

Chapter 1 : DISA expands availability of its mobile management service - Fedscoop

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) requirements for its sealift and airlift mobility operations, focusing on whether key assumptions in the DOD mobility requirements study were reasonable.

What is the DME? What is the process? Although an announcement is published on Fed Biz Ops to inform the U. Using preparation guides, a dedicated website, and staff assistance, the NAMC works with its members to ensure their proposals are compliant and complete. Who is a member of the NAMC? The NAMC is open to any and all traditional and nontraditional, large and small, for-profit companies, academic institutions, and non-profit organizations with ground vehicle and robotics technological capabilities doing business in the United States. A certification is required by U. What are the benefits of using the DME for ground vehicle development? Furthermore, the DME is helping remove the traditional barriers between Government and private industry, giving the Department of Defense DoD expedited access to the best in commercial technologies from small businesses and nontraditional defense contractors. Conversely, the DME allows NAMC industry members to collaborate and focus on what they do best, deliver cutting-edge ground vehicle solutions, without putting a strain on their operations. Can my organization join the DME? If funding is not available for one or more selected proposals sent by a NAMC member for a project requirement, or if the proposal is deemed technically sound, but another was rated higher and chosen for award, the Government will place such proposals in the electronic Basket file, otherwise referred to as the Basket, until funding becomes available. The RPP will contain the available ratings and their definitions to be assigned to proposals as a result of the technical evaluation as well as which specific ratings will qualify a proposal for inclusion in the Basket. The Government reserves the right to determine which, if any, proposals are to be selected according to the published criteria. Once in the Basket, a proposal may be identified for award by the Government based on Government need and availability of funding. The Government reserves the right i to request that the NAMC Member who submitted the identified proposal update, scale, or otherwise adjust the original proposal, and ii to fund all or part of the identified proposal. A selected proposal will reside in the Basket for 36 months from the close of the RPP for which it was competed against, unless fully funded or the submitting NAMC Member requests in writing beforehand to have it removed or the Government issues a TDL for the entire scope of work. With regard to proposals currently in the GVS OTA Basket as of the time this OTA is awarded, such proposals shall continue to reside in the Basket and be eligible for consideration, selection and award under this OTA, for a cumulative total of 36 months from the date they were placed in the Basket via Basket Selection letter. If an NAMC member makes the decision to discontinue their membership in the NAMC, any proposal s contained within the Basket for which they are the prime member will be removed from the Basket. If an NAMC member makes the decision to discontinue their membership in the NAMC, any proposal s contained within the Basket for which they are the subcontractor will remain in the Basket provided that the prime member is still a member in good standing with the NAMC. Proposals in the Basket are not ranked and are available to be reviewed and selected in whole or in part by the Government upon request to the Agreements Officer AO.

Chapter 2 : Army Sustainment: Spectrum: Strategic Mobility

Derived Credentials (Visit Mobility User Corner for latest release schedule) DEE with signing and encryption capabilities without the need for a CAC reader. Secure browser to access CAC enabled websites ; Optional Features. Customized MDM configuration - Mission partners with specific mission requirements may request a customized MDM configuration.

In those articles, I made the argument that strategic mobility was the U. In the 8 years since those articles were published, many things have changed and many have not. Logisticians are still just as guilty as other tacticians of refighting the last war. The United States continues to fight the Global War on Terrorism with unprecedented military spending while conducting modernization programs, the C&€"17 Globemaster and large medium-speed roll-on-roll-off LMSR vessel procurements, and base realignment. The Army has recently accomplished the largest transformation in its history; yet, despite all of the changes in procurements, modernizations, and modularity, my original argument still holds true: Strategic mobility has not been fixed and is the weakest link in the strategic chain of getting the right forces to the proper place in space and time to allow combatant commanders to deter, de-escalate, or decisively defeat an adversary. What is the Strategic Mobility Problem? Crises will develop rapidly and will require swift response by U. These crises will result in missions ranging from humanitarian, peacekeeping, and counterterrorism to major combat. Such operations will take place in areas where the United States has little or no footprint and in countries that have little or no developed infrastructure. They will lack major ports, rail and road networks, and modern airfields. These countries may not be conducive to rapid entry. Furthermore, the adversary could adopt anti-access and area-denial measures that would drive the United States to use forcible entry. Strategic mobility is the combination of airlift, sealift, and pre-positioned forces. Together, they make up the strategic mobility triad. What are the true capabilities of the strategic mobility triad? What needs to be done to fix it? Is strategic mobility really a critical requirement? Shortcomings still exist in the current capabilities of the strategic mobility triad. After 7 years of major combat operations and transformation, these weaknesses continue. This article focuses on why strategic mobility still has not been adequately addressed and what changes are needed in the triad to make the Army once again a viable first option. It will analyze available options and provide recommendations on how to bridge the ever-widening gap between mobility capabilities and requirements.

