

Chapter 1 : Project MUSE - Stanley Cavell and the Claim of Literature

"The great merit of Stanley Cavell and the Claim of Literature is the manner [in which] Rudrum puts together numerous leading theories and approaches, sorts through them distinctly, and acknowledges their genuine driving insights. It is a thoughtful, gracefully written book."

Instead of launching the film in lockstep with the novel the aftershocks at Hartfield of the marriage of Miss Taylor to Mr. Weston, which registers on Emma and Mr. In the film, the spatial surround of the Emma Woodhouse-George Knightley marriage settlement is not tethered to the intensely local question of whether the couple will live at Donwell Abbey or at Hartfield, as in the novel. I propose that both of these framing revisions adapt Emma as a narrative with noteworthy Cavellian inflections, pointing toward a human world in which adoption and marriage are isomorphic forms available, however elusively, to the perfectionist quest. I have elsewhere argued that Emma is usefully read as a novel about adoption. Three of the main characters—Frank Churchill, Jane Fairfax, and Harriet Smith—are untethered from their birth families, and this unusual surplus gives redundancy signifying force: For an account of how gay adoption functions to contest the model of the nuclear family, see Elfenbein and Watkins: Bastards Harriet Smith, orphans Jane Fairfax, and semi-orphans Frank Churchill line up as a disruptive adoptive set with other creatures on the margins of Highbury: Bates, governesses Miss Taylor, yeoman farmers Robert Martin, and threatening bands of gypsies. Although all three adoptive narratives in Emma take their origins in deaths Frank and Jane or the mysterious shadows of illegitimacy Harriet Smith, these haunted plots also mark spaces where new futures might be imagined in perfectionist glimpses. Fast on the heels of this foundational sorrow, the film cuts to the first image of adoption. Weston is at the bedside of his dead wife, and their son Frank is at the door with his aunt, Mrs. Churchill the sister-in-law of Mrs. Near the opening of the film; Mr. Weston at the deathbed of the first Mrs. Instead of foregrounding this tale of adoption, the novel offers it as backstory information in the second chapter, and the episode in the novel is also geographically distant from Highbury: Weston is serving in the military in Yorkshire when he marries a Miss Churchill, and Yorkshire is where Frank grows up at his new adoptive home, Enscombe, the Churchill family seat. It is significant that Mrs. Churchill, who famously jerks Frank around throughout the novel, is not his blood relative Mr. The effect of this pairing is to locate under the sign of adoption the marriage plot that will soon entangle both these characters. Near the opening of the film; the face of Frank Weston, glimpsed by his father through the back carriage window as he departs with his new Churchill family. Once again we see the adoptive child conveyed away from Highbury in a carriage, and Frank Weston and Jane Fairfax are now joined visually by the occasions and modes of their leave-takings. Near the opening of the film; the orphaned Jane Fairfax is assisted into the carriage by her surrogate caregiver, Col. Campbell, as Miss Bates and Mrs. Bates, her aunt and grandmother, look on. For these children, the future itself is immediately and grimly at stake: The contingencies of adoptive identity—not only its dire necessities but also its fragile possibilities—will fall upon them a second time as adults in the contingencies of marriage. The textual anchor for the wedding trip to the sea is a sentence several paragraphs before the conclusion: I was startled at first viewing because the narrative costs on this score are so high, but I now view these images as abundant recompense, especially as they open the film into the contingent Cavellian territory of perfectionist possibilities. Post-Highbury, Emma and Knightley in the film are first framed together in a carriage. Elton at the close of Volume One. Emma and Knightley, married, in a carriage headed for the sea. Freed from the carriage, the next image offers Emma and Knightley, backs to the camera, hand in hand, walking over the downs toward the sea. Penultimately, Emma and Knightley over the downs to the sea. I return to Cavell for a gloss on this image. Elinor is seated on the bench ever so slightly off center, inviting the thought of what absent other might fill an empty spot close beside her in a composition of balanced symmetry. Post-Sedgwick, reading the vectors of desire in Sense and Sensibility can never again fixate on heterosexual marriage as sole available telos. And were she standing there alone, the scene would be a wrap, on these notes. Unremarkably, the bench marks the grounded and settled spot where the marriage empire summons identity to take seated place, with room for one other.

