

6 Empathy for Objects Gregory Currie We think of empathy as an intimate, feeling-based understanding of another's inner life. We do not think of it as a way of understanding inanimate objects. Yet a century ago, talk of empathy for objects would have seemed very natural; it was the theme of a group of thinkers whose writings helped to found.

Franklin Perkins Larry G. Israel Middle Georgia State College: The last phrase warns us not to excessively excite emotive qi that is often regarded as a good source for righteousness in common sense, just as the term yi qi is still widely used in East Asian languages. However, if emotive qi is cultivated to be properly expressed, it does not only leads energetically the will zhi to perform righteous acts immediately, but also forms the sentimental heart that serves as an inherent standard for reflective deliberation by restoring our natural orientation for goodness. In this way, Mengzi takes emotive qi as an indispensable constituent of his sentimental theory on the goodness of human nature. John Ramsey Scripps College: Many commentators and scholars assume that these four so-called virtues are homogeneous but disagree over whether the virtues are best characterized as dispositions, skills, or forms of reasoning. In this paper, I take a step towards challenging the received orthodoxy and contend that the cardinal Mengzian virtues are heterogeneous. In other words, I maintain that the mature, cultivated forms of zhi and li are best understood as skills while ren and yi are best characterized dispositionally. Employing recent work in contemporary psychology and philosophy, I argue that zhi is a moral skill that involves expert decision-making and is, therefore, reason-responsive. Since expert decision-making involves grasping and employing success-reasons i. In other words, individuals who cultivate their sprouts of compassion and sense of shame through the techniques of zhi e. The goal of this paper is to determine more precisely what the Mengzi and WX have in common, while also making sense of the fundamental ways in which they diverge. The paper will be divided into three parts – the first discussing the distinction between the human way and the way of heaven in WX, the second trying to place that distinction in the broader context of Warring States Thought, and the third showing how the distinction is taken up in the Mengzi. Ori Tavor University of Pennsylvania: Descriptions of the sage, however, suggest that he is something more than human. Unlike ordinary people, he does not rely on sensory perception to experience reality, he lacks emotions and desires, and when he sleeps, he does not dream. These accounts led some scholars to claim that the sage represents the highest attainable level of human perfection, while others have suggested that he is a theomorphic, god-like being, superior to the rest of humanity. In this paper, I will draw on contemporary scholarship in the field transhumanist thought in order to offer an alternative reading of sagacity in the Huainanzi. The sage, I will suggest, can be seen as a representation of the next stage in the evolution of mankind, a transhuman figure that rises above human culture, institutions, and values, but is nonetheless crucial for their survival. Recent technological innovations have engendered animated discussions on the social and ethical ramifications of biomedical enhancement techniques, such as physiopharmaceutical augmentation, gene manipulation, and surgical intervention. Drawing on this discourse, I will suggest that the attainment of sagehood in the Huainanzi involved the use of bio-spiritual technologies of enhancement, seated meditation in particular, designed to elicit a complete psychophysical transformation. Understanding the nature of these technologies can thereby offer us some insights into the elusive figure of the sage and the vision of the Huainanzi as a whole, but it can also contribute to the current public and academic posthumanism debate. Judson Murray Wright State University: The examination combines historical, comparative, and textual analyses, on the one hand, to survey both the broad array of meanings shenming had for Han thinkers and the diverse intellectual discourses. On the other hand, following this contextual and conceptual overview of shenming the study then narrows in its focus to consider, in greater detail, one particular reading of this concept that has received much less attention in the secondary literature. The paper examines a coherent and compelling narrative that interrelates the qualities and power of shenming with not only sages and cultural innovation but also moral psychology and moral education. Specifically, the analysis begins by explaining the part shenming plays in the cosmogonic process and the manner in which it creates. Thus the cosmos – its phenomena and patterns – consists of foci of shenming that inherently possess and exhibit

extraordinary power and efficacy. The narrative recounts that these cosmological models and patterns inspired cultural creativity in early Chinese sages who were attuned to them and discerning about the possibilities they presented to human ingenuity. People undoubtedly were also born from this cosmogony and into this cohesive world, and therefore are themselves, or at least have been and perhaps can again be, powerful and awe-inspiring catalysts of shenming. Shenming can empower and has empowered them both intellectually and morally. People treat one another best morally when they rely on their innate and genuine feelings of moral goodness, and communicate them to others with real sincerity. When these aspects of shenming prevail, people not only subsist materially but also flourish in harmony with one another and with their hallowed world. The narrative also explains that, during later, degenerate ages when shenming has been obscured, education is what has preserved and transmitted its traces, and the values and forms it inspired, from earlier times and sages, in order to remind people of its presence and power. In short, the analysis will show that the cosmogonic, cosmological, ethical, cultural, and educational meanings and implications of shenming all interrelate in a coherent way in at least one Han reading of its import. This view equates shenming with creativity, efficacy, perspicacity, sincerity, and goodness—qualities of a divine origin and nature for the ancient Chinese that have inspired and transformed humankind, both morally and culturally. Stephen Walker University of Chicago: The exposition will proceed in four stages: Appreciating metaphysical spontaneity permits sagely persons to cultivate normative spontaneity—a family of strategies for coping with life and attaining excellence centered on non-interference with both oneself and others. Guo states throughout his commentary that all things affirm themselves and reject each other, and he reads statement after statement in the *Qiwulun* as hingeing on the necessity of mutual rejection. A key contrast between his reading and those prevailing in contemporary Anglophone scholarship is that Guo takes all affirmation and rejection to be of persons, or stand-ins for persons positions, voices, rather than claims or descriptions as such. I will argue that this reconstruction of the text is plausible and natural in some places, but that Guo applies it far too mechanically and ignores the variety and ambiguity of the points the text advances. I will argue that, if it really is true that all things affirm themselves and reject each other, then interactions and shared projects of any kind become basically unintelligible. If sagely competence is possible, then our situation as agents cannot, at bottom, be as simplistically partial as Guo makes it out to be. It follows that the original text cannot be arguing on the basis of such a thesis, and that we have no grounds for interpreting its claims as premised on a spontaneous preference for self. I will close by presenting my own hypothesis: The *Qiwulun* makes room for self-rejection, other-affirmation, and total disengagement thus for self-critique, shared projects, and matters of no interest, and rests its normative pluralism on arguments, not about the intrinsic dispositions of agents, but about the inevitable loss attending the substitution of one dao for another. This form of theatricality is especially important in death rituals to properly express grief within a set of prescribed formal behaviors. Thus, though filial piety in the *Analects* can function as the aesthetic and moral expression of genuine feelings and motivations toward parents in ritual performances, it also can function within creative attempts to harmonize complex human personalities within their communities. Aaron Stalnaker Indiana University, Bloomington: And Confucian analysis of the transmission of traditions of practice suggests that while some practices, such as ritual, are absolutely crucial to the cultivation of virtuous skill mastery, a greater variety of practices, such as archery, have the potential to be practiced so that they contribute to real virtuous mastery, even if they are more vulnerable to failure and deformation. Hagop Sarkissian Baruch College: The account goes something like this: Human beings have a drive toward sociability. In order to be social humans need to be interpretable to one another. Thus, in their attempts to get along, a community of humans will converge on a shared ontology of doables—that is, ways of being ordinary. More accurately, they will invent or construct this ontology as they are driven by the need to get along. Since different communities have different ontologies of doables differing sets of action types, everything is relative. The doables allow community members to comport themselves in ways that make them interpretable to one another, so members will feel the normative force of conforming to them as a general rule. Of course, members can and will deviate from the shared ontology—that is, they will behave in ways that are decidedly not ordinary. However, they cannot do so as a rule lest they risk being uninterpretable to others if not themselves. This fosters a general conservatism

