

## Chapter 1 : Modern Nationalism, the Masses & the Democracy of the Dead

*Nationalism is a modern movement. was thus much nearer to its religious matrix than later nationalisms that rose after secularization had made greater progress.*

Yet concrete analyses and political responses from the left are lagging behind the juggernaut of contemporary reaction. The aftermath of 11 September consolidated and intensified the colonial marriage of racism, xenophobia and far-right politics. Austerity and the prolonged impact of the global financial crisis has encouraged right-wing populisms. The buds of fascism are showing in Germany, Italy and central European countries like Poland and Hungary where fascism had been publicly rejected since the end of the Second World War. International powers fuel war in Syria and destabilise countries such as Libya, whilst refugees from the region provide convenient scapegoats for all social ills. Elsewhere, from Charlottesville to Sofia, violent neo-fascists and neo-Nazis reclaim a street presence and impact that would have been roundly condemned and resisted two decades ago. Across the globe, the limited gains of reformism have been rolled back and replaced by a renewed immiseration of the working classes and the denigration of women, racialised others, the disabled, non-gender-conforming people, the dispossessed and the different. Whilst, amongst some, such a state of affairs might encourage melancholia and withdrawal, for others it cries out for a radical left response. There are, however limited, seeds of hope to come from principled resistance to right-wing fascisms, nationalisms and populisms. The left must unify those who are threatened and those who are committed to resisting the right in solidarity, whilst transcending factionalist disagreements or a facile but politically naive and counterproductive left populism. This requires a renewed commitment to concrete analyses that challenge, oppose and dissect the cancerous growth of the contemporary far right: How is it anchored in the racism, authoritarianism and imperialism of the early twenty-first century world-order? What do the analyses of fascism, racism, nationalism and right-populism tell us about new articulations of the relationship between ideology, hegemony and political economy? No less important are, of course, the challenges for an effective resistance. What strategies for combatting the far right have proved productive – what can be learnt from countries where it has been kept in the margins? Can classical Marxist theories provide guidance during the present moment? How would they have to be updated and revised in the light of unfolding developments and changed circumstances? How can we rethink the conditions for a radical left strategy that would avoid sectarianism and work towards the mass mobilisation of subaltern classes around an anticapitalist project? Are there new dimensions of fascism, racism, sexism, homophobia and contemporary nationalisms that today require new and different as well as restated responses? What are the scope, limits and key characterising features of this latest articulation of right-wing politics? At the same time, the conference will include particular streams that will both extend the issues of combatting the new right whilst looking at particular agendas within their politics and theoretical contestations. In addition, as always, HM is open to proposals for panels and papers on any subject within the purview of Marxist and left radical thought and politics, including critical sociology; economics and the critique of political economy; cultural, literary and aesthetic theory; political science and theory; history and historiography; philosophy; law; science studies and any other relevant discipline.

**Chapter 2 : The Politics of Language and Nationalism in Modern Central Europe - Tomasz Kamusella - Go**

*The political concept of nationalism can be organized into various categories such as liberal, civic, ethnic or cultural, as the definition of nationalism varies. Although civilization has always had a tendency to organize itself around a shared identity, nationalism is generally identified as a modern movement.*

Optional Class Session One: Princeton University Press, Harvard University Press, He argues that the Great Wall had traditionally been associated with dynastic evil and that it became a symbol of national greatness only in the early twentieth century when the identity of Chinese civilization experienced a crisis. Class Session Three Optional: Stanford University Press, Using the case of Muslim Chinese, Gladney illustrates the complex pattern in which the identity, self-image, and ethnic boundaries of a minority group are defined. Cornell University Press, University of California Press, Yale University Press, The Chinese National Character. Best presented to students to accompany their reading prior to class, and then brought to class to structure discussion: Why is it important to consider the historical origins of the formation of the nation and present the diversity of representations of national identity that characterize nationalism in contemporary China? What does it tell us about the relationship between politics and culture in China? What are some comparisons similarities and differences that can be drawn between the process concerning national identity that has been going on in China since the beginning of the twentieth-century and any parallel processes going on in the U. From this perspective, is there a large difference between communist and democratic regimes? How is national identity a political project? What is its role in legitimating a ruling regime? In the construction of a modern nation? What are the competing interpretations or discourses of nationalism at work in Chinese politics today? Is there a real danger for the nation-state in popular nationalism? Or is it mainly a political tool to be utilized by the Chinese leadership? Critical Memo Assignment back to top This assignment can be used at the end of this or any other teaching unit to help students analytically connect the readings in the unit to broader topics e. The questions and topics for individual readings are intended to be incorporated into class sessions prior to the assignment of the critical memo. These questions and topics are designed to get students to begin thinking more in-depth about the readings for which the critical memo will be assigned. When the memo is assigned, have each student choose one of the readings from the teaching unit on which to focus in the memo. This reading could be a chapter from a book or an article. The three sections are designed to be addressed separately by students in order to encourage 1 conciseness in thinking and writing, and 2 selection and weighting of arguments or support for arguments. Section one is designed to help students think about the connections between readings in a semester-long course. Section two is designed to help students think about the broader implications of the reading about which they choose to write. The final section is to push students to analyze and think critically about the reading they have chosen, but in selective and concise ways. This assignment is adapted from <https://www.writingworkbooks.com/Preparatory-Guidelines-for-Writing-a-Critical-Memo/> The purpose of the critical memo is to enhance your critical thinking abilities using the assigned readings and to improve the depth and breadth of our in-class discussions. Simple summaries of the material are not sufficient. As preparation for writing the critical memo paper, think about the following questions and topics as we do each of the assigned readings. We will be incorporating these questions and topics into our in-class discussions and activities, so come prepared. Questions for individual readings: Is the author making an explicit argument about a topic? What are the most important points the author is trying to convey? How well does the author succeed in conveying these points? More interestingly, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the author? What kinds of evidence does the author use? What kinds of sources? If the author appears to be describing an apparently factual event, phenomenon, or theory, to what extent do you find the evidence presented convincing? Does the use of the evidence seem to you to be fair and reasonable? To what extent has the author presented the material objectively? Given the sources you have at your disposal in this course, what sorts of arguments might you have made that the author does not make? Topics for individual readings: As you think about the individual readings, compare the one you are reading to the others you have read this term. How might the authors of the articles speak to each other or what might they discuss if they were seated at a

seminar table, on the same roundtable panel, on a long flight together overseas? What would be their topic of conversation and what would be their points of agreement, disagreement, and compromise? To what extent are these authors talking about the same issue or different aspects of the same issue? That is, how do the themes in one reading relate to themes in earlier readings this term or themes and ideas in our class discussions? If you were invited to participate in their discussion, what would you say? In other words, would you find yourself siding more with one author than the other? What would that argument be or what would the additional evidence consist of? In what ways did it amplify, differ from, or change the impression you got from my summaries or our in-class discussions? Guidelines for writing the Critical Memo paper Memos are meant not only to assist you in carefully considering the readings you have done for this course, but also in understanding what they suggest about Chinese politics in particular and world politics more broadly. Memos should not be used to summarize the readings – I want to see evidence that you have thought analytically about the readings in some depth and considered their implications. To write an excellent memo, you need to:

Section 1 clearly marked: Section 2 clearly marked: Section 3 clearly marked: What are some of the contradictions or ambiguities in the reading? Does the author support all of his or her assumptions? What are the sorts of biases that exist in the reading? Are there ways that what is discussed in the text is congruent with your own experience? Did you have any particular personal responses to the reading?