Unremarkably, a bench also marks widely and deeply in the language the weight of communal and judicial authority, signifying here the foundational regime of coupledness that arranges the solitary Elinor in a position that demands a paired companion. Edward Ferrars will soon fill that spot, although the final paragraph of the novel has great sport with the thought that Marianne and Brandon crowd their way on the bench as well. The final image is a long shot from behind of the pair gazing out over the coast. The final image; Emma and Knightley, backs to the camera, gaze out over the sea. It is a place manifestly not without vulnerability, without risk—those cliffs! As in the image in *Sense and Sensibility*, the bench on the right marks the fixed settlement spot, but in this image it is, remarkably, empty. The faint track across the field to that bench confirms the power of the marriage empire, but the image also offers, disruptively, vanished traffic and an empty destination. The human pair to the left are set apart from that authoritative anchor, not seated of necessity or by birth in the old order but standing together in a shared difference, gazing away from the viewer into an unwritten future. The novel and the film offer a human world in which adoption and marriage are isomorphic forms suffered by and available to, however elusively, the perfectionist quest. I take that thought as license to superimpose a different narrative on this final image: To the left, standing aside, there is a place for someone who names himself, adoptively, Stan Cavell. It is the human fate of both the California ephebe and the Regency couple—adopted, re married—to remain apart from everything of which they are a part. Richard Cronin and Dorothy McMillan. *The Letters of Jane Austen*. Janet Todd and Antje Blank.

Chapter 2 : Stanley Cavell - Wikipedia

Stanley Cavell and the Claim of Literature Published: December 01, David Rudrum, *Stanley Cavell and the Claim of Literature*, Johns Hopkins University Press, , pp., \$ (hbk), ISBN

A discussion group about ideas, for everyone. You can find the details on our meetup. The issue here is how words come to have meaning. A standard account of the meaning of words is that they apply universals to particulars: The upshot of this chapter is that the idea of universals cannot solve the problems that gave rise to the idea of universals in the first place. We learn words in certain contexts and are expected to be able to project them into other contexts. This ability to project is a good criterion for having actually learned a word. With this in mind, Cavell wants to handle two issues: One important point to be kept in mind: Learning a second language may have some similarities and some differences, but they are very much incidental to his argument. Learning a Word 4. We might say the child learns that sounds like this name objects like that cat. If all we say is that this sound is a word which names cats, we are just repeating what we are trying to explain. The issue here is the question of how much knowing what something is involves knowing what it is called. First, we should not assume that we are teaching what we think we are teaching, or that the child is learning what we they they are learning. He says there is no clear difference between learning and maturation. The next time she sees a cat, she repeats the word. Having made it, meadows of communication can grow for us. I have wanted to say: We do not know the meaning of the words. We look away and leap around. Cavell wants to explain why it is wrong to think of learning a language as being taught the names of things, and this involves several points: Cavell wants to focus on the second and third. To say that learning a word means learning what it means is to say that we learn what the word labels. Everything is ostensibly defined: Attaching labels is actually a small part of language. Is he actually paying? We can answer this question in a variety of ways, but we will probably end up saying there is a sense in which he is paying. Cavell gives a different example of a child learning: And we can also say: The child will also learn other things about these conceptsâ€”and everything they have learned will be a part of what these concepts are for them. When one learns a first language, one does not only learn the names of things, but what a name is. And we do not only learn the form of expressing a wish, but what expressing a wish is. When do not only learn grammar, but a whole form of life. Instead of telling a beginner what a word means, we initiate them into the relevant form of life. We have to get them to follow us. To some extent, all we can say is that this just happens naturally. This makes language a somewhat shaky thing, which is why philosophers are always hunting for an absolute explanation of it. Many things can go wrong; the child could not grasp what we mean, or take our approval to be disapproval. This normally does not happen, thoughâ€”is that just an accident? We might be thinking the foundations of language are shaky here because we are looking for a particular sort of foundation and not finding it. This can give us the idea that our words will continue to be meaningful only so long as others find it worth their while to understand us, and may come to decide we are no longer a part of their world. It is as if our sanity depends on their approval of us. We might be wrong about what we say and do, But that failure is not one which can be corrected with a more favourable position of observation or a fuller mastery in the recognition of objects; it requires a new look at oneself and a fuller realization of what one is doing or feeling â€” it is countered not by saying that a fact about the world is otherwise than you supposed, but by showing that your world is otherwise than you see. A word is learned in certain contexts, but it can be appropriately projected into other contexts. If what can be said in a language is not completely determined by rules or universals, and if there are always new contexts and relationships, then in a sense the learning is never over: We do not just limit words to particular contexts with explicit definitions. For some purposes, we do require precision, so the power of ordinary language to be used across multiple contexts can also be its liability. To say that a word is ambiguous is to say that it can be used in many ways, but this does not mean it is being used in multiple ways in every instance, or that we are typically confused about the use of the word. In fact, the more uses a word can have, then the more precise we can be. We could use different words entirelyâ€”but what do we gain and lose if we do? First, this does not discriminate between differences which could be

