Chapter 1 : CiteSeerX â€" Citation Query Perceiving: A Philosophical Study

1. Biographical. Chisholm was born in North Attleboro, Massachusetts in As an undergraduate, he studied philosophy at Brown University where he worked with a number of distinguished philosophers including C. J. Ducasse and R. M. Blake.

Background and General Considerations Franz Brentano â€" is generally credited with having inspired renewed interest in the idea of intentionality, especially in his lectures and in his book Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. In this work Brentano is, among other things, concerned to identify the proper sphere or subject matter of psychology. While every such mental phenomenon has an object, different mental phenomena relate to their objects in different ways depending on whether they are mental acts of presenting something, of judging about something, or of evaluating something as good or bad. Identifying intentionality as the mark of the mental in this way opens up the possibility of studying the mind in terms of its relatedness to objects, the different modes or forms that this relatedness takes perceiving, imagining, hallucinating, and so forth , and in terms of the relationships that these different modes of intentionality bear to one another the relationships between presentations, judgments, and evaluations; for example, that every judgment fundamentally depends on a presentation the object of which it is a judgment about. Husserl studied with Brentano from to and, along with others such as Alexius Meinong, Kasimir Twardowski, and Carl Stumpf, took away from this experience an abiding interest in the analysis of the intentionality of mind as a key to the clarification of other issues in philosophy. This latter being a way of saying that Jack directed his mind toward the bird by thinking of it or perceiving it as a blue jay. Husserl himself analyzes intentionality in terms of three central ideas: The intentional act or psychological mode of a thought is the particular kind of mental event that is, whether this be perceiving, believing, evaluating, remembering, or something else. The intentional act can be distinguished from its object, which is the topic, thing, or state of affairs that the act is about. So the intentional state of seeing a white dog can be analyzed in terms of its intentional act, visually perceiving, and in terms of its intentional object, a white dog. Intentional act and intentional object are distinct since it is possible for the same kind of intentional act to be directed at different objects perceiving a tree vs. At the same time the two notions are correlative. For any intentional mental event it would make no sense to speak of it as involving an act without an intentional object any more than it would to say that the event involved an intentional object but no act or way of attending to that object no intentional act. Intentional Content The third element of the structure of intentionality identified by Husserl is the intentional content. The basic idea, however, can be stated without too much difficulty. The intentional content of an intentional event is the way in which the subject thinks about or presents to herself the intentional object. The idea here is that a subject does not just think about an intentional object simpliciter; rather the subject always thinks of the object or experiences it from a certain perspective and as being a certain way or as being a certain kind of thing. Intentional content can be thought of along the lines of a description or set of information that the subject takes to characterize or be applicable to the intentional objects of her thought. Thus, in thinking that there is a red apple in the kitchen the subject entertains a certain presentation of her kitchen and of the apple that she takes to be in it and it is in virtue of this that she succeeds in directing her thought towards these things rather than something else or nothing at all. It is important to note, however, that for Husserl intentional content is not essentially linguistic. While intentional content always involves presenting an object in one way rather than another, Husserl maintained that the most basic kinds of intentionality, including perceptual intentionality, are not essentially linguistic. Indeed, for Husserl, meaningful use of language is itself to be analyzed in terms of more fundamental underlying intentional states this can be seen, for example, throughout LI, I. The distinction between intentional object and intentional content can be clarified based on consideration of puzzles from the philosophy of language, such as the puzzle of informative identity statements. It is quite trivial to be told that Mark Twain is Mark Twain. However, for some people it can be informative and cognitively significant to learn that Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens. The notion of intentional content can be used to explain this. Cases such as this both motivate the distinction between intentional content and

intentional object and can be explained in terms of it. The notion of intentional content as distinct from intentional object is also important in relation to the issue of thought about and reference to non-existent objects. Examples of this include perceptual illusions, thought about fictional objects such as Hamlet or Lilliput, thought about impossible objects such as round-squares, and thought about scientific kinds that turn out not to exist such as phlogiston. Identifying intentional content as a distinct and meaningful element of the structure of intentionality makes it possible for Husserl to explain such cases of meaningful thought about the non-existent in a way similar to that of Gottlob Frege and different from the strategy of his fellow student of Brentano, Alexius Meinong. Meinong, on the other hand, was driven by his commitment to the thesis of intentionality to posit a special category of objects, the non-existing objects or objects that have Nichtsein, as the intentional objects of such thoughts Meinong For Husserl, such cases involve an intentional act and intentional content where the intentional content does present an intentional object, but there is no real object at all corresponding to the intentional appearance. However, throughout his work Husserl is able to make use of the distinction between intentional content and intentional object to handle cases of meaningful thought about the non-existent without having to posit, in Meinongian fashion, special categories of non-existent objects. For Husserl, the systematic analysis of these elements of intentionality lies at the heart of the theory of consciousness, as well as, in varying ways, of logic, language and epistemology. Husserl, notably in agreement with Frege, believed that this view had the undesirable consequences of treating the laws of logic as contingent rather than necessarily true and as being empirically discoverable rather than as known and validated a priori. For Husserl, pure logic is an a priori system of necessary truths governing entailment and explanatory relationships among propositions that does not in any way depend on the existence of human minds for its truth or validity. However, Husserl maintains that the task of developing a human understanding of pure logic requires investigations into the nature of meaning and language, and into the way in which conscious intentional thought is able to comprehend meanings and come to know logical and other truths. Thus the bulk of a work that is intended to lay the foundations for a theory of logic as a priori, necessary, and completely independent of the composition or activities of the mind is devoted precisely to systematic investigations into the way in which language, meaning, thought, and knowledge are intentionally structured by the mind. While this tension is more apparent than real, it was a major source of criticism directed against the first edition of Logical Investigations, one which Husserl was concerned to clarify and defend himself against in his subsequent writings and in the second edition of the Investigations in Intentionality in Logical Investigations In Logical Investigations Husserl developed a view according to which conscious acts are primarily intentional, and a mental act is intentional only in case it has an act-quality and an act-matter. Introducing this key distinction, Husserl writes: The one, however, judges one content and the other another content. Husserl views act-quality, act-matter and act-character as mutually dependent constituents of a concrete particular thought. Just as there cannot be color without saturation, brightness and hue, so for Husserl there cannot be an intentional act without quality, matter and character. The character of an act can be thought of as a contribution of the act-quality that is reflected in the act-matter. Act-character has to do with whether the content of the act, the act-matter, is posited as existing or as merely thought about and with whether the act-matter is taken as given with evidence fulfillment or without evidence emptily intended. The next two sub-sections deal with act-character and act-matter respectively. It seems clear that the character of an act is ultimately traceable to the act-quality, since it has to do with the way in which an act-matter is thought about rather than with what that act-matter itself presents. However, it is a contribution of the act-quality that casts a shadow or a halo around the matter, giving the content of the act a distinctive character. This becomes clearer through consideration of particular cases. Consider first positing and non-positing acts. When a subject wonders whether or not the train will be on time, the content or act-matter of her intention is that of the train being on time. Here what is at issue is the extent to which a subject has evidence of some sort for accepting the content of their intention. At this point the intention is an empty one because it merely contemplates a possible state of affairs for which there is no intuitive experiential evidence. When the same subject witnesses the sun set later in the day, her intention will either be fulfilled if the sunset matches what she thought it would be like or unfulfilled if the sun set does not match her earlier intention. Importantly, the distinctions between positing

