

Chapter 1 : Cultural Revolution - HISTORY

From the Back Cover. The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms brings together Tang Tsou's best essays written since , with a substantial introduction providing an overview and a major new essay extending his analysis backward to the May Fourth period of and forward into

See Article History Alternative Title: He abandoned many orthodox communist doctrines and attempted to incorporate elements of the free-enterprise system and other reforms into the Chinese economy. Early life and career until the Cultural Revolution Deng was the son of a landowner and studied in France 1924 , where he became active in the communist movement, and in the Soviet Union 1927 He then returned to China and later became a leading political and military organizer in the Jiangxi Soviet , an autonomous communist enclave in southwestern China that had been established in by Mao Zedong. Following the ouster of the communists by Nationalist forces under Chiang Kai-shek in , Deng participated in the arduous Long March 1935 of the Chinese communists to a new base in Shaanxi province, northwestern China. After the communist takeover of China in , he became the regional party leader of southwestern China. In he was summoned to Beijing and became a vice-premier. Rising rapidly, he became general secretary of the CCP in and a member of the ruling Political Bureau in From the mids Deng was a major policy maker in both foreign and domestic affairs. Deng was attacked during the Cultural Revolution 1976 by radical supporters of Mao. He was stripped of his high party and government posts sometime in the years 1969, after which he disappeared from public view. As effective head of the government during the months preceding the death of Zhou, he was widely considered the likely successor to Zhou. Rise to preeminence By July Deng had returned to his high posts. He soon embarked on a struggle with Hua for control of the party and government. Zhao Ziyang became premier of the government, and Hu Yaobang became general secretary of the CCP; both men looked to Deng for guidance. National Archives, Washington, D. He instituted decentralized economic management and rational and flexible long-term planning to achieve efficient and controlled economic growth. He freed many industrial enterprises from the control and supervision of the central government and gave factory managers the authority to determine production levels and to pursue profits for their enterprises. Deng eschewed the most conspicuous leadership posts in the party and government. He was also a vice-chairman of the CCP. By so doing he compelled similar retirements by many aged party leaders who had remained opposed or resistant to his reforms. Deng faced a critical test of his leadership in April1976 June Zhao had replaced the too-liberal Hu as general secretary of the CCP in After some hesitation, Deng supported those in the CCP leadership who favoured the use of force to suppress the protesters, and in June the army crushed the demonstrations in the Tiananmen Square Incident with considerable loss of life. Zhao was replaced as party leader by the more authoritarian Jiang Zemin , to whom Deng yielded his chairmanship of the Military Commission in By then Deng lacked any formal post in the communist leadership, but he still retained ultimate authority in the party. Although his direct involvement in government declined in the s, he retained his influence until his death. Deng restored China to domestic stability and economic growth after the disastrous excesses of the Cultural Revolution. Under his leadership, China acquired a rapidly growing economy, rising standards of living, considerably expanded personal and cultural freedoms, and growing ties to the world economy. Learn More in these related Britannica articles:

Chapter 2 : The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms: A Historical Perspective, Tsou

The Cultural Revolution and post-Mao reforms: a historical perspective User Review - Not Available - Book Verdict. Tsou, one of the country's senior and most widely respected China scholars, has for more than a generation been producing timely and deeply informed essays on Chinese politics as it develops.

Many communities were assigned production of a single commodity—steel. Mao vowed to increase agricultural production to twice levels. Uneducated farmers attempted to produce steel on a massive scale, partially relying on backyard furnaces to achieve the production targets set by local cadres. The steel produced was low quality and largely useless. The Great Leap reduced harvest sizes and led to a decline in the production of most goods except substandard pig iron and steel. Furthermore, local authorities frequently exaggerated production numbers, hiding and intensifying the problem for several years. Food was in desperate shortage, and production fell dramatically. The famine caused the deaths of millions of people, particularly in poorer inland regions. In July, senior Party leaders convened at the scenic Mount Lu to discuss policy. At the conference, Marshal Peng Dehuai, the Minister of Defence, criticized Great Leap policies in a private letter to Mao, writing that it was plagued by mismanagement and cautioning against elevating political dogma over the laws of economics. Peng was replaced by Lin Biao, another revolutionary army general who became a more staunch Mao supporter later in his career. Owing to his loss of esteem within the party, Mao developed a decadent and eccentric lifestyle. Sino-Soviet split and anti-revisionism Main article: Although initially they had been mutually supportive, disagreements arose after the death of Joseph Stalin and the rise of Nikita Khrushchev to power in the Soviet Union. In , Khrushchev denounced Stalin and his policies and began implementing post-Stalinist economic reforms. Mao and many members of the Chinese Communist Party CCP opposed these changes, believing that they would have negative repercussions for the worldwide Marxist movement, among whom Stalin was still viewed as a hero. Relations between the two governments soured. Without pointing fingers at the Soviet Union, Mao criticized its ideological ally, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. His approach was less than transparent, achieving this purge through newspaper articles, internal meetings, and skillfully employing his network of political allies. In the play, an honest civil servant, Hai Rui, is dismissed by a corrupt emperor. While Mao initially praised the play, in February he secretly commissioned his wife Jiang Qing and Shanghai propagandist Yao Wenyuan to publish an article criticizing it. Stress from the events led Luo to attempt suicide. The Outline, sanctioned by the Party centre, defined Hai Rui as constructive academic discussion, and aimed to formally distance Peng Zhen from any political implications. Once conditions are ripe, they will seize political power and turn the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Some of them we have already seen through; others we have not. Some are still trusted by us and are being trained as our successors, persons like Khrushchev for example, who are still nestling beside us. Classes were promptly cancelled in Beijing primary and secondary schools, followed by a decision on June 13 to expand the class suspension nationwide. Unlike the political movement of the s that squarely targeted intellectuals, the new movement was focused on established party cadres, many of whom were part of the work teams. As a result, the work teams came under increasing suspicion for being yet another group aimed at thwarting revolutionary fervour. He subsequently returned to Beijing on a mission to criticize the party leadership for its handling of the work-teams issue. Mao accused the work teams of undermining the student movement, calling for their full withdrawal on July Several days later a rally was held at the Great Hall of the People to announce the decision and set the new tone of the movement to university and high school teachers and students. At the plenum, Mao showed outright disdain for Liu, repeatedly interrupting Liu as he delivered his opening day speech. Sensing that the largely obstructive party elite was unwilling to fully embrace his revolutionary ideology, Mao went on the offensive. On July 28, Red Guard representatives wrote to Mao, calling for rebellion and upheaval to safeguard the revolution. Mao then responded to the letters by writing his own big-character poster entitled Bombard the Headquarters, rallying people to target the "command centre i. Mao wrote that despite having undergone a Communist revolution, a "bourgeois" elite was still thriving in "positions of authority" in the government and Communist Party. Liu

