

Chapter 1 : Declining birth rate in Developed Countries: A radical policy re-think is required

This book, written in and translated into English in , covers the ups and downs of the economy of Europe from the end of Antiquity to approximately the year and seems to have been written under the shadow of Henri Pirenne as every major idea has to related to whether it agrees or disagrees with Pirenne's work.

Submitted by David Galland via GarretGalland. California beaches, suburbia, and style. Every year from 1945 saw over 4 million babies born. The nation stood atop the world in every field. It was an era of great economic prosperity in The Land of the Free. So, what happened to the American traits of confidence, pride, and accountability? The roots of Western cultural decay are very deep, having first sprouted a century ago. Today, it is known as the Frankfurt School, and its ideals have perverted American society. When war broke out in 1914, instead of starting a revolution, the proletariat put on their uniforms and went off to war. Each man, on his own, concluded that the working class of Europe had been blinded by the success of Western democracy and capitalism. They reasoned that until both had been destroyed, a communist revolution was not possible. Gramsci was jailed by Mussolini in Italy where he died in due to poor health. In these lectures, graphic sexual matter was presented to children, and they were taught about loose sexual conduct. Here again, a Marxist theory had failed to take hold in the real world. It would later come to be known as simply The Frankfurt School. In 1933, the school changed course under new director Max Horkheimer. The team began mixing the ideas of Sigmund Freud with those of Marx, and cultural Marxism was born. In classical Marxism, the workers of the world were oppressed by the ruling classes. The new theory was that everyone in society was psychologically oppressed by the institutions of Western culture. The school concluded that this new focus would need new vanguards to spur the change. The workers were not able to rise up on their own. As fate would have it, the National Socialists came to power in Germany in 1933. So, the school moved to New York City, the bastion of Western culture at the time. Coming to America in 1934, the school was reborn at Columbia University. Its members began to exert their ideas on American culture. It was at Columbia University that the school honed the tool it would use to destroy Western culture: The school published a lot of popular material. The theory was simple: The hope was that these pillars would crumble under the pressure. The school pushed its shift away from economics and toward Freud by publishing works on psychological repression. Their works split society into two main groups: They argued that history and reality were shaped by those groups who controlled traditional institutions. At the time, that was code for males of European descent. Herbert Marcuse, another member of the school, stayed in America. In the book, Marcuse argued that Western culture was inherently repressive because it gave up happiness for social progress. It posed the idea of sexual pleasure outside the traditional norms. Who would replace the working class as the new vanguards of the Marxist revolution? Marcuse believed that it would be a victim coalition of minorities—blacks, women, and homosexuals. The social movements of the 1960s—black power, feminism, gay rights, sexual liberation—gave Marcuse a unique vehicle to release cultural Marxist ideas into the mainstream. One of the overarching themes of the Frankfurt School was total intolerance for any viewpoint but its own. In turn, this has contributed to the undeniable breakdown of the family unit, as well as identity politics, radical feminism, and racial polarization in America. Never one to buck a populist trend, the political establishment in America has fully embraced the ideas of the Frankfurt School and has pushed them on American society through public miseducation. Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, the beacons of progressivism, are both disciples of Saul Alinsky, a devoted cultural Marxist. And so we now live in a hyper-sensitive society in which social memes and feelings have overtaken biological and objective reality as the main determinants of right and wrong. Political correctness is a war on logic and reason.

The Birth of the Western Economy: Economic Aspects of the Dark Ages: Volume 2 - Kindle edition by Robert Latouche. Download it once and read it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets.