and non-positing acts on the one hand and between empty and fulfilled intentions on the other are separate. Act-Matter As noted above, the matter of an intentional act is its content: For Husserl, the matter of an intentional act does not consist of only linguistic descriptive content. The notion of act-matter is simply that of the significant object-directed mode of an act, and can be perceptual, imaginative, or memorial, linguistic or non-linguistic, particular and indexical, or general, context-neutral and universal. This makes intentionality and intentional content act-matter the fundamental targets of analysis, with the theory of language and expression to be analyzed in terms of these notions rather than the other way around. Motivated by his anti-psychologism he wants to treat meanings as objective and independent of the minds of particular subjects. However, having done this Husserl also needs to explain how it is that these abstract meanings can play a role in the intentional thought of actual subjects. Whereas Fregean accounts deal with the fact that one individual can have the same thought at different times and different individuals can think about the same thing at any time by positing a single abstract sense that is the numerically identical content of all of their thoughts, Husserl views particular act-matters or contents as instances of ideal act-matter species. These include the distinction between linguistic types and tokens, the distinction between words and sentences and the meanings that these express, the distinction between sentence meaning and speaker meaning, the meaning and reference of proper names and the function of indexicals and demonstratives. As noted above, Husserl takes the intentionality of thought to be fundamental and the meaning-expressing and reference fixing capabilities of language to be parasitic on more basic features of intentionality. Meaning and Expression Husserl is interested in analyzing the meaning and reference of language as part of his project of developing a pure logic. This leads him to focus primarily on declarative sentences from ordinary language, rather than on other kinds of potentially meaningful signs such as the way in which smoke normally indicates or is a sign of fire and gestures such as the way in which a grimace might indicate or convey that someone feels pain or is uncomfortable. Husserl maintains that the meaning of an expression cannot be identical to the expression for two reasons. Husserl also maintains that the meaning of a linguistic expression cannot be identical with its referent or referents. In support of this Husserl appeals to phenomena such as informative identity statements and meaningful linguistic expressions that have no referent, among others. Thus Husserl, like Frege, distinguishes the meaning of a term or expression both from that term itself and from the object or objects to which the term refers. A subject who utters this expression to a companion is in an intentional state, which includes an act-matter or intentional content that presents the weather as being cool today. The subject performing the utterance does, in principle, three things for his interlocutor. Second, assuming the interlocutor grasps that this is what is being expressed, her attention will itself be directed to the referent of this ideal sense, namely the state of affairs involving the weather today her act-matter will then also instantiate the relevant ideal act-matter species. This last point is very important for Husserl. Such expressions have two facets of meaning. Husserl recognizes, however, that the sentences expressing these semantic functions cannot simply be substituted for indexicals without affecting the meaning of sentences containing them. This makes it necessary to identify a second facet or component of indexical content. Husserl thus has a relatively clear understanding of some of the key issues surrounding indexical thought and reference that have been recently discussed in the work of philosophers of language such as John Perry , , as well as an account of how indexical thought and reference works. In the Ideas, Husserl proposes the systematic description and analysis of first person consciousness, focusing on the intentionality of this consciousness, as the fundamental first step in both the theory of consciousness itself and, by extension, in all other areas of philosophy as well. With hints of the idea already present in the first edition of Logical Investigations, by Husserl has come to see first person consciousness as epistemologically and so logically prior to other forms of knowledge and inquiry. Whereas Descartes took his own conscious awareness to be epistemically basic and then immediately tried to infer, based on his knowledge of this awareness, the existence of a God, an external world, and other knowledge, Husserl takes first-person conscious awareness as epistemically basic and then proposes the systematic study of this consciousness itself as a fundamental philosophical task. In order to lay the foundations for this project Husserl proposes a methodology known as the phenomenological reduction. The idea behind this is that most people most of the time do not focus their attention on the structure of their experience itself but rather look

past this experience and focus their attention and interests on objects and events in the world, which they take to be unproblematically real or existent. The eidetic reduction involves not just describing the idiosyncratic features of how things appear to one, as might occur in introspective psychology, but focusing on the essential characteristics of the appearances and their structural relationships and correlations with one another. It involves focusing on a kind of object, such as a triangle, and systematically varying features of that object, reflecting at each step on whether the object being reflected upon remains, in spite of its altered feature s , an instance of the kind under consideration. Each time the object does survive imaginative feature alteration that feature is revealed as inessential, while each feature the removal of which results in the object intuitively ceasing to instantiate the kind such as addition of a fourth side to a triangle is revealed as a necessary feature of that kind. Husserl maintained that this procedure can incrementally reveal elements of the essence of a kind of thing, the ideal case being one in which intuition of the full essence of a kind occurs. The eidetic reduction compliments the phenomenological reduction insofar as it is directed specifically at the task of analyzing essential features of conscious experience and intentionality. The considerations leading to the initial positing of the distinction between intentional act, intentional object and intentional content would, according to Husserl, be examples of this method at work and of some of its results in the domain of the mental. Whereas the purpose of the phenomenological reduction is to disclose and thematize first person consciousness so that it can be described and analyzed, the purpose of the eidetic reduction is to focus phenomenological investigations more precisely on the essential or invariant features of conscious intentional experience. However, Husserl does both modify and expand his views about intentionality, as well as the kinds of analyses of it that he pursues. The sections that follow concentrate on the core ideas concerning intentionality and intentional content from the Ideas, leaving many of these other areas out of consideration. Husserl does not simply change his terminology, however. This change in terminology coincides with an apparent change in metaphysical understanding of the relationship between the noema as an ideal meaning and the particular mental activities of actual subjects, and also with a much more intense interest in analyzing the different elements of the noema, as well as understanding its relationships, both temporal and semantic, to other noemata. Metaphysically the main change is that Husserl seems to abandon the model of meanings as ideal species that get instantiated in the act-matters of particular subjects in favor of a more direct correlative relationship between the noesis intentional acts and the noemata their objects. In Ideas it is noemata themselves that are the objects of intentional thought, that are graspable and repeatable and that, according to Husserl, are not parts of the intentional acts of conscious subjects. While the difference between these two interpretations may seem rather small, they are actually quite different in terms of their metaphysical commitments and in terms of the particular issues of meaning, reference, and epistemology that they are able to resolve or be challenged by. For a general introduction and overview see the introduction to Smith and Smith and for more detailed discussion of some of the main differences see Dreyfus and Hall , Zahavi , Drummond

Chapter 2 : consumerism, Sigmund Freud, marketing, advertising, wish fulfilment, desires | janetthomas

One of his claims was that the objects of intentional states have a special type of existence, which he called 'intentional inexistence'. Whether he meant by that a special sort of existence 'in' the intentional, or that intentional objects do not exist, is debated.

An Encyclopedia , ed. Sarkar Routledge, forthcoming Intentionality Some things are about, or are directed on, or represent, other things. Many mental states and events also have "aboutness": Arguably some mental states and events are not about anything: Actions can also be about other things: This -- rather vaguely characterized -- phenomenon of "aboutness" is called intentionality. Something that is about directed on, represents something else is said to "have intentionality", or in the case of mental states is said to be an "intentional mental state". Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional or mental inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing , or immanent objectivity. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired, and so on. Brentano did not mean that mental states are about peculiar nonexistent objects, but was rather referring to the admittedly obscure sense in which the object of a mental state is "in" the mind. First, intentionality has nothing in particular to do with intending, or intentions. Intentions, for instance the intention to buy a cat, are just one of many types of intentional mental states. Second, intentionality intentionality-with-a-t must be sharply distinguished from intensionality intensionality-with-an-s Searle , ch. Mental states are not intensional, only sentences are. A sentence s is intensional, or is an "intensional context", just in case substitution of some expression a in s with some coreferring expression b yields a sentence with different truth value from the truth value of s. As the first example indicates, a sentence can be intensional and yet have nothing to do with intentionality. Paradoxes of intentionality As informally explained above, an intentional mental state for example is "about" something. The belief that Brentano is Austrian is about Brentano. The object that the state is about is called the intentional object of the state. Intentional objects are sometimes taken to include states of affairs as well as particulars like Brentanto: Thinking of intentionality in this way, as a relation to intentional objects, leads to three classic "paradoxes of intentionality" Thau , ch. The first paradox is that the intentional object need not exist at any time. The belief that the fountain of youth is in Florida bears the intentional relation to the fountain of youth, and the fountain of youth does not exist. But if a is related to b, then there is such a thing as a, and such a thing as b. On this view, there is a fountain of youth, and the belief that the fountain of youth is in Florida bears the intentional relation to that nonexistent object. The second paradox is that a mental state can bear the intentional relation to something, without there being any particular thing that the state bears the relation to. But if a is related to something, then there is a particular object that a is related to. The third paradox is that a mental state can bear the intentional relation to a, but not bear the intentional relation to b, even though a is b. The belief that the first Postmaster General was a United States president is about the first Postmaster General, but not about the inventor of bifocals, even though the inventor of bifocals is the first Postmaster General, namely Benjamin Franklin. In Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint Brentano himself did appear to think that a mental state was always related to an intentional object, but in a later appendix he insisted that the "only thing which is required by mental reference is the person thinking. The terminus of the so-called relation does not need to exist in reality at all" , The moral of the paradoxes of intentionality is that thinking of intentionality in terms of "the intentional relation" is a bad idea. A better way involves drawing a distinction between the representational content of a mental state or some other thing that has intentionality and the objects if any the mental state is about. So, for example, the belief that the fountain of youth is in Florida has as its content the proposition that the fountain of youth is in Florida, and there is no object that the belief is about -- at any rate, not the fountain of youth the belief is about Florida. To believe that the fountain of youth is in Florida is to stand in the belief-relation to the proposition that the fountain of youth is in Florida. This proposition exists whether or not the fountain of youth does it does not contain the fountain

