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Chapter 1 : Patrick Seale: List of Books by Author Patrick Seale

This memoir, ghostwritten in part by a journalist with experience in the region, is a useful contribution to the literature on the Gulf War. Khaled, eldest son of the Saudi defense minister, at age 42 was promoted from his position as commander of the Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces to serve as Joint.

When the hostage crisis in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan underlined the need to strengthen U.S. Overcoming skeptical perceptions that the command was still an RDJTF in all but name, designed to support a Cold War strategy, took time. Soon afterward, as part of what became known as the " Tanker War ", the Federal government of the United States reflagged and renamed 11 Kuwaiti oil tankers. The original plan called for these five-and-two-thirds divisions to march from the Persian Gulf to the Zagros Mountains and prevent the Soviet Ground Forces army from seizing the Iranian oil fields. President George Bush responded quickly. A timely deployment of forces and the formation of a coalition deterred Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia , and the command began to focus on the liberation of Kuwait. The buildup of forces continued, reinforced by United Nations Security Council Resolution 660, which called for Iraqi forces to leave Kuwait. On January 17, 1991, U.S. The primary coalition objective, the liberation of Kuwait, was achieved on February 27, and the next morning a ceasefire was declared, just one hundred hours after the commencement of the ground campaign. The end of formal hostilities did not bring the end of difficulties with Iraq. Operation Provide Comfort, implemented to provide humanitarian assistance to the Kurds and enforce a "no-fly" zone in Iraq, north of the 36th parallel, began in April 1991. Security Council Resolution 688 condemning his brutal repression of Iraqi civilians in southeastern Iraq. Under the command and control of Joint Task Force Southwest Asia, coalition forces in this operation enforced a no-fly zone south of the 32nd parallel. In January 1992, Operation Northern Watch replaced Provide Comfort, with a focus on enforcing the northern no-fly zone. The command also brought significant challenges in Somalia as well as from the growing threat of regional terrorism. To prevent widespread starvation in the face of clan warfare, the command responded in with Operation Provide Relief to supply humanitarian assistance to Somalia and northeastern Kenya. Faced with attacks such as the bombing of the Khobar Towers , which killed 19 American airmen, the command launched Operation Desert Focus, designed to relocate U.S. In 1998, terrorists attacked the U.S. Bush to declare a war against international terrorism. Exercise Internal Look has been employed for explicit war planning on at least two occasions: These operations involved a series of Special Operations Forces raids, humanitarian assistance, consequence management, and a variety of civic action programs. The command has also remained poised to provide disaster relief throughout the region; its most recent significant relief operations have been a response to the October earthquake in Pakistan , and the large-scale evacuation of American citizens from Lebanon in 2006. Under the intelligence directorate, there are several divisions including the Afghanistan-Pakistan Center of Excellence. CENTCOM directs four "service component commands" and one subordinate unified command and no fighting units directly subordinate to it: CFC-A was disestablished in February 2003. War planning[edit] The following code names are known to have been associated with war planning per William Arkin: General Norman Schwarzkopf expressed the position over Israel frankly in his autobiography: With ongoing warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003, the United States Air Force used 35 bases, while in 2001 it used 14, including four in Iraq. The United States Navy maintains one major base and one smaller installation, with extensive deployments afloat and ashore by U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard ships, aviation units and ground units.

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Chapter 2 : Jurnal Singkat: Why Arabs Lose Wars

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The Modern History of Kuwait, The West and the Arab Elite. Milaf Al-Bayan 3 , December. The Myth and the Reality. Center for Arab Unity Studies Arabic. The Decline of Arab Oil Revenues. Arab Nationalism and Islam. Alexander, Jeffrey, and Paul Colomy. Reconstructing a Theoretical Tradition. Dar Al-Uruba Bookstore Arabic. The Power Elite and the State. Clifton Berry, and Norman Polmar. War in the Gulf. Tarikh Al-Kuwait History of Kuwait. Dar Al-Hayat Bookstore Arabic. The Oil Economy of Kuwait. Kegan Paul International Ltd. Al-Ittihad Printing House Arabic. Disorientation, A Society in Flux: Kuwait in the , " Reading, UK: Dar Nahdhat Misr Arabic. Dar Manarat Lilnashr Arabic. Monthly Review ress Pp. The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War. Human Rights Volations Since August 2, Oil and the Middle East. Arabian American Oil Company. City State in World Politics. Sanctions, Diplomacy, and War in the Persian Gulf. The Center for Strategic and International Studies. Aspin, Les and William Dickinson. Defense for a New Era: Lessons of the Persian Gulf War. House Armed Services Committee, U. Was the truth told about warning to Iraq? Saturday, July 13, A7. AThe Doctrines of the Coalition Forces. The Gulf War Assessed. Arms and Armour Press. The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace The British House of Commons. AA Growing Islamic Presence: Balancing Sacred and Secular. New York Times, May 2. Black, Ian and Benny Morris. Blau, Peter M, Terry C. Blum, and Joseph E. Ethnic Inter marriage in the Former Yugoslavia, to Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for State. Brown, Ben and David Shukman. Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. Reformers, Challenge the Old Guard. Bush, George and Brent Scowcroft. Dependency and Development in Latin America. New Left Review Center for Defense Information. Their Influence on U. University of California Press. Understanding the Crisis in the Persian Gulf. Report to UN Security Council re: American Defense and Foreign Policy Institutions: Toward a Sound Foundation. University Press of America. The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Perspectives on Nationalism and War. Gordon and Breach Publishers. Human Rights and Democracy in Kuwait. House of Representatives, June The Transformation of an Oil State. Kuwait And Her Neighbours. Power and Politics in the Year The Power Elite and the State: How Policy Is Made in America. Comaroff and Paul C. Stern, Perspectives on Nationalism and War. The Sword of the Arabs: Kuwait in the s: A Society Under Seige. Arabic Winds of Poisons. El-Mallakh, Ragaei and Jacob K. The absorptive Capacity of Kuwait. Effects of Planned Change on Social Organization: The University of Georgia. Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, and the Arabs in the Nineties. Riyad El-Rayyes Books Ltd. The Arab World After the Storm. United States Institute of Peace Press. The Politics of Arab Integration. Farid, Abdel Majid and Hussein Sirriyeh. Palestine and the Palestinians. Shifting Lines in the Sand: Kuwait Elusive Frontier with Iraq. Johnson, Development and Underdevelopment: Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil. The Family and the Politics of Survival.

