is perverse. I want in this paper to propose a view of the human person which you might call eschatological integration. The body is meant for the Lord, he says, and the Lord for the body. One more preliminary remark. The story of all four gospels is not the story of how God came in Jesus to rescue souls for a disembodied, other-worldly heaven. It is the story of how God, in Jesus, became king on earth as in heaven. Before my constructive proposal, however, I have several questions to put to the broadly dualist paradigm that seems to be dominant among many Christian philosophers today. But I hope this will be helpful as a framing of the question. Questions to the Dominant Dualist Paradigm Let me first say that of course I understand the impetus which has driven many, perhaps many of you, towards what has called itself dualism. Faced with a strident, sometimes even bullying, modernism in which humans are just naked apes or even just random bundles of atoms and molecules, it is important to protest. Many wise atheists would agree. There is much about human life, even without God in the picture, which rebels against that radical reductionism. As many have shown, even the reductionists listen to music and believe in human rights and other things which might call their stated position into question. There is more to life than the chance collision of particles. I have four questions or challenges; the third one subdivides. My first question is to wish that we would locate our modern debates more explicitly within the strongly prevailing Epicurean climate of the post-enlightenment world. Lucretius would, I think, be delighted at his late victory, with the gods banished to a distant heaven and the world doing its own thing, developing by its own inner processes. That view, of course, has allowed all kinds of political as well as scientific developments. But whereas most westerners today suppose that we have discovered self-perpetuating secular democracy as the ultimate form of government and a self-caused evolution as the ultimate form of the development of life, thus setting ourselves apart from lesser superstitious mortals who still believe otherwise, what has in fact happened is simply the triumph of one ancient worldview at the expense of others. This has conditioned, for instance, debates about causation: It is, basically, the same question: What Descartes and others tried to do to the person, then, has the same shape to what Enlightenment Epicureanism did to the world; and I regard both as highly dubious projects. The points which have to be made against naturalism, physicalism and reductionism will need to be made without accepting that framework of debate. This is one of those terms that I wish we could put out to grass for a long time. I should say that Philo of Alexandria is a special case in all this, representing a Platonic face of ancient Judaism which seems to me a major turn away from not only the Old Testament but most of his Jewish contemporaries. All of these dualities a first-century Jew would take for granted. But none of them constitutes a dualism in the any of the following three senses: Then there are three more which might be

possible within ancient Judaism: The radical rejection by most ancient Jews, in particular, of what we find in Plato and in much oriental religion, and the radical embrace of space, time and matter as the good gifts of a good creator God, the place where this God is known and the means by which he is to be worshipped – all this remains foundational, and is firmly restated and underlined in the New Testament. Creational, providential and covenantal monotheism simply leave no room for those four dualisms in the middle. In particular, I argued that such dualisms tend to ontologize evil itself, whereas in first-century Judaism evil is not an essential part of the creation, but is the result of a radical distortion within a basically good created order. You might then say that the NT itself demonstrates a turn away from Judaism and towards the wider world of Hellenistic philosophy. Well, many have argued that. In particular, as I shall shortly show, it seems to be almost ridiculously arbitrary to lump together such things as soul, mind, consciousness, sensation as though they are all part of the same second, non-physical reality. This leads to my third question. Paul uses over a dozen terms to refer to what humans are and what they do, and since he nowhere either provides a neat summary of what he thinks about them or gives us clues as to whether he would subsume some or most of these under two or three heads, it is arbitrary and unwarranted to do so on his behalf or claim his authority for such a schema. In particular, I