

# DOWNLOAD PDF CONCLUSION : THREE PARTS OF THE WHOLE JUDITH S. YAPHE

## Chapter 1 : NPR Choice page

*Download Citation on ResearchGate | Conclusion: Three Parts of the Whole | Fifteen years ago, in , the key issues driving U.S. policy in the Middle East included curbing Iranian efforts to.*

The Middle East Book Review 5 “brill. Soldiering, Martyrdom, and Remembrance Cambridge University Press, , pp isbn Sherko Kirmanj Identity and Nation in Iraq Lynne Rienner, , pp isbn Abstract Iraqis and those who study Iraq have been trying to answer the questions of what is Iraq and who is an Iraqi since the creation of the modern state under mandate in How you answer the questions usually depends on where you sit. For Western scholars, students of empires, and Iraqis who are Sunni Arabs, the answer is usually a linear description of political history and economic development, descriptions of who ruled and dated by wars, coups, revolutions, and repression. It is a broad and inclusive view that looks to incorporate the diverse ethnicities and religious sects that have been Iraq and Mesopotamia for thousands of years. The authors’ Dina Rizk Khoury and Sherko Kirmanj’ each tell the history well but draw different conclusions. Did the United States invent sectarianism in or has it always been present and waiting to divide the country? The answers to me are relatively simple. The Kurds of Iraq have lived by their own account for many centuries, if not millen- nia, in the territory that is and has been Iraq. And secondly, as both the books under review here affirm, sectarianism and its companion term ethnicity have existed, shaped, cursed, and enriched the lives of virtually all Iraqis throughout history, just as they have affected Jews in Israel and Europe, Christians in the Middle East, and all of the immigrants who have come to the United States in its more than four centuries of receiving immigrants. The ques- tion for this review is this: Limitations of Scholarship Since Iraq became a major security and policy issue in , many books and articles have been written on its history, politics, artificial creation by greedy colonial powers, and its former great leader Saddam Hussein by people who Bustan: For them and for many Iraqis, the question becomes, what is to be done about Iraq or, more specifically, what must the United States do about Iraq? Here was a golden opportunity to create a new world order in a country long denied the benefits of democratic values and institutions, as well as economic liberaliza- tion and free enterprise. Governing Iraq was never easy. War, occupation, and regime change followed by the violence of the insurgencies would not make things easier. This was certainly a pre- dominant American view. After all, Americans are a creative people; we can fix anything, even a broken country. The journalists, government administrators, military personnel, and intelligence analysts who were sent to Iraq to defeat Saddam, remove the government, and create institutions had little or no expe- rience of life in Iraq but most arrived determined to remake Iraq in our image. Once there, they were often embedded in military units or kept in the Green Zone with little opportunity to meet or experience Iraq, yet they claimed to understand Iraqi national aspirations and ambitions. These civil service tourists stayed a little while only to Bustan: Perhaps the most serious gap in knowledge involved identity and history. Much attention has been focused on Saddam and not Iraq. Yet, no one could answer a key question about him. Was the Republican Shaykh and the Father of His People an anomaly or a product of his times and political culture? How one answers that question says as much about the observer as the observed. But if the latter is true, then what hope was there that a new Saddam would not emerge? One scholar will explain why Iraq is a nation and an identity, and the other why it can never be a united as a nation or a people. Historical Exceptionalism This is meant to be a review of publications on what or how to build iden- tity in Iraq; it is not about scholarship on Iraq in general. It focuses on studies published in the last two years on Iraq that examine identity formation and the role of sectarianism and ethnicity in shaping political culture and national identity. These studies assess the impact of the state under Turkish, British, and American occupations and government by kings, prime ministers, military leaders and party autocrats’ all authoritarians in some degree who tried to create historical narratives which would legitimize the regime, justify its inter- nal and external policies, shape public opinion, and contain and eliminate real and imagined opponents. Some studies are well-researched and objective in their analysis and

assessments; others reflect a bias towards a specific sectarian, political or ethnic end state, a belief in the exceptionalism of the people and the unique destiny of the nation. History is more art than science, especially when in the hands of people who are describing, defending, or destroying national histories or national myths. And not all scholars feel bound to examine all sides of a story with an eye to current relevance or objectivity. Iraqis in this sense are no different than American, Israeli, Russian, British or other scholars who use the past to justify present values and practices. We are, for the most part, passionate about our histories. The Sunnis, for the most part, were Arab nationalists, called sharifians because they had served under Faisal in the British-backed Arab revolt and in his efforts at the Paris Peace Conference and in Syria to reject British and French plans to divide Syria into colonial mandates. Kadhim presents a rich narrative based on previously unavailable documents, memoirs, and family interviews. The senior cleric issuing the fatwa authorizing rebellion against the British was Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi al-Shirazi. Yale University Press, , p. He has written *Imagining the Nation: Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-political Conflict in Iraq*. Unity was possible only as a result of military defeat by a larger and more powerful entity. In Iraq, that entity was the state. Saddam considered the country his tribe and himself the republican shaykh who brought it all together; his manipulation of history and myth and application of tribal values of manliness, courage, and loyalty were intended to strengthen the image of Saddam as the state and the state as Saddam. Ali Allawi comes from a prominent political dynasty in Iraqi politics. He returned to Iraq from exile in the U.S. Two of his works represent significant contributions to our understanding of the making of modern Iraq under war and occupation. *Winning the War, Losing the Peace*, examines the American occupation of Iraq and the CPA as he witnessed and experienced it. But seen from the Iraqi and British perspective, Faisal was the rare figure who could command the loyalty of traditional and modernizing Arabs, especially in Iraq. Harith Hassan al-Qarawee, *Imagining the Nation*: For example, he pays little attention to Kurdish or ethnic issues. Yale University Press, *Yale University Press, Soldiering, Martyrdom, and Remembrance*. Khoury is becoming an important scholar in the field of Iraqi studies. She writes about the impact of sectarianism, violence and war on society and identity. Her first book, *State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire*, examined relations between the Ottoman state, local political leaders, and urban gentry on the eastern Iraqi frontier with the Ottoman Empire. In this, her second book, Khoury describes how the state under Saddam Hussein tried to mobilize Iraqi citizens and soldiers to support the leader, the state, and the war effort in the 1970s and 1980s. All this plus the generous use of violence and terror were meant to shape sectarian and ethnic views of the state, war, and memory. For Iraqis, it was always an imposed and personalized war. For Saddam and the Party, the battle was about good versus evil. *Inside an Authoritarian Regime* Cambridge, Persian soldiers were depicted as captives, corpses, unshaven, and subjugated, a mob and not a disciplined army. By contrast, Iraq represented its version of Islam as a modern liberation theology for a new Arab civilization; Iraqi soldiers were always manly, honorable, heroic, virtuous, brave, orderly and mustachioed. Khoury describes the war as a national struggle between two distinct versions of social organization: Her research in party files and interviews also revealed systemic corruption and party patronage system that undermined the autonomy of the military, its professionalism, and its performance; it also, she emphasizes, opened the door to increased social mobility by allowing soldiers to negotiate their survival. She makes an important distinction in the way Iran and Iraq treated their prisoners-of-war POWs. The Iraqis, however, wanted information from their captives while the Iranians concentrated on religious conversion to create new identities. In Iraq had a population of approximately 13 million; by this had grown to an estimated 18 million. In 1990, Iraq boasted a 1. The wars and the sanctions which began with the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, had significant impact on the state, its security, and governance. In addition, it owed billions of dollars in reparations to Iran. The war was experienced differently in the north and south, Khoury notes. In the north, on the other hand, the Kurds were less engaged militarily but were closely monitored for signs of rebellion and collaboration with the Iranian IRGC. In both cases, the message of war was shaped to fit ethnic and sectarian populations through use of the media, arts, culture and terror. The Party managed dissent and desertion, recruitment and burial, the dispensation of property, and at