important, like putting material into a machine and adding a piece to the construction of the machine. What differences are being sensed and prioritized? If we imagine a language in which every action has its own verb, we would be imagining a language which was completely intolerant of projection. We would have to assume certain things about their form of life, that they saw no connection between giving food to lions and swans. These actions would be as distinct as petting the cat or hunting it. Rather, they would have to be utterly different: It would be an entirely other form of life, with no projections at all. Language is tolerant; it allows projections. But it is also intolerant: We can project words into many different contexts. You feed peanuts to a monkey and feed coins into a meter, but you cannot feed a monkey with coins. What a lion refuses is tied to what they can be offered. It might just be that the shoe was quickly shuffled under the couch, so we did not get a clear look. There is no such thing as an explanation which is complete in itself. What applies here to explaining words also goes for giving directions, citing game rules, and justifying behaviour. When I give you directions, I give exterior facts about the directions: When I explain the rules of a game, I say a rule applies in such-and-such a situation, but I cannot say what following rules is, or explain how to follow a rule without presupposing that you can follow rules. The ability to draw a rabbit and the ability to imagine what we would do in certain circumstances both depend on the mastery of a form of representation. Cavell is trying to show two fundamental facts about human forms of life and the concepts they sustain: We need both the variance and the consistency if a concept is to accomplish its tasks of meaning, understanding, and communicating. The element of meaning he is trying to get it, the variance and consistency, can be rephrased: There would be no instances, and hence no concepts either. How do we know when an instance falls under a concept? If we define a word ostensively "by pointing at something" what points about the object is the ostensive definition pointing at? There would be definite points only when there are definite alternatives, passenger jets and bombers. Put another way, what is the difference between taking an object as an individual and as an example? We can phrase the problem of examples and so the problem of universals as this question: If our need for essences is real, then the need is satisfied by grammar. Wittgenstein imagines someone complaining that he has not said what the essence of language is "that is, he has not explained what all linguistic activities have in common and what makes them language. It looks as if he is offering the idea of family resemblances as an alternative to the idea of essence, but if he is, the idea is empty. A philosopher who wants to explain essences will still want to explain family resemblances. The idea of family resemblances is simply meant to make us dissatisfied with the idea of universals as an explanation of language, or of how a word can refer to multiple things. When we talk about what things have in common in an ordinary way, we see that these commonalities are different from what the idea of universals is meant to cover. The grasping of a universal cannot explain the function it is supposed to have, because the new application of a concept will still have to be explained in the particular case, and the explanations themselves are sufficient to explain the projection. And finally, it means we know no more about a concept than the explanations we give. Cavell thinks once we have all this in hand, the idea of a universal no longer has an obvious appeal. There is an essence to things, but we do not find it by finding a quality: To ask for a general explanation for the generality of language would be like asking for an explanation of why a child, as they are acquiring language, take what is said to them as consequential or as expressing an intention or projecting an expectation. It seems to me that growing up in modern culture? This could be because we have too little of something or too much, or because we are either slobs or saints. Driven by philosophy outside language-games, and in this way repudiating our criteria, is a different way to live; but it depends on the same fact of language as do the other lives within it "that it is an endless field of possibilities and that it cannot dictate what is said now, can no more assure the sense of what is said, its depth, its helpfulness, its accuracy, its wit, than it can insure its truth to the world. Which is to say that language is not only an acquirement but a bequest; and it is to say that we are stingy in what we attempt to inherit. One might think of poetry as the second inheritance of language.