note that three terms commonly used interchangeably to refer to the non-material element within dualist anthropology – mind, soul and spirit nous, psyche and pneuma, are emphatically not interchangeable. Paul urges the Romans to be transformed by the renewal of the mind, not the soul or the spirit. Jesus warns against gaining the whole world and forfeiting the psyche, not the mind or the spirit. So, too, when Paul thinks of the pneuma at work he does not restrict its operation to non-material activities. God breathed into human nostrils his own breath, the breath of life, nishmath hayyim, and the human became a living creature, nephesh hayyah Genesis 2. There are several other references indicating the same thing e. All refer to the ordinary human life. Several features of NT usage back this up. For a start, there is no sense, anywhere in the NT, of people who are now humans having had a life prior to their conception and birth. There is no pre-existent soul. Jesus himself is the only exception in the sense of having existed prior to his human conception and birth 1 Corinthians 8. When 1 Timothy 6. Further, there is never a hint of the psyche being immortal in and of itself. God alone possesses immortality. When Paul speaks of humans having immortality in the future, it is the whole mortal being to which he refers, not the psyche specifically 1 Corinthians When he says, a few verses earlier v. In particular, there is no reference anywhere in the NT to the psyche as the carrier or special vessel of what we would now call spirituality or openness to God. For him, the body could just as well have been carried up to heaven. There are other distinctions, too. When Paul discusses praying in tongues, he makes a distinction, but not between soul and body. The spirit prays, he says, but the mind, the nous, is unfruitful 1 Corinthians Most important for these discussions, Paul is of course clear about ultimate resurrection, and hence about an intermediate existence. But he never names the psyche as the carrier of that intermediate existence. The rest of the NT is likewise reticent: But in none of these passages is there any mention of the psyche. The only place we find it in this connection is in Revelation 6. But, with that solitary exception in Revelation, they never do. The one book in the biblical tradition which does say so, up front as it were, is the apocryphal Wisdom of Solomon. Here – and perhaps in chapter 3 as well – we have taken a small but significant step towards a genuine anthropological body-soul dualism, even though still held within a Jewish framework. And the interesting thing is that, though clearly this was easy to do, the New Testament never does it. Wisdom stands out conspicuously. Other variations occur, too. Within the NT, the remarkable passage in Acts What shall it profit, asks Jesus, for you to gain the whole world and forfeit your psyche? What will you give to get that psyche back? Clearly this implies that the psyche is something that can be gained or lost; but what does the sentence mean? More particularly, Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount challenges his hearers not to worry about their psyche, what they shall eat or drink, or about their soma, what they shall wear. This distinction is clear, and has nothing whatever to do with Platonic or quasi-Platonic dualism. The body is the outward thing that needs clothing; the psyche is the ongoing life which needs food and drink Matthew 6. What about the famous Matthew The point Jesus is making is, I think, a redefinition of the Messianic battle: And I note that in the Lukan version of the saying, Luke I will show you who to fear: To return to him, and to 1 Corinthians in particular: For the pneumatikos person, however, there is the striking

promise: The psychikos person is in fact more or less the same as the sarkinos person of 3. This then is carried over into the discussion of the resurrection body in chapter For Paul, the psyche is the breath of life, the vital spark, the thing that animates the body in the present life. The pneuma is the thing that animates the resurrection body. This is where the link is made: To speak, as many Christians have done, of the body dying, and the soul going marching on, is not only a travesty of what Paul says. It has encouraged many to suppose that the victory over death is the escape of the soul from the dead body.

Looking into the 'Soul' of Mummies - via Tattoos By Naima Tucker, Anthropology Major "Tattoos are one of the few things left behind that bioarchaeologists can study that are more of a representation of a person's soul than just quantitative analysis on age, sex, and stature," says Anthropology Major Elena Sandoval.

