

## Chapter 1 : Epistemic Contextualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*Epistemic contextualism (EC) is a recent and hotly debated position. EC is roughly the view that what is expressed by a knowledge attribution "S knows that p" depends partly on something in the context of 'the attributor', and hence the view is often called 'attributor contextualism'.*

Morality and Ethical Judgment Contextualism is one of the types of criteria we use to make a relevant and meaningful ethical decision. By definition, contextualism establishes that what is ethically right is determined by the situation rather than by a formal law or rule. This method of decision making has its advantages and disadvantages, an advantage would be the fact that this ethical judgment can be made only after the problem situation exists, not before. A disadvantage would be that no moral values or beliefs matter when making a decision. We will write a custom essay sample on Contextualism: Morality and Ethical Judgment specifically for you ORDER NOW. It is a theory or view of ethics that diminishes general moral principles while emphasizing the source of moral judgments in the distinctive characters of specific situations. In other words, people decide the action they will take the moment they are in that situation, never before. For example, if I were to practice abortion, I would decide whether that was right or wrong the moment I am in that situation of course thinking about the well-being of others, in this case, my well-being or the future baby. This action is up to discussion and used for this purpose as an example to clarify the definition. All of us are at some point in our lives have experienced being in those type of situations. For example, when a person lies to their family members in order to protect themselves or their loved ones by not telling the truth, that way of acting may not be ethical but the decision was made out of the concern for the well being of others which makes it right. People may not think about the consequences of that action but according to this principle, that person is unequivocally moral. On the other hand, formalism and most forms of relativism will not consider this as an advantage because lying goes against their fundamentals. In our society, honesty is one of the best qualities to have and practice; and although it is seen daily, it is never acceptable. A disadvantage of Contextualism could be that no moral values or beliefs matter when making a decision. On the opposite side, the foundation for the Formalism and Relativism is morality. The decisions we make are based on what the implied natural laws or what the society we live in establishes. This means, the situation comes after not before. An Introduction to the Art of Wondering. In the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved November 20, , from <http://www.randomhouse.com> Retrieved November 22,

**Chapter 2 : Moral contextualism definition**

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One such strand was the entertaining of the possibility of some kind of pluralism concerning epistemic standards. It is one thing in a street encounter, another in a classroom, another in a law court—and who is to say it cannot be another in a philosophical discussion? This provides a way of limiting skeptical threats, just because skeptical possibilities that a certain animal is really just a cleverly disguised mule, that I am now merely dreaming that I am sitting at my desk, that the seemingly intelligent agents around me are in fact just automatons might not be relevant, at least not ordinarily. As Austin famously puts it: But, insofar as there is some interesting variation in the set of relevant alternatives to a given proposition, we have the possibility of there being a corresponding variation in what it takes to know that p, and so a kind of pluralism here as well. For some discussion, see Goldman According to Annis, however, this picture fails to do justice to what is in fact the social character of justification. Suppose we are interested in whether Jones, an ordinary non-medically trained person, has the general information that polio is caused by a virus. If his response to our question is that he remembers the paper reporting that Salk said it was, then this is good enough. He has performed adequately given the issue-context. But suppose the context is an examination for the M. Here we expect a lot more. If the candidate simply said what Jones did, we would take him as being very deficient in knowledge. Thus relative to one issue-context a person may be justified in believing h but not justified relative to another context. So too, there are clear differences among the views just sketched as to just how we are to conceive of context, insofar as it is thought to be of central epistemological importance: DeRose, , , ; Heller, b, ff. Further Clarification So EC, of the sort which will concern us here, is a semantic thesis: In this respect, knowledge utterances are supposed to resemble utterances involving uncontroversially context-sensitive terms. Similarly, it is plausible though by no means universally accepted—see, e. That is, it is not as though 1 - 3 each has fixed truth-evaluable contents, the truth values of which happen to depend on context. For it is only relative to such facts that tokenings of such sentences have specific contents, and just what contents they do have depends on context. So too for epistemic contextualism: In the same way: So it is misleading too when EC of the form under discussion is described, as it sometimes is, as the view that whether one knows depends upon context, or as bearing on the nature of knowledge Bach , 55, n. As Richard Feldman says, “it is not true that contextualism holds that the standards for knowledge change with context. Feldman , 24; cf. Nonetheless, as we will see, when various proponents of EC flesh out their preferred version of the views, the differences among the resulting theories largely recapitulate some of the major lines of division among leading theories of knowledge itself. Finally, though there are connections between them touched on briefly in Section 4. But while, in the abstract, EC strikes many as quite contentious, according to its proponents it has considerable merits. Thus, although EC is not itself a theory of knowledge or related epistemic notions, it has been said to afford a resolution of certain apparent epistemological puzzles, both ordinary and extra-ordinary. More specifically, EC is said to give us a way of responding to certain cases in which we have apparently inconsistent knowledge claims, each of which enjoys some real plausibility. So that is the natural place to start. Consider one particular form of skeptical argument upon which leading contextualists have focused e. By waving my arms around? As to P2, it is just an instance of the closure principle for knowledge,[ 6 ] which many are inclined to regard as axiomatic. But b given our intuitive anti-skepticism, C seems immensely implausible, even though c the argument appears to be formally valid. On the face of it, then, we are confronted with a paradox—a set of independently very plausible but seemingly mutually inconsistent propositions. Because that is the problem, a complete solution to SA will have to do two things DeRose Essential to EC is the idea that these three options do not exhaust the possible responses to SA. Well, we might conclude iv that our concept of knowledge is somehow deeply incoherent, and that epistemological paradoxes such as SA are for this reason irresolvable. This is the view Stephen Schiffer , recommends. But