of youth as a constituent , and this proposition is true just in case there is such a thing as the fountain of youth, and it is located in Florida. Similarly, the desire that one have a cat has as its content the proposition that one has a cat, and there is again nothing that the belief is about -- at any rate no particular cat. Finally, the belief that the first Postmaster General was a United States president and the belief that the inventor of bifocals was a United States President are both about the same object, namely Benjamin Franklin. However, there is some truth behind the original mistaken claim that the two beliefs are about different objects. This can be brought out by noting that the contents of the two beliefs are true at different possible worlds of course, the contents are both false at the actual world. Specifically, the first proposition, but not the second, is true at a possible world in which the first Postmaster General became President and the inventor of bifocals never entered politics. The truth of the first proposition at a world depends on the political fortunes of whoever is the first Postmaster General at that world -- whether or not that individual invented bifocals. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves. Although quite dubious as an interpretation of Brentano Moran , it started a debate that continues to this day. Chisholm himself argued for the irreducibility of intentionality by first transforming this thesis into one about the sort of language adequate for psychology. Chisholm did not conclude that the failure of reduction impugned the reality of intentional mental states, but Quine famously did: One may accept the Brentano thesis as either showing the indispensibility of intentional idioms and the importance of an autonomous science of intention, or as showing the baselessness of intentional idioms and the emptiness of a science of intention. Quine , Many philosophers are not so pessimistic, and there are many suggestions for providing a physicalistic or naturalistic reduction of intentionality. This is discussed in the following section. Fodor is a prominent example: When they do, the likes of spin, charm, and charge will perhaps appear on their list. If the semantic and the intentional are real properties of things, it must be in virtue of their identity with or maybe of their supervenience on? If aboutness is real, it must be really something else. Fodor , 97 There are many different approaches to providing the reduction of intentionality that Fodor says we need. Most adopt some kind of divide-and-conquer strategy. First, a distinction is made between original intentionality and derivative intentionality Haugeland ; see also Searle for a similar distinction between intrinsic and derived intentionality. A thing has derivative intentionality just in case the fact that it represents such-and-such can be explained in terms of the intentionality of something else; otherwise it has original intentionality. Often the intentionality of language and other sorts of conventional signs is said to be derivative. Language, on this view, inherits its intentionality from the intentionality of mental states, specifically from the intentions and conventions adopted by language users see Grice , Part I. This is an attractive and plausible claim, although it is not obvious, and has been denied see, for example, many of the essays in Davidson However, if it is correct, then the problem of reducing intentionality is itself reduced to the problem of reducing the intentionality of the mental. Theories that attempt to provide a physicalistic reduction of intentionality fall into three broad groups. The first group comprises causal covariational theories Stampe , Dretske , Stalnaker , Fodor The basic idea is that mental states represent in much the same way that tree rings represent. A simple example of a causal covariational theory is this: This formulation takes the notion of a belief state for granted; a physicalistically acceptable version of the theory would have to provide a further reduction of a belief state. The second group comprises teleological theories Papineau , Millikan , Dretske The basic idea is to explain the intentionality of mental states in terms of their biological functions, which might in turn be given a reductive account in terms of evolutionary history. A simple example is this: The third group comprises functional role theories. Here the basic idea is that a representation or symbol means what it does because of its "functional role" -- its causal interaction with other representations. A simple example for public language: If this is to be an account of thought rather than language, then there must be an appropriate range of neural representations -- perhaps words in a "language of thought". On "long-armed" functional role theories, functional roles are taken to include causal interactions with the environment Harman ; "short-armed" functional role theories exclude such causal interactions, and for that reason are often taken to be accounts of the so-called "narrow content" of mental states Block Two other notable approaches should be mentioned. Searle is an example of a

philosopher who holds that intentionality is irreducible, yet holds that sensations are not intentional. Neither does the converse implication hold: Tye and Dretske, whose views are explained below, think that intentionality is the mark of the mental, and that it can be given a physicalistic reduction. However, the sufficiency claim might be amended as follows: According to the revised sufficiency claim, the mental is the source of all intentionality. This revised claim still faces problems. And if it is original intentionality, the sufficiency claim is false. Again, the sufficiency claim is false if the intentionality of language does not derive from the intentionality of the mental. At any rate, some philosophers think that sensations are obviously non-intentional. Armstrong and has been revived today by a number of philosophers including Dreske , Lycan , and Tye And if this thesis is correct, then because perceptions have intentionality, bodily sensations are not counterexamples to the claim that intentionality is necessary for mentality. More problematic cases are provided by certain "objectless" emotions, like forms of anxiety or depression where one is hard put to say what one is anxious or depressed about Searle , ch. Dretske, Lycan, and Tye, among others, endorse this determination claim. Such an "intentional theory of qualia" is controversial, and has been widely discussed in the literature on consciousness. Bibliography A Materialist Theory of the Mind.

Chapter 3 : Linda L. McAlister (ed.), The Philosophy of Brentano - PhilPapers

The descriptive method of Franz BrentanoSpiegelberg, H. Intention and intentionality in the scholastics, Brentano and HusserlMarras, A. Scholastic roots of Brentano's conception of intentionalityChisholm, R. M. Intentional inexistenceMcAlister, L. L. Chisholm and Brentano on intentionalityChisholm, R. M. Brentano's theory of.

Biographical Chisholm was born in North Attleboro, Massachusetts in As an undergraduate, he studied philosophy at Brown University where he worked with a number of distinguished philosophers including C. He received his Ph. At Harvard, Chisholm worked mainly with C. Lewis and Donald C. Bertrand Russell and G. After serving in the Army primarily as a psychological tester and getting married, Chisholm was employed briefly as a lecturer at the Barnes Foundation in Pennsylvania. He then returned to Brown as an assistant professor. He remained at Brown for the rest of his long career aside from periods as visiting professor at Harvard, Graz, Princeton, Chicago, Massachusetts, Salzburg, and several other places. He was Editor of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research from until He was then Associate Editor until the time of his death. As a result of his dealings with Russell and Moore, Chisholm became aware of the work of Brentano and Meinong. His interest in these philosophers eventually led to correspondence with Austrian philosophers and visits to Graz. In Chisholm was awarded an honorary doctorate at Graz. His courses, both at the undergraduate level and at the graduate, were always packed with enthusiastic students and colleagues. In spite of his great distinction, he was modest and amusing in the classroom. He enjoyed engaging in animated critical discussion with students, and encouraged his students to present their questions and objections. In many cases these questions led to revisions of the doctrines Chisholm had presented. He was always pleased to receive good criticism, and showed enormous creativity in producing revisions in his attempts to overcome the problems. Chisholm directed about 59 doctoral dissertations, thus making him perhaps the third most prolific producer of philosophy PhDs in American history. Many of his students went on to have distinguished careers of their own. Chisholm published an extraordinary number of journal articles and reviews. A short discussion of some of the most important of these is included below in Section He also edited, co-edited, and translated several works of others. Among the most important of the books written by Chisholm are: Chisholm received a remarkable array of academic honors and awards. He presented important lectures at Oxford, London, Stanford, and elsewhere. A volume of the Library of Living Philosophers is devoted to his work. Chisholm Hahn [LLP]. Chisholm died in Providence, Rhode Island, in January of Philosophical Method Chisholm wrote and taught in a distinctive style that inspired his readers and students. His characteristic methodology was to begin his discussion of a philosophical issue by identifying a few key questions and citing pre-analytic data that an adequate theory should accommodate. He sought to develop a theory that would be adequate to the puzzles. He formulated his theories by first introducing a small number of primitive or unanalyzed terms and then constructing an often elaborate system of definitions and principles all built on these primitives. The final principles and definitions were intended to provide the basis for solutions to the puzzles with which he began. The clarity and elegance of the systems were remarkable, though in some cases critics worried that the primitive concepts were for one reason or another suspect. Chisholm encouraged readers and students to criticize his systems by proposing counterexamples and objections. They were eager to do so, and Chisholm took great joy in revising and improving upon his views in the light of their comments. Chisholm was well known for his penchant for formulating definitions and subsequently revising them in the light of counterexamples. The authors of the Philosophical Lexicon see Other Internet Resources took note of this and accordingly introduced a new technical term of their own: To make repeated small alterations in a definition or example. Epistemology I â€" Epistemic Terms, Principles, Foundationalism Chisholm is perhaps best known for his work in epistemology. Chisholm took it as a starting point for his epistemological theorizing that we do have knowledge of the external world. In addition, Chisholm accepted further anti-skeptical doctrines concerning knowledge by memory of the past, and a priori knowledge of some necessary truths. He did not assume that he could refute skepticism. Rather, he understood the central project of epistemology to be the project of showing in detail how it is possible for us to have quite a lot of the