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Chapter 3 : Download PDF T Warr/desert Warrior Personal View Of The Gulf War By The Joint Forces Commander

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Social factors that prohibit success include: Arabic-speaking armies have been generally ineffective in the modern era. Egyptian regular forces did poorly against Yemeni irregulars in the s. Why this unimpressive record? There are many factors--economic, ideological, technical--but perhaps the most important has to do with culture and certain societal attributes which inhibit Arabs from producing an effective military force. It is a truism of military life that an army fights as it trains, and so I draw on my many years of firsthand observation of Arabs in training to draw conclusions about the ways in which they go into combat. The following impressions derive from personal experience with Arab military establishments in the capacity of U. As these examples suggest, when culture is considered in calculating the relative strengths and weaknesses of opposing forces, it tends to lead to wild distortions, especially when it is a matter of understanding why states unprepared for war enter into combat flushed with confidence. The temptation is to impute cultural attributes to the enemy state that negate its superior numbers or weaponry. American strategists assumed that the pain threshold of the North Vietnamese approximated their own and that the air bombardment of the North would bring it to its knees. It is particularly dangerous to make facile assumptions about abilities in warfare based on past performance, for societies evolve and so does the military subculture with it. The dismal French performance in the Franco-Prussian war led the German high command to an overly optimistic assessment prior to World War I. The history of warfare makes a mockery of attempts to assign rigid cultural attributes to individuals--as the military histories of the Ottoman and Roman empires illustrate. Indeed, awareness of prior mistakes should make it possible to assess the role of cultural factors in warfare. John Keegan, the eminent historian of warfare, argues that culture is a prime determinant of the nature of warfare. It may well be that these seemingly permanent attributes result from a culture that engenders subtlety, indirection, and dissimulation in personal relationships. But how does one integrate the study of culture into military training? At present, it has hardly any role. Belbutowski, a scholar and former member of the U. Delta Force, succinctly stated a deficiency in our own military education system: The Vietnamese communists did not fight the war the United States had trained for, nor did the Chechens and Afghans fight the war the Russians prepared for. This entails far more than simply retooling weaponry and retraining soldiers. Mindful of walking through a minefield of past errors and present cultural sensibilities, I offer some assessments of the role of culture in the military training of Arabic-speaking officers. I confine myself principally to training for two reasons. First, I observed much training but only one combat campaign the Jordanian Army against the Palestine Liberation Organization in Secondly, armies fight as they train. Troops are conditioned by peacetime habits, policies, and procedures; they do not undergo a sudden metamorphosis that transforms civilians in uniform into warriors. Having learned to perform some complicated procedure, an Arab technician knows that he is invaluable so long as he is the only one in a unit to have that knowledge; once he dispenses it to others he no longer is the only font of knowledge and his power dissipates. This explains the commonplace hoarding of manuals, books, training pamphlets, and other training or logistics literature. The American trainers took the newly-minted manuals straight to the tank park and distributed them to the tank crews. Right behind them, the company commander, a graduate of the armor school at Fort Knox and specialized courses at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds ordnance school, collected the manuals from the crews. Questioned why he did this, the commander said that there was no point in giving them to the drivers because enlisted men could not read. In point of fact, he did not want enlisted men to have an independent source of knowledge. Being the only person who can explain the fire control instrumentation or boresight artillery weapons brings prestige and attention. In military terms this means that very little cross-training is accomplished and that, for instance in a tank crew, the gunners, loaders, and drivers might be proficient in their jobs but are not prepared to fill in for a casualty.