## Chapter 3 : Spanish nationalism - Wikipedia

*Nationalism is a political, social, and economic system characterized by the promotion of the interests of a particular nation, especially with the aim of gaining and maintaining sovereignty (self-governance) over the homeland.*

Thu, 08 Nov , The HM conference is not a conventional academic conference but rather a space for discussion, debate and the launching of collective projects. We also strongly urge all speakers to take out personal subscriptions to the journal. There is no escaping the resurgence of far-right racisms, nationalisms, populisms and fascisms across the globe. Yet concrete analyses and political responses from the left are lagging behind the juggernaut of contemporary reaction. The aftermath of 11 September consolidated and intensified the colonial marriage of racism, xenophobia and far-right politics. Austerity and the prolonged impact of the global financial crisis has encouraged right-wing populisms. The buds of fascism are showing in Germany, Italy and central European countries like Poland and Hungary where fascism had been publicly rejected since the end of the Second World War. International powers fuel war in Syria and destabilise countries such as Libya, whilst refugees from the region provide convenient scapegoats for all social ills. Elsewhere, from Charlottesville to Sofia, violent neo-fascists and neo-Nazis reclaim a street presence and impact that would have been roundly condemned and resisted two decades ago. Across the globe, the limited gains of reformism have been rolled back and replaced by a renewed immiseration of the working classes and the denigration of women, racialised others, the disabled, non-gender-conforming people, the dispossessed and the different. Whilst, amongst some, such a state of affairs might encourage melancholia and withdrawal, for others it cries out for a radical left response. There are, however limited, seeds of hope to come from principled resistance to right-wing fascisms, nationalisms and populisms. The left must unify those who are threatened and those who are committed to resisting the right in solidarity, whilst transcending factionalist disagreements or a facile but politically naive and counterproductive left populism. This requires a renewed commitment to concrete analyses that challenge, oppose and dissect the cancerous growth of the contemporary far right: How is it anchored in the racism, authoritarianism and imperialism of the early twenty-first century world-order? What do the analyses of fascism, racism, nationalism and right-populism tell us about new articulations of the relationship between ideology, hegemony and political economy? No less important are, of course, the challenges for an effective resistance. What strategies for combatting the far right have proved productive – what can be learnt from countries where it has been kept in the margins? Can classical Marxist theories provide guidance during the present moment? How would they have to be updated and revised in the light of unfolding developments and changed circumstances? How can we rethink the conditions for a radical left strategy that would avoid sectarianism and work towards the mass mobilisation of subaltern classes around an anticapitalist project? Are there new dimensions of fascism, racism, sexism, homophobia and contemporary nationalisms that today require new and different as well as restated responses? What are the scope, limits and key characterising features of this latest articulation of right-wing politics?

**Chapter 4 : Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview - ABC-CLIO**

*Modern Nationalism, the Masses & the Democracy of the Dead (from "Revolt Against The Modern World") [ ] From what has been said previously it is possible to see that in modern society the opposite direction is prevailing, that is, the direction.*

The Enlightenment was cosmopolitan in its effort to spread the light of reason, but from the very beginning of the age there were nationalistic tendencies to be seen in varying shades. Although Rousseau himself was generally concerned with universal man in such works as *Emile*, Identification of state and people Nationalism, translated into world politics, implies the identification of the state or nation with the people—or at least the desirability of determining the extent of the state according to ethnographic principles. In the age of nationalism, but only in the age of nationalism, the principle was generally recognized that each nationality should form a state—its state—and that the state should include all members of that nationality. Formerly states, or territories under one administration, were not delineated by nationality. Men did not give their loyalty to the nation-state but to other, different forms of political organization: The nation-state was nonexistent during the greater part of history, and for a very long time it was not even regarded as an ideal. In the first 15 centuries of the Christian Era, the ideal was the universal world-state, not loyalty to any separate political entity. As political allegiance, before the age of nationalism, was not determined by nationality, so civilization was not thought of as nationally determined. Later, in the periods of the Renaissance and of Classicism, it was the ancient Greek and Roman civilizations that became a universal norm, valid for all peoples and all times. Still later, French civilization was accepted throughout Europe as the valid civilization for educated people of all nationalities. It was only at the end of the 18th century that, for the first time, civilization was considered to be determined by nationality. It was then that the principle was put forward that a man could be educated only in his own mother tongue, not in languages of other civilizations and other times, whether they were classical languages or the literary creations of other peoples who had reached a high degree of civilization. Cultural nationalism From the end of the 18th century on, the nationalization of education and public life went hand in hand with the nationalization of states and political loyalties. Poets and scholars began to emphasize cultural nationalism first. They reformed the mother tongue, elevated it to the rank of a literary language, and delved deep into the national past. Thus they prepared the foundations for the political claims for national statehood soon to be raised by the people in whom they had kindled the spirit. Before the 18th century there had been evidences of national feeling among certain groups at certain periods, especially in times of stress and conflict. The rise of national feeling to major political importance was encouraged by a number of complex developments: This large, unified territorial state, with its political and economic centralization, became imbued in the 18th century with a new spirit—an emotional fervour similar to that of religious movements in earlier periods. Under the influence of the new theories of the sovereignty of the people and the rights of man, the people replaced the king as the centre of the nation. State became identified with nation, as civilization became identified with national civilization. That development ran counter to the conceptions that had dominated political thought for the preceding 2, years. Hitherto man had commonly stressed the general and the universal and had regarded unity as the desirable goal. Nationalism stressed the particular and parochial, the differences, and the national individualities. Those tendencies became more pronounced as nationalism developed. Its less attractive characteristics were not at first apparent. In the 17th and 18th centuries the common standards of Western civilization, the regard for the universally human, the faith in reason one and the same everywhere as well as in common sense, the survival of Christian and Stoic traditions—all of these were still too strong to allow nationalism to develop fully and to disrupt society. Thus nationalism in its beginning was thought to be compatible with cosmopolitan convictions and with a general love of mankind, especially in western Europe and North America. European nationalism English Puritanism and nationalism The first full manifestation of modern nationalism occurred in 17th-century England, in the Puritan revolution. England had become the leading nation in scientific spirit, in commercial enterprise, in political thought and activity. Swelled by an immense confidence in the new age,