Strategic Mobility Background The Army has been implementing major changes during the last 10 years. It has undertaken a major transformation to move away from the Army of Excellence model to one that is lighter, more lethal and deployable, and less demanding logistically. The Army has made its brigades modular and has embraced the idea of being expeditionary; however, one problem has not been adequately addressed. In order to project land power at the speed and tempo required by the combatant commanders to deter conflict, prevent escalation, or defeat opponents quickly and decisively, the military must be able to project its land power into or within the area in crisis. Unfortunately, this critical requirement cannot be met with the resources the United States currently possesses. For the last 20 years, the United States has been paying lip service to addressing its strategic mobility requirements. The strategic mobility triad had been steadily improving throughout the 20th century. Since the end of the Cold War when the United States reduced its forward presence overseas, the centerpiece of the U. Power projection is the ability to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain U. Complementing overseas presence, power projection strives for unconstrained global reach. Global power projection provides national leaders with the options they need to respond to potential crises. During the Cold War, the United States pursued a containment strategy. This strategy relied heavily on massive amounts of pre-positioned equipment. After the troops employed the pre-positioned equipment in accordance with their general defense plan to contain the Soviet threat , follow-on sustainment materiel and additional forces would be transported by sea from CONUS to the theater of operations. This process employed all three legs of the strategic mobility triad. From to , more than , troops returned from forward locations and 82 military installations on foreign soil were closed. This strategy depends on the strategic mobility triad to rapidly send U. Armed Forces anywhere in the world. The National Security Strategy introduced an integrated strategic approach that was based on three concepts: Based on those concepts, the

