Chapter 1 : invasion of Iraq - Wikipedia

Harvey develops his arguments with evidence from two significant case studies: the American ballistic missile defence program and the war in Iraq. He argues that, as the costs and risks of relying exclusively on multilateralism increase, the logical, legal, strategic, and moral reasons for embracing only multilateral approaches to security.

Abandoned explosive ordnance may or may not have been primed, fuzed, armed, or otherwise prepared for use. Battle damage assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems air, ground, naval, and special forces weapon systems throughout the range of military operations. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. Circular Error Probable CEP â€" An indicator of the delivery accuracy of a weapon system, used as a factor in determining probable damage to a target. They may explode on contact with the ground or be fuzed with a delay. Collateral Damage Estimate CDE â€" Estimate of unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time. Such damage is not unlawful so long as it is not excessive in light of the overall military advantage anticipated from the attack. Also called a grenade, it has both anti-armor and antipersonnel effects. Dud â€" Common term for unexploded munition or cluster submunition; refers to munitions or submunitions that have been fired but did not explode on impact as intended. These are often hazardous duds that can still explode when disturbed. Emerging Target â€" A target that develops as the war progresses instead of being planned prior to the initiation of hostilities. Emerging targets include time-sensitive targets that are fleeting in nature such as leadership , enemy forces in the field, mobile targets, and other targets of opportunity. Multiple Launch Rocket System MLRS â€" This rocket artillery system can carry up to twelve rockets, which can be launched simultaneously or individually. Each rocket contains M77 submunitions. Precision-Guided Munition PGM â€" A weapon that uses a computerized guidance system that directs it toward a target with increased accuracy and less collateral damage. GPS, laser, and television guidance systems are particularly common. Rules of Engagement ROE â€" Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which U. The Thuraya satellite phone is common in the Middle East. Thuraya phones have an internal GPS chip that allows tracking within a one-hundred-meter radius. Time-Sensitive Target â€" Those targets requiring immediate response because they pose or will soon pose a danger to friendly forces or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity. Organized as a headquarters element, CENTCOM has no permanent fighting forces assigned to it; instead all four branches of the armed forces provide component commands to Central Command. Its area of responsibility extends from the Horn of Africa to Central Asia. It may have been fired, dropped, launched, or projected and should have exploded but failed to do so. Bush called the war in Iraq "one of the swiftest and most humane military campaigns in history. Human Rights Watch conducted a mission to Iraq between late April and early June with two objectives: Human Rights Watch did not undertake this mission to determine the number of civilian casualties. Rather, it sought to understand how and why civilians were killed or injured in order to assess compliance with international humanitarian law, with a view to lessening the impact of war on civilians in the future. The investigation showed that Iraqi forces committed a number of violations of international humanitarian law, which may have led to significant civilian casualties. These violations included use of human shields, abuse of the red cross and red crescent emblems, use of antipersonnel landmines, location of military objects in protected places such as mosques, hospitals, and cultural property , and a failure to take adequate precautions to protect civilians from the dangers of military operations. Human Rights Watch nevertheless identified practices that led to civilian casualties in the air war, ground war, and post-conflict period. The widespread use of cluster munitions, especially by U. Cluster munitions, which are large weapons containing dozens or hundreds of submunitions, endanger civilians because of their broad dispersal, or "footprint," and the high