the English people felt upon their shoulders the mission of history, a sense that they were at a great turning point from which a new true reformation and a new liberty would start. In the English revolution an optimistic humanism merged with Calvinist ethics; the influence of the Old Testament gave form to the new nationalism by identifying the English people with ancient Israel. Surrounded by congregated multitudes, I now imagine that I beheld the nations of the earth recovering that liberty which they so long had lost; and that the people of this island are disseminating the blessings of civilization and freedom among cities, kingdoms and nations. English nationalism, then, was thus much nearer to its religious matrix than later nationalisms that rose after secularization had made greater progress. The nationalism of the 18th century shared with it, however, its enthusiasm for liberty, its humanitarian character, its emphasis upon the individual and his rights and upon the human community as above all national divisions. The rise of English nationalism coincided with the rise of the English trading middle classes. American nationalism was a typical product of the 18th century. British settlers in North America were influenced partly by the traditions of the Puritan revolution and the ideas of Locke and partly by the new rational interpretation given to English liberty by contemporary French philosophers. American settlers became a nation engaged in a fight for liberty and individual rights. They based that fight on current political thought, especially as expressed by Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine. It was a liberal and humanitarian nationalism that regarded America as in the vanguard of mankind on its march to greater liberty, equality, and happiness for all. The ideas of the 18th century found their first political realization in the Declaration of Independence and in the birth of the American nation. Their deep influence was felt in the French Revolution. French nationalism Jean-Jacques Rousseau had prepared the soil for the growth of French nationalism by his stress on popular sovereignty and the general cooperation of all in forming the national will, and also by his regard for the common people as the true depository of civilization. The nationalism of the French Revolution was more than that: Individual liberty, human equality, fraternity of all peoples: Under their inspiration new rituals were developed that partly took the place of the old religious feast days, rites, and ceremonies: In the most varied forms, nationalism permeated all manifestations of life. As in America, the rise of French nationalism produced a new phenomenon in the art of warfare: In America and in France, citizen armies, untrained but filled with a new fervour, proved superior to highly trained professional armies that fought without the incentive of nationalism. The revolutionary French nationalism stressed free individual decision in the formation of nations. Nations were constituted by an act of self-determination of their members. The plebiscite became the instrument whereby the will of the nation was expressed. In America as well as in revolutionary France, nationalism meant the adherence to a universal progressive idea, looking toward a common future of freedom and equality, not toward a past characterized by authoritarianism and inequality. In Germany the struggle was led by writers and intellectuals, who rejected all the principles upon which the American and the French revolutions had been based as well as the liberal and humanitarian aspects of nationalism. The revolutionary wave German nationalism began to stress instinct against reason; the power of historical tradition against rational attempts at progress and a more just order; the historical differences between nations rather than their common aspirations. The French Revolution, liberalism, and equality were regarded as a brief aberration, against which the eternal foundations of societal order would prevail. That German interpretation was shown to be false by the developments of the 19th century. Liberal nationalism reasserted itself and affected more and more people: Though his immediate hopes were disappointed, the 12 years from 1815 to 1848 brought the unification of Italy and Romania, both with the help of Napoleon III, and of Germany; at the same time the 19th century saw great progress in liberalism, even in Russia and Spain. The victorious trend of liberal nationalism, however, was reversed in Germany by Bismarck. He unified Germany on a conservative and authoritarian basis and defeated German liberalism. The German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine against the will of the inhabitants was contrary to the idea of nationalism as based upon the free will of man. The people of Alsace-Lorraine were held to be German by objective factors, by race, independent of their will or of their allegiance to any nationality of their choice. Courtesy of the Museo del Risorgimento, Milan In the second half of the 19th century, nationalism disintegrated the supranational states of the Habsburgs and the Ottoman sultans, both of which were based upon prenational loyalties. In Russia, the penetration of nationalism produced two opposing schools of thought. Some nationalists proposed a

westernized Russia, associated with the progressive, liberal forces of the rest of Europe. Others stressed the distinctive character of Russia and Russianism, its independent and different destiny based upon its autocratic and orthodox past. These Slavophiles, similar to and influenced by German romantic thinkers, saw Russia as a future saviour of a West undermined by liberalism and the heritage of the American and French revolutions. One of the consequences of World War I was the triumph of nationalism in central and eastern Europe. Those states in turn, however, were to be strained and ravaged by their own internal nationality conflicts and by nationalistic disputes over territory with their neighbours. But the Bolsheviks also claimed the leadership of the world Communist movement, which was to become an instrument of the national policies of the Russians. After the war he found nationalism one of the strongest obstacles to the expansion of Soviet power in eastern Europe. National communism, as it was called, became a divisive force in the Soviet bloc. In Tito, the Communist leader of Yugoslavia, was denounced by Moscow as a nationalist and a renegade; nationalism was a strong factor in the rebellious movements in Poland and Hungary in the fall of ; and subsequently its influence was also felt in Romania and Czechoslovakia and again in Poland in . Yet Britain may have shown a gift for accommodation with the new forces by helping to create an independent Egypt ; completely, and Iraq and displayed a similar spirit in India, where the Indian National Congress, founded in to promote a liberal nationalism inspired by the British model, became more radical after . Japan, influenced by Germany, used modern industrial techniques in the service of a more authoritarian nationalism. The Treaty of Versailles, which provided for the constitution of the League of Nations, also reduced the empires of the defeated Central Powers, mainly Germany and Turkey. By , 35 years after its founding, the United Nations had added more than member nations, most of them Asian and African. Whereas Asian and African nations had never totalled even one-third of the membership in the League, they came to represent more than one-half of the membership of the United Nations. Of these new Asian and African nations, several had been created, entirely or in part, from mandated territories. Communism recruited supporters from within the ranks of the new nationalist movements in Asia and Africa, first by helping them in their struggles against Western capitalist powers, and later, after independence was achieved, by competing with Western capitalism in extending financial and technical aid. But Chinese Communism soon began to drift away from supranational Communism, as the European Communist countries had earlier. By the late s Russian and Chinese mutual recriminations revealed a Chinese nationalism in which Mao Tse-tung had risen to share the place of honour with Lenin. As Chinese Communism turned further and further inward, its influence on new Asian and African nations waned. Political and religious differences Ambitions among new Asian and African nations clashed. The complex politics of the United Nations illustrated the problems of the new nationalism. The struggle with Dutch colonialism that brought the establishment of Indonesia continued with the UN mediation of the dispute over West Irian Irian Jaya. Continuing troubles in the Middle East, beginning with the establishment of Israel and including inter-Arab state disputes brought on by the establishment of the United Arab Republic, concerned the UN. Other crises involving the UN included: Many new nations, all sharing the same pride in independence, faced difficulties. As a result of inadequate preparation for self-rule, the first five years of independence in the Congo passed with no semblance of a stable government. The problem of widely different peoples and languages was exemplified in Nigeria, where an uncouned population included an uncouned number of tribes at least, with three major divisions that used an uncouned number of languages more than language and dialect clusters. The question of whether the predominantly Muslim state of Jammu and Kashmir should go with Muslim Pakistan or Hindu India lasted for more than 20 years after the India Independence Act became effective in . Desperate economic competition caused trouble, as in Israel where the much-needed waters of the Jordan River kept it in constant dispute with its water-hungry Arab neighbours. But the policies pursued by France under Pres. Charles de Gaulle and the problem of a divided Germany showed that the appeal of the nation-state was still very much alive. Charles de Gaulle,