that strikes many as no more satisfactory than i directly embracing skepticism. Like i , iv is a result to be avoided if it is at all possible to do so. Fortunately, according to the contextualist, there is another way out. Thus an utterance of P1, such as occurs in SA, expresses a truth only because, owing to the introduction of a high-standards context, what it expresses is that the subject does not stand in an extraordinarily strong epistemic position with regard to the proposition that he has hands. But that, of course, is compatible with his meeting lower, though still perhaps quite demanding, standards, such as those in play in more ordinary contexts. As DeRose puts it: Thus our ordinary claims to know [are] safeguarded from the apparently powerful attacks of the skeptic, while, at the same time, the persuasiveness of the skeptical arguments is explained. After all, it is only because we thought this that SA posed a problem to which contextualism, or any of i - iii , might be offered as a solution. According to the contextualist treatment of the skeptical paradox, competent speakers can fail to be aware of these context-sensitive standards, at least explicitly, and so fail to distinguish between the standards that apply in skeptical contexts, and the standards that apply in everyday contexts. This misleads them into thinking that certain knowledge ascriptions conflict, when they are in fact compatible. Contextualism thus combines a contextualist semantics for knowledge ascriptions with a kind of error theory—a claim that competent speakers are systematically misled by the contextualist semantics. Cohen , 77; see too: Cohen a, 60; and DeRose , 40—41; , ; b, 37; , As it happens, though, in SA P2 is being evaluated at fairly high standards; for those standards are the ones put into play by the mentioning of P1. And this in turn provides an answer to the question of just which alternatives to what is believed are relevant: Justification, of course, comes in degrees; and what counts as justification simpliciter—i. What the skeptic does is make salient certain not-p possibilities e. For skepticism—indeed, epistemology generally—just is the making salient of certain possibilities of error. To ask, for example, whether we know that we are not BIVs, as assessing the first premise of SA requires, is ipso facto not to ignore that possibility. That indeed, is why the possibility that one is a BIV is among the skeptical possibilities singled out by philosophers for attention. As stated by Blome-Tillman, x pragmatically presupposes p in C [iff] x is disposed to behave, in her use of language, as if she believed p to be common ground in C. Still other versions of EC takes the shifting standards to directly govern ascriptions of evidence. The relevant rule here once again bears certain similarities to those proposed by Cohen and Lewis: According to Rieber, however, explanations are always at least implicitly contrastive, and whether one thing explains another will depends upon which contrasts are salient. For, as applied to SA, it would have the consequence that what the conclusion of that argument actually says is: Once again, then, armed with the correct contextualist semantics for the relevant claims, we can see that the conclusion of SA may be true, but that, contrary to appearances, that conclusion is not incompatible with a typical claim to know various mundane matters of fact. More generally, when is the attainment of a true belief genuinely creditable to the agent? It is here that contextual matters enter in. And now we have an argument for EC: As noted in Section 3. Once again, however, there is a strong degree of consensus among the theories under discussion that context itself is to be understood in terms of such things as the interests, purposes, expectations, and so forth, of the knowledge attributor. Further, there is of course consensus among these theorists that, understood along those lines, context affects the truth-conditional content of knowledge sentences—and, in fact, that this phenomenon is what underlies and explains the power of skeptical arguments, even though it also reveals why those arguments do not threaten our ordinary claims to know. For on all such views, it is only by effecting shifts in the epistemic standards, and so in what the relevant claims express, that the skeptic is able to truthfully state his view. So, in this sense, the contextualist stands to lose something if it in fact turns out that the skeptic is only very rarely or never able to raise the standards for a knowledge-ascribing sentence to express a truth. For then some other account would be required to explain the apparent power of arguments like SA. For there too, they say, we find evidence of the very same sort of context-sensitivity which skeptical arguments are actually exploiting. As Hookway puts the general claim: For a couple of reasons, it is very important not to overlook the appeal to everyday cases—that is, not to restrict ourselves to a consideration of apparently inconsistent knowledge claims where one of these claims arises in a clearly skeptical context. They want to know whether the flight has a layover in Chicago. They overhear someone ask a passenger Smith if he knows whether the flight stops in Chicago. It could

contain a misprint. They could have changed the schedule at the last minute. They decide to check with the airline agent. Keep in mind, though, a point stressed in Section 2: What reason is there, though, for adopting this way of resolving the apparent incompatibility between the two knowledge utterances? Well, it is important that the low-stakes claim be true, since that preserves our intuitive anti-skepticism—the thought that we do know many things: Certainly they are being prudent in refusing to rely on the itinerary. They have a very important meeting in Chicago. Yet if Smith knows on the basis of the itinerary that the flight stops in Chicago, what should they have said? Cohen, 58 But we can avoid having to make sense of such claims, and having to explain why we mistakenly thought that what Mary and John were saying was correct, if we accept EC: As we saw, the perhaps-natural denial of knowledge to Smith, in the preceding example, is like this. Thus, while the probability of holding the winning ticket in a fair lottery may be vanishingly small assuming there are very many tickets, etc., many balk at crediting any given ticket-holder with knowledge that their ticket is not the winner. But why should that be if, as fallibilism about knowledge has it, one does not need evidence that guarantees the truth of a belief in order to know? Some contextualists again—notably Lewis and Greco, — have assayed extending EC to the Gettier problem as well on the latter, see Steup, Section 2. But this remains a much more controversial move among proponents of EC. Further, there is some disagreement among contextualists as to the status of the closure principle for knowledge, mentioned in Section 3. The majority view is that closure should be preserved Mark Heller is the notable exception; see note 7, below, but also—of course, given EC—that it should be seen as holding only within a given context, on pain of equivocation. As such disagreement illustrates, what one makes of closure and of EC are orthogonal issues—even if one prefers EC in an RA guise.