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At a higher level it means there is no depth in technical proficiency. Because the Arab educational system is predicated on rote memorization, officers have a phenomenal ability to commit vast amounts of knowledge to memory. The learning system tends to consist of on-high lectures, with students taking voluminous notes and being examined on what they were told. It also has interesting implications for foreign instructors; for example, his credibility is diminished if he must resort to a book. The emphasis on memorization has a price, and that is in diminished ability to reason or engage in analysis based upon general principles. Thinking outside the box is not encouraged; doing so in public can damage a career. Instructors are not challenged and neither, in the end, are students. Head-to-head competition among individuals is generally avoided, at least openly, for it means that someone wins and someone else loses, with the loser humiliated. This taboo has particular import when a class contains mixed ranks. Education is in good part sought as a matter of personal prestige, so Arabs in U. American military instructors dealing with Middle Eastern students learn to ensure that, before directing any question to a student in a classroom situation, particularly if he is an officer, the student does possess the correct answer. If this is not assured, the officer will feel he has been set up for public humiliation. Furthermore, in the often-paranoid environment of Arab political culture, he will believe this setup to have been purposeful. This student will then become an enemy of the instructor and his classmates will become apprehensive about their also being singled out for humiliation--and learning becomes impossible. SOLDIERS Arab junior officers are well trained on the technical aspects of their weapons and tactical know-how, but not in leadership, a subject given little attention. This problem results from two main factors: Most Arab officers treat enlisted soldiers like sub-humans. When the winds in Egypt one day carried biting sand particles from the desert during a demonstration for visiting U. On a typical weekend, officers in units stationed outside Cairo will get in their cars and drive off to their homes, leaving the enlisted men to fend for themselves by trekking across the desert to a highway and flagging down busses or trucks to get to the Cairo rail system. Garrison cantonments have no amenities for soldiers. The same situation, in various degrees, exists elsewhere in the Arabic-speaking countries--less so in Jordan, even more so in Iraq and Syria. The young draftees who make up the bulk of the Egyptian army hate military service for good reason and will do almost anything, including self-mutilation, to avoid it. In Syria the wealthy buy exemptions or, failing that, are assigned to noncombatant organizations. As a young Syrian told me, his musical skills came from his assignment to a Syrian army band where he learned to play an instrument. In general, the militaries of the Fertile Crescent enforce discipline by fear; in countries where a tribal system still is in force, such as Saudi Arabia, the innate egalitarianism of the society mitigates against fear as the prime motivator, so a general lack of discipline pervades. With some exceptions, NCOs are considered in the same low category as enlisted men and so do not serve as a bridge between enlisted men and officers. Officers instruct but the wide social gap between enlisted man and officer tends to make the learning process perfunctory, formalized, and ineffective. The show-and-tell aspects of training are frequently missing because officers refuse to get their hands dirty and prefer to ignore the more practical aspects of their subject matter, believing this below their social station. A dramatic example of this occurred during the Gulf war when a severe windstorm blew down the tents of Iraqi officer prisoners of war. For three days they stayed in the wind and rain rather than be observed by enlisted prisoners in a nearby camp working with their hands. The military price for this is very high. Without the cohesion supplied by NCOs, units tend to disintegrate in the stress of combat. This is primarily a function of the fact that the enlisted soldiers simply do not trust their officers. Once officers depart the training areas, training begins to fall apart as soldiers begin drifting off. The situation, he said, had only marginally improved in Iraqi prisoners in showed a remarkable fear and enmity toward their officers. This leads to a highly centralized system, with authority hardly ever delegated. Rarely does an officer make a critical decision on his own; instead, he prefers the safe course of being identified as industrious, intelligent, loyal--and compliant. Bringing attention to oneself as an innovator or someone prone to make unilateral decisions is a recipe for trouble. As in civilian life, conformism is the overwhelming societal norm; the nail that stands up gets hammered down. Orders and information flow from top to bottom; they are not to be reinterpreted, amended,

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or modified in any way. This author has several times seen decisions that could have been made at the battalion level concerning such matters as class meeting times and locations requiring approval from the ministry of defense. All of which has led American trainers to develop a rule of thumb: Army has as much authority as a colonel in an Arab army. Methods of instruction and subject matter are dictated from higher authorities. Unit commanders have very little to say about these affairs. The politicized nature of the Arab militaries means that political factors weigh heavily and frequently override military considerations. Officers with initiative and a predilection for unilateral action pose a threat to the regime. This can be seen not just at the level of national strategy but in every aspect of military operations and training. If Arab militaries became less politicized and more professional in preparation for the war with Israel, 22 once the fighting ended, old habits returned. Now, an increasingly bureaucratized military establishment weighs in as well. A veteran of the Pentagon turf wars will feel like a kindergartner when he encounters the rivalries that exist in the Arab military headquarters. Taking responsibility for a policy, operation, status, or training program rarely occurs. A high rate of non-operational U. This imperative works even at the most exalted levels. During the Kuwait war, Iraqi forces took over the town of Khafji in northeast Saudi Arabia after the Saudis had evacuated the place. General Khalid bin Sultan, the Saudi ground forces commander, requested a letter from General Norman Schwarzkopf, stating it was the U. As for equipment, a vast cultural gap exists between the U. The Arab difficulties with U. The American concept of a weapons system does not convey easily. A weapons system brings with it specific maintenance and logistics procedures, policies, and even a philosophy, all of them based on U. Tools that would be allocated to a U. The expertise, initiative and, most importantly, the trust indicated by delegation of responsibility to a lower level are rare. Without the needed tools, spare parts, or expertise available to keep equipment running, and loathe to report bad news to his superiors, the unit commander looks for scapegoats.

