

This book is a must-have for readers who seek to understand future relations between Europe and the United States. An A-list group of authors contributed to Beyond Paradise and Power; just as important, however, this is one of the very few books on the subject that does not seek consensus from its contributors.

America and Europe in the New World Order. American-European relations after the Cold War. Kagan argued that differences in their relative levels of power are leading Europeans and Americans to develop very different ideas about how the world works and what their policies in it ought to be. Militarily well-endowed Americans are comfortable with unilateralism and the use of force, and uncomfortable with the constraints of international institutions. Militarily weaker Europeans are the opposite. From the start, there was something wrong with this argument. As several authors in this volume point out, Europe has more than enough technology, money, and soldiers to compete with America militarily. So instead of military weakness causing what Kagan calls "Kantian" norms, such norms seem to precede and cause the military weakness. But this leaves standing his true contribution, which is to raise the twin issues of whether the tensions between Europe and America are being caused by structural factors beyond the control of any one government, and depending on the answer to that, whether and how U. Divergence, rather than being shameful, is merely tragic. Many of the contributors agree that a key source of the tensions between the two regions is, paradoxically, their joint victory in the Cold War. With the demise of the Soviet Union, Europe and the U. Francis Fukuyama offers another possible reason for thinking that the rift "is not just a transitory problem": All such structuralist perspectives insist that there is no reason why the United States and at least some of the major European powers should not return to the on-and-off friendships that characterized them, say, before , even if they cannot return to the tight alliance of the Cold War days. Such structuralism is rejected especially by those who blame the trans-Atlantic breach on the Bush Administration and its so-called unilateralism, whether in spurning the Kyoto treaty or invading Iraq. Some critics predict, therefore, that other countries will eventually form "balancing" coalitions against America. Mead, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, argues in effect that though Kagan may not be right about power balances now, he will be in the future, albeit for different reasons. So if the U. But even so, this superiority will still not permit the U. The result, Mead says, is that both regions will continue to need each other more than they like or currently realize. A relatively diminished Europe will need the U. Lindberg turns away from all this talk of money and powerâ€”toward culture. Is there any plausible chance of armed conflict within the Atlantic community in the foreseeable future? No, says Lindberg, and we must not lose sight of this remarkable fact. This turns out to be a highly contentious issue. Moreover, what is at stake extends beyond European-American relations to the very future of these two regions in global politics. Several authors in this volume argue that the apparent European preference for international institutions, negotiation, and persuasion provides a model for conflict-avoidance and conflict-resolution for the rest of the world. Mead nicely captures the predominant American skepticism: Of course, much of the world is indeed mired in history, having neither economic growth nor stable democracy nor peace. Europeans acknowledge this de facto, but never doctrinally, when they limit membership in their own Union to countries that meet strict criteria, including stable democracy and much else besides. But Europeans are hesitant to declare all of this openly and in principle. The Bush Administration, by contrast, has been willing to admit that what works in certain contexts may not work in others. Europeans run the risk that their discretion will advantage them in the short term, because they are perceived as polite and sensitive, but disadvantage them in the long run, because American realism is more accurate and American methods more likely to be effective. In her chapter, Kalypso Nicolaidis, a University Lecturer at Oxford University, accepts the distinction between more civil and rougher parts of the world, as well as the notion that the softer European approach may not be suitable for dealing with the latter. Given the gradual spread of democracy and the ongoing economic development of states, Nicolaidis warns that America is tooling its foreign policy to deal with the diminishing number of admittedly dangerous rogue states while the E. This makes the current U. If this is right, then while the U. Thus the different foreign policies of Europe