## Chapter 3 : The Parenting of Adolescents and Adolescents as Parents: A Developmental Contextual Perspective

*consequences, then understanding is a relation between our hypotheses and these consequences. "Knowledge," on these terms, is bestowed upon consequences so assured and stable as to be accepted as facts: the inert core, to paraphrase William James, of the living tree of.*

Within epistemology alone, there are two broad categories of theories that have been called "contextualist": Subject Contextualism A few basic concepts are needed to explain subject contextualism. Let  $S$  be an epistemic subject, a being whose cognitive attitudes are proper targets of epistemic evaluation. Let  $C$  be a cognitive attitude that  $S$  has.  $C$  may be a belief, a judgment, a high degree of confidence, an affirmation or endorsement of some kind—any attitude that is a proper target of epistemic evaluation.  $C$  has a propositional content  $p$ . Finally, let  $x$  be the situation in which  $S$   $C$  s that  $p$ . One or another version of such a view has been suggested in various passages in the writings of C. Quine , and J. But only since the mid-1970s has subject contextualism been developed with any precision and generality. The different versions of subject contextualism differ from each other in at least two ways. First, these different versions specify different features of  $x$  as relevant to constitutively determining whether  $S$   $C$  s that  $p$  in  $x$ . Second, these different versions of subject contextualism specify different ways in which the relevant feature of  $x$  can determine whether  $S$   $C$  s that  $p$ . By differences of the first kind, we can distinguish the various theories of subject contextualism that have been propounded into three broad groups. The most prominent argument in favor of this first variety of subject contextualism proceeds from consideration of case pairs such as the following from Goldman. Suppose that, in normal daylight, Henry, who has normal visual powers, has an unobstructed view of a barn right in front of him. Henry sees the barn, has a normal visual experience as of a barn, and believes that there is a barn in front of him. If there is nothing unusual about the case, then Henry knows that there is a barn in front of him. In this second case, just as in the first case, Henry has a true belief that there is a barn in front of him. But in the second case, unlike the first, Henry does not know that there is a barn in front of him. What difference in the two cases could account for this difference in whether or not Henry knows? Opponents of this first variety of subject contextualism typically respond to the preceding argument by offering an alternative explanation of why Henry knows, in the first case but not in the second case, that there is a barn in front of him. In each case, they contend, Henry believes that there is a barn in front of him partly because he believes that, in his environment, things that look like barns from his vantage point typically are barns. So his belief that there is a barn in front of him is partly based on the latter epistemic belief. And the epistemic belief is true in the first case and false in the second case. It is the difference in the truth-value of the epistemic belief that explains why Henry knows in the first case but does not know in the second case—or so say the opponents of this first variety of subject contextualism. According to a second group of subject-contextualist theories Annis , Williams , Henderson , Klein , whether  $S$   $C$  s that  $p$  in  $x$  constitutively depends on the inquiry that takes place in  $x$ . The main argument for this second variety of subject contextualism, propounded in different ways by Annis, Williams, and Klein, has to do with the regress of reasons. According to this argument, neither foundationalism nor coherentism offers a correct account of structure of epistemic reasons, or justifications. Foundationalism cannot offer a correct account, because it is committed to the unsustainable claim that some cognitive attitudes—the foundational beliefs—are intrinsically justified. And coherentism cannot offer a correct account, because it is committed to claiming either that circular reasoning provides justification or that each belief in a coherent set is a foundational belief. According to this second variety of subject contextualism, this question is best answered as follows:  $S$ , in a particular context of inquiry, makes certain presuppositions. But when  $S$  moves into a different context of inquiry, some presuppositions in the earlier inquiry may be put into question in the new inquiry, and other propositions that were in question in the earlier inquiry may simply be presupposed in the new inquiry. To the preceding argument, Henderson adds that because our cognitive competence is limited, in ways that can be empirically ascertained, we are incapable of forming beliefs about our environment without taking a great deal for granted. What we need to take for granted to form needed beliefs will vary from task to task. Since we are incapable of forming the

beliefs that we need to form without taking a great deal for granted, we cannot be epistemically obligated to do otherwise. Our epistemic obligations cannot exceed our cognitive potential. Since our belief-forming processes require us to take more or less for granted, depending on the cognitive task at hand, our epistemic obligations must allow us to take more or less for granted, depending on the task. Opponents of this second variety of subject contextualism typically respond to the preceding arguments by defending foundationalism or coherentism. While foundationalist and coherentist theories of justification might hold us to normative standards that we do not commonly meet, this is not a problem for those theories if, in the epistemological realm, "ought" does not imply "can. The most prominent argument in favor of this third variety of subject contextualism considers pairs of cases such as the following adapted from Fantl and McGrath. Suppose that you are at the train station waiting for the train to New York. You would like to get on the express train so that you can be in New York by dinnertime, but it does not matter all that much to you whether you get there by dinnertime or not. You ask someone else on train platform, "Is the next train an express train, or a local? You believe her, and you have no reason to distrust her. In this situation, it seems that you know, and are justified and warranted in believing, that the next train is an express. But now suppose that the situation is exactly the same except that your life depends on your being in New York by dinnertime. In this case, the testimony of your honest and knowledgeable interlocutor does not justify or warrant—let alone give you knowledge—that the next train is an express. When so much depends on your being right, knowledge, justification, warrant, etc. These are the main varieties of subject contextualism, and the arguments concerning them. Some subject contextualists are also attributor contextualists, and almost all attributor contextualists are also subject contextualists. Attributor Contextualism A few more basic concepts are needed to explain what attributor contextualism is. Let  $y$  be the situation that  $A$  is in when  $A$  evaluates whether  $S$  C s that  $p$  in  $x$ . The earliest prominent statements of such a view appear in Lewis and Dretske. The view gained widespread notice following the publication of Cohen, DeRose, and Lewis. By differences of the first kind, we can distinguish the various attributor-contextualist theories on offer into several groups. Although there is thus some diversity among attributor-contextualist theories, a single line of argument has generally been used to support attributor contextualism. The argument in question proceeds from consideration of cases similar to those commonly adduced to support the third variety of subject contextualism. Suppose that Jones and Smith are at the train station trying to catch a train to New York. They want to know whether the next train is an express. They ask a bystander if he knows whether the next train is an express. The bystander looks at a schedule and replies, "Yes, I know. It is an express. Jones says, "That schedule could easily have been outdated. That guy does not really know that the next train is an express. If the bystander is right that he knows, then is Jones making a false assertion when he says that the bystander does not know. If such warrant is strong enough to give the bystander knowledge, then, it seems, it is also strong enough to give Jones and Smith knowledge. But if Jones and Smith have warrant strong enough to give them knowledge that the next train is an express, they have no reason to check further whether the next train is an express. Since they clearly do have a reason to check further whether or not the next train is an express, their warrant cannot be strong enough to give them knowledge of whether or not it is. But if they do not have enough warrant for knowledge, then it seems that the bystander does not know, since he does not have any more warrant than they do. Suppose that the bystander is wrong, that he does not know that the next train is an express. So if the bystander does not know that the next train is an express, then most of us know very little of what we ordinarily claim to know. How can we avoid simply granting that Jones and Smith are right to deny that the bystander knows, or that the bystander is right to claim to know? The attributor contextualist avoids granting this by claiming that the truth-values of knowledge attributions are relative to the context in which the attribution is made. Relative to the context in which the bystander claims to know, her claim is true. But relative to the context in which Jones claims that the bystander does not know, his claim is true. So both claims are true, and they do not contradict each other. These assertions only appear to contradict each other because we fail to notice that "knows" requires a higher standard or signifies a more stringent epistemic relation in one context of attribution than in the other context of attribution than in the other context of attribution. Analogous arguments may support the conclusion that ascriptions of other epistemic properties, not just ascriptions of knowledge, are semantically

