

DOWNLOAD PDF CONTINENTAL AND SUB-CONTINENTAL INCOME INEQUALITY

Chapter 1 : World's 5 Most Unequal Countries on Same Continent

Continental and Sub-Continental Income Inequality— Income inequality can be measured at different levels of aggregation such as global, continental, international and national levels.

Overview[edit] U. For example, the top 0. They became moderately less progressive between and [6] but slightly more progressive measured between and Income transfers had a greater impact on reducing inequality than taxes from to While before-tax income inequality is subject to market factors e. The influence of the labor movement has waned in the U. Shiller , who called rising economic inequality "the most important problem that we are facing now today" , [47] former Federal Reserve Board chairman Alan Greenspan , "This is not the type of thing which a democratic society " a capitalist democratic society " can really accept without addressing" , [48] and President Barack Obama who referred to the widening income gap as the "defining challenge of our time". The first era of inequality lasted roughly from the post-civil war era or "the Gilded Age " to sometime around Highly progressive New Deal taxation, the strengthening of unions, and regulation of the National War Labor Board during World War II raised the income of the poor and working class and lowered that of top earners. Wages remained relatively high because American manufacturing lacked foreign competition, and because of strong trade unions. By more than a third of non-farm workers were union members, [53]: This tremendously productive working class gets back for its own consumption a smaller part of its output and hands over in the form of profit to the capitalist owners of the instruments of production a greater part of its output than does either the English or the French working class. Studies have found income grew more unequal almost continuously except during the economic recessions in "91 , Dot-com bubble , and sub-prime bust. Before , a larger share of top earners income came from capital interest, dividends, income from rent, capital gains. After , income of high-income taxpayers comes predominantly from labor: In , the Occupy movement drew considerable attention to income inequality in the country. Market income for a household is a combination of labor income such as cash wages, employer-paid benefits, and employer-paid payroll taxes , business income such as income from businesses and farms operated solely by their owners , capital gains profits realized from the sale of assets and stock options , capital income such as interest from deposits, dividends, and rental income , and other income. Higher-income groups tend to derive relatively more of their income from more volatile sources related to capital income business income, capital gains, and dividends , as opposed to labor income wages and salaries. Other sources of capital income also fell: CBO estimated that "average federal tax rates under law would be higher " relative to tax rates in " across the income spectrum. The estimated rates under law would still be well below the average rates from through for the bottom four income quintiles, slightly below the average rate over that period for households in the 81st through 99th percentiles, and well above the average rate over that period for households in the top 1 percent of the income distribution. Lindert and Jeffrey G. The share of incomes for those in the bottom half of the U. Pretax incomes for the top 0. The economists also note that the growth of inequality during the s to the s can be attributed to wage growth among top earners, but the ever-widening gap has been "a capital-driven phenomenon since the late s. Causes of income inequality in the United States Illustrates the productivity gap i. Each dot is an industry; dots above the line have a productivity gap i. A study in the American Sociological Review , as well as other scholarly research, using the broadest methodology, estimates that the decline of unions may account for from one-third to more than one-half of the rise of inequality among men. As unions weakened, the vast majority of the gains from productivity were taken by senior corporate executives, major shareholders and creditors e. As unions have grown weaker, there has been less pressure on employers to increase wages, or on lawmakers to enact labor-friendly or worker-friendly measures. This would cause capital share to increase, relative to labor share, as machines replace some workers. More important, soaring incomes at the top were achieved, in large part, by squeezing those below: Perhaps more important still, the wealthy exert a vastly disproportionate effect on policy. And elite priorities " obsessive concern with budget