number of submunitions that do not explode on impact. The British used an additional seventy air-launched and 2, ground-launched cluster munitions, containing , submunitions. Although cluster munition strikes are particularly dangerous in populated areas, U. Coalition air forces also caused civilian casualties by their use of cluster munitions, but to a much lesser degree. Many of the civilian casualties from the air war occurred during U. The United States used an unsound targeting methodology that relied on intercepts of satellite phones and inadequate corroborating intelligence. Thuraya satellite phones provide geo-coordinates that are accurate only to within a one-hundred-meter foot radius; therefore, the United States could not determine the origin of a call to a degree of accuracy greater than a 31,square-meter area. This flawed targeting strategy was compounded by a lack of effective assessment both prior to the attacks of the potential risks to civilians and after the attacks of their success and utility. All of the fifty acknowledged attacks targeting Iraqi leadership failed. While they did not kill a single targeted individual, the strikes killed and injured dozens of civilians. Iraqis who spoke to Human Rights Watch about the attacks it investigated repeatedly stated that they believed the intended targets were not even present at the time of the strikes. Coalition air strikes on preplanned fixed targets apparently caused few civilian casualties, and U. Coalition forces did, however, identify certain targets as "dual use," including electricity and media installations. Most of the civilian casualties attributable to Coalition conduct in the ground war appear to have been the result of ground-launched cluster munitions. In some instances of direct combat, especially in Baghdad and al-Nasiriyya, problems with training on as well as dissemination and clarity of the rules of engagement ROE for U. Explosive remnants of war ERW caused hundreds of civilian casualties during and after major hostilities and continue to do so today. The Coalition left behind many tens of thousands of cluster munition "duds," i. If the average failure rate were 5 percent, the number of cluster munitions Coalition forces reported using would leave about 90, duds. The humanitarian and military harm they caused has led even some of the soldiers who fought in Iraq to call for an alternative to a weapon that produces so many duds. Meanwhile, Iraqi forces abandoned staggering quantities of arms and ammunition that have injured or killed civilians searching for playthings or scraps to sell or reuse. Neither country,however, does an adequate job of investigating and analyzing why civilian casualties occur. That job, left largely to organizations like Human Rights Watch, should be the responsibility of parties to the conflict. Having the capability to do this kind of assessment, the United States and United Kingdom should accurately account for the civilian casualties they cause in armed conflict so that they can provide maximum protection to civilians in any future conflict. International Humanitarian Law During the war in Iraq, Coalition and Iraqi forces were bound by international humanitarian law, also known as the law of armed conflict. IHL requires parties to an armed conflict to respect and protect civilians and other persons not or no longer taking a direct part in hostilities. It also limits permissible means and methods of warfare. Today, many, if not most, of its provisions are considered reflective of customary international law. It requires parties to a conflict to distinguish at all times between combatants and civilians. Civilians and civilian objects may not be attacked, and operations may only be directed against military objectives. These are attacks "of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction. Parties to a conflict are therefore required to take precautionary measures with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects. Hospitals and other medical units must be "respected and protected" and must not be the object of attack. They must not be used "to shield military objectives from attack. While the military conducts such assessments to determine the military success of an operation, Human Rights Watch reviews the same incidents from an IHL perspective. For this mission to Iraq, Human Rights Watch conducted its research in three phases: Pre-Mission During the active phase of hostilities, Human Rights Watch monitored press reports from around the world of civilians injured or killed by the fighting. It examined each report for the location, date, and time of the incident as well as the tactics and weapons employed and the military forces involved. The reports were compiled into an electronic database on a daily basis, which helped Human Rights Watch researchers to determine the initial sites for inspection and analysis inside Iraq. The pre-mission work also included the creation of ArcView geographic