sensitive to context. Opponents of attributor contextualism will typically reply to an argument like the preceding in one or both of the following two ways. First, like Bach, they may claim that, although the bystander knows that the next train is an express, Jones and Smith do not know, and that is because knowledge requires sufficient confidence. Although the bystander is sufficiently confident that the next train is an express, Jones and Smith are not, and so they do not satisfy one of the necessary conditions of knowledge. This suggests a second line of response to the attributor-contextualist argument above: Even if Jones and Smith, prior to doing any further investigation, are sufficiently confident that the next train is an express, their confidence is unreasonable, given how much is at stake. To do this, they must focus on a particular epistemic subject  $S$  in a particular context  $x$ , and then find variation in the truth conditions for asserting that  $S$   $C$   $s$  that  $p$  in  $x$ . To make the case for attributor contextualism, they must make sure that the variation they discover is variation in the truth conditions of an ascription of knowledge, and not simply in the conditions under which we are inclined to make, or are warranted in making, the ascription. DeRose undertook to do all this. Three other sorts of argument that have commonly been used to support attributor contextualism. The first is an argument to the effect that attributor contextualism provides the best response to a skeptical argument like the following: I cannot possibly know that I am not a brain in a vat being electrochemically stimulated to have realistic experiences. If I knew that I have hands, then I could deduce, and thereby come to know, that I am not a brain in a vat being electrochemically stimulated to have realistic experiences. I do not know that I have hands. While some philosophers would simply deny one of the premises, attributor contextualists typically take such denial to be implausible. So how can attributor contextualists avoid accepting the skeptical conclusion of such an argument? They can do so by claiming that the skeptical conclusion is true only relative to contexts of attribution that we enter into by thinking in some way or other about premise 1. Relative to other, more commonplace, contexts of attribution, premise 1 is false, as is the skeptical conclusion of the argument. Attributor contextualists typically take this response to the skeptical argument above to be more plausible than any alternative response, and they take this to count as a point in favor of attributor contextualism concerning knowledge attributions. Analogous arguments have been adduced in favor of attributor contextualism concerning attributions of other epistemic properties.

## Chapter 4 : Contextualism - Wikipedia

*Contextualism describes a collection of views in philosophy which emphasize the context in which an action, utterance, or expression occurs, and argues that, in some important respect, the action, utterance, or expression can only be understood relative to that context.*

From Lerner, et al. For example, among to year-old African American youth, social support from kin was related to self-reliance and good school grades; however, when kinship support was low the youth experienced feelings of distress Taylor, Students from intact families are least likely to drop out. Similarly, youth from such families are less likely to experiment with drugs than are adolescents from single-parent families Turner, Irwin, Millstein, Of course, however, adults differ in the ways in which they enact their role as parent. They show different styles of raising their children. Differences in child rearing styles is associated with important variation in adolescent development. Child rearing styles in adolescence The classic research of Diana Baumrind , resulted in the identification of three major types of child rearing styles: Authoritative, authoritarian, and permissive. The first style of rearing is marked by parental warmth, the use of rules and reasoning induction to promote obedience and keep discipline, non-punitive punishment e. Indeed, because of the diversity of behavioral patterns that can characterize the permissive parenting style, Maccoby and Martin proposed that this approach to parenting can best be thought of as two distinct types: Whether the three categories of rearing style originally proposed by Baumrind , , the four categories suggested by Maccoby and Martin , or other labels are used, it is clear that the behavioral variation summarized by use of the different categories is associated with differences in adolescent behavior and development Lamborn, et al. For example, in a study of over 4, 14 to 18 year olds, adolescents with authoritative parents had more social competence and fewer psychological and behavioral problems than youth with authoritarian, indulgent, or neglectful parents Lamborn, et al. In fact, youth with neglectful parents were the least socially competent and had the most psychological and behavioral problems of any group of adolescents in the study. In turn, youth with authoritarian parents were obedient and conformed well to authority, but had poorer self concepts than other adolescents. Finally, while youth with indulgent parents had high self confidence, they more often abused substances, misbehaved in school, and were less engaged in school. Moreover, adolescents with authoritative parents are more likely to have well-rounded peer groups, that is, groups that admire both adult as well as youth values and norms, e. In turn, youth with uninvolved parents had peer groups that did not support adult norms or values, and boys with indulgent parents were in peer groups that stressed fun and partying Durbin, et al. Considerable additional research confirms the generally positive influence on adolescent development of authoritative parenting and, in turn, of the developmental problems that emerge in youth when parents are authoritarian, permissive, indulgent, or uninvolved e. Socialization in adolescence Whatever style parents use to rear their adolescents, the goal of parenting is to raise a child who is healthy and successful in life, who can contribute to self and to society, who accepts and works to further the social order. The process--the behaviors that are used over time--to reach these goals is termed socialization. Although all societies socialize their youth in order that, as future contributors to society, the society can survive and prosper , there are marked differences in what different societies, or groups within society, want to see in a youth that has been "successfully" socialized. Said another way, there is great diversity in the specific goals parents have in socializing their youth. One way of illustrating this contextual variation and, as well, of judging whether parents and society at large have been successful in shaping youth to accept social values, is to ask youth what it means to be a good or a bad child. In one study that took this approach American, Japanese, and Chinese adolescents were asked "What is a bad kid? In America, youth answered that a lack of self control and substance abuse were the marks of being bad. In China, a youth who engaged in acts against society was judged as bad. In Japan, a youth who created disruptions of interpersonal harmony was regarded as bad. Another way of understanding the socialization process is to see how immigrants to a new country give up the values and customs of their country of origin and adopt those of their new one--a set of changes termed acculturation. This approach was used in a series of studies involving youth of Chinese ancestry, who were