DOWNLOAD PDF CONTINENTAL AND SUB-CONTINENTAL INCOME INEQUALITY

deficits, with the supposed need to slash social programs “ have done a lot to deepen [wage stagnation and income inequality]. Relevant discussion may be found on the talk page. Please do not remove this message until conditions to do so are met. February Learn how and when to remove this template message Real GDP per household has typically increased since the year , while real median income per household was below levels until , indicating a trend of greater income inequality i. The decline measured for wages and salaries was 7. These trends imply income due to capital i. For example, Alan B. In general, as income inequality worsens: Krueger wrote in Restoring a greater degree of fairness to the U. Krueger wrote that borrowing likely helped many households make up for this shift, which became more difficult in the wake of the “ recession. A strong demand for redistribution will occur in societies where a large section of the population does not have access to the productive resources of the economy. Rational voters must internalize such issues. Increasing inequality harms growth in countries with high levels of urbanization. High and persistent unemployment also has a negative effect on subsequent long-run economic growth. Unemployment may seriously harm growth because it is a waste of resources, because it generates redistributive pressures and distortions, because it depreciates existing human capital and deters its accumulation, because it drives people to poverty, because it results in liquidity constraints that limit labor mobility, and because it erodes individual self-esteem and promotes social dislocation, unrest and conflict. Policies to control unemployment and reduce its inequality-associated effects can strengthen long-run growth. Gross , former managing director of PIMCO , criticized the shift in distribution of income from labor to capital that underlies some of the growth in inequality as unsustainable, saying: Even conservatives must acknowledge that return on capital investment, and the liquid stocks and bonds that mimic it, are ultimately dependent on returns to labor in the form of jobs and real wage gains. If Main Street is unemployed and undercompensated, capital can only travel so far down Prosperity Road. A December Associated Press survey of three dozen economists found that the majority believe that widening income disparity is harming the US economy. They argue that wealthy Americans are receiving higher pay, but they spend less per dollar earned than middle class consumers, the majority of the population, whose incomes have largely stagnated. Higher levels of income inequality increase political pressures, discouraging trade, investment, hiring, and social mobility according to the report. The main reason for this shift is the increasing importance of human capital in development. When physical capital mattered most, savings and investments were key. Then it was important to have a large contingent of rich people who could save a greater proportion of their income than the poor and invest it in physical capital. But now that human capital is scarcer than machines, widespread education has become the secret to growth. Epstein defended inequality in a free market society, maintaining that "taxing the top one percent even more means less wealth and fewer jobs for the rest of us. In his dissent in the Louis K.

DOWNLOAD PDF CONTINENTAL AND SUB-CONTINENTAL INCOME INEQUALITY

Chapter 2 : Income inequality in the United States - Wikipedia

Income inequality can be measured at different levels of aggregation such as global, continental, international and national levels. Here we consider income inequality at regions defined as equivalent of continental and sub-continental levels. We investigate the economic disparity between regions of.

In other words, the living standards of the Nigerian elite have raced far ahead of the quality of life of the majority. Indeed, according to the HDI, every country in Africa is today less equal than it was in ; for the African masses, in other words, the trickle-down benefits of economic growth have been relatively small. But the story of inequality in Africa is more complex than that of a widening gulf between the very rich and the very poor. African Women, in particular, have shouldered a disproportionately heavy burden. The causes of rising inequality in Africa are a matter for debate. But as Branko Milanovic shows in his excellent book *Global Inequality* “as in the West, so in Africa, the concentration of wealth in the hands of the few is a long-run global trend. But the markets which have emerged in the last two decades are not spontaneous or organic creations; they have architects. Major Western donor governments and international lending institutions, in particular, spearheaded neoliberal reforms in Africa which spur headline GDP growth but drive inequality. Under the influence of Western donors, austerity became African leaders default coping mechanism for periods of global economic stress. The cure for economic stagnation, in other words, became the cause of a new pathology: Never was this truer in Africa than after the financial crisis. The cut-backs buoyed macro-economic growth rates, but entrenched inequality, so much so that the IMF acknowledged it had overestimated the value of structural adjustment. Increasingly, development in the form of retrenchment and chasing GDP growth has become a kind of madness: But such extreme inequality has driven popular protest in Ethiopia in recent months, which has shut down factories, stalled foreign investment and crippled infrastructure. Is Ethiopia a bellwether, a portent for Africa for the year ahead? It is an extreme case: But Ethiopia is not unique. This is an election year for a number of large African economies, including Angola, Algeria, Kenya, Rwanda and Sierra Leone; each faces a cocktail of falling commodity prices, international economic headwinds, isolationism and domestic polarization. As Joseph Warungu writes , many African governments enter in defensive mode. As events in Ethiopia, the US and Europe in have hinted, the fall-out from rising inequality promise to be problematic “as much in Africa as in the West.