least in the early days of the war, the rights of widows to inherit and manage their wealth, work, and children. This changed as the state and Saddam became more religious, patriarchal, and tribal, favoring traditional customs over modern practices and urging women to return to the home and have more babies. A similar process occurred in Iran. Many of her observations have a direct impact on Bustan: Their suppression reinforced sectarian and ethnic identities and regional fissures that would shape post-Saddam Iraq. I question other hints of the future conflict and some of her conclusions, as well: Yet, she also says ethnic and sectarian differences were a key to the breakdowns. Is she simply referring to language or does she mean tribes and their alliances were unimportant between and the s? I believe tribalism has always been present, just not as explicitly at some times, for example in the s when Saddam banned use of tribal names to mask the pervasiveness of certain tribes Sunni and regions Tikritis in government, military, and security positions. I agree with the latter part but find it hard to see where the Party or the state security apparatus was withdrawing or relaxing its vigilance, including its use of surveillance and terror, to detect threats and rivals. No, she answers, the Party was ultimately defeated by the sects and ethnic tribes, parties and groups who constructed alternative meanings of victimization. Inside and outside Iraq, a powerful challenge came from parties and groups who constructed an alternative meaning of victimization, particularly around the Intifada, the Anfal, and Halabjah €. And, she concludes, neither leader has a concept of sacrifice for the nation. Put another way, national reconciliation has never been an option in post-Saddam Iraq. It recounts the foundation myths of the Kurds, their beginnings as the original people in what we call Iraq, the superiority of their pre-Islamic culture as descendants of the Medes an ancient Aryan people , their history of heroic struggles, their victimization and betrayal at the hands of Turkish, British, American, Arab, and occasionally Iranian empires, their faith in democracy and self-determination, and their recent emergence as a de facto, virtually independent self-governing province of Iraq a failed state with hopes of soon becoming a de jure state. Kirmanj specializes in Kurdish history, identity, sectarianism and the politicization of Islam. He received his Bustan: Identity and Nation in Iraq is an example of historical exceptionalism. As such, the book is both interesting and aggravating. Kirmanj is a good writer telling a complicated story. The book is a comprehensive and comparative review of the evolution of Kurdish, Arab, and Iraqi national identity or lack thereof and the process of national integration or lack thereof in Iraq from through Little mention is made of other minority populations. What they do have are conflicting claims to much of the territory of Iraq. Unlike many writing on recent Iraqi history and politics, Kirmanj does not blame the British or the United States for creating the sectarian violence plaguing Iraq.

## Chapter 2 : Strategies for Writing a Conclusion

*Y edited by Judith calendrierdelascience.com APHE THE MIDDLE EAST IN Advance comments on The Middle East in Conclusion: Three Parts of the Whole Judith S. Yaphe.*

From Khatami to Ahmadinejad edited by Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri is a compact and clear introduction into the studies of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The book is consequentially the papers and results that were discussed at that conference. Together with Ehteshami and Zweiri seven other experts in the field of Iranian studies contributed to the book ranging for Iranian and European officials to experts in the field of Iranian Studies. In their introduction Ehteshami and Zweiri argue that in order to understand the Islamic Republic of Iran it is vital to study its foreign policy. According to them the foreign policy of Iran is heavily influenced by its constitution resulting in four fundamental principles. These are the four principles that serve as some form of basis of analysis for the whole book. In all ten chapters these principles resurface at some point or another. The structure of the book is virtually divided into a first part that covers the history of Iran and then introduces the reader to the various theoretical approaches that can be used for the study of Iranian foreign policy. The second part is comprised out of case studies ranging from Iran-US relations concerning Iraq to the Arab-Iranian relations. The first chapter written by R. The main purpose of this chapter is to illustrate that the foreign policy principles proclaimed by the Islamic Republic have their roots in a distinct understanding of Iranian history that predates the recent events of the twentieth century and goes back to pre-Islamic times 1. The second chapter covers various theoretical approaches of foreign policy and its affects on the foreign policy analysis of Iran. After covering historical and theoretical approaches more detailed and specific case studies are introduced in eight different chapters. Yaphe emphasises on the commonalities and differences between Iran and the United States when it comes to the stability in Iraq. Others like Shahriar Sabet-Saeidi focus on the relationship between Iran and European countries and how it is in the interest of both sides to maintain a strategic partnership with each other. This and Anastasia Th. Therefore it can be said, that these two scholars diverge a little bit from the rest of the contributors and bring in a rather different perspective. It should be said that most chapters focus mainly on security issues and one could argue that the book follows a rather western-centric point of view. The structure of the book with its historical and theoretical first part and its more analytical second part helps to get a better overview of the matter. Its main strength lies in the accessible writing of its contributors and the clear and straightforward way the subject is presented. Unfortunately, the book misses a concluding chapter which would have been helpful to knot the more detailed case studies together. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the emphasis on British-Iranian relations in the book is justified " covering the issues in two chapters while relations with Russia or China are solely mentioned parenthetically. This can only be explained and justified if one considers the locality of the conference from which the book has resulted from. It can be considered as a stepping stone for further research in the field, especially if one takes the detailed bibliographies into account.