either first generation Americans their parents were born in China and immigrated before the adolescent was born or second generation Americans their grandparents were born in China, but their parents had been born in the United States. These youth were contrasted to Chinese adolescents from Hong Kong, to youth of Chinese ancestry whose parents had immigrated to Australia, to European American youth, and to Anglo Australian youth. Still another approach to understanding socialization is to appraise whether different groups within a society direct their youth to comparable developmental achievements. Research in Israel, for instance, suggests that youth from Arab Israeli families are raised to view the father as having more power than the mother; in turn, Jewish Israeli youth see more maternal than paternal power Weller, Florian, Mikulincer, In turn, male and female adolescent immigrants from Third World countries to Norway differ in their attitudes toward acculturation Sam, ; although both groups place a lot of importance on maintaining their cultural heritage, boys favor acculturation more than girls. In the United States, while there is evidence of consistency in some socialization practices across diverse groups e. By virtue of the fact that society continues to evolve, and is not characterized by intergenerational warfare or revolution, and that the vast majority of youth become contributing adults to society, we can conclude that socialization "works," that the "apple does not fall far from the tree" Adelson, ; Lerner, It is through the relationships that parents and their adolescent children have that the most immediate bases are provided of youth behavior and development. Parent-child relationships in adolescence There are a range of behaviors and associated emotions exchanged between parents and their adolescent offspring: Some of these exchanges involve positive and healthy behaviors and others involve the opposite; some of the outcomes for adolescent development of these exchanges reflect good adjustment and individual and social success, whereas other outcomes reflect poor adjustment and problems of development. As is true for all facets of human development, there is then diversity in the nature and implications of parent-child relations in adolescence. Similarly, among German adolescents, parental behaviors marked by approval and attention to the positive behavior of the youth is associated with an adolescent who feels he or she is capable of controlling events that can affect him or her Krampen, ; however, when parental behaviors disparage the child and fail to attend to his or her specific behavior, the adolescent feels that chance determines what happens to him or her in life. As illustrated by the above studies, warmth, nonhostility, and closeness seem to be characteristics of parent-adolescent interaction that are associated with positive outcomes among youth. Other research confirms these linkages. The characteristics of parent-child interaction that are associated with positive outcomes for the adolescent are similar in that they reflect support for and acceptance of the developing youth. When such emotions occur in adolescence, positive outcomes for the youth are seen. In sum, then, parent-child relationships marked by behaviors supportive of the youth and by positive feelings connecting the generations are associated with psychologically and socially healthy developmental outcomes for the adolescent. However, some families do not have parent-child relations marked by support and positive emotions; and no family has such exchanges all the time. Families experience conflict and negative emotions. Such exchanges also influence the adolescent; but, as we might expect, the outcomes for youth of these influences differ from those associated with support and positive emotions. At the least, conflicts are a ubiquitous part of all families at some times in their history. Just as the reasons for conflicts between individuals, on the one hand, or nations, on the others, varies, so too do the reasons for conflicts in families. In turn, in a study of over 1, Latino, African American, and European American parents of adolescents, conflicts were said to occur in the main over everyday matters, such as chores and style of dress, rather than in regard to substantive issues, such as sex and drugs Barber, The presence of conflicts between youth and parents is, then, a fact of family life during adolescents. Arguments with their youngsters are events with which parents must learn to cope. Nevertheless, despite its developmental course, the presence of conflict at any point in the parent-adolescent relationship may influence the behavior and development of the youth. In addition, conflict is associated with "externalizing" problems e. Moreover, the negative emotions exchanged between adolescents and their parents can themselves result in problems for the youth. Moreover, parents of tenth graders with conduct problems are more hostile than parents of tenth graders with depression Ge, et al. Moreover, the presence of problem behaviors in parents per se is linked to problems in adolescent development. In short, the rearing of adolescents is not accomplished in the same way and with the same

outcomes by all parents. Adults vary in their parenting styles and in the manner in which they socialize their children. This variation is linked to different individual characteristics of parents and, as well, to the features of the proximal and distal contexts within which parents and families are embedded. This variation is associated also with differences in other contextual factors--relating, for instance, to parental education, family social support, parental mental health, family stability, and poverty. In turn, in regard to family stability, there is a considerable body of research that indicates that divorce is associated with social, academic, and personal adjustment problems, including those associated with early initiation of sexual behavior e. In addition, parent-child relations are less hierarchical and children are pushed to grow up faster in divorced families Smetana, Furthermore, in some cases there are gender differences in the reaction of adolescents to divorce. However, in the case of remarriage, there is evidence that although both male and female adolescents may have difficulty interacting with stepfathers, girls may have particular problems e. Moreover, both male and female adolescents show no improvement in relationships with their step fathers, or in behavior problems e. For instance, adolescents living with their fathers adjust more poorly than youth living in other arrangements e. These women must support themselves and their children and thus, in such contexts, maternal employment is virtually a necessity. Of course, women work outside the home even when they live in intact, two-parent families. Indeed, the majority of American mothers work outside the home, and do so for personal, social, and economic reasons that correspond to those found among men Hernandez, ; J. Despite their reasons for working, maternal employment per se has generally not been found to have adverse affects on the personal or social development of youth J. Simply, the mother feels stress because of the nature of her multiple roles. Lerner, ; J. Parental work and adolescents in self-care In addition, there may be implications for youth simply because, when their mother is at work, there is no parent in the home. Unsupervised time, especially the hours of 3: However, in such cases it is the lack of supervision and not maternal employment per se that is the source of these difficulties for youth. These problems can be counteracted, however. In addition, effective community programs for youth, for example, 4-H, Boys and Girls Clubs, and community athletics, can provide youth with attractive, positive, and productive ways to spend their time. Current opinion among leaders of such youth-serving organizations is that if such community programs are strengthened young adolescents will have richer experiences and fewer life problems Carnegie Corporation of New York, However, the positive effect of community programs may not be as readily achievable when the parents in a family are themselves adolescents. In such cases, the risks to offspring are increased. We turn, then, to this focus.

