

DOWNLOAD PDF APPLYING WITTGENSTEIN (CONTINUUM STUDIES IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY)

Chapter 1 : Mark Addis - Wikipedia

A key development in Wittgenstein Studies over recent years has been the advancement of a resolutely therapeutic reading of the Tractatus. Rupert Read offers the first extended application of this reading of Wittgenstein, encompassing Wittgenstein's later work too, to examine the implications of.

Notes for the Meeting of Wittgenstein and Zen". Cambridge University Press for permission to reproduce material included in: Blackwell for permission to reproduce material from Read, R. Johns Hopkins University Press, for permission to reproduce extracts from the following material: Reflections on and of Derangement", in Gibson, J. Taylor and Francis for Read, R. The publishers have made every effort to contact copyright holders. However, they would welcome correspondence from any copyright holders they have been unable to trace. To the memory of a great applier of Wittgenstein, James Guetti: Suggestions from participants at the UEA Wittgenstein Workshop have greatly shaped the material in this book, as have comments on earlier versions of various papers. And, of course, and above and beyond: The editor would like to thank the following people for the suggestions, conversations and encouragement which have kept this project moving, particularly Mark Gregory, Ian Whittle and Jerry Goodenough. Laura also owes a debt of gratitude to the author for his unstinting support and patience during this project Finally, this project would have been impossible without Lucy Cook, best Mend and mentor, whose advice, encouragement and support has helped quiet my self-criticism. Both of us would like to thank the staff at Continuum for their great forbearance and assistance in the course of this project: We dedicate this book to the memory of James Guetti, a dear friend and mentor whose influence upon the material in this book is immeasurable. Guetti cautioned against the theorization of literature, which tends to render many of the better aspects of literary, and other texts inaudible. Perhaps his most important legacy is to be found in his ability to show his readers how to listen to literature, without silencing it with Theory. As such, it is hoped that this book will contribute to the lasting legacy of his work. In his well-known essay, "Is There a Text in this Class? We have a suspicion that there are aspects of the text which have been rendered inaudible, leaving our interpretation seeming somehow provisional and arbitrary. Whilst this type of interpretation may sometimes prove useful or interesting, it ultimately subsumes the literature which it seeks to elucidate into a pre-existing theoretical framework, thus overlooking the potency that the literature has in its own right. If we can state the meaning of a poem or piece of prose in propositional terms, then the literary work itself is rendered redundant The work of Fish provides us with a picture of Wittgenstein which is allied with the accounts of his work given by commentators such as Strawson and Malcolm. However, whilst seemingly closer to the resolute reading offered here, it is the elucidatory reading of Wittgenstein which forms the prime target of our criticism. Read and I would argue that this account, advanced by commentators such as P. This approach takes nonsense seriously as a term of criticism: We must therefore consider the sentence-forms Wittgenstein uses as at moments when we want to lean on them deliberately coming apart from his philosophical aim? With these considerations in mind, we are in a position to say that the method according to which Read applies Wittgenstein is roughly thus: We should not imagine would-be Wittgensteinian phrases such as "Meaning is use" nor even thought-provoking sentences like "[T]he given. To understand Wittgenstein aright is to understand him negatively as inviting us to engage in a process of overcoming. Of course, it is undoubtedly difficult to disabuse ourselves of the temptation to talk of language without recourse to theory. Inner processes have effects - including "grammatical effects", effects upon one which result from systematic aspects of the language, such as we are much subject to in the operation of good poetry, and these effects can be much more than mere individual psychological associations. Contra Fish, we might argue that the effect and affect of much poetry and literature is instead the result of grammatical effects, rather Foreword xvii than of working language. Again, the distinction between consequentially meaningful language and the poetic is not to be regarded as a rigid boundary. Rather, these are therapeutic moves. What Part 1 attempts to show, in the form of a reminder, is that an appreciation of these