and Deng kept their seats on the Politburo Standing Committee but were in fact sidelined from day-to-day party affairs. The extensive Organization Department, in charge of party personnel, essentially ceased to exist. The top officials in the Propaganda Department were sacked, with many of its functions folding into the CRG. Red Guards dragged the remains of the Wanli Emperor and Empresses to the front of the tomb, where they were posthumously "denounced" and burned. Although the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, it is still trying to use the old ideas, culture, customs, and habits of the exploiting classes to corrupt the masses, capture their minds, and stage a comeback. The proletariat must do just the opposite: It must meet head-on every challenge of the bourgeoisie [Currently, our objective is to struggle against and crush those people in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic "authorities" and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and to transform education, literature and art, and all other parts of the superstructure that do not correspond to the socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system. The implications of the Sixteen Points were far-reaching. It elevated what was previously a student movement to a nationwide mass campaign that would galvanize workers, farmers, soldiers and lower-level party functionaries to rise up, challenge authority, and re-shape the "superstructure" of society. On August 18, , over a million Red Guards from all over the country gathered in and around Tiananmen Square in Beijing for a personal audience with the Chairman. Some changes associated with the "Four Olds" campaign were largely benign, such as assigning new names to city streets, places, and even people; millions of babies were born with "revolutionary"-sounding names during this period. Other aspects of the Red Guard revolution were more destructive, particularly in the realms of culture and religion. Various historical sites throughout the country were destroyed. The damage was particularly pronounced in the capital, Beijing. Temples, churches, mosques, monasteries, and cemeteries were closed down and sometimes converted to other uses, looted, and destroyed. They began by passing out leaflets explaining their actions to develop and strengthen socialism and posting the names of suspected counter-revolutionaries on bulletin boards. They assembled in large groups, held debates, and wrote educational plays. They held public meetings to criticize and solicit self-criticisms from counter-revolutionaries. You young people, full of vigor and vitality, are in the bloom of life, like the sun at eight or nine in the morning. Our hope is placed on you The world belongs to you. These quotes directly from Mao led to other actions by the Red Guards in the views of other Maoist leaders. What started as verbal struggles among activist groups became physical, especially when activists began to seize weapons from the army in The central Maoist leaders limited their intervention in activist violence to verbal criticism, but after the PLA began to intervene in , authorities started to suppress the mass movement. On August 22, , a central directive was issued to stop police intervention in Red Guard activities, and those in the police force who defied this notice were labeled counter-revolutionaries. The number injured exceeded that. Many people who were indicted as counter-revolutionaries died by suicide. In August and September , there were 1, people murdered in Beijing alone. In Shanghai there were suicides and deaths related to the Cultural Revolution in September. In Wuhan there were 62 suicides and 32 murders during the same period. In October, Mao convened a "Central Work Conference", essentially to convince those in the party leadership who had not yet adopted revolutionary ideology. Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were prosecuted as part of a bourgeois reactionary line zichanjieji fandong luxian and begrudgingly gave self-criticisms. Deng Xiaoping was sent away for a period of re-education three times, and was eventually sent to work in a Jiangxi engine factory. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. May Learn how and when to remove this template message On January 3, , Lin Biao and Jiang Qing employed local media and grassroots organizations to generate the " January Storm ", during which the Shanghai municipal government was essentially overthrown. In Beijing, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were once again the targets of denunciation; others condemned Vice Premier Tao Zhu , signaling that even central government officials should not be immune from criticism. In February, Jiang Qing and Lin Biao, with support from Mao, insisted that class struggle be extended to the military. Many prominent generals voiced their hostility and opposition to the Cultural Revolution. Foreign Minister Chen Yi and Vice-Premier Tan Zhenlin vocally incriminated the turn of events in Shanghai, accusing the movement of "destroying the party".

