

Chapter 1 : The Diversity of Latin American Democracy

Latin America experienced a dramatic political change in the last quarter of the twentieth century. At the onset of the so-called "third wave" of democracy in , the only democratic regimes were Costa Rica, Colombia and Venezuela.

Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and one of the founding editors of The Intercept. Links Transcript This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form. This is Democracy Now! Voters in Brazil head to the polls Sunday in an election that could reshape the political landscape of South America. Bolsonaro has a long history of making racist, misogynistic, homophobic comments. He has encouraged police to kill suspected drug dealers. Most polls show Bolsonaro winning on Sunday but failing to win enough votes to avoid a runoff election on October 28th. He has risen to the polls since September 8th, when he was stabbed while campaigning. Lula remains in jail on what many consider trumped-up corruption charges to prevent him from becoming president. He represents hatred for our country, because he represents the loss of the few rights that the people he targets, such as the black people, the indigenous people and the LGBT community and women, have conquered so far. He represents a threat to democracy in our country, a democracy that we are still building. Glenn, welcome back to Democracy Now! Can you talk about the significance of what is happening right now in Brazil, and particularly on Sunday, the election? And can you talk more about just exactly what Bolsonaro represents, his homophobic comments, his anti-women comments, his support of the Brazilian military dictatorship? And you can go through the whole list of shocking comments. He once said in an interview that he would rather hear that his son died in a car accident than hear that his son is gay. But the much more worrying aspect are not these kind of comments, but the policies that he is explicitly endorsing. He believes in military rule. He regards it as something noble and wants to replicate it. And he has the entire top level of the Brazilian military supporting him and behind him. Speaking outside the prison after a visit, Noam Chomsky condemned the right-wing media in Brazil. We have just had the great privilege of spending an hour with Lula. And one of the points that he emphasized was that during his entire tenure in office, there was just a constant flood of attacks from all the media, constantly, thousands of attacks from every direction, which, of course, confuses and undermines public opinion. So the answer to your question is, something is needed to counter the concentrated power of right-wing media, which, particularly in Latin America, just overwhelms everything. So, that is Noam Chomsky. Glenn Greenwald, a couple questions about that. How is the media allowed to cover Noam Chomsky visiting Lula in prison? You have left-wing dictatorship or right-wing dictatorship, and both are equally bad. PT ran this country for 14 years, and whatever else you might want to say about it, whatever mistakes they made, you certainly had a very free and open press that constantly attacked it. They impeached one of their presidents and put the other one in prison. And so, Brazilian institutions, the Brazilian establishment bears a lot of blame, just like U. I spoke to him right before he went to jail, and he was talking about the presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro. He was an Army captain in the Brazilian Army. The information that we have is that he was expelled from the Brazilian Army. And his behavior is far-right-wing, fascist. He is very much prejudiced against women, against blacks, against indigenous persons, against human rights. He believes that everything can be resolved with violence. He has the right to run. He projects a certain image to please a part of the society that is of the extreme right. He believes that those who defend human rights are doing a disservice to democracy. He is against everything that is discussed when one is talking about human rights. You can check it out at democracynow.com. Your comments on what he said, as we begin to wrap up, Glenn? When we take over, your days are numbered. They want to use violence to solve political problems here. But in this last minuteâ€”you are a constitutional lawyerâ€”your thoughts, as you look north to the United Statesâ€”you are an American citizenâ€”on the nomination and possible confirmation of Judge Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court, in just 30 seconds, if you can? So, I do think there are real due process questions when it comes to accusations about somebody that we ought to take very seriously. Well, I want to thank you, Glenn, for being with us. Also, you can go to democracynow.com. Please attribute legal copies of this work to democracynow.com. Some of the work s that this program incorporates, however, may be separately licensed. For further information or additional permissions, contact us.

Yet Latin America is not wholly given over to dictatorship and revolution. Interesting experiments in avoiding both anarchy and tyranny have been made in Colombia and in Uruguay, at the two extremes of the southern continent.