**Chapter 5 : Project MUSE - Contemporary U.S. Poetry and Its Nationalisms**

*This classical nationalism later spread across the world and still marks many contemporary nationalisms. The Concept of a Nation In its general form the issue of nationalism concerns the mapping between the ethno-cultural domain (featuring ethno-cultural groups or "nations") and the domain of political organization.*

The idea of nationalism as a possible path toward more just societies would seem historically unwarranted as well: The record of oppressive, hegemonic political institutions and violent conflicts that nationalist movements and nationalist politicians have helped shape during the last two centuries is long and hardly reassuring. But nothing more greatly fuels contemporary doubts about nationalism— and specifically, the power of nationalism to produce a democratic civic culture— than the current tendency to identify nationalism with populism. This is not surprising. Yet distinguishing between nationalism and populism has never been more important, for reasons that are analytic, normative, and political in nature. It is important to avoid the temptation to substitute one tendency among scholars and certainly among religious studies scholars— that is, thinking about nationalisms as identical to and embedded in nation-states— with another inclination: Both tendencies carry the same danger— the conceptual and historical flattening of nationalism rather than a fuller, more nuanced appreciation of its cultural narratives and political manifestations. For scholars of populism, identifying the differences between nationalism and populism is central to understanding the multiple forms of populism that are not always organized around nationalist rhetoric or agendas. But appreciating the differences between nationalism and populisms is also vital in helping us see both the expressions and the democratic possibilities of contemporary nationalisms. While all populisms, progressive or conservative, are as Jan-Werner Mueller correctly asserts about the denial of pluralism, that is not the case with nationalisms. Yes, nationalisms always involve some level of homogenization inside the national group and impose boundaries around those who are not considered to be members of that group; and, yes, nationalisms often share with populisms the exclusive focus on justice for one people or one nation. As such, they might initially increase the level of political contestations and bring together many ideological constituents, but they ultimately involve two processes: Most importantly, nationalisms can involve expressions of identity that do not marginalize or abolish pluralism but can simultaneously affirm drive toward homogeneity and respect for plurality; nationalisms can also, while clearly asserting boundaries of belonging and collective attachment, frame more expansive forms of national identification that acknowledge and respect the members of other national groups. Here, I want to highlight two concrete instances in which nationalism is framed within narratives that link homogeneity and pluralism, on the one hand, and inclusion and justice, on the other. The first is the event that started as a symbolic protest of just one NFL player, Colin Kaepernick, and grew into a movement of solidarity as well as contention among many NFL players— the event that, at least in one reading, emerges as part of a narrative of American identity that is not just a protest against racial injustice but also the affirmation of the idea of what America as a nation ought to be. Most of all, such cases raise important questions about the range of democratic responses to contemporary populist politics: Is the only plausible and forceful challenge to a populism that threatens democratic pluralism some type of cosmopolitan vision and identity which is often, it ought to be underlined, intertwined with the discourse and practices of global capitalism? Or can a more powerful response to white nationalism and radical populisms be a nationalism that asserts a robust but more expansive— pluralistic— narrative of American national identity, defined by questions of justice, equality, and inclusion? While white nationalists and radical right populists continue to bring torches to the lawn of a public university to call for a resurgence of white-only America, citizens all over the United States keep responding with their own vision of America by posting signs on their own lawns welcoming the others in their mother tongue. Nationalism is not synonymous with populism; it can be its foil. Her scholarly interests and publications center on religion and collective identity, religious and secular humanisms, theories of religion and secularism, theories of modernity, nationalism and populism, interreligious dialogue, and conflict resolution. Religion, Choice, and Identity in Late Modernity.

*Auto Suggestions are available once you type at least 3 letters. Use up arrow (for mozilla firefox browser alt+up arrow) and down arrow (for mozilla firefox browser alt+down arrow) to review and enter to select.*

Second Series Nationalism, as well as racial pride and consciousness, are potentially powerful unifying forces. Columbia University history professor Carleton J. Hayes, an opponent of European nationalism, viewed nationalism as a form of religion Hayes, Nationalism: The German experience demonstrates how important race can be as a unifying and mobilizing force. Jews, governments, and elites perceive white racial consciousness as deeply inimical to their ambitions. Therefore it is demonized, pathologized, and brutally repressed in flagrant violation of law and basic human rights. In marked contrast, Jewish chauvinism and every form of anti-white racism is lauded, nurtured, and institutionalized because it imparts enormous power to non-white groups. These patterns of differentiation exist not only between the major races of mankind, but within every race as well. Consequently, races and subraces form a system of nested hierarchies. Nationalisms on various levels, such as Breton nationalism mini- , French full-scale nationalism , or Pan-Slavic macro-nationalism , are political reflections of this underlying biological reality. Pan-national movements " macro-nationalisms " provide historical examples of early attempts by Europeans to build loyalties and political institutions across existing national boundaries. They may suggest ways to consolidate genetic and cultural resources to create more inclusive identities while preserving key elements of ethnic and linguistic particularity firmly rooted in history. The ultimate objective would be the blending of numerous white ethnicities and nationalities into a handful of unitary, large-scale ethnic-linguistic-cultural polities: These polities would in turn unite via federation or confederation while retaining a degree of autonomy. A Jewish historian of nationalism, Louis L. Snyder defined it as follows: Nationalism is enlarged in meaning, influence, and scope to include all pan , who by reason of race, geography, religion, or language, or by a combination of any or all of them, are held to belong to the same category. The pan-movements grouped together all those holding a similar national sentiment and who believed that they belonged together. An important fact about nineteenth and early twentieth-century macro-nationalism is that it flourished before the scientific understanding of race had fully developed. Therefore, race in the modern sense was typically not a primary ideological component of pan-nationalist philosophy, as it must be today. A brief overview of some historical and contemporary macro-nationalisms will provide a concrete feel for the idea. Noteworthy by its absence is any Southern European pan-movement " the only major region of Europe not represented. Whether this is because of a lack of underlying racial, historical, political, linguistic, or cultural cohesion in the region, or some other factor, is unclear. It could be the result of chance. Pan-Slavism Pan-Slavism , the doctrine that Slavs should embrace as large a measure of political solidarity as possible, is the oldest and one of the largest macro-nationalist movements, arising in the early nineteenth century. In part it was based upon the remarkably close kinship between the various Slavic languages. During the late nineteenth century Russians came to dominate the debate over the goals and rationale of Pan-Slavism, causing friction and ill-will among smaller Slavic nationalities in the coalition. The intrusion of Russian dynastic and state interests hindered the realization of Pan-Slavic ideals. Doctrinally, Slavophilism must be distinguished from Pan-Slavism. The intellectual cross-currents of Pan-Slavism included some who propagated an Asian ideology. Danilevsky held that ten identifiable historical-cultural types he wrote in the pre-race era were akin to biological organisms and went through predetermined life cycles including youth, adulthood, and old age. The Slavic world should unify, establishing its capital at Constantinople Istanbul, Turkey. The triumph of Communism in Russia put an end to Russian leadership of the movement, and the new frontiers drawn at Versailles created states with smaller minority populations, achieving many Slav objectives. Ukrainian scholars have described a brief upsurge of Pan-Slavism under Soviet auspices in the s: A concerted effort was made by the Soviet authorities in the s to revive Pan-Slavic sentiments, and in they backed the creation of the All-Slavic Committee and staged the All-Slavic Congress in Moscow. Those efforts were more an extension of Soviet foreign policy than reflections of popular sentiment. Pan-Germanism Pangermanismus, Alldeutschum Another major