and America may determine which region emerges, over the next 50 years, as the dominant liberal democratic force in the world. But this vision of ultimate European advantage is premature, because it is based on a badly misinformed conception of current U. In this volume, for example, Timothy Garton Ash bristles at the implication that Europeans are feminine, and Ischinger has Kagan referring to "Euro-weenies," an epithet which, to my knowledge, Kagan has never used. Still the overall point is well-taken: Europeans do not pursue a uniformly "soft" approach to the world, as anyone knows who has watched French guns cut down scores of Ivory Coast citizens demonstrating in their own capital city. Martial imagery usefully describes U. The war on terror is only one part of a larger foreign policy that predominantly focuses on such cooperation-heavy issues as trade and investment, international technical standards, immigration, and routine security matters. And even the war on terror is mainly being carried out through peaceful bilateral and multilateral cooperation on money-tracing, police surveillance, and intelligence-sharing. If anything, as Fukuyama points out, America is more consistently multilateralist on international economic matters than are the E. The notion that the United States is systematically martial is simply false. Which means the theory that the United States is ill-prepared to navigate the more civilized regions of the world is a delusion, which may give comfort to some people for the moment, but will ultimately discredit its votaries.

Chapter 2 : Liberalism and Power

Beyond Paradise and Power has 6 ratings and 0 reviews. America's dramatic split with France, Germany, and much of the rest of Europe over the Iraq war ha.

The humanitarian achievement also proved unprecedented. For not only were civilian casualties and damage to non-military targets minimized to a hitherto unmatched extent. Never before had a complex and massive military operation so effectively prepared for the swift delivery of food and water and other basics in order to relieve civilian suffering. But perhaps the most remarkable achievement of Operation Iraqi Freedom was the unprecedented weaving of military might and humanitarian assistance. By contrast, the international debate about the legal merits of the use of military force to disarm Saddam Hussein that led up to Operation Iraqi Freedom proved soberingly familiar. Among the permanent members of the U. Security Council—itsself not a body whose structure derives from any recognized norms of international law but which survives as a rickety institutional relic of the post-World War II political settlement—debate was derailed by the national self-interest of several permanent members of the Security Council parading as deference to international law and international institutions. Yet the respectable if not decisive legal argument put forward by the US and Great Britain, rooted in a perfectly plausible reading of Security Council resolution passed by unanimous vote in November and of 16 other Security Council resolutions over the course of 12 years that preceded it, was met with adamant opposition and resolute obscurantism from France, Russia, and China. They were not content to claim that their legal arguments were superior. Rather, with France at the forefront and Germany cheering from the sideline, they made a mockery of the truth by resolutely maintaining that the legal arguments advanced by Great Britain and the US were devoid of merit. Even in the foreign policy of those—this certainly includes both Europeans and the United States—whose moral and political orders in various ways affirm the humanitarian ethic. What is puzzling is why American and European perceptions of their national interest are diverging so dramatically. Written in the shadow of September 11 and published in the months leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, his incisive analysis of strategic culture in the US and Europe suggests that the trans-Atlantic allies are increasingly likely to disagree about the role of international law and international institutions in securing the conditions for global order. Militarily strong nations like the United States will naturally see the virtues in military strength and will naturally seek to exercise them to advance their interests, while militarily weak nations like those of Europe, making a virtue out of necessity, will attempt to vindicate their interests by championing the supremacy of international law and diplomacy. America enforces its will because it can. Europe falls back on the United Nations because it must. Yet there is more to the puzzle than Kagan allows. Contrary to the provocation with which his book begins, Europe and America, in a decisive respect, occupy the same world and share a common view of it. It was not written in stone, for example, that the debate between the US and Europe about Iraq would revolve around how best to secure human rights and promote democracy, rather than, say, whether human rights and democracy are universally valid and desirable. But he neither pursues the thought that ideas matter in the formation of strategic culture, nor does he correctly identify the moral and political tradition that links the US and Europe. The tradition in question is best called liberalism. One critical strand within this tradition is the Enlightenment, which teaches that universal principles of reason govern moral and political life and that all human beings can be educated to live in accordance with them. But the Enlightenment ideal does not go to the heart of the matter, which is freedom, or more accurately, equality in freedom. The liberal tradition rests on the premise of equality in freedom, or the natural freedom and equality of all. Like all great moral and political traditions, it is in part constituted by a debate over the practical implications of its fundamental premise. Conservative liberals, liberal liberals, and radical liberals are united by their commitment to equality in freedom; they are divided by opinions about what beliefs, practices, and associations best secure it. Some matters, such as the need for regular competitive elections, toleration, freedom of speech and press, and an independent judiciary are relatively settled. Others, such as the role of the government in the economy, remain quite contentious. The disagreement between the US and Europe over strategic culture turns out to be a new and critical chapter in