differences should alert us to the dangers in assuming that the way we are wont to treat language-in-use is in fact appropriate for literary language. The appreciation of the connotative nature of literary language, which the discussion in Part 1 attempts to foster, is explored further in Part 2. The recognition of grammatical effects as differing from the consequentially meaningful can aid us in our reading of poetry; at the least, by removing the temptation to read poetry in certain bad, reductionist, paraphrasal ways. For relinquishing the attempt to assimilate the literary into everyday terms enables us to hear the elements of the text that have been rendered inaudible by our attempts at translation. It can make a beautiful noise; and a complex noise that prompts us to notice and comprehend much about it and about the world and about words and noises - but that is not the same as taking us from A to B. That is fine, if that is what one wants to do; but it is liable to be unhelpful and confusing to others. To see Stevens as Wittgensteinian is therefore also to start to see Wittgenstein as Stevensian, i. As Louis Sass has pointed out, modernist literature foregrounds the sensation of failing to mean, which is at basis the motivation behind the impulse to philosophize. The schizophrenic parallels the sceptic in experiencing the relationship between words and world as problematic. This perceived gap between what we can say about the world and what we wish to say about the world is registered in philosophical scepticism. In order to examine the confluence between certain pathological states and scepticism, Part 2 then turns to examine one of the great writings on severe mental affliction: Here, drawing on his published exchanges on the nature of madness with the literary psychologist Louis Sass and the Nobel Prize-winning writer J. In this section, the reader is presented with a way of seeing Faulkner as Wittgensteinian, a way which yields a distinctive and novel set of doubts concerning whether severe mental illnesses e. Here, the author turns to examine philosophical accounts of time, rinding a strong link between e. For Read, philosophic accounts of time tend towards the psychopathological, and signify nothing meaningful Whilst Dummett appears to be putting forth a plausible post-Anti-Realist theory of time, actually, his account is profoundly vulnerable to Wittgensteinian objections, which ultimately, by throwing light on the true nature of lived time, indicate the surprising degree of complicity between philosophical theory and lived problems of time, problems that are insoluble by philosophical theorizing. However, this is not therefore to dismiss these moods as somehow extraneous to the business of philosophy. What the analyses in the preceding Parts show is that attempts to master time philosophically, to offer a final interpretation of a text, or more broadly, to conceptualize our everyday experience, are prone to collapse. For once we begin to seek a theoretical underpinning on which to base our experiences, we begin to feel a sense of loss: In his Afterword to this book, which considers further prospects for applying Wittgenstein, Read also briefly alludes to a suggestion of his that there is room for a re-reading of key texts in the Western philosophical tradition, along the same lines that have been attempted with regard to Wittgenstein in this monograph. That is to say: However, in terms of the confluence between philosophy and literature that Read hopes to establish in this book, it is a strength, an unavoidable reflection of and on the nature of philosophical work. As such, it aims at two main audiences. This is as it should be: Books which succeed in reaching both the audiences I have in mind are exceedingly rare. This book may well fail, for instance by falling between two stools. But I cannot henceforth ignore the question of audience, and merely do the best I can, letting the cards fall as they may, because this book is intended, as all true Wittgensteinian philosophy ought to be, as a set of exercises in therapy. But an author has very little control over who picks up or uses their book; only over how well they fashion it for the audience they envisage in this respect, if perhaps in no other, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* was an unsuccessful book, a flawed book and over what they choose to write about So, the reader might ask why choose to write about this? Or, to put the question more blundy: After all, in the end all he was was one odd, posh, very rich at least, until he gave it all away and privileged man who issued a wealth of strange and fertile pronouncements. What does it matter what he said? This attitude is partly right and partly wrong. It is wrong chiefly in that it misses something that might be important in how Wittgenstein writes. This attitude tends to hold sway even among many of those who explicitly claim to reject it. But I said above that the attitude represented above was also partly right. The analytic philosophers who read Wittgenstein are right at least not to allow themselves to become trapped in