This group of party leaders were subsequently denounced as the "February Countercurrent". Many of these rulers were criticized for trying to sabotage the revolution and fell into political disgrace thereafter. At the same time, some Red Guard organizations rose in protest against other Red Guard organizations who ran dissimilar revolutionary messages, complicating the situation. The situation was quickly spinning out of control; local revolutionary activities lacked centralized leadership. By July, factional violence had become commonplace across the country. After the initial praise by Jiang Qing, the Red Guards began to break down barracks and other army buildings. This activity, which could not be stopped by army generals, continued through to the autumn of 1967. In the central city of Wuhan, like in many other cities, two major revolutionary organizations emerged, one supporting the establishment and the other opposed to it. The groups fought over the control of the city. Chen Zaidao, the Army general in charge of the area, forcibly repressed the anti-establishment demonstrators. However, in the midst of the commotion, Mao himself flew to Wuhan with a large entourage of central officials in an attempt to secure military loyalty in the area. In this same year, Chinese New Year celebrations were banned in China; they were only reinstated 13 years later. A year later, the Red Guard factions were dismantled entirely; Mao predicted that the chaos might begin running its own agenda and be tempted to turn against revolutionary ideology. Their purpose had been largely fulfilled; Mao and his radical colleagues had largely overturned establishment power. In early October, Mao began a campaign to purge ruling officials. Many were sent to the countryside to work in reeducation camps. During this movement, which lasted for the next decade, young bourgeoisie living in cities were ordered to go to the countryside to experience working life. The term "young intellectuals" was used to refer to recently graduated college students. In the late 1960s, these students returned to their home cities. This movement was thus in part a means of moving Red Guards from the cities to the countryside, where they would cause less social disruption. It also served to spread revolutionary ideology across China geographically.

The book The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms: A Historical Perspective, Tang Tsou is published by University of Chicago Press.

Deng then led the effort to place government control in the hands of veteran party officials opposed to the radical excesses of the previous two decades. The new, pragmatic leadership emphasized economic development and renounced mass political movements. At the pivotal December Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress Central Committee, the leadership adopted economic reform policies aimed at expanding rural income and incentives, encouraging experiments in enterprise autonomy, reducing central planning, and attracting foreign direct investment into China. After, the Chinese leadership moved toward more pragmatic positions in almost all fields. The party encouraged artists, writers, and journalists to adopt more critical approaches, although open attacks on party authority were not permitted. Reform policies brought great improvements in the standard of living, especially for urban workers and for farmers who took advantage of opportunities to diversify crops and establish village industries. Literature and the arts blossomed, and Chinese intellectuals established extensive links with scholars in other countries. At the same time, however, political dissent as well as social problems such as inflation, urban migration, and prostitution emerged. Although students and intellectuals urged greater reforms, some party elders increasingly questioned the pace and the ultimate goals of the reform program. Hu Yaobang, a protege of Deng and a leading advocate of reform, was blamed for the protests and forced to resign as CCP General Secretary in January. His proposal in May to accelerate price reform led to widespread popular complaints about rampant inflation and gave opponents of rapid reform the opening to call for greater centralization of economic controls and stricter prohibitions against Western influence. This precipitated a political debate, which grew more heated through the winter of. The death of Hu Yaobang on April 15, , coupled with growing economic hardship caused by high inflation, provided the backdrop for a large-scale protest movement by students, intellectuals, and other parts of a disaffected urban population. Their protests, which grew despite government efforts to contain them, called for an end to official corruption and for defense of freedoms guaranteed by the Chinese constitution. Protests also spread to many other cities, including Shanghai, Chengdu, and Guangzhou. Martial law was declared on May 20, Late on June 3 and early on the morning of June 4, military units were brought into Beijing. They used armed force to clear demonstrators from the streets. There are no official estimates of deaths in Beijing, but most observers believe that casualties numbered in the hundreds. After June 4, while foreign governments expressed horror at the brutal suppression of the demonstrators, the central government eliminated remaining sources of organized opposition, detained large numbers of protesters, and required political reeducation not only for students but also for large numbers of party cadre and government officials. Though not completely eschewing political reform, China has consistently placed overwhelming priority on the opening of its economy.

Chapter 4 : Monthly Review | Farmers, Mao, and Discontent in China: From the Great Leap Forward to the

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While the disastrous famine of can be explained by policy failures and natural conditions, the Cultural Revolution was a human event with more contentious causes. Today in China, the government monitors and censors discussion of the Cultural Revolution more than any other historical event. In this work, Lee argued that the Cultural Revolution began as a conflict between party elites, but expanded rapidly into a conflict between elites and the masses. Lee suggested that most of the Red Guards were from underprivileged sections of urban society. They were aggrieved because the Revolution had failed to meet their needs. The Red Guards were thus motivated by frustration and class envy more than political or ideological concerns. According to Lee, Mao set this movement in motion but was unable to control or restrain it. Competition for university places, government jobs and technical appointments had rapidly increased, leaving many with little chance of success. Chinese students of the s were subject to political socialisation: The radicalism of many Red Guards was fuelled by this intense competition and the belief that success could only come through fanatical loyalty and enthusiasm. Ouyang Xiang is beaten by Red Guards in He was later murdered. It is possible to identify present-day barriers to further knowledge. One is our inability to study Chinese military archives. A Historical Perspective, The Cultural Revolution was necessary, Tsou argued, because the power of the government had grown excessively and a correction was needed. These writers argued that the social disruption and human cost of the Cultural Revolution far outweighed whatever political benefits it delivered. In the West, the prevailing view of the Cultural Revolution was that it was mostly the work of Mao Zedong. Chang considers that the vast majority of young Chinese were brainwashed by Maoism and its personality cult. Content on this page may not be republished or distributed without permission. For more information please refer to our Terms of Use. This page was written by Jennifer Llewellyn and Steve Thompson. To reference this page, use the following citation: This website uses pinyin romanisations of Chinese words and names. Please refer to this page for more information.