information software GIS customized maps of Iraq and its major cities. These digitized maps would be used to display data collected inside Iraq of the precise location of various objects and events. On Mission Human Rights Watch sent a team of three researchers to Iraq between April 29 and June 1, , to investigate the effect of the air war, ground war, and the immediate post-combat environment on civilians. The team included a senior military analyst and Iraq expert, a lawyer with expertise in international humanitarian law and the use of cluster munitions, and a principal researcher. All three had previous experience with this kind of research. It obtained data about the location of cluster munition strikes from the Humanitarian Operations Center HOC in Kuwait, plotted those strikes in ArcView, and visited many of the sites located in populated areas. The team traveled freely both within and between cities by private vehicle, unarmed and without military escort. At each of the sites visited, the team attempted to investigate three sources of information: Ballistic evidence included blast and fragmentation damage and, especially in the case of cluster munitions, pieces of weapons; this information helped the team determine the weapons used in a particular incident and the manner in which they were employed. The team attempted to interview soldiers from all parties to an incident who could provide information about how they fought particular engagements, including details on the weapons and tactics they used, the behavior they observed from the enemy, and the presence of civilians at the time of the attack. The team interviewed victims and witnesses of attacks that harmed civilians to gather information about the time, date, location, and nature of incidents. They also reviewed thousands of medical records at more than a dozen hospitals in the cities they visited and interviewed medical personnel at those facilities. In addition, at each site, the team recorded the precise global positioning system GPS coordinates of important locations-such as debris fields, bomb craters, shrapnel and small-arms damage, location of Coalition and Iraqi forces according to witness testimony, places of civilian deaths or injuries-with hand-held Garmin GPS units. The team also took thousands of digital photographs to analyze in conjunction with the evidence described above. It must be stressed that, with one exception, Human Rights Watch was unable to interview members of the Iraqi armed forces in order to get their response to accusations of violations of IHL and their views on how the Coalition forces fought. This report does not assess the military advantage of any particular attack it describes. Parties to an armed conflict must carry out this assessment on a case-by-case basis before each attack. Post-Mission After returning from Iraq, the team compiled and analyzed all of the information it gathered during the mission. It also conducted follow-up interviews with relevant U. Although an overall number would be useful in order to understand fully the impact of the war and to perform comparative analyses with other recent conflicts, we believe it is more important to understand the circumstances that led to civilian casualties. Human Rights Watch researchers went to many of the hospitals in the ten cities and numerous small towns they visited during the mission. Hospital directors and medical personnel who had been working in these facilities during the conflict made Iraqi medical records available. The quality of the records varied from detailed computerized hospital forms to bloodstained notebooks with hand-written notes. While some medical facilities were able to keep comprehensive records, others had incomplete records with sections missing. Understandably, during active military operations, record keeping was not always the highest priority. This is one reason that the total number of civilian casualties in Iraq will never be accurately known. Another challenge to quantifying Iraqi civilian casualties is that in this Muslim nation the dead are buried almost immediately. Though hospitals have records of some of the deaths in the war, a certain percentage of casualties, due to religious customs, were not taken to hospitals, not even to obtain death certificates. Finally, as in any war, in some instances, there were few if any remains by which to identify the dead.

Chapter 2 : INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS, NO. ,

The article distinguishes between procedural multilateralism, where US military operations are endorsed by an international organization, and operational multilateralism, where military actions are coordinated with the armed forces of other countries.