He defines what constitutes a man to be a whole man. An individual human person is an essential body and soul composite. The soul apart from the body and vice-versa cannot be recognized as the whole man. The man has to have both the degenerative material body and the immortal soul together as a unity. His works on philosophical anthropology show that he was under strong influence of Platonism, Neo-Platonist work of Plotinus and Porphyry. Copleston claims that Augustine used much of the neo-Platonic ideas while formulating the Christian world and life view. Firstly, the Platonism claims the souls to be existed eternally and self-sustaining substance that are not created on contrary to what Augustine believes. Therefore, soul is the life-force for the body. Secondly, the body is a matter that is also competent to exist on its own, but the functionality comes to halt by virtue of being inert after death that is followed by decomposition. Death only provides the escape way for the soul to be liberated from the body that is impure and polluted, according to Platonic view. For that reason, the body is prison house indeed that is made for the soul to live in the certain time and space but not a real person. Finally, Plato believes that the human soul is a rational and a real person. The real knowledge of the Form is only possible, if the soul is pure and immortal. By means of the virtue of soul, then the real knowledge ought to have independent recognition; it cannot be otherwise. Unlike Platonism, the anthropology of Neo-Platonism does not consider the soul as the principle of life. As the One is virtually what Intellect is, so Intellect is paradigmatically what Soul is. Therefore, the human is more like God. Nevertheless, Plotinus views the totality of a human person is only the reflection of the temporal embodied life of the soul that the soul uses the body as the instrument to individualize itself. By the time of Augustine, the philosophical problem of the relationship between the body and soul was still continuing in the marketplace of philosophy schools. He obviously acknowledges the fact that man is the apex of creation and is created with the soul and the body. Nevertheless, he makes distinction between two as the soul-body unity. The soul alone cannot be counted as a whole person or otherwise. Augustine reasons his arguments for the immortality of soul, first, in the human mind and secondly, in the Scriptures of Christian God and its teachings. Augustine argues that the soul must be a reality because of its capacity to reason. In other words, the soul is a rational being actualizing its essence into the material and corporeal body in order to be a fully human being. Therefore, the soul must be necessarily an incorporeal substance in order to do reason. Thus, the soul is immortal. The human soul once identified as incorporeal is now a living substance that is the axiom which animates the body. The living soul directs and guides the body. Augustine insists that if the truth to be immortal, then he reasons, unquestionably on Platonic basis, that the human soul must be immortal, since the truth can only exist in the incorporeal soul. The first reason for the immortality of the soul, for Augustine, is the nature of science which is believed to be eternal. According to his writing, science exists everywhere and can never ceases to exist into human mind. It is eternal and the nature and the truth it has cannot be invalidated. The reason is that the equilateral triangle always has three equal angles and three equal sides. The form of the equilateral triangle exists in our human mind without seeing it once we know its basic characteristics. It is rooted in the absolute truth and the science. He further maintains that science needs lives for its own existence. And science is only possessed by the living, so it cannot dwell in anything that cannot reason. By applying the same logic, we can say that the mind in which eternal science exists ought to be eternal in terms of its nature that eternal cannot exist in non-eternal. Likewise, reason comes from the mind. In the process of reasoning, the soul performs solely devoid of any assistance from the body. Our thought or reason comes to exist independently through thinking. As Augustine contends that science is the synonym for all knowledge of any type and kinds; science exists and dwells in the human mind. Therefore, the human mind is eternal and it always lives. The human soul contains knowledge, but all knowledge pertains to some science, and science is immortal, therefore the soul is immortal. This argument is followed by another which also