January 1, Dr. Introduction Although there is widespread concern throughout Europe during the current period of economic recession, with high levels of unemployment and the recent upsurge in refugee movements associated with the serious ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe, there is generally less awareness of long-term demographic developments which have been in process since the s. The underlying trend towards low fertility is giving rise to significant imbalances in the population pyramid of Europe. This is illustrated by the increased aging of the population and the labour force. New policy measures to reverse the trend towards population decline are being recommended. This paper examines these recent trends in the population of Western Europe, focusing particular attention on the causes and consequences of fertility decline. Policy implications, including the likelihood of massive immigration into Western Europe, are also outlined. The main reason for this downward trend is that the European Community EC has experienced a fall in its birth rate of one-third during the last 20 years and is characterized by a relatively stable death rate. The population growth, therefore, fell from two million people per annum during the first half of the s to „â€”, per annum during the second half of the s. The average number of children per woman total fertility rate for all member states except Ireland is less than two children. By there will be as many people aged 65 years and over as under 15 years of age Eurostat Ireland still has the highest rate of natural increase in the EC, at 5. In Ireland was the only EC country that kept its total fertility rate 2. A consequence of these differences in the timing of fertility decline is that Ireland is the only country with a relatively young population in Europe, with a median age of In contrast the two countries with the oldest population are Denmark, with a median age of At present only three-quarters of the number of children needed to replace the present generation are being born. Around half of all households in the EC are either one or two person households, while households having five or more persons constitute only Within the EC only 6. The number of marriages in the Community fell from 2,, in to 1,, in , while the fragility of existing marriages has increased. If the trends observed over recent years in the various age groups were to hold for a whole generation, throughout its life-cycle, marriage would cease to be the norm and would involve only half the population ESCEC The number of divorces increased from , in to , in for the EC as a whole. During the s Spain and Italy legalized divorce for the first time, leaving Ireland as the only country in the EC with no such legal provision. The available data suggests that the final proportion of marriages contracted in and ending in divorce should be more than one in five in France, more than one in four in England and Wales and nearly one in three in Denmark ESCEC With the option of divorce, the number of remarriages increased so that in it was almost double the figure: In addition to the growth in cohabitation, there has been a big increase in the number of people living alone, as widowers, widows or divorcees ESCEC There has also been a significant increase in single parent families, with that parent most often being the mother. The proportion of family units which were one parent families in „â€”82 was 5. Since marriage has been facing competition from various types of more informal union, the number of births out of wedlock in the EC has increased from 4. The decline in fertility has had a significant impact on third and subsequent births between and Since the s there has been a slight rise in the average age at first marriage, and there has also been an increase of one year in the average age of women at the birth of their first child. Among the most striking features that have characterized the European family in recent decades, therefore, are later childbirth, smaller families and more children born out of wedlock. A related social phenomenon, for which few data are provided by many EC countries, is the growth in the number of declared legal abortions. In abortions as a proportion of live births were as follows: Differences between countries can be explained to some extent in terms of changes in the law in relation to abortion. Causes of fertility decline Demographic trends indicate that most developed countries are converging towards lower fertility rates and, while there are few significant signs of a foreseeable reversal in these trends, it should be noted that Swedish fertility rates have begun to increase rapidly with the number of children per woman now 2. Swedish women

are opting in large numbers to give birth at ages that were previously regarded as high and medically risky for starting a family. While other European countries may follow this trend in the coming decade, the evidence to date is not very promising. A society wanting to maintain its population size, without systematically relying on mass immigration, needs a considerable number of families with three children. But the reality is that only a minority of families are in favor of three children. It would appear that a fundamental change in attitudes to life and to the family has occurred in recent decades and children are seen by many as restricting the ability to maintain a certain standard of living ESCEC Having a second or third child often requires the mother to give up her job and the loss of a second income during the period of mortgage repayment. With the liberalization of contraception and abortion, many couples reject the idea of having an unplanned child. This was a generation which benefited hugely from the explosion in educational opportunities, but unfortunately many have discovered that a higher level of education has not ensured entry into the workforce. Thus in there were Youth unemployment is particularly problematic, as the following figures for the percentage under 25 years of age who were unemployed in indicate: Associated with the rise in the level of education among women came a significant increase in the number of women in paid employment. Between and the European labour force expanded by an additional six million women compared with just under two million men. In more than half the women in the EC were in employment: In women made up more than half the total number of long-term unemployed in the EC, but the figure for Ireland was only It has been suggested that the difficulties of reconciling the demands of a job with the demands of being a mother is one of the critical challenges facing the future of western society, and that too little emphasis is placed on the importance of parenthood ESCEC The concern of policy makers about the extent of fertility decline is expressed by Cliquet as follows: In the light of the new opportunities and challenges people are experiencing now, post-industrial societies are not well enough organized and have not yet developed a value system which incites a sufficient number of people to transcend their personal needs with respect to parent-hood to such an extent that they also meet societal needs with respect to long-term replacement. Consequences of low fertility While many demographers are still quite tentative in their discussion of the causes of fertility decline, two main consequences of the low European birth rate since the s are becoming quite clear, and are by no means altogether favorable: Although the financial impact of a drop in fertility is favorable in the medium term " in that it results in a reduction of certain financing requirements in education, health and family benefits " in the long term the economic effects are definitely adverse in some sectors and the overall effects are less beneficial than is often supposed. In the early s, when enthusiasm for zero population growth had reached its peak, the general expectation was that a reduction in fertility would result in beneficial economic effects. The experience, however, has been that reduced spending on youth did not, in the countries most affected by demographic decline, result in a positive economic response ESCEC Yet some Irish economists continue to be concerned about the high ratio of dependents in Ireland relative to the economically active population: This is accounted for by the boom in births in the s and s, by the large proportion of married women working in the home and by high levels of unemployment. While the number of children increased until , there has been a decline of more than 20, a year between and , and an increase in the number of women in paid employment. Thus the ratio of dependents to workers has started to fall. He points out that although emigration eliminated all the growth in the labour force during the s, the numbers of unemployed continued to increase. In European countries where fertility decline has been longer established, policy makers are becoming concerned about negative consequences such as a fall in the number of young people entering the labour force. While this may be lessened by a rise in the number of women at work, it is unlikely to offset the full effect in the long term. The growing imbalance in the population pyramid is also likely to lead to major changes in the pattern of demand, with an expansion in demand for products specific to the old and a decline in products aimed at younger age groups. Sectors such as agriculture and food, building and construction and school supplies are likely to be badly affected by these developments. Among the main consequences of two decades of continuing low fertility is an aging of the population of the European Community, without securing any substantial improvement in affluence. It is also expected that an aging labour force will lead to a heavier burden on the economy. Among the reasons suggested for this are an upward pressure on labour costs because of the smaller pool of younger workers, a