knowledge that, in our reflective moments, we take ourselves to have. In adopting this stance, he seems to have been influenced by Moore as well as some of his teachers at Brown and Harvard. These serve to display the relation between directly evident foundational knowledge and indirectly evident beliefs about the external world, the past, and other matters about which we can have knowledge. In his doctoral dissertation, Chisholm made his earliest attempt to formulate a set of such principles. In the three editions of [TK] Chisholm presented even more carefully worked out sets of proposed epistemic principles. When he stated these principles, Chisholm made use of several terms of epistemic appraisal. He appreciated the importance of explaining precisely what each of these terms means. He also appreciated the importance of explaining precisely how they are related. In an effort to explain all this, Chisholm started with a single primitive epistemic concept â€" this is the concept of greater reasonability, which relates the holding of one propositional attitude toward some proposition with the holding some other propositional attitude toward some proposition. In his discussion of this concept, he pointed out that holding an attitude belief, denial, withholding in one proposition could be more reasonable for a certain subject than holding some attitude belief, denial, withholding in another proposition. And then, making use of this fundamental epistemic concept as well as the concepts of belief, refraining and negation , Chisholm defined the concepts of certainty, being evident, being beyond reasonable doubt, being acceptable, and so on. In [TK1] 22 , Chisholm proposed these definitions of some central terms of epistemic appraisal: Chisholm maintained that there are logical relations among these concepts. Thus, for example, he said that if something is evident, then it is at least reasonable. A key necessary condition for knowing a proposition, according to Chisholm, was that the proposition be evident. In some of his early works, Chisholm analyzed knowledge as evident true belief. In subsequent works he modified this in response to the Gettier problem. In that chapter, he presents a set of nine epistemic principles. These are states such as belief, hope, fear and other propositional attitudes, as well as phenomenal states of being appeared to in various ways, as well as states of intending or undertaking to do something. Principle A would play a central role in a proposed explanation of the possibility of a certain form of introspective knowledge. For example, it would figure in an explanation of how it is possible for a person to know that it now seems to him that he is seeing a doorknob. By itself, A has no implications for knowledge of the external world. Subsequent principles purport to explain further sorts of knowledge. B If S believes he perceives something to have a property F, then the proposition that he does perceive something to have F, as well as the proposition that something has F is reasonable for S. It implies merely that it is reasonable for S to believe this. Since reasonability is not a sufficiently strong epistemic condition for knowledge, this would not explain how knowledge of the external world is possible. But the next principle may seem to explain this. C If there is a sensible characteristic F such that S believes that he perceives something to have F, then it is evident to S that he is perceiving something to have F, and that there is something that has F. This would be a feature that is appropriate to one of the senses, or a common sensible. But even when so restricted, C seems to be a very strong principle, for it seems to imply that some of our beliefs about objects in the external world are evident â€" and this would be sufficient for knowledge according to the analysis of knowledge that Chisholm accepted at the time. However, on the next page Chisholm expresses some serious reservations about C. He mentions an analogy to statements of prima facie obligation. Such obligations can be overridden. These later remarks suggest that Chisholm had intended C to be understood as a principle of merely prima facie evidence. Apparently, then, the real principle is: This can be seen if we reflect on what would count as a counterexample to C. Consider a case in which a person knows perfectly well that he has just taken some hallucinogenic drugs. Suppose he knows the typical effects of these drugs. Suppose he has good reason to believe that there are no unicorns, but now he believes that he is perceiving something to be a unicorn. Principle C seems to imply that it is evident to him that there is a unicorn. The fact that the appearance occurs within this wider context defeats its prima facie epistemic status. Then come three principles about memory: D If S believes he remembers having perceived something to have F, then the proposition that he does remember having perceived something to have F, as well as the proposition that he did perceive that something had F, and the proposition that something was F, is acceptable for S. E If F is a sensible characteristic, and S believes he remembers having perceived something to have F, then the proposition that he does remember having perceived

something to have F, as well as the proposition that he did perceive that something had F, and the proposition that something was F, is reasonable for S. F If there is a self presenting state P such that S believes he remembers having been in P, then the proposition that he was in P, as well as the proposition that he was in P, is one that is reasonable for S. None of these principles would explain how we can have knowledge of the past, for none of these principles implies that beliefs about the past can rise to the status of being evident â€" and according to Chisholm a person can know a fact only if it is evident for him. These would include things that are confirmed by the evidence of our senses. As a step toward achieving this, he has a principle about such things. The principle makes use of the concept of the empirically acceptable. Those are empirically acceptable for S at t. Chisholm does not define confirmation, but assumes we understand it. G If h is confirmed by the set of all things empirically acceptable for S at t, then h is acceptable for S at t. This is still not enough for knowledge. Consider a set of propositions that are logically consistent and independent.

Chapter 4 : Intentionality (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. The puzzles of intentionality lie at the interface between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language.

Quinean double standard see below which is divided into: Roderick Chisholm , G. Anscombe , Peter Geach , and Charles Taylor all adhere to the former position, namely that intentional idiom is problematic and cannot be integrated with the natural sciences. Members of this category also maintain realism in regard to intentional objects, which may imply some kind of dualism though this is debatable. The latter position, which maintains the unity of intentionality with the natural sciences, is further divided into three standpoints: Eliminative materialism, supported by W. Proponents of the eliminative materialism, understand intentional idiom, such as "belief", "desire", and the like, to be replaceable either with behavioristic language e. Quine or with the language of neuroscience e. Holders of realism argue that there is a deeper fact of the matter to both translation and belief attribution. In other words, manuals for translating one language into another cannot be set up in different yet behaviorally identical ways and ontologically there are intentional objects. Famously, Fodor has attempted to ground such realist claims about intentionality in a language of thought. As Quine puts it, indeterminacy of radical translation is the thesis that "manuals for translating one language into another can be set up in divergent ways, all compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one another" Quine , Quine and Wilfrid Sellars both comment on this intermediary position. One such implication would be that there is, in principle, no deeper fact of the matter that could settle two interpretative strategies on what belief to attribute to a physical system. In other words, the behavior including speech dispositions of any physical system, in theory, could be interpreted by two different predictive strategies and both would be equally warranted in their belief attribution. This category can be seen to be a medial position between the realists and the eliminativists since it attempts to blend attributes of both into a theory of intentionality. Dennett, for example, argues in True Believers that intentional idiom or " folk psychology " is a predictive strategy and if such a strategy successfully and voluminously predicts the actions of a physical system, then that physical system can be said to have those beliefs attributed to it. Dennett calls this predictive strategy the intentional stance. They are further divided into two theses: However, exponents of this view are still further divided into those who make an Assumption of Rationality and those who adhere to the Principle of Charity. Dennett , , , Cherniak , , and the more recent work of Putnam recommend the Assumption of Rationality, which unsurprisingly assumes that the physical system in question is rational. Donald Davidson , , , and Lewis defend the Principle of Charity. The latter is advocated by Grandy and Stich , , , , who maintain that attributions of intentional idioms to any physical system e. Basic intentionality types according to Le Morvan[edit] Working on the intentionality of vision, belief, and knowledge, Pierre Le Morvan [18] has distinguished between three basic kinds of intentionality that he dubs "transparent", "translucent", and "opaque" respectively. The threefold distinction may be explained as follows. An intentional state is transparent if it satisfies the following two conditions: An intentional state is translucent if it satisfies i but not ii. An intentional state is opaque if it satisfies neither i nor ii. Mental states without intentionality[edit] The claim that all mental states are intentional is called intentionalism, the contrary being anti-intentionalism. Some anti-intentionalism, such as that of Ned Block , is based on the argument that phenomenal conscious experience or qualia is also a vital component of consciousness, and that it is not intentional. The latter claim is itself disputed by Michael Tye. Forman argues that some of the unusual states of consciousness typical of mystical experience are pure consciousness events in which awareness exists, but has no object, is not awareness "of" anything. Intentionality and self-consciousness[edit] Several authors have attempted to construct philosophical models describing how intentionality relates to the human capacity to be self-conscious. Cedric Evans contributed greatly to the discussion with his "The Subject of Self-Consciousness" in He centered his model on the idea that executive attention need not be propositional in form.