DOWNLOAD PDF APPLYING WITTGENSTEIN (CONTINUUM STUDIES IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY)

trying to figure out what exactly Wittgenstein meant with some set of words or other, or even how this exemplifies what Wittgenstein called "our method" in philosophy, or his style. Important Those of us who take ourselves to be followers of Wittgenstein had better do so primarily for this reason. Not because we might want to believe that the man was a god who got nothing wrong; nor because we perhaps believe that his thought is intrinsically fascinating to follow and hermeneuticize; but because we believe that much of what and how he said and wrote was of lasting importance, utterly independent of the fact that it was he who said it. In the end, it matters relatively little, then, whether Wittgenstein is being accurately interpreted by his followers. Instead, we, as it were, make a bet that it is worth trying to interpret him accurately, because we have evidence that our belief that his was a great and innovative mind is justified. Of finding his way of approaching philosophical questions novel and valuable, his styles of writing his way through them liberating. In the final analysis, compelling proof that we have got Wittgenstein wrong, Introduction: The proof of the philosophy is in the eating: Thus it follows that exegesis has to come to an end somewhere. Of course, there is always more to be done: Logic does not discriminate. To sum up, then: It is of great import to establish and teach why Wittgenstein wrote what and how he did - ifYm writings are of lasting importance. In order to establish that, we have to go beyond those writings. They have to function as a pointer. If one scrutinizes the pointer forever, one is completely missing the point. Only this can test whether there really is a kind of unity to philosophy; and 4 Applying Wittgenstein only this can make philosophy after Wittgenstein something that we practise rather than recite; the valuable activity of a growing cultural force, not the esoteric preoccupation of a clique. Exegesis must come to an end somewhere, because it can only be a means to an end: And what matters is whether we can learn how to go on. One does not know how to play chess if one can only repeat sequences of moves that one has seen before. This is what I seek to do in this book, building on others who have gone before me. I try to do what must be done, sooner or later, if Wittgenstein is to live. There is no doctrine to apply. In doing so, I seek to further our recollection of how this works, by considering some ordinary cases, and by looking at how language necessarily proceeds, dialogically - and novelly. Then, in greater depth, I consider a kind of flipside of such everyday language, which Wittgenstein himself considered far less: In Part 2 of this book, I major on this minor theme. I think about how literature works on one via its idling, thinking about this via cases such as the poetry of Wallace Stevens. Literature considered, after Wittgenstein, as sometimes presenting a kind of philosophy of psychopathology. William Faulkner authored such a tale, and filled it with sound and fury, signifying a great deal - on a particular interpretation of the word "signify". In the closing segment of Part 1, I argue that that interpretation, common in Introduction:

DOWNLOAD PDF APPLYING WITTGENSTEIN (CONTINUUM STUDIES IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY)

Chapter 2 : Maybe she's born with it. Maybe it's _____. | Cards Against Humanity Online Random PH

Applying Wittgenstein Continuum Studies in British Philosophy Series Editor: James Fieser, University of Tennessee at Martin, USA Continuum Studies in British Philosophy is a major monograph series from Continuum.

