

Chapter 1 : Holdings : Claiming knowledge : | York University Libraries

∅ An example of a claim about knowledge is: "The knowledge that hydrogen is the lightest chemical element is quite secure because the methods of chemistry give us a fairly good model of what chemical elements look like."

According to this analysis, justified, true belief is necessary and sufficient for knowledge. The Tripartite Analysis of Knowledge: S knows that p iff p is true; S believes that p; S is justified in believing that p. Much of the twentieth-century literature on the analysis of knowledge took the JTB analysis as its starting-point. It became something of a convenient fiction to suppose that this analysis was widely accepted throughout much of the history of philosophy. In fact, however, the JTB analysis was first articulated in the twentieth century by its attackers. Consequently, nobody knows that Hillary Clinton won the election. One can only know things that are true. Many people expected Clinton to win the election. Not all truths are established truths. If you flip a coin and never check how it landed, it may be true that it landed heads, even if nobody has any way to tell. Truth is a metaphysical, as opposed to epistemological, notion: Knowledge is a kind of relationship with the truth—“to know something is to have a certain kind of access to a fact. The general idea behind the belief condition is that you can only know what you believe. Failing to believe something precludes knowing it. Outright belief is stronger see, e. Suppose Walter comes home after work to find out that his house has burned down. Critics of the belief condition might argue that Walter knows that his house has burned down he sees that it has , but, as his words indicate, he does not believe it. A more serious counterexample has been suggested by Colin Radford Suppose Albert is quizzed on English history. One of the questions is: E Elizabeth died in Radford makes the following two claims about this example: Albert does not believe E. The fact that he answers most of the questions correctly indicates that he has actually learned, and never forgotten, such historical facts. Since he takes a and b to be true, Radford holds that belief is not necessary for knowledge. But either of a and b might be resisted. David Rose and Jonathan Schaffer take this route. The justification condition is the topic of the next section. Why not say that knowledge is true belief? The standard answer is that to identify knowledge with true belief would be implausible because a belief might be true even though it is formed improperly. Suppose that William flips a coin, and confidently believes—“on no particular basis—“that it will land tails. For William to know, his belief must in some epistemic sense be proper or appropriate: For example, if a lawyer employs sophistry to induce a jury into a belief that happens to be true, this belief is insufficiently well-grounded to constitute knowledge. Internalists about justification think that whether a belief is justified depends wholly on states in some sense internal to the subject. Conee and Feldman present an example of an internalist view. Given their not unsubstantial assumption that what evidence a subject has is an internal matter, evidentialism implies internalism. Propositional justification concerns whether a subject has sufficient reason to believe a given proposition;[9] doxastic justification concerns whether a given belief is held appropriately. The precise relation between propositional and doxastic justification is subject to controversy, but it is uncontroversial that the two notions can come apart. Suppose that Ingrid ignores a great deal of excellent evidence indicating that a given neighborhood is dangerous, but superstitiously comes to believe that the neighborhood is dangerous when she sees a black cat crossing the street. Since knowledge is a particularly successful kind of belief, doxastic justification is a stronger candidate for being closely related to knowledge; the JTB theory is typically thought to invoke doxastic justification but see Lowy This view is sometimes motivated by the thought that, when we consider whether someone knows that p, or wonder which of a group of people know that p, often, we are not at all interested in whether the relevant subjects have beliefs that are justified; we just want to know whether they have the true belief. For example, as Hawthorne One could allow that there is a lightweight sense of knowledge that requires only true belief; another option is to decline to accept the intuitive sentences as true at face value. In what follows, we will set aside the lightweight sense, if indeed there be one, and focus on the stronger one. Although most agree that each element of the tripartite theory is necessary for knowledge, they do not seem collectively to be sufficient. There seem to be cases of justified true belief that still fall short of knowledge. Here is one kind of example: Imagine that we are seeking water on a hot day. We suddenly see water, or so we think. In fact, we