decline in geographical and social mobility, and a reduction in the renewal of the economically active population ESCEC Associated with these developments are growing doubts about the ability of European economies to maintain their international competitiveness partly due to the loss of a spirit of initiative and innovativeness. It is generally accepted that societies dominated by 50 and 60 year olds are unlikely to be very forward-looking. Among these would be the additional social security and taxation costs associated with aging, and the reduced ability to master advanced technologies and to compete in export markets. There are, however, significant differences between European countries related to the timing of baby boom and of fertility decline. Thus the working-age population has already stopped growing rapidly in France. The report suggested that both the economic system and the working contributors could find the extra burden resulting from an increase in the number of people entitled to benefits difficult to bear. While demographic aging is primarily caused by a decline in the fertility rate, an increase in the age at which people die is accentuating the phenomenon. Between and life expectancy for women increased by ten years in Spain, France and Italy, largely as a result of a fall in infant mortality rates. Improvements in life expectancy among the old is also the result of reduced mortality in these age groups. The proportion of people who are 75 years and over is increasing steadily, as is the high medical expenditure to which it is linked. In France a difference of three years in life expectancy would mean an increase from Because of the destruction of traditional social networks of solidarity, a huge proportion of the old end up in special homes rather than being enabled to remain in their own homes. Since per capita expenditures on the elderly substantially exceed those on the young, projected increases in the proportion of elderly and very elderly dependents are likely to lead to an appreciably greater increase in the social dependency burden than was implied by a simple head count of the total number in the dependent age groups. On average, total outlays on the elderly in OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries exceed those on the young by a ratio of 2. Population aging, therefore, implies a significant reallocation of resources from programmes serving the young to programmes serving the elderly. French data suggest that by there could be two non-active persons to every active working person. In the costs of an old person will be shared between 1. Although most European countries have been promoting the early retirement of older workers for the past two decades, a retirement age of 70 would be necessary in in France if it wished to maintain its current active-non-active ratio. Japan is one of the more extreme examples of an aging population: Some policy makers are thinking in terms of the possibility of intergenerational conflict, and there is already evidence of such conflict being generated in the United States by organized interest groups. A major cause of error has been the practice of hypothesizing a zero migratory balance, which has never been the case in practice. Apart from recent refugee movements from Eastern Europe, on the whole Europe has experienced relatively low levels of immigration in recent decades. This situation, however, is unlikely to continue. As Europe faces the challenge of maintaining its economic dynamism in the face of considerable population decline, there is continuing pressure from the Maghreb countries of North Africa where trends in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria suggest a doubling of the population from 58 million to million between now and CEC Much of this pressure is expected to be directed against France and to a lesser extent Belgium and the Netherlands. It has been suggested that between twenty and fifty million Moslems from the countries around the Mediterranean will arrive in Europe by Clarke Because of its aging population Europe will have little choice but to open its frontiers to young Africans and Asians. Many economists argue that Western Europe, with its aging population and falling birth rate, should welcome rather than fear the injection of able-bodied and relatively cheap labour offered by immigration from less prosperous neighbouring countries. It is unlikely, however, that northern public opinion will welcome such an influx, partly out of racial and cultural prejudice, but also because of fears that such an influx would drive down wages, create unemployment and drive up the price of housing. There is, therefore, a need for an EC policy in relation to immigration levels, particularly if Europe wishes to become more open to international trade. Some people wonder why a common immigration and asylum policy, rather than economic and monetary union, has not been at the top of the European political agenda.

Chapter 3 : latouche birth of the western economy - Search and Download

The birth of Western economy; economic aspects of the Dark Ages. With a foreword by Philip Grierson. Translated by E.M. Wilkinson.