*CONTEXTUALISM* The term "contextualism" has been used to denote many different philosophical theories. Within epistemology alone, there are two broad categories of theories that have been called "contextualist": subject contextualism and attributor contextualism.

Knowledge constructed by the functional contextualist is general, abstract, and spatiotemporally unrestricted. Like a scientific principle, it is knowledge that is likely to be applicable to all or many similar such events, regardless of time or place. By studying the current and historical context in which behavior evolves, behavior analysts strive to develop analytic concepts and rules that are useful for predicting and changing psychological events in a variety of settings. The behavior-analytic approach to studying psychological events can be described as selectionistic. Essentially, "behavior analysts think of the shaping of behavior as working in just the same way as the evolution of species" Baum, , p. In biological evolution, contingencies of survival in a given environment select which genetic traits will persist in a species; in behavioral evolution, contingencies of reinforcement in a given context select which class of responses will persist or be likely to occur for an individual. Both the evolution of species and the evolution of behavior can be described as selection by consequences Skinner, , and the same process has also proven useful for interpreting the evolution of cultural practices Biglan, ; Harris, ; Skinner, . Indeed, behavior analysts consider human behavior to be "the joint product of a the contingencies of survival responsible for the natural selection of the species and b the contingencies of reinforcement responsible for the repertoires acquired by its members, including c the special contingencies maintained by an evolved social environment [a culture]" Skinner, , p. Contextualism and selectionism are closely related concepts, with selectionism being the causal mode inherent to contextual philosophy. Selectionism involves an emphasis on the role historical context and consequences play in shaping the form and function of the phenomenon of interest in the current settingâ€”an emphasis that clearly reflects both the root metaphor and truth criterion of contextualism. In fact, many of the distinctive characteristics of behavior analysis as a contextualistic science developed directly from this overarching goal. It is important to recognize that prediction and influence form a single goal, and functional contextualists thus value analyses that allow both the prediction and influence of psychological events. They seek to identify variables that "predict the event in question and would, if manipulated, affect the probability, incidence, or prevalence of the event" Biglan, , p. Analyses which only allow the prediction of behavior, or which rely on variables that are not manipulable at least in principle , are considered inadequate or incomplete. Although these models can be quite accurate predictors of psychological events, they are not very helpful to those who also wish to know how to influence or change psychological events. When one type of psychological event is said to cause or explain another, with limited reference to the impact of environmental or historical variables, we are left with little knowledge of how to change or influence either type of psychological event. To change or influence the behavior or psychological events of another person, we must search for manipulable variables in the environment. In addition, the purported "causes" of behavior in cognitive and mentalistic models are themselves psychological events that require explanation. What caused the attitude, for example, and how can we change it? To put this perspective in terms that may seem less controversial, behavior analysts simply believe that people learn how to think, reason, plan, construct meaning, problem-solve, and more through interactions with their natural, social, and cultural environments. Thus, behavior analysts attempt to identify aspects of the manipulable environment that influence the occurrence, incidence, prevalence, or probability of both private and overt psychological events. The most effective strategy for identifying variables that both predict and influence behavior is controlled experimentation: This orientation allows researchers to isolate which features of the context are functionally related to changes in the psychological event; purely descriptive or correlative research generally does not provide such knowledge. In behavior analysis, these procedures have traditionally involved the intensive study of individual organisms with time-series or repeated measures methodology e. Group designs using between-subject comparisons can be employed effectively for the purposes of functional contextualism, for example, and even correlational or predictive research of the sort

described above can provide clues about contextual variables that might impact behavior. Qualitative methodologies also have their uses in functional contextualism, but are not as effective as experimental procedures for testing the influence of environmental variables on behavior or for verifying the general utility of principles.

## Chapter 6 : BBC - Ethics - Introduction to ethics: Situation ethics

*In literary studies the question of the consequences of contextualism for the practices and self-understanding of the discipline has become one of the most hotly contested topics. The present book addresses this issue, with the purpose of providing a corrective to these debates, which have predominantly relied on simplified notions of the text.*