are not seeing water but a mirage, but when we reach the spot, we are lucky and find water right there under a rock. Can we say that we had genuine knowledge of water? The answer seems to be negative, for we were just lucky. The 14th-century Italian philosopher Peter of Mantua presented a similar case: Let it be assumed that Plato is next to you and you know him to be running, but you mistakenly believe that he is Socrates, so that you firmly believe that Socrates is running. However, let it be so that Socrates is in fact running in Rome; however, you do not know this. Gettier presented two cases in which a true belief is inferred from a justified false belief. He observed that, intuitively, such beliefs cannot be knowledge; it is merely lucky that they are true. Since they appear to refute the JTB analysis, many epistemologists have undertaken to repair it: Above, we noted that one role of the justification is to rule out lucky guesses as cases of knowledge. A lesson of the Gettier problem is that it appears that even true beliefs that are justified can nevertheless be epistemically lucky in a way inconsistent with knowledge. Epistemologists who think that the JTB approach is basically on the right track must choose between two different strategies for solving the Gettier problem. The first is to strengthen the justification condition to rule out Gettier cases as cases of justified belief. No False Lemmas According to one suggestion, the following fourth condition would do the trick: There are examples of Gettier cases that need involve no inference; therefore, there are possible cases of justified true belief without knowledge, even though condition iv is met. Suppose, for example, that James, who is relaxing on a bench in a park, observes an apparent dog in a nearby field. So he believes There is a dog in the field. Suppose further that the putative dog is actually a robot dog so perfect that it could not be distinguished from an actual dog by vision alone. Given these assumptions, d is of course false. And since this belief is based on ordinary perceptual processes, most epistemologists will agree that it is justified. If so, then the JTB account, even if supplemented with iv, gives us the wrong result that James knows d. Suppose there is a county in the Midwest with the following peculiar feature. The landscape next to the road leading through that county is peppered with barn-facades: Observation from any other viewpoint would immediately reveal these structures to be fakes: Suppose Henry is driving along the road that leads through Barn County. Naturally, he will on numerous occasions form false beliefs in the presence of barns. Since Henry has no reason to suspect that he is the victim of organized deception, these beliefs are justified. Now suppose further that, on one of those occasions when he believes there is a barn over there, he happens to be looking at the one and only real barn in the county. This time, his belief is justified and true. Yet condition iv is met in this case. His belief is not the result of any inference from a falsehood. Once again, we see that iv does not succeed as a general solution to the Gettier problem. Sensitivity, to a first approximation, is this counterfactual relation: Given a Lewisian Lewis semantics for counterfactual conditionals, the sensitivity condition is equivalent to the requirement that, in the nearest possible worlds in which not-p, the subject does not believe that p. One motivation for including a sensitivity condition in an analysis of knowledge is that there seems to be an intuitive sense in which knowledge requires not merely being correct, but tracking the truth in other possible circumstances. This approach seems to be a plausible diagnosis of what goes wrong in at least some Gettier cases. For if there were no water there, you would have held the same belief on the same grounds—viz. However, it is doubtful that a sensitivity condition can account for the phenomenon of Gettier cases in general. It does so only in cases in which, had the proposition in question been false, it would have been believed anyway. But, as Saul Kripke Consider for instance the Barn County case mentioned above. Henry looks at a particular location where there happens to be a barn and believes there to be a barn there. The sensitivity condition rules out this belief as knowledge only if, were there no barn there, Henry would still have believed there was. But this counterfactual may be false, depending on how the Barn County case is set up. Relatedly, as Kripke has also indicated We assume Henry is unaware that colour signifies anything relevant. Since intuitively, the former belief looks to fall short of knowledge in just the same way as the latter, a sensitivity condition will only handle some of the intuitive problems deriving from Gettier cases. Most epistemologists today reject sensitivity requirements on knowledge. For example, George, who can see and use his hands perfectly well, knows that he has hands.

Chapter 2 : The Analysis of Knowledge (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

For example, you could contrast those who claim "only beliefs that are true count as knowledge" with those who think "k is what fits in with my other knowledge". Impossible to give exact list of all the ToK-related terms.