*Steven L. Spiegel --Conclusion: Three parts of the whole Judith S. Yaphe --Israel-Turkey: Strategic relationship or temporary alliance? Alan Makovsky. Alan Makovsky. Responsibility.*

Influence Political Progress in Iraq? Regardless of the debate over the success or failure of the military surge in Iraq, Americans and Iraqis agree on one key point: A political surge is essential, and it can only be delivered by Iraqis. Yet, as the military surge reaches its peak and despite U. If the political stalemate in Baghdad were not enough, Iraq in the months ahead will face three other potentially explosive political events: What can the U. More to the point, what can the U. Efforts to destabilize the elected government, even if it is unpopular with Iraqis and Americans, or to encourage regime change by unconstitutional means will drive a further wedge between the U. Iraq needs a more inclusive political system and national reconciliation, but demanding that the government create these by fiat will not work. Encouraging electoral reform could achieve this goal. The current electoral process of national lists and a nation-wide election only strengthens sectarian and ethnic factionalism. Provincial elections and electoral districts based on geography should produce candidates from local communities and responsible to them. Make clear to Iraqis that we are serious about long-term withdrawal and that our policy is not dependent of the status of the insurgencies in Iraq; it is based on protecting our national interests. This includes talks with Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia on the mutual need for a secure and united Iraq and the need to limit foreign intervention. Iraq had no history of sectarian warfare but it had a long tradition of political violence. The moment was brief. Iraq today is a country divided by competing identities and loyalties. Some Iraqis find their primary identity in their ethnic origins-Kurds seeking to right historic wrongs through maximalist demands for territory and wealth, Arabs and Turkmen trying in response to defend their own rights to land and resources. Iraq is not in the midst of a single insurgency focused simply on ending American occupation, nor is it enmeshed in a sectarian civil war in which one clearly defined religious faction makes war on another over doctrinal differences. Instead, struggles over national identity and political power lie at the heart of the issue. Iraq is experiencing a complicated set of civil wars and power struggles over conflicting visions of identity and reality. The parties to the struggle are tribal leaders, militia chiefs, politicized clerics, former government and military officials, Mafia-style warlords, criminals, and individuals who spent long years in exile. In the midst of this multi-faceted conflict, Iraqis are under constant siege from poverty, unemployment, a dysfunctional government, corrupt political leaders, and vicious militias determined to enforce their peculiar combination of sectarian purity and material self-aggrandizement. At the same time, the Maliki government is under pressure from the U. The problem is that the political system upon which all these demands are being levied has not yet completed the painful process upon which the country embarked in April Rather than creating accountable ministries staffed by apolitical technocrats and experts, they find it necessary to ensure control by embedding family, friends, and clients in powerful and lucrative posts. While they have promised cooperation with American and coalition forces in the war on al-Qaida and other terrorist elements, in reality they define "terrorists" as their political or tribal opponents and the militias those opponents control. Why has the Political Surge Failed? However, they resent what they view to be unwarranted intrusion into sovereign political issues. For these Iraqis, the U. The resentment is fueling tensions between Iraqis and Americans and further undermining U. No amount of U. The lack of progress has other sources. Part lies in the newly invented political system and its constitution, which was crafted in haste in Political authority was decentralized, national power was limited, and provincial, sectarian, and ethnic interests consolidated. Identity shaped by a strong sense of ethnicity, religious sect, and victimization define loyalty for many in Iraq. Part of the problem lies in the politicians and factions trying to assert control over territory, people, and wealth. Their self-absorption has left the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki unable to curb sectarian strife, establish a modicum of security, win political consensus on any issue, or deliver the goods and services desperately needed by the Iraqi people. And, part of