The paper will analyze the role of multilateralism in the political discourse of each one of these actors and look at how it informs foreign policy and practices. Although always disputed and controversial in the internal realm, multilateralism has been an essential element of United States foreign policy since the World War II and one of the foundations of the international order of the Pax Americana. This feature has been maintained in spite of the strong isolationism rooted in the tradition and the political culture of this country. From the EU perspective, multilateralism is considered to be â€" more than an option â€" an imperative. Its own experience in regional integration is seen as a contribution to the multilateral order â€" a building block, more than a stumbling block â€" in order to resolve the growing needs for governance and for the provision of global public goods in the international system, such as peace and international security. In the process of formation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy CFSP , since its appearance in the Treaty of Maastricht, the commitment to multilateralism has been reaffirmed and made explicit. Finally, as it will be pointed out, multilateralism constitutes an important 1 Professor of International Relations, Complutense University of Madrid. Regarding Latin America and the Caribbean, it also shares this commitment with multilateralism. As in the previous cases, it is not merely a rhetorical statement, given the rich historical legacy of the region in pacific resolution of conflicts, avoiding war, trough regional or universal organizations. As Russell and Tokatlian This task and goal at the same time, is to a great extent connected with its relative position of power as a peripheral area of the international order, but also with an identity of Grotian nature that has been strengthening itself over the years. It has made significant doctrinal contributions to international law, and its participation in regional integration processes is, like in the case of the EU, a constitutive characteristic of its international identity and an important vector of foreign policies of the region. Subject to usual tools of discourse analysis in social sciences, the texts originated in the EU â€" Latin America and the Caribbean summits, the Summits of the Americas and the transatlantic dialogue between EU and the United States would show very similar discursive logics regarding adherence to multilateral norms and institutions and the significance given to them in the international society. Over and above superficial criticisms that can be put to this kind of governmental interactions, it should be underlined that they are an arena for confrontation as well as a place for socialization of political and social elites and an important space for construction of international consensus. Narratives and discourses around multilateralism: Sometimes, it becomes a technique of entrepreneurial management or electoral propaganda â€" the so-called storytelling â€", where narrations and metaphors replace with greater communicative efficiency statistic data or abstract arguments. Therefore, narratives often have a crucial role in social construction of reality by providing it with certain rationality and coherence, avoiding it to be expounded unintelligibly. They are being configured as interpretative frames capable of giving sense to facts. Thus, they define expectations, assign roles and functions and prescribe conducts, establishing incentives and penalizations in advance. They have, 3 therefore, an important constitutive role in interests, values and identities of political actors and social practices, in foreign politics and other spheres. All said so far does not pretend to underestimate the material factors â€" like the relative possession of economic or military capabilities and assets â€" as the explicative variables of international politics. That is especially important when the international system is being transformed by rapid processes of change in the nature, sources and patterns of distribution of power in the international system, and it is assumed that ideas matter as sources of power. Consequently, they are not explanations of reality, as much as constructions that must be explained, especially as cognitive or discursive sources of power. This is what Barnett and Duvall In the field of international relations, and more specifically, in the sub-field of Foreign