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Chapter 4 : Project MUSE - The Petroleum Triangle

Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander. By HRH General Khaled Bin Sultan, written with Patrick Seale. HarperCollins, New York, , pp. List: \$35; AET: \$

Army retired colonel with eight years residence in Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt, and a graduate degree in Arab studies from the American University of Beirut, is currently instructing U. Army personnel assigned to Middle Eastern areas. The opinions expressed here are strictly his own. Arabic-speaking armies have been generally ineffective in the modern era. Egyptian regular forces did poorly against Yemeni irregulars in the s. Why this unimpressive record? There are many factors—economic, ideological, technical—but perhaps the most important has to do with culture and certain societal attributes which inhibit Arabs from producing an effective military force. It is a truism of military life that an army fights as it trains, and so I draw on my many years of firsthand observation of Arabs in training to draw conclusions about the ways in which they go into combat. The following impressions derive from personal experience with Arab military establishments in the capacity of U. False Starts Including culture in strategic assessments has a poor legacy, for it has often been spun from an ugly brew of ignorance, wishful thinking, and mythology. As these examples suggest, when culture is considered in calculating the relative strengths and weaknesses of opposing forces, it tends to lead to wild distortions, especially when it is a matter of understanding why states unprepared for war enter into combat flushed with confidence. The temptation is to impute cultural attributes to the enemy state that negate its superior numbers or weaponry. American strategists assumed that the pain threshold of the North Vietnamese approximated their own and that the air bombardment of the North would bring it to its knees. It is particularly dangerous to make facile assumptions about abilities in warfare based on past performance, for societies evolve and so does the military subculture with it. The dismal French performance in the Franco-Prussian war led the German high command to an overly optimistic assessment prior to World War I. The history of warfare makes a mockery of attempts to assign rigid cultural attributes to individuals—as the military histories of the Ottoman and Roman empires illustrate. The Role of Culture These problems notwithstanding, culture does need to be taken into account. Indeed, awareness of prior mistakes should make it possible to assess the role of cultural factors in warfare. John Keegan, the eminent historian of warfare, argues that culture is a prime determinant of the nature of warfare. In contrast to the usual manner of European warfare which he terms "face to face," Keegan depicts the early Arab armies in the Islamic era as masters of evasion, delay, and indirection. Lawrence termed "winning wars without battles. It may well be that these seemingly permanent attributes result from a culture that engenders subtlety, indirection, and dissimulation in personal relationships. But how does one integrate the study of culture into military training? At present, it has hardly any role. Belbutowski, a scholar and former member of the U. Delta Force, succinctly stated a deficiency in our own military education system: The Vietnamese communists did not fight the war the United States had trained for, nor did the Chechens and Afghans fight the war the Russians prepared for. This entails far more than simply retooling weaponry and retraining soldiers. Mindful of walking through a minefield of past errors and present cultural sensibilities, I offer some assessments of the role of culture in the military training of Arabic-speaking officers. I confine myself principally to training for two reasons. First, I observed much training but only one combat campaign the Jordanian Army against the Palestine Liberation Organization in Secondly, armies fight as they train. Troops are conditioned by peacetime habits, policies, and procedures; they do not undergo a sudden metamorphosis that transforms civilians in uniform into warriors. Having learned to perform some complicated procedure, an Arab technician knows that he is invaluable so long as he is the only one in a unit to have that knowledge; once he dispenses it to others he no longer is the only font of knowledge and his power dissipates. This explains the commonplace hoarding of manuals, books, training pamphlets, and other training or logistics literature. The American trainers took the newly-minted manuals straight to the tank park and distributed them to the tank crews. Right behind them, the company commander, a graduate of the armor