The world is everything that is the case. The world is all that is the case. What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts. What is the case—“a fact”—is the existence of states of affairs. The logical picture of the facts is the thought. A logical picture of facts is a thought. The thought is the significant proposition. A thought is a proposition with sense. Propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions. An elementary proposition is a truth function of itself. This is the general form of proposition. This is the general form of a proposition. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence. The world is represented by thought, which is a proposition with sense, since they all—“world, thought, and proposition”—share the same logical form. Hence, the thought and the proposition can be pictures of the facts. Starting with a seeming metaphysics, Wittgenstein sees the world as consisting of facts 1, rather than the traditional, atomistic conception of a world made up of objects. Facts are existent states of affairs 2 and states of affairs, in turn, are combinations of objects. They may have various properties and may hold diverse relations to one another. Objects combine with one another according to their logical, internal properties. Thus, states of affairs, being comprised of objects in combination, are inherently complex. The states of affairs which do exist could have been otherwise. This means that states of affairs are either actual existent or possible. It is the totality of states of affairs—“actual and possible”—that makes up the whole of reality. The world is precisely those states of affairs which do exist. Pictures are made up of elements that together constitute the picture. Each element represents an object, and the combination of elements in the picture represents the combination of objects in a state of affairs. The logical structure of the picture, whether in thought or in language, is isomorphic with the logical structure of the state of affairs which it pictures. This leads to an understanding of what the picture can picture; but also what it cannot—its own pictorial form. Logical analysis, in the spirit of Frege and Russell, guides the work, with Wittgenstein using logical calculus to carry out the construction of his system. First, the structure of the proposition must conform to the constraints of logical form, and second, the elements of the proposition must have reference *bedeutung*. These conditions have far-reaching implications. The analysis must culminate with a name being a primitive symbol for a simple object. Moreover, logic itself gives us the structure and limits of what can be said at all. This bi-polarity of propositions enables the composition of more complex propositions from atomic ones by using truth-functional operators 5. He delves even deeper by then providing the general form of a truth-function 6. Having developed this analysis of world-thought-language, and relying on the one general form of the proposition, Wittgenstein can now assert that all meaningful propositions are of equal value. Subsequently, he ends the journey with the admonition concerning what can or cannot and what should or should not be said 7, leaving outside the realm of the sayable propositions of ethics, aesthetics, and metaphysics. It follows that only factual states of affairs which can be pictured can be represented by meaningful propositions. This means that what can be said are only propositions of natural science and leaves out of the realm of sense a daunting number of statements which are made and used in language. There are, first, the propositions of logic itself. These do not represent states of affairs, and the logical constants do not stand for objects. This is not a happenstance thought; it is fundamental precisely because the limits of sense rest on logic. Tautologies and contradictions, the propositions of logic, are the limits of language and thought, and thereby the limits of the world. Obviously, then, they do not picture anything and do not, therefore, have sense. Propositions which do have sense are bipolar; they range within the truth-conditions drawn by the truth-tables. The characteristic of being senseless applies not only to the propositions of logic but also to mathematics or the pictorial form itself of the pictures that do represent. These are, like tautologies and contradictions, literally sense-less, they have no sense. Beyond, or aside from,