This paper recovers and pays homage to the arguments in support of the equality of the sexes developed by the Seventeenth Century Cartesian philosopher François Poullain de la Barre ().

Later on, other philosophers called this feature intentionality. Brentano starts by illustrating the kind of phenomena that he is interested in describing: According to Brentano, every mental phenomenon is either a presentation of something or is based upon some such presentation. By a presentation, Brentano means something the act of presenting something, like hearing a sound or seeing a color. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. Still, this is compatible with the claim that only mental phenomena exhibit intentionality, even if not all do. This can still allow us to say that what is distinctive of the class of mental phenomena is that they are directed towards something, or that they have intentionality. We will examine an attempt by Roderick Chisholm to sharpen the notion, and see how far it can get us. Above we said that intentional inexistence was a kind of directedness. Chisholm identifies one of the main features of intentional inexistence as follows: For instance, think about an attitude like believing that the music festival in Brooklyn next week will be awesome, or wanting to ride a unicorn. Compare the sentences used to describe attitudes with the following: If the first sentence is true, it entails that there are tacks, and if the second is true, it entails that there are soccer balls. The kind of sentences that we use to describe attitudes and the sentences that describe other kinds of facts are syntactically the same. The first one seems to describe a relation between me and the nicest unicorn, and the second one seems to describe a relation between me and a tack. The difference between the two is that in order for the first one to be true, the object of the relation need not exist, but in the other one it must. Chisholm refines this notion by describing three features that characterize intensional sentences: Some of our uses of perception-expressions are intentnional in the sense above. Chisholm considers and dismisses one such translation: A man believes that there are unicorns if he is disposed to utter sentences containing words that designate or refer to unicorns. One way to try to define intensions is this: Let us now suppose that we define ascription thus: Would it help if we assume that Anna is usually right when she takes something to be a dog? There is no obvious way to fix the notion of intention appropriately. How should we define this signifying relation? Many people have appealed to substitute stimulus. According to such definitions, the sign is described as a substitute for the referent: V is a sign of R for a subject S if and only if V affects S in a manner similar to that in which R would have affected S. S expects E to occur means that S is in a bodily state b such that either i b would be fulfilled if and only if E were to occur or ii b would be disrupted if and only if E were not to occur. But even this may be seen to fail, unless we use intentional terms. What if someone meets his aunt and takes her to be someone else? All contents by martin.

called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (by which you should not take me to mean a thing), or immanent objectivity.

Retrieved November 10, , from https: Literally, this means a tension or stretching, but it is used by scholastic philosophers of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries as a technical term for a concept. This technical term was a translation of two Arabic terms: Medieval logicians followed al-Farabi in distinguishing between first and second intentions. First intentions are concepts which concern things outside the mind, ordinary objects and features of objects. Second intentions are concepts which concern other intentions. Some of these philosophers developed detailed theories about how intentions were connected to the things they concerned â€" what we would now call theories of intentionality. According to Aristotle , in thought and perception the mind takes on the form of the thing perceived, without receiving its matter. When I think about a horse, the form of horse exists in my mind. But the form has a different kind of existence in my mind than it does in a real horse. In a real horse, the form of horse has esse naturale or existence in nature; but in my thought of a horse, the form of horse has esse intentionale or intentional existence see Anscombe and Geach ; Kenny These scholastic terms largely disappeared from use during the Renaissance and the modern period. Empiricist and rationalist philosophers were of course concerned with the nature of thought and how it relates to its objects, but their discussions were not cast in the terminology of intentionality. The terminology was revived in by Franz Brentano, in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. In a well-known passage, Brentano claimed that: Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the Middle Ages referred to as the intentional and also mental inexistence of the object, and what we, although with not quite unambiguous expressions, would call relation to a content, direction upon an object which is not here to be understood as a reality or immanent objectivity. And second, intentional inexistence does not itself mean that the objects of thought need not exist â€" although as we shall see, this is a relatively uncontroversial feature of intentionality. What inexistence means is rather that one thing â€" the object of thought â€" exists in another, as the object of the mental state itself see Bell , ch. So noemata are not the objects on which intentional states are directed, but it is in virtue of being related to a noema that any intentional state is directed on an object at all. This intentional inexistence is exclusively characteristic of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon manifests anything similar. Consequently, we can define mental phenomena by saying that they are such phenomena as include an object intentionally within themselves. Phenomena are what are given to the mind, and Brentano does not believe that physical objects are given to the mind see Brentano [] The distinction he is making is among the data of consciousness, not among entities in the world: In chapter 11 of Perceiving , Chisholm argued against the behaviourism that was popular at the time by showing that it is not possible to give a behaviouristic account of, for example, belief, since in order to say how belief leads to behaviour one has to mention other intentional states such as desires whose connections with behaviour must themselves be specified in terms of belief and other intentional states see Behaviourism, analytic. This suggests that we should postulate an irreducible category of intentional mental entities: However, the argument can be taken in another way, as W. Work on intentionality in the analytic tradition in the s and s has attempted to resolve this dilemma. For example, Fodor , Dretske and others have attempted to reconcile physicalism with the existence of intentionality by explaining it in non-intentional terms.

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Cf. Roderick M. Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study (), especially chapter 11 "Intentional Inexistence", There Chisholm writes that: "We may say that in our language, the expressions 'looks for', 'expects', 'believes' occur in sentences which are intentional or are used intentionally, whereas 'sits in.