Dedicated to the military history and civilization of the Eastern Roman Empire to "Time in its irresistible and ceaseless flow carries along on its flood all created things and drowns them in the depths of obscurity. It is a rare thing for a historian to be able to point to an exact day for a major historical change. But at some point on the 17th a sole commander-in-chief of the Roman military machine died. The death of the Emperor led to the final split of the Empire into two political entities, the West Occidentale and the East Orientale. The general military organization of the East would roughly stay the same until the Arab invasions of the s. Though it should be noted, they easterners always called themselves Romans up to the fall of Constantinople in The division into two sections recognized a growing cultural divergence. The common language of the East had always been Greek, while the West was Latin-speaking. This was not per se a significant division, as the Empire had long been a fusion of Greek and Roman cultures and the Roman ruling class was entirely bilingual. But the rise of Christianity strained that unity, as the cult was always much more widespread in the East than in the West, which was still largely pagan in The Army of Theodosius I The size of the Eastern army in is controversial because the size of individual regiments is not known with any certainty. Plausible estimates of the size of the whole 4th-century army excluding fleets range from c. This would place the Eastern army in the rough range , to , since the army of each division of the empire was roughly equal. Late Roman Empire Infantry The higher end of the range is provided by the late 6th-century military historian Agathias , who gives a global total of , effectives for the army "in the old days", presumed to mean when the empire was united. This figure probably includes fleets, giving a total of c. Agathias is supported by A. Jones calculated a similar total of , exc. Following Jones, Treadgold suggests , for the East in A rigorous reassessment of the evidence by R. Duncan-Jones concluded that Jones had overestimated unit sizes by times. The evidence is that regiments were typically one-third understrength in the 4th century. Agathias gives a figure of , for the army in his own time late 6th century which is more likely to be accurate than his figures for the 4th century. Spain , which seems inherently unlikely. The discrepancy in army size estimates is mainly due to uncertainty about the size of limitanei regiments, as can be seen by the wide range of estimates in the table below. Jones suggests limitanei regiments had a similar size to Principate auxilia regiments, averaging men each. More recent work, which includes new archaeological evidence, tends to the view that units were much smaller, perhaps averaging There is less dispute about comitatus regiments, because of more evidence. Treadgold estimates the 5 comitatus armies of the East as containing c. About one third of the army units in the Notitia are cavalry, but cavalry numbers were less than that proportion of the total because cavalry unit sizes were smaller. The available evidence suggests that the proportion of cavalry was about one-fifth of the total effectives: Click on chart to enlarge High command structure of the East Roman army c. Commands and army sizes based on data in the Notitia Dignitatum Orientis. Eastern magistri militum, in command of comitatus armies, reported direct to the Emperor. Duces are shown reporting to their diocesan magister militum, as suggested by Jones and Elton. Locations given indicate usual winter quarters in this period. Command structure The later 4th-century army contained three types of army group: These were ordinarily based near Constantinople, but often accompanied the emperors on campaign. These were based in strategic regions, on or near the frontiers. These were based on the frontiers themselves. The command structure of the Eastern army, as recorded in the Notitia Dignitatum, is represented diagrammatically in the organisation chart above. By the end of the 4th century, there were 2 comitatus praesentales in the East. They wintered near Constantinople at Nicaea and Nicomedia. Each was commanded by a magister militum "master of soldiers", the highest military rank Each magister was assisted by a deputy called a vicarius. There were 3 major regional comitatus, also with apparently settled winter bases: The large comitatus were commanded by magistri, the smaller ones by comites. All five reported direct to the eastern Augustus. This structure remained essentially intact until the 6th century. Regiments were classified according to whether they were attached to

the comitatus armies comitatenses or border forces limitanei. Of the comitatenses regiments, about half were palatini literally: Size may also have varied depending on the grade of the regiment. The table below gives some recent estimates of unit strength, by unit type and grade:

Chapter 4 : Staff View: The birth of Western economy;

