

Chapter 1 : The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability

The study is entitled "The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: The Issues." In fact, say the authors, Canadian defence planners are well-along in the process. Canadian defence planners have been moving towards greater interoperability with the United States in a manner that is far more comprehensive and rapidly paced than.

Print PDF Increasingly intense discussions in the halls of Parliament and in the media have recently focused on the evolving relationship between the Canadian Forces and the defence establishment of the United States. The issue has become politically salient because of the events and controversies that have followed the horrendous attacks of September 11 on New York and Washington. The initial question was the security of the Canada-US border and the measures that would be required to persuade the Americans that it could be safely left open to the free flow of people and commerce. Then in early January it became clear that the Canadian desire to play a significant, not merely token, role in the British-led peacekeeping force in Kabul would remain unrequited. The British, and the Europeans more generally, had politics of their own to serve. For their purposes, Canadians in large numbers were not required. This fuelled discussion about the more involved questions this paper addresses. This implied combat operations. It also implied operational subordination. Controversies and uncertainties soon arose. Among them was a concern over the status of Taliban and al-Qaeda prisoners that might fall into Canadian hands and, in particular, whether the Canadians would be obliged to turn them over to their US commanders for such disposition as American interrogators might think appropriate. Another concern unfolded when it became evident that the PPCLI and the materiel they required had to be transported to Kandahar by American aircraft, a circumstance that appeared to both delay the deployment and confuse the distribution of supplies. A failure to reach an accommodation might mean that Canada would be left outside the American homeland defence perimeter, with potentially catastrophic consequences for the Canadian economy. All these developments, accompanied as they have been by elaborate initiatives designed to enhance Canada-US co-operation in a wide array of other security domains, have placed on the public agenda some fundamental issues bearing on the Canada-US defence relationship and where it is headed. Wherever it is headed, however, it has been heading there for some time. Some will think them good. Some will think them bad. Perhaps most will think them a mixture of the two. But whether good or bad, they certainly warrant an informed public debate. Baril, an unusually ambitious disquisition: *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for* And so it was subsequently to be. For a document with such impressive aspirations, its contents were surprisingly unremarkable. Indeed, they were typical of bureaucratic think pieces written under the dark shadow we can only assume of the Treasury Board. After these came a list of the attributes 11 of them the strategy was intended to exhibit, along with a statement of the vision by which it was to be guided. These domains were said to build in turn upon the eight long-term strategic objectives of existing defence policy and the various five-year targets associated with each of them, respectively. In relentlessly earnest spirit, these were listed, too. And at the end there was the assertion that success would be achieved only if the effort were sustained by unity, continuity, resolve and partnership. The exposition was only 12 pages long, but it is easy to imagine the accomplished Canadian scholar-diplomat, John W. Nonetheless, there could be discerned in the plethora of largely empty abstractions at least one concept that had potentially significant practical implications, one quietly revealing display, as it were, of bureaucratic code. Taken at face value, the interoperability concept might at first be regarded as no more remarkable than the document as a whole. In practice, Canada has always operated militarily overseas in coalition with others. This has been true in the conduct of war. It has been equally true in the making, and sometimes the enforcing, of peace that is, in peacekeeping of both the first- and second-generation kinds. This has been effected prominently through NATO, but also by way of a host of highly integrated mechanisms for the direct defence of the North American continent. Obviously not all of these arrangements have entailed technical interoperability for the Canadian Forces CF at the practical that is, operational, or combat level, but they have certainly encouraged it see below. That being so, the declared dedication to interoperability in *Strategy for* could easily be regarded as no more than a restatement of traditional practice and continuing