appealed strongly to the mind of Augustine at the time it was formulated. The soul of man is immortal because it is the seat of Reason which is immortal. Reason is another of those things which exists in the soul in an inseparable manner, but Reason can exist only in a living subject, and since it must exist always, its subject must be immortal, therefore the human soul is immortal. Our reason originates from the mind. Now, it is lawful to say that Reason is in the mind or reason itself is a mind giving the qualifications of the soul as inseparable with the Reason. We have already talked about Reason that it is also, in the same manner like science and mind, must be necessarily inseparable from the subject referring to the body, since the Reason needs the living subject according to its nature to function as a complete unit. The body is mutable due to its alteration in its mode of existence. On the other hand, the Reason is immutable and undeniable in the sense that it applies the same mode consistently in its reasoning. Two and two always are four and their existing mode does not change at all. The mode of these numerical values does not change but always exist in the same mode. Therefore, the Reason then is immutable. Augustine writes that the soul is immortal because God created them and intended them to be immortal. It bears the very image of God. As a result, the soul is superior to the body, says Cooper. The soul escapes the bodily death, because God bestowed immortality while he created in his image. Augustine knows the Platonic ideas of reincarnation of the soul. That kind of soul shall return to the Father after death of the body. In their reincarnated state, they will escape the misery of the ill world and suffer no more. Once we evaluate these two views of Plato and Porphyry, we come to know that these views are contrast with the Christian view of the resurrection of the body and the soul. The opposing both views deny the bodily resurrection. Porphyry says that the pure soul belongs to the wise and righteous that should only return to the incorruptible bodies in the world to live a blessed and immortal life. If we put these two views together, we can find the missing link that Augustine found to formulate Christian life and worldview about the soul-body eternal life in harmony with the Scripture. That missing link is the grace of Christ that Porphyry did not find because he did not seek rightly for the universal way of the deliverance of the soul. For they concerning other philosophers suppose that the blessedness of the soul then only is complete, when it is quite denuded of the body, and returns to God as a pure and simple, and, as it were, naked soul. Porphyry believes that the holy or the purified soul will never return to live again in the misery. The Platonic traditions and the Neo-Platonic thought can be easily traced in his writing, as sometimes he expressly declares and deliberates their thoughts into his works. His philosophical theology of original sin, free will, and the nature of human soul was very influenced by Neo-platonic. In the history of Christianity, the Neo-platonic influenced always did not prove to be disadvantage. Augustine used much of their materials to shape the Christian philosophical thought without losing originality of the orthodox theology of the Church Fathers who lived before him. His philosophical theology can be seen in the works of Thomas Aquinas. Later, Reformers like Luther, and especially John Calvin were much influenced. Through his anthropological philosophy, we can now understand what makes us as a complete human person and implication of our soul living in the eternity with God. Works Cited Allen, Diogenes. *Philosophy for Understanding Theology*. Basic Writings of Saint Augustine: On the Immortality of the Soul. The City of God. The Fathers of the Church: Catholic University of America, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-dualism Debate. Catholic University of America. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, Augustine to Scotus Tunbridge Wells: Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and Monism-Dualism Debate, 2nd ed. Eerdmans, , John Knox, , Phaedo 64c , Indianapolis: Hackett, , Hackett Publishing, 7th ed. Socrates asks Thrasymachus if he could perform anything without assistance of soul. Phaedo 76c,e , Indianapolis: Immortality of the Human Soul, Milwaukee:

Is the Soul Sexed? Anthropology, Transgenderism, and Disorders of Sex Development Elliott Louis Bedford, Ph.D. System Director, Ethics St. Vincent Health.

