

**Chapter 1 : It Isn't Just Trump: The Roots Of Democracy's Crisis Are Many And Deep | HuffPost**

*Two main lessons were learned by the presidential election and the aftermath that followed. The first is that every vote truly does count. The second is that democracy truly does work -- hence the name Democracy's Biggest Test.*

Share via Email Blatant dictatorship “ in the form of fascism, communism, or military rule ” has disappeared across much of the world. Military coups and other violent seizures of power are rare. Most countries hold regular elections. Democracies still die, but by different means. Since the end of the Cold War, most democratic breakdowns have been caused not by generals and soldiers but by elected governments themselves. Democratic backsliding today begins at the ballot box. The electoral road to breakdown is dangerously deceptive. The presidential palace burns. The president is killed, imprisoned or shipped off into exile. The constitution is suspended or scrapped. Corey Robin Read more On the electoral road, none of these things happen. There are no tanks in the streets. Constitutions and other nominally democratic institutions remain in place. Elected autocrats maintain a veneer of democracy while eviscerating its substance. They may even be portrayed as efforts to improve democracy “ making the judiciary more efficient, combating corruption or cleaning up the electoral process. Newspapers still publish but are bought off or bullied into self-censorship. Citizens continue to criticize the government but often find themselves facing tax or other legal troubles. This sows public confusion. People do not immediately realize what is happening. Many continue to believe they are living under a democracy. Those who denounce government abuse may be dismissed as exaggerating or crying wolf. The foundations of our democracy are certainly stronger than those in Venezuela, Turkey or Hungary. But are they strong enough? Answering such a question requires stepping back from daily headlines and breaking news alerts to widen our view, drawing lessons from the experiences of other democracies around the world and throughout history. When fear or miscalculation leads established parties to bring extremists into the mainstream, democracy is imperiled A comparative approach reveals how elected autocrats in different parts of the world employ remarkably similar strategies to subvert democratic institutions. As these patterns become visible, the steps toward breakdown grow less ambiguous “and easier to combat. Knowing how citizens in other democracies have successfully resisted elected autocrats, or why they tragically failed to do so, is essential to those seeking to defend American democracy today. We know that extremist demagogues emerge from time to time in all societies, even in healthy democracies. An essential test for democracies is not whether such figures emerge but whether political leaders, and especially political parties, work to prevent them from gaining power in the first place “ by keeping them off mainstream party tickets, refusing to endorse or align with them and, when necessary, making common cause with rivals in support of democratic candidates. Isolating popular extremists requires political courage. But when fear, opportunism or miscalculation leads established parties to bring extremists into the mainstream, democracy is imperiled. Once a would-be authoritarian makes it to power, democracies face a second critical test: Institutions alone are not enough to rein in elected autocrats. Constitutions must be defended “ by political parties and organized citizens but also by democratic norms. Without robust norms, constitutional checks and balances do not serve as the bulwarks of democracy we imagine them to be. Institutions become political weapons, wielded forcefully by those who control them against those who do not. By the time Obama became president, many Republicans in particular questioned the legitimacy of their Democratic rivals How serious is the threat now? Many observers take comfort in our constitution, which was designed precisely to thwart and contain demagogues like Trump. Our Madisonian system of checks and balances has endured for more than two centuries. It survived the civil war, the great depression, the Cold War and Watergate. Surely, then, it will be able to survive Trump. We are less certain. Historically, our system of checks and balances has worked pretty well “ but not, or not entirely, because of the constitutional system designed by the founders. Democracies work best “ and survive longer “ where constitutions are reinforced by unwritten democratic norms. These two norms undergirded American democracy for most of the 20th century. Leaders of the two major parties accepted one another as legitimate and resisted the temptation to use their temporary control of institutions to maximum partisan advantage. Norms of toleration and restraint served as the soft guardrails of

American democracy, helping it avoid the kind of partisan fight to the death that has destroyed democracies elsewhere in the world, including Europe in the s and South America in the s and s.