the problem lies in the engrained resentment in Baghdad over U. Occupied by Turks, British, and Americans, Iraqis resent foreign intervention in their politics. What Could Change This Picture? Iraq may be at risk of failing as a state, but it is not there yet. What could restore their willingness to cooperate and a modicum of confidence in the United States, and boost its influence. The trend of tribal and other leaders within the Sunni Arab community turning against the terrorist elements with which they had previously been allied began in predominantly Sunni Anbar with the support of U. The United States should not take this tribal cooperation with American forces for granted; it does not signify Sunni Arab acceptance of the legitimacy of the government in Baghdad, nor should it be interpreted as new-found loyalty to the U. It does, however, demonstrate how readily self-interest can alter what may appear at first glance to be alliances of principle. His organization is officially being guided by one of his sons, but the real power is likely to be a technocrat highly regarded in the West, Adil Abd al-Mahdi. Adil is not a cleric and is reportedly unpopular with the rank-and-file of the ISCI, but he is apparently an effective organizer and may be able to put together a more coherent and less combative organization. Talabani is in his 70s and showing his age after long years of combating both Saddam Husayn and his primary rival for leadership of the Kurdish community, Kurdistan Regional Government President and Kurdish Democratic Party head Masoud Barzani. The two Kurdish factions are still negotiating the unification of their organizations and militias, and the rising generation of Kurdish leaders may be willing to challenge the autocratic control wielded by these powerful warlords over the Kurdish economy, politics, and civil society. In recent months several prominent Iraqi leaders have attempted to create political alliances that cross sectarian lines. Allawi is a well-known quantity admired for his decisiveness and courage, but he is also seen as corrupt and criticized for being too close to the U. The Kurds are determined to gain Kirkuk by the end of this year by de-Arabizing the city and then holding a referendum that will approve Kurdish control. Turkey would like the referendum postponed while it considers the potential impact that an expanded Kurdish regional authority virtually independent of Iraq might have on its own Kurdish population. Representatives of some Kurdish factions claim their leaders are considering changing loyalties and allegiances from Baghdad to Ankara. What Can the U. There is little consensus between policy advocates in either the United States or Iraq on what can or cannot work in Iraq. Some policy analysts argue that the U. Others urge re-inventing a strong, central governing authority in Baghdad rather than relying on a weak, decentralized political system that lacks the authority or will to act in defense of the nation. A policy of cultivating new allies raises a number of practical questions: Who can the U. How do you win over these new allies? Do you arm them and assist them in their inter-tribal, clan, ethnic or sectarian battles? Will tilting towards specific groups because of their sectarian identification or mutual antipathy for Iran help or harm the U. Can one buy a tribe or only rent one? On the other hand, continuing to work through the elected central government, regardless of who leads it, implies U. Is the creation of such a government and force, with the necessary public credibility, possible? Not in the short term. Creation of a democratic culture and a government and armed forces willing to act constitutionally takes time and training. While outsiders debate the next stages of U. Iraq needs technical experts in economic reconstruction, agriculture, and a wide range of skills to support the reconstruction efforts already underway in many regions. To sustain these efforts and initiate new programs aimed at building security, the U. One thing is clear. It will need to pick its way carefully through the dangerous zones of Iraqi politics and security. Even the appearance of acceding to demands from Washington or Tehran could undermine whatever base of support Maliki has now. The Iraqi government must walk a fine line between its dependence on support from the U. Demanding transparent governance, strict accountability, and the passage of specific kinds of legislation without reforming the electoral system will only increase resentment of the U. Iraqis talk about needing the rule of law, which the U. The result could be the rise of new political players who enjoy bona fide popular legitimacy, have the local political bases to govern more effectively, and who ultimately can present a constructive challenge to the factions currently holding national politics hostage to personal pique. Deal with Iraqi political players in terms of parties and factions, and not as ethnic or sectarian blocs. Emphasizing sectarian or ethnic identity reinforces

separateness rather than encouraging inclusion. In particular, urge the removal of the most offensive and extreme appointees in the Defense, Interior and Intelligence Ministries. Finding replacements for them and the militias embedded in these ministries will be difficult but is necessary before Iraqis can look to their own rather than to the U. A strategy that tilts towards seemingly compliant Sunni Arab tribes and leaders today could produce unintended consequences tomorrow, such as the creation of a new, well-armed militia focused on attacking Americans rather than al-Qaida terrorists or Iranian elements. Emphasize recruitment from all sectors of the population, provide training in military tactics and civil-military relations, and provide the means for the Iraqis to defend themselves against well-armed insurgents. And all are probably planning their actions once the U. The withdrawal card may be our strongest lever. This might pressure a recalcitrant central government and self-absorbed allies, such as the Kurds, to cooperate. None of the key players wants immediate U. The neighbors, for now, are part of the problem. Their recruitment of young men for Sunni insurgent operations in Iraq and collection of money allegedly has the tacit support of the ruling Sunni families in several Gulf countries. None of the Gulf governments appears to have much interest in an Iraq led by non-Sunnis or non-Arabs, although all would deny it. A Cautionary Note Iraqis warn that a U. Their neighbors agree that the result will be a worse chaos than has been witnessed to date. They say anticipation of a U. S military withdrawal is already encouraging Iraqi factions, militias, and terrorists to prepare for the day after we leave. Effective governance may still be possible. As Iraqi politics and politicians mature, they may see the benefits to be gained from thinking nationally, and not merely factionally. There may yet be room for compromise, even over the critical issues of oil exploitation and revenue distribution, federalism, and the role of Islam in governance.

**Chapter 4 : Project MUSE - Iraq: The Exception to the Rule**

*THE MIDDLE EAST IN* Judith calendrierdelascience.com *The Impact of Regional Trends on U.S. Strategic Planning*  
edited by.

Many have compared the attacks of September 11, to the bombing of Pearl Harbor, sixty years previous. There were, of course, important differences in what transpired on both days. More people died on September 11 than died during the Pearl Harbor attacks. And unlike the case of Pearl Harbor, almost all who died on September 11th were civilians. There also are many similarities between what happened on both days. In each case, a surprise air attack left thousands of Americans dead. Immediately after both events, the President declared the US to be in a state of war. In each case, our attackers had decided that they were at war with us long before we realized we were at war with them. War for them began with preparations for attack and the assembly of forces to execute their attacks. Now, as was the case 60 years ago, we confront a global war with all its inherent uncertainties of dimension, duration and loss of life. To defeat and destroy our enemy, we must understand more than the crimes that are already committed. We must understand what drives and motivates it; the source of its power; the resources at its command; its internal strengths and weaknesses; the identity, roles, motives of its allies, enablers and supporters; and its ability to adapt to changed circumstances, especially after we struck back. In other words, we must know everything we can about al Qaeda if we are to crush it. To help us do precisely that, we have assembled a distinguished group of experts to guide us in our work. Our first panel brings together three distinguished experts to address the origins of al Qaeda, Dr. Rohan Gunaratna is the author of "Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. Our second speaker is Dr. Sageman is an expert on the psychological aspects of al Qaeda, recruitment and membership. All prepared statements will be entered into the record in full, and we would ask each of our witnesses to summarize their statements before we turn to questions from the commissioners. Thank you, Chairman Kean, ladies and gentlemen. Abdullah Azzam, the founder of al Qaeda, in March , and published in "Al Jihad," the journal of the Arab mujaheddin, a publication that was printed in Peshawar, Pakistan, during that period. According to the charter of al Qaeda, al Qaeda is the vanguard, "the pioneering vanguard of the Islamic movements. According to al Qaeda, al Qaeda must mount attacks that will inspire and instigate the other Islamic movements, as well as the wider Muslim community that seeks to support, that al Qaeda wants to build support, in order to continue with their political agenda. If you look at the charter, the charter very clearly states that al Qaeda has a role as the pioneering vanguard. And it is because of that specific role that al Qaeda mounted attacks very selectively on your outstanding landmarks, on your iconic targets, because by charter al Qaeda has a responsibility to show the way to these other movements, that the United States can always be attacked and destroyed the same way the Soviet Union was reduced from a superpower into Russia, the same way the largest land army in the world, the Soviet army, was defeated in Afghanistan. And al Qaeda wanted to show the way to many other Islamic movements, wanted to empower these movements. And that is why al Qaeda built with the assistance of Taliban state-of-the-art terrorist training and operational infrastructure in Afghanistan. Throughout the s, Afghanistan became a terrorist Disneyland, where more than 40 different terrorist organizations were training and using Afghanistan as an operational base at the time the United States, its allies and its friends intervened in Afghanistan in October of . But for 10 years, the U. The center where terrorist organizations planned, prepared and executed operations. If you look at the previous attacks conducted by al Qaeda, all those attacks were mounted either by members who were trained in Afghanistan and using Afghanistan as a training base. But if you look at the trajectory of al Qaeda operations, there is an incremental escalation in al Qaeda attacks. Look at August , the East Africa bombings. Al Qaeda mounted land suicide attacks against the U. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, coordinated simultaneous attacks. If you look at October , al Qaeda mounted a maritime suicide attack. And look at the sophistication of the organization. When al Qaeda attacked those American targets, those land targets in East Africa, the Americans increased the perimeter security of their