Today, most countries in the region have established democratic institutions, and a return to full-fledged authoritarianism is unlikely. However, these regimes are often at odds with the electoral, constitutional, liberal, and representative attributes that are associated with democratic regimes. Even though elections are the only means of access to public office in most of the region, they frequently involve high levels of clientelism, harassment of the opposition, and unfair advantages for incumbents. Although the separation of powers is central to the constitutional design in most countries, a generalized tendency exists toward the concentration of power in the national executive through formal or informal mechanisms. In some countries, party systems have collapsed. The institutional ecology of many of these countries has also become one of the most diverse in the world, as representative institutions coexist with other forms of democratic decision making, such as plebiscites, participatory budgeting, citizen assemblies, national conferences, community councils, local and indigenous autonomies, town hall meetings, and constituent processes. These challenges to the liberal model of democratic governance have in most cases followed victories by left-wing parties and candidates, who have launched major efforts to overhaul their political systems. The region has also inspired new research agendas on the rise of ethnic-based social movements and democratic consolidation, on the electoral consequences of neoliberalism, and on the implications of direct and participatory democracy for effective governance. Most importantly, the particularities of Latin American democracies have problematized our definitions of democracy itself. This article offers an overview of current research on Latin American democracies. The first section presents general introductions to the topic, as well as efforts to produce normative assessments of changes in the quality of democracy in each country. The second section cites works that have drawn on the peculiarities of the Latin American experience to reconceptualize the notion of democracy itself. In the rest of the article, empirical research on specific aspects of democratic politics is organized in eight general categories: General Overviews Since the early 1980s, academic and nonacademic publications have highlighted a puzzling aspect of Latin American democracy: Despite economic crises, popular revolts, corruption, crime, insecurity, low-quality public services, and generalized distrust against political institutions, openly authoritarian regimes have become increasingly unlikely. The works in this section examine, at a general level, the survival of democratic institutions as well as their chronic underperformance in most of the region. Kingstone and Yashar is the best point of entry to the literature on Latin American politics and democracy. The other sources in this section evaluate the interaction among democratic institutions, their contexts, and their outputs. Hagopian and Mainwaring explores the effects of political and social conditions on the consolidation of democratic institutions, while Payne, et al. Levine and Molina and Morlino adopt a more normative purpose, developing a framework to substantiate claims about lower or higher levels of democratic quality in specific countries. Finally, the index provided by Polilat is a useful source of data about changes in the quality of democracy in the region since 1980. Hagopian, Frances, and Scott Mainwaring, eds. Cambridge University Press, Through case studies, the contributors to this volume explore the conditions under which democratic institutions can survive poor governmental performance and economic adversities. The editors argue that strong links among civil society, political parties, and the state contribute to the survival of democracy even under inhospitable circumstances. Kingstone, Peter, and Deborah J. Routledge Handbook of Latin American Politics. Offers overviews of academic debates on political institutions, economic development, social policy, civil society, interest groups, social movements, and international relations. It includes chapters about how the study of Latin American politics has influenced research methods in comparative politics. Quality of Democracy in Latin America. The book opens with two theoretical chapters about how to measure the quality of democracy, then presents country-specific chapters for Chile, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Colombia, and Venezuela, and concludes with a discussion by the editors on the general trends in the region. Mainwaring, Scott, and Christopher Welna, eds. Democratic

Accountability in Latin America. Oxford University Press, The contributors develop, in detail, the concept of accountability and then analyze how the interaction between different institutions—elections, checks and balances, and oversight agencies—and civil society organizations affect democratic accountability. Politics and Reform in Latin American Countries. Inter-American Development Bank, The authors argue that more democratic and efficient institutions can, over time, mitigate the negative effects of antidemocratic factors related to political culture, socioeconomic development, or international pressures. Democracy in Latin America: United Nations Development Programme, Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content on this page. Please subscribe or login. How to Subscribe Oxford Bibliographies Online is available by subscription and perpetual access to institutions. For more information or to contact an Oxford Sales Representative [click here](#).