senseless propositions Wittgenstein identifies another group of statements which cannot carry sense: Nonsense, as opposed to senselessness, is encountered when a proposition is even more radically devoid of meaning, when it transcends the bounds of sense. Under the label of unsinnig can be found various propositions: While some nonsensical propositions are blatantly so, others seem to be meaningful—and only analysis carried out in accordance with the picture theory can expose their nonsensicality. Wittgenstein does not, however, relegate all that is not inside the bounds of sense to oblivion. He makes a distinction between saying and showing which is made to do additional crucial work. This applies, for example, to the logical form of the world, the pictorial form, etc. They make themselves manifest. Is, then, philosophy doomed to be nonsense unsinnig, or, at best, senseless sinnlos when it does logic, but, in any case, meaningless? What is left for the philosopher to do, if traditional, or even revolutionary, propositions of metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, and ethics cannot be formulated in a sensical manner? It is an activity of clarification of thoughts, and more so, of critique of language. In other words, by showing them that some of their propositions are nonsense. For it employs a measure of the value of propositions that is done by logic and the notion of limits. It is here, however, with the constraints on the value of propositions, that the tension in the Tractatus is most strongly felt. It becomes clear that the notions used by the Tractatus—the logical-philosophical notions—do not belong to the world and hence cannot be used to express anything meaningful. Since language, thought and the world, are all isomorphic, any attempt to say in logic is. That is to say, the Tractatus has gone over its own limits, and stands in danger of being nonsensical. In the decades that have passed since its publication it has gone through several waves of general interpretations. These revolve around the realism of the Tractatus, the notion of nonsense and its role in reading the Tractatus itself, and the reading of the Tractatus as an ethical tract. There are interpretations that see the Tractatus as espousing realism, i. Such realism is also taken to be manifested in the essential bi-polarity of propositions; likewise, a straightforward reading of the picturing relation posits objects there to be represented by signs. As against these readings, more linguistically oriented interpretations give conceptual priority to the symbolism. In any case, the issue of realism vs. Subsequently, interpreters of the Tractatus have moved on to questioning the very presence of metaphysics within the book and the status of the propositions of the book themselves. Beyond the bounds of language lies nonsense—propositions which cannot picture anything—and Wittgenstein bans traditional metaphysics to that area. The traditional readings of the Tractatus accepted, with varying degrees of discomfort, the existence of that which is unsayable, that which cannot be put into words, the nonsensical. More recent readings tend to take nonsense more seriously as exactly that—nonsense. The Tractatus, on this stance, does not point at ineffable truths of, e. An accompanying discussion must then also deal with how this can be recognized, what this can possibly mean, and how it should be used, if at all. This discussion is closely related to what has come to be called the ethical reading of the Tractatus. And it is precisely this second part that is the important point. Obviously, such seemingly contradictory tensions within and about a text—written by its author—give rise to interpretative conundrums. There is another issue often debated by interpreters of Wittgenstein, which arises out of the questions above. This has to do with the continuity between the thought of the early and later Wittgenstein. And again, the more recent interpretations challenge this standard, emphasizing that the fundamental therapeutic motivation clearly found in the later Wittgenstein should also be attributed to the early. The Later Wittgenstein 3. Wittgenstein used this term to designate any conception which allows for a gap between question and answer, such that the answer to the question could be found at a later date. The complex edifice of the Tractatus is built on the assumption that the task of logical analysis was to discover the elementary propositions, whose form was not yet known. What marks the transition from early to later Wittgenstein can be summed up as the total rejection of dogmatism, i. It is in the Philosophical Investigations that the working out of the transitions comes to culmination. Other writings of the same period, though, manifest the same anti-dogmatic stance, as it is applied, e. It was edited by G. Anscombe and Rush Rhees and translated by Anscombe. It comprised two parts. Part I, consisting of numbered paragraphs, was ready for printing in , but rescinded from the publisher by Wittgenstein. Part II was added on by the editors, trustees of