Chapter 3 : Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Ch. 7 “Seoul Philosophy Club

Stanley Cavell and the Claim of Literature Rudrum, David Published by Johns Hopkins University Press Rudrum, David.
Stanley Cavell and the Claim of Literature.

Advanced Search Abstract Is there a way of reading philosophically without imposing a pre-existing philosophy on the literary text? The reader must be willing to let her own experience of philosophy, of life be educated by the work. I was honoured to receive an invitation to be a keynote speaker at the Biennial Conference of the International Society for Religion, Literature and Culture. I chose to speak about philosophy and literature, in the hope that the questions I raise about the relationship between literature and philosophy, and about how to read a literary text, will be relevant also for people working in the fields of religion and theology. This text is a much-revised version of the lecture I gave at the conference in Oxford in September. People become interested in the relationship between philosophy and literature for different reasons at different times, and different reasons for raising the question will require different answers. Such lists often disappoint. To cast philosophers as the guardians of universality, reason, insight and argument is to strip literature of its ambition to provide knowledge, thought and truth. Such lists also have an unfortunate tendency to reproduce a stereotypical gender hierarchy, in which the terms on the left get coded as masculine and superior, and those on the right as feminine and inferior. Men think, women feel; men do philosophy, women write romantic novels. Lists of features assume that the answer to the question of the relationship between literature and philosophy must take the form of a definition of the two terms. Given that philosophers have never agreed on what philosophy is, and given that even the most agile minds have failed to produce a convincing definition of literature, this is not a promising path. If we did, a checklist of features that could help us decide whether we were dealing with an instance of philosophy or literature would be quite useful. Rather we raise the question for other reasons, reasons we often fail to make completely clear even to ourselves. The challenge for someone who wants to think about literature and philosophy, then, is to figure out what her question actually is. Usually, the question is triggered by a sense of irritation, a conviction that someone is failing to do justice to something we care about. This reaction was triggered by the popularity of existentialism, its faith in the philosophical novel, and its call for committed literature. Fundamentally, the debate turned on aesthetic norms: In this case, then, the answer to the question of literature and philosophy would have to be something like a theory of the novel. My own interest in the relationship between literature and philosophy has to do with the question of philosophical reading. I have long been frustrated with criticism that reduces the literary text to an example of a pre-existing theory or philosophy, whether this means looking for convincing illustrations of existing positions in moral philosophy in Dickens or Woolf, or tracking down Foucault in Jane Austen, Derrida in George Eliot, or Deleuze in Ibsen. What is the point of reading literature if all we manage to see in it is a theory we already know? I share the conviction that literary criticism would be the poorer without them. In the hands of the best practitioners, to read literature with philosophy is to enrich both. The question is how to achieve this. I would like to find ways to read philosophically without falling into the trap of casting the critic, the theorist or the philosopher as necessarily wiser, deeper, more intelligent, more politically correct than the writer. The tendency to turn the critic into a champion of critique has been a common failing of the hermeneutics of suspicion, which has dominated literary criticism for a long time. The spirit of the hermeneutics of suspicion has made us believe that to read critically is necessarily to debunk, deconstruct, take apart, and tear down, not to praise and admire. On this view, it is easier to justify the role of critics they defend us against the ideological machinations of the text than the works they labour so mightily to take apart. For me, then, the question of literature and philosophy really is a question of reading, or, more broadly, of criticism. How can we read philosophically without reducing the text to a witting or unwitting illustration of a pre-existing theory? How can we read literature with philosophy in ways that suggest that the writer may actually have something to tell the philosopher? Is there a way to read philosophically without having recourse to a given philosophy at all? Can criticism itself be philosophy? As I formulate these questions, I realise that I probably would not have expressed them in just this way if I had never read anything