Chapter 3 : Latin America: Revolution, Dictatorship, and Democracy, Present | History

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Types of dictatorships[edit] Right after the end of World War II , with a more relaxed political and social climate, several studies regarding the classification of various forms of government have been conducted. Among these, has been intensely discussed by historians and political scientists the conceptualization and definition of the dictatorship form of government. Eventually, it has been concluded that dictatorship is a form of government in which the absolute power is concentrated in the hands of a leader commonly identified as a dictator , a "small clique", or a "government organization", and it aims the abolition of political pluralism and civilian mobilization. This form of government is characterized by the presence of a single political party and more specifically, by a powerful leader a real role model who imposes his personal and political prominence. The two fundamental aspects that contribute to the maintenance of the power are: Here, the government has "total control of mass communications and social and economic organizations". According to the political scientist Juan Linz , the distinction between an authoritarian regime and a totalitarian one is that while an authoritarian regime seeks to suffocate politics and political mobilization, totalitarianism seeks to control politics and political mobilization. In her study, she focused in how elite-leader and elite-mass relations influence authoritarian politics. Geddes typology identifies the key institutions that structure elite politics in dictatorships i. The study is based and directly related to factors like: According to Barbara Geddes, a dictatorial government may be classified in five typologies: Military dictatorship Military dictatorships are regimes in which a group of officers holds power, determines who will lead the country, and exercises influence over policy. High-level elites and a leader are the members of the military dictatorship. Military dictatorships are characterized by rule by a professionalized military as an institution. In military regimes, elites are referred to as junta members; they are typically senior officers and often other high-level officers in the military. One-party state Single-party dictatorships are regimes in which one party dominates politics. In single-party dictatorships, a single party has access to political posts and control over policy. Other parties may legally exist, compete in elections, and even hold legislative seats, yet true political power lies with the dominant party. In single-party dictatorships, party elites are typically members of the ruling body of the party, sometimes called the central committee , politburo , or secretariat. Personalist dictatorships differ from other forms of dictatorships in their access to key political positions, other fruits of office, and depend much more on the discretion of the personalist dictator. Personalist dictators may be members of the military or leaders of a political party. Yet, neither the military nor the party exercises power independent from the dictator. In personalist dictatorships, the elite corps is usually made up of close friends or family members of the dictator. These individuals are all typically handpicked to serve their posts by the dictator. Real political power must be exercised by the monarch for regimes to be classified as such. Elites in monarchies are typically members of the royal family. When regimes share characteristics of all three forms of dictatorships, they are referred to as triple threats. Most dictatorships are represented as darker shades of red. One of the tasks in political science is to measure and classify regimes as either dictatorships or democracies. The Democracy-Dictatorship Index is seen as an example of the minimalist approach, whereas the Polity data series , is more substantive. Constitutional, Communist nominally championing the " dictatorship of the proletariat " , Counterrevolutionary and Fascist. Since World War II , a broader range of dictatorships has been recognized, including Third World dictatorships, theocratic or religious dictatorships and dynastic or family-based dictatorships. Roman dictators were allocated absolute power during times of emergency. In execution, their power was originally neither arbitrary nor unaccountable, being subject to law and requiring retrospective justification. There were no such dictatorships after the beginning of the 2nd century BC and later dictators such as Sulla and the Roman Emperors exercised power much more personally and arbitrarily. As the Roman Emperor was a king in all but name, a concept that remained anathema to traditional Roman society, the institution was not carried forward into the Roman Empire. Such dictators have been also referred