DOWNLOAD PDF CONTINENTAL AND SUB-CONTINENTAL INCOME INEQUALITY

Chapter 3 : Dear UN Poverty Expert –“ The UK Has No Extreme Poverty | The Continental Telegraph

Income inequality can be measured at different levels of aggregation such as global, continental, international and national levels. Here we consider income inequality at regions defined as.

This paper reviews design features by which safety nets might do more with less. It reviews the current evidence on their success in practice—including three brief reviews of southern Africa experience—and suggests a role for future policy research in furthering the goal of designing safety nets that reduce poverty in a cost-effective way. In doing so, the paper highlights a tension between the large gaps in our knowledge about the design of safety nets and the demand for short-run answers in this area. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at <http://www.worldbank.org/prwp>. Summary This paper uses household-level data from a nationally-representative survey to analyze the impact of nonfarm income on income inequality in rural Egypt. After pinpointing the importance of nonfarm income to the rural poor, the paper decomposes total rural income among five sources of income: This decomposition shows that while nonfarm income represents the most important inequality-decreasing source of income, agricultural income represents the most important inequality-increasing source of income. While a 1 percent marginal increase in nonfarm income will cause the Gini coefficient of overall income to fall by 0.1 percentage points, a 1 percent increase in agricultural income will cause the Gini coefficient to rise by 0.1 percentage points. The reason for this difference has to do with land, which is distributed very unevenly in this study. Regression analysis of the determinants of income shows that while land ownership is positively and statistically related to the receipt of agricultural income, it has no statistical relationship to the receipt of nonfarm income. In the past many researchers and policymakers have viewed the rural economy of developing countries as being synonymous with agriculture. According to this view, rural households receive income primarily from agriculture. By combining the findings of two different studies, the paper analyzes the conditions of children at different stages of impact. It looks at the conditions of vulnerable children living in households with HIV positive members; children at risk of becoming orphans. Using primarily in-depth interviews and observations, the paper contributes toward filling two knowledge gaps—one on children vulnerable to becoming orphans and another on those already orphaned. Our results emphasize the role of already established patterns of childcare arrangements as primary safety nets in the context of AIDS in South Africa. Children are intimately involved with providing care, support and assistance in treatment to HIV mothers and younger siblings. Our evidence demonstrates the positive impacts of disclosure of HIV status to children and the ability of Show Context Citation Context In part due to these migratory labor patterns, divorce and non-marital births increased greatly for Africans during the apartheid era Burman and van der Spuy The bidimensional decomposition of inequality: A nested Theil approach by Michele Giammatteo , " In this paper we propose a nested inequality decomposition by income sources and population subgroups derived by the Theil index. We firstly motivate our preference for its associated decomposition by income sources with respect to the axiom-based proposal of Shorrocks and the Gini-based decomposition of Lerman and Yitzhaki We firstly motivate our preference for its associated decomposition by income sources with respect to the axiom-based proposal of Shorrocks and the Gini-based decomposition of Lerman and Yitzhaki Then we enhance the set of desirable properties able to sustain that choice with the additional requirement of subgroup decomposability. The nested decomposition of the Theil index allows the overall level of inequality to be function of only three types of factors: The contribution of inequality of education to inequality of earnings in Mexico is the second highest in Latin America, after Brazil, and the significance of education has been increasing over time. Moreover, the income effect is always prevalent, and the distribution of education is highly significant even after controlling for changes in other relevant variables, such as age, economic sector, region, and labor market status. The increase

DOWNLOAD PDF CONTINENTAL AND SUB-CONTINENTAL INCOME INEQUALITY

in earnings inequality, however, does not appear to be the result of a worsening in the distribution of education, although the income profile, which is related to the returns to schooling, has become much steeper. This means that the shift in demand toward high-skilled labor has not been matched by an increase in supply. Any opinions expressed here are those of the author s and not those of the institute. Research disseminated by IZA may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. The Institute for the Study of Labor IZA in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and visitors and doctoral programs. IZA engages in i original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, ii development of policy concepts, and iii dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. Lafora body is a rarely seen and progressive disease which is characterized by mental decline, myoclonus and generalized epilepsy. Definitive diagnosis is made with biopsy showing typical spherical PAS positive inclusion bodies. In this article, we present a case who had myoclonus, general In this article, we present a case who had myoclonus, generalize seizure and dementia and diagnosed with Lafora body disease. Diagnosis was confirmed by axillary skin biopsy. Partial improvement in both myoclonic and generalized seizure frequencies was seen.