European macro-nationalism was Pan-Germanism, whose origins lay in the 19th-century war of liberation against Napoleon I. It developed particularly during the early years of the Second Reich. Like other nineteenth-century macro-nationalisms, it initially coalesced around commonality of language and culture. Pan-Germanism sought to unite one people Volksdeutsche. Prior to there were 15 million Germans living outside the frontiers of the Reich, chiefly in Austria-Hungary and Russia. The movement is closely associated with the program of the Pan-German League, which excluded Jews from its membership. The League was never very large. At its peak it had only 21, members, drawn chiefly from academic and professional circles, and never more than 8, subscribers to its main periodical. It is instructive that a comparatively modest voluntary organization such as this could nevertheless constitute such a potent social and historical force. Austrian Pan-Germanism made a profound impression upon Adolf Hitler in his early years. NS foreign policy was from its inception substantially that advocated by the Pan-German League for half a century. Despite its important biological orientation, NS Pan-Germanism ultimately proved more nationalist than racist, provoking enormous intra-white strife. It is why it is so critical to foster a coterminous white identity. These outposts could serve as planetary bastions for all members of the white race, regardless of the particular national family they belong to. The image conveyed is one of fraternal unity. In a world burdened by bitter differences between peoples, the Scandinavians presented an idea of unity. Yet each of the five states sees itself as independent, but at the same time is willing to work closely with each other. The national identity is never submerged. This attitude is rare among the macro-nationalisms, which have remained ineffective because of rivalries among their members. Pan-Europa A united Europe has long been the dream of anti-white elites, who in recent years have erected a racist, trans-European, quasi-totalitarian state inimical to the interests of whites. It is a conscious, willful engine of genocide. The present demands that every SS-officer, regardless of nationality. It is natural in this process that the German nation, as the largest and strongest, must assume the leading role. It is only through unification of the white race that Western culture could be saved from the danger of the yellow race. At the present time, the Waffen-SS is leading in this respect because its organisation is based on equality. Therefore it is of great importance that every Waffen-SS officer gets his training at the same military college. Later Thiriart converted to Eurasianism. Basically, it claims to represent some unique synthesis of European and Asian principles. An enlightening summary of classical Eurasianism is worth quoting because of its pertinence to building a white intercontinental federation: In the view of the [classical] Eurasians, the elemental opposition between Europe and Russia was transcendent, and a fact of life for all time. In a very literal sense, the two were mutually antithetical, for Russia-Eurasia defined itself precisely in terms of its distinctions and differences from the West. Once again, the classical Eurasians described these differences in the familiar language of the Russian nationalist tradition, that is to say, in terms that were essentially moral, ethical, and civilizational: Needless to say, there was no thought whatsoever that the two regions ever could or indeed should overcome their differences and seek to achieve a sort of higher reconciliation. Very much to the contrary, the ultimate goal was to realize as thorough a disengagement as possible from Europe and develop Eurasia as a practical alternative to it. Because this form of anti-Westernism keeps cropping up in Russian intellectual circles, it must be noted that any theory such as this is inimical to, and incompatible with, a racial worldview in which Russians and other Slavs are deemed integral members of the global white community, common descendants of the original Indo-Europeans. A well-known neo-Eurasianist is the Russian Aleksandr Dugin, born in His thought has had some influence upon elements of the Russian elite. The most important historical task of Eurasianism is to provide the world with a common platform for struggle against US Atlanticism. Dunlop, in *Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia* *Osnovy geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii*, Dugin advocates Russian reabsorption of most Soviet-era possessions and, long-term, the Finlandization of Europe under Russian hegemony. Finally, he seeks a Russian-Iranian alliance and the destabilization of Turkey. A young German academic whose work may be suspect he writes polemically, using the overblown rhetoric of Jewish hate claims that Dugin: The goal is the formation of a federated Empire that is ethnically homogeneous and economically independent, autarkical. In this spirit, Russia would be in the center of such an ensemble, which would be the most powerful and most imposing on the planet. Typically, 19th-century pan-nationalists focused on language and culture

rather than race. Language is not an adequate basis for an ethnostate, because any group of racially alien people can speak any European language, and today do. During the heyday of macro-nationalism racial science and white consciousness were not fully developed. This shortcoming was offset to some extent by the fact that race, ethnicity, and nationalism were still closely correlated. Nevertheless, a lack of clear racial identification created problems. It is unsurprising that the idea enjoyed special favor during the Administration of Franklin Roosevelt. Pan-Americanism has no basis in shared race, ethnicity, language, or culture. It is fallacious to contend that the Americas are united simply because of hemispheric proximity. A complicated constellation of competing pan-movements on the demographic and geographic periphery of Europe were three rival macro-nationalisms in Turkey: Pan-Ottomanism, the attempt to unite all peoples of the Ottoman Empire Turks, Arabs, Greeks, Albanians, and Jews into a super-Ottoman nationality; Pan-Turkism or Pan-Turanism, proclaiming the unity in language, thought and action of all Turkic-speaking peoples; and Pan-Islamism, calling for the union of all Muslims. It is interesting to note that in the 30s and 40s there was significant sympathy for NS Germany among Pan-Turks. Pan-Hispanism sought to unite all Spanish-speaking peoples, including the hybrid populations of Latin America. Pan-Lusitanism, also language-centric, targeted the peoples of the old Portuguese empire: Today, explicit whiteness is a mandatory requirement for all nationalists, micro-, mini-, reconquest, or macro-, who recognize the paramount necessity of racial preservation. Under different historical circumstances this would not necessarily be the case, but it is the dominant issue of our time. There is no need to repeat the mistakes of the past in this regard. It ran aground on the still-vigorous nationalism of its era. But following the deliberate destruction of culturally, religiously, and ethnically homogeneous nations, nationalism in the old sense is a spent force.