about the doablesâ€”which may be revised but only in ways that resonate with existing values, practices, and commitments. So what sorts of norms will emerge in such communities? These aspects of human constrain the range of possible moralities that communities will construct cf. However, apart from this, he does not discuss the content of the moralities that such communities would embrace. Indeed, as I have suggested in the past, when we generalize over the various commitments of classical Confucianism they can all be boiled down to just two broad injunctions: Having outlined these points of contact, I will conclude that the similarities are not accidental, since both Velleman and the classical Confucians with the possible exception of Mencius embrace a functional view of morality. And since metaethical functionalism leads inexorably to relativism, I will suggest that Confucians ought to embrace this too. Dan Robins University of Hong Kong: This paper mostly defends that claim, though with reference to the Mencius rather than the Analects. Some reformulation is required. This makes it unlikely that any early Chinese philosopher conceived of the way as having crossroads in his intended sense. Accordingly, I reformulate the idea in what I hope are less tradition-bound terms. This leads me to focus on three questions. How did the authors of the Mencius conceive of the ostensible ways of their rivals? What did they have to say about hard cases in which norms they endorsed conflict? And what role if any did they give to normative judgment in the moral cultivation of an individual? This need not be the normative judgment of the individual concerned, it might be the judgment of a teacher or an ancient sage, for example. I argue that the answers to these questions imply that the authors of the Mencius conceived of their way as a way without crossroads. Most of my time will be spent on the third question, since that turns out to be trickiest. I argue that the authors of the Mencius thought of moral cultivation in such a way that it made sense to ask whether and to what extent an individual was cultivated, but not whether the individual had been cultivated in the right way. This is so even on interpretations such as my own that take the Mencius to be advancing relatively modest claims about human nature. Michael Ing Indiana University, Bloomington: I will begin the presentation with an overview of the ways in which contemporary scholars have described Confucianism as a worldview without irresolvable value conflicts. Value conflicts, according to these scholars, are understood as epistemic, not ontological. In other words, many contemporary scholars assert that early Confucians understood the world as a place where tensions between values can be resolved if the skills or other capacities of the moral agent are sufficient to resolve them. Failure to tend to some value signifies a shortcoming of the moral agent, not a problem with the possibilities afforded by the world. I will challenge these narratives by looking at several vignettes that depict irresolvable value conflicts. In constructing my argument I will distinguish between a strong claim and a more moderate claim; the latter of which I wish to emphasize. I will not make the strong claim that Confucians believed that values inherently conflict. Early Confucians did not believe that we live in a fractured world where values are necessarily at odds with each other. Yet they did believe in the reality of value conflicts such that tragic circumstances are possible. In other words, early Confucians recognized the complexities of life such that even the highly skilled moral agent i. As such, early Confucians could see the world as conflictual, although they did not see the world as necessitating conflict. The Confucian conflictual world is one of possible incongruity, where minor value conflicts may even be inevitable given the complexities of life, but values in the abstract sense are not thought to be in conflict in and of themselves. In this light, deep value conflicts such as those I will discuss in this presentation may rarely occur, but the fact that they can occur, and that they can occur for even the most profound people is significant in forecasting the sentiments people have about the world they live in. Here I critically examine his courageous attempt to synthetically incorporate seemingly disparate and anachronistic traditions of ancient Chinese thought with aspects of contemporary psychology for the purpose of both better understanding the complexities of wu-wei and making constructive suggestions for better living. Confucius, Laozi, Mencius, and Zhuangzi.

Chapter 2 : Holdings : Empathy : | York University Libraries

We think of empathy as an intimate, feeling-based understanding of another's inner life. We do not think of it as a way of understanding inanimate objects. Yet a century ago, talk of empathy for objects would have seemed very natural; it was the theme of a group of thinkers whose writings helped to found the notion of empathy itself.