DOWNLOAD PDF CONTINENTAL AND SUB-CONTINENTAL INCOME INEQUALITY

Chapter 4 : RACE, INCOME, AND ENVIRONMENTAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES

Abstract. Income inequality can be measured at different levels of aggregation such as global, continental, international and national levels. Here we consider income inequality at regions defined as equivalent of continental and sub-continental levels.

By Eric Levitz The bosses of the Senate, circa But the profound threat that Vladimir Putin poses to our republic is one. A large and growing body of evidence suggests that Russian agents aided the campaign of an American presidential candidate, in hopes of furthering their own special interests and, perhaps, gaining a sympathetic ear at Pennsylvania Avenue. In a liberal democracy, the legitimacy of a state is founded on the integrity of its elections. Spread doubt about the latter, and the former starts to fall away. If Americans believe that their leaders do not derive their power from the popular will, but merely from the favor of shadowy puppet-masters, then civic engagement and social trust will decay. Voter participation will decline, along with confidence in public institutions. And these developments will, in turn, make it easier for bad actors to manipulate the democratic process. Eventually, cynicism about democracy could make some voters welcome the prospect of authoritarian rule. That may sound like a non sequitur. The debate over tax policy in the United States is generally framed as a conflict between rival economic theories. Democrats may claim that cutting taxes on the rich will slow the economy, or drive up the debt, or force cuts to popular domestic programs. But few would put supply-side cuts on a list of threats to liberal democracy in the United States. That the rich can easily convert their wealth into political dominance was a common-sense proposition for Americans born into a Gilded Age. In , American billionaires aided the campaigns of their preferred presidential candidates , in hopes of furthering their special interests and perhaps, gaining a sympathetic ear at Pennsylvania Avenue. Some may take exception to this implicit analogy: American elites attempting to influence our elections through political speech and Russian operatives trying to do so through cyberattacks are categorically different phenomena. This is certainly true; but it also does nothing to negate the premise that the political influence of American multi-millionaires, billionaires, and corporations undermines the integrity of our democracy, in many of the same ways that Russian interference does. Koch, Koch, Murdoch, Mercer, Mercer. Getty Images Such claims are facially absurd. But the discrepancy between how seriously our political elites take the threat that Russian meddling poses to our democracy and how blithe they are about the one that concentrated wealth poses to it is not. But they are typically confined to debates over campaign finance laws. This is unfortunate and not merely because the Supreme Court has erected a mountainous roadblock on the path to federal reforms. So long as the wealthiest 0.1% were somehow overturned. After all, campaign donations are just one of the many ways that well-heeled elites influence the political process and not necessarily the most effective. It is hard to see how one can impose tight restrictions on political organizing and policy research in a free and open society let alone, one with constitutional protections of speech as robust as our own. Pushing for more public financing of elections should be part of any plan for limiting the influence of big money in politics. The stakes of these regressive cuts might strike some Americans as abstract. After all, as they raid the federal treasury for their billionaire benefactors, Republicans do intend to set aside a bit of hush money for the witnesses in the middle class. And since the GOP does not currently plan to attach spending cuts to their tax package, most American households will come out ahead in the near-term. Progressives can and should argue that these tax cuts will threaten popular domestic programs down the road. And there is no question that reducing the tax burden of the wealthy will swell those inequalities. Conservatives maintain that such disparities in income are a worthy price for the economic growth that supply-side tax cuts will provide to all Americans. For example, countries that made large cuts in top tax rates, such as the United Kingdom or the United States, have not grown significantly faster than countries that did not, such as Germany or Denmark. While the Reagan tax cuts did not give the U. This is not because globalization and automation inevitably create a winner-take-all economy. Japan and continental

DOWNLOAD PDF CONTINENTAL AND SUB-CONTINENTAL INCOME INEQUALITY

Europe have been reshaped by those forces, and yet saw no similar explosion in the income share of their rich. Wealthy Americans responded to tax cuts by producing more, and thus increased their pre-tax income. As Piketty and Saez write: Here, top earners might be able to partly set their own pay by bargaining harder or influencing compensation committees. In other words, top rate cuts stimulate rent-seeking at the top but not overall economic growth — the key difference with the supply-side, scenario. Virtually everything that we fear Russian interference could do to our democracy, these inequities have done already. Polls show Americans are losing faith in democracy itself, and are growing more sympathetic to authoritarian appeals. Our allegiance to American institutions requires the overthrow of this kind of power.