See Article History Alternative Title: At that time, almost everything in the domain of systematic knowledge was understood to be a branch of philosophy. As a branch of philosophy it served, instead, as a kind of review of the implications for human nature of philosophically more central doctrines, and it may have incorporated a good deal of empirical material that would now be thought of as belonging to psychology. Because the field of study was a part of philosophy, it did not have to be explicitly so described. By the end of the 19th century, anthropology and many other disciplines had established their independence from philosophy. Anthropology emerged as a branch of the social sciences that studied the biological and evolutionary history of human beings physical anthropology , as well as the culture and society that distinguished Homo sapiens from other animal species cultural anthropology. In their study of social and cultural institutions and practices, anthropologists typically focused on the less highly developed societies, further distinguishing anthropology from sociology. As a result of these developments, the term philosophical anthropology is not in familiar use among anthropologists and would probably not meet with any ready comprehension from philosophers either, at least in the English-speaking world. To put the matter somewhat differently, anthropology is now regarded as an empirical scientific discipline, and, as such, it discounts the relevance of philosophical theories of human nature. The inference here is that philosophical as opposed to empirical anthropology would almost certainly be bad anthropology. These views reflect a positivistic conception of scientific knowledge and the negative judgment of philosophy that typically goes with it. According to this view, philosophy, like religion, belongs to a period in the history of thought that has passed; it has been replaced by science and no longer has any real contribution to make to inquiries that conform to the rigorous epistemic or cognitive norms set by the natural sciences. It follows that the application of the adjective philosophicalâ€”not just to anthropology, but to any discipline at allâ€”has fallen out of favour. The only exception would be when the philosophical aspect of the discipline in question is confined to epistemological and logical matters and remains quite distinct from the substantive inquiries in which that discipline engages. Many philosophers have signaled an acceptance of this limitation on their work by concentrating their attention on language as the medium through which logical issues can be expressed. This term is also applied to the older accounts of human nature by philosophers whose work predated such distinctions. For the purposes of this discussion, however, the primary reference of the term philosophical anthropology will be to the period in which these ambiguities developed. In both old and new approaches, the principal focus of philosophical interest has been a feature of human nature that has long been central to self-understanding. In simple terms, it is the recognition that human beings have minds â€”or, in more traditional parlance, souls. Long before recorded history, the soul was understood to be that part of human nature that made life, motion, and sentience possible. Since at least the 19th century the actuality of the soul has been hotly contested in Western philosophy , usually in the name of science, especially as the vital functions once attributed to it were gradually explained by normal physical and physiological processes. But even though its defenders no longer apply the term widely, the concept of the soul has endured. Within philosophy it has been progressively refined to the point of being transformed into the concept of mind as that part of human nature wherein intellectual and moral powers reside. At the same time, many of the ideas traditionally associated with the soulâ€”immortality, for exampleâ€”have been largely abandoned by philosophy or assigned to religion. During the 19th century the long-standing concept of the mind as an entity distinct from the body was challenged, causing it as well as the concept of the soul to become problematic in a new and quite radical way. In a sense, materialism itself can be treated as a new thesis within philosophical anthropology, and due note will be taken of it as such. As such a project, philosophical anthropology now has the status of what, in another context , the English political theorist W. In dealing with these questions, it is important to acknowledge the deep affiliation of the traditional philosophical conception of human nature with the intuitive understanding that human beings have of themselves and of

their fellow human beings. Philosophers regard it as naive because it claims that humans perceive things in the world directly and without the mediation of any impression, idea, or representation. Because no provision is made for any such direct apprehension in the scientific worldview, the concept has been summarily dismissed. More generally, intuitive distinctions of this kind do not fare well within scientific thinking, which recognizes facts only when all their components can be reduced to a common level of physical process. Although, historically, philosophy has shared this distrust of commonsense distinctions and has not hesitated to override them with constructions of its own, contemporary philosophical anthropology typically treats such intuitions with more respect. It does not simply dismiss them as crude errors, and it does not treat the fact that they may be irreconcilable with assumptions made by the natural sciences as the last word on the subject. Wherever possible, it tries, instead, to incorporate them into a defensible conception of human nature that leaves the work of the sciences standing, though not necessarily within the kind of ontological framework that scientists may think is required. There is a wide variety of views as to how this can best be done, but these do not seem to engage the attention of many contemporary philosophers. As Socrates discovered, many philosophers have regarded the natural world and its processes as being at least as interesting, if not more so, than the human mind and its vagaries. That attitude has maintained itself down to the present day and may even have become more extreme. The name of Socrates does, however, suggest a positive affinity for philosophical anthropology with humanism as a mode of thought that is animated by a strong sense of both the moral and the human importance of achieving an understanding of human nature. Humans do not, after all, ask large philosophical questions primarily in their capacity as workers in a specialized field of inquiry; rather, they ask them as human beings who feel the need to understand their own lives in as wide a context as possible. It may be that a candid identification of philosophical anthropology with that degree of humane interest would express its character better than an official designation of it as a subfield within the bureaucratized world of academic philosophy. It would then be, in effect, the philosophical rationale for the understanding of human nature that humanism has represented, typically without offering much in the way of supporting argument.