Book 1 online resource vi, p. Nielsen Book Data 1. What emotions are, and their place in psychological explanation -- 3. Emotions and feelings -- 4. Culture, evolution, and the emotions -- 5. Expression of emotion -- 6. Emotion, mood, and traits of character -- 7. Jealousy -- Suggested reading, Bibliography, Index. Nielsen Book Data Peter Goldie opens the path to a deeper understanding of our emotional lives through a lucid philosophical exploration of this surprisingly neglected topic. He illuminates the phenomena of emotion by drawing not only on philosophy but also on literature and science. He considers the roles of culture and evolution in the development of our emotional capabilities. He examines the links between emotion, mood, and character, and places the emotions in the context of such related phenomena as consciousness, thought, feeling, and imagination. A key theme of *The Emotions* is the idea of a personal perspective or point of view, contrasted with the impersonal stance of the empirical sciences. Goldie argues that it is only from the personal point of view that thoughts, reasons, feelings, and actions come into view. He suggests that there is a tendency for philosophers to over-intellectualize the emotions, and investigates how far it is possible to explain emotions in terms of rationality. Over-intellectualizing can also involve neglecting the centrality of feelings, and Goldie shows how to put them where they belong, as part of the intentionality of emotional experience, directed towards the world from a point of view. Goldie argues that the various elements of emotional experience--including thought, feeling, bodily change, and expression--are tied together in a narrative structure. The narrative is not simply an interpretive framework of a life: Goldie concludes by applying these ideas in a close study of one particular emotion: This fascinating book gives an accessible but penetrating exploration of a subject that is important but mysterious to all of us. Any reader interested in emotion, and its role in our understanding of our lives, will find much to think about here. Nielsen Book Data Online.

Chapter 3 : 17 results in SearchWorks catalog

Yet a century ago, talk of empathy for objects would have seemed very natural; it was the theme of a group of thinkers whose writings helped to found the notion of empathy itself. They were particularly interested in empathy as a means of attending to the aesthetic properties of things.

Empathy and Mind 1. Its Features and Effects, Amy Coplan 2. Empathy as a Route to Knowledge, Derek Matravers 3. Two Routes to Empathy: Insights from Cognitive Neuroscience, Alvin I. Empathy and Aesthetics 7. Empathizing as Simulating, Susan L. Empathy and Morality Is Empathy Necessary for Morality? Is Empathy a Virtue? Empathy, Justice, and the Law, Martin L. Empathy and Trauma Culture: Anti-empathy, Peter Goldie Her primary research interests are in philosophy of emotion, aesthetics especially philosophy of film , feminist philosophy, and ancient Greek philosophy. She has published articles on the nature and importance of emotion and on various forms of emotional engagement with film, including empathy, sympathy, and emotional contagion. She is currently editing a collection on the film Blade Runner for the Routledge series Philosophers on Film. His main philosophical interests included the philosophy of mind, ethics, and aesthetics, and particularly questions concerning value and how the mind engages with value. His books include The Emotions: He edited Understanding Emotions: Goldman, Rutgers University Martin L. I highly recommend it to people interested in empathy and empathy-related phenomena.

Chapter 4 : Project MUSE - Delusion, Rationality, Empathy: Commentary on Martin Davies et al.:

Empathy, imitation, and the social brain / Jean Decety and Andrew N. Meltzoff Empathy for objects / Gregory Currie Empathy, expansionism, and the extended mind / Murray Smith.

We do not think of it as a way of understanding inanimate objects. Yet a century ago, talk of empathy for objects would have seemed very natural; it was the theme of a group of thinkers whose writings helped to found the notion of empathy itself. They were particularly interested in empathy as a means of attending to the aesthetic properties of things. I will move on quickly to see what light can be shed on their idea of empathy for objects by current research in the sciences of mind. I identify a class of processes which, I claim, underlie empathy for objects as well as personal empathy; these processes are often called *simulative* in a special sense that I will try to explain. I then have two questions to which I seek answers of at least a preliminary sort. What sort of access to worldly things, including artworks, are we given by these simulative processes; is it, in particular, a perceptual form of access? Second, what role if any does conscious awareness of these processes play in our aesthetic encounters with things? Aaron Meskin, Jerome Singer, and Kathleen Stock commented on the paper at Durham and I am grateful for their criticisms and suggestions. Comments from Rae Langton brought about some late changes to Section 2, while Matthew Kennedy and Murray Smith were especially helpful in formulating the claims of Section 3. Aesthetics, now displaced from the centre of intellectual life in the sciences and humanities, was then a core theme for thinkers of every kind, and especially for those who walked the scarcely differentiated territories of philosophy and psychology. It was never focused exclusively on art, and it was very variably pursued, both in methods and in doctrines. Fifty years later, these ideas were applied by Lipps and the Empathists to the aesthetics of visual form. Their views shifted over time in ways that are sometimes hard to associate with compelling arguments; understanding the complexities of this evolution of thought requires a historically nuanced paper that I am unable to provide. Instead 3 The otherwise extremely comprehensive Encyclopedia of Aesthetics edited by Michael Kelly in four volumes, Oxford University Press, carries no account of his ideas. It does not mention Lee or Langfeld; Vischer and Groos are noted in passing. Lipps held that we know another only by bringing about some sort of union, by means of projection, with that other; his concept of empathy correspondingly involved an act of personal projection wherein we feel the dynamic properties of the objectâ€”an architectural column, sayâ€”as our own. But Lipps rejected attempts to ground the empathic relationship in awareness of our own bodies a: Lee, on the other hand, threatens to reduce aesthetic appreciation to callisthenic exercises. Such an image of movement he calls a motor memory: To do their work, these images, he says, do not need to be consciousâ€”an important point to which we shall return. She was also the author of some effective ghost stories. For critical comment see Mitchell Berenson to be mentioned further on claimed that Lee and Anstruther-Thompson had plagiarized his ideas for their essay. On the relation of empathy with art objects and its relation to bodily activity see Etlin , especially pp. Groos was the author of important work on animal and human play. Lee denied that empathy could be understood in terms of inner mimicry Rather, the object of attention generates a range of motor images. Langfeld described these in terms of activation of nerve systems that would otherwise produce the very movements in question. If we speak instead of neural systems we have something suggestive to a modern reader of simulative processes, the evidence for which is now very strong within psychology and the neurosciences. The term simulation is currently used in distinct ways by different groups of researchers and I must be clear about how I am using it here. It is a theory about ways in which certain aspects of human performance are implemented in systems that operate within the person, are not directly under personal control, and the workings of which may be inaccessible to consciousness, though they may give rise to conscious experiences. It is a sub-personal hypothesis. Their imaginative performance is, it seems, constrained by the same biomechanical factors that constrain actual bodily movement. The neural basis of this is not fully understood but on one view these imagined movements which may or may not be conscious are constituted by the activation of an inner model we all possess of our own bodies: There is evidence that this model shares neural resources with systems which activate real movements; people who are impaired in movement are often