DOWNLOAD PDF CONTINENTAL AND SUB-CONTINENTAL INCOME INEQUALITY

Chapter 5 : Continental And Sub-Continental Income Inequality

CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Council, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): positions.

WhatsApp The effect of neoliberal globalisation - poverty plummets. Absolutely nothing at all to equate with anything the United Nations might be able to observe as a global or historical level of poverty. OK, about as well as any economic calculation can make them. The reason we use this number, or something very close to it, is that this is the modal human experience over time. Take a slightly different tack. Income per person cannot be higher across the population than GDP per person. People get richer, more children survive, we end up with just more people living at the old standard. This is the value of what can be consumed that day. Whatever the daily value of that shirt is, that hovel. There is none of this in the UK. Simply none at all, it does not exist. So, things should be pretty easy for our UN bod, eh? The electricity consumption of a computer? For the amount of time it takes to log on? But look at that number. This is, by our global standards, a thoroughly middle class income in fact. Still, there is good news here: Last year his no-holds-barred UN report into the impact of Trump-era policies on the US brought a stinging reaction from the White House. The odds are that Alston will say the UK is far from doing enough to meet its obligations. In the UK ratified the UN covenant on economic, social and cultural rights agreeing that policy changes in times of economic crisis must not be discriminatory, must mitigate, not increase, inequalities and that disadvantaged people must not be disproportionately affected. Usefully, inequality has fallen: Inequality fell in the recession, as it normally does fall in recessions.

DOWNLOAD PDF CONTINENTAL AND SUB-CONTINENTAL INCOME INEQUALITY

Chapter 6 : CiteSeerX " Citation Query The Contribution of Income Components to Income Inequality

Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the institute. Research disseminated by IZA may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international.

See other articles in PMC that cite the published article. Abstract This article asks whether the relationship between neighborhood and household income levels and neighborhood hazard levels varies according to neighborhood and household racial composition. Using a national, census tract-level data set, the authors find that black, white, and Hispanic households with similar incomes live in neighborhoods of dissimilar environmental quality, that the association between neighborhood and household income levels and neighborhood hazard levels varies according to neighborhood and household racial composition, and that increases in neighborhood and household income levels are more strongly associated with declining hazard levels in black neighborhoods and households than in white neighborhoods and households. These researchers have focused much of their attention on three questions: Are racial minorities disproportionately burdened by environmental hazards? If so, is this because of their racial status or because minorities tend to have lower incomes than whites? And is neighborhood racial composition a stronger predictor than neighborhood income levels of neighborhood environmental hazard levels? We expand on this research, and on arguments set forth by Pulido , and Downey , by arguing that rather than comparing the predictive power of race and income, it would be more fruitful to ask whether these factors interact to produce environmentally inequitable outcomes. Thus, this study addresses questions such as the following: Does the association between neighborhood income levels and neighborhood hazard levels vary according to neighborhood racial composition? Are increases in neighborhood income levels more strongly associated with declining hazard levels in minority neighborhoods or white neighborhoods? Questions such as these have not been posed in prior environmental inequality research. Thus, this article extends prior research by a developing a theoretical explanation for why race and income should interact to produce environmentally inequitable outcomes and b testing neighborhood- and household-level hypotheses derived from this explanation. We then divide U. Finally, we run a set of regression analyses that allow us to determine whether the relationship between neighborhood income levels and neighborhood hazard levels varies according to neighborhood racial composition. Although these analyses do not allow us to determine why or how race and income interact to produce environmentally inequitable outcomes, they do allow us to determine whether they interact to produce environmentally inequitable outcomes. As we hope to demonstrate below, this increases our understanding of environmental inequality in the United States in several important ways. Literature Review These quantitative studies have produced mixed results. Although several studies have found that the association between neighborhood racial composition and neighborhood hazard levels persists after controlling for neighborhood income levels and other neighborhood characteristics Ash and Fetter ; Brulle and Pellow ; Lester, Allen, and Hill ; Mennis and Jordan ; Morello-Frosch, Pastor, and Sadd ; Sadd et al. Moreover, the findings in some of the former studies only hold under certain model specifications or when certain pollution variables are used but not others. These researchers note, for example, that racial income inequality is largely the product of racial discrimination in educational institutions and housing and labor markets Massey and Denton ; Waldinger Thus, it is likely that racial discrimination plays an important role in shaping environmental racial inequality even when regression models indicate that environmental racial inequality is due solely to racial income inequality. This is problematic, they contend, because a race and income work together, not separately, to produce racially and environmentally inequitable outcomes and b the role income and class play in shaping environmental outcomes likely differs for different racial and ethnic groups Pulido Given this argument and the fact that racial and ethnic groups vary in their ability to translate income gains into residential mobility Crowder and South ; Massey and Denton , we hypothesize that a the relationship between household income levels and