National Military Strategy of expanded on the premise that the United States would remain globally engaged to shape the international environment and create conditions favorable to U. It emphasized that U. Armed Forces must respond to the full spectrum of crises to protect national interests. The strategy further stated that, as the United States pursues shaping and responding activities, it must also take steps to prepare now for an uncertain future. Strategic mobility is a key element of our strategy. It is critical for allowing the United States to be first on the scene with assistance in many domestic or international crises, and is a key to successful American leadership and engagement. Deployment and sustainment of U. In , the Army Science Board published a study that included a very profound and still relevant statement: Overlapping major combat operations place major demands on strategic mobility. Achieving objectives in such operations requires robust sealift, airlift, aerial refueling and pre-positioned assets. Strategic mobility that supports these operations also requires supporting equipment to store, move and distribute materiel and an information infrastructure to provide real-time visibility of the entire logistics chain. European Command, Marine Corps General James Jones, testified to Congress that building a larger array of airlift and sealift platforms is an essential component of the sweeping overhaul that would, if approved, position U. The first strategy was to simultaneously defend the homeland, conduct deterrence in four regions of the globe, and execute two major campaigns in swift fashion. The second strategy called for delivering needed forces to a theater within 10 days of a deployment order, swiftly defeating the enemy there within 30 days, and resetting the force 30 days after that victory. Analysts have argued that other countries could become increasingly unwilling to permit U. Some analysts have also suggested that future adversaries may not freely allow U. The strategic mobility triad necessitates transport aircraft, cargo ships, forward bases, equipment afloat, and ground transportation operated by DOD and commercial carriers. While the capabilities of the mobility triad appear to project a picture of robustness and depth, they have built-in weaknesses and do not meet the requirements laid out by DOD. Airlift Strategic airlift is a combination of military airlift capabilities and commercial aircraft that participate in the Civilian Reserve Air Fleet. No C-17's are left in the inventory. That is an However, Air Mobility Command leaders estimate that the true lift requirement is not The level of mobility is inconsistent with the image portrayed by the planners. The news is even worse when you consider the many other factors not taken into account, for instance, maintenance posture, airfield throughput capability, and the level of airfield modernization. Sealift Sealift, the second triad leg, is designed to get the bulk of the needed equipment to the area of operations between 10 and 30 days after callup, and it is the primary means of sustaining the fight. Sealift capability comes from three sources: Government-owned ships, commercial ships under long-term charter to DOD, and ships operating in commercial trade. As with airlift, the current number and capabilities of the fleet do not meet projected requirements. Only 28 of the ships are medium speed or higher. The first wave of ships only averaged 23 knots versus the expected 33 knots, adding 5 days to the transit time. The Ready Reserve Force fared much worse, with only 25 percent of the ships deploying on time and 50 percent over 5 days late. During the second phase of activation, an additional 26 Ready Reserve Force ships were activated; only 4 were on time, and over half of them were more than 10 days late. Over the last 20 years, the Government-owned fleet has been modernized somewhat with the purchase of 20 LMSRs and the procurement of a new logistics support vessel LSV. However, these ships are slow and only account for 25 percent of the total fleet. And the fleet is not young. The average Ready Reserve Force ship is over 37 years old. In the APF, all ships are self-sustaining. They all have organic cargo-handling capability that enables them to discharge their cargo despite limited or nonexistent port facilities. Army pre-positioned stocks APS consist of pre-positioned equipment that is stored in preconfigured unit sets that are either ashore or afloat. APS are configured as combat brigade sets with ammunition, but no to-accompany-troop equipment individual weapons and equipment. APS are divided into five regional locations: Land-based pre-positioning programs are maintained in Europe, Southwest Asia, and the Pacific region. The APS program supports the National Military Strategy by strategically pre-positioning vital war stocks afloat and ashore worldwide, thereby reducing the deployment response times of the modular, expeditionary Army. APS has a few challenges. The first, and the hardest to overcome, is ships. During Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, three pre-positioned LMSRs were unable to unload their cargo because their draft prevented them from entering any port. After 2 weeks of trying to locate

a suitable port, the ships returned to Diego Garcia without discharging their cargo. Pacific Command PACOM areas of responsibility as these areas are viewed as the most likely areas for future conflicts. Ports are considered militarily significant today if they can accommodate the LMSR, which has a draft of 35 feet. Sea vessels with shallow draft and limited overall length can access many more ports that are not considered militarily significant. The space needed for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration is immense. The second challenge is that the transport problem crosses over to the land-based pre-positioned equipment. During operations in Kosovo, the United States deployed two LSVs to provide intratheater lift to transport heavy equipment between the Balkans and Italy. Currently, APS are exhausted in all theaters. This did not happen. Significant critical equipment shortages across the Army also affect APS, including shortages of up-armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles, materials-handling equipment, and crew-served weapons. JLOTS watercraft can also be used operationally to reposition units and materiel within a theater. The LSV transports combat vehicles and sustainment cargo worldwide.

Chapter 3 : DISA | Mobility Services

In its Mobility Requirements Study and Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update, DOD addressed the intertheater portion of the directive. According to Joint Staff officials, the Intratheater Lift Analysis addressed the intratheater portion of the directive. DOD is planning to update this analysis as part of its Mobility Requirements Study.

Chapter 4 : DISA | DoD Mobility Unclassified Capability

The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study (MCRS) provided some useful information concerning air mobility systems such as intratheater airlift, strategic airlift, and air refueling but several weaknesses in the study raised questions about its ability to fully inform decision makers.

Chapter 5 : DoD CIO Discusses Pentagon Wireless, Mobility Programs > U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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Chapter 6 : FAQ “ Defense Mobility Enterprise

The Defense Department is laying the groundwork to begin a sweeping new mobility requirements study in , an assessment that will revise the requirement for the total number of aerial refueling tankers, cargo aircraft and supply ships the U.S. military requires to support the defense strategy commissioned by the Trump administration and expected to be complete later this.