to as "personalismos". The wave of military dictatorships in South America in the second half of the twentieth century left a particular mark on Latin American culture. In Latin American literature, the dictator novel challenging dictatorship and caudillismo is a significant genre. There are also many films depicting Latin American military dictatorships. Communism and Fascism in 20th-century dictatorships[edit] In the first half of the 20th century, Communist and Fascist dictatorships appeared in a variety of scientifically and technologically advanced countries, which are distinct from dictatorships in Latin America and post-colonial dictatorships in Africa and Asia. Leading examples of modern totalitarian dictatorship include: These constitutions often failed to work without a strong middle class or work against the preexisting autocratic rule. Some elected presidents and prime ministers captured power by suppressing the opposition and installing one-party rule and others established military dictatorships through their armies. Whatever their form, these dictatorships had an adverse impact on economic growth and the quality of political institutions. Theories of dictatorship[edit] You can help by adding to it. Mancur Olson suggests that the emergence of dictatorships can be linked to the concept of "roving bandits", individuals in an atomic system who move from place to place extracting wealth from individuals. These bandits provide a disincentive for investment and production. Olson states that a community of individuals would be better served if that bandit were to establish himself as a stationary bandit to monopolize theft in the form of taxes. Except from the community, the bandits themselves will be better served, according to Olson, by transforming themselves into "stationary bandits". By settling down and making themselves the rulers of a territory, they will be able to make more profits through taxes than they used to obtain through plunder. By maintaining order and providing protection to the community, the bandits will create a peaceful environment in which their people can maximize their surplus which means a greater taxable base. Thus a potential dictator will have a greater incentive to provide security to a given community from which he is extracting taxes and conversely, the people from whom he extracts the taxes are more likely to produce because they will be unconcerned with potential theft by other bandits. This is the rationality that bandits use in order to justify their transformation from "roving bandits" into "stationary bandits".

Chapter 4 : Democracy and dictatorship in Latin America (edition) | Open Library

In dictatorship, the sources of power are family dictatorship, military dictatorship, constitutional dictatorship and self-coup. Democracy brings the peace and making good relations with other nations while most of the.

It is a somewhat common refrain in Latin America that countries need the *mano dura* strong hand of a military dictatorship in order to get things done. Surveys in the early twenty-first century reveal a growing disenchantment with civilian governments, with a surprisingly large minority of Latin Americans stating a preference for a dictatorial form of government over democracy. Such sentiments date back to the founding of the Latin American republics in the early nineteenth century. After the removal of the Iberian crowns, conservatives argued that the new states were like children who needed parental guidance. These conservatives favored a centralist form of government in which a small group of elites would hold power and rule paternalistically on behalf of the rest of the country. Positivism, with its emphasis on order and progress, often provided a philosophical basis for such regimes in Latin America. Military rule has been a feature of Latin America dating back to the colonial period. Rather than interpreting this as a cultural phenomenon, many observers have pointed to a failure of civilian institutions to address persistent problems of poverty and corruption. Some twentieth-century military dictatorships follow the pattern of nineteenth-century caudillo leaders who often ruled more through a use of personal charisma than brute military force. In fact, the only remaining nonelected executive in Latin America at the end of the twentieth century was Fidel Castro in Cuba, and his personalist style was more in line with the leadership of classic caudillos than what many would understand as the defining characteristics of a military dictatorship. However, while caudillos could be civilians and presented a variety of ideological stripes, "dictatorship" in Latin America normally refers to right-wing rulers who maintain themselves in power through overwhelming military force. For example, the Somoza and Pinochet dictatorships in Nicaragua and Chile maintained power more through repressive means than through personalist, caudillo styles of government. Particularly in South America in the 1970s and 1980s, bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes like those in Chile and Argentina attempted to use the power of state institutions to enact a fundamental reordering of society. In Nicaragua, a series of three Somozas established a family dynasty that ruled the country from 1936 to 1979. Somoza, as well as his two successors, his sons Luis Somoza Debayle and Anastasio Somoza Debayle, spoke English fluently and remained submissive to United States foreign policy objectives. As Franklin Roosevelt allegedly said of the elder Somoza, "He may be a son-of-a-bitch, but he is our son-of-a-bitch" Schmitz, p. Over time, the Somoza family dynasty became increasingly brutal as it extended complete control over the country. A growing disparity in land distribution and gaps between the rich and the poor led to increasing discontent. Mounting repression and corruption finally led to alienation of the middle class and evaporation of business support for the regime. On 19 July Sandinista guerrillas overthrew the dictatorship and implemented a leftist revolutionary government. In Chile, General Augusto Pinochet overthrew the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende in a bloody 11 September coup. Allende was the first Marxist elected to the chief executive office in Latin America in freely contested elections. In power, Pinochet proved to be vicious, destroying the existing political system, engaging in extensive human rights abuses, and privatizing industry while taking services away from the lower classes. Until handing partial power back to civilian leaders in 1988, Pinochet provided a classic example of a military dictatorship. The Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces, which came to power in Peru in 1975 under the leadership of General Juan Velasco Alvarado, provides an interesting counterpoint to these conservative military dictatorships. In implementing these reforms, Velasco challenged the incompetence and corruption of civilian politicians who were unable to implement badly needed reforms. He announced a "third way" of national development between capitalism and socialism. While progressive military governments in Peru and, to a lesser extent, Ecuador and Panama ruled in favor of the lower classes, implementing agrarian, labor, and other reforms, their ultimate aim was to undercut leftist organizing strategies. Providing agrarian reforms, even though they were partial, limited, and served to support the existing class structures, drew strength away from peasant and guerrilla demands. Ultimately, however, these reforms failed to address