Context-sensitive expressions are ones that "express different propositions relative to different contexts of use". Contextualism was introduced, in part, in order to undermine skeptical arguments that have this basic structure: The main tenet of contextualist epistemology, no matter what account of knowledge it is wedded to, is that knowledge attributions are context-sensitive. Then the truth values of our term "know" depend on the context in which it is used. We can realize that in the context in which the standards to claim truthfully knowledge are so high. Nevertheless, if we utter the same proposition in an ordinary context. So, only when we participate in philosophical discourses of the skeptical sort, do we seem to lose our knowledge. However, once we leave the skeptical context, we can truthfully say we have knowledge. Contextualists use this to explain why skeptical arguments can be persuasive, while at the same time protecting the correctness of our ordinary claims to "know" things. It is important to note that this theory does not allow that someone can have knowledge at one moment and not the other, for this would hardly be a satisfying epistemological answer. What contextualism entails is that in one context an utterance of a knowledge attribution can be true, and in a context with higher standards for knowledge, the same statement can be false. What varies with context is how well-positioned a subject must be with respect to a proposition to count as "knowing" it. Contextualist accounts of knowledge became increasingly popular toward the end of the 20th century, particularly as responses to the problem of skepticism. This is a loose contextualist account of knowledge, and there are many significantly different theories of knowledge that can fit this contextualist template and thereby come in a contextualist form. Knowledge amounts to there being no "nearby" worlds in which one goes wrong with respect to p. But how close is sufficiently close? Example[ edit ] It is claimed that neurophilosophy has the goal of contextualizing. Contextualism is opposed to any general form of Invariantism, which claims that knowledge is not context-sensitive. SSI claims that it is the context of the subject of the knowledge attribution that determines the epistemic standards, whereas Contextualism maintains it is the attributor. IRI, on the other hand, argues that it is the context of the practical interests of the subject of the knowledge attribution that determines the epistemic standards. Thus, any view which maintains that something other than knowledge attributions are context-sensitive is not, strictly speaking, a form of Contextualism. DeRose responds to recent attacks on contextualism, and argues that contextualism is superior to these recent rivals. An alternative to contextualism called contrastivism has been proposed by Jonathan Schaffer. Contrastivism, like contextualism, uses semantic approaches to tackle the problem of skepticism. This research has proceeded by conducting experiments in which ordinary non-philosophers are presented with vignettes which involve a knowledge ascription. Participants are then asked to report on the status of that knowledge ascription. The studies address contextualism by varying the context of the knowledge ascription, e. In the studies completed up to this point, no support for contextualism has been found. More specifically, non-philosophical intuitions about knowledge attributions are not affected by the importance to the potential knower of the accuracy of that knowledge. Some may argue that these empirical studies for the most part have not been well designed for testing contextualism, which claims that the context of the attributor of "knowledge" affects the epistemic standards that govern their claims. Experimental work continues to be done on this topic.

## Chapter 7 : Values and the Scientific Culture of Behavior Analysis

*From the perspective of functional contextualism, behavior analysis is a natural science of behavior that seeks "the development of an organized system of empirically-based verbal concepts and rules that allow behavioral phenomena to be predicted and influenced with precision, scope, and depth" (Biglan & Hayes, , pp. ). By studying the.*

Abstract As scientists and practitioners, behavior analysts must make frequent decisions that affect many lives. Scientific principles have been our guide as we work to promote effective action across a broad spectrum of cultural practices. Yet scientific principles alone may not be sufficient to guide our decision making in cases with potentially conflicting outcomes. In such cases, values function as guides to work through ethical conflicts. We will examine two ethical systems, radical behaviorism and functional contextualism, from which to consider the role of values in behavior analysis, and discuss potential concerns. Implicit in our practices are numerous assumptions about the welfare of those we serve and how to best ensure it. Our scientific tradition has yielded a powerful behavioral technology, and our fields of application are ever expanding. In this tradition, scientific principles have been our guide to best practice. Yet scientific principles alone may not be sufficient to guide our decisions in situations with potentially conflicting outcomes. In such cases, values function as guides to action and play a key role in helping us work through ethical quandaries. If it is true that operating without a lucid set of guiding principles can bring about grave consequences Prilleltensky, , then it is in our best interest to have a working understanding of ethical systems that support values-based decision making in behavior-analytic practices. To this end, we will consider two separate philosophical approaches to behavior-analytic science each with its own ethically relevant consequences. From there, we will explore the relationship between values and scientific decision making from the tenets in each case. Specifically, we will examine the reaches and limitations of both systems in guiding decision making within situations involving value conflicts and ethical dilemmas. Finally, we will turn to philosophical pragmatism, focusing on the work of John Dewey, as a tradition that may help behavior analysts build a coherent knowledge and ethical system. The first philosophical approach we will discuss is B. In his treatment of values, Skinner dismisses the distinctions made by many philosophers between values and facts. Next we review contextualism, a philosophical framework originally proposed by Pepper and advanced as a worldview for behavior analysis by Hayes. Within contextualism the personal values of the scientist are considered to be the basis for the development of scientific goals. The scientist, in turn, is not in principle accountable to others in the scientific or broader community. Thus, we will consider some parallels between Machiavellian and contextualistic pragmatism and discuss moral considerations that may limit the adequacy of contextualism in guiding scientific decision making in difficult cases. The potential confluence of values and scientific decision making can be clearly depicted with a case study from feminist science. One defining aspect of feminist science is its understanding of scientific activity as political activity, and its willingness to explicitly allow political values to help guide choices when faced with conflict situations. We discuss the work of biologists Longino and Doell to illustrate how values may be used as guides to action in scientific decision making when they are made explicit, and scientific knowing is conceived as participating in a social context. This case study will lead to the final section of the paper in which we consider the philosophical pragmatism of Dewey, whose work we believe is particularly relevant for our behavior-analytic community. What we need, we believe, is serious and open dialogue on how we, as a community, can make valued ethical decisions and use them as guides to scientific action. The items on a list of values can be classified under three headings: At the center of B. Skinner described it this way: A culture corresponds to a species. We describe it by listing many of its practices, as we describe a species by listing many of its anatomical features. Two or more cultures may share a practice, as two or more species may share an anatomical feature. The practices of a culture, like the characteristics of a species, are carried by its members, who transmit them to other members. For example, he wrote, There are circumstances under which a group is more likely to survive if it is not happy, or under which it will survive only if large numbers of its members submit to slavery. We have no reason to urge them to do so. We need not say that anyone chooses survival as a criterion according to which a cultural practice is to be