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school at Fort Knox and specialized courses at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds ordnance school, collected the manuals from the crews. Questioned why he did this, the commander said that there was no point in giving them to the drivers because enlisted men could not read. In point of fact, he did not want enlisted men to have an independent source of knowledge. Being the only person who can explain the fire control instrumentation or boresight artillery weapons brings prestige and attention. In military terms this means that very little cross-training is accomplished and that, for instance in a tank crew, the gunners, loaders, and drivers might be proficient in their jobs but are not prepared to fill in for a casualty. At a higher level it means there is no depth in technical proficiency. Education Problems Training tends to be unimaginative, cut and dried, and not challenging. 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officers. Once officers depart the training areas, training begins to fall apart as soldiers begin drifting off. The situation, he said, had only marginally improved in Iraqi prisoners in showed a remarkable fear and enmity toward their officers. Decision-making and Responsibility Decisions are made and delivered from on high, with very little lateral communication. This leads to a highly centralized system, with authority hardly ever delegated. Rarely does an officer make a critical decision on his own; instead, he prefers the safe course of being identified as industrious, intelligent, loyal—and compliant. Bringing attention to oneself as an innovator or someone prone to make unilateral decisions is a recipe for trouble. As in civilian life, conformism is the overwhelming societal norm; the nail that stands up gets hammered down. Orders and information flow from top to bottom; they are not to be reinterpreted, amended, or modified in any way. This author has several times seen decisions that could have been made at the battalion level concerning such matters as class meeting times and locations requiring approval from the ministry of defense. All of which has led American trainers to develop a rule of thumb: Army has as much authority as a colonel in an Arab army. Methods of instruction and subject matter are dictated from higher authorities. Unit commanders have very little to say about these affairs. The politicized nature of the Arab militaries means that political factors weigh heavily and frequently override military considerations. Officers with initiative and a predilection for unilateral action pose a threat to the regime. This can be seen not just at the level of national strategy but in every aspect of military operations and training. If Arab militaries became less politicized and more professional in preparation for the war with Israel,²² once the fighting ended, old habits returned. Now, an increasingly bureaucratized military establishment weighs in as well. A veteran of the Pentagon turf wars will feel like a kindergartner when he encounters the rivalries that exist in the Arab military headquarters. Taking responsibility for a policy, operation, status, or training program rarely occurs. A high rate of non-operational U. This imperative works even at the most exalted levels. During the Kuwait war, Iraqi forces took over the town of Khafji in northeast Saudi Arabia after the Saudis had evacuated the place.

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Chapter 5 : United States Central Command - Wikipedia

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systems, including aircraft, vehicles, munitions, and "naval systems. Examines readiness of prepositioned supplies, repair parts, food and clothing, and weapons systems. The racial composition of U. Use of Navy and Marine Corps Reserves: Summary of numbers of recalled reservists. American Foreign Policy Current Documents and Department of State, , Government" during and A separate microfiche supplement contains complete transcripts of many briefings and documents. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, This indispensable reference work provides an overview of naval operations, with a section on initial "lessons learned"; includes 16 appendices and a chronology. CNN War in the Gulf. Includes charts, maps, sketches of weapons systems, and a description of Operation Provide Comfort. Aspin, Les, and Bill Dickinson. Defense for a New Era: Lessons of the Persian Gulf War. Bipartisan congressional analysis of the Gulf War. City-State in World Politics. Background on Kuwait-Iraq land disputes and Iraqi military capabilities. Aegis Guided Missile Cruiser. A popular illustrated glimpse of the Aegis cruiser. The Intelligence War in the Gulf. Australian National University,

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Chapter 6 : Why Arabs Lose Wars | Christian Forums

Warrior A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander Who's Who The House of Saud Prince Khalid bin Sultan - Prince Khalid is best known as the commander of the joint Arab forces.

CNN War in the Gulf. Includes charts, maps, sketches of weapons systems, and a description of Operation Provide Comfort. Aspin, Les, and Bill Dickinson. Defense for a New Era: Lessons of the Persian Gulf War. Bipartisan congressional analysis of the Gulf War. City-State in World Politics. Background on Kuwait-Iraq land disputes and Iraqi military capabilities. Aegis Guided Missile Cruiser. A popular illustrated glimpse of the Aegis cruiser. The Intelligence War in the Gulf. Australian National University, Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis: A Collection of Documents. Syracuse University Press, Collection of speeches and addresses by Iraqi president Saddam Hussein between February and February Bennis, Phyllis, and Michel Moushabeck, eds. A Gulf Crisis Reader. Olive Branch Press, Essays by political and social scientists, Middle East experts, and opponents of the Gulf War on various aspects of the war. Thunder in the Desert: Deputy Director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and CNN analyst describes the military operations, with numerous drawings, maps, and charts. At War in the Gulf: Daily chronology from 2 August through 28 February tracks selected military and diplomatic developments. Blake, Gerald, et al. Cambridge University Press, With the Marines in Operation Provide Comfort: Humanitarian Operations in northern Iraq, History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U. In the Eye of Desert Storm: Photographers of the Gulf War. Graphic images of the war by 24 Sigma Photo News photographers. Bulloch, John, and Harvey Morris. Faber and Faber, Veteran British journalists argue that while the United States and Arab nations underestimated the Iraqi threat to Kuwait, Saddam Hussein bears responsibility for starting the Gulf war and for its consequences. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Understanding the Gulf Crisis. Examines the events leading to the war, the conduct of the war, and the aftermath. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War. United States of America: Department of Defense, April The History of the Unified Command Plan, The Gulf and the West: Strategic Relations and Military Realities. Major background study, especially strong on U. Airpower in the Gulf. Air Force Association, Sea Combat in the Falklands and the Gulf War. History and Museums Division Headquarters, U. Examines the background of the conflict and the events leading to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Triumph in the Desert: The Challenge, the Fighting, the Legacy. Foreword by Colin Powell. Excellent "commemorative" photographic history with more than photos and maps; includes works by Navy combat artist John Roach. First-hand accounts and photographs of the Gulf war, edited by the staff of Military History Magazine. The War in the Persian Gulf. Comprehensive, highly readable account of the war by Time magazine journalists. Numerous color photos, illustrations, detailed maps, order of battle charts. Short human interest news stories by the staff of USA Today. Includes capsule biographies and memorials of American military personnel who died in the war. Heavily illustrated popular narrative of the sea, air, and land mobilization during Desert Shield. Desert Storm Air Victory. Uncritical, popular, day-by-day account of the allied air campaign against Iraq. Dudley, William, and Stacey Tipps, eds. Essays by politicians, national leaders, military historians, and analysts on controversial questions surrounding the Gulf War. From Shield to Storm: William Morrow and Co. Hastily produced hodgepodge by a noted wargame designer and a journalist. How to Defeat Saddam Hussein. The Sword of the Arabs: Desert Shield and Desert Storm: Strategic Studies Institute, The War for Kuwait. Naval Institute Press,