comparably impaired in their capacity to simulate movement. Part II, and Goldman a: While disgust evolved, presumably, as an encouragement to us to avoid the noxious, its mechanisms are implicated in the recognition of disgust in others; the sight of someone with a disgusted facial expression activates brain areas used in the generation of our own feelings of disgust Wicker et. And people who have damage to one of these areas—the insula—and which prevents them from feeling disgust, are impaired in their recognition of disgust in others Calder et. The secondary somatosensory cortex, once thought only to respond to physical touch, is strongly activated by the sight of other people being touched. Seeing inanimate objects collide generates the same activity Keysers et al. While simulative processes underlie empathy for objects and for persons, a variety of other tasks involve simulation, including, apparently, language processing. The motor homunculus is a region of the brain that controls voluntary movements of various body parts, so called because its shape is a distorted but recognizable model of the body within which adjacent areas control adjacent parts of the body. Even words rather indirectly related to action have this effect: There is the sense of having your body disposed in a way which resembles perhaps minimally the geometry of the object viewed and its dynamical relations to other things, as one imagines standing upright supporting a heavy load, in response to the sight of a load-bearing column. Or one might imagine swaying in the wind like a tree. To this we should add those cases of simulation provoked by representational art, as when we respond to artistically represented people rather than to real ones. See also Goldman a: I am grateful to Anezka Kuzmicova for discussion of this issue. It is also plausible that motor imagery is involved in our sense of artworks as artifacts Langfeld Viewers sometimes report empathic reproduction of the actions which produced the object or shaped its properties: But we do not always respond in ways which correspond closely or at all to the ways in which the object really was made, or even could be made. I think it has the capacity to help a good deal. But note two things. First, this is empathy with the maker, and not with the object. Secondly, as indicated above, some of this might consist in a wildly unrealistic yet aesthetically productive enterprise—imagining squeezing a piece of metal or stone into its current shape. Thus far we have a natural grouping of activities: This is the best sense one can make, I think, of the idea of empathy for objects themselves. Nervous-seeming brushwork can, through its simulative resonance, cause us to feel nervous and hence to attribute properties to the mind of the sitter that would not otherwise be available There are a range of bodily simulation-based activities which are directed towards works of art or aesthetic objects more generally and which may contribute to aesthetic engagement with those objects. But they are all cases of bodily simulation. There are two important questions to be answered about the relation between bodily simulation and engagement with art objects: Addressing them helps us understand how simulative states put us in contact with works of art. These are works in visual media because seeing them is required if we are to make the right sort of contact with them. Vision focuses us on the work—the right object. But, the argument goes, simulation of bodily movement or exertion of pressure focuses our attention on ourselves, distracting us from the work. Tragedies give rise to pity and terror or, if not precisely to these things, then to phenomenological states of some sort, while ghost stories cause fear, sometimes of a very salient kind. Works which did not move us in these ways would not be good works of their kinds. Lee offers the implausible hypothesis that, while our sense that a seen mountain is rising comes about because we raise our eyes to it, the fact that we are engrossed in the mountain makes us attribute rising a general notion, distilled from our manifold experiences and imaginings of rising to the mountain and not to ourselves. Pity and fear of some kinds count as respectable responses, because they help us achieve the right kind of relation to the work; they focus us on its pitiable and fearful aspects. If Hamlet gave you toothache, this would not enrich your understanding of the play. One response to this claims that the simulation of movement itself constitutes a form of perception of certain properties in the picture; thus the motor simulations provoked by a viewing of *Descent from the Cross* would be ways of perceiving such things as the sense of effort and muscular tension felt by the mourners as they lower the body of Christ. I reject this view. Take the case of emotion perception. According to the story already outlined, recognizing your expression as one of disgust involves the activation of my own disgust response. But is it true that the activation, in these circumstances, of my disgust response itself constitutes a perception of your disgust? At best, activation of my disgust response counts as perception of your disgust in special circumstances and only in conjunction with

uncontroversially perceptual access to you by other means I need to see your facial expression. Neither of these things are true of sight, hearing, etc, which are very highly correlated with the things in the external world they are apt to detect, and do not operate via the operation of other senses. Further, it ought to be possible, for any mode of perception, to make a distinction between the veridical and the non-veridical case: There ought to be a stronger degree of intentional relatedness between the experience and the slide itself for it to count as an art object. Still, an actor may fool us, in which case what we see are mere signs of disgust. In the case where our emotion-simulation is triggered by the sight of the actor, what mere appearances does the simulation expose us to? There do not seem to be any ready candidates for these appearances, other than the visual appearances. The objection was that simulative processes are not related in the right ways to objects of our aesthetic attention for those processes to count as genuinely aesthetic responses to them. And we may say that these simulative processes do have the right kinds of relationsâ€”though they are not directly perceptual relationsâ€”to objects of aesthetic attention. These processes provide information which is accessed by the visual system, and which contributes to a visual experience in which various properties of the work, or of that which is represented in it, are made manifest. And these things are given to me in visual experience itself, as that experience is enriched by its connections with simulative processes; they are not given to me by a combination of vision and a set of distinct, simulation-based perceptual systems. The properties I perceive in the picture are the properties I see there. This account makes bodily simulations part of our canonical responses to pictures, but it does not make pictures multi-sensory objects, accessible through more than one sense modality; they are not available to vision and to a supposed motor simulative perceptual sense. What is made accessible in a picture by way of bodily simulation is seen in the picture. This is a hypothesis about causal connections between certain mental systems: Is there some independent evidence to which we can appeal for support? In experiments on biologically realistic motion, the movement of a light-point tracing a closed path, in this case an ellipse, looked uniform to subjects in the experiment as long as the 23 I am indebted here to Millar I have put the point in a way that will, I hope, be acceptable to a disjunctivist about perception. He does not suggest, and nor would it be plausible to suggest, that the emotions give us perceptual but non-visual access to the frighteningness of the toboggan. Presumably subjects were relying on a motor simulation of the motion as they would draw it, using sub-personal systems which mimic the operations, and respect the biomechanical constraints, of the hand and arm; when the motion matched that inner simulation, it looked uniform. His own emotional reactions are in the normal range, except again for disgust. His conceptual understanding of disgust is intact. A plausible hypothesis is that his impaired disgust response compromises his ability to simulate disgust on seeing a disgusted face; as a consequence, a face that looks disgusted to others is much less likely to look so to him.