evaluated. Human behavior does not depend upon the prior choice of any value. Thus, survival is a measure of effective action taken by a culture. So, for example, we may say that a liberal democracy and an Islamic theocracy are both examples of survival-worthy cultures due to cultural practices that have collectively led to effective action in each case. Some may want to argue that the effective cultural practices that one or both of these forms of government rely on for survival are undesirable, in the same sense that slavery is undesirable. Such concerns, however true, are irrelevant if the criterion of goodness is the Skinnerian one: One can see that B. Although Rorty was referring to the philosophy of John Dewey in this passage, his comments apply equally well to radical behaviorism. For Skinner, value-laden terms, such as good, function as tacts for reinforcers. Given that reinforcers are always functionally defined, it follows that values too may be understood functionally rather than as matters of metaphysics. He did not, however, dismiss value judgments but rather embraced them as part of the subject matter of a science of behavior. According to Skinner, it is not true that statements containing should or ought have no place in scientific discourse. However, it is important to provide translations of value statements in functional terms in order to reveal the relevant contingencies of reinforcement. Thus, because normative statements tact standards based on factual claims, we can bring evidence to bear on them e. Skinner believed that such analyses take on particular importance in the context of cultural design and the evaluation of cultural practices. Critics within the field of behavior analysis e. We will now examine each of these claims in more detail. This would require reliable knowledge of the future, which Staddon argues is not fully achievable given the unpredictable nature of evolution. To illustrate, he considers smoking and its health hazards, citing statistics in the New York Times Winter, from a recent study for the Czech Republic sponsored by the Philip Morris Company. Perhaps the same justification can be used to argue against or for stem cell research. If survival is deemed the ultimate criterion of value, then science cannot predict which values are appropriate because it cannot foresee which values will better aid survival of the culture. Skinner argued that science can contribute to the assessment of ethical matters because it relies on obtainable empirical evidence that can be used to justify our factual claims. As an example, we might advance the following injunction about the role of cultural survival as a value: Zuriff then examines the implications of the verbal relations established by Skinner in arguing that ethical injunctions can be substantiated. Using standard and familiar equivalence nomenclature, we may refer to good as A, reinforcers as B, and values as C. Now we recall that when we speak of reinforcers we are tacting events that enter into empirically observable relations. These relations are matters of fact because we must be able to observe the effects and functions of reinforcers in order to identify them as such. Thus, for Skinner, the equivalence that is derived between good and values i. Specifically, if what we call good A is equivalent to our values C, we should be able to offer empirical evidence of reinforcing functions B in order to obtain our equivalence relation. We would therefore not be warranted in speaking of cultural survival as a value C. In contrast to Skinner and his followers, such groups constitute distinct verbal communities. The first argument involves the reaches of science Staddon. Thus, we may not be able to fully ascertain potential benefits of objectionable practices or the long-term fallout of ones that seem advantageous. Because what different groups call good varies, we cannot distill strict rules for choosing among goods. The foregoing conclusions hold true not only for the culture at large but also for the subculture of scientists who adhere to a pragmatic goal orientation and effective action as a truth criterion in establishing the validity of scientific beliefs. An interesting question thus arises: More specifically, if, as Skinner suggests, contingencies of human survival will control the behavior of scientists in the long run, then what contingencies control scientific behavior in the short term? Zuriff suggests that in the short term, scientists will adopt whatever topics of study they individually find most rewarding. Most, if not all, behavior analysts may indeed function with a view to advancing practices that are in the long-term interest of the culture, but the rules of evidence of scientific inquiry do not prescribe checks and balances for them to do so. Indeed, Zuriff noted that lacking agreement on goals, purposes, and definitions of effectiveness, controversies among individuals over best practices are in part disagreements over values. However, implicating personal values as contingencies for scientific activity was untenable for Skinner. Although a functional analysis of values in terms of reinforcers does indeed seem plausible, a growing number of behavior analysts have chosen to retain personal values as a core concept of their scientific practice. This is known as contextualism, and it is

our next point of discussion. He interpreted this vagueness as indicative of dogmatism within radical behaviorism. When the scientist states explicit goals ahead of the analysis, he or she creates a standard against which to assess the effectiveness of the methodology. Thus, the claim is dogmatic and undermines pragmatism itself. For Hayes, the nondogmatic pragmatists recognize that their analytic goals are themselves arbitrary and fundamentally indefensible. In effect, the purposes of any given analysis are ultimately personal and subjective. Contextualists adopt a pragmatic stance on truth. The root metaphor of contextualism is the act in context. According to Pepper, acts have a satisfaction in their completion. In effect, scientific analyses also have desired consequences that can be satisfied, and herein lies the truth criterion of contextualism—the achievement of desired consequences or valued ends. One of the terms that Pepper uses to describe the truth criterion of contextualism is successful working. Successful working is an outcome concept that refers to reaching a goal or producing a desirable consequence to action. The terms goal, purpose, and desirable consequence all suggest that the important issue is not simply the presence or absence of any consequences, but the degree to which the consequence produced was part of the preanalytically specified outcome. Hayes, By allowing the scientist to evaluate the utility of a particular investigative methodology, the truth criterion is applied always in the service of moving him or her in the direction of the valued ends. It is important to understand that in contextualism, ultimate goals cannot themselves be justified—they may only be stated. The attempt to justify a goal requires the specification of yet another more global goal. Moreover, any attempt to demonstrate the value of a goal via successful working requires yet another analytic goal. Thus, only local goals can be justified, and the choice of an ultimate analytic goal is taken to be a personal rather than an ontological issue. Contextualists argue, therefore, that the use of a goal in contextualism cannot be dogmatic. There are an infinite number of valued ends towards which the analyst may move. Hayes provides the following examples: Once the behavior analyst has chosen a goal, he or she can assess the degree to which analytic practices have moved him or her towards that goal in the past and how likely they are to do so in the future.

### Chapter 8 : Martin Montminy, Contextualism, relativism and ordinary speakers' judgments - PhilPapers

*Introduction. According to contextualism in epistemology, the truth-value of knowledge attributions ("S knows that p") and knowledge denials ("S does not know that p") depends in some significant way on the context in which those sentences are uttered.*

### Chapter 9 : Contextualism | calendrierdelascience.com

*Developmental contextualism is a theory of human development (Lerner, , ; Lerner, et al., ) that focuses on the changing relations--or, better, coactions (Gottlieb, )--between the developing individual and his or her context.*