Intentionality is that feature of many mental states by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world. So, for example, if I have a belief, it must be a belief that such and such is the case. If I have a desire, it must be the desire that such and such should be the case. If I have an intention, it must be the intention that I do something. Intentionality is a technical term not to be confused with the ordinary English words intend and intentional. Intending in the sense of intending to do something is just one kind of intentionality, along with hunger, thirst, belief, desire, fear, hope, pride, shame, love, hate, perception, memory, and so on. Intentionality and Its History The concept of "intentionality" in this modern sense was reintroduced into philosophy by Franz Brentano , who took the notion from the medieval scholastics. Brentano thought that intentionality was "the mark of the mental," and because he thought that intentionality could not be reduced to anything physical, dualism seemed to follow; a world of intentional phenomena, the mind, is distinct from the world of physical phenomena. Edmund Husserl , a student of Brentano and the inventor of phenomenology, made the investigation of intentionality his main philosophical project. In Anglo-American philosophy, the topic of intentionality was introduced in large part by Roderick Chisholm Chisholm was influenced by Brentano and attempted to produce a linguistic criterion of intentionality. In addition to his writings on the subject, he edited a collection of works by Brentano, Husserl, and others Chisholm, and conducted a lengthy published correspondence on the topic with Wilfrid Sellars Chisholm and Sellars, Two Mistaken Theories of Intentionality In his early work, Brentano thought that every intentional state must have an intentional object. If, for example, I believe that the mail carrier arrives at 11 a. But what is the intentional object when a child believes that Santa Claus comes on Christmas Eve? Brentano thought that to provide an intentional object in such cases, we have to postulate it inside the intentional state itself. Brentano called this mode of existence "intentional inexistence. The statement, "Santa Claus comes on Christmas Eve" has a meaning but does not thereby succeed in referring to Santa Claus because there is no such thing to refer to; and likewise the belief that Santa Claus comes on Christmas Eve has an intentional content but does not have an intentional object. Brentano was confusing intentional content with intentional object. By definition every intentional state has an intentional content but not every intentional state has an intentional object. An intentional state has an intentional object only if something fits or satisfies the intentional content. A second error is to suppose that there is some essential connection between intentionality with a "t" and intensionality with an "s. Thus, if a equals b, and a has property F, then b has property F. But for some sentences about intentional states, this law does not hold. Sam believes that Caesar crossed the Rubicon; and 2. The sentence about the intentional state is intensional with an "s" but it does not follow from this that the state itself is intensional with an "s. But the effort failed. There are intensional sentences that do not report intentionality and reports of intentionality that are not intensional. For example, 4 is intensional but not about intentionality: Necessarily, 9 is greater than 7; 5. The number of planets equals 9. But it does not follow that: Necessarily the number of planets is greater than 7. Sentence 7 is about intentionality but is not intensional. Sam saw the Eiffel Tower ; and 8. The Eiffel Tower is the tallest iron structure in Paris. Sam saw the tallest iron structure in Paris; even if Sam does not know the truth of 8. If intensionality is not a sure test for intentionality, what then is the relation between them? The report is a representation of a representation. The Relation of Intentionality to Consciousness Every intentional state is mental, but not every conscious mental state is intentional. For example, one may have feelings of anxiety that do not have any intentional content. One is not anxious about any particular thing; one just has a general undirected feeling of anxiety. Such a state is conscious and therefore mental without being intentional. If Brentano was wrong that intentionality is the mark of the mental, this leads to the larger question: What exactly is the relation between intentionality and consciousness? The answer is that there is a very heavy overlap but the two are not coextensive. At any given point in my life,

many of my intentional states are unconscious. For example, I can believe that in George W. Bush was president even when I am not thinking about it or when I am asleep. And many of my conscious states are not intentional, as, for example, the undirected anxiety that I mentioned above. There does, however, seem to be a close connection between intentionality and consciousness in the following respect: Whenever someone has an intentional state that is unconscious, as when one is sound asleep, we understand it as that particular intentional state only in virtue of the fact that it is the kind of thing that can become conscious. A person might be unable to bring intentionality to consciousness because of being asleep or because of brain damage or repression, for example; but our understanding of an intentional state as a mental state is dependent on our being able to conceive of that state as occurring in consciousness. The Irreducibility of Intentionality For philosophers who reject dualism, intentionality, like consciousness, has always been an embarrassment. How is it possible in a purely physical world, in a world composed of physical particles in fields of force, that there could be such a thing as mental aboutness or directedness? Many philosophers think it is impossible, and they have made various efforts to reduce intentionality to some materialist basis or to eliminate it altogether. Hence in the behaviorist period in the philosophy of mind, many philosophers e. Later on, functionalist theories of mind e. A more recent variation on functionalism is to try to identify intentional states with computational states. The idea of computationalism is that the brain is a digital computer and the intentional states are just states of the computer program Crane, All of these efforts fail because they try to reduce intentionality to something else. But it is not something else. I believe the way to avoid dualism while recognizing the reality and irreducibility of intentionality is to recognize that intentionality is a biological phenomenon like growth or photo-synthesis or digestion. If we ask the question in the abstract: How can an animal have a belief about some distant object? How is it possible for an animal to see anything or to feel hungry or thirsty or frightened? We can build more sophisticated forms of intentionality, such as belief and desire and imagination, on the more biological basic forms such as perception and intentional action. The Structure of Intentionality Four concepts are essential for understanding the structure and functioning of intentionality Searle, First, the distinction between intentional content and psychological mode; second, the notion of direction of fit; third, the notions of conditions of satisfaction; and fourth, the holistic network of intentionality. The distinction between intentional content and psychological mode. Every intentional state consists of an intentional content in a certain psychological mode. You can see this clearly by keeping intentional content constant while varying the mode. Thus, I can believe that you will leave the room, wish that you will leave the room, and wonder whether you will leave the room. In each case the state consists of a propositional content, which we will represent by the variable p, in a certain psychological mode, which we will represent with an M. The structure, then, of these intentional states is M p. Because the contents of these intentional states are entire propositions, they are sometimes called, following Bertrand Russell, "propositional attitudes. Here the intentionality is directed at an object, but it does not have a whole propositional content. Its form is not M p but M n. The propositional content of the intentional state will relate to reality in different ways depending on the mode in which that content is presented. Thus beliefs, like statements, are supposed to be true, and they are true in virtue of the fact that they accurately represent some state of affairs in the world. They have what we can call the mind-to-world direction of fit, or responsibility of fitting. Desires and intentions, on the other hand, are not designed to represent how things are in fact but how we would like them to be or how we intend to make them be. Such intentional states have the world-to-mind direction of fit or the world-to-mind responsibility for fitting. Some intentional states take the preexisting fit for granted. Thus, for example, if I am sorry that I offended you or I am glad for your good fortune, in each case I take for granted the truth of the proposition that I offended you or that you have had good fortune, and I have an attitude about the state of affairs represented. Where the intentional state does have a direction of fit, such as belief, desire, perception, or intention, we can say that the intentional state is a representation of its conditions of satisfaction. Just as the belief will be satisfied if and only if it is true, so the desire will be satisfied if and only if it is fulfilled, and the intention will be satisfied if and only if it is carried out. The network of intentionality. Intentional states do not come to us in isolated atoms but as part of a holistic network of intentionality. This is perhaps most obvious in the case of the emotions. In order, for example, that someone be angry at another person, he or she must have

a set of beliefs and desires. He or she will typically believe the other person has done some harm, will desire that the harm had not been done, will desire to harm, or express disapproval of the person at whom he or she is angry, and so on. Intentional states do not come to us individually and do not function in an atomistic form, but rather one has one intentional state only in relation to other intentional states. This holistic network is essential even for the functioning of simple beliefs. So, for example, one can believe that in George W. Bush was president of the United States only if one has a rather large number of other beliefs. One must believe at least a certain number of things such as that the United States is a republic, that it elects presidents, that its president serves for a certain number of years, that presidents have certain powers and responsibilities, and so on. One way to describe this feature is to say that any intentional state functions, it determines its conditions of satisfaction, only in relation to a network of other intentional states. Most philosophers today accept some form of holism as opposed to atomism.

Intentionality is a philosophical concept and is defined by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as "the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs".