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There have been diverse functional distinctions attributed to the discontinuity between imagination and supposition, but none has gained universal acceptance. Richard Moran contends that imagination tends to give rise to a wide range of further mental states, including affective responses, whereas supposition does not see also Arcangeli , Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft contend that supposition involves only cognitive imagination, but imagination involves both cognitive and conative imagination. Tyler Doggett and Andy Egan contend that imagination tends to motivate pretense actions, but supposition tends not to. There remain ongoing debates about specific alleged functional distinctions, and about whether the functional distinctions are numerous or fundamental enough to warrant discontinuism or not. Indeed, it remains contentious which philosophers count as continuists and which philosophers count as discontinuists for a few sample taxonomies, see Arcangeli ; Balcerak Jackson ; Kind Roles of Imagination Much of the contemporary discussion of imagination has centered around particular roles that imagination is purported to play in various domains of human understanding and activity. Amongst the most widely-discussed are the role of imagination in understanding other minds section 3. The variety of roles ascribed to imagination, in turn, provides a guide for discussions on the nature of imagination section 1 and its place in cognitive architecture section 2. Many such hybrid accounts include a role for imagination. On pure versions of such accounts, imagination plays no special role in the attribution of mental states to others. For an overview of theory theory, see entry on folk psychology as a theory. For early papers, see Goldman ; Gordon ; Heal ; for recent dissent, see, for example, Carruthers ; Gallagher ; Saxe , ; for an overview of simulation theory, see entry on folk psychology as mental simulation. How this metaphor is understood depends on the specific account. Though classic simulationist accounts have tended to assume that the simulation process is at least in-principle accessible to consciousness, a number of recent simulation-style accounts appeal to neuroscientific evidence suggesting that at least some simulative processes take place completely unconsciously. On such accounts of mindreading, no special role is played by conscious imagination see Goldman ; Saxe Alvin Goldman , for example, argues that while mindreading is primarily the product of simulation, theorizing plays a role in certain cases as well. Partly in light of these considerations, the relative lack of spontaneous pretense in children with autistic spectrum disorders is taken as evidence for a link between the skills of pretense and empathy. Consequently, they also disagree about the mental states that enable one to pretend. Different behaviorist theories explicate behaving-as-if in different ways, but all aim to provide an account of pretense without recourse to the innate mental-state concept pretend. Philosophical and psychological theories have sought to explain both the performance of pretense and the recognition of pretense, especially concerning evidence from developmental psychology see Lillard for an early overview. On the recognition side, children on a standard developmental trajectory distinguish pretense and reality via instinctual behavioral cues around 15â€”18 months; and start to do so via conventional behavioral cues from 36 months on Friedman et al. Not surprisingly, the debate between theories of pretense often rest on interpretations of such empirical evidence. Specifically, they argue that behavioral theories do not offer straightforward explanations of this early development of pretense recognition, and incorrectly predicts that children systematically mistake other acts of behaving-as-ifâ€”such as those that stem from false beliefsâ€”for pretense activities. In response, Stephen Stich and Joshua Tarzia has acknowledged these problems for earlier behaviorist theories, and developed a new behaviorist theory that purportedly explains the totality of empirical evidence better than metarepresentational rivals. The debate concerning theories of pretense has implications for the role of imagination in pretense. Behaviorist theories tend to take imagination as essential to explaining pretense performance; metarepresentational theories do not. However, arguably the innate mental-state concept pretend posited by metarepresentational theories serve similar functions. Currie and Ravenscroft gives a broadly behaviorist theory of pretense that does not require imagination. Most recently, Peter Langland-Hassan , has developed a theory that aims to explain pretense