*By Shwan Zulal: Kurdistan Region president, Massoud Barzani, has set the date for the next Kurdish general election at 21 September Both parliamentary and presidential elections will be held.*

Actually, they very strongly favor the Proposition, even though Weede concludes that: This is the most important finding of this analysis To compensate for difficulties in his democracy scale, he dichotomized the scale into democracies and nondemocracies, and war frequencies into the occurrence of at least one war or no war for the regime. The result for the different data sets on war and the three different periods is that all the cross-tabulations are in the proper direction, although only one specific cross-tabulation is significant by itself Weede. Although frequencies are dichotomized into the presence or absence of war, they still do not avoid the problem of regimes with a few killed in war being equated with those in which millions are lost. Nonetheless, he has also been cited as finding that democracies are neither more nor less warlike than other types of regimes. Small and Singer used an appropriate measure of severity battle dead and their results are relevant to the Proposition. But the Chan and Weede studies are inappropriate, since they measure violence by the number of years at war, by the frequency of wars, or by the existence of war, none of which measures the severity of violence central to the Proposition. There are five other studies following on these that do analyses bearing on the Proposition, but they all use the Small and Singer war or the Gochman and Maoz militarized dispute data and cross-tabulate or correlate violence or war frequencies with some measure of democracy. If their use of frequencies was relevant to the Proposition, one study would be positive Morgan and Schwebach, 30 two would tend to be ambiguous Domke, Maoz and Abdolali, and two studies would be negative Cole, Morgan and Campbell, neither one strongly so. In Crises in the Twentieth Century, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Michael Brecher and Sheila Moser cross-tabulate actors involved in crises according to whether they were democracies, authoritarian or military dictatorships. Conversely, democratic regimes which were most likely to perceive non-violent acts as triggers to their crises tended to choose pacific [crisis management techniques], with negotiation the most frequent among them: That is, democracy is less warlike severity than other regimes. This is contrary to the prevailing wisdom among students of war, but upon careful inspection the results underlying their consensus have not only been shown to equate for a nation wars involving a few dozen killed with wars killing millions, but also, were frequencies relevant, to support the Proposition, not negate it. Regardless, one does not need to rely on the nuances of these studies or their methodology. As empirically shown in my "Libertarianism and International Violence" study, by other work in the field in which relevant and appropriate variables have been used, and by the analyses I did here, when properly measured, democracies are less violent than non-democracies. Typographical errors have been corrected, clarifications added, and style updated. This significance was for two different ways of calculating the highest violence in the sample, significant at chi-squares, p, one-tailed. Also the correlation between regime type and severity was significant at p 3. Although I am often cited as the exception to the alleged findings that democracies are no less warlike than other regimes, in my Vol. A Test Against Published Research Results" article, I list over a dozen studies the empirical results of which also support the Proposition. For a chapter length discussion and presentation of the evidence on each of these propositions, see Power Kills. Note that as far as these propositions and their evidence are concerned, the term "freedom" can be replaced by "democracy". The average battle dead for the given type of regime is the sum of all those killed in battle of all the regimes of that type such as US citizens killed in battle for the United States, plus Canadians for Canada, plus Australians for Australia, and so on for democracies divided by the number of regimes of that type. Since only state regimes are involved, all battle dead are for interstate wars. For both Bonferroni adjusted and Tukey pairwise comparisons, p 8. The significance for the analysis of variance is p All the data on violence and type of regime used here are given in Statistics of Democide. How many regimes have existed depends on how different regimes have been defined. For the Gurr Polity II data there are regimes, Polity II gives three regimes for the Soviet Union, ; I count only one here as well. The Bonferroni adjustment and Tukey pairwise comparisons were significant at p Data were from Global Data Manager Wealth is a distinct dimension from