fundamental structural problems in society. These failures reveal how difficult it was to escape from dependent development without radical structural changes in class, property relations, and income distribution. At the same time, this history reveals that military governments are not always as reactionary as one might think. Furthermore, various branches of the military also tend to have different ideological orientations. Specifically, the army is sometimes seen as progressive because of its development work in rural communities, whereas the navy is usually affiliated with the elite and the police are often accused of committing the bulk of human rights abuses. This reveals the need for a more careful and complex interpretation of the role of the military, to break away from simplistic and unidimensional perspectives on the history of dictatorships in Latin America.

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Chapter 5 : Dictatorship - Wikipedia

Democracy has come a long way in Latin America and we can draw encouragement from the region's historic rejection of military dictatorships and bloody civil conflicts (although the one in Colombia continues unabated).

November 9, last updated Compared to the paucity of democracies in Latin America at the start of the Third Wave in the mids, the near-universal presence of democratic regimes today highlights the tremendous democratic progress made in the region over the past three-dozen years. Nevertheless, within this broader regional success exists considerable country-by-country variation in democratic experience and quality. It will then discuss the evolution of democracy in the region over the past three and a half decades. Next it will examine the considerable variance in the degree of democratic consolidation and democratic quality in the region as of A final section will draw some general conclusions about some of the most significant factors that drove the democratization of Latin America. This latter group is dominated by the dozen ex-British colonies, which with the exception of Guyana have avoided any serious democratic breakdowns since achieving independence between and , and at present all possess robust democratic systems. Democracy and Dictatorship in Latin America at the Dawn of the Third Wave In January , only two of the 19 former Spanish and Portuguese colonies could truly be classified as democracies. Costa Rica and Venezuela were islands of consolidated democracy within a sea of dictatorship, with the former continuously democratic since and the latter since A third country, Colombia, was in the midst of a democratic transition following the end in of its experience with a quasi-democratic power-sharing pact between the Liberal and Conservative parties, which had been established in as a means to help end a decade-long civil conflict. The remaining 16 countries were governed by military or civilian dictatorships of diverse stripes. Examples of the former set of countries include Brazil and Mexico. In Brazil, different generals occupied the presidency for a fixed term during most of the dictatorship. Nicaragua and Paraguay are examples of the latter type of country. In Paraguay, Alfredo Stroessner had held the reins of power continuously since and would continue to do so until his removal by a military coup in The Third Wave Democratic Transitions Between and , 15 of these 16 nondemocratic Latin American countries would embrace democracy, with the exception being totalitarian Cuba. The nature of the initial transitions from authoritarian to democratic governance, however, varied tremendously among the 15 countries that became democracies during the post period. Several countries experienced gradual, managed transitions, with Brazil and Mexico two examples of this model. In Brazil, where restricted elections had been held to select national legislators and local officials throughout most of the military dictatorship, these elections became increasingly free and fair over time. Under the iron control of the PRI, Mexico had held regular restricted and fraudulent elections since the s, with never any doubt that the outcome would be a PRI victory. Mexico would pass the final democratic litmus test in when, after over 70 years in power, the PRI lost the presidential election and transferred the presidency to the victorious Vicente Fox of the opposition National Action Party. Other democratic transitions were much more abrupt. Argentina was governed between and by a military dictatorship responsible for the murder of between 10, and 20, citizens and the torture, imprisonment and exile of tens of thousands more. Elections were scheduled for October , with power handed over to a democratically elected civilian president in December of that year. The 15 countries that transitioned to democracy during the Third Wave also differed dramatically in terms of their ability to construct their new democracies on the foundations of substantial past democratic experiences. At one end of the continuum were countries such as Chile, Uruguay and, to a slightly lesser extent, Argentina and Brazil. During the transitional period, these countries were guided by their rich democratic pasts and, with the exception of Brazil, their robust political party systems, which had remained vibrant during the dictatorial interludes. When Argentina , Chile and Uruguay transitioned from dictatorship to democracy, they did so with well-institutionalized political parties that possessed deep roots in society and party elites with considerable democratic experience, and all four countries did so with a historical legacy of functioning democratic institutions. In , the Colorado Party won the presidency with 41 percent of the vote, followed by the Blanco Party with 40 percent and the Broad Front with 18 percent. Thirteen years later, the results were strikingly similar: The other end of the