land targets. Then al Qaeda attacked a maritime target. Then the Americans increased the perimeter security of their land and their maritime targets. But then al Qaeda again deceived the United States and conducted an airborne suicide attack. So, and also if you look at the targeting of al Qaeda, there was gradually a larger number of fatalities. There was an increase in sophistication of the organization. But there was more than an intelligence failure. There was operational failure. There was a failure to act. You knew that your country will be attacked, but you did not do what was necessary to prevent your country being harmed and humiliated. You knew that the intention of al Qaeda was to kill American people wherever they could be found. But still you did not act, and therefore you paid a very heavy price for it. Today we are confronting a large number of Islamist terrorist organizations. Let us look at the two waves of attacks that we saw in October of last year and May this year. On the same day there were attacks in Chechnya. He goes by the name of Abu Waleed. So you can see the coordination of the attacks in that week of May between al Qaeda and the Chechen group. And then again on the 16th of May in Casablanca, the Casablanca attack was not by al Qaeda but by an associate group of al Qaeda called Assiarat al Moustaqim. And then again the previous day, that is on the 15th of May, again an associate group of al Qaeda, Lashkar-I-Jhanqui, attacked 21 Shell and Caltex stations in Pakistan, coordinated simultaneous attacks within a half an hour -- 21 stations attacked. So what I would like to say is that the threat has certainly moved beyond al Qaeda. That was not by al Qaeda, but an associate group of al Qaeda called Jemaah Islamiya. Another group al Qaeda had armed, trained and financed in Afghanistan during that year period in Afghanistan. And in that same week in October, we saw attacks against the U. And these groups will continue to fight. Al Qaeda will more or less remain in the background, will be more an ideological provider, because it lacks the operational capability, while these other groups will continue to fight with al Qaeda in the background. So it is a long-term threat. And to fight this kind of threat you need a multi-pronged, multidimensional, multi-agency and a multinational response. The United States, although it is the most preeminent political, military, economic and diplomatic superpower, you cannot defeat this kind of threat unless you continue to work with your allies and your friends, not only in the military field, but also in the political, ideological, diplomatic and economic fields. Thank you very much. Ladies and gentlemen, since my colleague talked about, a little more about al Qaeda, I will submit my full testimony to the record, and I am just basically going to fill in some added information on the testimony. It is very important to first of all reverse the popular understanding about al Qaeda that bin Laden is the main figure in al Qaeda, and focusing on bin Laden puts our efforts in a different trajectory of pursuing al Qaeda. And although my colleague just mentioned to you that an airborne attack was in its inception in Peshawar, in fact in as Ayman Zawahiri said he was contemplating the Sadat association he was discussing with his colleague Aboud Az Zumur to use an airplane and crash it in the stand of President Sadat. Thus using planes to target high-level targets was not conceived in Kandahar, but rather on the Nile shores in Cairo. To understand Zawahiri is really key understanding of al Qaeda and how it operates. Zawahiri, a man born in Egypt, in the southern part of Cairo called Al Mahdi -- he was born in He graduated from medical school in in Cairo, and joined the jihad movement in after he graduated from high school to form Al Jihad movement. Ayman Zawahiri was arrested and kept in prison for three years in Egypt, and left Egypt in for Saudi Arabia, and spent one year there working at Anifis ph clinic as a doctor. And from there he moved to Peshawar. Some of us are mystified by the name "al Qaeda. Assam, the Palestinian leader of the jihad in Afghanistan. Ayman Zawahiri and his jihad movement coming from Egypt started an al Qaeda guest house. The other group, which also came from Egypt, the Islamic group, started another house called al Ansar, the supporters of al Qaeda. The main umbrella sponsors in that neighborhood in Peshawar and Pakistan and Afghanistan was represented by three figures, mainly Gul Buddin Hekmatyar who represents also the branch of the Muslim brotherhood, and that takes us back to the ideological trajectory of al Qaeda, as well as Abdel Rebrasu Sayyef, who was also protecting the Islamic group members who were coming again from Egypt via Jeddah, as well as the Taliban and Mullah Omar, who sponsored Bin Laden and the Zawahiri. But to understand all of this, we cannot just focus on the technical aspect of al Qaeda. We have to look at al Qaeda in its broader context in the Muslim world. Al