behavior and pretense recognition without appeal to either metarepresentation or imagination. While Langland-Hassan does not deny that pretense is in some sense an imaginative activity, he argues that we do not need to posit a *sui generis* component of the mind to account for it. That is, the atypical patterns of cognition and behavior associated with each psychopathology have been argued to result from atypical functions of imagination. The imaginative aspect of autism interacts with other prominent roles of imagination, namely mindreading, pretense, and engagement with the arts Carruthers The degree to which an imaginative deficit is implicated in autism remains a matter of considerable debate. Particularly striking examples would include Capgras and Cotard delusions. In the former, the sufferer takes her friends and family to have been replaced by imposters; in the latter, the sufferer takes himself to be dead. More mundane examples might include ordinary cases of self-deception. One approach to delusions characterize them as beliefs that are dysfunctional in their content or formation. For a representative collection of papers that present and criticize this perspective, see Coltheart and Davies eds. However, another approach to delusions characterize them as dysfunctions of imaginings. Currie and Ravenscroft That is, a delusion is an imagined representation that is misidentified by the subject as a belief. Roger Scruton develops a Wittgensteinian account of imagination and accords it a central role in aesthetic experience and aesthetic judgment. When one engages with an artwork, one uses it as a prop in a make-believe game. As props, artworks generate prescriptions for imaginings. When one correctly engages with an artwork, then, one imagines the representational contents as prescribed. Out of all the arts, it is the engagement with narratives that philosophers have explored most closely in conjunction with imagination see Stock for an overview. Gregory Currie offers an influential account of imagination and fiction, and Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen discuss literature specifically. However, Derek Matravers notably criticizes it and argues that imagination is not essential for engagement with narratives. Philosophers have also done much to articulate the connection between imagination and engagement with music see entry on philosophy of music ; see also Trivedi Some philosophers focus on commonalities between engagement with narratives and engagement with music. For example, even though Walton , a, acknowledges that fictional worlds of music are much more indeterminate than fictional worlds of narratives, he maintains that the same kind of imagining used in experiencing narratives is also used in experiencing various elements of music, such as imagining continuity between movements and imagining feeling musical tension. Similarly, Andrew Kania argues that experiencing musical space and movement is imaginative like our experience of fictional narratives. Other philosophers draw parallels between engagement with music and other imaginative activities, namely as understanding other minds section 3. As an example of the former, Jerrold Levinson argues that the best explanation of musical expressiveness requires listeners to experience music imaginativelyâ€”specifically, imagining a persona expressing emotions through the music. As an example of the latter, Scruton argues that musical experience is informed by spatial concepts applied metaphorically, and so imaginative perception is necessary for musical understanding but see Budd for a criticism; see also De Clercq and Kania Stephen Davies , and Peter Kivy notably criticize the imaginative accounts of engagement with music on empirical and theoretical grounds. Other imaginative accounts of engagement with the arts can be found in the entries on philosophy of film and philosophy of dance. Philosophers have sought to clarify the role of imagination in engagement with the arts by focusing on a number of puzzles and paradoxes in the vicinity. The puzzle of imaginative resistance explores apparent limitations on what can be imagined during engagements with the arts and, relatedly, what can be made fictional in artworks. The paradox of tragedy and the paradox of horror examine psychological and normative differences between affective responses prompted by imaginings versus affective responses by reality-directed attitudes. Finally, the puzzle of moral persuasion is concerned with real-world outputs of imaginative engagements with artworks; specifically, whether and how artworks can morally educate or corrupt. For more detail on each of these artistic phenomena, see the Supplement on Puzzles and Paradoxes of Imagination and the Arts. The unconstrained imagination can thereby take raw materials and produce outputs that transcend concepts that one possesses. As an example, Michael Polanyi gives imagination a central role in the creative endeavor of scientific discovery, by refining and narrowing the solution space to open-ended scientific problems see Stokes And, in addition to creative processes of geniuses, contemporary philosophers

also consider creative processes of ordinary people. Berys Gaut and Dustin Stokes argue that two characteristic features of imagination—its lack of aim at truth and its dissociation from action—make it especially suitable for creative processes. There are two points of disagreement regarding the role of imagination in creative processes. First, philosophers disagree about the nature and the strength of the connection between imagination and creativity. Kant takes imagination to be constitutive of creativity: Gaut and Stokes, by contrast, thinks there is only an imperfect causal connection between imagination and creativity: Second, philosophers disagree about the type of imagination involved in creative processes. By hypothesizing a common evolutionary cause, Carruthers suggests that the same imaginative capacity is involved in pretense and in creativity. Many philosophical arguments call on imagination when they appeal to metaphysical modal knowledge see entry on epistemology of modality ; the papers collected in Gendler and Hawthorne eds. The kind of thought experiments that are regularly used in scientific theorizing is also plausibly premised on imaginative capacities see entry on thought experiments. As already discussed, people use imagination to understand the perspectives of others section 3. Moreover, people often make decisions via thinking about counterfactuals, or what would happen if things had been different from how they in fact are see entries on causation and counterfactual conditionals. However, the phenomenon of transformative experience has recently called into question which kind of imaginary scenarios are truly epistemically accessible. For a representative collection of papers that explore different epistemic roles of imagination, see Kind and Kung eds. Broadly speaking, thought experiments use imaginary scenarios to elicit responses that ideally grant people knowledge of possibilities. A special, but prominent, type of thought experiment in philosophy concerns the link between imagination, conceivability, and metaphysical possibility. The current prevalence of similar modal arguments can be verified by the entries on zombies and dualism. These modal arguments all rely, in some way, on the idea that what one can imagine functions as a fallible and defeasible guide to what is really possible in the broadest sense. Pessimists, notably Peter Van Inwagen Optimists typically take it as a given that there is some connection between imagination and metaphysical modal knowledge, but focus on understanding where the connection is imperfect, such as when one apparently imagines the impossible. To just give a few examples, Saul Kripke [] , Stephen Yablo , David Chalmers , Dominic Gregory , Peter Kung , and Timothy Williamson , have each developed a distinctive approach to this task. For example, Kripke adopts a redescription approach to modeling some modal errors: Other thought experiments are scoped more narrowly; for example, scientific thought experiments are intended to allow people to explore nomic possibilities. In this thought experiment, Galileo asked people to imagine the falling of a composite of a light and heavy object versus the falling of the heavy object alone. While it is incontrovertible that imagination is central to thought experiments, debates remain on whether imagination can be invoked in the context of justification Gendler b; Williamson or only in the context of discovery Norton , ; Spaulding The role of imagination in counterfactual reasoning—and, in particular, the question of what tends to be held constant when one contemplates counterfactual scenarios—has been explored in detail in recent philosophical and psychological works Byrne ; Williamson , , Williamson suggests that When we work out what would have happened if such-and-such had been the case, we frequently cannot do it without imagining such-and-such to be the case and letting things run. Williamson argues that our imaginings have evolved to be suitably constrained, such that such counterfactual reasoning can confer knowledge. Indeed, he argues that if one were to be skeptical about gaining knowledge from such a hypothetical reasoning process, then one would be forced to be implausibly skeptical about much of ordinary reasoning about actuality. Developing an idea anticipated by Williamson , Margot Strohminger and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri forthcoming argue that the same imaginative mechanisms that capable of producing metaphysical modal knowledge are also capable of producing knowledge of other restricted modalities, such as nomic and practical modality. Thinking about counterfactuals is just one way that imagination can factor into mundane decision-making. Neil Van Leeuwen , a, b and Bence Nanay a have recently started to elaborate on the connection between imagination and actions via decision-making. At the same time, the recently prominent discussion of transformative experiences calls into question the extent to which imagination can be epistemically useful for making life-altering decisions. Paul , , ; see also Jackson , ; D.