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Cultural Revolution propaganda poster. It depicts Mao Zedong, above a group of soldiers from the People's Liberation Army. A caption on the poster says, "The Chinese People's Liberation Army is the great school of Mao Zedong Thought."

Programs carried out by his colleagues to bring China out of the economic depression caused by the Great Leap Forward made Mao doubt their revolutionary commitment and also resent his own diminished role. He especially feared urban social stratification in a society as traditionally elitist as China. Mao thus ultimately adopted four goals for the Cultural Revolution: They were organized into groups called the Red Guards, and Mao ordered the party and the army not to suppress the movement. Mao also put together a coalition of associates to help him carry out the Cultural Revolution. His wife, Jiang Qing, brought in a group of radical intellectuals to rule the cultural realm. Defense Minister Lin Biao made certain that the military remained Maoist. Premier Zhou Enlai played an essential role in keeping the country running, even during periods of extraordinary chaos. Mao believed that this measure would be beneficial both for the young people and for the party cadres that they attacked. The Red Guards splintered into zealous rival factions, each purporting to be the true representative of Maoist thought. The resulting anarchy, terror, and paralysis completely disrupted the urban economy. Industrial production fell 12 percent below that of 1966. In January the movement began to produce the actual overthrow of provincial party committees and the first attempts to construct new political bodies to replace them. In February many remaining top party leaders called for a halt to the Cultural Revolution, but Mao and his more radical partisans prevailed, and the movement escalated yet again. Indeed, by the summer of 1968, disorder was widespread; large armed clashes between factions of Red Guards were occurring throughout urban China. Instead of producing unified support for the radical youths, this political-military action resulted in more divisions within the military. The tensions inherent in the situation surfaced vividly when Chen Zaidao, a military commander in the city of Wuhan during the summer of 1968, arrested two key radical party leaders. In 1969, after the country had been subject to several cycles of radicalism alternating with relative moderation, Mao decided to rebuild the Communist Party to gain greater control. The military dispatched officers and soldiers to take over schools, factories, and government agencies. The army simultaneously forced millions of urban Red Guards to move to the rural hinterland to live, thus scattering their forces and bringing some order to the cities. Two months later, the Twelfth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee met to call for the convening of a party congress and the rebuilding of the party apparatus. From that point, the issue of who would inherit political power as the Cultural Revolution wound down became the central question of Chinese politics. Lin took advantage of Sino-Soviet border clashes in the spring of 1969 to declare martial law and further used his position to rid himself of some potential rivals to the succession. Several leaders who had been purged during 1968 died under the martial law regimen of 1969, and many others suffered severely during this period. Lin quickly encountered opposition. Mao himself was wary of a successor who seemed to want to assume power too quickly, and he began to maneuver against Lin. Thus, despite many measures taken in 1970 to return order and normalcy to Chinese society, increasingly severe strains were splitting the top ranks of leadership. These strains first surfaced at a party plenum in the summer of 1970. Shortly thereafter Mao began a campaign to criticize Chen Boda as a warning to Lin. Chen disappeared from public view in August 1970. Matters came to a head in September when Lin himself was killed in what the Chinese asserted was an attempt to flee to the Soviet Union after an abortive assassination plot against Mao. They had in this quest attacked and tortured respected teachers, abused elderly citizens, humiliated old revolutionaries, and, in many cases, battled former friends in bloody confrontations. He encouraged a revival of the educational system and brought back into office a number of people who had been cast out. China began again to increase its trade and other links with the outside world, and the economy continued the forward momentum that had begun to build in 1966. Mao personally approved these general moves but remained wary lest they call into question the basic value of having launched the Cultural Revolution in the first place. During 1971, however, Mao suffered a serious stroke, and Zhou learned that he had a fatal malignancy. These