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Aquitaine Aquitaine under Rome had been in southern Gaul , Romanised and speaking a Romance language. Similarly, Hispania had been populated by peoples who spoke various languages, including Celtic , but the area was now populated primarily by Romance language speakers. Between Aquitaine and Hispania were the Euskaldunak , Latinised to Vascones , or Basques , [33] living in Basque country, Vasconia, which extended, according to the distributions of place names attributable to the Basques, most densely in the western Pyrenees but also as far south as the upper Ebro River in Spain and as far north as the Garonne River in France. The Romans were never able to entirely subject Vasconia. The border with Aquitaine was Toulouse. At about , the Duchy of Vasconia united with the Duchy of Aquitaine to form a single realm under Felix of Aquitaine , governing from Toulouse. This was a joint kingship with a Basque Duke, Lupus I. Lupus is the Latin translation of Basque Otsoa, "wolf". As the Basques had no law of joint inheritance but practised primogeniture , Lupus in effect founded a hereditary dynasty of Basque rulers of an expanded Aquitaine. Umayyad conquest of Hispania Moorish Hispania in The Latin chronicles of the end of Visigothic Hispania omit many details, such as identification of characters, filling in the gaps and reconciliation of numerous contradictions. He chose to impose a joint rule over distinct jurisdictions on the true heirs. Evidence of a division of some sort can be found in the distribution of coins imprinted with the name of each king and in the king lists. If the reigns of both terminated with the incursion of the Saracens , then Roderic appears to have reigned a few years before the majority of Achila. Odo the Great of Aquitaine was at first victorious at the Battle of Toulouse in They took Bordeaux and were advancing towards Tours when Odo, powerless to stop them, appealed to his arch-enemy, Charles Martel , mayor of the Franks. In one of the first of the lightning marches for which the Carolingian kings became famous, Charles and his army appeared in the path of the Saracens between Tours and Poitiers , and in the Battle of Tours decisively defeated and killed al-Ghafiqi. Loss and recovery of Aquitaine[edit] After the death of his father, Hunald I allied himself with free Lombardy. However, Odo had ambiguously left the kingdom jointly to his two sons, Hunald and Hatto. The latter, loyal to Francia, now went to war with his brother over full possession. Victorious, Hunald blinded and imprisoned his brother, only to be so stricken by conscience that he resigned and entered the church as a monk to do penance. The story is told in Annales Mettenses priores. Grifo had installed himself as Duke of Bavaria, but Pepin replaced him with a member of the ducal family yet a child, Tassilo, whose protector he had become after the death of his father. The loyalty of the Agilolfings was perpetually in question, but Pepin exacted numerous oaths of loyalty from Tassilo. However, the latter had married Liutperga , a daughter of Desiderius , king of Lombardy. At a critical point in the campaign, Tassilo left the field with all his Bavarians. Out of reach of Pepin, he repudiated all loyalty to Francia. One year earlier, Pepin had finally defeated Waifer , Duke of Aquitaine , after waging a destructive, ten-year war against Aquitaine. Charles met Carloman, but Carloman refused to participate and returned to Burgundy. Charles went to war, leading an army to Bordeaux , where he set up a fort at Fronsac. Lupus, fearing Charles, turned Hunald over in exchange for peace, and was put in a monastery. Gascon lords also surrendered, and Aquitaine and Gascony were finally fully subdued by the Franks. Perforce union[edit] The brothers maintained lukewarm relations with the assistance of their mother Bertrada, but in Charles signed a treaty with Duke Tassilo III of Bavaria and married a Lombard Princess commonly known today as Desiderata , the daughter of King Desiderius , to surround Carloman with his own allies. Less than a year after his marriage, Charlemagne repudiated Desiderata and married a year-old Swabian named Hildegard. Before any open hostilities could be declared, however, Carloman died on 5 December , apparently of natural causes. Italian campaigns[edit] Conquest of the Lombard kingdom[edit] The Frankish king Charlemagne was a devout Catholic and maintained a close relationship with the papacy throughout his life. Shown here, the pope asks Charlemagne for help at a meeting near Rome. At his succession in , Pope