Chapter 6 : Empathy - Hardcover - Amy Coplan; Peter Goldie - Oxford University Press

Empathy for Objects 1. About us. Editorial team. General Editors: David Bourget (Western Ontario) David Chalmers (ANU, NYU) Area Editors: David Bourget Gwen Bradford.

Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives A. The concept of empathy is actually at the center of different discussion within the contemporary debate and the book is an excellent example of the interdisciplinary research that it can entail. *Method* Issue 2 issn: Each section contains six original essays by distinct contemporary researchers. Before analyzing in more detail the three sections, I would like to give some space to the Introduction itself. After defining the three areas of investigation, Coplan and Goldie proceed to focus on the history of the concept of empathy. First of all, they analyze the philosophical traditions that had dealt with the empathy, sympathy, and their related phenomena. In the paragraph dedicated to David Hume and Adam Smith, Coplan and Goldie introduce an internal distinction within the concept of empathy that would be used throughout their Introduction and would be an useful tool to interpret the essays too: And thus it seems that the process he referred to as sympathy is the same or at least very similar to what we will call low-level empathy or mirroring Coplan, Goldie, Introduction, p. Regardless of whether sympathy for Smith is self- or other-oriented, it is usually described as a high-level process involving an imaginative component Coplan, Goldie, Introduction, p. The difference between low-level empathy and high-level one lies in the engagement of imaginative and cognitive processing. The other distinction that Coplan and Goldie introduce is that between self-oriented and other-oriented perspective-taking, that is deeply discussed in the first essay of *Empathy and Mind* by Coplan. The historical account continues with the discussion of the work of Theodor Lipps In *Phenomenology and Hermeneutics* the editors start underlining in particular the criticisms moved by the phenomenological tradition “ Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, and Max Scheler ” to Theodor Lipps, providing just a reference to the idea that: In the paragraph about Clinical Psychology the focus is on the relevance of empathy within a therapeutic relationship, in particular in the work of Heinz Kohut The last two paragraphs of the historical reconnaissance concern two research fields of recent born: Developmental and Social Psychology started to be interested in this topic around the s and Care Ethics was developed in the s. For what regards the first research field, different research programs were established. References for this field are extensive. For the second, the work of Michael Slote is widely considered. The last two sections regard the development of the studies of empathy within neuroscience and ethology with particular reference to the works of Frans de Waal. A narrow conceptualization of empathy informed by recent psychological and neuroscientific research. I believe we should start by analyzing the very minimal phenomena and not a complex one that is likely to be confused with the concept of sympathy. On the other hand, the article is particularly interesting for its aim, as I already said, for the amount of references, the interaction between psychological and neuroscientific studies and conceptual analysis, and for the distinction between self-oriented and other-oriented perspective-taking we have mentioned above. In order to achieve his goal, Matravers defines empathy as: An imaginative endeavour that results in us having the same type of feeling or emotion as the other person [. Hence, I draw a distinction between empathy and the broader phenomenon of our ability to recognize other creatures as minded creatures Matravers, pp. The article aims at answering three different questions: There is empathy if: He raises some very interesting questions and objections to this first attempt of definition stemming from recent psychological and neuroscientific results. And he concludes his first paragraph saying that: These preliminary comments should alert the reader to the fact that different writers and researchers exhibit different approaches to empathy. In addition, however, research findings can contribute to an understanding of how empathy is produced. How exactly does this system, or these systems, work? What different consequences might ensue as upshots of different modes of empathizing? Goldman distinguishes two different routes of empathy: This distinction is the equivalent of the one between low-level and high-level empathy. The entire article deals with this distinction and with the different neural circuits that are involved in both phenomena, with particular attention for mirror neurons. The following chapter also deals with mirror neurons and the physiological basis of empathy. Since mirror neurons are more widespread

in humans than previously thought, Iacoboni suggests: Thus, while it has been proposed that mirror neurons and mirroring may be critical for low-level forms of mindreading and empathy; but not for high level forms Goldman a , the new data make it entirely plausible that high-level mindreading may also be based on neural mirroring Iacoboni, pp. Meltzoff aims at bringing together: The authors claim that empathy and imitation are linked and they provide a great amount of data in order to prove it. This last essay constitutes a turning point from the first section to the second one that considers the relations between empathy and aesthetics. Curries focuses on empathy and bodily simulation, takes the example of visual arts and argues in favor of an aesthetics based on empathy. A number of points can be made in defence of the claim that empathy along with its relatives plays a significant role in our apprehension of fictions and other narratives Smith, p. Indeed, they do so by fortifying the link between seeing and empathy in a distinct way Lopes, p. Lopes link empathy to sight and underlines the possibility to develop the em- pathic skill through exercise and he focuses on the expressive power of pictures. This link between empathy and sends a difference as compared with previous con- tributions focusing more on simulation theory. The third essay, by Stephen Davies, focuses on the emotional contagion en- tailed by music. The relevance of this contribution, at least from my perspective, is that of considering emotional contagion as a basic form of empathic response. He avoids the term empathy, trying to pro- vide further distinctions within emotional engagement. He distinguishes between identification, coincident emotional state, vectorially converging states, sympathy, solidarity, and mirror reflexes. The last essay of this section: And, concluding that at least empathic reading of fictions was not likely to be the norm, I have shown how some of the material from psychology that might seem to support such a reading cannot offer the promised help. Further, I have suggested that the peculiarities of the artistic case here, the novel require an account all of its own, if at all McFee, pp. The general idea is that empathy is not sufficient for morality, since it does not entail a moral motivation. The counterexample of the empathic torturer reveals that fact. The first essay of the section, by Jesse Prinz, asks the question: The author avoids def- initions of empathy that entail some degree of concern for others and normative feelings, that is, those that tell us how the other should, or ought, to feel. These definitions are too close to that of sympathy and do not allow for distinction. Jesse Prinz defines empathy as: It seems that there is little role for empathy within morality as far as moral judg- ment, moral development, moral conduct, and moral motivation are concerned. He also underlines the limitations of empathy. At this point, we can draw an initial conclusion: But that does not mean em- pathy plays no role in morality. Presumably empathy can induce moral judgment, factor into moral development, and facilitates moral motivation. It probably plays all these roles to some degree. I have tried to suggest that the degree may be limited. That is a descriptive claim. One might think that this claim is un- interesting from the perspective of ethical theory. The question that really matters is normative, not descriptive. Even if empathy does not play a central role in morality, perhaps it could. Should we, then, try to increase the role for empathy in morality? Should we cultivate moral systems that are based on empathy? He uses a broad sense of empathy and underlines its role as a motive and in development, and the modes of its arousal. Besides them, he con- cludes that empathy certainly plays a role in law, in making and in changing them, as well as in the practice of implementing laws in courtrooms. Kaplan proposes three kind of empathic responses to catastrophic im- ages: The answer to this question depends on which concept of empathy and of virtue we adopt and on the combination of the two. The author very precisely proceeds in providing different conceptual analysis both of empathy and of virtue. For what regards empathy, I identify four different concepts of empathy: After some very interesting pages, the author concludes: If it is voluntary concepts 3 and 4 and reliable, it is a skill. If it is involuntary concepts 2 , it is a capacity. Briefly, does this demonstrate that we should reject our leading theoretical concepts of empathy? Very roughly speaking, what I am against is what I will call empathic perspective- shifting: I am not against what I will call in-his-shoes perspective-shifting: He usefully distinguishes between empathy as outcome and empathy as process Goldie, p. The author interprets morality as a possible barrier to empathic response towards evil agents. On the one hand, we want empathy with evil-doers to be as easy as possible, exploiting the psychological continuities that Morton discusses. The amount of literature quoted and the different aspects of the matter ana- lyzed make it a touchstone for everyone interested in the concept or the applica- tions of empathy. The first one is that there is not a clear and