one with which political characteristics are correlated. That is, political characteristics, and thus type of regime, have little correlation with wealth. As with wealth, the political characteristics of nations also have little correlation with their physical power, that is, their capability. This statement is based on a simultaneous factor analysis called super-P factor analysis of behavior and attributes for , , and ; and a canonical analysis of dyadic behavior regressed on the distances between nations, such as along wealth and capability dimensions, among others. Data are from Global Data Manager Not only is energy consumption among the best indicators of capability, but it also avoids the currency convertibility problem of its close rival, GNP. See also Small and Singer In previously using the Small-Singer data I avoided the problem of the vastly different number killed in a war for each country by using battle dead as my measure of war. But my results are still affected by the 1, battle-dead cutoff for a war. Thus, a state that had a few killed in a war in which it had many troops was included in my analysis while a state that lost near 1, in a military action in which 1, were not killed overall was not included. The t-test should be 2. They do have another table giving the number of democracies and nondemocracies participating in wars Table 3. The number of democracies is always a small percentage of the total number of nations involved, but nothing can be made of this without knowing the total number of democratic regimes in the international system. The significance tests were by chi-square. Admittedly, my phrasing of this led Chan to conclude I was using frequencies. However, my previous discussion of the methodology and Proposition should have warned him away from this interpretation. I should also say that when I wrote the article I did not realize that virtually without exception subsequent research by others would use frequencies. In any case, Chan At the very least, this approach assumes that the analyst has a homogeneous set of war involvements. I suspect that depending on the particular measure of war or conflict used, one can arrive at very different conclusions about the relative pacifism of democracies". Chan is now persuaded that democracies may be more peaceful but still in terms of frequencies. In his latest piece These are given in the January-February issues of Freedom at Issue for each year. I will ignore the results for extrasystemic wars, since only independent states are counted. All significance levels were one-tailed. If we assume that there is no relationship between democracy and having fought wars, then the probability of getting 10 cross-tabulations out of 10 in the hypothesized direction by chance is 0. But these 10 cross-tabulations were not all independent. The different data sets overlap, as do the subperiods with the full periods, and this is enough to vitiate the probability. Nonetheless, it is possible that these 10 cross-tabulations can be either positive or negative and therefore that they were all in the proper direction should be considered substantively important, if one accepts the underlying measurements. Note also that it is incorrect to test separately the significance of coefficients arrayed in a table as Weede does here. For such coefficients, 5 should be significant at p 0. Weede ignored the Proposition that democracies do not make war on each other, and, as he later wrote, did not accept it at this time. In his latest article Now, the weight of the evidence makes me accept this proposition. Two readers, one strongly, argued that Bremer should also be included as positive, since he found that democratic vs. But these results are dyadic, not monadic, and thus irrelevant to whether democracies are more or less warlike. However, these results do bear positively on the different Proposition that the more democratic two regimes, the less likely there will be violence between them. Russett does not present results relevant to the monadic Proposition, but in a personal communication he reported reanalyzing his data on democracy, wars and disputes. He found that the data, , clearly supported the Proposition. Domestic and International Imperatives. Chan, Steve "Mirror, Mirror on the War Are Democratic States More Pacific? Chan, Steve "Democracy and War: Cole, Timothy Michael "Politics and Meaning: Rosenau eds Government without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, pp. Evidence from Experimental Research", International Interactions 18 3: Clifton and Valerie L. A Prescription for Peace? Ray, James Lee "Wars between Democracies: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition. University of South Carolina Press. Quantitative International Politics, pp.

**Chapter 3 : Democracy's Self-Destruct Button? | The Mahablog**

*Find helpful customer reviews and review ratings for Democracy's Biggest Test: The Presidential Election and the Thirty-Six Days That Followed at [calendrierdelascience.com](http://calendrierdelascience.com) Read honest and unbiased product reviews from our users.*