DOWNLOAD PDF CONTINENTAL AND SUB-CONTINENTAL INCOME INEQUALITY

neighborhood hazard levels should vary according to household racial composition and b the relationship between neighborhood income levels and neighborhood hazard levels should vary according to neighborhood racial composition. As noted earlier, these hypotheses have not been tested in prior research. For example, the most common explanations of environmental inequality hold that poor and minority neighborhoods are more likely than other neighborhoods to house environmental hazards because a poor and minority communities lack the political power to keep hazardous facilities out of their neighborhoods Hamilton ; b housing market racism confines minorities to undesirable neighborhoods shunned by whites Mohai and Bryant ; c housing costs are relatively low in environmentally hazardous neighborhoods, making them more attractive to lower income people who are, in turn, disproportionately nonwhite Hamilton ; Mohai and Bryant ; or d environmentally hazardous facilities are intentionally sited in minority neighborhoods Downey c. Although few researchers have directly tested these explanatory models exceptions include Downey c ; Hunter et al. As a result, these models have provided theoretical justification for much quantitative environmental inequality research. What these models have failed to do is provide researchers with any reason for expecting that race and income should interact to produce environmentally inequitable outcomes. Thus, in developing a theoretical explanation for why race and income should interact to produce environmental inequality, and in testing hypotheses drawn from this explanation, this study fills an important theoretical and empirical gap in the literature. Thus, differences between blacks and whites across a whole range of social indicators are the result not of racial discrimination but of income differences between blacks and white. If Wilson is correct, then the life chances and experiences of blacks and whites with similar incomes should be relatively similar to each other, and as a result, blacks and whites with similar incomes should live in neighborhoods of similar environmental quality Downey In other words, if Wilson is correct, the relationship between neighborhood and household income levels and neighborhood pollution levels should not vary according to neighborhood and household racial composition. For example, research demonstrates that white housing preferences and discriminatory real estate and lending practices place blacks and whites in different housing markets Galster and Godfrey ; Massey and Denton ; Oliver and Shapiro Racial and ethnic groups also vary in their ability to translate income and human capital gains into residential mobility into more desirable neighborhoods Charles ; Crowder and South ; Logan and Alba ; South, Crowder, and Chavez Thus, the relationship between neighborhood and household income levels and neighborhood pollution levels is likely to vary according to neighborhood and household racial composition. But even if this relationship does vary according to neighborhood and household racial composition, it is not clear what the nature of this variation will be. On the one hand, because higher incomes tend to increase residential mobility for whites more than for minorities Charles ; Crowder and South ; South et al. On the other hand, because low-income minority neighborhoods and households are more likely than low-income white neighborhoods and households to experience neighborhood disorganization and neighborhood deterioration Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley ; Small and Newman ; Wilson , it seems likely that increases in income levels across neighborhoods and households will be more strongly associated with declining hazard levels in minority neighborhoods and households than in white neighborhoods and households. Thus, in the analyses presented below, we test the following hypotheses: Blacks, whites, and Hispanics with similar incomes live in neighborhoods of dissimilar environmental quality. The association between neighborhood and household income levels and neighborhood hazard levels varies according to neighborhood and household racial composition. Increases in neighborhood and household income levels should be more strongly associated with declining hazard levels in white neighborhoods and households than in minority neighborhoods and households. Increases in neighborhood and household income levels should be more strongly associated with declining hazard levels in minority neighborhoods and households than in white neighborhoods and households. Before proceeding, we should note that Hypotheses 3 and 4 refer to variation in income levels across neighborhoods and households at a single point in time rather than to variation over time in income levels within neighborhoods and households. The TRI records the number of pounds of specified toxic chemicals released into the environment each year