necessity. Such restatement might be regarded as particularly timely, given recent operational experiences in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere, as detailed below. Peace was at hand, and its dividend could therefore be enjoyed. Part of the answer might lie with an advancing military technology – more bang, more accurately delivered, for fewer bucks. But the rest of it could well require operating not just in tandem with others, but as a wholly integrated or at least integration-capable component of the defence establishments of coalition partners. In practice, once again, this might really mean the defence establishment of the United States. The force structure must be viable, achievable and affordable. But in principle it could have larger consequences, too, among them consequences for the degree of latitude actually available to Ottawa in the deployment of the CF. That is the central question this paper is intended to explore. The need to consider it, as we have argued, has been brought home further by the circumstances – not to say the confusions – surrounding CF deployments in the wake of the September 11 terrorist assaults on New York and Washington. Those circumstances provide a clear and present demonstration of realities that might otherwise have been consigned by policy planners and independent observers alike to that vaguely nagging but not practically salient category of conceivable, yet improbable, possibilities. Our discussion begins with a brief exploration of interoperability as a concept. We then attempt to place it, briefly and broadly, in its longer-term historical context, so as to lend perspective to judgment. Our observations on earlier incarnations of the interoperability phenomenon as a feature of Canadian policy are followed by a consideration of the various additional catalysts in support of it that have emerged from more recent operational experiences in the field, as well as from other developments. We conclude with an assessment of the initiatives that are now underway and an attempt to identify some of their potential implications, both good and bad, for Canadian foreign and security policies in the broader sense. In the real world, moreover, they can be immensely difficult to put into practical effect. It follows from the foregoing that, in the most general terms, the ultimate goal of interoperability is not to ensure that all the contributors to a given coalition will deploy identical types of military systems and units, but simply to achieve a more practicable level of co-operation among them. Normally, of course, such a contribution will impart or at least will be intended to impart political benefits, too: More concretely, interoperability seeks to overcome a number of obstacles to the more effective functioning of multinational forces that have been established on the assumption that their various national components will act in concert. Left unattended, such sources of behavioural divergence can create havoc in the field, particularly when many of the national contingents involved are not large enough to be logistically, and in other respects, self-sufficient – precisely the circumstance in which Canadian units have found themselves in every operation since World War II, with the possible exception of ground force units in certain phases of the Korean War. That being so, the issue often seems not to be very central to the concerns of politicians who are engaged in planning the broader direction of their national policy. In practice, however, interoperability can seem to be very much a two-edged sword when considered from the political point of view. By enabling a country with only modest military capabilities like Canada to contribute in a meaningful way to multinational operations, it can lend a certain visibility to the willingness to make a substantive commitment to the resolution of the conflict at hand, a visibility that can earn political dividends from audiences at home as well as from coalition partners abroad. Having said all that, the very notion of working with larger and more powerful allies in military coalitions, as opposed to operating unilaterally, raises the prospect of some – or even a complete – loss to the smaller powers of autonomy in decision-making, a circumstance that carries with it the risk of generating perceptions both at home and abroad of a decline in national prestige, and a reduced capacity for acting independently in the national interest. A preoccupation with the danger that interoperability will go hand-in-hand with perceptions of political dependency has thus been a prominent theme in the calculations of successive Canadian governments from the earliest days of Confederation to the present. That being so, the political dimensions of military interoperability with the United States may now warrant more attention than they have tended in the past to receive. But before considering these and other implications of current and recent developments, it may be helpful to place the issue as a whole somewhat more fully, although still very briefly and selectively, in its longer-term historical perspective. The Historical Context It should be clear that, in any military alliance, interoperability is primarily an issue for the lesser

powers. Such was the case even in the earliest days of the alliance. The difficulty has come not so much from the superiority of American forces in quantitative terms as from the lead they hold in qualitative terms, and in recent years it has intensified in tandem with accelerating and increasingly expensive advances in modern military technology. The underlying roots of the problem, however, precede the technology gap. This is partly because the militaries of the various NATO members, including Canada, have evolved in very different geopolitical, historical, cultural and economic circumstances. Hence, they frequently exhibit significantly different characteristics in relation to size, composition, equipment, training, roles and competencies. As a result, no single military establishment is an exact clone of any other. The result was that the most prevalent pattern took the form of a seemingly endless struggle on the part of the smaller contributors to obtain at least some measure of standardization and interoperability with the forces of their dominant military partner – the United States. In the case of interoperability, therefore, as in the case of most other military concepts, it can be argued that there is little that is genuinely new under the martial sun. The process began first in relation to the British. Later, starting roughly with the onset of World War II, the focus shifted to the United States, where it has remained ever since. Alas, from the military point of view the results were less than impressive. When circumstances posed the prospect of military operations in South Africa in the late s, the British War Office initially made no attempt to acquire military contingents from the colonies. It was simply assumed that it would take too long to train them to British standards. At the outbreak of World War I, Canadian military units were woefully unprepared for the conflict. Ottawa, moreover, lacked any independent vision that could be regarded as pertinent to the conduct of the hostilities. It was simply taken for granted that Canadians would fight alongside the British, under British leadership, and that they would follow British tactics and procedures in battling their common foe. With the failure of the League of Nations, however, and with storm clouds gathering in the Far East as well as in Western Europe, Ottawa began in the late s to show signs of moving toward a closer defence relationship with its continental neighbour. Indeed, in many respects, the reciprocal pledges of mutual defence support that were issued by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King in constituted the basic foundation for Canada-United States defence co-operation, a foundation that endures to the present day. The same spirit of co-operation was soon extended to the related area of defence production. Taken together, they had the cumulative effect of tying both the military establishments and the defence industries of the two states into a seemingly irrevocable web of closely coordinated interconnectedness. As time went on, interoperability became an increasingly prominent feature, and consequence, of this intricate construct. General co-operation and exchange of observers in connection with exercises and with the development and tests of material of common interest. Mutual and reciprocal availability of military, naval and air facilities in each country, applied as may be agreed in specific instances. Almost from its inception, however, NORAD also raised concerns among some Canadians over loss of autonomy in decision-making. At its inception, NORAD was but the latest in a series of bilateral air defence arrangements that were designed to provide a more rapid and effective joint response to the commonly perceived threat to North America from Soviet long-range bombers carrying nuclear weapons. Given this degree of integration, there were, and indeed there still remain, points of friction for Canada, as the smaller partner in an organization so unequally composed. One of these became very evident during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October , when Canadian components of NORAD were automatically placed on the same alert status as their American counterparts, even though the Diefenbaker government initially regarded such action as both unnecessary and potentially provocative. Since then, procedures have been developed to allow US personnel to replace their Canadian colleagues should the two governments disagree on the need for a particular alert. The point worth noting here is not that Ottawa has no choice on these matters. Clearly it has at least some room for manoeuvre, and in the past it has made use of it both to underscore its commitment to the ABM Treaty and to decline to participate directly in SDI. The point, instead, is that continued participation in the kind of interoperability arrangement that NORAD represents entails certain costs, some of which are political and others financial. That being so, it may even make possible from time to time the exercise of a moderating influence. Supporters of interoperable arrangements are thus easily drawn to their rhetorical question: Recent Catalysts Over the decade or so since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of the