In , we both began to get this eerily creeping feeling that we had seen this movie before. At first it was just small echoes—“hearing candidates accusing rivals of being disloyal, railing against the media, or working crowds into a frenzy by encouraging violence. Throughout the ’16 presidential primary season, we were worried and talked to each other a lot about these echoes. But for both of us, a big turning point came when Donald Trump won the nomination. In our minds, something pernicious was afoot. This same dynamic had taken place in Europe between the two World Wars—when demagogues had taken over political parties that had been mainstream—and similar things had also happened in Latin America, when establishment politicians made deals with outside insurgents, thinking they could be contained. We know that this sort of hostile takeover, whether allowed by the establishment out of opportunism, cowardice, or fear, is a precursor to bad things. And when, in the last days of the presidential campaign, candidate Donald Trump refused to promise he would abide by the results of the election, we realized we were in dangerous new terrain. You write about the challenge that democracies face in the dual imperatives of choosing a popular candidate and keeping out extremist demagogues. How should American parties balance those goals? This is an important issue. The so-called smoke-filled room of the previous century, while at first glance offensive to democratic sensibilities, had a virtue: It actually did a remarkably good job of keeping extremist demagogues off party tickets. They seek candidates who will win, and this usually means keeping demagogues far from power. Of course, the smoke-filled room has reason to be criticized for being an elite affair. This is a recurring tension at the heart of democracy: Sustaining a democracy may require keeping the selection of candidates—before democratic competition begins—partly in the hands of party leaders. What was different in America in that allowed a populist outsider to succeed in doing so? These are all great examples of how gatekeeping used to work. This is why party conventions were so important in the past: Party leaders made deals at the conventions, and insider-backed candidates were almost always selected. This shifted power, for better or worse, to the party rank and file. What about our society has changed that makes party gatekeepers no longer effective? A perfect storm of factors combined to dramatically open up the nomination process, and the effects have not always been great. Bush—who usually won against outsider challengers. But over the past several years, this system has been in decline. Party gatekeepers have become shells of what they once were for two main reasons. The other was the explosion of alternative media, particularly cable news and social media. Now, with enough money and media access, candidates can skirt the invisible primary. The Republican Party, even more than the Democrats, has been deeply affected by both of these trends, leaving it ineffective as a gatekeeper. The chance that an outsider would someday make it through to win the nomination has always been there; in , the conditions were in place to make it happen. You have developed a litmus test to help identify autocrats before they come to power. What are the four behavioral warning signs that comprise the test, and how many of them did Trump test positive for, even before his inauguration? The idea is that certain politicians, in effect, show their cards before they even come into office. If a candidate tests positive on any part of this test, we should be nervous. The first indicator is if a politician, in words or practice, appears to reject the democratic rules of the game; the second is whether they deny the legitimacy of their opponents; and the third is whether they appear to tolerate or encourage violence. Finally, we should also be alarmed if a politician expresses a willingness to curtail the civil liberties of their opponents, including the media. In some countries, you see candidates like this quite often; thankfully, it is much rarer in the United States. With the exception of Richard Nixon, no major-party presidential candidate met even one of these four criteria over the last century. Donald Trump, when running for office, tested positive on all four indicators. Why should we worry about extremist rhetoric or outbursts on Twitter? There are several reasons why we believe words should be taken seriously. First, in our studies of demagogues around the world, words are usually followed by action. In Peru, when candidate Alberto Fujimori was running for office, he railed against elites; when he

came into office, he acted on his fury. Further, words reflect and shape unwritten rules of behavior. When broken taboos lead to great electoral success, norms shatter and other demagogic politicians are tempted to imitate norm breakers. Norm breaking can be dangerously contagious. When a politician receives applause when threatening the press, other like-minded politicians are encouraged to do the same. In this way, a political system, sustained by shared standards of what is acceptable, can begin to deteriorate. But this is not the end of it. As language becomes more extreme, the opponents of demagogues grow frightened and feel compelled to respond in kind. A tit-for-tat extremism can be unleashed. The results are not good. Constitution is one of the most revered and imitated documents in modern history. We have to remember something critically important about our Constitution: At the end of the day, it is only a piece of paper. It is not self-enforcing. There has been a lot of talk about norms and norm breaking since Donald Trump came into office. But for all the talk, commentators often have difficulty focusing on which norms matter the most for our democracy. We think two norms in particular carry a lot of weight in the American political system. Think of this example: From a strictly legal perspective, it is amazingly easy to impeach a president, requiring only a simple majority in the House. To remove a president requires a two-thirds vote in the Senate. But this action has been rare in American politics, which is a good thing: But the rarity of the use of the impeachment tool is not a function of the Constitution, or because the Constitution makes it difficult; it is because American politicians have long held a norm to act with forbearance in this domainâ€”to use this incredibly powerful weapon only under exceptional circumstances. There are times when impeachment might be called for. But given the relatively low constitutional threshold, the only thing preventing impeachment from becoming a regular and highly disruptive tool of politicsâ€”which, by the way, it has become in other countriesâ€”is not the written Constitution but a shared norm of restraint. What frightens us today is that there are signs that forbearance is decaying. We have become accustomed to reading about democratic decline in other parts of the world, but you argue that America experienced its own form of democratic collapse in the postâ€”Civil War Reconstruction Era. The United States first experienced a democratic breakdown of sorts during the Civil War. Our democracyâ€”imperfect as it was at the timeâ€”was, in effect, entirely suspended in a third of the country during the war, and after the war many Southern states were placed under military rule. Following Reconstruction, the U. South underwent one of the most dramatic instances of de-democratization in history. After the Reconstruction Act and the Fifteenth Amendment barred suffrage restrictions based on race, African Americans suddenly constituted a majority or near-majority of the voting population throughout most of the former Confederacy. African Americans registered and voted in large numbers. In , for example, black turnout surpassed 65 percent in much of the South. But over the next two decades, every Southern state adopted lawsâ€”such as poll taxes and literacy requirementsâ€”aimed at disenfranchising African Americans. By , black turnout in the South had plummeted to under 2 percent. African Americans were thoroughly disenfranchised, an extraordinarily antidemocratic act. In other words, the U. South descended into authoritarianism in the late nineteenth centuryâ€”and remained authoritarian for nearly a century. It has been a gradual spiral, worsening over time. You argue that racial and religious realignment and growing economic inequality are the major forces driving the extreme political polarization in America. Scholars have shown a long-standing relationshipâ€”dating back to the nineteenth centuryâ€”between income inequality and polarization. The dramatic increase in inequality since the s, together with the absence of serious campaign finance regulation, is clearly one of the factors pulling the Republicans to the right. But a dramatic change has also taken place in our party system. The American electorate has grown much more diverse since the s: So the nonwhite share of the electorate grew dramatically. Most of these new voters became Democrats, while Southern whites fled the Democratic Party for the Republicans. At the same time, evangelical Christians flocked to the GOP starting in the s. So whereas half a century ago the Democrats and Republicans were both white and Protestant, the parties are now divided by race and religion. This is a big deal. And, crucially, the Republican Party has become the political home for white Protestantsâ€”a majority ethnic group in decline. White Protestants, who long sat atop the American social pyramid, are losing their dominant status in the face of growing diversity and racial equality. Many feel that their country is being taken away from them, which, together with disappearing economic opportunities, fuels the anger and extremism we see in movements such