Introduction The dispute between rationalism and empiricism takes place within epistemology, the branch of philosophy devoted to studying the nature, sources and limits of knowledge. The defining questions of epistemology include the following. What is the nature of propositional knowledge, knowledge that a particular proposition about the world is true? To know a proposition, we must believe it and it must be true, but something more is required, something that distinguishes knowledge from a lucky guess. A good deal of philosophical work has been invested in trying to determine the nature of warrant. How can we gain knowledge? We can form true beliefs just by making lucky guesses. How to gain warranted beliefs is less clear. Moreover, to know the world, we must think about it, and it is unclear how we gain the concepts we use in thought or what assurance, if any, we have that the ways in which we divide up the world using our concepts correspond to divisions that actually exist. What are the limits of our knowledge? Some aspects of the world may be within the limits of our thought but beyond the limits of our knowledge; faced with competing descriptions of them, we cannot know which description is true. Some aspects of the world may even be beyond the limits of our thought, so that we cannot form intelligible descriptions of them, let alone know that a particular description is true. The disagreement between rationalists and empiricists primarily concerns the second question, regarding the sources of our concepts and knowledge. In some instances, their disagreement on this topic leads them to give conflicting responses to the other questions as well. They may disagree over the nature of warrant or about the limits of our thought and knowledge. Our focus here will be on the competing rationalist and empiricist responses to the second question. Some propositions in a particular subject area, S, are knowable by us by intuition alone; still others are knowable by being deduced from intuited propositions. Intuition is a form of rational insight. Deduction is a process in which we derive conclusions from intuited premises through valid arguments, ones in which the conclusion must be true if the premises are true. We intuit, for example, that the number three is prime and that it is greater than two. We then deduce from this knowledge that there is a prime number greater than two. Intuition and deduction thus provide us with knowledge a priori, which is to say knowledge gained independently of sense experience. Some rationalists take mathematics to be knowable by intuition and deduction. Some place ethical truths in this category. Some include metaphysical claims, such as that God exists, we have free will, and our mind and body are distinct substances. The more propositions rationalists include within the range of intuition and deduction, and the more controversial the truth of those propositions or the claims to know them, the more radical their rationalism. Rationalists also vary the strength of their view by adjusting their understanding of warrant. Some take warranted beliefs to be beyond even the slightest doubt and claim that intuition and deduction provide beliefs of this high epistemic status. Others interpret warrant more conservatively, say as belief beyond a reasonable doubt, and claim that intuition and deduction provide beliefs of that caliber. Still another dimension of rationalism depends on how its proponents understand the connection between intuition, on the one hand, and truth, on the other. Some take intuition to be infallible, claiming that whatever we intuit must be true. Others allow for the possibility of false intuited propositions. The second thesis associated with rationalism is the Innate Knowledge thesis. The Innate Knowledge Thesis: We have knowledge of some truths in a particular subject area, S, as part of our rational nature. The difference between them rests in the accompanying understanding of how this a priori knowledge is gained. The Innate Knowledge thesis offers our rational nature. Our innate knowledge is not learned through either sense experience or intuition and deduction. It is just part of our nature. Experiences may trigger a process by which we bring this knowledge to consciousness, but the experiences do not provide us with the knowledge itself. It has in some way been with us all along. According to some rationalists, we gained the knowledge in an earlier existence. According to others, God provided us with it at creation. Still others say it is part of our nature through natural selection. Once again, the more subjects included within the range of the thesis or the more controversial the claim to