by Stanley Cavell. Even the most deeply felt ideas are inspired by others. How does he conceive of the question? What can someone interested in reading literature learn from the way he connects the two fields? Certainly not so long as philosophy continues, as it has from the first, to demand the banishment of poetry from its republic. Perhaps it could if it could itself become literature. But can philosophy become literature and still know itself? One way to take this question is to say that Cavell wonders whether Shakespeare, and Othello and Desdemona, could ever be recognised as philosophers by other philosophers. For someone who believes that a work of art can have philosophical insights this is a natural question. After all, if philosophy is taking place in works of art, philosophers ought to be able to recognise it as philosophy. This raises the question of what Cavell thinks philosophy is: It seeks to disquiet the foundations of our lives and to offer us in recompense nothing better than itself – and this on the basis of no expert knowledge, of nothing closed to the ordinary human being, once, that is to say, that being lets himself or herself be informed by the process and the ambition of philosophy. Philosophy will ask awkward questions about why we do what we do, and why we think what we think. There is more than a shade of Socrates here. Since the activity requires no expert knowledge, we should expect to come across it outside academia, and in texts not traditionally marked as philosophy. So, why not in plays and films? For Cavell, it is quite natural to claim that the film director Frank Capra can enter into a productive philosophical conversation with the philosopher Immanuel Kant. This may be the moment to stress that insofar as they turn on the question of aesthetic judgment, most of the questions raised in this paper are equally pertinent to literature, theatre and film. The question, therefore, is not just whether philosophy can acknowledge literature, but whether it can acknowledge that criticism – the work of reading, thinking and writing about literature and other art forms – can be a part of philosophy. Thinking about Othello, Cavell pushes his own understanding of scepticism further than he could have done otherwise. In a dense passage from , written in a moment when he looked back on his work, Cavell connects self-expression and self-exploration to the question of literature and film and philosophy: Only in stages have I come to see that each of my ventures in and from philosophy bears on ways of understanding the extent to which my relation to myself is figured in my relation to my words. This establishes from the beginning my sense that in appealing from philosophy to, for example, literature, I am not seeking illustrations for truths philosophy already knows, but illumination of philosophical pertinence that philosophy alone has not surely grasped – as though an essential part of its task must work behind its back. By neglecting the turn, or return to literature, philosophy will overlook fundamental insights available only to the philosopher willing to stop, pause, turn back and pick up the pearls strewn on a path he thought he had already explored. Criticism – the work of reading – is here connected to the idea of stopping, pausing, paying attention and looking more closely. What I say or write will reveal my blindness and my callousness, my insights and my generosity, my failures and my achievements. Cavell wants to make a place for literature within philosophy, both because he thinks literature contains illuminations of value to philosophy, and because he thinks that the question of expression and experience lie at the very heart of philosophy. It exposes our judgment to the potential ridicule of the world. Surely this is another reason why we are so quick to hide behind the authority of acknowledged master thinkers in our readings and viewings. It also requires us to trust it, and to find it worth expressing: There are four tasks here: I am struck by the parallels between this view and the work going on in feminist consciousness-raising groups in the 60s and 70s. The purpose of these groups was to encourage women to take an interest in their own experience, to be willing to voice them and to claim authority for them. The result was revolutionary. For Cavell, aesthetic experience is not divorced from ordinary experience: The moral of this practice is to educate your experience sufficiently so that it is worthy of trust. Experience is not fixed; previous experience does not doom me forever to repeat the same mistakes. This is like psychoanalysis: There is a way to break the old patterns! Experience can be trained! I must be prepared to discover that my sense of the work was profoundly mistaken, but that discovery will itself be part of my further education as a critic. Here too there is no difference between aesthetic experience our experience of the work of art and ordinary experience what we experience in life. Sometimes a book will completely transform our understanding of a phenomenon or a problem. Films and plays and books can help us overcome, or undo, our existing beliefs. Just like other experiences, the experience of film, theatre, literature has the power to change us. My original question was

how to read philosophically in a way that avoids imposing my pre-existing theory on the work of art. Cavell is not interested in laying down requirements for how to read. But how are we to do that? The only hint Cavell provides is to say that we usually have no trouble letting a work of theory or philosophy teach us how to read it. I think this means that the right sort of reading would emerge if we simply read literature or watch films in much the same way as we read philosophy. What does this sort of reading look like? Well, we often begin by trying to get at least a general idea of what the work is about, what its major concerns and concepts are. At first, we may only form a hazy idea of the whole. To get a clearer view, we zoom in on key concepts, study the examples, circle back to passages that illuminate them, look for the arguments, the contradictions and the exceptions. If it really fascinates us, we may engage with it again, maybe revise some of our initial impressions, try to get clear on why it strikes us as important and reflect on what we can use it for in our own work. Why do we imagine that it is always much harder to let a novel or a play teach us how to read it than it is for a theoretical essay to do so? Maybe because we lack practice. In addition, we may fear that a reading emerging from such a process might not look all that impressive. After all, it would have to be built on concepts supplied by the work itself, rather than concepts supplied by a specific philosophy. This may or may not give rise to philosophically interesting readings. To be willing to learn from the work requires a critic capable of a certain degree of humility. All her life, Beauvoir was passionately engaged in both philosophy and literature. She was obsessed with the question of the other and, like Cavell, thought of writing as an act implicating the other. However, this is not the place to do this. Here, as everywhere else in her writings on literature, Beauvoir writes as the passionate and voracious reader she was.