**Chapter 7 : ExEAS - Teaching Materials and Resources**

*Are there new dimensions of fascism, racism, sexism, homophobia and contemporary nationalisms that today require new and different as well as restated responses? What are the scope, limits and key characterising features of this latest articulation of right-wing politics?*

Chinese nationalism The awakening of nationalism across Asia helped shape the history of the continent. The key episode was the decisive defeat of Russia by Japan in 1905, demonstrating the military superiority of non-Europeans in a modern war. The defeat quickly led to manifestations of a new interest in nationalism in China, as well as Turkey, and Persia. It was a nationwide protest movement about the domestic backwardness of China and has often been depicted as the intellectual foundation for Chinese Communism. According to historian Patricia Ebrey: Nationalism, patriotism, progress, science, democracy, and freedom were the goals; imperialism, feudalism, warlordism, autocracy, patriarchy, and blind adherence to tradition were the enemies. Intellectuals struggled with how to be strong and modern and yet Chinese, how to preserve China as a political entity in the world of competing nations. African nationalism and History of Africa Kenneth Kaunda, an anti-colonial political leader from Zambia, pictured at a nationalist rally in colonial Northern Rhodesia now Zambia in 1961. In the 19th and 20th centuries the European powers divided up almost all of Africa only Ethiopia and Liberia were independent. They ruled until after World War II when forces of nationalism grew much stronger. In the 1950s and 1960s the colonial holdings became independent states. The process was usually peaceful but there were several long bitter bloody civil wars, as in Algeria, [66] Kenya [67] and elsewhere. Across Africa nationalism drew upon the organizational skills that natives learned in the British and French and other armies in the world wars. It led to organizations that were not controlled by or endorsed by either the colonial powers or the traditional local power structures that were collaborating with the colonial powers. Nationalistic organizations began to challenge both the traditional and the new colonial structures and finally displaced them. Leaders of nationalist movements took control when the European authorities exited; many ruled for decades or until they died off. These structures included political, educational, religious, and other social organizations. In recent decades, many African countries have undergone the triumph and defeat of nationalistic fervor, changing in the process the loci of the centralizing state power and patrimonial state. From 1948 to 1994, it was controlled by white Afrikaner nationalists focused on racial segregation and white minority rule known officially as apartheid. The black nationalist movement fought them until success was achieved by the African National Congress in 1994 and Nelson Mandela was elected President. As the Ottoman Empire declined and the Middle East was carved up by the Great Powers of Europe, Arabs sought to establish their own independent nations ruled by Arabs rather than foreigners. Syria was established in 1946; Transjordan later Jordan gradually gained independence between 1946 and 1952; Saudi Arabia was established in 1932; and Egypt achieved gradually gained independence between 1922 and 1952. The Arab League was established in 1945 to promote Arab interests and cooperation between the new Arab states. Parallel to these efforts was the Zionist movement which emerged among European Jews in the 19th century. Beginning in 1882, Jews, predominantly from Europe, began emigrating to Ottoman Palestine with the goal of establishing a new Jewish homeland. The effort culminated in the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948. As this move conflicted with the belief among Arab nationalists that Palestine was part of the Arab nation, the neighboring Arab nations launched an invasion to claim the region. The invasion was only partly successful and led to decades of clashes between the Arab and Jewish nationalist ideologies. Post-Communism[ edit ] There was a rise in extreme nationalism after the collapse of communism in the 1990s. When communism fell, it left many people with no identity. The people under communist rule had to integrate, and found themselves free to choose. Given free choice, long dormant conflicts rose up and created sources of serious conflict. In his article Jihad vs. McWorld, Benjamin Barber proposed that the fall of communism will cause large numbers of people to search for unity and that small scale wars will become common; groups will attempt to redraw boundaries, identities, cultures and ideologies. Academic Steven Berg felt that at the root of nationalist conflicts is the demand for autonomy and a separate existence. The national census numbers for a ten-year span "measured an increase from 1. Within Yugoslavia, separating Croatia

and Slovenia from the rest of Yugoslavia is an invisible line of previous conquests of the region. Croatia and Slovenia to the northwest were conquered by Catholics or Protestants, and benefited from European history; the Renaissance, French Revolution, Industrial Revolution and are more inclined towards democracy. In the leadership of the separate territories within Yugoslavia protected only territorial interests at the expense of other territories. In Croatia, there was almost a split within the territory between Serbs and Croats so any political decision would kindle unrest, and tensions could cross the territories adjacent; Bosnia and Herzegovina. Political organizations were not able to deal successfully with such diverse nationalism. Within the territories the leadership could not compromise. To do so would create a winner in one ethnic group and a loser in another, raising the possibility of a serious conflict. This strengthened the political stance promoting ethnic identities. This caused intense and divided political leadership within Yugoslavia. In the s Yugoslavia began to break into fragments. Conflict in the disputed territories was stimulated by the rise in mass nationalism and inter-ethnic hostilities. This combined with escalating violence from ethnic Albanians and Serbs within Kosovo intensified economic conditions. The ongoing conflict in Kosovo was propagandized by Communist Serbian Slobodan Milosevic to further increase Serb nationalism. As mentioned, this nationalism did give rise to powerful emotions which grew the force of Serbian nationalism through highly nationalist demonstrations in Vojvodina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo. Within Slovenia, fear was mounting because Milosevic was using the militia to suppress a in Kosovo, what would he do to Slovenia. In fall of tensions came to a head and Slovenia asserted its political and economic independence from Yugoslavia and seceded. In January , there was a total break with Serbia at the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, an institution conceived by Milosevic to strengthen unity and became the backdrop for the fall of communism within Yugoslavia. In August , a warning to the region was issued when ethnically divided groups attempted to alter the government structure. The republic borders established by the Communist regime in the postwar period were extremely vulnerable to challenges from ethnic communities. Ethnic communities arose because they did not share the identity with everyone within the new post-Communist borders. The same disputes were erupting that were in place prior to Milosevic and were compounded by actions from his regime. Also within the territory the Croats and the Serbs were in direct competition for control of government. Elections were held and increased potential conflicts between Serb and Croat nationalism. Serbia wanted to be separate and decide its own future based on its own ethnic composition. But this would then give Kosovo encouragement to become independent from Serbia. Albanians in Kosovo were already independent from Kosovo. Muslims nationalists wanted their own territory but it would require a redrawing of the map, and would threaten neighboring territories. When communism fell in Yugoslavia, serious conflict arose, which led to the rise in extreme nationalism. Nationalism again gave rise to powerful emotions which evoked in some extreme cases, a willingness to die for what you believe in, a fight for the survival of the group. In the six years following the collapse , people died in the Bosnian war. Please improve the article by adding information on neglected viewpoints, or discuss the issue on the talk page. May Main article: Neo-nationalism Arab nationalism began to decline in the 21st century leading to localized nationalism, culminating in a series of revolts against authoritarian regimes between and , known as the Arab Spring. Following these revolts, which mostly failed to improve conditions in the affected nations, Arab nationalism and even most local nationalistic movements declined dramatically. The rise of globalism in the late 20th century led to a rise in nationalism and populism in Europe and North America. This trend was further fueled by increased terrorism in the West the September 11 attacks in the U. The result had been largely unexpected and was seen as a victory of populism. His unexpected victory in the election was seen as part of the same trend that had brought about the Brexit vote.