the continuing debate that constitutes the liberal tradition over the best means for securing individual freedom. Philosophical Roots of the Strategic Divide Liberalism is above all devoted to establishing a form of government able to secure conditions under which individuals can enjoy the personal freedom to live as they see fit. Securing political freedom gives rise to a number of enduring challenges. Three are of particular importance to understanding the divide that has opened up between the US and Europe about the use of power in international affairs. The first concerns freedom and rule: In what circumstances can the laws under which citizens live be reasonably seen as expressing and advancing, rather than denying or curtailing, their freedom? The second deals with equality and passion: The third goes to the question of sovereignty and foreign affairs: Taken together, the answers to these questions suggest that in recent years European strategic culture has put an undue reliance on international law and institutions and that the cause of freedom is best served, as the United States has frequently argued throughout the last quarter century, by states that recognize, and are prepared to act on the recognition, that global order and liberty under law regularly require the exercise of power in international affairs. Freedom and Rule A frequently remarked upon ambiguity afflicts the liberal understanding of legitimate political authority. What kinds of laws do individuals who are by nature free and equal have an obligation to obey? Those, the liberal tradition teaches, which individuals have chosen because they believe them to serve their interests or, in other words, to which they have consented. Individuals have an interest in consenting to give up some of their natural freedom and living under laws to which they along with others have also consented because life under laws that bind others equally is in every way better than an untrammelled freedom for oneself that exposes one to the untrammelled freedom of others. But individuals need not give their formal and public consent to every particular law enacted by the state. That would be utterly impractical. It is enough for people to consent to the basic political framework, the constitutional order, through which particular laws are enacted by representatives who remain accountable to the people. Having consented to the underlying system through which laws are made and implemented and enforced, and through which controversies that arise under the law are adjudicated, and having had a say in choosing office holders through free and fair elections, one has in effect consented to obey even specific laws or rulings about the laws that one finds onerous or foolish. But in what does the original act of consent consist? What deeds must be performed, what signs must be given, what conditions must be met in order to establish consent? After all, none of us were there when the Constitution was debated and ratified. We did not give our actual consent. Nor have we been asked recently. And even if we were to be asked, many of us would be in a poor position to consent responsibly owing to a weak grasp of the structure of government established by the Constitution and unfamiliarity with the alternatives. In what sense then can we be said to have consented? In practice, responds the liberal tradition, we must be understood to have consented tacitly. We give tacit consent to the laws and basic political framework of a free society by choosing to stay and live under them rather than leave and live somewhere else. To be sure, the doctrine of tacit consent is not in every way satisfactory. In the real world material and moral constraints—poverty, sickness, ignorance, prejudice, familial and cultural ties—leave many individuals with no realistic alternative but to live out their lives in the country of their origin. Their consent is not freely given but, one might say, coerced by circumstance. However, the liberal tradition resists making the state responsible for overcoming every form of coercion under which we labor. The paradigm form of coercion that it opposes is that of lawlessness or arbitrary laws. To the extent that the liberal state goes further by assuming responsibility for combating the inexhaustible variety of material and moral constraints on individual freedom—which it irresistibly does because the distinction between legal coercion and material and moral coercion is imperfect—it risks sanctioning the sorts of massive invasions of personal freedom liberalism is sworn to protect against. Indeed, the liberal theory of consent threatens to turn into its very opposite when consent is severed from any concrete action undertaken by those who have allegedly given it. This happens when consent is no longer seen as an open and voluntary affirmation or, more tenuously, as implicit in our actions, but as derived from our natures as free and equal beings. Such a conception disjoins consent from anything we self-consciously say or do or think. Instead it elaborates principles and practices that it would be rational for us to choose despite the fact that we never have considered those choices or may have considered them and rejected them. It then proceeds to declare some