continuum was occupied by countries with limited to almost nonexistent prior experience with democratic electoral processes and governance. The gradual democratic evolution which took place in Mexico along with the rather unique role played by the PRI make the country something of a sui generis case in the region in regard to historic experience with democracy. The cases of the Dominican Republic and El Salvador make clear that the lack of a democratic legacy does not pose an insurmountable barrier to future democratic success. However, it is readily apparent that the absence of a shared national history of successful democratic institutions and of political elites with experience operating within a democratic environment has represented a hindrance to democratic consolidation in a majority of these eight countries. One institutional feature shared among all 15 transitioning countries, along with Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela, was their use of the presidential form of democratic government. While there have been isolated experiences with nonpresidential government in the region -- the Uruguayan experiment with a Swiss-type collegial executive between and being the most notable -- Latin Americans have almost exclusively been governed by pure presidential regimes. In the current democratic era, these systems feature the separate election of presidents and legislatures for fixed terms and a constitution with a checks-and-balances framework. During the early days of the Third Wave, many scholars and policymakers expressed concerns that presidentialism would result in problems of severe executive-legislative gridlock, winner-take-all elections, crises of democratic legitimacy and the election of anti-democratic outsiders. These critics generally proposed the adoption of parliamentary or semi-presidential constitutions to help avoid these potential problems. However, these reform proposals have met with virtually no success in the region. In general, the initial fear that many of the Third Wave Latin American democracies would fail due to their use of presidentialism appears today to have been unfounded. Often presidents were removed from office either through impeachment or a credible threat of impeachment that resulted in an anticipated resignation by the president. However, within this broad democratic rubric exists a considerable level of variance in the quality and performance of democracy across the region. Freedom House places every country on two scales, ranging from 1 to 7, measuring their level of political rights and civil liberties, which are then combined and divided by two to provide a Freedom Score, where 1 is most free and democratic and 7 is least free and democratic. Three of the 18 Latin American democracies under consideration receive the highest Freedom Score possible: Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay. A second set of countries has not achieved the same level of democratic success as these three, but at the same time they have created thriving democratic systems in which elections and the rule of law play a dominant role within the political system. At the other end of the spectrum are Nicaragua 4. Cuba has a Freedom Score of 6. Large majorities in all 18 electoral democracies believe democracy is preferable to any other form of government, with more than four-fifths of the population holding this opinion in eight countries, and all countries registering a majority greater than two-thirds. However, while Latin Americans overwhelmingly prefer democracy to other forms of government, a substantial proportion are not especially satisfied with how their own democracy is functioning today. For example, in a third of the countries, a majority of the population is either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in their country, with Peru 61 percent, Venezuela 59 percent and Mexico 56 percent possessing the most unsatisfied citizens. In contrast, seven of the 18 were found in the lower third of countries, with scores below 2. Factors Behind the Democratic Transition