Early conceptions of the soul The earliest origins of the concept of the soul are hidden in a remote prehistoric past. Human beings undoubtedly lived then, as most still do, in a state of deep absorption in the world around them. What seems to have struck these early human beings most forcefully was the difference between what is alive and what is dead. This was the distinction that the idea of soul was originally designed to express. The soul was a life-principle, and, as such, it was regarded as something that leaves the body at death. As indicated by a variety of Indo-European words for soul, such as the Sanskrit *atman* and the Greek *psyche*, it was often identified with breath; it was not so much immaterial as it was a finer, attenuated form of matter. As thinking about these issues progressed, a variety of functions were assigned to the soul, which gradually came to be conceived as a kind of container in which the functions resided. This connotation of inwardness survives to this day. The soul was considered a distinct individual entity—“not unlike an organ of the body, but also very different, because its location in the body could not be determined. In this way, each soul-mind came to be understood as one more entity in the world, yet one with the unique quality of containing simulacra of the other entities. One of the facts that the soul-mind was supposed to account for was the knowledge that humans had of the world around them. It was sometimes thought—and children still often imagine—that rays of some kind emanate from the eyes and meet other rays emanating from the perceived object halfway, where perception supposedly occurs. Eventually, however, perception came to be understood as a process outside the body that reaches a sense organ and then produces some kind of facsimile of the object in the person whose sense organ has been affected. Knowledge is thus the production of a copy or something like it in the mind of the object that is outside it. The natural world was the immediate object of both perception and thought, but it was not long before God came to be considered an even more important object of knowledge. Indeed, knowledge of God eventually came to be regarded by some philosophers as a necessary condition for any other knowledge the soul might have, including that of the natural world. Still another object of knowledge for the soul was the soul itself; its ability to take itself, reflexively, as the object of its own awareness has been cited as one of its most remarkable characteristics. Of these three types of knowledge—“of the external world, of God, and of the soul itself”—it is the first that has received most attention from philosophers. Although that

priority of interest will be observed in this discussion, the other kinds of knowledge will be touched on in appropriate contexts. Oddly, one kind of knowledge, of the souls or minds of other human beings, did not become a major topic of philosophical discussion until late in the modern period, and since then it has been much controverted; see other minds, problem of. But if the soul-mind had all of these different cognitive capabilities, it could not be a purely receptive or passive entity. It had its own spontaneity even in the area of cognition, where it could draw inferences about things or events not immediately present in space or time. Even more important, the soul-mind had the power to make decisions and undertake actions, and accordingly it held responsibility for the moral quality of those decisions and actions. The soul in ancient Greece A great many thinkers have contributed in one way or another to the philosophical understanding of human nature. In the history of Western thought, however, there has been a discernible series of turning points that are of special importance for appreciating the situation of philosophical anthropology at the present time. The first of these occurred in ancient Greece and coincided with the beginning of the Western philosophical tradition. They were followed by others who tried to reconstruct the concept of mind on a very different basis. The significance of this juncture is so central to the viability of philosophical anthropology that further attention must be devoted to it. In the thought of Plato and Aristotle, however, there was a clear philosophical conception of the soul as an entity that is somehow distinct from the body and is also the seat of functions like