have knowledge in them, the more radical the form of rationalism. Stronger and weaker understandings of warrant yield stronger and weaker versions of the thesis as well. The third important thesis of rationalism is the Innate Concept thesis. The Innate Concept Thesis: We have some of the concepts we employ in a particular subject area, S, as part of our rational nature. According to the Innate Concept thesis, some of our concepts are not gained from experience. They are part of our rational nature in such a way that, while sense experiences may trigger a process by which they are brought to consciousness, experience does not provide the concepts or determine the information they contain. Some claim that the Innate Concept thesis is entailed by the Innate Knowledge Thesis; a particular instance of knowledge can only be innate if the concepts that are contained in the known proposition are also innate. Others, such as Carruthers, argue against this connection, pp. The content and strength of the Innate Concept thesis varies with the concepts claimed to be innate. The more a concept seems removed from experience and the mental operations we can perform on experience the more plausibly it may be claimed to be innate. Since we do not experience perfect triangles but do experience pains, our concept of the former is a more promising candidate for being innate than our concept of the latter. Two other closely related theses are generally adopted by rationalists, although one can certainly be a rationalist without adopting either of them. The first is that experience cannot provide what we gain from reason. The Indispensability of Reason Thesis: The knowledge we gain in subject area, S, by intuition and deduction, as well as the ideas and instances of knowledge in S that are innate to us, could not have been gained by us through sense experience. The second is that reason is superior to experience as a source of knowledge. The Superiority of Reason Thesis: The knowledge we gain in subject area S by intuition and deduction or have innately is superior to any knowledge gained by sense experience. How reason is superior needs explanation, and rationalists have offered different accounts. Another view, generally associated with Plato Republic ec, locates the superiority of a priori knowledge in the objects known. What we know by reason alone, a Platonic form, say, is superior in an important metaphysical way, e. Most forms of rationalism involve notable commitments to other philosophical positions. One is a commitment to the denial of scepticism for at least some area of knowledge. If we claim to know some truths by intuition or deduction or to have some innate knowledge, we obviously reject scepticism with regard to those truths. We have no source of knowledge in S or for the concepts we use in S other than sense experience. Insofar as we have knowledge in the subject, our knowledge is a posteriori, dependent upon sense experience. Empiricists also deny the implication of the corresponding Innate Concept thesis that we have innate ideas in the subject area. Sense experience is our only source of ideas. They reject the corresponding version of the Superiority of Reason thesis. Since reason alone does not give us any knowledge, it certainly does not give us superior knowledge. Empiricists generally reject the Indispensability of Reason thesis, though they need not. The Empiricism thesis does not entail that we have empirical knowledge. It entails that knowledge can only be gained, if at all, by experience. Empiricists may assert, as some do for some subjects, that the rationalists are correct to claim that experience cannot give us knowledge. The conclusion they draw from this rationalist lesson is that we do not know at all. I have stated the basic claims of rationalism and empiricism so that each is relative to a particular subject area. Rationalism and empiricism, so relativized, need not conflict. We can be rationalists in mathematics or a particular area of mathematics and empiricists in all or some of the physical sciences. Rationalism and empiricism only conflict when formulated to cover the same subject. Then the debate, Rationalism vs. The fact that philosophers can be both rationalists and empiricists has implications for the classification schemes often employed in the history of philosophy, especially the one traditionally used to describe the Early Modern Period of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries leading up to Kant. It is standard practice to group the major philosophers of this period as either rationalists or empiricists and to suggest that those under one heading share a common agenda in opposition to those under the other. We should adopt such general classification schemes with caution. The views of the individual philosophers are more subtle and complex than the simple-minded classification suggests. See Loeb and Kenny for important discussions of this point. Descartes and Locke have remarkably similar views on the nature of our ideas, even though Descartes takes many to be innate, while Locke ties them all to experience. Thus, Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz are mistakenly seen as applying a reason-centered epistemology to a common metaphysical agenda, with each

trying to improve on the efforts of the one before, while Locke, Berkeley and Hume are mistakenly seen as gradually rejecting those metaphysical claims, with each consciously trying to improve on the efforts of his predecessors. One might claim, for example, that we can gain knowledge in a particular area by a form of Divine revelation or insight that is a product of neither reason nor sense experience. What is perhaps the most interesting form of the debate occurs when we take the relevant subject to be truths about the external world, the world beyond our own minds. A full-fledged rationalist with regard to our knowledge of the external world holds that some external world truths can and must be known a priori, that some of the ideas required for that knowledge are and must be innate, and that this knowledge is superior to any that experience could ever provide. The full-fledged empiricist about our knowledge of the external world replies that, when it comes to the nature of the world beyond our own minds, experience is our sole source of information. Reason might inform us of the relations among our ideas, but those ideas themselves can only be gained, and any truths about the external reality they represent can only be known, on the basis of sense experience. This debate concerning our knowledge of the external world will generally be our main focus in what follows. The debate raises the issue of metaphysics as an area of knowledge.

Chapter 3 : Rationalism vs. Empiricism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Claiming disability: knowledge and identity. [Simi Linton] -- Disabled people have emerged from the shadows and back rooms of our institutions, upping the ante on demands for an inclusive society. Claiming Disability captures this moment in the first.