as the Tea Party. How many of them has Trump attempted? Looking around the world, we identified three strategies that elected authoritarians commonly use, and were dismayed to discover that Trump has tried all of them. The first is capturing the referees, which means gaining control over the courts and key investigative, regulatory, and law enforcement agencies. The second is sidelining key players—such as media owners, wealthy businesspeople, opposition politicians, or prominent cultural figures—who could rally public opposition.

Chapter 4 : EVMs? Trust Deficit! | Gfiles Magazine

*The largest and most powerful Arab nation, Egypt, votes in late March in presidential elections where most strong opponents have been barred from contesting by the government of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.*

Copy link to share with friends Copy link Why you should care Because the outcomes of these elections could shape global political and economic trends for decades to come. The Soviet Union had just collapsed, Germany had reunited and former Eastern bloc communist countries were queuing up to join the European Union. That belief has faced sporadic challenges in recent years. But over the next 12 months, it will face its most thorough test yet. The countries that will vote include increasingly authoritarian regimes like Venezuela, Egypt and Russia, and nations with growing cynicism over corruption, like Brazil and Malaysia. These elections are extremely crucial for the future of democracy. In addition, we will bring stories to you throughout the year that capture emerging trends and personalities that could influence these elections. The sparring over fake news “ and its use to influence elections “ is echoing across Europe, including Italy, where we begin this series. Then there are the stiff examinations democracy itself faces. A decade and a half after the U. In Malaysia, youth are turning away from uninspiring elections that are pitting a year-old former prime minister against an incumbent accused of funneling public funds into his account. Corruption has battered the second-largest economy in the Americas, Brazil, whose president faces possible impeachment proceedings his predecessor was impeached. And the candidate currently leading polls for the October elections, also an ex-president, has been convicted. Populism is rising “ on the left and the right. The largest and most powerful Arab nation, Egypt, votes in late March in presidential elections where most strong opponents have been barred from contesting by the government of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Will elections give authoritarian regimes a veneer of democratic legitimacy? Will new leaders, where they emerge, truly chart a fresh course, or will cynicism defeat democracy in countries where choices appear sparse? Will war-torn nations make a new beginning? And will the world be less or more unstable 12 months from now? Join us for this series as we bring you the answers.

**Chapter 5 : OZY Brings You a Ringside View of Democracy's Big Test | Opinion | OZY**

*Democracy's big test California's GHG emission law is under challenge by ballot initiative, led by a posse of carbon-dependent corporate funders and Tea Party billionaires. What a rat's nest of misinformation and irrationality that campaign is likely to be!*