References and Further Reading 1. The Intentional Relation If I am thinking about horses, what is it about my thought that makes it about horses and not, say, sheep? That is, in what relation do intentional states stand to their objects? Formal Theories of Intentionality One answer to the question is that mental states refer to the things they do because of the intrinsic features of those mental states. All horses, for example, although individually made of different material, have something in common â€" and this is their form. Plato held that when we think about an object, we have the form of the object in our mind, so that our thought literally shares the form of the object. Aristotle further developed this theory, arguing that in perception sensu the form of an object perceived is transmitted from the object to the mind of the perceiver. Although images or shapes may play a role in thought, it is generally accepted that they cannot provide a complete account of intentionality. The relation between an image and its object is a relation of resemblance. But this presents a difficulty that was first raised against the formal theory by Ockham in the Middle Ages King, The problem is that the relation of resemblance is ambiguous in a way that the intentional relation cannot be. An image of a man walking up a hill also resembles a man walking backwards down a hill Wittgenstein, , whereas a thought about a man walking up a hill is not also a thought about a man walking backwards down a hill. Similarly, while an image of Mahatma Gandhi resembles Mahatma Gandhi, it also resembles everyone who resembles Mahatma Gandhi Goodman, Thoughts about Mahatma Gandhi on the other hand, are not thoughts about anyone who looks like Mahatma Gandhi. An alternative formal model that seems to avoid this problem appeals to descriptions Frege , Russell This view holds that if I am thinking about something, then I must have in mind a description that uniquely identifies that thing. Descriptions seem to avoid the problem of ambiguity faced by images. In addition to answering the question why an intentional state refers to one object and not another, the formal approach is also helpful in explaining how thinkers understand what it is they are thinking about. One thing that we seem to be able to do when we have mental states that are directed at particular things objects is to reflect upon different aspects of those objects, reason about them, describe them, and even make reliable predictions about them. For example, if I understand what horses are, and what sheep are, I ought to be in a position to tell you about their differences, and perhaps make good predictions about their behavior. If intentional states are conformal with their objects, we have some explanation for how such understanding is possible, since the form of the object the intentional state is directed at should be available to me if I reflect upon my own thoughts. And we have another reason still for expecting that thoughts have a formal component. Frege observed that we can have multiple thoughts about the same thing, without realizing that we are thinking of the same thing in each case. The Ancient Greeks believed that Hesperus and Phosphorus two Greek names for Venus were two different stars in the sky, one of which appeared in the morning, while the other appeared in the evening. As a result they believed that Hesperus rises in the evening while simultaneously believing that Phosphorus does not. Of course Hesperus and Phosphorus, as it turns out, are the same object â€" the planet Venus, which rises both in the morning and in the evening. And so the Ancient Greeks had two contradictory beliefs about Venus, without realizing that both beliefs were about the same thing. The upshot is that it is possible for us to have distinct concepts that pick out the same thing without our knowing. Frege proposed as an explanation that our concepts must vary in more ways than in what they refer to. Supposing that the intentional relation is one of conformality, then, allows us to explain i why a thought refers to what it does, ii how we can have introspective knowledge of the things we think about, and iii how two or more of our concepts could pick out the same thing without our knowing. But there are problems facing the formal approach, which have lead many to look for alternatives. Problems for Forms, and the Causal Alternative The formal theory of intentionality faces two major objections. Putnam articulated this objection using a now famous thought-experiment. Suppose that you are thinking of water. If the descriptive theory is right, for example, you must have at your disposal a description that uniquely distinguishes water from all

other things. But suppose, suggests Putnam, that there is another planet far away from here, which looks to its inhabitants just like Earth looks to us. The second difficulty for the formal accounts, specifically directed at the descriptive account, is that descriptions do not identify the essential nature of the things they pick out, whereas many words and concepts do Searle , Kripke But it is perfectly coherent to suppose that Hesperus could have existed without having been visible in the evening. It could have drifted into a different orbital pattern, or have been occluded by a belt of asteroids, and therefore never have been visible in the evening. This description does not, therefore, capture an essential feature of Hesperus. That this is an important difference can be seen when we realize that concepts and descriptions seem to behave differently in thoughts about counterfactual possibilitiesâ€"or, alternative ways the world could have turned out. So now we have a further reason for thinking that concepts are not cognitively equivalent to descriptionsâ€"since they behave differently in thoughts about counterfactual possibility. On this alternative model, our concepts do not have intrinsic formal features that determine what they refer to. Rather, a concept picks out the thing that originally caused it to occur in the mind of a thinker, or the thing it is causally related to in the mind-independent world. On this view, if I have a concept that picks out horses, this concept must have initially been caused to occur in me by a physical encounter with horses. If I have a concept that picks out water, the concept must have been caused to occur in me by a causal interaction with water. And if I have a concept that picks out Hesperus, this concept must have a causal origin in my apprehension of Hesperus, perhaps by seeing it in the sky. We can see how the causal theory can be used to address the two major objections to the formal theory. Similarly, I can causally interact with water, or tomatoes, even if I have false beliefs about these things, so the causal model allows that the descriptions I might offer of the things I think about can be false. The causal model therefore seems to handle the problem of ignorance and error. However, the causal model has trouble explaining some of the things the formal model was designed to explain see last paragraph of Section 1a above. Firstly, the causal model has trouble explaining ii , how we can reflect on the objects of our thoughts, and say something about them. If concepts have no formal component that somehow describes their objects this becomes mysterious. The causal model also fails to explain iii , how we can have multiple thoughts about the same thing without realizing. While formal models can explain this by holding that different concepts can be cognitively equivalent to different descriptions of the same thing, the causal model has trouble explaining this. Since the thoughts of an Ancient Greek about hesperus, and the thoughts of an Ancient Greek about phosphorus have a causal origin in the same object, namely Venus, the causal relation that stands between these concepts and their object is identical in each case; as a result, there ought to be no difference between the concepts on the causal model. The formal and causal models therefore each provide good explanations for one set of phenomena, but run into trouble in explaining another. On this approach, although it is necessary to know what environment a thinker is causally connected to in order to know what her thoughts refer to, this need not rule out that her concepts also have a formal component. The trick is to find a formal component that does not run into the problems raised by the causal theorist. To deal with the problem of error, for example, it has been proposed that the formal component of a concept might be a description of the appearance of the object the concept refers to Searle Although I can be wrong that the things my tomato concept picks out are vegetables, it would seem that I cannot be mistaken that they are apparently red shiny edible objectsâ€"since I cannot be wrong about how the world appears to me. To deal with the problem of ignorance, where my descriptive knowledge fails to uniquely determine which thing I am thinking of, it has been proposed to write the causal origin of my experience into the formal component. This description, it would seem, does indeed distinguish water from Twin-Earth water, since only water is the causal source of my experiences because I am on Earth, not Twin-Earth. Such content, it is hoped, can account for the phenomena formal models explain without running into the difficulties faced by earlier formal accounts. Whether these modifications really succeed in handling the problems raised by the causal theorist is, however, a topic of ongoing controversy see Soames , and Recanati for recent defenses of the causal approach; see Chalmers for a defense of the two-dimensional approach, and an advanced overview of the debate. Intentional Objects Having seen some of the layout of the debate about what determines the object of any intentional state, we can now consider issues that arise when we consider the objects themselves. Do they all have something in common that makes them

appropriate as objects of intentional states? Might there be non-existent intentional objects? Do our thoughts connect directly with these objects or only indirectly, via our senses? Intentional Inexistence Franz Brentano has been mentioned already in this article, in part because his work set the tone for much of the debate over intentionality in the 20th century. This idea had a particularly strong influence on the work of Edmund Husserl, who founded a branch of philosophy of mind known as phenomenology, which he conceived of as the study of experience. Husserl emphasizes that the objects of thought have a particular character insofar as they are objects of thought. Visual illusions present a good example of this. If we are presented with an object that appears to be a cube sitting on a flat surface, we will approach the object with certain expectations, for example that if we turn our heads to one side we will see the side of the cube now out of view, if we grab a hold of it our grasp will be resisted, and so on. If the object turns out to be an image painted in such a way that it only appears as a cube from a certain angle, when we discover this by trying to pick it up, for example, the idea we are working with of the object will disintegrate. The idea that the nature of our minds imposes constraints on the way we experience the world is in fact a claim that is increasingly widely accepted, and phenomenology has become an area of particular interest for the emerging field of cognitive science see for example Varela, Thompson and Rosch But deep puzzles arise when we consider what it means to say something about a non-existent object. Can we, for example, coherently state that Santa Claus has flying reindeer? If he does not exist, how can it be true that he has flying reindeer? Can we indeed even coherently state that Santa Claus does not exist? If he does, our statement is false. Another way of putting the puzzle involves definite descriptions. It seems reasonable to say the following: Russell proposed a famous solution to this puzzle. It involves first analyzing definite descriptions to show how we can use these to express claims about things that do not exist, and second to show that most terms that we use to make negative existential claims are actually definite descriptions in disguise. And rather than being meaningless, the claim that such a thing does not exist is true, if no unique thing exists that is both a king and a fairy: And that seems to be perfectly coherent. Are there any terms, in language or thought, on this account, that are not descriptions? These terms are only meaningful if in fact there are objects in the world to which they refer. Since the descriptions that can pick out non-existent objects are composed of terms that are only meaningful if they refer to existing things, the objects of at least singular terms must exist for the view to make any sense. Direct versus Indirect Intentionality Even supposing that many objects of thought do exist, a further question arises as to whether the objects that we encounter in experience are products of our minds, or mind-independent objects. The view that the objects of experience are mind-dependent can be motivated by two complementary considerations. A color-blind person and a person with perfect color vision might have visually very different experiences in the same environment. When I look at an oasis in the desert, I have a visual experience that might seem to be identical to the experience I have when faced with a mirage, even though these two environments are very different. According to the sense-data theorist, what we immediately experience are not mind-independent objects, but sense-data that are produced at least partly by our minds. This allows us to explain the two puzzles considered above. If what we encounter in experience are sense data and not mind-independent objects, then two people could have very different experiences in the same mind-independent environment, and correlatively, one person could have two indistinguishable experiences in two very different mind-independent environments. Note that these sense-data may correspond very closely to the way things stand in the mind-independent world around us, so the view need not imply that our interactions with the world should be dysfunctional. When we say of the ketchup before us that it is red, are we saying this about the ketchup, or about the sense-data that we experience as a result of looking at the ketchup?