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Chapter 7 : Gulf War - Wikipedia

Get this from a library! Desert warrior: a personal view of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces commander. [Khaled ibn Sultan, Prince grandson of Ibn Sa'ud King of Saudi Arabia; Patrick Seale].

July 14, I found a link to this at NRO, and it ended up being a pretty interesting read in light of current events. I figured others might find it interesting as well. Others around here might be able to add some helpful commentary. Arab armies perform very poorly. Particular aspects of Arab culture result in poorly organized units, low morale, and insufficient maintenance for weapons systems. Army retired colonel with eight years residence in Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt, and a graduate degree in Arab studies from the American University of Beirut, is currently instructing U. Army personnel assigned to Middle Eastern areas. The opinions expressed here are strictly his own. Arabic-speaking armies have been generally ineffective in the modern era. Egyptian regular forces did poorly against Yemeni irregulars in the s. Why this unimpressive record? There are many factors—economic, ideological, technical—but perhaps the most important has to do with culture and certain societal attributes which inhibit Arabs from producing an effective military force. It is a truism of military life that an army fights as it trains, and so I draw on my many years of firsthand observation of Arabs in training to draw conclusions about the ways in which they go into combat. The following impressions derive from personal experience with Arab military establishments in the capacity of U. False Starts Including culture in strategic assessments has a poor legacy, for it has often been spun from an ugly brew of ignorance, wishful thinking, and mythology. As these examples suggest, when culture is considered in calculating the relative strengths and weaknesses of opposing forces, it tends to lead to wild distortions, especially when it is a matter of understanding why states unprepared for war enter into combat flushed with confidence. The temptation is to impute cultural attributes to the enemy state that negate its superior numbers or weaponry. American strategists assumed that the pain threshold of the North Vietnamese approximated their own and that the air bombardment of the North would bring it to its knees. It is particularly dangerous to make facile assumptions about abilities in warfare based on past performance, for societies evolve and so does the military subculture with it. The dismal French performance in the Franco-Prussian war led the German high command to an overly optimistic assessment prior to World War I. The history of warfare makes a mockery of attempts to assign rigid cultural attributes to individuals—as the military histories of the Ottoman and Roman empires illustrate. The Role of Culture These problems notwithstanding, culture does need to be taken into account. Indeed, awareness of prior mistakes should make it possible to assess the role of cultural factors in warfare. John Keegan, the eminent historian of warfare, argues that culture is a prime determinant of the nature of warfare. In contrast to the usual manner of European warfare which he terms "face to face," Keegan depicts the early Arab armies in the Islamic era as masters of evasion, delay, and indirection. Lawrence termed "winning wars without battles. It may well be that these seemingly permanent attributes result from a culture that engenders subtlety, indirection, and dissimulation in personal relationships. But how does one integrate the study of culture into military training? At present, it has hardly any role. Belbutowski, a scholar and former member of the U. Delta Force, succinctly stated a deficiency in our own military education system: The Vietnamese communists did not fight the war the United States had trained for, nor did the Chechens and Afghans fight the war the Russians prepared for. This entails far more than simply retooling weaponry and retraining soldiers. Mindful of walking through a minefield of past errors and present cultural sensibilities, I offer some assessments of the role of culture in the military training of Arabic-speaking officers. I confine myself principally to training for two reasons. First, I observed much training but only one combat campaign the Jordanian Army against the Palestine Liberation Organization in . Secondly, armies fight as they train. Troops are conditioned by peacetime habits, policies, and procedures; they do not undergo a sudden metamorphosis that transforms civilians in uniform into warriors. Having learned to perform some complicated procedure, an Arab technician knows that he is invaluable so long as he is the only one in a unit