DOWNLOAD PDF CONTINENTAL AND SUB-CONTINENTAL INCOME INEQUALITY

by industrial facilities that fall into one of seven industrial categories manufacturing, metal mining, coal mining, electric generating facilities that combust coal or oil, chemical wholesale distributors, petroleum terminals, and bulk storage, employ the equivalent of ten or more full-time workers, and manufacture, process, or otherwise use the specified chemicals in specified quantities. In , the specified quantities were 25, pounds for facilities that manufactured or processed TRI chemicals and 10, pounds for facilities that otherwise used TRI chemicals Rtknet The TRI chemical list included over chemicals and chemical categories in The RSEI estimates a kilometer square pollution plume model made up of one-kilometer square grid cells for each air pollutant released by each TRI facility in a calendar year. Incorporating factors such as wind speed, wind direction, air turbulence, smokestack height, exit gas velocities, and rate of chemical decay and deposition, the RSEI model estimates a yearly, average air pollutant concentration value for each one-kilometer square grid cell in each plume model. Each grid cell value in each plume model is then multiplied by the toxicity weight of the modeled air pollutant, and the toxicity-weighted grid cell values for each plume model in the United States are then summed together to create a toxicity-weighted air concentration grid also made up of one-kilometer square grid cells for the entire nation see EPA a for technical details on the RSEI model. For example, if we placed a grid consisting of one-kilometer square grid cells across the entire continental United States, and each grid cell in this national grid had a value of zero, then a each of the grid cells in each of the air pollutant plume models would directly correspond to one of the cells in the national grid and b we could add the value of each plume model grid cell to the value of its corresponding grid cell in the national grid. The RSEI data used in this article are thus created by successively adding cell values from each air pollutant plume model to the appropriate cell values in the national grid, such that some cell values in the national grid are calculated using information from multiple plume models and multiple TRI facilities and other cell values retain a value of zero because they do not correspond with any of the plume model grid cells. Finally, in order to estimate the toxicity-weighted air pollutant concentration level in each census tract in the continental United States, we calculated the proportion of each census tract covered by each grid cell that overlapped it. Before proceeding, it is important to note that the data used in this study were obtained directly from the EPA and are not included in the public release data set. The main difference between our data and the public release data is that the public release data provide facility-specific hazard and risk scores for each facility in the TRI database, while the data used here provide an estimated air pollutant concentration value for each one-kilometer square grid cell in the United States, with each cell value potentially incorporating information from multiple facilities. Unlike the data used here, the public release data also incorporate information on water and ground pollution. It is also important to note that RSEI data are not exposure estimates. Thus, the tract-level, toxicity-weighted, air pollutant concentration data used in this study provide estimates of the relative risk of each census tract in the study area in relation to every other census tract in the study area see Downey for a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the RSEI data. Demographic Data Demographic data for every census tract in the continental United States were obtained from the U. Demographic variables include percent His-panic, percent non-Hispanic black, percent non-Hispanic white, median household income in thousands of dollars, the percentage of tract residents twenty-five years old and older who have completed at least one year of college percent some college, median property value in thousands of dollars, median housing unit age, the number of tract residents per square mile divided by 1, population density, the percentage of tract housing units that are vacant percent vacant, and the percentage of employed tract residents sixteen years old and older who are engaged in manufacturing occupations percent manufacturer. Table 1 lists the means and standard deviations of these variables and of the toxicity-weighted air pollutant concentration variables, toxic concentration and toxic concentration logged.

Chapter 7 : Inequality Is a Bigger Threat to Our Democracy Than Putin Is

Abstract. Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the institute. Research disseminated

DOWNLOAD PDF CONTINENTAL AND SUB-CONTINENTAL INCOME INEQUALITY

by IZA may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions.

Chapter 8 : CiteSeerX " of LaborContinental and Sub-Continental Income Inequality

CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Council, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): An index to IZA Discussion Papers is located at.

Chapter 9 : The World Distribution of Income and Income Inequality

Here we consider income inequality at regions defined as equivalent of continental and sub-continental levels. We investigate the economic disparity between regions of the world and among.