Chapter 4 : Stanley Cavell and the Claim of Literature

Through detailed analysis of these works, Rudrum explores Cavell's ideas on the nature of reading; the relationships among literary language, ordinary language, and performative language; the status.

Life[edit] Cavell was born to a Jewish family in Atlanta, Georgia. His mother, a locally renowned pianist, trained him in music from his earliest days. Austin , whose teaching and methods "knocked him off Before completing his Ph. In April , during the student protests chiefly arising from the Vietnam War , Cavell, helped by his colleague John Rawls , worked with a group of African-American students to draft language for a vote by the faculty that established the Department of African and African-American Studies at Harvard. In , along with the documentary filmmaker Robert Gardner , Cavell helped found the Harvard Film Archive , to preserve and present the history of film. In , his second son David was born. After retiring, he taught courses at Yale University and the University of Chicago. He includes film and literary study in philosophical inquiry. Cavell writes extensively on Ludwig Wittgenstein , J. He interprets Wittgenstein in a fashion known as the New Wittgenstein. A scholarly journal, the Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies, engages with his philosophical work. Cavell is perhaps best known for his book, *The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy* , which forms the centerpiece of his work, and which has its origins in his doctoral dissertation. In *Pursuits of Happiness* , Cavell describes his experience of seven prominent Hollywood comedies: Cavell argues that these films, from the years 1930s, form part of what he calls the genre of " *The Comedy of Remarriage* ," and he finds in them great philosophical, moral, and indeed political significance. Specifically, Cavell argues that these Hollywood comedies show that "the achievement of happiness requires not the [Having used Emerson to outline the concept, this book suggests ways we might want to understand philosophy, literature, and film as preoccupied with features of perfectionism. And perhaps we can say: A passionate utterance is an invitation to improvisation in the disorders of desire. Excerpts from *Memory* , is an autobiography written in the form of a diary. In a series of consecutive, dated entries, Cavell inquires about the origins of his philosophy by telling the story of his life.

Chapter 5 : reading cavell | Download eBook PDF/EPUB

Stanley Cavell and the Claim of Literature is the first monograph to comprehensively address the importance of literature in Cavell's philosophy, and, in turn, the potential effect of his philosophy on contemporary literary criticism.