Adrian I demanded the return of certain cities in the former exarchate of Ravenna in accordance with a promise at the succession of Desiderius. Instead, Desiderius took over certain papal cities and invaded the Pentapolis, heading for Rome. Adrian sent ambassadors to Charlemagne in autumn requesting he enforce the policies of his father, Pepin. Charlemagne demanded what the pope had requested, but Desiderius swore never to comply. Charlemagne and his uncle Bernard crossed the Alps in and chased the Lombards back to Pavia, which they then besieged. The young prince was chased to the Adriatic littoral and fled to Constantinople to plead for assistance from Constantine V, who was waging war with Bulgaria. The pope granted him the title patrician. He then returned to Pavia, where the Lombards were on the verge of surrendering. In return for their lives, the Lombards surrendered and opened the gates in early summer. Desiderius was sent to the abbey of Corbie, and his son Adelchis died in Constantinople, a patrician. Charles, unusually, had himself crowned with the Iron Crown and made the magnates of Lombardy pay homage to him at Pavia. Charlemagne was then master of Italy as king of the Lombards. He left Italy with a garrison in Pavia and a few Frankish counts in place the same year. Instability continued in Italy. Charlemagne rushed back from Saxony and defeated the Duke of Friuli in battle; the Duke was slain. Their co-conspirator, Arechis, was not subdued, and Adelchis, their candidate in Byzantium, never left that city. Northern Italy was now faithfully his. Southern Italy[edit] In , Charlemagne directed his attention towards the Duchy of Benevento, [49] where Arechis II was reigning independently with the self-given title of Princeps. Children[edit] Charlemagne left and his eldest son, Pepin the Hunchback. Tenth-century copy of a lost original from about During the first peace of any substantial length "â€", Charles began to appoint his sons to positions of authority. In , he made his two youngest sons kings, crowned by the Pope. The elder of these two, Carloman, was made the King of Italy, taking the Iron Crown that his father had first worn in , and in the same ceremony was renamed "Pepin". Charlemagne ordered Pepin and Louis to be raised in the customs of their kingdoms, and he gave their regents some control of their subkingdoms, but kept the real power, though he intended his sons to inherit their realms. He did not tolerate insubordination in his sons: Charles was determined to have his children educated, including his daughters, as his parents had instilled the importance of learning in him at an early age. Charles was mostly preoccupied with the Bretons, whose border he shared and who insurrected on at least two occasions and were easily put down. He also fought the Saxons on multiple occasions. He subjected them to Frankish authority and devastated the valley of the Elbe, forcing tribute from them. Pippin had to hold the Avar and Beneventan borders and fought the Slavs to his north. Finally, Louis was in charge of the Spanish March and fought the Duke of Benevento in southern Italy on at least one occasion. He took Barcelona in a great siege in He kept them at home with him and refused to allow them to contract sacramental marriages though he originally condoned an engagement between his eldest daughter Rotrude and Constantine VI of Byzantium, this engagement was annulled when Rotrude was However, he tolerated their extramarital relationships, even rewarding their common-law husbands and treasuring the illegitimate grandchildren they produced for him. He also, apparently, refused to believe stories of their wild behaviour. After his death the surviving daughters were banished from the court by their brother, the pious Louis, to take up residence in the convents they had been bequeathed by their father. Abbasid"Carolingian alliance Vasconia and the Pyrenees[edit] This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. December Learn how and when to remove this template message The destructive war led by Pepin in Aquitaine, although brought to a satisfactory conclusion for the Franks, proved the Frankish power structure south of the Loire was feeble and unreliable. After the defeat and death of Waiofar in , while Aquitaine submitted again to the Carolingian dynasty, a new rebellion broke out in led by Hunald II, a possible son of Waifer. The Basque Duke, in turn, seems to have contributed decisively or schemed the Battle of Roncevaux Pass referred to as "Basque treachery". A Christianisation programme was put in place across the high Pyrenees He was eventually released, but Charlemagne, enraged at the compromise, decided to depose him and appointed his trustee William of Gellone. William, in turn, fought the Basques and defeated them after banishing Adalric Events in the Duchy of Vasconia rebellion in Pamplona, count overthrown in Aragon, Duke Seguin of Bordeaux deposed, uprising of the Basque lords, etc. These "Saracen" Moorish and Muladi rulers offered their homage

to the king of the Franks in return for military support. Seeing an opportunity to extend Christendom and his own power and believing the Saxons to be a fully conquered nation, Charlemagne agreed to go to Spain. The armies met at Saragossa and Charlemagne received the homage of the Muslim rulers, Sulayman al-Arabi and Kasmin ibn Yusuf, but the city did not fall for him. Indeed, Charlemagne faced the toughest battle of his career. The Muslims forced him to retreat. He decided to go home since he could not trust the Basques, whom he had subdued by conquering Pamplona. He turned to leave Iberia, but as he was passing through the Pass of Roncevalles one of the most famous events of his reign occurred. The Basques attacked and destroyed his rearguard and baggage train. The Battle of Roncevaux Pass, though less a battle than a skirmish, left many famous dead, including the seneschal Eggihard, the count of the palace Anselm, and the warden of the Breton March, Roland, inspiring the subsequent creation of the Song of Roland *La Chanson de Roland*. Charlemagne conquered Corsica and Sardinia at an unknown date and in the Balearic Islands. The islands were often attacked by Saracen pirates, but the counts of Genoa and Tuscany Boniface.