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to have that knowledge; once he dispenses it to others he no longer is the only font of knowledge and his power dissipates. This explains the commonplace hoarding of manuals, books, training pamphlets, and other training or logistics literature. The American trainers took the newly-minted manuals straight to the tank park and distributed them to the tank crews. Right behind them, the company commander, a graduate of the armor school at Fort Knox and specialized courses at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds ordnance school, collected the manuals from the crews. Questioned why he did this, the commander said that there was no point in giving them to the drivers because enlisted men could not read. In point of fact, he did not want enlisted men to have an independent source of knowledge. Being the only person who can explain the fire control instrumentation or boresight artillery weapons brings prestige and attention. In military terms this means that very little cross-training is accomplished and that, for instance in a tank crew, the gunners, loaders, and drivers might be proficient in their jobs but are not prepared to fill in for a casualty. At a higher level it means there is no depth in technical proficiency. Education Problems Training tends to be unimaginative, cut and dried, and not challenging. Because the Arab educational system is predicated on rote memorization, officers have a phenomenal ability to commit vast amounts of knowledge to memory. The learning system tends to consist of on-high lectures, with students taking voluminous notes and being examined on what they were told. It also has interesting implications for foreign instructors; for example, his credibility is diminished if he must resort to a book. The emphasis on memorization has a price, and that is in diminished ability to reason or engage in analysis based upon general principles. Thinking outside the box is not encouraged; doing so in public can damage a career. Instructors are not challenged and neither, in the end, are students. Head-to-head competition among individuals is generally avoided, at least openly, for it means that someone wins and someone else loses, with the loser humiliated. This taboo has particular import when a class contains mixed ranks. Education is in good part sought as a matter of personal prestige, so Arabs in U. American military instructors dealing with Middle Eastern students learn to ensure that, before directing any question to a student in a classroom situation, particularly if he is an officer, the student does possess the correct answer. If this is not assured, the officer will feel he has been set up for public humiliation. Furthermore, in the often-paranoid environment of Arab political culture, he will believe this setup to have been purposeful. This student will then become an enemy of the instructor and his classmates will become apprehensive about their also being singled out for humiliation—and learning becomes impossible. Soldiers Arab junior officers are well trained on the technical aspects of their weapons and tactical know-how, but not in leadership, a subject given little attention. This problem results from two main factors: Most Arab officers treat enlisted soldiers like sub-humans. When the winds in Egypt one day carried biting sand particles from the desert during a demonstration for visiting U. On a typical weekend, officers in units stationed outside Cairo will get in their cars and drive off to their homes, leaving the enlisted men to fend for themselves by trekking across the desert to a highway and flagging down busses or trucks to get to the Cairo rail system. Garrison cantonments have no amenities for soldiers. The same situation, in various degrees, exists elsewhere in the Arabic-speaking countries—less so in Jordan, even more so in Iraq and Syria. The young draftees who make up the bulk of the Egyptian army hate military service for good reason and will do almost anything, including self-mutilation, to avoid it. In Syria the wealthy buy exemptions or, failing that, are assigned to noncombatant organizations. As a young Syrian told me, his musical skills came from his assignment to a Syrian army band where he learned to play an instrument. In general, the militaries of the Fertile Crescent enforce discipline by fear; in countries where a tribal system still is in force, such as Saudi Arabia, the innate egalitarianism of the society mitigates against fear as the prime motivator, so a general lack of discipline pervades. With some exceptions, NCOs are considered in the same low category as enlisted men and so do not serve as a bridge between enlisted men and officers. Officers instruct but the wide social gap between enlisted man and officer tends to make the learning process perfunctory, formalized, and ineffective. The show-and-tell aspects of training are frequently missing because officers refuse to get their hands dirty and prefer to ignore the more practical aspects of their subject matter, believing this below their social station. A dramatic example of this occurred during the Gulf war

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when a severe windstorm blew down the tents of Iraqi officer prisoners of war. For three days they stayed in the wind and rain rather than be observed by enlisted prisoners in a nearby camp working with their hands. The military price for this is very high. Without the cohesion supplied by NCOs, units tend to disintegrate in the stress of combat. This is primarily a function of the fact that the enlisted soldiers simply do not trust their officers. Once officers depart the training areas, training begins to fall apart as soldiers begin drifting off. The situation, he said, had only marginally improved in Iraqi prisoners in showed a remarkable fear and enmity toward their officers. Decision-making and Responsibility Decisions are made and delivered from on high, with very little lateral communication. This leads to a highly centralized system, with authority hardly ever delegated. Rarely does an officer make a critical decision on his own; instead, he prefers the safe course of being identified as industrious, intelligent, loyal and compliant. Bringing attention to oneself as an innovator or someone prone to make unilateral decisions is a recipe for trouble. As in civilian life, conformism is the overwhelming societal norm; the nail that stands up gets hammered down. Orders and information flow from top to bottom; they are not to be reinterpreted, amended, or modified in any way. This author has several times seen decisions that could have been made at the battalion level concerning such matters as class meeting times and locations requiring approval from the ministry of defense. All of which has led American trainers to develop a rule of thumb: Army has as much authority as a colonel in an Arab army. Methods of instruction and subject matter are dictated from higher authorities. Unit commanders have very little to say about these affairs. The politicized nature of the Arab militaries means that political factors weigh heavily and frequently override military considerations. Officers with initiative and a predilection for unilateral action pose a threat to the regime. This can be seen not just at the level of national strategy but in every aspect of military operations and training. If Arab militaries became less politicized and more professional in preparation for the war with Israel,²² once the fighting ended, old habits returned. Now, an increasingly bureaucratized military establishment weighs in as well.