Naoko Saito and Paul Standish eds. *Stanley Cavell and the Education of Grownups* Published: November 04, Naoko Saito and Paul Standish eds. It has been marked, in the past decade or so, by a number of distinguished anthologies in a wide range of disciplines including politics and literature. Philosophy of education has been primarily pursued in departments, programs, and schools of education, and in those places it also has a somewhat tenuous position. Academic programs in education tend to be primarily concerned with issues about schooling, and the preparation of teachers who will operate in schools. Evidently the essays were first presented at a Cavell Colloquium. This makes it possible to include some remarks mostly from Cavell, but some from Hilary Putnam from the discussion that ensued after each paper was given. The book also begins with an essay by Cavell reflecting on his own phrase "Philosophy as the Education of Grownups" and concludes with a brief coda, also by Cavell on "Philosophy as Education. The other essays are divided into three groups. Arcilla, and Naoko Saito. This sorts oddly with the other essays but has its own definite interest. Is there more for him to say on this, given his previously published commentaries? We are reminded that language is a "natural" feature of human life, but that we must be initiated into its practices that are themselves intimately connected with almost all of the other human practices into which we must be initiated. Any view of language that would make this educative process impossible cannot be correct. Putnam in fact had contributed another essay to one of the anthologies mentioned above, "Philosophy as the Education of Grownups: Stanley Cavell and Skepticism. Here the idea of philosophy as the education of grownups shows itself with great clarity. The two essays in "Part II: Paul Standish in "Skepticism, Acknowledgment and the Ownership of Learning" does succeed in showing the relevance of Cavell to contemporary discussions of the nature of education. The popular metaphor of "owning learning" and the idea of "learner-centered education" are responses to genuine issues in education, but Standish thinks that they can lead to certain forms of pathology in educational theory. Standish elucidates the idea of possessiveness or ownership, which seems to imply a commodification of learning, by a brief discussion of Heidegger and Thoreau. Standish believes that failure to accept "the ordinary conditions of learning" has led to the pathologies in educational theory with which he began. This danger results from the academic overvaluation of the concepts that it employs in its theorization of the world. Bearn thinks that for Whitehead "What is privileged is the concrete reality that always exceeds whatever abstractions we use, however successfully to understand and control it. Surely, however, that claim need not entail that one turns away from, or denies, the sensual detail of experience. The final group of essays is supposed to be united under the heading of perfectionism, but the members of that group have very different emphases. Inheritance, Abandonment and Jazz" is, for me, another highlight of this collection. His is the only essay that looks closely at the education of the grownup Stanley Cavell as reported in his autobiographical essays. Colapietro is well equipped to write about all of this in a beautifully constructed essay. This conception values education in itself as a crucial element in a life worth living, rather than for its utility for achieving other life goals. Arcilla looks at the set of perfectionist texts that Cavell has employed rather than a definition of "perfectionism" in his consideration of it. What Arcilla finds to be most salient in these texts is their mode of address, that is, the way in which they seek to engage the reader. The perfectionist quest is one for self-intelligibility. It functions, according to Arcilla, not as a blueprint for a better self, but as a dialectical provocation to engage in the common project of going on -- and trying to go on better. In this sensitive essay, the author succeeds in connecting these philosophical reflections to the perennial reexamination of the meaning of liberal education. Naoko Saito in "The Gleam of Light: Saito is particularly good at bringing out the way in which Cavell sees the connection between perfectionism and democracy -- how he does not have an elitist perfectionist view. The perfectionist quest is a human possibility and may go better, or worse, for anyone. This reviewer is not in a position to present an independent account of Zen and Nishida, but Odin is clear and persuasive on the resemblance of elements of these views from different

philosophical traditions. *Reading Cavell*, Routledge , Andrew Morris ed. *Stanley Cavell and Literary Studies: Consequences of Skepticism*, Continuum. These books joined such earlier works as: *A bibliography of work on Cavell* of course exceeds this list dramatically. There are now accessible on-line bibliographies of the Cavell literature. *Autobiographical Exercises*, Harvard University Press,

stanley cavell and the claim of literature determined by our participating in it, or by our specii--• cally refusing to. Happily, I can still claim some kind of Cavellian provenance for this reading, in that.