thought, perception, and desire. Plato Plato was the first great philosophical exponent of the soul in the West. He depicted its rational component as a ruler overseeing the jumble of constantly changing and often conflicting states that reach human awareness through perception and become objects of human attachment through desire. He largely dismissed truth claims that were made for perception and instead sought authentic knowledge in a very different quarter that would be free from the instability and impermanence of the spatiotemporal world revealed by perception. Such knowledge appeared to be wholly independent of perception, having achieved a degree of necessity and universality that was unattainable by merely empirical methods. Accordingly, the proper business of the rational soul was thought, and the proper objects of thought were not concrete particulars but abstract essences, which he called Ideas, or Forms. Such Ideas make each particular thing the kind of thing it is, and it is the apprehension of these abstract Ideas, in their pure universality, that enables the soul to bring order into the chaotic jumble of things and processes in the world. Plato conversing with his pupils Plato conversing with his pupils, mosaic from Pompeii, 1st century bce; in the National Archaeological Museum, Naples. It introduced a conception of human life as the effort to control the chaos of sensation and desire through an understanding of the ideal order that is appropriate to each kind of being. Only the intelligence that comes from the deepest understanding of reality should preside over human affairs, while all the other criteria of legitimacy applied by human societies must yield to it. Indeed, it is reasonable to say that this primary emphasis on the intellect represented the point of origin for the whole Western conception of the character of an ideally complete human being and of the intellectual and moral order within which such a person is to function. At the same time, however, the life of the intellect was conceived as being driven by a passionate aspiration for what was eternal and universal. At its deepest level, each life is driven by a passionate desire for what is at once beautiful and less time-bound than itself. For most people, eros takes the form of sexual love and the extension of a finite life through progeny. There is, moreover, an ascending order of objects of eros, encompassing not just beautiful bodies but beautiful souls, as well as laws, institutions, and practices that are, in their own way, beautiful. Given all that it incorporates, this ascending hierarchy becomes increasingly abstract and decreasingly time-bound. At its summit is the idea of the Good itself. The achievement of a vision of the Good is the ultimate goal and fulfillment of a human life, but it is strongly suggested that it lies beyond the power of words to express the content of that vision. Aristotle was a student of the natural world, and, unlike Plato, he assigned a much more important role to perception as the route through which humans gain access to that world. Aristotle denied that they can be separate from particulars, as Plato had claimed. The word Form, when used to refer to Forms or Ideas as Plato conceived them, is often capitalized in the scholarly literature; when used to refer to forms as Aristotle conceived them, it is conventionally lowercased. Even amid all the accidents and changes in the world of space and time that Plato had emphasized, such forms provided an element of stability, because they made

something the kind of thing it is and they guided its development toward an appropriate fulfillment. Among these, the intellectual virtues occupy the highest place, but the role of practical understanding in the conduct of life is also recognized. But if the soul itself is the form of the body, this would mean that there would be a form in another form, which is puzzling. Aristotle tried to ensure the realistic character of this perceptual commerce with the world through the assumption that the form in the soul is necessarily identical with the form of the corresponding object in the world, but the warrant for this assumption proved very elusive in the further development of the philosophy of mind. What it did accomplish, however, was to obviate the need for any deeper examination of the relation between the form in the soul and the character of the object it was, in effect, supposed to represent. Page 1 of 3.