**Chapter 8 : nationalism | Definition of nationalism in US English by Oxford Dictionaries**

*Contemporary Examples. of nationalism. Individual governments took the lead, bankrolling most of the process in the name of competition and nationalism.*

Abbott Handerson Thayer, Stevenson Memorial, 1, words Essential elements of modern nationalism existed in early times in the form of tribalism. In fact, modern European nationalism is often excoriated by critics as a form of tribalism or racism. According to English anthropologist Sir Arthur Keith, in prehistoric times man everywhere lived in small, isolated bands. Later, the city-state of Rome expanded into a mighty empire throughout Europe. The Middle Ages witnessed territorial devolution. The group, not the individual was paramount, and every aspect of behavior was evaluated according to its effect on the harmonious organic whole. Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism, , Nationalism assumed its modern form in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries with the rise of the European nation states. Today there are fifty-two , the embattled white components of which are slipping into minority status. Keith uses Germany to illustrate the overall process of national consolidation in Europe. By the s there were independent states within the frontiers of modern Germany, in thirty-nine, and in twenty-five. And consolidation has been accomplished by means of violence. The Apogee of European Nationalism German-American Columbia University then Columbia College political scientist Francis Lieber, also a founder and editor of the Encyclopaedia Americana, provided the following definition of nationalism: What is a Nation in the modern sense of the word? Organic, intellectual and political internal unity, with proportionate strength, and a distinct and obvious demarcation from similar groups, are notable elements of the idea of a modern nation in its fullest sense. It was undoubtedly this same understanding and reality that informed English anthropologist Sir Arthur Keith when he wrote in My second theme relates to the current conception of race and of nation. The only live races in Europe today are its nations. While the close association between race more precisely, ethnicity or sub-race and nation was still valid when Keith wrote, it vanished soon after. The strength of classic political nationalism was that it combined a variety of factors that contributed, at least within nations, to the preservation and expansion of white racial subpopulations. In the past, nationalist ideology dictated a de facto congruence between political identity and racial and cultural identity. The weakness of historic nationalism was that even in its heyday white nations allowed centrifugal secondary forces to nullify the centripetal unifying force of race. Nations developed mutual enmity via natural mechanisms examined by social identity theory in social psychology. Today the unifying force of ethnicity has been completely extinguished by anti-white elites. Everywhere, white racial interests and national interests are mutually antagonistic. Whites are a diaspora scattered across an array of darkening anti-white states whose boundaries no longer reflect the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, or religious makeup of their historic populations. These states are intensely hostile to indigenous populations, and intentionally pursue biologically and culturally destructive policies. Under such conditions, it is senseless for whites to identify with, or feel love or loyalty for, nations whose governments, cultural institutions, and elites hate them, discriminate against them, steal from them, oppress them, and commit genocide against them. Three Choices Whites appear to have three alternatives: These polities would in turn unite via federation or confederation but retain a large degree of autonomy. For the time being, the alternatives should be evaluated without regard to their seeming impracticality or impossibility. All three seem equally likelyâ€”or unlikelyâ€”of attainment. We are at the early stage of visualization. None of these mini-nationalisms are ethnically based. In fact, they are anti-white. The Confederacy and the United States at the time of its formation were mini-nationalisms. Every secessionist movement is a mini-nationalism. Irish nationalism, the most powerful and violent of the twentieth-century European nationalisms, was a mini-nationalism prior to the establishment of the Irish Free State in , but not after. Now it is irredentist. However, PLEs do not aspire to formal legal status. Reconquest The great historical model here is the reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula from the Moors in the s, followed ultimately by the expulsion of Moors, Jews, and Moriscos. Pan-Nationalism As already noted, future white ethnostates can be imagined on a scale from very large to very small. Pan-national movementsâ€”macro-nationalismsâ€”provide historical examples

of early attempts to build loyalties and political institutions across existing national boundaries. They might suggest ways to consolidate genetic and cultural resources and create more inclusive identities while preserving key elements of ethnic and linguistic particularity firmly rooted in history. Because large geographic and demographic size means power and room for population expansion, larger political units seem inherently preferable to smaller ones. The smaller the state, the less likely it will remain viable over time due to vulnerability to racial attack. There should also be a reduction rather than an increase in the number of political units with potential for creating future intra-racial friction. In sum, racial amalgamation seems preferable to division, other things being equal.

**Chapter 9 : The Politics Of Language And Nationalism In Modern Central Europe – Download PDF Now**

*The beginning. This special issue on "Race and Crisis" was initially planned in , in the context of a project on Framing Financial Crisis and Protest (, funded by the Leverhulme Trust).*