The transitions to democracy that took place in Latin America between the late 1970s and early 1990s were as diverse in their origins as they were in their outcomes. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some trends present across subgroups of the countries that were integral to the initial transition. In one set of cases, countries that had enjoyed robust democracies at varying points in time during the post-World War II era experienced military coups in the 1970s and 1980s designed not just to remove democratically elected leaders, but also to impose a new type of technocratic rule by the military as an institution, a regime type commonly referred to as bureaucratic authoritarianism. These regimes were found in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, all countries with a large and politically influential middle class as well as a working class that became increasingly opposed to military rule and dissatisfied with government performance -- with Chile representing a partial exception -- during these dictatorships. The growing pressure by the middle class and working class became too much for the military governments to bear, with the result eventually being a peaceful transition to democracy in all four

countries. Another set of cases is found in Central America north of Costa Rica, where there was limited to nonexistent prior experience with democracy. Here the successful revolution led by the Sandinistas in Nicaragua sent shock waves through the economic oligarchies and militaries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. For Reagan, Nicaragua was a Soviet beachhead on the continent that in turn threatened its three northern neighbors, all of which had communist guerrilla insurgencies operating at varying levels of intensity. These twin forces of elite fear of revolution and U. Reagan played a particularly prominent role in managing the Salvadoran transition to democracy as well as in placing pressure on the authoritarian government of then-Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, who eventually felt compelled to hold free and fair elections in , which he lost. Conclusion Latin America has come a long way from the dark days of the mids, when dictatorships reigned and democracies were an endangered species. Today, the threat of military coups has been greatly diminished compared to the past, as support for authoritarian rule among both ordinary citizens and elites is minimal. In , the greatest threat to democracy in Latin America no longer lies in the barracks, but rather in the presidential palace. In a not insignificant number of countries, elected presidents have over time increasingly concentrated in their hands an excessive and dangerous level of political and economic power. To date, the region has for the most part avoided the reverse swing of the pendulum in its latest period of democratization. All of the countries that transitioned to electoral democracy over the past three-dozen years remain democracies today. That said, there exists a growing level of variance in the degree of democratic performance, quality and satisfaction within the region. Several democracies rival the best in the world, with others increasingly close behind and all enjoying a seemingly positive future trajectory. However, other countries find themselves barely above the threshold required to be considered even a minimalist democracy, with trajectories that are taking them every day closer and closer to authoritarianism. It is likely that these trends will continue in Latin America, with the result being an increasingly diverse set of democracies and democratic experiences coexisting within the region. Jones is the Joseph D.

Chapter 6 : Democracy in Latin America - Political Science - Oxford Bibliographies

Breakdowns of democracy in Latin America tended during the most tense moments of the Cold War. Geopolitics has come to play a role again, as China and Russia make inroads into the hemisphere.

Chapter 7 : Democracy and dictatorship in Latin America (The Reference shelf): calendrierdelascience.com

dictatorship in latin america. It is a somewhat common refrain in Latin America that countries need the mano dura (strong hand) of a military dictatorship in order to get things done. Source for information on Dictatorship in Latin America: New Dictionary of the History of Ideas dictionary.

Chapter 8 : Latin America's New Class of Dictators Have Hijacked Democracy

There are five dictatorships in Latin America The government of Fidel Castro in Cuba, is without question the oldest dictatorship in the Americas. A traditional 20th century tyranny, the only of its kind.

Chapter 9 : There are five dictatorships in Latin America

Over the past 40 years, peace and democracy has largely replaced dictatorship and conflict in Latin America, to the great benefit of the United States.