One tweet in particular caught my eye. It falls into line with a few ideas that I have been thinking about of late. The Tweet went like this: No one knows enough to be an atheist. He was obviously baiting atheists who like to search on the hashtag of atheism and recant the faith claims of theists who often troll it. He received a heap of replies and even engaged with me, during which he basically told me I was a fake for having a Krampus image as my avatar. But in truth, we are ALL agnostic. Those who claim to know are either completely deluded or are lying. The levels of agnosticism, though, fit into the spectrum between 6 and 2, and most people will, if given the chance to fully reflect on it, place themselves somewhere within those points. They believe that god listens to them, and they believe that god will judge them. Take away the idea of a specifically designed planet, and suddenly the idea of being special, or part of a plan loses some of its polish. Young Earth Creationists hold on very tightly to their idea that the earth of the Bible or Koran is the literal truth, that Mohammed spoke personally with Allah, that Jesus died for our sins and was resurrected, that Noah made an impossibly large boat and carried the ark of sample animals into the new world, and that the world is impossibly young. This is a faith claim, and there is no evidence that any of this happened, except for those words written in those special books. There is no way of knowing what the actual origins of these books is except by using independent historical study. So we go on faith. Admittedly, there is a also certain amount of faith involved with believing the claims of scientists, but the difference here is that the discoveries made are tested, retested, repeated and if need be, falsified to make room for new discoveries. Science is a continuing story, one that bulids upon previous knowledge, and discards hypotheses that have been disproven. It is not a closed book, and it is so broad in its studies that one can never know all of it. So the faith we have is not in science itself, but in the men and women, real living people, whose aim is to bring about the truth of a situation, to work together and give us what we call scientific fact. This is a very different kind of faith, and it is not even close to the kind of faith involved in religion. So can I say that I know that my left hand is made up of atoms which were produced in the heart of an exploding star? But studies in nuclear physics can, and if I were in a situation to need this proof, there would be ways to measure this. I know people who work in this field, and can tell me what they know from their own experiments. Deepak Chopra has made claims of knowledge throughout his career. He is agnostic about his claims, as we all are about a lot of things.

Chapter 4 : What is a knowledge claim? what is a knowledge issue? | Yahoo Answers

In the first two parts of the study, the researchers showed that self-perceived financial knowledge predicts claiming an understanding of nonexistent, false financial concepts. For example, participants were provided 15 terms or concepts; a dozen were real and the rest were fabricated.

History[edit] The question of what constitutes "knowledge" is as old as philosophy itself. Gettier himself was not actually the first to raise the problem named after him; its existence was acknowledged by both Alexius Meinong and Bertrand Russell , the latter of which discussed the problem in his book *Human knowledge: Its scope and limits*. Alice thus has an accidentally true, justified belief. Russell provides an answer of his own to the problem. Quine and others, and was used as a justification for a shift towards externalist theories of justification. Pollock and Joseph Cruz have stated that the Gettier problem has "fundamentally altered the character of contemporary epistemology" and has become "a central problem of epistemology since it poses a clear barrier to analyzing knowledge". According to the inherited lore of the epistemological tribe, the JTB [justified true belief] account enjoyed the status of epistemological orthodoxy until , when it was shattered by Edmund Gettier Of course, there is an interesting historical irony here: It is almost as if a distinguished critic created a tradition in the very act of destroying it. A subject S knows that a proposition P is true if and only if: P is true, and S believes that P is true, and S is justified in believing that P is true The JTB account was first credited to Plato , though Plato argued against this very account of knowledge in the *Theaetetus* a. This account of knowledge is what Gettier subjected to criticism. Therefore, Gettier argued, his counterexamples show that the JTB account of knowledge is false, and thus that a different conceptual analysis is needed to correctly track what we mean by "knowledge". Each relies on two claims. That is, that if Smith is justified in believing P, and Smith realizes that the truth of P entails the truth of Q, then Smith would also be justified in believing Q. Case I[edit] Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition: Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from d to e , and accepts e on the grounds of d , for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that e is true. But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition e is true, though proposition d , from which Smith inferred e , is false. In our example, then, all of the following are true: Smith therefore justifiably concludes by the rule of disjunction introduction that "Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona", even though Smith has no information whatsoever about the location of Brown. In fact, Jones does not own a Ford, but by sheer coincidence, Brown really is in Barcelona. Again, Smith had a belief that was true and justified, but not knowledge. This led some early responses to Gettier to conclude that the definition of knowledge could be easily adjusted, so that knowledge was justified true belief that does not depend on false premises. More general Gettier-style problems[edit] In a scenario known as "The sheep in the field", Roderick Chisholm asks us to imagine that someone is standing outside a field looking at something that looks like a sheep although in fact, it is a dog disguised as a sheep. They believe there is a sheep in the field, and in fact, they are right because there is a sheep behind the hill in the middle of the field. Hence, they have a justified true belief that there is a sheep in the field. But is that belief knowledge? However, since the animal actually is in the field, but hidden in a hollow, again, the farmer has a justified, true belief which seems nonetheless not to qualify as "knowledge". Another scenario by Brian Skyrms is "The Pyromaniac", [6] in which a struck match lights not for the reasons the pyromaniac imagines but because of some unknown "Q radiation". A different perspective on the issue is given by Alvin Goldman in the "fake barns" scenario crediting Carl Ginet with the example. Accordingly, he thinks that he is seeing a barn. In fact, that is what he is doing. But what he does not know is that the neighborhood generally consists of many fake barns – barn facades designed to look exactly like real barns when viewed from the road, as in the case of a visit in the countryside by Catherine II of Russia, just to please her. Since if he had been looking at one of them, he would have been unable to tell the difference, his "knowledge" that he was looking at a barn would seem to be poorly founded. A similar process appears in Robert A. The "no false premises" or "no false lemmas" solution which