Cold War, domestic political demands for peace dividends in the non-US NATO partners have led the governments involved to degrade their respective military establishments to such a significant degree that the United States now spends more on its armed forces in absolute terms each year than all of the other allies combined.

Chapter 2 : Interoperability within the Canadian Armed Forces and Lessons from Afghanistan – NAOC

THE CANADIAN FORCES AND INTEROPERABILITY: PANACEA OR PERDITION? is an indispensable source of information, argument and evidence for those who are seriously concerned about the implications of closer military integration with the United States and our other allies for Canadian sovereignty.

In the void left by ending combat operations in Afghanistan, it is of the utmost importance to come out of the intense operational environment in a positive way and make the most of the lessons and experiences our soldiers, sailors and airmen have gained over the past 13 years. In fact, Major-General Tabbornor told the Standing Committee on Defence and National Security that more than 14, Reservists took part in overseas operations between and , including nearly 1, in alone. The two main components of the Canadian Armed Forces are the Reserves and the Regular Forces, the latter of which would be more familiar to the average Canadian. Life in the Reserves and the Regular Forces is very different. Reservists serve and train as part-time soldiers to supplement full time civilian careers or are full-time students. In an operational sense, the Reserves function to mobilize in support of the Regular Force when needed, and this includes overseas military engagements. In light of the level of involvement Reservists had in the recent conflict in Afghanistan, it is necessary to examine the successes of this initiative. A look at online social media outlets such as Reddit and other online forums will yield no shortage of what appears to be Regular Force members criticising and degrading the contributions and usefulness of Reservists in an overseas combat environment. For example, as one anonymous poster stated, deployed Reservists are put on gate duty. In fact one active duty general stated that the mission in Afghanistan could not have been completed without the support of Reservists. Aside from their combat role, Reservists augment the Regular Forces by providing expertise in psychological and medical operations. A Senate report authored in part by Senators Pamela Wallin and former General Romeo Dallaire goes as far as stating that the Reserves now have capabilities that do not exist in the Regular Force. The Afghanistan operation took on a broad range of military and civil effects, and many Reservists have additional skill sets derived from their civilian professional lives, which enrich and further the operational capabilities of the Canadian Forces. The contributions of our often-neglected Reservists have earned them a bigger place in the picture in terms of Strategic Planning. While Afghanistan was undoubtedly a demonstration of their value in overseas combat missions, in the Post-Afghanistan world, experts believe it would be useful for the CAF to consider the merit of maintaining a small number of Reservists at Regular Forces high readiness training levels. It is worthwhile to implement at the very least a baseline level of training and capability to ensure continued interoperability between both elements of the military. There is an opportunity for all Reservists to benefit from the new experience and expertise of their comrades returning home. We must also recognize the burden this goal places on our part-time soldiers. Maintaining increased levels of training and readiness asks our Reservists to take time away from their jobs to participate in training operations, often to the detriment of their civilian careers. If that burden is something Canadians are going to ask of them, then their compensation should be adjusted to reflect it. The same report on the state of the Reserves recommends the introduction of benefits currently not afforded to Reserve Members of the CAF. The task of augmenting the Regular Forces has clearly been well executed by the Reserves, but there is a school of thought that says in a philosophical sense we are departing from a Total Force Concept when it comes to the deployment of our Reservists. Beyond the operations in Afghanistan, over the last decade the Reserves have been actively deployed not only in other international initiatives such as Haiti, but also to great effect domestically. Reservists have played a large role in the security of the Winter Olympics in Vancouver as well as the G-8 and G Summits in Hunstville and Toronto respectively. They have also had a chance to utilize their unique skills and abilities beyond just that of a security force by assisting in civil emergencies such as those on the East Coast during recent hurricanes, the ice storms in Central Canada, and flooding in the Prairies. This departure from purely serving as an augmentation tool of the Regular Forces represents a fundamental change in the nature of the Reserves from the Cold War Era when the Total Force Concept was first implemented. Many believe that a natural future for the Reserves is to add to their portfolio of responsibilities by continuing to be called in to