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Qaeda hangs in a web of relations in the Muslim world. Since September 11th on balance I can say we have won the war against the formal structure of al Qaeda, its organization, its military capacity, and its financial networks. This progress has been helped greatly by recent attacks on Riyadh on May 12th. In fact, if al Qaeda shot itself in the foot on September 11th, it shot itself in the head on May 12th in Saudi Arabia, because practically it dried the whole financial support and allows the Saudi state to start an all-out war on these groups, because basically the threat is coming home. Although we seem to understand the formal structure of al Qaeda, we have yet to grasp the broader context and the forces that make such organizations appealing to many people in the Muslim world, from which al Qaeda and its affiliate organization draw their support and new recruits. It is easy enough to identify individuals and governments who finance newspapers, TV stations that promote extremist ideas. This is both in terms of how they present their ideas in the media and how they deal with those who disseminate an actively radical branch of Islam. The financial aspects of the media have to be reconsidered and studied more in depth. In many Arab newspapers and TV programs bin Laden can appear as an hero, and even if al Qaeda is not named, its ideas and its mission is being supported. Currently many governments in the Arab and Muslim world are happy with the new division of labor, where the media is for bin Laden and his affiliate organizations, and state power is for the traditional elite. We need to have a balance sheet and wait for these answers from every government in the region. Terrorism in the Muslim world can be drawn as a triangle between three points: The current policy addresses two elements of this triangle: In fact, movements to be ahead of states in the Middle East -- at least the trend points to the primacy of these movements in the Arab world, and we see Hizbollah is much more important than the government of Hariri in Lebanon. We see Hamas is much more important than Arafat, and all of that. The threat represented by these movements causes a loss of focus in the fight against terrorism for the U.

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### Chapter 5 : Reinventing Iraq: The Regional Impact of U.S. Military Action | Judith Yaphe - calendrierdelasc

*Judith Yaphe is a senior fellow at the National Defense University. She studied Saddam Hussein and some of the people who advise him. She joins us in our studios.*

McNair, wrote this memo at the end of September. Analysis and conclusions expressed are hers and do not reflect the views of the university, the Department of Defense or any other government agency. As the United States prepares following are preliminary thoughts on for a military confrontation with these issues. It will be hard to reconcile after Saddam, his family and friends, and their demands for a pacific post-Saddam his Baath party have disappeared from the Iraq with those of Iraqis, who will have scene. The wars and military and political defectors will demand the long years of sanctions have decimated their share of the pie as well. Those who remained in Iraq A dilemma could surface, however. Many belonged to leader could decide just before or after we the Baath party, but most were probably attack Iraq to do the unthinkable but long members for the perquisites a party hoped for: His sons and credential guaranteed " education, careers cousins who dominate the security and and the promise of a secure future, albeit intelligence apparat would be gone as well. In return for this act of courage, the The United States almost certainly will general or prominent political or tribal face a critical political decision before the leader would expect a great reward " military battle is over. That decision will power. Would he agree to rule with the involve whom to reward with power, INC, et al.? Or, more likely, would he turn authority and responsibility. The Iraqi to his family, friends and tribal-political opposition in exile, led by the Iraqi National allies to receive the prize that is Iraq? Most Iraqis assume that they deserve the spoils of war; will probably abandon Saddam quickly they may be present with U. They are they assume control of Iraq. They will likely to hide at home or some protected promise a broad coalition of the ethnic, location and stay put until the battles are political and sectarian elements that over and the victor certain and secure. It will be easier, perhaps, for mid- Kurdish Democratic party and the level military and government bureaucrats Talabani-led Patriotic Union of Kurdistan; if they believe they do not risk arrest as the 65 percent of the population that is war criminals. The Iraqi National and extremely unpopular inside Iraq. If a general or political divided among its ethnic and religious leader is given power, then Iraqis are likely communities. It cannot be so easily to wonder what has changed in their divided. Kurdish and Arab areas seem governance and what the war was about. None have survived long Kirkuk, claimed also by the Turkmen and enough to govern, the controlled by the last being the July 17, Arabs. A federal , coalition that Federalism [state- or state that simply the militant Baathists province-based] would divides Kurd from and Saddam Hussein mean 18 equal states in a Arab may be difficult replaced two weeks to sustain. Given their federal union. It would government in mistrust and suspi- not be what the Kurds Baghdad, democratic cion of each other as want, but it may be a viable or authoritarian, can well as their neigh- afford to concede its solution for all of Iraq. Turkey, however, is their own rapacious potential successors. This will Kirkuk and Irbil. Ankara at the same time not be a velvet revolution. If history is any is reserving the right to intervene in Iraqi guide " and it usually is " Iraq on its own is internal affairs if the Turkmen are threat- likely to face a protracted period of chronic ened or denied their rights. For them compete for control. It will not be pretty; it there is no division between Sunni and Shia could be bloody. It will have to Only 17 percent of the population, they build from scratch political institutions that have ruled Iraq since Ottoman times, and are democratic, pluralistic, transparent and many tend to regard the Shia and Kurds as diverse. Its origins lie in the perhaps before the political decisions are Ottoman military academies, and its made in Washington or Baghdad. It has military will probably be elation that played a role in virtually every coup and Saddam and his family are gone and the attempted coup from to , when dead hand of Saddam and his regime is the Baathists preempted military leaders removed. The welcome may not last, and began the long process of purging and however. By day three, some may be reindoctrinating the military. We and weapons and subordinated in the s will have to spell out very clearly from day to the Republican Guard, whose members one our vision of the New Iraq,