DOWNLOAD PDF APPLYING WITTGENSTEIN (CONTINUUM STUDIES IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY)

his Nachlass. In a new edited translation, by P. In the Preface to *PI*, Wittgenstein states that his new thoughts would be better understood by contrast with and against the background of his old thoughts, those in the *Tractatus*; and indeed, most of Part I of *PI* is essentially critical. Its new insights can be understood as primarily exposing fallacies in the traditional way of thinking about language, truth, thought, intentionality, and, perhaps mainly, philosophy. In this sense, it is conceived of as a therapeutic work, viewing philosophy itself as therapy.

DOWNLOAD PDF APPLYING WITTGENSTEIN (CONTINUUM STUDIES IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY)

Chapter 3 : Applying Wittgenstein (Continuum Studies in British Philosophy) Rupert Read: Laura Cook: Co

This important book positions itself at the forefront of a revolutionary movement in Wittgenstein studies and philosophy in general and offers a new and dynamic way of using Wittgenstein's works. Read more Read less.

Second, it is utterly obscure what he means by a "form of life. The "given" in Latin is datum, plural data, and the history of modern philosophy is strewn with different conceptions of the data with which we begin building the scaffolding of our understanding. For Descartes it is simple ideas, for Hume it is impressions, for Locke it is ideas, and for Kant sensations. Russell, with whose work Wittgenstein was thoroughly familiar, was notorious for changing his conception of the nature of our data, although he held firmly to the view that they were some sort of simples. In his *Tractatus* Wittgenstein seems committed to simples, but leaves us uncertain whether the simples are facts, which make up the world, or objects, which make up the substance of the world. Objects are not facts, and therefore, according to the opening sentences of the *Tractatus*, they are not part of the world. Yet Wittgenstein leaves us puzzling over whether we begin with facts and analyze them to find objects, or begin with objects and combine them to build facts. Whether or not this obscurity was one of the serious faults Wittgenstein later attributed to the *Tractatus*, it seems reason enough for his readers to be troubled. The common characteristic of the given data in modern philosophy is that, however understood, what is given forms the foundation for understanding, allows for the analysis of complex thoughts and ideas, and provides the place where analysis ends. Complexities can be resolved into simples, and the ultimate simples are the given. Possibilities cannot be the elements of analysis. Analysis, as in chemistry, requires that the elements be definite well-defined simples. That is why associating the given with forms of any kind means abandoning analysis. Kishik reviews for his readers all the occasions on which Wittgenstein speaks of form of life. In this context it is a bit disconcerting that he refers p. Kishik models the first part of the book on the *Tractatus*, even though his title calls attention to a much later idea. So the introduction is titled "World," the first chapter "Form," the second chapter "Picture," the third "Meaning," and the fourth "Philosophy. In the first chapter Kishik notes the importance of form in the *Tractatus*, and the distinction between proper concepts such as yellow and square and formal concepts such as color and shape. He claims -- again creatively -- that life is a formal concept in the Tractarian sense, and that there is in this way a powerful continuity from the early to the later work of Wittgenstein. In the *Tractatus* the distinction between proper concepts and formal concepts helps Wittgenstein make allowance for propositions that are senseless they lack T-F poles but not nonsense, truisms such as "7 is a number, not a color. It is only in Analytic Philosophy, where the nature of a proposition is determined by the nature of its constituents, that the distinction between proper and formal concepts has a role to play. Noting the variety of language-games eliminates that role. The second chapter "Picture" begins with ethics and ends with hope, citing Goethe along the way. The fourth chapter touches none of the critical issues I mentioned at the outset of this review. In the fifth chapter Kishik assumes a strong dependence of "grammar" on "rules," contending p. As for "rules," he shows no awareness that Anscombe was doubtful that there are any rules of language, on the ground that for the presumed "rules" of language there is no genuine contrast between following and disobeying them. None of these matters is hinted at in chapter five, nor does one find Kant, Anscombe, or Rawls in the bibliography. Nearly all philosophers since Descartes have thought that they belong to the same category language-game, namely epistemology. But he then goes on to say p. The remark also leads us directly and decisively away from Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein has said that forms of life are given, and what is given is not something to be explained but rather something that just has to be accepted. Further, Kishik leads us directly away from Wittgenstein to Giorgio Agamben, for whom the notion of form of life "must become the guiding concept and unitary center of the oncoming politics" and "must constitute the subject of the coming philosophy" p. They are utterly alien to anything he ever wrote or thought.

Chapter 4 : Ludwig Wittgenstein (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

DOWNLOAD PDF APPLYING WITTGENSTEIN (CONTINUUM STUDIES IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY)

Applying Wittgenstein (Continuum Studies in British Philosophy) - Kindle edition by Rupert Read, Laura Cook. Download it once and read it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Use features like bookmarks, note taking and highlighting while reading Applying Wittgenstein (Continuum Studies in British Philosophy).

Chapter 5 : Wittgenstein: Religion and Nonsense | Oxford University Department for Continuing Education

Extra info for Applying Wittgenstein (Continuum Studies in British Philosophy) Sample text For the change is conceived of as a change in something definite and quasi-scientifically theorizable.

Chapter 6 : (Over)Interpreting Wittgenstein - PDF Free Download

About Applying Wittgenstein. A key development in Wittgenstein Studies over recent years has been the advancement of a resolutely therapeutic reading of the Tractatus.

Chapter 7 : Antiphilosophy - Wikipedia

Applying Wittgenstein. Read more. Introducing Wittgenstein.

Chapter 8 : Applying Wittgenstein - PDF Free Download

Get this from a library! Applying Wittgenstein. [Rupert J Read; Laura L Cook] -- In the light of a radical reassessment of Wittgenstein's work currently taking place in contemporary Wittgenstein scholarship, 'Applying Wittgenstein' offers a dynamic reading of Wittgenstein's.

Chapter 9 : Applying Wittgenstein / Rupert Read ; edited by Laura Cook - Details - Trove

calendrierdelascience.com: Wittgenstein's Religious Point of View (Continuum Studies in British Philosophy) () by Tim Labron and a great selection of similar New, Used and Collectible Books available now at great prices.