Policy Analysis and foreign policy decision-making, cognitive factors has been taken into account at an early date. A wide range of studies focusing on the role of agency of state actors emerged from the fifties, and particularly in the seventies Carlsnaes Although in a broader interpretative framework, these factors were also assessed in the classic study of G. Subsequently, other studies of decision making based on social-institutionalist perspective, in particular social-constructivism, also gave relevance to the cognitive dimension of international relations and in particular foreign policy. These studies highlight how inter-subjective meanings play an important role in setting expectations for behaviour Hill Finally, a comprehensive examination by V. That explains the fact that the basic agreements are pretty superficial; that political dialogue about global governance and multilateralism is actually an arena of dispute and that the effective cooperation for the construction of an effective multilateralism shows so little advances. The dialogue between the members of this triangle in matters like the 2 See, among others, Horowitz , Roubini , or Posen In his classic work about the missile crisis in Cuba â€" Essence of Decision, Allison uses a similar strategy, explaining the decisive process triggered by the Cuban missile crisis based on three explicative models. These three narratives could be defined as: This metaphor is only aimed to expose the main structures and presumptions of each narrative through its performing roles, actors, and scripts. Their basic screenplay would be based on two great elements: These theories define the frames of foreign policy through the action of the think tanks, whether it is the more progressive Center for American Progress, or the neoconservative Project for a New American Century. God bless America is still a usual expression in the political vocabulary of this country, both for the democrats as well as for the republicans. Because of all this, as stated by B. There are other relevant characters in this account: The successive US national security strategies adopted since the end of the Cold War show, in spite of changes of governments and doctrines, an eye- catching continuity regarding this collections of friends and foes. In this account, multilateralism makes up the natural space for the exercise of the US leadership and a mechanism that reduces the costs of a strategy of bandwagoning for the leader as well as its followers, sharing costs and generating legitimacy. Nevertheless, the United States will never put their sovereignty or their interests under multilateral rules or institutions: What about the United Nations? Hence the frequent reference of the US populist right to multilateral organizations as hindrances that the other countries, portrayed as Lilliputians, pretend to use in order to hold that modern Gulliver. In the argumental synopsis of this account, global governance is a result of the teleological struggle of the United States to secure their supremacy and expand their values, considered to be universal. Sometimes, the protagonist can be wrong and turn unilateral and violent â€" fine, no one is perfect â€", he is condemned by multilateral organizations and alienated from the support of the allies In this case, the screenplay is being 7 fed on the pronounced nationalism and anti-imperialism present in political culture of these countries. It has been formulated by a broad range of national leaders and intellectuals from developing countries, as well as organizations like already mentioned G, G, or UN institutions like the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean ECLAC. The former is well placed in ECLAC and other economic think tanks, and the latter is deeply rooted in the curricula of diplomatic academies and foreign offices of countries like Brazil, Mexico or India. In this account, the actors of the international system would get roles very different from the ones assigned to them by the previous one. However, in this account this policy would be the object of general dishonor. And above all, it is still a too complex political artifact, impossible to understand, hand-tied by an inefficient bureaucracy and in spite of its moral rhetoric it is driven by double standards, between democratic rhetoric and power interests related with stability; between human rights claims and restrictive migratory policies; or between the commitment to development and agricultural protectionism. What about the United Nations and multilateral organizations? It is based on the defense of international law and especially the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and sovereign equality of the States Serbin Some organizations, like the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank are seen as mere instruments of domination of the United States and neoliberal ideology that are weaking Nation- States in order to facilitate the penetration of transnational capital into the developing countries. It is, again, the strategy of Lilliputians,