was proposed early in the discussion proved to be somewhat problematic, as more general Gettier-style problems were then constructed or contrived in which the justified true belief does not seem to be the result of a chain of reasoning from a justified false belief. After arranging to meet with Mark for help with homework, Luke arrives at the appointed time and place. He can help me with my logic homework". Luke is justified in his belief; he clearly sees Mark at his desk. Nevertheless, Mark is in the room; he is crouched under his desk reading Frege. Again, it seems as though Luke does not "know" that Mark is in the room, even though it is claimed he has a justified true belief that Mark is in the room, but it is not nearly so clear that the perceptual belief that "Mark is in the room" was inferred from any premises at all, let alone any false ones, nor led to significant conclusions on its own; Luke did not seem to be reasoning about anything; "Mark is in the room" seems to have been part of what he seemed to see. That looks to me like Mark in the room. No factor, right now, could deceive me on this point. Therefore, I can safely ignore that possibility. The second line counts as a false premise. However, by the previous argument, this suggests we have fewer justified beliefs than we think we do. Thus, a general scenario can be constructed as such: Bob believes A is true because of B. Argument B is flawed, but A turns out to be true by a different argument C. However, Bob had no knowledge of A. Responses to Gettier[edit] The Gettier problem is formally a problem in first-order logic, but the introduction by Gettier of terms such as believes and knows moves the discussion into the field of epistemology. Here, the sound true arguments ascribed to Smith then need also to be valid believed and convincing justified if they are to issue in the real-world discussion about justified true belief. Affirmations of the JTB account: This response affirms the JTB account of knowledge, but rejects Gettier cases. Typically, the proponent of this response rejects Gettier cases because, they say, Gettier cases involve insufficient levels of justification. Knowledge actually requires higher levels of justification than Gettier cases involve. This response accepts the problem raised by Gettier cases, and affirms that JTB is necessary but not sufficient for knowledge. With the fourth condition in place, Gettier counterexamples and other similar counterexamples will not work, and we will have an adequate set of criteria that are both necessary and sufficient for knowledge. This response also accepts the problem raised by Gettier cases. However, instead of invoking a fourth condition, it seeks to replace Justification itself for some other third condition? TB that will make counterexamples obsolete. One response, therefore, is that in none of the above cases was the belief justified because it is impossible to justify anything that is not true. Conversely, the fact that a proposition turns out to be untrue is proof that it was not sufficiently justified in the first place. Under this interpretation, the JTB definition of knowledge survives. This shifts the problem to a definition of justification, rather than knowledge. Another view is that justification and non-justification are not in binary opposition. Instead, justification is a matter of degree, with an idea being more or less justified. This account of justification is supported by mainstream philosophers such as Paul Boghossian [9] [1] and Stephen Hicks [2] [3]. The case itself depends on the boss being either wrong or deceitful Jones did not get the job and therefore unreliable. In case 2, Smith again has accepted a questionable idea Jones owns a Ford with unspecified justification. Without justification, both cases do not undermine the JTB account of knowledge. Their responses to the Gettier problem, therefore, consist of trying to find alternative analyses of knowledge. They have struggled to discover and agree upon as a beginning any single notion of truth, or belief, or justifying which is wholly and obviously accepted. Gettier, for many years a professor at University of Massachusetts Amherst later also was interested in the epistemic logic of Hintikka , a Finnish philosopher at Boston University , who published Knowledge and Belief in This theory is challenged by the difficulty of giving a principled explanation of how an appropriate causal relationship differs from an inappropriate one without the circular response of saying that the appropriate sort of causal relationship is the knowledge-producing one ; or retreating to a position in which justified true belief is weakly defined as the consensus of learned opinion. The latter would be useful, but not as useful nor desirable as the unchanging definitions of scientific concepts such as momentum. Thus, adopting a causal response to the Gettier problem usually requires one to adopt as Goldman gladly does some form of reliabilism about justification. See Goldmans Theory of justification. On their account, knowledge is undefeated justified true belief " which is to say that a justified true belief counts as knowledge if and only if it is also the case that there is no further truth that, had the subject known it, would have defeated her present