events highlighted the continued uncertainty over the succession. In early Zhou and Mao brought back to power Deng Xiaoping. Deng, however, had been the second most important purge victim at the hands of the radicals during the Cultural Revolution. His reemergence made Jiang Qing and her followers desperate to firmly establish a more radical path. The former favoured ideology, political mobilization, class struggle, anti-intellectualism, egalitarianism, and xenophobia, while the latter promoted economic growth, stability, educational progress, and a pragmatic foreign policy. Mao tried unsuccessfully to maintain a balance between these two forces while he struggled to find a successor who would embody his preferred combination of each. From mid until mid the radicals were ascendant; they whipped up a campaign that used criticism of Lin Biao and of Confucius as a thinly veiled vehicle for attacking Zhou and his policies. By July, however, the resulting economic decline and increasing chaos made Mao shift back toward Zhou and Deng. Mao then sanctioned criticism of these policies by means of wall posters dazibao, which had become a favoured method of propaganda for the radicals. Assessment Although the Cultural Revolution largely bypassed the vast majority of the people who lived in rural areas, it had serious consequences for China as a whole. In the short run, of course, the political instability and the constant shifts in economic policy produced slower economic growth and a decline in the capacity of the government to deliver goods and services. Officials at all levels of the political system learned that future shifts in policy would jeopardize those who had aggressively implemented previous policy. The result was bureaucratic timidity. Bold measures were taken in the late s to confront these immediate problems, but the Cultural Revolution left a legacy that continued to trouble China. There existed, for example, a severe generation gap; individuals who experienced the Cultural Revolution while in their teens and early twenties were denied an education and taught to redress grievances by taking to the streets. Post-Cultural Revolution policies—which stressed education and initiative over radical revolutionary fervour—left little room for these millions of people to have productive careers. Indeed, the fundamental damage to all aspects of the educational system itself took several decades to repair. Another serious problem was the corruption within the party and government. Both the fears engendered by the Cultural Revolution and the scarcity of goods that accompanied it forced people to fall back on traditional personal relationships and on bribery and other forms of persuasion to accomplish their goals. Concomitantly, the Cultural Revolution brought about general disillusionment with the party leadership and the system itself as millions of urban Chinese witnessed the obvious power plays that took place under the name of political principle in the early and mids. The post-Mao repudiation of both the objectives and the consequences of the Cultural Revolution made many people turn away from politics altogether. Among the people themselves, there remained bitter factionalism, as those who opposed each other during the Cultural Revolution often shared the same work unit and would do so for their entire careers. Perhaps never before in human history has a political leader unleashed such massive forces against the system that he created. The resulting damage to that system was profound, and the goals that Mao sought to achieve ultimately remained elusive.

Limited knowledge of tourism must be viewed in terms of its intersection with the unique economic, social, and political contexts that existed in China during respondents' childhood.

He comes from a rural background in China. Most of the research for this article was carried out by means of interviews in the rural areas discussed. There are widespread misconceptions about numerous aspects of the Chinese revolution. In addition, local and regional officials have sold farmland for development purposes, usually lining their own pockets, with inadequate compensation for the farmers. This has resulted in the current massive unrest in rural areas, involving literally hundreds of thousands of incidents with protesting farmers. This was also the era of massive irrigation projects "local, regional, and national in scope" that were to result in impressive gains in crop yields in subsequent years. However, the extra work burden that necessitated increased food consumption by the rural population was not accompanied by sufficient enhanced calorie intake. The current widespread rural, as well as urban, discontent in China is in sharp contrast to the relative absence of unrest during the Great Leap Forward, when grain shortages led to severe hunger in some parts of rural China as a result of harsh weather conditions and mismanagement by various governmental levels. There is considerable disagreement as to whether or not mass starvation occurred and, if it did, how many people died. Nevertheless, it is clear that significant hardships were created by grain shortages induced, at least partially, by the policies of the Great Leap Forward. However, during my research in rural China over the past twenty-five years "including extensive interviews with farmers in Jimo County in Shandong Province" I have not come across a single farmer who believed that Mao lost popularity because of the Great Leap Forward. Nor have I encountered any farmer who contemplated rising up against the government during the Great Leap Forward, or any literature mentioning that there were serious peasant protests during this period. However, a significant number of farmers, particularly younger ones, express their willingness to join a rebellion now if there was one against the government. And, as difficult as conditions may have been during the Great Leap Forward, farmers were apparently not too emaciated or too weak to build a large number of national, provincial, regional, and local irrigation projects. The Communist Party and the People The Party compared its relationship with the Chinese people to that of fish and water. The Communists argued that water people can live without fish Communist Party members. But fish cannot live without water, thus stressing the importance of popular support for the success of the revolution. This special relationship between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese people was built through a long process of trial and error, not always without failures. And there were many failures during the Great Leap Forward, leading to attempts at rectification through the Socialist Education Campaign in and the Cultural Revolution in The argument that people might not have other recourse except to engage in individual and everyday types of resistance or coping in the social context of the Great Leap Forward seems convincing. Chinese farmers, like all other people, would not lightly rise to the serious undertaking of trying to overthrow the government. But between the choice of starving to death and rebellion, the choice should not be hard to make. If the death toll of millions claimed by the critics of the Great Leap Forward were true, then why would the Chinese farmers submit to death by slow starvation rather than rising up and giving themselves some hope of survival? The Chinese term *jiegan erqi* rise up with bamboo sticks was created to describe the peasant rebellion during the Qin dynasty in particular and other peasant rebellions in general when Chinese farmers, under the duress of social injustice, rose up, using anything they could lay their hands on as weapons. However, during the Great Leap Forward, the Chinese population was more armed than ever. That was the time when Mao called for large-scale organization of militia divisions *daban minbingshi*. Young villagers in production teams were organized into militia platoons. In each production brigade there was a militia company. At the commune level, there were militia battalions. The department of military affairs in the county government was in charge of arming and training the militia. Chinese farmers worked in the fields with their rifles stacked nearby during the Great Leap Forward years. Past Accomplishments and Future Goals There are a number of factors discussed below that led to acceptance and wide, active participation of farmers in the projects of the Great

Leap Forward. One of the principal ones was that farmers knew that the projects were going to benefit them and their villages in the future. In addition, many farmers had received land and other assets during the land reform and felt a responsibility to the government. For example, in Jimo County, the landlords and rich peasants, who accounted for 4 percent of the population, lost over 11, hectares , mu of land, 33, houses, 2, horses and other farming animals, 4, pieces of farming implements, and 6,, kilos of grain because of land reform. But at the same time, poor peasant households, which accounted for 60 percent of the total population, got land, farming animals, and houses as a result of land reform.