but in reverse order. In this story, developing countries embody a teleological struggle of the weak against the powerful, in order to achieve greater justice and equality in international relations, satisfy historical grievances, defend themselves from interventionism, achieve greater political and autonomy, economic development and social welfare, and reach their just and legitimate national interests. And, certainly, at the end of this account there is also a happy end: The basic screenplay of this account would contain various elements. This narrative would include a number of ingredients: Among the cast for this account, the external observer will find the member states, permanently confronted with the dilemmas often presented by their Europeanist commitment, and their traditional national interests and imperatives of domestic policy marked by domestic politics and voting calendars. The United States appear as an arrogant and inevitable partner, unable of recognizing the EU as an equal, trying to impose it hegemonic agendas. Besides preventing an autonomous European defense through NATO, the US tries to split Europe through the UK and other atlanticist allies, and occasionally turns unilateral, violent and out of control. Finally, the EU is obliged to engage with developing countries, but they are strongly nationalist, always asking for money, to whom patient Europe keeps insisting to embrace democracy, regional integration and supranationality, fiscal reforms and social cohesion, etcâ€¦ that will give them the key to freedom and progress. What is the outline of this account? As in every blockbuster, there is a happy end: But even if the reality is considered more complex and the analysis became more sophisticated, these narratives remain as a basic cognitive framework for policy making and the search for the search of the international position of each actor. Each self-perception and concept of multilateralism can be challenged by its counter-image, all of them coherent for 10 themselves and capable to claim a number of elements of truth. Moreover, these narratives are justified from different historical experiences, often very painful: And in case of Latin America, the painful experience of colonialism, imperialism and foreign intervention by European powers and the United States. As it has been said, the purpose of this intellectual play is no other but to demonstrate up to what extent these narratives matter: But just like agreements and consensus can emerge from them, they also can be the source of disagreements and misunderstandings that stand in the way of cooperation. They have been created across specific historical processes and are rooted a inter-national society based on the territorial nation-State; i. With these underpinnings, it seems to be a difficult endeavor to make truly cosmopolitan global governance through effective multilateralism, based on common objectives as well as on respect for diversity. We know that politics does not respond to facts but to perceptions and, as we have seen, they are in part socially constructed by means of these accounts and narratives. It responds to narratives and frameworks deeply rooted in history, identities, normative preferences, ethos and political culture. It is not predictable that the growing demands of global governance imposed by globalization would change during the night the constructions of national interest, national identities and values characteristic for each â€¦nationalâ€¦ political system, society or culture that have been shaping us for decades, even centuries. Nevertheless, there seem to be reasons for optimism. With globalization and crisis, it seems that the pair global economic integration and Nation-State have been chosenâ€¦ at the cost of democratic politics: There is only one feasible pair in this trilemma that combines democratic politics and global economic integration, given that it does not seem to be possible or desirable to break the link with global economy after three or four decades of economic transnationalization and development of global supply chains. In brief, the deep changes brought by globalization, accelerated by wars and crisis across the last decade are provoking growing cognitive dissonances among these accounts and global scenario that each day persistently express political imperatives that seem not to have satisfactory answers from these narratives. In this context, what happens with the narratives in force? The experience of the developing countries through the crisis seems to indicate so. That is the main reason explaining why China has no other option but to recycle its colossal trade surplus, acquiring at a loss Treasuries issued by the US Government. This reveals that these countries are more globalized, more interdependent and have more things on stake in an effective global governance than they are politically ready to admit Arenal , Sanahuja It also does not seem feasible not to support the reform of the international organizations giving more weight to emerging countries, in order to