Chapter 9 : Christian anthropology - Wikipedia

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For evolution to be true, thousands of "links" or transitional phases would be necessary for a true movement from one species to another. To establish the doctrine of evolution a gradual, or even a provable abrupt change, must be found between: Science shows great gaps between different species and that each came without known antecedents in the lineal descent. Other species take their places apparently by substitution, not by transmutation. When evolutionists assign millions and millions of years for the process of producing man, they do so without evidence. The Question may be justified whether the earth has been habitable millions of years. The oldest written records with verifiable chronology only dates back to the first dynasty in Egypt c. While the concept is intriguing of infinite time to form the earth and all the life that is on earth, there is no evidence to support the theory. Equally opposed to the theory of evolution is the idea of the crossing of the species. Nature herself has closed the door to this possibility note Gen. The earliest remains of man are of high development, showing that man like the other species came upon the scene in the maturity of his being. There may be evidence for devolution or man going from a higher state of existence to a lower state as per Genesis , but there is no evidence that any man has gone from a lower state to a higher form of existence. Radiocarbon dating methods have proven to be unreliable for establishing dates of antiquity, and even more damaging is that lack of fossil evidence when population statistics are considered. From all the people that would have lived on earth in the last million years, even with a slow population growth rate, there is little evidence of the preservation of ancient man. If evolution is true, why there so little evidence in the fossil records? In the past, some extraordinary hoaxes have been offered by evolutionists to fool the public. In the Neander Valley, near Dusseldorf, Germany a creature was found that was believed to be semi-erect and sub-human. There was a single skull cap found. The next year, still digging in the same area but fifty feet away, Dubois discovered a thigh bone, along with two molar teeth. Assuming all the pieces belonged together, Dubois dated the find as a half million years old, and told the world. What he did not tell the world until thirty-one years later is that he had also found two obviously human skulls at the same time and on the same level as the digs. Just before his death, Dubois conceded that Java man was really the remains of a large gibbon. From a skull part and a few teeth, the little chap was dated to be from ten thousand years old! In , the bones of "Dawn Man" were put under the spotlight of truth: The skull portion unearthed had been stained with iron salts and the teeth had been deliberately filed down to give it the appearance of age. Unearthed near Peking, China in by Davidson Bolack, this find consisted of the fragments of thirty skulls and teeth. Today, Peking man is believed to be the remains of some large monkeys or baboons which were killed and eaten by those working in an ancient lime-burning quarry. Harold Cook informed the world that he had made a wonderful discovery in western Nebraska in . What did he find? The world was made to wonder as an imagine artist drew a mouth around the ape-man that was declared to be six thousand years old. In the tooth was discovered to have really belong to an extinct pig. Leakey have made a marvelous discovery in Olduvia, Tanzania. A skull cap and a few bone fragments were produced and dated to be million years old. Here at last was a real missing link. Just prior to his death, Leakey admitted that he felt his find was nothing more than a variety of australopithecus Southern ape found in . Nature today, and the fossil records of the past continue to testify against evolution by demonstrating that some kingdoms in nature are vastly superior to others. This would not be the case if evolution were true. Rather, there would be some sort of connection between the kingdoms to form a unified ecosystem. However, there cannot be found in the vegetable kingdom anything from which the characteristic features of animal life could be developed or vice versa. So too there is a vast gulf between the animal and man, despite the attempts of modern science since to show how similar man and animal are. Some dramatic differences may be noted. Animals may solve problems based on a biological urge but only man sits down to think, the way that a philosopher, professor, theologian, or someone in love does. The bird still builds her nest

and the bee her cell as they did at the Gate of Eden. There has been no progress in their mental development. Animals may use tool, but no animal makes a pattern or die press to stamp out other tools for mass production. Animals communicate with sounds and grunts. They communicate emotions and impulses but nothing that can be asserted to be true or false. There is a universal law of degeneration, which argues against the evolutionary model. The law of entropy says that everything goes from order to disorder. There is a natural breakdown of all things. Physically, modern men are believed to be inferior to the ante-diluvian civilization and mentally we may not be above the ancient Egyptians either; their inventions rival ours. It will be interesting to see if modern buildings will stand the test of time like the pyramids. Rather than ascend ever upward, the body of man is wearing down just like all the things he builds and the universe itself. One day, the sun will stop shining, the earth will rotate no longer, and the starlights shall disappear. The universe is winding down, not up. If evolution is a cosmic process, it should be everywhere apparent and in actual operation before our eyes. Why is there no discernable evolutionary processes going on? Has everything in the evolutionary model reached such a stage of perfection that no advance is possible? Evolutionary science is strangely silent before such questions. If intelligent cross breeding has failed to produce a single new species in ideal laboratory conditions, what probability is there that blind chance or natural selection could do so? Natural selection will not be able to do what intelligent selection cannot do.