deal with domestic threats such as terrorism as well as natural disasters as they have done in the past. This role makes sense as contrasted with Regular Force units which are concentrated in just a handful of military bases nationwide Reserve units are situated in a wide range of communities where they may already know the situation and are well positioned to assist civilian authorities as first responders. Craig plans to study Government and Security Studies at the graduate level and later enter a career in the federal public service or in law enforcement.

Chapter 3 : Law enforcement in Canada - Wikipedia

Interoperability, Integration, and Interdependence between the United States and Canadian Forces: Recreating the Devil's Brigade, by Lieutenant Colonel Jesse Lamarand, USAF, 42 pages. In today's complex security environment, the United States' need for allies is greater than ever.

Training alongside some 3, United States Army personnel, the Canadians were able to test their own high readiness capabilities, as well as command and control in the field. More importantly for the Canadian side, however, was the opportunity to develop interoperability with American forces. Exercise Warfighter should prompt some reflection on the part of Canadian policymakers and the public. While a valuable training opportunity, the frequency with which the Canadian Army engages in joint training with its American counterpart greatly exceeds that of any joint training with European members of NATO. With the exception of the recent Operation Reassurance and the training assistance the Canadian Forces has provided to the Lithuanian, Polish, and Ukrainian militaries through the annual Exercise Maple Arch since , there are exceedingly few opportunities for Canadian troops to exchange best practices with European forces. Even Exercise Maple Resolve , which involves some British elements, is foremost a joint exercise between Canadian and American forces. Previously, that lack of engagement with European NATO members has not impeded the capacity for the Canadian Forces to actively participate in multilateral operations. But that has generally been because Canadian troops have worked closely together with larger American elements, as was the case on the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. But this might not always be the case. A future conflict could necessitate close cooperation with, for example, French or German forces. Lacking joint exercises, interoperability could be diminished with such partners and the Canadian troops could find themselves sidelined as a result. The Army Training Review , introduced in February as part of the Army Renewal program, offers some opportunity to fine tune this aspect of the Canadian military and the strategic direction of the Army. For decades, Canadian policymakers and military leaders have struggled to strike a balance between two competing principles: In the case of the former, some governments have sought to ensure full interoperability with the British military and more recently with US forces. The latter principle, niche militarization, involves the development of a force in such a way that it fulfills one specific function exceedingly well at the expense of neglecting many other areas. This allows a country with a small military to provide a nonetheless essential function in multilateral operations, typically avoiding frontline combat in the process. For example, with its eight highly effective minesweepers, the Royal Norwegian Navy has a clear niche within operations fielded by NATO or other international institutions: It has generally been the Canadian practice to adhere to interoperability at the expense of niche militarization. But declining government revenues and the changing nature of warfare in the 21st century lend strength to the argument that the Canadian Forces cannot, and should not, strive to match every American military capability but should instead target specific areas where Canada can make a contribution that exceeds anything which can be offered by other NATO member states. Niche militarization would also further ensure that the Canadian Forces does not become culturally and practically dependent on any particular partner, retaining its own distinct character and the flexibility to operate alongside any NATO member. More likely, the review will simply find ways in which the Army can adjust its training to realize objectives imposed from the top down. If that is the case, there may be a greater cultural challenge within the Canadian Army than the dynamic between interoperability and niche militarization.

Chapter 4 : Interoperability, Not Integration: Canadian Army Renewal â€“ NAOC

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Chapter 5 : National Security and Military Interoperability

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