choices as in principle invalid on the grounds that no reasonable person could possibly choose them, and to announce that other rules and regulations are not only valid but should be seen as binding because no reasonable person could possibly fail to choose them. Such a step is tempting and perhaps on rare occasion appropriate, because the very idea of consent carries with it the idea of rational, self-aware choice. It is also dangerous because the idea of consent also carries with it the notion of open and voluntary affirmation. Although the doctrine of derived consent has roots liberal ideas about freedom and rule, in practice it is more likely to menace individual freedom than it is to serve it. Hints of the doctrine of derived consent can be seen in the teachings of Hobbes and Locke, according to whose theories the outline and main provisions of the social contract are objective and universal. Although he writes as a friend of freedom, Rousseau makes explicit some of its startlingly illiberal implications through the idea of the general will, which stirred many of the French Revolutionaries to ruthless violence, particularly the imperative connected to the doctrine of the general will of forcing individuals to be free. Kant elaborates a sublime version of the doctrine of derived consent in his moral philosophy, contending that each should regard himself as a legislator for, but also subject in, a universal kingdom of ends. It is subscribed to by large numbers of international human rights lawyers. The doctrine of derived consent lives on as well in European strategic culture. Indeed, it has become the mainstay of the European outlook. While reliance on international law and international institutions as the primary means of dealing with other countries may suit the interests of militarily weak nations, as Kagan suggests, such reliance is justified through arguments and appeals that presuppose or celebrate a doctrine of derived consent. Consider, for example, the case for investing the United Nations with greater authority to promulgate laws that bind all nations, for establishing an International Criminal Court, and for granting to the courts of sovereign states universal jurisdiction to try certain classes of crimes committed anywhere and by any parties. The only form of consent, however, that the spread of international law rooted in the decisions of the United Nations could be consistent with is derived consent. It is obviously not the product of actual consent since almost half of the nations represented at the UN themselves lack democratic legitimacy. Nor could its legitimacy flow from tacit consent: So the UN, and the International Criminal Court, and local European courts claiming universal jurisdiction must maintain that their actions and edicts reflect universal laws that all individuals would agree to if they were rationally considering their true interests. The well-known problems that arise domestically for the doctrine of derived consent are exacerbated in the international system where, because of the distance and levels of government separating the people from those who speak for them on the world stage, consent and accountability, already stretched in the modern nation state, are greatly attenuated. What if delegates to the United Nations and justices on the International Criminal Court and local European judges claiming universal jurisdiction get the universal rational norms wrong? What if the universal norms are invoked not on principled grounds but on grounds of self interest? What if the self-interest is not enlightened but cynical? And, what if the cynical appeal to self-interest does not reflect the sort of human lapse concerning which we must always be on guard but is rather a by product of the spirit that liberalism itself fosters? Equality and the Passions In fact, the wayward passions that equality stirs up provide good cause to worry that nations imbued with the liberal belief in equality in freedom will be tempted to invoke universal principles on grounds ranging from the dubious to the disgraceful. The connection between high-minded liberal principle and the abuse of it to which wayward human passion is inclined is obscured by those who insist that liberalism is nothing more than a set of shared procedures for organizing moral and political life. Even the soundest principle requires care and courage in its application to concrete circumstances. Liberalism, like every political regime, constitutes a way of life. It translates its guiding premises and principles into political institutions. The reverberations of equality in freedom in all spheres of our lives foster many appealing qualities: But not all the qualities that equality encourages are humanly attractive or good for a liberal state. Equality, for example, also encourages a certain arrogance, one-sidedness, and resentment. Consider first the arrogance. Regimes based on the principle of equality embody an obvious claim to justice, as even the classical political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, which is highly critical of democracy, reminds. It makes sense for all to share in political power because we have common needs and desires, limitations and vulnerabilities. From this, however, partisans of equality are inclined to reason that all are

equally well-equipped to hold office and to judge the conduct of affairs of state. But such reasoning rests on the fallacy that because we are equal in one or some morally relevant respects we are equal in all respects. The one-sidedness promoted by the rein of equality is related to the arrogance.

Chapter 3 : Beyond Paradise And Power: Europe, America, And The Future Of A Troubled Partnership

"Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus," wrote foreign policy guru Robert Kagan famously in his book Of Paradise and Power, which became an instant New York Times bestseller last year.

Chapter 4 : Beyond Venus and Mars

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