Food Shortages The Great Leap Forward got its name partly because of the unprecedented scale of its irrigation projects. These projects, which were designed to increase grain yield, contributed, ironically, to the short-term grain shortage of the Great Leap Forward. Most agrarian societies work closely with the cycle of seasons. In Northern China, the seasonal cycle involves the following: Until recently, rural households in China would budget their grain supplies according to the cycle of their work in the fields. They would eat more and better food when they had to work strenuously in the fields, and would eat much less and lower quality food during the slow and idle seasons. Most farmers in northern China would get up very late in winter and early spring, and go to bed very early at night to save energy. They only ate two meals a day, and the foods they ate were mostly porridge or sweet potatoes during the idle seasons. As a result, the food consumption was kept to a minimum during the winter and early spring seasons. During the busy seasons, when farmers had to engage in intensive manual labor, they would eat as much wheat or corn bread as they could possibly afford. As a result, the food consumption during these busy seasons could be three to four times higher than the idle and slow seasons. The Great Leap Forward turned the idle and slow seasons of rural China into busy seasons. During the winter and spring of , , and , rural people worked on building reservoirs, digging wells, dredging river bottoms, and building irrigation channels. There were national projects, provincial projects, regional projects, and local projects being built at the same time. Some of the more well-known examples of these projects are: Shipeng Reservoir in the southern part of Jimo County; Wangquan Reservoir in the central part; Songhuaquan Reservoir in the midwestern part; Yecheng Reservoir in the west; and the Chahe Irrigation Project in the north. Apart from these big projects, there were also numerous minor projects launched by communes and villages in Jimo County. In , Jimo County also dug, for the first time, thirty-three big and deep electric-powered irrigation wells. There were undoubtedly very severe management problems during the Great Leap Forward. People were being asked to participate in physically demanding projects, but were not consistently provided with sufficient extra food rations. Without these gigantic irrigation projects, there would probably not have been any starvation in Jimo; the grain shortage and the aftermath would have been much less severe. It was, at the very least, overzealous to engage in such a gigantic investment of labor in such a short time and without sufficient food rations. Clearly, Jimo County government leaders were guilty of miscalculation and mismanagement of human and financial resources during the Great Leap Forward. Looking back, the leaders might blame the fervid social environment created by the central government or the pressure they received for more and quicker results from their higher-ups in the provincial or central governments. The slogan of the time was: But, at the grassroots level, leaders were supposed to know their local conditions better than the upper-level government, and they were ultimately responsible for the lives of the local people. There was a general consensus among local government leaders, local community leaders, and ordinary farmers that enhanced irrigation was needed in order to improve crop yields. Therefore, most farmers saw the connections between these irrigation projects and a better life for themselves in the near future. Even though they went through a great deal of hardship in constructing these projects at the time, farmers said they could not deny the fact that the purpose was to make their lives better in the future. As someone who worked on a collective farm for many years, moyanggong and chiqing appeared to me to be a necessary part of dealing with daily life during the Great Leap Forward, rather than individual forms of resistance against government policies or officials. What else could people do, when they were exhausted from hard work but did not feel it was right to stop working completely while others worked on? It was appropriate to engage in moyanggong as a way of taking a break, and other farmers understood. Chiqing was another accepted and widespread practice during the Great Leap Forward, necessitated by the long working hours and short supplies of food. When I was working on a