Each of these aspects requires elaboration. Although sovereignty is often taken to mean full statehood Gellner , ch. Despite these definitional worries, there is a fair amount of agreement about the historically paradigmatic form of nationalism. Territorial sovereignty has traditionally been seen as a defining element of state power and essential for nationhood. It was extolled in classic modern works by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau and is returning to center stage in the debate, though philosophers are now more skeptical see below. Issues surrounding the control of the movement of money and people in particular immigration and the resource rights implied in territorial sovereignty make the topic politically center in the age of globalization and philosophically interesting for nationalists and anti-nationalists alike. This classical nationalism later spread across the world and still marks many contemporary nationalisms. In breaking down the issue, we have mentioned the importance of the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity. This point raises two sorts of questions. First, the descriptive ones: Second, the normative ones: Is the attitude of caring about national identity always appropriate? This section discusses the descriptive questions, starting with 1a and 1b. The normative questions are addressed in Section 3 on the moral debate. If one wants to enjoin people to struggle for their national interests, one must have some idea about what a nation is and what it is to belong to a nation. So, in order to formulate and ground their evaluations, claims, and directives for action, pro-nationalist thinkers have expounded theories of ethnicity, culture, nation and state. Their opponents have in turn challenged these elaborations. Now, some presuppositions about ethnic groups and nations are essential for the nationalist, while others are theoretical elaborations designed to support the essential ones. Since nationalism is particularly prominent with groups that do not yet have a state, a definition of nation and nationalism purely in terms of belonging to a state is a non-starter. This leaves two extreme options and a number of intermediates. The first extreme option has been put forward by a small but distinguished band of theorists, including Renan and Weber ; for a recent defense, see Brubaker and for a comparison with religion, Brubaker According to their purely voluntaristic definition, a nation is any group of people aspiring to a common political state-like organization. At the other extreme, and more typically, nationalist claims are focused upon the non-voluntary community of common origin, language, tradition and culture: Philosophical discussions centered around nationalism tend to concern the ethnic-cultural variants only, and this habit will be followed here. One cannot chose to be a member; instead, membership depends on the accident of origin and early socialization. However, commonality of origin has become mythical for most contemporary candidate groups: This is the kind of definition that would be accepted by most parties in the debate today. So defined, the nation is a somewhat mixed category, both ethno-cultural and civic, but still closer to the purely ethno-cultural than to the purely civic extreme. The wider descriptive underpinnings of nationalist claims have varied over the last two centuries. For almost a century, up to the end of the Second World War, it was customary to link nationalist views to organic metaphors for society. Most contemporary defenders of nationalism, especially philosophers, avoid such language. The organic metaphor and talk about character have been replaced by one master metaphor: It is centered upon cultural membership, and used both for the identity of a group and for the socially based identity of its members, e. Various authors unpack the metaphor in various ways: Seymour have significantly contributed to introducing and maintaining important topics such as community, membership, tradition and social identity into contemporary philosophical debate. In social and political science one usually distinguishes two kinds of views. A volume dedicated to A. Smith debates his ethno-nationalism Leouss and Grosby, eds. The second are the modernist views, placing the origin of nations in modern times. They can be further classified according to their answer to an additional question: The modernist realist view is that nations are real but distinctly modern creations, instrumental in the genesis of capitalism Gellner , Hobsbawn , and Breuille and The realist view contrasts with more radical antirealism. These divergent views seem to support rather divergent moral claims about nations: For an

overview of nationalism in political theory see Vincent and the encyclopedic volume edited by Delanty and Kumar. Indeed, older authors – from great thinkers like Herder and Otto Bauer to the propagandists who followed their footsteps – took great pains to ground normative claims upon firm ontological realism about nations: See, for instance, MacCormick ; Miller , ; Tamir , Gans , Moore , , Dagger and, for an interesting discussion, Frost. They point out that common imaginings can tie people together, and that actual interaction resulting from togetherness can engender important moral obligations. Let us now turn to question 1c about the nature of pro-national attitudes. The explanatory issue that has interested political and social scientists concerns ethno-nationalist sentiment, the paradigm case of a pro-national attitude. Is it as irrational, romantic and indifferent to self-interest as it might seem on the surface? The issue has divided authors who see nationalism as basically irrational and those who try to explain it as being in some sense rational. Authors who see it as irrational propose various explanations of why people assent to irrational views. But where does such false consciousness come from? On the opposite side, the famous critic of nationalism Elie Kedourie thinks this irrationality is spontaneous. A decade ago Liah Greenfeld went as far as linking nationalism to mental illness in her provocative article; see also her book. On the opposite side, Michael Walzer has offered a sympathetic account of nationalist passion in his . Authors relying upon the Marxist tradition offer various deeper explanations. For an overview of Marxist approaches see Glenn. Now we turn to those who see nationalist sentiments as being rational, at least in a very wide sense. Some authors claim that it is often rational for individuals to become nationalists. Hardin. Consider the two sides of the nationalist coin. On the first side, identification and cohesion within an ethno-national group relates to inter-group cooperation, and cooperation is easier for those who are part of the same ethno-national group. To take an example of ethnic ties in a multiethnic state, a Vietnamese newcomer to the United States will do well to rely on his co-nationals: Once the ties are established and he has become part of a network, it is rational to go on cooperating, and ethnic sentiment secures the trust and the firm bond needed for smooth cooperation. A further issue is when it is rational to switch sides; to stay with our example, when does it become profitable for our Vietnamese to develop an all-American patriotism? This has received a detailed elaboration in David Laitin , summarized in ; applied to language rights in Laitin and Reich ; see also Laitin , who uses material from the former Soviet Union. On the other side of the nationalist coin, non-cooperation with outsiders can lead to sometimes extreme conflict between various ethno-nations. Can one rationally explain the extremes of ethno-national conflict? Authors like Russell Hardin propose to do so in terms of a general view of when hostile behavior is rational: If both sides take precautions, however, each will tend to see the other as increasingly inimical. It then becomes rational to start treating the other as an enemy. Mere suspicion can thus lead by small, individually rational steps to a situation of conflict. It is relatively easy to spot the circumstances in which this general pattern applies to national solidarities and conflicts see also Wimmer. It has enabled the application of conceptual tools from game-theoretic and economic analyses of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior to the explanation of ethno-nationalism. It is worth mentioning, however, that the individualist rational-choice approach, centered upon personal rationality, has serious competitors. A tradition in social psychology, initiated by Henri Tajfel , shows that individuals may identify with a randomly selected group even when membership in the group brings no tangible rewards. Does rationality of any kind underlie this tendency to identification? They propose a non-personal, evolutionary sort of rationality: But cultural evolution has taken over the mechanisms of identification that initially developed within biological evolution. As a result, we project the sentiment originally reserved for kinship onto our cultural group. More detailed explanations from socio-biological perspectives differ greatly among themselves and constitute a wide and rather promising research program see an overview in Goetze. There is a growing literature connecting these issues with cognitive science, from Searle-White to Hogan and Yack. Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz express a common view when they write about belonging to a nation: One cannot choose to belong. Belonging brings crucial benefits: Why is national belonging taken to be involuntary? It is often attributed to the involuntary nature of linguistic belonging: All these are embedded in the language, and do not exist without it. Early socialization is seen as socialization into a specific culture, and very often that culture is just assumed to be a national one. The resulting belonging is then to a large extent non-voluntary. There are exceptions to this basically

non-voluntaristic view: Strict and Wide We pointed out at the very beginning of the entry that nationalism focuses upon 1 the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity, and 2 the actions that the members of a nation take when seeking to achieve or sustain some form of political sovereignty. The politically central point is 2: To these we now turn, beginning with sovereignty and territory, the usual foci of a national struggle for independence. They raise an important issue: The classical answer is that a state is required. A more liberal answer is that some form of political autonomy suffices. Once this has been discussed, we can turn to the related normative issues: Consider first the classical nationalist answer to 2a.