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federalism are recruited from especially loyal Sunni and the role of Iraqis inside and outside the Arab tribes, including the al-Ubayd, al- country. Iraq will need the talents and Jabbur, al-Shammar and al-Dulaymi. Federalism as a " they emerged afterward with whatever state or province-based idea might be was left of military hardware, continued to better received. This would mean 18 equal train, and effectively put down the rebellion states in a federal union similar to the in southern Iraq. They were prevented structure of our government with equal and from similar success against the Kurds representative institutions at the national only by Operation Provide Comfort now level. It would not be what the Kurds Northern Watch. Their The goal of the United States and the commanders will believe that they stand to new Iraqi government will be to create a be executed as war criminals and have new Iraqi army that has been shorn of its nothing to lose. That they are guilty of war Baathist, militant Arabist and extreme crimes goes without saying " Saddam nationalist ambitions. The trick will be to implicated all around him in killing fractious do so without creating a pan-Arab, anti- Kurds, recalcitrant Shia and disgruntled U. The military institution in Sunni Arabs. All have blood on their hands Iraq has a long and proud tradition. It was and almost certainly lack the ability to think the first military created in an independent independently of the regime. If they could, Arab state and has the dubious they would not have survived, as Saddam distinction of being the first to be used in an executed or exiled any senior military 28 YAPHE: Yet it is Conventional Rearmament equally important that in the years since If denying Iraq under any government , virtually all of the reported and weapons of mass destruction is the primary alleged coup attempts have been made by U. They have a much can be done. Ridding it of its pride in its greater fear of Iraq rearmed with conven- Arabism, militant opposition to Israel, and tional arms " new tanks, guns, aircraft, etc. They threat to Israel. The military as an have to comply with U. Security Council institution remains respected in Iraq. To resolutions regarding WMD research, reflect the shape of the new government, it acquisition and development. It will be will have to be turned into a more diverse difficult to maintain the embargo on institution, once again bringing Kurdish and conventional weapons, however, especially Shia recruits into all echelons of the once the new Iraqi government has control military. Any government in senior ranks now, but the number is not Baghdad will need to have the means to known; Shia recruits were nearly 80 defend itself " a right acknowledged in percent of the regular army, but few made international law and the U. Its loyalty may be gained with once again to covet WMD capability, new training, equipment and responsibilities especially nuclear. Its officers and recruits arms rebuilding, which could help ensure a may also respond to positive contacts with pro-U. The risk of ethnic Baghdad will also feel it needs a credible and family loyalties taking precedence over military to maintain territorial and political national ones is there and almost impossible integrity, for example in the event the to estimate. Kurds grow restive or tribal warlords emerge to challenge central authority. Finally, Domestic Tranquility it is difficult to gauge the extent of local In an eerie way, U. How do you keep control? How Much, How Long? He restored their rights to The custom under the Turkish empire, administer local justice and impose taxes so British mandate, king and republic was long as they did not contravene national authoritarian rule by one, several, a com- law and maintained law and order. I mittee or a council. Elections, when held, assume this means that tribal elements man were affairs for the most part arranged to local police and security posts and that the suit the current government. Baath party members and improved on its practices. In this one con- imposition of sanctions these Iraqis are too nection, Afghanistan may provide some busy working two or three jobs to feed clues. Although Iraq has long been a more their families and too demoralized to care complicated and modern society with many about the larger picture. If and values have been defined by class, not, chaos could emerge as rival political, family and tribal interests and shaped military and tribal leaders vie for power, around ethnic and sectarian differences. Some Iraqis have strong ties to Arab Islamic empire during the flowering of traditional families, clans and villages. This Arab and Islamic art, culture and civilization is especially true of the generation that during the eighth-thirteenth centuries CE. City-bred Iraqis be they Arab, practices, they will look to this past for Kurd, Sunni or Shia in origin have long validation and legitimacy. Emphasis on been urban-oriented and have looked with commonalty " we are Arabs and Kurds, we disdain on the citified

peasants and the are Muslims and Christians, we were great religious communities with their crude and will be again " can help deflect the customs and arcane loyalties. All, how- anxiety of the current moment and perhaps ever, are bound by a common fear: They will wait to see who gets will not be able to withdraw quickly from what " exiles, generals, reconstructed Iraq. Iraqis are bound to reject imposition Baathists who are now Arab nationalists of diaspora exiles and fear reinstatement of and Iraq-firsters again. They will need some outside traditional sources of authority in the monitoring while they wend their unsteady countryside " tribal shaikhs, prominent way to open elections and political parties, individuals and families " to help form local and democratic, transparent and represen- civil administration and encourage civil tative government institutions. More society organizations to reform. Iraqis who have been trained as profes- It is impossible to guess the length of sional educators, scientists, engineers, stay that will be required. Given the talents lawyers, bureaucrats, technicians, etc. Some Iraqi shorter time for foreign reconstruction and specialists do not believe the cadre of development assistance than they will need talent is there. Others do " and I agree " for security assistance. Iraqis will be suspi- does what. Once one of the best-educated cious of their motivation and intent: Is populations with the highest literacy rate in Ankara secretly encouraging the Turkmen the Arab world, many Iraqis have been ill- to rebel and scaring the Kurds into passiv- educated, untrained and isolated from the ity? Is Riyadh trying to export its version technological and intellectual advances of of Wahhabism a puritanical and extreme the last dozen years. More important, they form of Sunni Islam into Iraq, especially in are unaccustomed to planning and making the central Sunni Arab regions, and thereby decisions independently, unfamiliar with subverting the new secular government? Getting the schools open and Shia into seeking establishment of a running normally will be critical. Have Dam- can play a role here, as can the apolitical ascus and Amman conceded their claims to religious institutions in Iraq such as the Arab or Hashemite hegemony over Iraq? Shia Muslim Khoi Foundation. Getting Given these concerns, Iraqis are most Iraqis to display initiative and independent likely to turn to the West and Russia for judgment will be harder. Is there a Role for Outsiders? Two kinds of assistance will be neces- Probably not. No candidate with the sary: External opposition, and none is likely to appear. It will be needed to handle Hashemite prince, such as Prince Hassan refugee flows from Turkey, Iran, Jordan brother to the late King Hussein, who on and Saudi Arabia; distribute food and his deathbed dumped him as his succes- humanitarian aid; repair and rebuild hous- sor , or a cousin of the murdered Faisal II, ing, schools and clinics; rebuild and repair the last king of Iraq London-based Sharif oil and gas industry infrastructure; and Ali, who left Iraq in at the age of two prevent banditry.