collective farm after the Great Leap Forward, it was an acceptable practice to eat a limited amount of green wheat, green corn, tender sweet potatoes and tender peanuts, turnips, and cabbages. We sometimes cooked green corn, soybeans, and even sweet potatoes in the fields. Farmers in Shandong called this shao pohuo build a small fire in the field. Boys tried that with girls, and girls tried that with boys. Production team leaders engaged in this game with ordinary villagers, as well. Without understanding the social context of these practices, it is easy to see them as everyday resistance. Societal Support for Farmers The social climate of the time also helped farmers make the connection between these irrigation projects and a better future. The government gave great attention to rural areas during the Great Leap Forward – the whole nation and Party members were told they should help agriculture, rural areas, and farmers. It was a common practice for local government, office and factory workers, army units, and high school and college students to come to help farmers during the busy seasons. An old farmer I interviewed in Henan told me with great fondness how excited he and his fellow farmers were to see the nationally famous artists who came to perform for them on the irrigation sites during Great Leap Forward. He said that their work hours were long, and the food they ate was not particularly good. But the farmers persisted, because Chairman Mao and the government cared about farmers. Forty years later, he used these same words as his own. Post-Mao publications branded these initiatives by the government to send artists and intellectuals to work with farmers and workers as part of the Maoist persecution of intellectuals. But these government initiatives served to enhance national solidarity and spirit. Farmers who were at the bottom of Chinese society acquired a sense of importance and empowerment when government officials, professors, and college students were working side by side with them. Mao and other national leaders worked on the Shisanling Reservoir on May 25, , giving rise to waves of government officials participating in this kind of activity. In September , 28, students and teachers from Qingdao City came to Jimo to help with harvesting and planting. From his recently published memoirs, we know that, once Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong realized the difficult situation of rural China during the Great Leap Forward, he gave up eating meat. He also refused to act upon the suggestions of people around him that he should allow his daughters to get a little more food. Some might argue that it was not a major sacrifice for Mao to give up his pork when hundreds of thousands of farmers were suffering because of his questionable policies and mismanagement. But most farmers at the time could not possibly know what Mao did or did not do. What farmers did know at the time was the behavior of county, commune, and village leaders. Leadership by Local Officials Farmers in Jimo believed that the quality of national leaders is defined by the quality of grassroots officials guojia lingdai ren de pingde cong difang guanyuan de pingde zhong biao xian chulai. During the Great Leap Forward, Jimo County leaders, including the head leader, County Party Secretary Xu Hua, Head of County government, Li Anshi, and other county government leaders, were busily traveling around the county to work with people at irrigation project sites. Each county and commune leader assumed responsibility for at least one village. More importantly, they ate the same food with ordinary villagers at their homes, and always paid the standard cost for the meals, which was often higher than the real value of the food. Song Wenying, who hosted the commune leaders a few times, said that Wang Shuchun, who was the head of Chengguan Commune Government, came to his village frequently. At the time, farmers ate mostly sweet potatoes, and Wang Shuchun would eat the same food with them. After the meal he would leave thirty cents and a three-liang grain coupon for his meal.

The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms brings together Tang Tsou's best essays written since , with a substantial introduction providing an overview and a major new essay extending his analysis backward to the May Fourth period of and forward into

Hire Writer On August 8, Mao returned to Beijing in a flurry of energy and revolutionary spirit and published a manifesto of 16 points in which he outlined his intentions for the future of china. Coinciding with this move was a great call to all workers and students to rededicate themselves to unwavering class struggle and eliminate bourgeoisie and upper class thinking and ideals and focus on promoting the virtues of the agrarian proletariat. This opportunity to escape work and indulge in blind ideological hysteria proved very tempting for most Chinese students and by the 16th of October millions of Red Guards, as they were dubbed, flocked to mass rallies in Tiananmen Square, where Mao and Lin Biao made frequent appearances to over 11 million adoring youths. With this call to arms throughout all major institutions Mao enlisted the impressionable and easily led youth of china as his instrument for reimposing his will upon the nation and reshaping it. The revolutionary fervor and blind fanaticism of the red guards was matched by no other in Chinese society, and indoctrinated teenagers all over china rushed to do his bidding and destroy the 4 Olds, the 4 enemies of the continuing revolution as outlined by Mao, old culture, old thoughts, old customs and old habits. It was in this way that the Cultural Revolution broadened from an internal communist party purge to a mass public movement in line with the self preserving aims of Mao. Giant posters in universities and schools encouraged students to join the struggle against all those who had diverted from the revolutionary path, and in July in a carefully orchestrated propaganda event Mao was seen swimming in the Yangtze River, a move which served to rally further support for the revolution. This specific event touched the hearts of many Chinese and led to serious momentum behind the revolution, in modern terms it is the equivalent of Queen Elizabeth swimming the English channel, and it is easy to see why this great symbolic gesture excited all of china and inspired loyalty and devotion among the Chinese for their appearingly strong and wise leader. Mao took the opportunity of revolution to finally dispose of his political enemies, and it was his newly formed and wildly devoted red guards he used to publicly ridicule and intimidate his opponents both in Beijing and the outer provinces. As the existing student movement was elevated to a mass national campaign, attacks on religious and historical institutions intensified and many churches and temples were looted and destroyed. At this time Red guards were also encouraged to travel to Beijing with free transport and food provided by the government and many took the opportunity to make a pilgrimage to Tiananmen Square to catch a glimpse of their beloved leader. By the end of Mao had a giant, easily manipulated, blindly devoted and violent army with which he consolidated his rule over the communist party with an iron fist, and at the same time elevated his personal following to almost cult status. When analyzing this period of Chinese history many agree that the Cultural Revolution was carefully orchestrated by Mao Zedong himself and that the Red Guard movement grew out of prepared soil. Alongside great cruelty and egotistic mania Mao showed an astute grasp of mass psychology, he knew that the students were the most suggestible and easily manipulated group in Chinese society, and he appealed directly to them to create a vast political instrument with which he could forcefully impose his will upon the whole of china. The effects of the Cultural Revolution directly or indirectly touched every facet of Chinese society, and the 10 years of organized vandalism and civil unrest brought the education system and economy to a grinding halt. The former favored ideology, political mobilization, class struggle, anti intellectualism, egalitarianism, and xenophobia, while the latter promoted economic growth, stability, educational progress, and a pragmatic foreign policy. In recent years china has taken steps to rehabilitate the millions of Chinese displaced and formally recognized the full extent of the damage caused by the Cultural Revolution, although any expressions tracing blame back to the CCP are fiercely censored. By conducting unbiased historical analysis and with the benefit of hindsight it is reasonable to conclude that the cultural revolution was nothing more than a vast political and ideological purge which was aimed at eliminating every semblance of tradition, decency and intellectualism, in due course leaving only the divine chairman Mao and a

clean slate upon which for him to propound his ideology and political agenda. London, Hodder and Stoughton. The Cultural Revolution and post-Mao reforms: US, University of Chicago Press. Inside the Cultural Revolution. University of California, Macmillan books ltd. The Chinese Cultural Revolution translated. La Revolution Culturelle Chinoise. Accessed 3 nov University of Maryland electronic resource. The Cultural Revolution Available:

Chapter 8 : Political Science Reforms in Post-Mao China

A counterpoint to these negative interpretations of the Cultural Revolution came from Tang Tsou (The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms: A Historical Perspective,). In his book and a series of essays, Tsou argued that the Cultural Revolution was a functional expression of 'people power' that limited the power of the.