Freedom Democratic states nearly always have freer people than autocratic states. They obviously have the right to vote for their government so by extension deciding the policy of their nation and what their nation should be like. They have more freedom of speech and expression than in autocracies. In particular they are free to criticise their own government. Except for the freedom to choose the government there is no reason why people cannot be as free under an autocracy as in a democracy. Represents the people The biggest virtue of Democracy is that it is government by the people for the people. The government represents the views of the people who elect them and can throw them out if the government does things that the people do not like. Unlike other forms of government democracy is about the little man, everyone rather than the elite that are often disconnected from how everyone else lives their lives. Democracy does not do very well at representing the people. In first past the post systems a government may not even have the support of a majority of those who voted not even including that many will not have votes and many more will not have the vote. This means that it is often a small minority of the population who determines which party gets in to government. Once they are there they are rarely representative of the people as they have several years to do what they like. Yes they need to think about re-election but that simply means they need to do more that the people like than the people dislike or else have a good advertising campaign. Better governance due to transparency Democracy is as much about having checks and balances to the executive and having transparency of decision-making as it is about elections and the populace throwing governments out of power. They are therefore able to see if the executive is doing things that are detrimental to the country, are immoral, or even illegal. This can then be brought to a halt. While this is mostly found in democracy it is not something that has to be exclusive to democracies. Autocracies can potentially be transparent and have checks and balances they however often do not simply because an autocracy often has the time, and the willingness to use force to prevent these from occurring. Respect of Human Rights Democracy as much it is understood, is the government of the people, by the people and for the people. If democracy is put at it appropriate performance, then, all facet of human rights is respected. The citizens would have the rights to exercise freedom of speech concerning the well-being of the populace in areas of the economy, education, health, infrastructural development, etc. It is impossible for a state to accommodate all conflicting views on a subject. Thus, majority rule is practiced. This puts the rights of minorities into jeopardy. Promotes Human Rights As much as Democracy is understood, it is a government of the people, by the people and for the people. The ability of the people to have a voice in the running of the State, in the economy, health, education, infrastructural development, etc creates a bit-balanced environment for governance to thrive; this can only be achieved in a democratic governance. Economic growth Autocracies are better at big projects, they can get things done and as such they are likely to be better at creating economic growth if they have the will. In an autocracy there are not the avenues for dissent that can block building projects, the police or troops can be used to clear protests that in the west would slow down large infrastructure projects. As a consequence of this all the infrastructure that is needed to create a modern economy can be produced quicker and cheaper than would be the case in a democracy. Also the resource base of the country can be accessed faster no pesky environmentalists preventing drilling and mining! This is not the case. The most developed and richest countries are all democracies. While they may well have been developing their democracies during their initial industrialisation democracy and the freedom it brings is increasingly necessary for economic growth once the country has moved to being mostly dependent upon services rather than manufacturing or natural resource exploitation for economic growth. Once this occurs then creativity becomes important and the freedoms associated with democracy are needed to foster this creativity that is needed for industries such as information technology, creative arts, research and development etc. Increasingly about money In some countries democracy seems to

be increasingly about money. This is not what democracy should be about and it discourages other countries from moving along the path to democracy. Indeed it undermines the very idea of democracy. Democracy when money is involved to the extent that it is in the U. Autocracies obviously avoid this immense expense by avoiding elections. Electorate is not motivated You can drag the electorate to the ballot box if you like but you cannot make them interested in most of the topics. An elected representative can take more time to consider the idea, discuss it with peers, and explain themselves if it is contrary to popular opinion. Of course, most politicians are weasels and will support popular opinion over educated opinion, but the result of this is no worse than direct democracy.

**Chapter 6 : NY Daily News - We are currently unavailable in your region**

*Democracy's biggest benefit is the freedom of choice to pick your own leader. No matter your race or sex (age to vote is still a bit high to vote but the mentally ill are allowed to vote:?), you.*