justification for the belief. But if Smith had known the truth that Jones will not get the job, that would have defeated the justification for his belief. However, many critics such as Marshall Swain [] have argued that the notion of a defeater fact cannot be made precise enough to rule out the Gettier cases without also ruling out a priori cases of knowledge[citation needed]. Pragmatism[edit] Pragmatism was developed as a philosophical doctrine by C. Peirce and William James â€” Peirce argued that metaphysics could be cleaned up by a pragmatic approach. Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the objects of your conception to have. Then, your conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object. Peirce emphasized fallibilism , considered the assertion of absolute certainty a barrier to inquiry, [11] and in defined truth as follows: This is the case, even though in practical matters one sometimes must act, if one is to act at all, with decision and complete confidence. For example, one might argue that what the Gettier problem shows is not the need for a fourth independent condition in addition to the original three, but rather that the attempt to build up an account of knowledging by conjoining a set of independent conditions was misguided from the outset. Those who have adopted this approach generally argue that epistemological terms like justification , evidence , certainty , etc. Knowledge is understood as factive, that is, as embodying a sort of epistemological "tie" between a truth and a belief. The JTB account is then criticized for trying to get and encapsulate the factivity of knowledge "on the cheap," as it were, or via a circular argument, by replacing an irreducible notion of factivity with the conjunction of some of the properties that accompany it in particular, truth and justification. Criticisms and counter examples notably the Grandma case prompted a revision, which resulted in the alteration of 3 and 4 to limit themselves to the same method i. In the midst of these fake barns is one real barn, which is painted red.

Chapter 5 : Gettier problem - Wikipedia

*Claiming Knowledge: Strategies of Epistemology from Theosophy to the New Age (Social, Economic, and Political Studies of the Middle East a) [Olav Hammer] on calendrierdelascience.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers.*

Chapter 6 : Claims to knowledge - Martin S Pribble

About knowledge: "Mathematical knowledge is certain." This is a second-order knowledge claim because it is about mathematical knowledge. We establish this by examining the methods of mathematics themselves using the tools of TOK.

Chapter 7 : Claim knowledge | WordReference Forums

Knowledge questions are general questions about knowledge Another challenging aspect of TOK is the requirement that a knowledge question is somehow more general than the particular examples which illustrate it.

Chapter 8 : knowledge claim | WordReference Forums

God, philosophy, and academic culture: a discussion between scholars in the AAR and the APA / edited by William J. Wainwright.

Chapter 9 : ToK - What the heck are Knowledge Claims and Knowledge Issues by George McCombe on P

3 This omission may be redressed by bringing disability issues into the liberal arts to develop "a broad-based epistemology of inclusion."3 Claiming Disability ends with a.