common definition of the concept of empathy. Different essays and different authors keep using terminology in idiosyncratic ways, thus not allowing true comparison between different theories or approaches. It is certainly true that this defect is strongly linked with all the history of the concept, but an attempt to provide some common ground, particularly in such a precise and interesting volume, would have been useful to the research itself. The second, and more limited, defect regards the little space that had been granted to a perceptual account of empathy. It is mentioned in the essay by Lopes and in the Introduction when treating Theodor Lipps and the phenomenological tradition, but it has not been at the center of a proper discussion. Simulation theory is generally taken almost for granted, as if empathy can only be a matter of simulation and no further explanation is needed. So, besides the relevancy and the interest of the volume edited by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie, there is still much work to do as far as empathy is concerned. Sentimental Values and the Instability of Affect, in P.

Chapter 7 : Empathy - Film/Cinema Studies bibliographies - Cite This For Me

Yet a century ago, talk of empathy for objects would have seemed very natural; it was the theme of a group of thinkers whose writings helped to found the notion of empathy itself.

Gregory Currie and Jon Jureidini *Delusions, we all agree, are pathological. Exactly where we think the pathology lies depends in good measure on how we further characterize delusions. If we think of them as beliefs, our attention is naturally directed to the kinds of experiences that prompt the delusions; strange beliefs can be rational if rationally mandated by strange experiences. As Davies and colleagues note, one view is that delusions are, in fact, rational responses to pathological experiences. They show that this is not an adequate view. They also note that delusions might not always be best characterized as beliefs, though, for the purposes of their essay, they chose to treat them as such. How much difference would it make if we disputed this treatment? Of course, delusions are in various ways like beliefs, otherwise there would be no tendency to think of them as beliefs. We suggest that imaginings of a certain kind are also significantly belief-like, though they are not, in fact, beliefs. Imaginings are capable of mirroring many of the inferential characteristics of beliefs. Readers of fiction imagine things about the characters and events of the story, and their imaginings combine in complex ways with their beliefs to lead to new imaginings; that is how we make inferences from what is explicit in the story to what is merely implicit content. The imaginings that fictions promote often have strong emotional consequences. We feel powerful emotions when things go badly for characters we admire, and these emotions are not in obvious ways different from those prompted by our beliefs about real people. Perhaps delusions are imaginings rather than beliefs. We find support for this by recalling the two ways that, according to Davies and colleagues, a delusion can be consequent on an experience. It can simply take over the content of the experience, as when a hallucinating subject has an experience of a pink rat and comes to believe that there is a pink rat in front of him. Imaginings are just the sorts of things that are often formed in these two ways. First, it is characteristic of imagining to be much more easily triggered by perception than is belief. Indeed, if imagination were not easily triggered by mere appearances, pictures, plays, and movies would have very little appeal for us. Second, it is surely quite common to imagine all sorts of wild hypotheses in response to an odd experience. A rational agent with the odd experience of familiar faces, which we think Capgras patients have, might well be prompted to imagine that his loved ones had been replaced by imposters. On this hypothesis, what needs explaining is not the formation of the delusional state, for the hypothesis has it that the delusional state is an imagining and there is nothing irrational about having such an imagining. What needs explaining is why the imagining is not recognized as such but is, apparently, treated by the patient as if it were a belief. What is it for an imagining to be treated as if it were a belief, when in fact it is not one? What we suggest happens is this: The deluded subject fails to monitor the self-generatedness of her imagining that P. In the kinds of cases we are currently considering, it would be natural for it to seem that You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:*

Chapter 8 : Empathy for Objects 1 - Oxford Scholarship

Empathy has for a long time, at least since the eighteenth century, been seen as centrally important in relation to our capacity to gain a grasp of the content of other people's minds, and predict and explain what they will think, feel, and do; and in relation to our capacity to respond to others ethically.

Chapter 9 : Works by Greg Currie - PhilPapers

*Gregory Currie and Jon Jureidini *Delusions, we all agree, are pathological. Exactly where we think the pathology lies depends in good measure on how we further characterize delusions.**