Chris Weigant is a political commentator. That piece of doublethink is the heart of the conundrum in which we now find ourselves in Egypt. That piece of doublethink has been at the center of American foreign policy pretty much since World War II, and it is the heart of the conundrum we now find ourselves in regards to what is happening in Egypt and other countries in North Africa and the Middle East. According to our definition of "wrong," of course. This is the key drawback to democracy and American support of democracy in the rest of the world -- sometimes the "wrong" people win. At heart of this dichotomy is the realpolitik fact that America promotes its own ideals and values, while simultaneously looking out for its own national interests. When the two conflict, we almost always choose our national interests as we see them at the time over our lofty ideals. Sometimes this leads to disaster, sometimes it leads to stability, and sometimes it leads to an American president pulled in two different directions -- as President Obama is right now over the Egyptian protests. During the Cold War, American foreign policy was a pretty black-or-white affair. Anti-communism was the overriding acid test for whether countries would garner our support or not. Democracy was a distant second, in terms of who we supported on the world stage. This led us to back dictators, despots, and autocrats take your choice across the globe -- in Central and South America, in Africa, and in the Far East. As long as a strongman denounced communism with sufficient fervor, we turned an enormous blind eye to pretty much anything the strongman did to crush his own people to stay in power. Examples of this abound throughout the past 65 years of history. To put it quite bluntly, when American values conflicted with American national interests, our national interests always trumped our values. The classic example of this is a quote attributed to Franklin D. Which makes calling for his ouster rather touchy. Show too much support for him right now, and it becomes obvious that all that fancy talk about how we "support democracy" is nothing more than window dressing, when the rubber meets the road. We still support all kinds of dictatorial leaders around the globe. We conveniently "look the other way" when some of these leaders hold sham "elections" whose results are questionable, at best -- and downright laughable, at the worst. Sometimes, as with Egypt, this is because the policy is inherited and ongoing. This is the worry, currently, when it comes to Egypt. Our support of an election is going to be seen as awfully hypocritical if we refuse to deal with the legitimate victor of such an election. But supporting the pro-democracy movement exposes a different type of American hypocrisy as well, because we have been such a staunch support of Mubarak up until this point. American foreign policy spokespeople love to talk pie-in-the-sky American values, when addressing this region of the world. People like George W. At the same time these speeches are given, we shovel billions of dollars in military aid to leaders who deny all of these things to their people. Egypt is so good at torturing prisoners that we de facto subcontracted some of this work out to them with our own prisoners. How, exactly, do we square that uncomfortable fact with all of our pretty speeches about human rights? But the people living in the region are not so adept at this American species of doublethink. They see the tangible results of American foreign policy, from the missile casings to the tear gas canisters that are stamped "Made in America. They watch as we cozy up to leaders of countries that we have a strategic military need for and hand them billions of dollars in military aid, without a single thought of how these leaders treat their own people. President Obama got a lot of heat politically for not coming out and embracing the street demonstrations in Iran, a while back. His hands were tied by our own history -- not just of previous regime change, but of decades of support for a strongman who just happened to be "our bastard. Supporting democracy -- in the abstract -- is always easier than supporting a real, live revolt in the streets. There are too many unknowns to answer this at this point in time. The recent return of Muqtada Al Sadr who is never referenced in the American press without his proper media-friendly label: We may eventually wind up denouncing a freely-elected government in a country where we set up the democratic forms of government in the first place. Such irony may be mostly lost on the American public -- but it is definitely not ignored in the region itself. Because, as always, American interests

be they economic, military, or other trump American values and ideals. We support democracy and democracy movements around the world right up to the point where they elect the "wrong" people. From that point on, the demonizing begins and all talk of the wonders of "democracy" fades quickly. Clinton appeared on every Sunday political show possible yesterday, projecting a message that was couched in diplomatic terms, but was still pretty clear -- America wants an orderly transition of power, supports the concept of non-violence, and is not going to dictate to the Egyptian people what form of government they should have. The movement in the street is not going to accept anything less, and Clinton had several supportive things to say about the protest movement and their goals -- again, not giving full-throated support to the movement against Mubarak, but doing everything but offer such explicit support. Cries for Obama to do more or, even, "less" than he is doing currently are mostly muted and from groups with specific interests of their own. While appealing for calm and an orderly transition of power is pretty standard diplomatic fare, openly supporting full democratic rights for Egyptians is a gamble. Which is why supporting a dictator who consistently sides with the U. Strategic national interests have always been more important than ideological purity of values when it comes to American foreign policy. Currently, fans of George W. Bush are cheerleading that "Bush was right" on the Middle East, and that the dominoes are falling precisely as he predicted they would after invading Iraq. Democracy, in this storyline, is spreading like wildfire across the region, which is cause for celebration. These will be exactly the same people who will denounce any elected government in any of these countries who is deemed the "wrong" winner of an election. Because, whether we like it or not, this is what democracy truly means. A country elects a leader that the people of that country want -- and not a leader that some other country prefers. But that is as it should be, to anyone who truly supports democracy.