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### Chapter 6 : Uncharted Journey : Thomas Carothers :

*Three prominent scholars examine the emergence of an Iranian nuclear political strategy and its role in shaping domestic political discourse and international security policy. Farideh Farhi examines Iran's nuclear policy and the rhetorical instruments used in the.*

Strategies for Writing a Conclusion Strategies for Writing a Conclusion Conclusions are often the most difficult part of an essay to write, and many writers feel that they have nothing left to say after having written the paper. A writer needs to keep in mind that the conclusion is often what a reader remembers best. Your conclusion should be the best part of your paper. A conclusion should stress the importance of the thesis statement, give the essay a sense of completeness, and leave a final impression on the reader. Suggestions Answer the question "So What? Show them that your paper was meaningful and useful. They have read it. Show them how the points you made and the support and examples you used were not random, but fit together. Redirect your readers Give your reader something to think about, perhaps a way to use your paper in the "real" world. If your introduction went from general to specific, make your conclusion go from specific to general. By demonstrating how your ideas work together, you can create a new picture. Often the sum of the paper is worth more than its parts. Strategies Echoing the introduction: Echoing your introduction can be a good strategy if it is meant to bring the reader full-circle. If you begin by describing a scenario, you can end with the same scenario as proof that your essay was helpful in creating a new understanding. Example Introduction From the parking lot, I could see the towers of the castle of the Magic Kingdom standing stately against the blue sky. To the right, the tall peak of The Matterhorn rose even higher. From the left, I could hear the jungle sounds of Adventureland. As I entered the gate, Main Street stretched before me with its quaint shops evoking an old-fashioned small town so charming it could never have existed. Disneyland may have been built for children, but it brings out the child in adults. Conclusion I thought I would spend a few hours at Disneyland, but here I was at 1: I could see tired children, toddling along and struggling to keep their eyes open as best they could. My forty-year-old feet ached, and I felt a bit sad to think that in a couple of days I would be leaving California, my vacation over, to go back to my desk. But then I smiled to think that for at least a day I felt ten years old again. By issuing a challenge to your readers, you are helping them to redirect the information in the paper, and they may apply it to their own lives. Example Though serving on a jury is not only a civic responsibility but also an interesting experience, many people still view jury duty as a chore that interrupts their jobs and the routine of their daily lives. Thus, jury duty challenges us to be interested and responsible citizens. Looking to the future: It may help them apply the new information to their lives or see things more globally. Example Without well-qualified teachers, schools are little more than buildings and equipment. If higher-paying careers continue to attract the best and the brightest students, there will not only be a shortage of teachers, but the teachers available may not have the best qualifications. Our youth will suffer. And when youth suffers, the future suffers. Posing questions, either to your readers or in general, may help your readers gain a new perspective on the topic, which they may not have held before reading your conclusion. It may also bring your main ideas together to create a new meaning. Instead, most tell us what a boob or knave the opposing candidate is, or they present general images of the candidate as a family person or God-fearing American. Do such advertisements contribute to creating an informed electorate or a people who choose political leaders the same way they choose soft drinks and soap? For questions and suggestions, please e-mail us at [leolink@stcloudstate.edu](mailto:leolink@stcloudstate.edu). This document may be copied for educational purposes only. If you copy this document, please include our copyright notice and the name of the writer; if you revise it, please add your name to the list of writers. Techniques and examples are adapted from Basic Writing:

**Chapter 7 : Iran's Foreign Policy: From Khatami to Ahmadinejad by Anoushiravan Ehteshami**

*I Judith S. Yaphe THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY WINTER him or pray someone else will. Imposing sanctions and seeking to eliminate him as the ruler of Iraq are options the United States is willing to pursue.*

The United States no longer expects to see a model new democracy, a self-supporting oil industry or a society in which the majority of people are free from serious security or economic challenges, U. Iraqi officials yesterday struggled to agree on a draft constitution by a deadline of tomorrow so the document can be submitted to a vote in October. The political transition would be completed in December by elections for a permanent government. But the realities of daily life are a constant reminder of how the initial U. Parents fearful of kidnapping are keeping children indoors. Barbers post signs saying they do not shave men, after months of barbers being killed by religious extremists. Ethnic or religious-based militias police the northern and southern portions of Iraq. Analysts estimate that in the whole of Iraq, unemployment is 50 percent to 65 percent. The ferocious debate over a new constitution has particularly driven home the gap between the original U. Kurds and Shiites are expecting de facto long-term political privileges. In the race to meet a sequence of fall deadlines, the process of forging national unity behind the constitution is largely being scrapped, current and former officials involved in the transition said. The goal now is to ensure a constitution that can be easily amended later so Iraq can grow into a democracy, U. On security, the administration originally expected the U. The surprising scope of the insurgency and influx of foreign fighters has forced Washington to repeatedly lower expectations -- about the time-frame for quelling the insurgency and creating an effective and cohesive Iraqi force capable of stepping in, U. Killings of members of the Iraqi security force have tripled since January. Last week was the fourth-worst week of the whole war for U. Yves Fontaine said Friday. Convoys ferrying food, fuel, water, arms and equipment from Kuwait, Jordan and Turkey are attacked about 30 times a week, Fontaine said. There is also growing talk of turning over security responsibilities to the Iraqi forces even if they are not fully up to original U. But necessary is the key word -- necessary for them or for us? When we finally depart, it will probably be for us," a U. Pressed by the cost of fighting an escalating insurgency, U. But Iraq, ranked among world leaders behind Saudi Arabia in proven oil reserves, is incapable of producing enough refined fuel amid a car-buying boom that has put an estimated 1 million more vehicles on the road after the invasion. Lines for subsidized cheap gas stretch for miles every day in Baghdad. Oil production is estimated at 2. The United States had high hopes of quick, big-budget fixes for the electrical power system that would show Iraqis tangible benefits from the ouster of Hussein. But inadequate training for Iraqi staff, regional rivalries restricting the power flow to Baghdad, inadequate fuel for electrical generators and attacks on the infrastructure have contributed to the worst summer of electrical shortages in the capital. Water is also a "tough, tough" situation in a desert country, said a U. Pumping stations depend on electricity, and engineers now say the system has hundreds of thousands of leaks. But most damage was from looting [after the invasion], which took down state industries, large private manufacturing, the national electric" system. Ironically, White said, the initial ambitions may have complicated the U. The higher your expectation, the longer you have to stay. Getting out is going to be a more important consideration than the original goals were. Moving the goal posts again, I see. We went from "mushroom cloud" to "Yeah, but Saddam slaughtered more Iraqis than we have. One of the Bush drones in another thread proclaims the left is usually wrong about their predictions. I believe the exact opposite is true. In all seriousness, what has the Bush administration gotten right about Iraq? This seems to be only the latest example in a continual series of miscalculations, baseless optimism, and outright deceptions.