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Chapter 8 : Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander by Khaled bin

Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander, with Patrick Seale. New York: Harper Collins, New York: Harper Collins, Written in response to General Schwarzkopf's autobiography.

Additional Information In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Former general counsel for the Treasury Department. The Economic and Strategic Imperatives. Abelson, and John B. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, The Financing of Terror. Simon and Schuster, The Need for a New Stabilizing Mechanism. Albrecht, Holger, and Oliver Schlumberger. Regime Change without Democratization in the Middle East. Present and Future Perspectives. Cambridge Energy Research Associates, The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe. Society and State in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula: Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation. Cambridge University Press, A History of Saudi Arabia. Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Managing the Oil Wealth: Andersen, Roy, Jon G. Wagner, and Robert F. Politics and Change in Middle East. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall Professional, 9th ed. Princeton University Press, Interpretations of the Events of September Explaining the Terrorist Threat. New York University Press, Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt, eds. The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy. An Organizational and Tactical Examination. How to Win a Cosmic War: God, Globalization, and the End of the War on Terror. The Secret History of Al Qaeda. You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

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Chapter 9 : Why Arabs Lose Wars

DESERT WARRIOR: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces commander Khaled bin Sultan with Patrick Seale pages. \$HarperCollins.

Calvinist Private I found this article online and found it to be interesting. Does anyone have any thoughts and comments on arab military doctrine? Do you agree or disagree with the author? Army retired colonel with eight years residence in Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt, and a graduate degree in Arab studies from the American University of Beirut, is currently instructing U. Army personnel assigned to Middle Eastern areas. The opinions expressed here are strictly his own. Arabic-speaking armies have been generally ineffective in the modern era. Egyptian regular forces did poorly against Yemeni irregulars in the s. Why this unimpressive record? It is a truism of military life that an army fights as it trains, and so I draw on my many years of firsthand observation of Arabs in training to draw conclusions about the ways in which they go into combat. The following impressions derive from personal experience with Arab military establishments in the capacity of U. False Starts Including culture in strategic assessments has a poor legacy, for it has often been spun from an ugly brew of ignorance, wishful thinking, and mythology. As these examples suggest, when culture is considered in calculating the relative strengths and weaknesses of opposing forces, it tends to lead to wild distortions, especially when it is a matter of understanding why states unprepared for war enter into combat flushed with confidence. The temptation is to impute cultural attributes to the enemy state that negate its superior numbers or weaponry. American strategists assumed that the pain threshold of the North Vietnamese approximated their own and that the air bombardment of the North would bring it to its knees. It is particularly dangerous to make facile assumptions about abilities in warfare based on past performance, for societies evolve and so does the military subculture with it. The dismal French performance in the Franco-Prussian war led the German high command to an overly optimistic assessment prior to World War I. The Role of Culture These problems notwithstanding, culture does need to be taken into account. Indeed, awareness of prior mistakes should make it possible to assess the role of cultural factors in warfare. John Keegan, the eminent historian of warfare, argues that culture is a prime determinant of the nature of warfare. In contrast to the usual manner of European warfare which he terms "face to face," Keegan depicts the early Arab armies in the Islamic era as masters of evasion, delay, and indirection. Lawrence termed "winning wars without battles. It may well be that these seemingly permanent attributes result from a culture that engenders subtlety, indirection, and dissimulation in personal relationships. But how does one integrate the study of culture into military training? At present, it has hardly any role. Belbutowski, a scholar and former member of the U. Delta Force, succinctly stated a deficiency in our own military education system: The Vietnamese communists did not fight the war the United States had trained for, nor did the Chechens and Afghans fight the war the Russians prepared for. This entails far more than simply retooling weaponry and retraining soldiers. Mindful of walking through a minefield of past errors and present cultural sensibilities, I offer some assessments of the role of culture in the military training of Arabic-speaking officers. I confine myself principally to training for two reasons. First, I observed much training but only one combat campaign the Jordanian Army against the Palestine Liberation Organization in Secondly, armies fight as they train. Troops are conditioned by peacetime habits, policies, and procedures; they do not undergo a sudden metamorphosis that transforms civilians in uniform into warriors. Having learned to perform some complicated procedure, an Arab technician knows that he is invaluable so long as he is the only one in a unit to have that knowledge; once he dispenses it to others he no longer is the only font of knowledge and his power dissipates. This explains the commonplace hoarding of manuals, books, training pamphlets, and other training or logistics literature. The American trainers took the newly-minted manuals straight to the tank park and distributed them to the tank crews. Right behind them, the company commander, a graduate of the armor school at Fort Knox and specialized courses at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds ordnance school, collected the manuals from the crews. Questioned why he did

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