**Chapter 7 : Top 10 Nations of Democracy | Synonym**

*The Democracy Ranking uses a formula to arrive at its ranking. The quality of a country's democracy is derived by adding measures of the country's freedom and political characteristics to performance on nonpolitical dimensions, including economic health, gender equality, knowledge, health and environmental quality.*

Many see Donald Trump as an expression of that crisis — though some look at him and see the problem and others, the solution. Here are some of the reasons I think democracy is in crisis. The fight, from the founding, over what democracy is. Should the federal government be strong, as Alexander Hamilton argued, or weak, as Thomas Jefferson did? Which is more important, the freedom of the group, or of the individual? How do we balance respecting the will of the people with protecting against demagoguery and mob rule? And over what America is. Is the essence of America its democratic creed — as Jefferson asserted — or is it an ethnic homeland, as Andrew Jackson saw it? Under the present administration, the issue is very much alive. Slavery and its aftermath. Although the Civil War ended in 1865, America only started to become a full democracy a century later, when African-Americans were first able to exercise the franchise in full. To this day, we live with the lingering effects of racial injustice and its twins, shame, and denial. As one example among many Voter suppression, supposedly justified by insignificant levels of voter fraud. The backlash to increasing social equality. Experiments show that people value relative social status more than money. Those close to the bottom are especially afraid of letting others climb past them — one explanation for why poor people sometimes vote against their own economic interest. The backlash to economic inequality, as wealth gains have flowed to the top while wages for the middle while working classes have stagnated. Researchers disagree, though, about how much this drove the recent election results, as compared with ethnic and cultural tensions. That bolstered their support for law and order, and, potentially, more authoritarian leadership. The hyper-politicization of the judiciary. The *Wade* decision that made politics a litmus test for every new justice thereafter. When one side sees abortion as a civil right and the other sees it as murder, democratic compromise is hard to achieve. So people turn to alternatives, like the courts. Terrorism, which has scared many of us into compromising democratic values in favor of security. The abandonment of the Enlightenment and its focus on reason: It has a long history in the U. The right has its moral absolutists, but the left does, too. The weakening of institutions, including education and journalism, the two pillars that make government by an informed citizenry viable, as our founders well knew. Uninvolved citizens, with low interest in politics, and low propensity to vote, whether because of loss of faith in the process, or lack of civics education, or Entertainment and consumption as opiates of the masses. People who have worked in public service know this is far from true, but many, many Americans are sure that it is. Scientific marketing of candidates and causes, leading to ever more partisan and divisive campaigns, which are based on pushing psychological buttons instead of making coherent policy arguments. Pork barrel politics — as well as less pork barrel politics. Pork barrel spending by Congress causes people to lose faith in the system of checks and balances. But reducing pork, say by banning earmarks, may have the unanticipated side-effect of making Congressional deal-making harder, and recalcitrance easier, by reducing the leverage leaders have over rank and file members. Gerrymandering, which reduces incentives for compromise. The removal of restrictions on campaign finance, along with the growth of lobbying, and the new role of billionaires as power brokers to rival the parties. The end of the Fairness Doctrine, making it legal to present opinion and provocation as news, and thereby possible to make huge amounts of money — a segment of media and politics became a highly profitable outrage industry. The rise of talk radio, digital cable TV, and the internet, leading to the fragmentation of world views, the growth of the outrage industry, and greater reach for extremists. The Big Sort of Americans into like-minded communities, as described by author Bill Bishop, enabled by technologies like electricity, air conditioning, and highways. Anxiety over the increasing complexity of the world, giving rise to a longing for simple solutions, and making authoritarianism more attractive. Fake news via scam websites, social media, and organized campaigns, enabled by the near-zero cost of producing and distributing counterfeit information, and the difficulty many of us have detecting it. Postmodern philosophy going mainstream, migrating from the

academic theory to playbook. We now see some political operatives explicitly arguing that reality is whatever we say it is. Do you have information you want to share with HuffPost?

**Chapter 8 : Suddenly, Alex Cora is facing the biggest test of his young managerial life**

*Cover Story Cover Story: EVMs - Democracy's Biggest Hoax? In , when million Indians vote to elect a new government, they, along with the political fraternity, will rest their faith on the controversial, malfunctioning, and hack-able voting machines.*

**Chapter 9 : How Democracies Die by Steven Levitsky, Daniel Ziblatt | [calendrierdelascience.com](http://calendrierdelascience.com)**

*The Big Green tried only 11 passes, completing four for 49 yards. But the political opposition to a fair test of vouchers, for example, is, and long has been.*