Stanley Cavell and the Claim of Literature Published: Phillips, Martha Nussbaum, Alasdair MacIntyre, among others -- who took a more than recreational interest in literature. And in the bargain we get a Cavellian reading of a text that Cavell seems not to have taken up: Rudrum begins, however, by carefully separating Cavell from anything resembling academic literary study, with its critical methods, poststructuralist theories, and diverse cultural agendas -- gender studies, ethnic studies, queer theory, and so on. To put the matter as simply as possible, for Cavell a literary work is after Wittgenstein a "form of life. It is something one learns to inhabit. A Cavellian might answer that, being made of words, philosophy and literature are not mutually exclusive but interpenetrate one another -- sometimes smoothly, as when the philosopher William Gass writes novels, and sometimes critically, as when a philosopher confronts the question as Cavell did early in his career in his encounter with the texts of Wittgenstein: How is it to be written? After all, when forms of life become institutionalized impositions of "official culture" , they provoke efforts of escape, except perhaps among those who seek safe havens, as when the atonality of modern music helped to move Cavell from a career as a composer to a life as a philosopher -- without, however, making himself entirely recognizable philosophically. Which no doubt helps to explain why Cavell from first to last has confounded consecutive thinking in order to satisfy his "craving for parentheses" MWx , or what in poetic contexts is called "open form," serial writing that is irreducible to generic, much less disciplinary, expectations. To find a certain freedom from that sound was therefore necessary if I was to feel I was finding my way to an investigation of my own preoccupations. If, as professional philosophers, we were asked whether philosophizing demands of us anything we would think of as a style of writing, our answer, I guess, would waver, perhaps because our philosophical motivation in writing is less to defend a style than to repress style or allow it only in ornamental doses CH In one of his many self-reflexive moments, he writes: About my own sound it may help to say that while I may often leave ideas in what seems a more literary state, sometimes in a more psychoanalytic state, than a philosopher might wish -- that is, that a philosopher might prefer a further philosophical derivation of ideas -- I mean to leave everything I will say, or have, I guess, ever said, as in a sense provisional, the sense, that is, to be gone on from CH Imagine the sound of someone thinking out loud. My subject is nothing apart from sensing the specific weight of these words as they sink; and that means knowing the specific identities of the writer through his metamorphoses, and defining the audiences in me which those identities address, and so create; and hence understanding who I am that I should be called upon in these ways, and who this writer is that he takes his presumption of intimacy and station upon himself SW Now if to speak of the imp of the perverse is to name the imp in English, namely as the initial sounds of a number of characteristically Poe-ish terms, then to speak of something called the perverse as containing this imp is to speak of language itself, specifically English, as the perverse. IOQ The basic fact of language and hence of poetry and literature generally is what Plato, and many after him, warned us against, namely its demonic materiality. When we do note these cells or molecules, these little moles of language perhaps in thinking, perhaps in derangement , what we discover are wordimps -- the initial, or it may be medial or final, movements, the implanted origins or constituents of words, leading lives of their own, staring back at us, calling upon one another, giving us away, alarming -- because to note them is to see that they live in front of our eyes, within earshot, at every moment. But for Cavell this would be to deny life to language, which in the sheer perversity of its "wordimps," its autonomy confronts us with a choice comparable to what Cavell in an early essay "Music Discomposed" calls "the imperative choices we have when confronted with a new development in art" MW People devote their lives, sometimes sacrifice them, to producing such objects just in order that they will have such consequences; and we do not think they are mad for doing so. A final point in this connection would concern the question of theatricality, specifically our relation to characters on stage, acting a part Lear, Othello. Rudrum devotes only a few pages to this question, but they are well taken, for basically the question is whether this theatrical

relation undergoes anything like a metamorphosis from the aesthetic, where we are disinterested observers of a passing show, to the ethical, where the characters exert a claim on us analogous to the claim of the Levinasian Other, or what Cavell calls a claim upon our acknowledgment of them as persons. One may feel like saying here: But this does not mean that acknowledgment is impossible in a theater. Rather it shows what acknowledgment, in a theater, is. And acknowledging in a theater shows what acknowledgment in actuality is. For what is the difference between tragedy in a theater and tragedy in actuality? In both, people in pain are in our presence. We may find that the point of tragedy in a theater is exactly relief from this necessity. Or, as he otherwise expresses it: Cambridge University Press, , xxiii. University of Chicago Press, , 24e. See "Music Discomposed" MW University of Minnesota Press, , It only emerges demonstratively in the profoundest experience of art. Oxford University Press, Meanwhile of Emerson Cavell says that "mastering his text is a matter of discerning the whim from which at each word it follows. University of Chicago Press, , Harvard University Press, , University of Chicago Press, Living Batch Press, , Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Crossroad Publishing, , esp. North Point Press, , 51, where the "scene of interpretation" is described as a situation "of reading and being read. North Point Press, Peter Hertz New York: Harper and Row, ,

Chapter 7 : The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy by Stanley Cavell

Stanley Cavell and the Claim of Literature David Rudrum Stanley Cavell is widely recognized as one of America's most important contemporary philosophers, and his legacy and writings continue to attract considerable attention among literary critics and theorists.

Chapter 8 : Emerson's Transcendental Etudes | Stanley Cavell, Edited by David Justin Hodge

For me the richness and intensity of Cavell's writing continually rewards that attention and was a major part of my education in philosophical reading. It is these same qualities that enabled Cavell's writing to gain such a wide audience outside of academic philosophy."

Chapter 9 : New PDF release: Stanley Cavell and the Claim of Literature - Livraison de Books

This will be our reading for the February 10 meeting. You can find the details on our calendrierdelascience.com page.. 1. This chapter is about Wittgenstein's account of language, what Cavell calls "the entire body and spirit of human conduct and feeling which goes into the capacity for speech" ().