guarantee their representativeness, legitimacy and effectiveness8. The global crisis can be a catalyst for the change. It requires a more intense, assertive and proactive action regarding multilateralism, transcending the traditional hegemonic, defensive and normative approaches, whose function after all is nothing more but framing the reality in cognitive loops that feedback each other, preventing new views about the changes registered in the emerging international order, 8 The debate from May-June about the succession of the Managing Director of the IMF, in which the European Union insisted on maintaining the discredited and obsolete distribution of the positions from the postwar period, expresses these resistances. The persistence of these narratives involves challenges and risks. As historian Tony Judt Remaining closed inside these narratives will not contribute to overcoming that dissability. Before the imperatives of the crisis, it seems necessary to redefine interests, identities and values in a cosmopolitan key, as a foundation of a more effective international cooperation. A broader dialogue is required, a communicative action â€" in the sense that Habermas gives to this concept â€" that would promote a major mutual understanding, recognition of diversity and that would start the processes of construction of a broader narrative that would contribute to a new shared definition of interests, identities and values before global challenges. Bibliography Allison, G, , Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Simmons, Handbook of International Relations. The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism.

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Snyder Jack, Anarchy and Culture, op. According to Wendt and Friedhem, [11] Idealists if this is understood in a social, non-utopian sense believe that the base of world politics is a shared knowledge structure and that material forces are significant insofar as this structure gives them meaning. Idealists are not saying that states do not act on the basis of power and interests but rather that this is contingent on the social structure in which states are embedded. In a conflictual system power interests matter, but what makes a system conflictual is an underlying nature of common knowledgeâ€¦ Second, and relatedly, this debate is also not about how much conflict exists in the system. Material forces may cause cooperation and shared knowledge, conflict. Neo-Realists have confused matters by treating conflictual systems as realist worlds. How liberal a state is affects both how it responds to U. Liberal elites of the world tend to perceive a relatively broad coincidence of interest between their country and other liberal countries. They tend to interpret the United States as benign and devote few state resources to counterbalancing it. In turn, the liberals who govern the United States tend to treat other liberal countries relatively benignly. But anti-liberal elites tend to perceive a more malign United States and devote more state resources to counterbalancing; the United States, meanwhile, tends to treat less benignly countries governed by such elites and their favored institutions. The end of the Cold War created a crisis of meaning of international politics. In the absence of hierarchy among these international problems, none could become a leading security issue. Since the old rules of international politics no longer applied, the U. Unilateralism by contrast, during the Cold War era, the U. Neglect to cultivate the great power relationships in contrast to the success of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in creating a situation in which China and the Former Soviet Union feared one another more than they feared Americans, American relations with Russia and China in the post-Cold War era seriously deteriorated ; 3. Inconsistency of how the United States pursued regional justice for instance, seeking justice for the Chechens or the Tibetans, or the Kosovo Albanians â€" applying universal principles on a less than universal basis is not free of the charge of hypocrisy ; [27] , [28] 5. Emphasizing the advantages and neglecting the dangers of globalization. Undoubtedly, in order to deal more effectively with a new kind of threat - terrorism - some old policy styles used during the Cold War needed to be invoked again. First of all, it was necessary to have a clear strategic vision. Lewis Gaddis put it in this way: This means avoiding the illusion that one can pursue particular policies in particular places without their interacting with one another. It means remembering that actions have consequences: It means thinking about the implications of such asymmetries for the relationship between ends and means. However, maintaining this coalition on a long run is not easy task. As Lewis Gaddis acknowledges, the United States, if the goal is to maintain this alliance, has to see its allies more in terms of shared interests and less in terms of shared values. Given the importance of maintaining broad international support, the United States is, according to Stephen Walt, [30] likely to subordinate other foreign policy goals to the broader task of keeping its alliance intact. The United States needs help from a number of states and groups with poor human rights record; for example, Uzbekistan; 3. The crisis has also provided an ideal opportunity to improve relations with Russia; and, 4. Indeed, much of this is going on in contemporary American foreign policy. The Bush Administration has supported the Pakistani Government, declared that it would decrease the American military presence in Kosovo and Bosnia, and so forth. In regard to the latest developments, the Administration participates in the nation-building of Afghanistan [32] and plays a leading role in rebuilding of the Iraqi government. Between Informal and Formal Empire Niall Ferguson at the end of the Clinton Administration has identified a list of factors that may constrain American imperial prospects: The reasons this i. Perhaps that is the greatest disappointment facing the world in the twenty-first century: In respect to this, he has pointed out several important components: The means of destruction have never been cheaper. The global inequality gap has risen

significantly, and, with it, dissatisfaction among the losers. The United States is incapable of coping with the challenge of global disorder without strong U. However, his criticism of super-national institutions, such as the United Nations, is one-dimensional. There is no doubt that the U. However, this is only one part of the story. The fact is that the United States, under an umbrella of super-national organizations, may more effectively have used a number of policy tools, [35] including highly developed U. For instance, in regard to the recent war in Iraq, on December 12, , the U. Nevertheless, this is a logical consequence of the modernization process. Margaret Levi argues that an increase in both variables â€" democratization and industrialization â€" pushes governments to invest more in convincing their populations of the importance of the war and in winning their consent to fight. We can easily see this in the current war on Iraq in which the Bush administration has publicly made a tremendous effort to explain newly defined security strategy, that is, the necessity of a pre-emptive military action. Despite the facts that recently conducted coalition war against Saddam was quick with a low-casualty level See Table 3 , the Gulf War II remains to be seen in America as a bi-partisan issue. While the Republican support for both wars was consistent â€" around 94 percent â€" the Democratic support dropped from 81 percent in to 50 percent. A comparative view of the Gulf Wars.

Chapter 4 : The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq | HRW

Foreign policy is a concept that has been neglected academically in recent years. Politically it has been given more attention, but mostly as a vehicle for ethical projects. This is a pity given that the content of foreign policy has expanded, through domestic and foreign affairs becoming more.

Chapter 5 : Iraq War and U.S. Public Opinion - Stanford Scholarship

Battleground IRAQ (CMOC) to handle relationships with the local population. The UMCP, FAS, or CMOC might be pushed forward to the combat trains, a smaller collection of logistical assets focused on fuel, ammunition, maintenance, and medical assets of immediate necessity in sustaining the fight.

Chapter 6 : Table of contents for Library of Congress control number

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