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And the ratio is moving closer to one to three. Its crippling economic crisis has seen a net exodus of people from the country, as hundreds of thousands of Spaniards and migrants leave in the hope of finding jobs abroad. Record numbers of economic migrants and asylum-seekers are seeking to enter the European Union this summer and are risking their lives in the attempt. The paradox is that as police and security forces battle to keep them at bay, a demographic crisis is unfolding across the continent. Europe desperately needs more young people to run its health services, populate its rural areas and look after its elderly because, increasingly, its societies are no longer self-sustaining. In Portugal, the population has been shrinking since 2008. According to prime minister Pedro Passos Coelho: Germany has the lowest birthrate in the world: He and a few friends took it upon themselves to begin tackling the issue, starting the non-profit group Demographic Renaissance in 2011, with the aim of raising awareness of the crisis. More than 1,000 settlements "once home to schools, businesses and filled with children" now sit abandoned, overgrown with weeds and bushes. In 2012, the regional government launched a multi-pronged initiative to address the falling fertility rate, with plans to roll out measures such as home and transport subsidies for families and radio advertisements urging women to have more children. For southern Europe, migration within the EU has become a grave problem. Hundreds of thousands of Portuguese have left, hoping to find better opportunities abroad. Coelho has said the next 10 to 15 years would be decisive in reversing the trend. Toy shops and hundreds of schools are closing while petrol stations and motels are being converted into nursing homes. Coelho has called on the EU to make falling birthrates a priority in the next five years. Facts are facts and that is what is happening. Italy has tried to overcome its bleak demographic outlook with initiatives ranging from pension cuts to a baby bonus, but the statistics are not on their side. The difficulty for mothers to return to the workplace also means women must make considerable sacrifices if they decide to have children. With the fertility rate falling from 2.1 to 1.4 last year, an estimated 91,000 Italians emigrated, a sharp increase from the 50,000 that did so in 2011. The youth jobless rate hit 23% in Germany last week, there was a rare piece of good news. For decades there have been far more deaths than births in Germany. Those women who do give birth are bearing relatively few on average 1.3. Experts say to keep the population at its current rate, that would need to rise to just over two. By the end of the century, the government expects the population to plunge from 81 million to 67 million, a decrease that is being accelerated by depressed areas in both eastern and western parts of the country that are hemorrhaging large numbers. No other industrial land is as starkly affected "and this is despite a strong influx of young migrant labourers. In order to offset this shortage, Germany needs to welcome an average of 1.5 million immigrants every year, which perhaps gives context to the estimate that 1 million refugees are due to come to Germany this year. Only Scandinavia appears to be weathering the demographic storm with any success, partly thanks to generous parental leave systems, stable economies, and, in the cases of Sweden and Norway, high net immigration. Chakkour He puts the high fertility rates down to social support for parents. We must recognise that if we do not do this now, we are going to have a gigantic problem in a few years. But across huge swaths of the European Union, longstanding communities are disappearing and the social burden on the young is becoming unsustainable. Meanwhile, in Kos, Lampedusa and on the Hungarian border, tens of thousands plead to be allowed in.

Chapter 6 : Full text of "The Birth Of Western Economy"

The Birth of the Western Economy: Economic Aspects of the Dark Ages by Robert Latouche starting at \$ The Birth of the Western Economy: Economic Aspects of the Dark Ages has 2 available editions to buy at Alibris.

Toggle display of website navigation Argument: October 19, , 9: Petersburg on May 29, Putin has good reason to want them lifted: Something unusual is going on in Russia these days: Russians are having far fewer children in than they did just last year. It shows the number of children born every month as a percentage of how many were born during the same month in the previous year. Despite month-to-month variation, over the past year a clear downward trend has emerged. For 11 of the past 12 months, Russia has recorded significant decreases in the number of children being born compared to in the previous year. In , Russia registered 1,, births and 1,, deaths, for a natural population increase of just 5, people, not counting immigration. By contrast, from January through August of , Russia registered 1,, births to 1,, deaths, for a net loss of , people. Extrapolating forward for the whole year, Russia is on pace to record only 1,, births and around 1,, deaths, netting , fewer Russians in . Certainly, with a total population of some million people, missing , is hardly noticeable, and to suggest that Russia is in some sort of demographic death spiral would be disingenuous. While still lagging far behind their European neighbors, Russians today are healthier and living longer than at any point in their history, and those positive trends show no signs of changing. But especially in light of these gradual improvements, we still need to explain why Russians are suddenly having fewer kids. And the most plausible hypothesis blames Western economic sanctions. The causation is straightforward: There is ample supporting evidence: The twin shocks of U. More worryingly were a spike in unemployment and a sudden jump in the number of Russians living in poverty " from . Logically, under such economic gloom, Russian families would be reluctant to have additional children. The alternative explanation is that these are simply long-term demographic trends. When communism collapsed 25 years ago, it took not only the Soviet Union down with it, but also unleashed an unprecedented demographic catastrophe. During the decade-long economic depression of the s under Boris Yeltsin, Russian mortality skyrocketed. Male life expectancy bottomed out at around 59 years. At the same time, fertility plummeted. What we are witnessing, then, is the beginning of an inevitable long-term shrinkage of the Russian population that, by , will make Russia only the 15th " most " populous country , behind the Philippines and Tanzania. But there are reasons to believe that Western sanctions accelerated Russia toward the cliff edge. As with your local weather forecast, the further into the future you predict, the more likely your forecast is to be wrong. Yet, as mentioned previously, Russia is actually shaping up for a net population loss of around , in . Second, in recent years, Russia has benefitted from in-migration, especially from the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. Migration is driven by politics and economics, not demographics. The difference between an optimistic and a pessimistic scenario today could mean a projected difference of some . Imagine the potential of . On the flipside, sustaining economic growth becomes harder and harder for those remaining in an ever-shrinking population. How far and how quickly Russia falls will make all the difference, and President Putin certainly knows it. In , a U. State Department official claimed: Mark Lawrence Schrad, Ph. A newly revised and expanded paperback version of his *Vodka Politics*:

IT WAS IN THE ordering of rural life that the Late Empire introduced its most successful innovations; it was in this particular sphere that its achievements, for reasons which will have to be explained later, had the most far-reaching effects. The ancient Romans and the Gauls were familiar with the.

This article has been cited by other articles in PMC. Fertility rates tend to be higher in poorly resourced countries but due to high maternal and perinatal mortality, there is a reduction in birth rates. In developing countries children are needed as a labour force and to provide care for their parents in old age. In these countries, fertility rates are higher due to the lack of access to contraceptives and generally lower levels of female education. The social structure, religious beliefs, economic prosperity and urbanisation within each country are likely to affect birth rates as well as abortion rates, Developed countries tend to have a lower fertility rate due to lifestyle choices associated with economic affluence where mortality rates are low, birth control is easily accessible and children often can become an economic drain caused by housing, education cost and other cost involved in bringing up children. Higher education and professional careers often mean that women have children late in life. This can result in a demographic economic paradox. The Total Fertility Rate TFR of a population is the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if she were to experience the exact current age specific fertility rates through her life time and she were to survive from birth through the end of her reproductive life. It is obtained by summing the single year age specific rates for a given time point. Perhaps more relevant to the current debate is the replacement fertility rate which is the total fertility rate in which women would have only enough children to replace themselves and their partners. Effectively it is the total fertility rate at which newborn girls would have an average of exactly 1 daughter over their lifetimes. By definition replacement is only considered to have occurred when the offspring reach 15 years of age. The replacement fertility rate is roughly 2. At this rate, population growth through reproduction will be approximately 0, but still be affected by male-female ratios and mortality rates. The fertility of the population of the United States is below replacement among those native born, and above replacement among immigrant families and the socially deprived Singh et al. However the fertility rates of immigrants to the US have been found to decrease sharply in the second generation as a result of improving education and income. For example, a population that has recently dropped below replacement fertility rate continues to grow because the recent high fertility produced large number of young couples who would now be in their child bearing years. The time lag effect is of great importance to human population growth rates. The state policy institutes and international population studies are closely monitoring how reproductive patterns cause immigrant generations globally. There are two potential means of addressing the problem of providing a young productive workforce able to generate income to provide the social care for the old and infirm. The first is to find ways of increasing the birth rate; this is essentially a long term solution but one which should provide more steady and predictable results. The second is to encourage immigration of a predominantly young and skilled workforce; this may provide an instant answer to the problem but is likely to be short-term unless the immigrants decide to stay in large numbers. Countries like Japan have a similar concern. In addition there are socio-economic factors that have led to women and couples delaying having children. In parallel, it is also necessary to have a national and an international initiative for the prevention of infertility and protection of fertility. The projects will need to be focussed at the specific needs of the local population. It is necessary for governments to work in close partnership with the voluntary sector to achieve the maximum effect. A regular and open education programme for women and men would empower them with knowledge required to protect their fertility. Furthermore, recent surveys suggest that prevention of reproductive and sexual health problems would be best achieved through education in secondary schools. It is important to plan a practical and a meaningful initial and follow-up programme for reproductive and sexual health education in secondary schools, with an aim to prevent future infertility. This is aimed at increasing natural conception rates. Fertility treatment in the UK as in other European countries is currently funded and managed by the Department of Health within the government. Since healthcare has several priorities such as

cancer, care of elderly and acute medicine, fertility care is not high on the agenda. This has led to inadequate funding and concerns about inequity. The need for private assisted conception due to lack of public funding may eventually lead to only the rich benefiting from fertility treatment. This will lead to long term social inequality. The state should fund the mild IVF treatments which are safer, less costly and have comparable success rates to the standard downregulation protocols Heijnen et al. This will improve access to fertility treatment for the socially deprived. It involves sustaining the current family structure for the creation of future generations.

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