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During the Industrial Revolution manufacturers produced more goods than were needed and people had to be persuaded to become consumers to absorb them. The studies of Sigmund Freud were used to develop methods of manipulative persuasion by the advertising industry so that they could foster the growth of these consumers. Because advertising is so reliant on images and words, the study of semiotics was also used to help trigger emotional responses in consumers. The consumer is told that through buying commodities, they will be able to satisfy their desires. The prevalence of advertising in modern societies has made it necessary to become a skilled reader of advertisements and to know what devices are used. Advertising and the consumer culture has become that power. The consumer society emerged from the surplus of goods manufactured during the Industrial Revolution. With the advent of machines, goods could be manufactured more than one item at a time. Mass advertising was used to appeal to the growth of these potential markets Jawitz ,W. The economies of modern societies came to be dominated by large scale commerce Deborg, G. Once manufacturers had convinced people to buy products or commodities that they did not need, consumer culture had begun in earnest. During the early twentieth century Euro-American societies changed from the values of work and civic responsibility to that of leisure and self-fulfilment. The increased acquisition of goods was considered to make life better rather than an emphasis on saving. Feelings of inadequacy were enforced to make the intended consumer feel in need of improvement from the various commodities put forward. Advertising used staged imagery rather than reality to reinforce these feelings and so gave form to changing social desires Jawitz, W. Before the nineteenth century most advertising was merely informative. It consisted of price lists, signs on walls, printed announcements, and even the calls of the town crier. Supply and demand were in balance and there was no need to produce new products. People bought what they needed and needed what they bought. There was limited competition among merchants Jawitz, W. The late nineteenth century saw the emergence of the commodity culture in which the distinctions between objects and images eroded. The huge growth in advertising showed how persuasion works when used by manufacturers. The advertising industry needed to know how people think and react and what motivates them. Therefore, they turned to the study of psychoanalysis for help. Sigmund Freud was an Austrian neurologist who was the founder of the theories of psychoanalysis. Freud said that the human ego is at the beck and call of three masters: Human mental life, Freud states, is the conflict between those contending authorities Derbyshire, J. The real source of human motivation is our unconscious desires and needs. Before the use of psychoanalysis advertisers assumed that a product was bought because it was best among its competitors or cost less. Whereas demographics are the statistical study of a large group of people, psychographics gives a more specific profile of the target audience. Advertisers use this information to create the language and images people in modern societies receive everyday. Advertising is full of symbolic images and unconscious associations. Direct messages are avoided because this may contradict what the potential consumer already believes. A hidden message is given by means of a device, the signifier or word, and the signified or object Inglis, F. The study of semiotics sets out to describe how culture and language work together to produce meaning systematically. All meaning producing activities are gathered under the one conceptual framework: A sign can be a sound- any physical form which refers to something else. The practices of advertising provide a clear demonstration of the processes of signification by deploying a signifier and attaching it to a mental concept they wish to put with their product. This provides the product with that meaning Inglis, F. An example of this is an ad for health insurance found in a newspaper. The image has nothing to do with what the reader would normally associate with health insurance, hospitals, doctors, nurses, ambulances etcâ€¦ However the appeal of this advertisement is in the picture which suggests love, beautiful people, freedom, the beauty of nature, and even a certain naturalness and youth. The emotional appeal of the advertisement is that, by having this health insurance, the reader will

somehow be associated with the feeling the picture suggests. Another type of appeal is the celebrity. In this advertisement a bank is selling the image of a winning racing car driver. Advertisers pay enormous amounts of money to famous people to endorse their products. They select according to the feeling the person communicates- a feeling the advertiser wants associated with the product; in this case, winning. Nearly every advertisement attempts to give the impression that the product advertised will make the person more successful, popular, powerful, safer etcâ€¦ Although this is obviously untrue, the advertiser tries to say that the user will feel loved or popular or whatever if they use the product. Ads have always appealed to emotions, but researchers find that even practical, everyday products are purchased more on emotion than practical qualities Jawitz, W. Advertisements increasingly speak to problems of anxiety and identity crisis, and offer harmony, vitality, and the prospect of self-realisation. Today, consumption is looked at as both a form of leisure and pleasure and as a form of therapy. It is commonly understood that commodities fulfil emotional needs. The paradox is that those needs are never truly fulfilled as the market lures people into wanting different and more commodities- the newest, the latest, and the best. To policy-makers, people are consumers, voters, producers or unemployed, taxpayers, clients, crowds, and not much else. We are rarely citizens, users, actors, participants, democrats. To cast a society as consumers is to see its members as creatures to be fed, housed and kept quiet. It shows contempt and arrogance by the powerful to set up the politics of bribery whereby consumers are bribed with extra fat helpings of consumer goods often enough to ensure the docile stability of their vote Inglis, F. It serves to give people a sense of place in the world, homogenised as it may be, in part through their purchase and use of commodities which seem to give meaning to their lives in the absence of meaning derived from a close-knit community. But when we buy a commodity that has meaning attached to it, we are buying not to satisfy need but to satisfy desire. This is why people continue to buy, because desire can never be satisfied. By the time we are sixty years of age we would have seen over 50 million advertising messages Jawitz, W. Most of these will be ignored, some will help, but others will mislead. Advertising can help to discover new products or show where to buy goods at the lowest price. However, it can also mislead by convincing people to buy what we do not want or thinking a particular brand is better than what it is. To be able to counteract these persuasions, we need to be skilled readers of advertisements. People must learn to determine facts and then recognise how an advertisement tries to make the product appealing. This may seem simple but advertising agencies spend millions to make the job difficult. Almost every advertisement makes what is called a product claim. This is simply what the advertisement says about the product. There are two basic kinds of claims- one provides useful information for making a purchase decision and the other tells little or nothing factual Jawitz, W. Once advertisements have been evaluated so that they do not mislead there is a second important skill needed to deal with advertising. People need to understand how advertisements appeal to them through involving their feelings, wishes and dreams. Advertisements attempt to make products look luxurious, sexy, sophisticated, modern, happy, patriotic, or any of dozens of other so-called desirable qualities. Many advertisements appeal to feelings and emotions. Most advertisements have both a reasonable-sounding claim and an appeal to feelings. The careful consumer should be able to see in any ad not only what claim is being made but also what emotional appeal is being used. Different types of appeal are in different advertisements, although some use a combination of appeals. In looking for the emotional appeal, always notice the setting in which the product is placed. Placing a car by a mansion with a chauffeur and people in expensive-looking clothes says that this is a car for wealthy people. In Sigmund Freud published a short essay extolling the virtues of renouncing pleasure and desire in the name of something greater. It is argued by the writer Edmundsen Derbyshire J. Freud recognized that charismatic leaders such as Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini etc.. Such a promise is illusory but is no less powerful or alluring. The consumer frenzy spoken of by environmentalist George Monbiot Monbiot, G. It needs to be controlled and the best way of controlling it is by understanding how it works. Black and Red Sturken, M.