Pinterest Chinese red guards during the cultural revolution in How exactly did it start? Chinese students sprung into action, setting up Red Guard divisions in classrooms and campuses across the country. Gangs of teenagers in red armbands and military fatigues roamed the streets of cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. Party officials, teachers and intellectuals also found themselves in the cross-hairs: Nearly 1, people lost their lives in Beijing in August and September alone. Workers joined the fray and China was plunged into what historians describe as a state of virtual civil war, with rival factions battling it out in cities across the country. By late Mao realised his revolution had spiralled out of control. He also ordered the army to restore order, effectively transforming China into a military dictatorship, which lasted until about As the army fought to bring the situation under control, the death toll soared. US president Richard Nixon even toured the country in February in a historic visit that re-established ties between Washington and Beijing. How many victims were there? Historians believe somewhere between , and two million people lost their lives as a result of the Cultural Revolution. Perhaps the worst affected region was the southern province of Guangxi where there were reports of mass killings and even cannibalism. Appalling acts of barbarity also occurred in Inner Mongolia where authorities unleashed a vicious campaign of torture against supposed separatists. Yet contrary to popular belief, the government was responsible for most of the bloodshed, not the Red Guards. How were foreigners affected? As chaos enveloped Beijing in the summer of , foreign diplomats found themselves at the eye of the storm. By the following year things had taken a more sinister turn. Anthony Grey, a Reuters journalist in Beijing, spent more than two years in captivity after being detained by Chinese authorities in July What was the Little Red Book? During the s, the Little Red Book is said to have been the most printed book on earth , with more than a billion copies printed.

Chapter 9 : Historiography of the Cultural Revolution

In late , Mao's Cultural Revolution was officially proclaimed a catastrophe. Hua Guofeng, a protege of Mao, was replaced as premier in by reformist Sichuan party chief Zhao Ziyang and as party General Secretary in by the even more reformist Communist Youth League chairman Hu Yaobang.

Useful Links Description of Objectives and Requirements: Our most populous country is an excellent "laboratory" for the social scientific study of political, economic and social behavior. Moreover, there is much variation in the political, economic and social institutions across the regions and cities of China today, making it a very rich area for the study of institutions. This course begins with the premise that understanding how China has arrived at the last decade of this century can also help us understand how other societies change, including such processes as democratization and marketization. Our goal in this class is to study and explain the momentous transformations of the Post-Mao reform period in a way that helps us understand change in societies in general. In order to do so we will be reading and discussing many theoretical and empirical works. As such, class participation will be an important part of your final grade 20 percent , including both everyday participation and one session in which you will lead discussion on a reading or set of readings. Three quizzes and two short essay assignments 40 percent of total on narrowly defined topics will help you remember some key facts. And a final, research paper pages in length will help you critique and evaluate existing theories, as well as propose and evaluate some of your own. The final paper is worth 40 percent and can be written on any topic related to Chinese politics in the Post-Mao era, but it must be on a topic decided on through consultation with me. Except for the in-class quizzes, all written assignments must be double-spaced, carefully-proofread, meticulously-cited, legible hard copy be sure and retain a copy for your own security. Late papers will not be accepted. Any student with a documented disability needing academic adjustments or accommodations is requested to speak with me during the first two weeks of class. All discussions will remain confidential. Textbooks are available at the Campus Book Store in used and paperback form. Most books and all articles are also on reserve at Fondren Library. University of California Press. Lu, Xiaobo and Elizabeth Perry, ed. Smith, Richard, , chapters , Lu, Hsun , all. The Question of Political Culture. Honig, Emily, , Creating Chinese Ethnicity: Subei People in Shanghai, , New Haven: Harvard University Press, chapter State Building, Centralization and Cultural Revolution. MacFarquhar, Roderick, and John K. Volumes 14 , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chapters , in volume 14, chapters 2,6, in volume Princeton University Press, chapter 1. Columbia University Press, pp. University of Chicago Press, pp. Important Actors and Institutions. Lieberthal and David Lampton, eds. University of California Press, pp. The Nomenklatura," China Quarterly, No. Perry and Mark Selden, ed. Change, Conflict and Resistance, London: Calhoun, Craig, , all. Eastern Europe , " Journal of Politics, vol. Marketization in the Largest Central Planned Economy. Naughton, Barry, , Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chapters No Class on April 12 Spring Recess. Final Research Paper Due April Yale University Press, chapters Probably Available Online Reddings, S. Harvard University Press, pp. McMillan and Barry Naughton, eds. University of Michigan Press. China as a Society in Transition: Cambridge University Press, all. Available Online Useful Links: