

*Enthusiasm for secession and the Confederate cause in Brown County was a myth that would develop long after the Comanche threat had been removed. Carl Bodiford He and his wife Lorinda recently settled in Brownwood after retiring from public school teaching in the Metroplex.*

You may be interested in it as an abstract concept or as a viable possibility for escaping a federal government that Americans now fear and distrust in unprecedented numbers. As Mises wrote in *The Situation of Having to Belong to a State to Which One Does Not Wish to Belong* is no less onerous if it is the result of an election than if one must endure it as the consequence of a military conquest. Mises understood that mass democracy was no substitute for liberal society, but rather the enemy of it. Of course he was right: The federal government is now the putative ruler of nearly every aspect of life in America. But to borrow a line from the novelist L. And that, ladies and gentlemen, is precisely why we should take secession seriously, both conceptually — as consistent with libertarianism — and as a real alternative for the future. Does anyone really believe that a physically vast, multicultural, social democratic welfare state of million people, with hugely diverse economic, social, and cultural interests, can be commanded from DC indefinitely without intense conflict and economic strife? Does anyone really believe that we can unite under a state that endlessly divides us? Frankly it seems clear the federal government is hell-bent on Balkanizing America anyway. So why not seek out ways to split apart rationally and nonviolently? Since most of us in the room are Americans, my focus today is on the political and cultural situation here at home. I truly believe secession movements represent the last best hope for reclaiming our birthright: In a world gone mad with state power, secession offers hope that truly liberal societies, organized around civil society and markets rather than central governments, can still exist. Building a libertarian secession movement need not involve mass political organizing: Hoppe counsels us to use what little daylight the state affords us defensively: In other words, a bottom-up revolution employs both persuasion and democratic mechanisms to secede at the individual, family, community, and local level — in a million ways that involve turning our backs on the central government rather than attempting to bend its will. Frankly, any notion of a libertarian takeover of the political apparatus in DC is fantasy, and even if a political sea change did occur the army of 4. Convincing Americans to adopt a libertarian political system — even if such an oxymoron were possible — is a hopeless endeavor in our current culture. Politics is a trailing indicator. Culture leads, politics follows. There cannot be a political sea change in America unless and until there is a philosophical, educational, and cultural sea change. Over the last years progressives have overtaken education, media, fine arts, literature, and pop culture — and thus as a result they have overtaken politics. Not the other way around. This is why our movement, the libertarian movement, must be a battle for hearts and minds. It must be an intellectual revolution of ideas, because right now bad ideas run the world. The philosophy of liberty is growing around the world, and I believe we are winning hearts and minds. This is a time for boldness, not pessimism. Yet libertarianism will never be a mass — which is to say majority — political movement. It may be due to genetic traits, environmental factors, family influences, bad schools, media influences, or simply an innate human desire to seek the illusion of security. But we make a fatal mistake when we dilute our message to seek approval from people who seemingly are hardwired to oppose us. And we waste precious time and energy. This is why secession is a tactically superior approach in my view: What About the Federales? They surely would like to, but whether or not they can actually do so is an entirely different question — it is only necessary to recognize that the members of the governmental apparatus always represent, even under conditions of democracy, a very small proportion of the total population. Without local enforcement, by compliant local authorities, the will of the central government is not much more than hot air. It would be prudent — to avoid a direct confrontation with the central government and not openly denounce its authority — Rather, it seems advisable to engage in a policy of passive resistance and noncooperation. One simply stops to help in the enforcement in each and every federal law — Finally, he concludes as only Hoppe could remember this is the s: Waco, a teeny group of freaks, is one thing. But to occupy, or to wipe out a significantly large group of normal, accomplished, upstanding citizens is quite another, and quite a more

difficult thing. Now you may disagree with Dr. Hoppe as to the degree to which the federal government would actively order military violence to tamp down any secessionist hotspots, but his larger point is unassailable: Eliminate the illusion of benevolence and omnipotence and consent quickly crumbles. Imagine what a committed, coordinated libertarian base could achieve in America! As Hoppe posits, it is no easy matter for the state to arrest or attack large local groups of citizens. Left and Right are Hypocrites Regarding Secession One of the great ironies of our time is that both the political Left and Right complain bitterly about the other, but steadfastly refuse to consider, once again, the obvious solution staring us in the face. Imagine California or Massachusetts having every progressive policy firmly in place, without any preemptive federal legislation or federal courts to get in their way, and without having to share federal tax revenues with the hated red states. Imagine an experiment where residents of the San Francisco bay area were free to live under a political and social regime of their liking, while residents of Salt Lake City were free to do the same. Surely both communities would be much happier with this commonsense arrangement than the current one, whereby both have to defer to Washington! The last thing they want is local control over anything! They are the great centralizers and consolidators of state authority. Our friends on the Right are scarcely better on this issue. Many conservatives are hopelessly wedded to the Lincoln myth and remain in thrall to the central warfare state, no matter the cost. As an example, consider the Scottish independence referendum that took place in September of 2014. Some conservatives, and even a few libertarians claimed that we should oppose the referendum on the grounds that it would create a new government, and thus two states would exist in the place of one. If it were in any way possible to grant this right of self-determination to every individual person, it would have to be done. This was the case in Scotland, where younger Scots who supported the independence referendum in greater numbers hoped to create strong ties with the EU parliament in Brussels and build a Scandinavian-style welfare state run from Holyrood never mind that Tories in London were overjoyed at the prospect of jettisoning a huge number of Labour supporters! But if support for the principle of self-determination is to have any meaning whatsoever, it must allow for others to make decisions with which we disagree. Political competition can only benefit all of us. What neither progressives nor conservatives understand – or worse, maybe they do understand – is that secession provides a mechanism for real diversity, a world where we are not all yoked together. It provides a way for people with widely divergent views and interests to live peaceably as neighbors instead of suffering under one commanding central government that pits them against each other. Secession Begins With You Ultimately, the wisdom of secession starts and ends with the individual. Bad ideas run the world, but must they run your world? The question we all have to ask ourselves is this: Secession really begins at home, with the actions we all take in our everyday lives to distance and remove ourselves from state authority – quietly, nonviolently, inexorably. The state is crumbling all around us, under the weight of its own contradictions, its own fiscal mess, and its own monetary system. How To Secede Right Now So in closing, let me make a few humble suggestions for beginning a journey of personal secession. But all of us can play a role in a bottom-up revolution by doing everything in our power to withdraw our consent from the state: Secede from intellectual isolation. Talk to like-minded friends, family, and neighbors – whether physically or virtually – to spread liberty and cultivate relationships and alliances. The state prefers to have us atomized, without a strong family structure or social network; secede from dependency. Become as self-sufficient as possible with regard to food, water, fuel, cash, firearms, and physical security at home. Resist being reliant on government in the event of a natural disaster, bank crisis, or the like; secede from mainstream media, which promotes the state in a million different ways. Ditch cable, ditch CNN, ditch the major newspapers, and find your own sources of information in this internet age. Take advantage of a luxury previous generations did not enjoy; secede from state control of your children by homeschooling or unschooling them; secede from college by rejecting mainstream academia and its student loan trap. Educate yourself using online learning platforms, obtaining technical credentials, or simply by reading as much as you can; secede from the US dollar by owning physical precious metals, by owning assets denominated in foreign currencies, and by owning assets abroad; secede from the federal tax and regulatory regimes by organizing your business and personal affairs to be as tax efficient and unobtrusive as possible; secede from the legal system, by legally protecting your assets from rapacious lawsuits and probate courts as much as possible;

secede from the state healthcare racket by taking control of your health, and questioning medical orthodoxy; secede from your state by moving to another with a better tax and regulatory environment, better homeschooling laws, better gun laws, or just one with more liberty-minded people; secede from political uncertainty in the US by obtaining a second passport; or secede from the US altogether by expatriating. Most of all, secede from the mindset that government is all-powerful or too formidable an opponent to be overcome. All of us, regardless of ideological bent and regardless of whether we know it or not, are married to a very violent, abusive spendthrift.

**Chapter 2 : Project MUSE - More Zeal Than Discretion**

*Family, Community, and Secession, 61 96 8. The Marshal Ney of Texas, 62 9. Partisan Ranger, 65 Citizen Lane, 87*

When the decision was issued two days later, Republicans began spreading word that Taney had revealed to Buchanan the forthcoming result. Buchanan had hoped that the Dred Scott decision would destroy the Republican platform, but outraged northerners denounced the decision. While the South escaped largely unscathed, northern cities experienced drastic increases in unemployment. Buchanan agreed with the southerners who attributed the economic collapse to overspeculation. While the government was "without the power to extend relief", [44] it would continue to pay its debts in specie, and while it would not curtail public works, none would be added. The economy did eventually recover, though many Americans suffered as a result of the panic. Young harassed federal officers and discouraged outsiders from settling in the Salt Lake City area, and in September the Utah Territorial Militia perpetrated the Mountain Meadows massacre against Arkansans headed for California. Buchanan was also personally offended by the polygamous behavior of Young. Kane as a private agent to negotiate peace. The mission succeeded, the new governor was shortly placed in office, and the Utah War ended. The President granted amnesty to all inhabitants who would respect the authority of the government, and moved the federal troops to a nonthreatening distance for the balance of his administration. This resulted in violence between "Free-Soil" antislavery and proslavery settlers in what became known as the "Bleeding Kansas" crisis. The antislavery settlers organized a government in Topeka, while proslavery settlers established a seat of government in Lecompton, Kansas. For Kansas to be admitted as a state, a constitution had to be submitted to Congress with the approval of a majority of residents. Under President Pierce, a series of violent confrontations known as "Bleeding Kansas" escalated as supporters of the two governments clashed. The situation in Kansas was watched closely throughout the country, and some in Georgia and Mississippi advocated secession should Kansas be admitted as a free state. Buchanan himself did not particularly care whether or not Kansas entered as a slave state, and instead sought to admit Kansas as a state as soon as possible since it would likely tilt towards the Democratic Party. Rather than restarting the process and establishing one territorial government, Buchanan chose to recognize the Lecompton government. Walker to replace John W. Geary as territorial governor, with the mission of reconciling the settler factions and approving a constitution. Walker, who was from Mississippi, was expected to assist the proslavery faction in gaining approval of a new constitution. In October, the Lecompton government organized territorial elections that were so marked by fraud that Walker threw out the returns from several counties. Nonetheless, that same month, the Lecompton government framed a pro-slavery state constitution known as the "Lecompton Constitution" and, rather than risking a referendum, sent it directly to Buchanan. Though eager for Kansas statehood, even Buchanan was forced to reject the entrance of Kansas without a state constitutional referendum, and he dispatched federal agents to bring about a compromise. The Lecompton government agreed to a limited referendum in which Kansas would vote not on the constitution overall, but rather merely on whether or not Kansas would allow slavery after becoming a state. The Topeka government boycotted the December referendum, and slavery overwhelmingly won the approval of those who did vote. A month later, the Topeka government held its own referendum in which voters overwhelmingly rejected the Lecompton Constitution. He also transmitted a message that attacked the "revolutionary government" in Topeka, conflating them with the Mormons in Utah. Buchanan made every effort to secure congressional approval, offering favors, patronage appointments, and even cash for votes. The Lecompton Constitution won the approval of the Senate in March, but a combination of Know-Nothings, Republicans, and northern Democrats defeated the bill in the House. Rather than accepting defeat, Buchanan backed the English Bill, which offered Kansans immediate statehood and vast public lands in exchange for accepting the Lecompton Constitution. In August, a Kansas referendum strongly rejected the Lecompton Constitution. On one side were Buchanan, most Southern Democrats, and northern Democrats allied to the Southerners "Doughfaces"; on the other side were Douglas and most northern Democrats plus a few Southerners. Buchanan used his patronage powers to remove Douglas sympathizers in Illinois and Washington, DC and installed pro-administration Democrats,

including postmasters. The Senate election was the primary issue of the legislative election, marked by the famous Lincoln-Douglas debates. Buchanan, working through federal patronage appointees in Illinois, ran candidates for the legislature in competition with both the Republicans and the Douglas Democrats. Buchanan was reduced to a narrow base of southern supporters. Buchanan, in turn, vetoed six substantial pieces of Republican legislation, causing further hostility between Congress and the White House. Buchanan argued that these acts were beyond the power of the federal government as established by the Constitution. He also sought to establish American protectorates over the Mexican states of Chihuahua and Sonora, and, perhaps most importantly, he hoped to finally achieve his long-term goal of acquiring Cuba. After long negotiations with the British, he convinced them to agree to cede the Bay Islands to Honduras and the Mosquito Coast to Nicaragua. In China, despite not taking direct part in the Second Opium War, the Buchanan administration won trade concessions in the Treaty of Tientsin. However, the Democratic committee members, as well as Democratic witnesses, were equally enthusiastic in their pursuit of Buchanan, and as pointed in their condemnations, as the Republicans. The Democratic report, issued separately the same day, pointed out that evidence was scarce, but did not refute the allegations; one of the Democratic members, Rep. James Robinson, stated publicly that he agreed with the Republican report even though he did not sign it. Although Douglas led after every ballot, he was unable to win the two-thirds majority required. The convention adjourned after 53 ballots, and re-convened in Baltimore in June. After Douglas finally won the nomination, several southerners refused to accept the outcome, and nominated Vice President Breckinridge as their own candidate. Douglas and Breckinridge agreed on most issues except for the protection of slavery in the territories. Failing to reconcile the party, and nursing a grudge against Douglas, Buchanan tepidly supported Breckinridge. Though Lincoln had virtually no support in the South, his support in the North was enough to give him an Electoral College majority. Buchanan would be the last Democrat to win a presidential election until the 1890s. Buchanan was forced to address it in his final message to Congress. Both factions awaited news of how Buchanan would deal with the question. In his message, [70].

**Chapter 3 : 19 Secession Winter | History Hub**

*Family, community, and secession () The Marshal Ney of Texas () Walter P. Lane emigrated from Ireland as a young boy, fought in three wars, sailed.*

The significance of Alabama Unionists during the Civil War and Reconstruction has long been a subject of study among scholars. Largely centered in northern Alabama and to a lesser degree in the southeast region and in Montgomery and Mobile, Unionists were important both militarily and politically. Until recently, however, the details of this phenomenon have remained less well known, largely because the term Unionist both then and now has been used to refer to a range of different individuals and positions. In the broadest sense, Unionist has meant any white person who opposed secession including those who later supported the Confederacy and those who came to support the Union Stephen A. Douglas during the war despite having originally supported the Confederacy. This broad definition includes a very wide range of Alabamians—from the most well-to-do planters who ultimately become officers in the Confederate Army to the subsistence farmer who deserted the southern cause midway through the war. It is also possible to define Unionism more narrowly, confining the label to those individuals who resisted both secession and the Confederacy during the war. They were mostly nonslaveholding farmers though a small minority owned slaves living in the northern third of the state. A few Unionists also lived in the piney woods and coastal plain further south. In many respects, these men and women were very much like their neighbors who supported the Confederate cause. The reasons they remained loyal to the Union were also quite diverse. Many saw secession as illegal, whereas others felt that it would dishonor the American Revolution and their own ancestors. Still others were certain that secession would end in political or military disaster. Many were influenced by the respected figures in their families or neighborhoods. Unionism in Alabama arose under the pressures of the presidential election of 1860. By directly linking the presidential election to secession, the legislature fostered a political atmosphere that was particularly hostile to Unionists. Newspaper editorials and participants at community meetings condemned as traitors those who canvassed for Illinois senator Stephen Douglas, the nominee of the regular Democratic Party, rather than the John Breckinridge southern-rights Democratic nominee, John Breckinridge. John Bell, the Constitutional Union candidate who was supported by a number of Alabamians hostile to secession, received 31 percent of the vote. Douglas, the candidate most associated with a strongly Unionist position, polled slightly more than 15 percent. Republican Abraham Lincoln was not even on the ballot in Alabama. The campaign for convention delegates provoked heated and sometimes violent debates among neighbors, forcing many to defend their positions in public. In fact, the men elected on this platform represented a wide range of ideas about if, when, and under what circumstances to cooperate with secession and included a minority faction—probably less than one-third the vast majority of them from the northern third of the state—of unconditional Unionists who opposed secession outright. These delegates convened in Montgomery on January 7, 1862, and debated secession for four days. Many of those who voted against the ordinance, however, ultimately did support secession, and four immediately reversed themselves and signed with the majority. Among the opposition, 33 delegates subsequently signed the "Address to the People of Alabama," in which they pledged to consult with their supporters and then act on their wishes. Ten signatories Henry C. Sanford of the address signed the ordinance to satisfy their constituents. Other delegates who rejected the ordinance eventually took active part in the war. Only three signers—Henry C. Sanford of Cherokee County, Elliot P. Jones of Fayette County, and Robert Guttery of Walker County—never signed the ordinance and maintained their Unionism throughout the war. Only two wartime Unionists—R. Watkins of Franklin County and Christopher C. Many were ostracized and ridiculed by neighbors, called before community vigilance committees for questioning and intimidation, or actually harmed for endorsing the Union. Such treatment was most commonly meted out to those who publicly asserted their views; those who kept quiet and did not interfere with volunteering were often left alone during the first year of the war. After Confederate conscription began in April 1862, however, community tolerance of Unionists waned. Individuals who resisted the draft, for whatever reason, were subject to arrest and imprisonment. Family members who supported resisters

were frequently threatened with violence or exile by conscript cavalry who hoped to pressure men to come in from the woods or mountains and surrender. In addition, it was not at all uncommon for the families of Unionists to be targeted for punitive foraging or arson by Confederate forces or local conscript cavalry. After the Union Army invaded Alabama in early 1862, Unionists had more opportunities to flee behind Union lines for safety and the possibility of employment as soldiers, spies, or laborers. Dodge, stationed at Corinth, Mississippi. The regiment served mostly in northern Alabama, western Tennessee, and northeastern Mississippi, though it marched with Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman to Savannah in 1864. Those who remained at home, both within Union-occupied territory and behind Confederate lines, also actively assisted Union forces as spies and guides. In some cases, they collaborated with local African Americans most often their own slaves to aid and abet the Union Army or pro-Union men in their neighborhoods. Moreover, African Americans from Alabama also crossed the Union lines to serve as laborers and soldiers, and after the Emancipation Proclamation went into effect in 1863, many were inducted into United States Colored Troops regiments. Disillusioned by the realities of warfare, angered by the inequities of service under laws exempting slaveowners and selected professionals, such as Alabamians generally wanted the war to end more than they desired Union victory, though some did cross lines and join the Union army rather than desert and avoid service altogether. A small peace movement also emerged at this time among men who had originally opposed secession but later supported the state. After the war, Unionists continued to struggle politically and socially, for their wartime activities had alienated them from their now-defeated neighbors. Most eagerly joined the Union League and the Republican Party. Some wartime Unionists helped reintroduce the Methodist-Episcopal Church as contrasted with the Methodist-Episcopal Church, South to northern Alabama, finding there a more hospitable environment for worship. Many campaigned strenuously to convince the president and Congress to limit the political rights of former Confederates. They also sought positions of local and state authority for others who had supported the Union during the war. At this point, a number of men who had originally opposed secession but supported the state in 1865, as well as citizens who had become disillusioned with the war, also moved to the fore of Grenville M. Dodge political life in Alabama. These moderates were, in general, encouraged by Pres. Andrew Johnson, who appointed such men to positions of political authority in the immediate post-war provisional governments he established. The Republican Party in Alabama was populated by such individuals, as well as core Unionists who had served in the Union Army or otherwise actively resisted the Confederacy. Both groups were referred to by their Democratic opponents as scalawags.

*Page NORTH CAROLINA ON THE EVE OF SECESSION. By WILLIAM K. BOYD. In the great drama of North Carolina had no leading part like that of South Carolina or the far South.*

The project symbolically stalled because Jefferson Davis, the Mississippi Senator in charge, was instead presiding over the Confederacy. Bell mostly ignored the thornier politics of slavery while promoting union. Lincoln continued, officially at least, to support southeastern slavery while blocking its western expansion. He would outlaw slavery in the western territories just as Thomas Jefferson had in the Northwest Territories in , even if that happened under the Articles of Confederation rather than the Constitution. Capital Rotunda Under Construction, March , Library of Congress Lincoln won a plurality of the popular vote and a majority of the electoral votes. If one region left after this election, then maybe another might leave in a huff the next time e. The election was the most regionalized in history. After Lincoln called on volunteers to subdue their rebellion, four more border states left the U. John Breckinridge tried to steer Kentucky toward neutrality, but reluctantly gave up and joined the Confederacy, for whom he fought and later served as Secretary of War. As for Seward, who disliked and disrespected Lincoln, the new president was magnanimous enough to hire him anyway and make him Secretary of State, because he thought it gave the Union the best chance of surviving. He co-opted other rivals and critics as well, absorbing their advice and eventually winning them over. Stephen Douglas also sided with Lincoln after secession. At first, the Republicans expected Lincoln to be a figurehead while better-known operatives like Seward and Salmon Chase ran things behind the scenes, but they underestimated his political prowess. He clarified his policies as soon as he was elected because the sitting president, pro-slavery northern Democrat James Buchanan, just wanted to ride out his term. When Lincoln finally made his way from Illinois to Washington by train, security had to use doubles and switch him from car to car to avoid assassination. Death threats poured in by the thousands from the day he was elected, some with bullets and poisoned ink, and one with a dumpling full of spiders. They gave a lot of attention to one box large enough to hide him in, making sure the railroad workers knew it was vitally important, and that it absolutely had to make it through to Washington that night. Inside assassins found a stack of unimportant papers. Lincoln skipped his scheduled stop in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, leaving Mary Todd and the kids to face a disappointed crowd. For Lincoln, just showing up for work the first day was a major accomplishment. Like Ben Franklin, he could kick up his heels and play the frontiersmen whenever it suited him, spitting tobacco as he spun yarns and told off-color jokes, but he was no simple country bumpkin. He made ample use of studios and had photographers airbrush out skin blemishes before shipping his portraits to the highest-circulation newspapers those with steam-powered presses. One young girl from Buffalo, New York wrote the nominee a letter, saying he should cover his homely face. He took her advice and grew a beard and when his inaugural train stopped through Buffalo months later, he called the girl up on stage and told the humorous story. Once in Washington, he seized the initiative with the media by establishing his own press corps , pioneering a tradition that formalized in and continues to this day, except that the president no longer picks its members at least until Sam Houston, by Mathew Brady, ca. South Carolina led the charge against him, just as they had in when they were one of the first colonies to secede from Britain before Continental Congress declared independence. That mattered now, more than ever. Mississippi exited next, which put pressure on Georgia and Florida in between South Carolina and Mississippi. The original Confederacy was the deep southern states stretching to Texas, where a spirited debate ensued among cotton planters from the eastern part of the state and German immigrants in central Texas who believed in doing their own work. East Texas disagreed, though, and when Texas seceded, that made for seven Confederate states. Four more upper southern states “ Arkansas, Tennessee, Virginia, and North Carolina ” seceded after Lincoln took office and requested volunteers to help subdue the first seven. The immediate Constitutional matter was whether states had the right to leave the U. Was the Union a voluntary compact, as South Carolina argued, or a permanent alliance as Lincoln proposed? There were some Southerners who either disagreed or wanted to clarify things further in , though, because they tried to pass Constitutional amendments to allow for secession. Other amendment proposals

included a three-headed presidency with at least one Southerner permanently among the three and all three having veto power. Some New Englanders considered secession during the War of and some abolitionists discussed it in the s. To be fair, South Carolina made it clear at the founding in and again at the Constitutional Convention in that they had no interest in being in the country if it prohibited slavery. Lincoln believed the Constitution granted existing states the right to maintain slavery. Crittenden tried and failed to get an amendment passed permanently shoring up the legality of southeastern slavery â€” a proposal Lincoln fully supported. The president-elect thought secession was a bluff and that the South just wanted slavery protected along with better enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act. Congress passed the amendment, in fact, but the states never ratified it. President Buchanan also supported such a measure. However, the South, or at least certain vocal and influential politicians who claimed to speak for the entire region, wanted no such deal. They also feared that Lincoln, despite his Thirteenth Amendment offer, was hostile toward slavery where it already existed. And why would the American Founders have included a provision for the breakup of their own experiment? Causes of Secession The South, at least if narrowly defined by Confederate leadership, seceded from the U. The North, defined likewise by its leaders, responded initially only to keep the South from leaving, not to end slavery. After all, the Confederate states spent most of their own post-colonial history under the U. In Vietnam, for instance, the U. Country A could invade country B for resources, and country B could fight back out of self-defense or for religious reasons. The American Civil War is another example because in a nutshell: This is a good teaching moment, if you pardon the rather lengthy digression that follows, because in all of American history the cause of the Civil War is the topic that the public and historians disagree on more than any other. Big states like Texas can cause a ripple effect when they force 8th-grade textbooks to downplay slavery as a cause of the Civil War. Slavery was an after issue. Fortunately, publishers are starting to tailor their books digitally on a state-by-state basis, mitigating the damage caused by such unnecessary white-washing of reality. Many citizens learn fishy things in school or at monuments and museums through no fault of their own, while for others their hearts get in the way of their heads. Ancestor worship is a universal instinct â€” even institutionalized in Confucianism â€” so people naturally want to believe their relatives fought for honorable causes. In many southern states, conversely, it was illegal to even mention slavery in relation to the Civil War for nearly a century afterward. While often an appropriate idea in academics, complexity, in this case, is a smokescreen for downplaying the most important factor. Learning to think historically can also involve simplifying by finding common threads amidst complex phenomena. Do they mean, Was Secession legal? Why did the South secede? Why did soldiers fight in the war? Why did the North challenge secession? Those are four different questions with four different answers. Tariffs were divisive for good reason, as we saw a few chapters ago in our discussion of the Nullification Crisis in South Carolina from Import duties helped protect northern industry while hurting the exporting South, who only stood to suffer from retaliatory duties in Europe and artificially high prices on products at home. Tariffs, in effect, constituted a tribute payment from Southerners and northern farmers to northern manufacturers. The newly-formed Republican Party tried to smooth over any potential conflict between northern farmers and manufacturers by pushing for tariffs on agricultural imports, too. The Morrill Tariff , passed after the secession of the first seven states just before Buchanan handed over the reins to Lincoln, extended protection to crops. The regions agreed on a compromise in , a big reduction favoring the South, and another decrease in One could argue that even the tariff controversy was indirectly tied to slavery through cotton production. What about economic differences? Likewise, this overlaps with slavery. In the previous chapter, we talked about the traditional, static South versus the upwardly mobile economy of the North. Increased communication networks and voter participation increased tension all the more. For interpretations emphasizing the economic struggle, the type of workers in industry wage workers and plantation agriculture slaves is incidental; the struggle is between industrial capitalism and plantation agriculture. But purely economic interpretations of the Civil War oversimplify regional differences between North and South, depicting traditional agriculture versus industrial capitalism. The anti-industrial agrarian movement had proponents in both regions, and many Southerners advocated industry. There was a lot of agriculture mixed in with northern industry; it was just family farms instead of plantations and small family plots. Moreover, some Southerners were Whig

businessmen that supported a stronger, more interventionist national government. Southern slave-grown cotton had traditionally fed textile mills in the North, Britain, and Europe, and Northerners made more money shipping, financing, and insuring slave-grown commodities than they did in their other relatively small mills. Northern textiles and Southern plantations were all part of the same system. For capitalists in the Cotton Kingdom, the crucial metric was bales per acre per hand. The question was which region would win the American future by spreading west, giving its political representatives a lock on power and backing their form of labor. The most popular southern author was Sir Walter Scott, a Romantic Scottish writer whose best-known work *Ivanhoe* depicts an honorable 12th-century Saxon stand against Norman tyranny. In questions like this, chronology, context, and timing matter. What stands out about Lincoln? Many things, including his height and stovepipe hat, but his distinguishing characteristic was that he was the first president in American history to oppose slavery, or at least its expansion. One South Carolina family conveyed that sentiment as they sent four sons off to fight: Did southern states secede because the national government was becoming too powerful in relation to the states? This explanation seemingly has some promise, because Lincoln threatened an important right of incoming western territories. He rejected their right to legalize slavery, and it was during the territorial phase that territories drew up their future state constitutions. Confederates opposed the right of those same western territories to outlaw slavery. Unsurprisingly, he got zero southern electoral votes. New Mexico and Utah had banned slavery during their territorial phases but, in order to prevent that from happening again, Jefferson Davis argued that the national government should buttress the *Dred Scott* ruling by reinforcing it with a federal slave code out west. Like the Confederates-to-be, Lincoln also favored a blanket ruling for new western territories. Such arguments and controversy could scarcely be avoided in a federal system designed to share and distribute power at multiple levels.

### Chapter 5 : James Buchanan - Wikipedia

*Secession really begins at home, with the actions we all take in our everyday lives to distance and remove ourselves from state authority – quietly, nonviolently, inexorably. The state is crumbling all around us, under the weight of its own contradictions, its own fiscal mess, and its own monetary system.*

Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: City of Stockbridge Vikki Consiglio wants amenities. To be precise, the Georgia woman wants fine dining, a Whole Foods and an upscale hotel. And she and many of her neighbors are willing to form a new city to get it. A referendum on whether or not to secede will be on the ballot in November. But she is surrounded by the tentacles of Stockbridge, a city 21 miles south of Atlanta, that through successive incorporations over the years has taken on the shape of an amoeba. Their other argument is money. Doing so, she says, will entice new high-end restaurants, retail and hotels to locate there. We know we can do better and have a Whole Foods. The sponsor of the initiative, Silicon Valley venture capitalist Tim Draper, who previously has championed efforts to divide California into as many as six different states, has said that splitting up "will get us better infrastructure, better education and lower taxes. Those longshot measures are, as the Los Angeles Times has noted, only the latest of more than attempts to split up or secede since California joined the Union in 1850. In the San Fernando Valley, with its 1. In , the well-to-do, largely white neighborhoods on the southern side of Baton Rouge, La. In many ways, a secession is like a divorce. And just as in an acrimonious divorce, the biggest question is who gets what. Unlike a divorce, however, only one party gets any say -- at least in that Atlanta suburb. Nathan Deal recently signed legislation that allows residents in an area marked for secession to vote in November on whether or not to form a new city. Stockbridge city officials filed a lawsuit seeking an injunction to stop the vote, claiming the secession is unconstitutional. The matter goes to court next month. As in Baton Rouge, secession proponents have been accused of racism. Currently, African-Americans outnumber whites 2-to-1 in Stockbridge, and last year the city elected its first black mayor and first all-black city council. Deal said state lawmakers should create a more consistent framework for the process going forward. The notion of seceding and forming a new government can seem to some residents like an attractive way to create a new community. But in general, splintering an existing municipality can make it harder for government to deliver services equitably, says Owens, the Emory political scientist.

**Chapter 6 : More zeal than discretion : the westward adventures of Walter P. Lane in SearchWorks catalog**

*The high unemployment is having deleterious effects on family, community, and local politics. The situation is analogous to early twentieth century America - a populace so divided and upset that here in Washington state that we gave "Progressive Party" candidate Theodore Roosevelt % of the vote AND Socialist Party candidate Eugene V. Debbs.*

Like other cotton-growing and slaveholding states, Texas seceded from the Union in early 1862 and joined the Confederate States of America. Texas was the seventh state to secede and the last to secede before the firing at Fort Sumter signaled the start of the Civil War and forced citizens of the upper South to choose between fighting against or with their Southern brethren. The election of a Republican, Abraham Lincoln, to the presidency of the United States and fears that Republican control of the executive branch would threaten slavery and the traditional rights and liberties of Americans precipitated the secession crisis in Texas and elsewhere. Some Texans were slow to accept secession, however, or never accepted it. They did not simply react to the election of Lincoln and emulate South Carolina. Indeed, the timing of the secession of Texas and the motivation behind it are of continued interest because they open up a series of questions about the nature of the Texas economy, the population, political parties, local needs, the role of such Unionists as Sam Houston, and the effects of public pressure to conform. Running through all of these questions is the role of slavery. Many Texans believed in the 1850s that slavery was vital to the Texas economy and to its future growth. Indeed, slavery had grown rapidly in Texas after annexation in 1845. By 1860 slaves constituted roughly 30 percent of the population. Limited means of transportation, however, concentrated plantations along the river valleys of eastern Texas and in the coastal counties just below Houston and Galveston. Only cotton grown in these places could easily reach a market. In other settled regions of Texas slavery was virtually absent, and the economy depended upon livestock, corn, or wheat and not on slavery and cotton. Texas was divided between a region dependent on slavery and a largely slave-free region. Most of those who lived in the slaveholding region in eastern and southeastern Texas had come to the state from the lower South. The population of the rest of the state had more diverse origins. Settlement extended little more than 100 miles west of Austin in 1845. Along the frontier were nonslaveholders from the upper South or from Germany. In north central Texas were wheat growers from the upper South. The major Texas cities, San Antonio, Houston, and Galveston, which all had populations just under 10,000, had significant German or Mexican populations. Population and economic characteristics greatly influenced secession. The diversity of the state slowed the secession process and helped to produce pockets of resistance to it. On the other hand, the recent immigration of many Texans from the lower South and their dependence on cotton and slavery influenced many to follow the lead of South Carolina and the rest of the lower South. Groups of Germans or upper Southerners who lived close to lower Southerners and in areas in which slavery and cotton were feasible were beginning to be assimilated into a lower South culture by and largely supported secession. Ties to political parties and ideology could in some cases determine attitudes toward secession. In general, Democrats were inclined to support the right of individuals to own slaves even at the expense of the Union. Whigs and other opposition groups were less inclined to sacrifice the Union for the sake of slavery. Regardless of their personal stake in slavery, groups were often influenced by party ties to support or oppose secession. Germans who did not hold slaves supported secession in Comal County out of loyalty to the Democratic party. Slaveholding former Whigs opposed secession in Galveston and Harrison counties. Local needs also influenced attitudes toward secession. Slaveholding Whigs in Galveston were often involved in extensive commercial dealings with merchants in England and New York. Any disruption of the Union would disrupt their business. Comal County Germans had learned during the nativist controversies of the 1840s that it was best to go along with other white Americans on the slavery issue. Along the frontier the ability or inability of the United States Army to protect the citizens often influenced attitudes toward secession. Well-protected areas, where the army garrisons were also the best market for local goods and services, opposed secession. Poorly protected areas supported secession. Closely related to local needs and political parties was the role of individuals, particularly individual Unionists. In Comal County, Ferdinand J. Lindheimer, a longtime Texan and the editor of the local

German-language newspaper, helped sway the Germans to support secession. Usually, however, secession was popular enough without the help of community leaders. Prominent Unionists, on the other hand, were a major reason that Texas did not secede before March. The most important of these was Sam Houston, the governor of the state from 1859 to 1861. He slowed the calling of a convention until January 1862, helped force the holding of a public referendum on secession February 23, 1862, and opposed joining the Confederacy. Along with other outspoken and well-placed Unionists such as state senator James W. Throckmorton, who was one of only eight members of the Secession Convention to vote against leaving the Union, Houston slowed but could not stop the secession movement. Secession could not be halted because public pressure became too great. Whether it was because the danger to slavery that Texans associated with the Republican party threatened the economy or because white Texans could not tolerate any move toward racial equality with black Texans, secession became an exceptionally charged issue. The emotion came to a head in late January and early February 1862, when a convention met in Austin and voted to secede. Pressure to call a convention to consider the issue began in October 1861, when it became apparent that Abraham Lincoln would be elected to the presidency. In Texas only the governor could call the legislature into special session, however, and only the legislature could call a convention. Houston refused to act and hoped that with time the ardor for secession would cool. Realizing that the governor would not act, Oran M. Ford, and several other prominent Texans took the law into their own hands. Starting around December 3, 1861, before South Carolina officially seceded, they printed calls in several Texas newspapers for the election, on January 8, 1862, of delegates to a convention to consider secession. The elections were to be supervised by the county judges of the state, and the convention was to meet on January 1862. Once it was clear that some sort of secession convention would meet, Houston convened the legislature in mid-January, with the hope that it would declare the convention illegal. Instead, legislators validated the calling of a convention, turned over the House chambers to the convention, and adjourned. Though the election of delegates needed all the legitimacy the Texas legislature could give it, existing evidence indicates that the election procedures did not meet even the low standards of the day. Delegates were often elected by voice votes at public meetings. Unionists were discouraged from attending such meetings or chose to ignore the process because they considered it illegal. As a result the delegates disproportionately favored secession. The delegates were in some ways a typical cross section of the free male population of the state. Their average age was about forty, and almost all had been born in slaveholding states. They were slightly wealthier than the average Texan, but the great planters and merchants of the state did not dominate the convention. Two significant components, however, distinguished the convention from the population as a whole—lawyers, who made up 40 percent of the membership, and slaveholders, who constituted 70 percent. After opening with prayer on Monday afternoon, January 28, 1862, the delegates to the convention elected Roberts as presiding officer. That power, I assert, you now represent. Wharton moved "that without determining now the manner in which this result should be effected, it is the deliberate sense of this Convention that the State of Texas should separately secede. Flournoy, the motion passed to 6. In the next two days the convention delegates worked out a formal ordinance of secession which, unlike those of the lower Southern states, called for a popular referendum to resolve the secession question officially. Texans had held a referendum on joining the Union in 1845, and most insisted on holding another to ratify leaving the Union in 1862. Besides, Governor Houston and the legislature had asked for such a referendum, and a popular vote would end all doubt, as the legislature saw the matter, about the legality of secession. It was a roll-call vote done in alphabetical order. When it was over, 10 had voted for secession and 8 against. The most prominent of those voting against was Throckmorton, of Collin County, who was later a Confederate general and a Reconstruction era governor of Texas. After the vote the convention formed the first of the Civil War Committees of Public Safety, sent delegates to Montgomery, Alabama, to participate in the establishment of the Confederate States of America, and adjourned on February 4 to await the popular vote. Before the vote, the Committee on Public Safety used the power given it by the convention to authorize the seizure of all federal property in Texas, including the arsenal at San Antonio. The committee order forced the evacuation of the almost 3,000 federal troops in Texas. The seizure of the San Antonio arsenal, the evacuation of federal troops, and the sending of delegates to Montgomery made the secession referendum itself appear an afterthought. For some individuals and in some

counties of Texas, however, the secession referendum was far from insignificant. Opposition to secession during the referendum campaign was concentrated in counties along the northern border of the state and in a circle of counties surrounding Austin. Leaders such as Throckmorton and Benjamin H. Epperson in North Texas and Elisha M. Houston continued to question the necessity and wisdom of leaving the Union. United States representative Andrew J. Hamilton, another citizen of Austin, also spoke against secession. Opposition to the measure exhibited three notable traits. First, it persisted in areas culturally, geographically, and economically unlike the lower South. Second, the status and number of its leaders encouraged the weak at heart and the apolitical to vote against secession. Third, in all these areas Unionist leaders often had left the Democratic party in the late s or never had belonged to that party. In contrast, the approximately one in four counties where over 95 percent of the vote was cast for secession were strongly linked to the lower South, had no outspoken critics of secession, and had very strong Democratic party organizations that facilitated secession. In these counties there is evidence of violence and intimidation of Unionists during January and February of Few opponents of secession spoke out on the eve of the secession referendum. Most probably did not vote. On February 23, , Texas went to the polls and voted for or against secession. The results for the state as a whole were 46, for and 14, against. Of the counties casting votes only eighteen cast majorities against secession. Only eleven others cast as much as 40 percent of their vote against.

**Chapter 7 : Allison to Cunningham | Tar Heel Civil War Leaders, â€“**

*Secession & the Constitution Lincoln needed all the help he could get because he was facing the stiffest challenge of any president in American history.*

Ironically, however, he was elected as the moderate, non-secessionist choice of Alabama voters. The son of a Revolutionary War and War of veteran, Moore was six feet tall, well built, with sharp facial features. Although sometimes rigid, he was generally frank and cordial, a master at political party maneuvering, and possessed of a logical mind. One legislative contemporary described Moore as "a clever fellow but scary," who "has a good opinion of himself. Although no information about his early education has survived, Moore evidently received a good one. Moore, who was the first of the family to settle in Perry County. The elder Moore established a plantation west of Marion near the old Fairview Presbyterian Church and became a successful cotton planter. In young Andrew Moore arrived in Marion, which was still a frontier town with log cabins. One account suggests that he had remained in South Carolina to complete his education; another that he came to Marion on business and had no intention of remaining permanently. He apparently was convinced by townspeople to stay and teach at a local school for two years, however. He then read law and was admitted to the bar in . On December 5, , Moore, a Presbyterian, married Mary Ann Goree, the daughter of a neighboring cotton planter, with whom he had four children. Moore served as a justice of the peace for eight years and in was elected to the state House of Representatives on the Democratic ticket. The Whig party was strong in Perry County, and Moore was defeated in but regained his legislative seat in . In the legislative session the following year, Moore supported the idea of counting only the white population to determine representation in the legislature, despite the preference in his Black Belt community for counting all people, including those who were enslaved , which would have increased the legislative power of those counties. Nonetheless, Moore retained the confidence of his constituency and held his seat for three more sessions. Benjamin Fitzpatrick Moore was elected speaker of the state House of Representatives in , , and . From this powerful position, he supported Governor Benjamin Fitzpatrick in his campaign to liquidate the Alabama state bank. Moore believed that the irregularities and excessive loans being exposed by legislative investigations of the state bank were destroying the credibility of the state government. He favored the relocation of the capital from Tuscaloosa to Montgomery , and he supported a constitutional amendment providing for biennial sessions of the legislature. Moore was the last person to speak in the old statehouse in Tuscaloosa, when he responded to a resolution of appreciation for his service as speaker. In , Moore was a presidential elector for the Democratic ticket, and in he represented Alabama as a delegate to the Nashville Convention, at which slave states met to discuss the potential ramifications of the Compromise of . In , Governor Henry W. His nomination occurred after 26 ballots and a spirited contest between several candidates. He supervised the construction of the state hospital for the insane in Tuscaloosa and saw it opened under Peter Bryce.

*Secession (derived from the Latin term secessio) is the withdrawal of a group from a larger entity, especially a political entity, but also from any organization, union or military alliance.*

Everything is considered but the will of the people and the health of their communities. How much longer can such an alienated populace live in pain under a seemingly disconnected and uncaring authority? Small businesses are being dragged through the bowels of bankruptcy at alarming rates. The trillions of federal support that encompass this "recovery" appear to have been mostly targeted to stabilizing our largest banking institutions and corporations at the expense of unions, small businesses, community banks, and families. These large institutions have not reciprocated with hiring, only downsizing. The feeling in small town America darkens. We appear to have spent the last ten years bankrupting our economy by fighting and losing wars most of us did not support, by loosing the reigns on a steroidally liquid economy whose end effect was the wholesale destruction of community and family. What do we owe Washington,D. Why should we believe in anything now? To whose allegiance do we owe our "patriotism" now? The argument is pervasive. In all corners, "middle Americans" are now in pain. The high unemployment is having deleterious effects on family, community, and local politics. The situation is analogous to early twentieth century America - a populace so divided and upset that here in Washington state that we gave "Progressive Party" candidate Theodore Roosevelt It seems certain now that we will not "recover" from shocks this deep. There is not enough "resilience" left inside of us to handle so much pain,loss, and volatility. And yet the "spectacle of government" parades on in Washington, D. Do its citizens bother to listen to it anymore? If not, those citizens may very soon start to consider their "options. The first might be a generalized revolt. Perhaps not an organized revolt at first, but small pockets of armed resistance organizing "criminal" strikes against local businesses, national corporations, federal infrastructure, interstate banks. At some point, "the foreclosure crisis" could escalate to such an epidemic that state governors would have to step in as they did in the depression , desperate to keep families and property taxpayers in their homes. This would break interstate banking and in turn possibly break the interstate economy as we now know it. In anticipation of these events, high level advocates of states rights are most probably right now contemplating a path to secession. The United States is geographically arranged such that economic relationships between the states could be formed independent of federal authority. These states have export based economies that could survive or even prosper as a single nation-state. If state based support were great enough for a "western secession", ultimately there would little the federal government could do against a unified effort here on the west coast or perhaps elsewhere. Most probably, large corporations and interstate banks would be "nationalized" either by law or in practice during any secessionist attempts. New taxing authorities, trade relationship, access to capital, and international relationships would have to be created. But then again, we are good at such things on the "Left Coast". Too good and too far-sighted to let a corrupt and bankrupt Wall Street and Washington, D.

**Chapter 9 : Unionism | Encyclopedia of Alabama**

*Secession, in U.S. history, the withdrawal of 11 slave states (states in which slaveholding was legal) from the Union during following the election of Abraham Lincoln as president.*

This page has been accessed times. Biography John Randolph Chambliss, Jr. A brigadier general of cavalry, Chambliss was killed in action during the Second Battle of Deep Bottom. Chambliss was born at Hicksford in Greensville County, Virginia. His father, John R. The younger Chambliss was appointed to the United States Military Academy, graduating 31st of 52 in the Class of , distinguished by having 15 future Civil War generals in it, including fellow Confederates John S. Chambliss was commissioned as a brevet second lieutenant in the mounted infantry, and taught at the cavalry school at Carlisle, Pennsylvania until the following spring, when he resigned. He then returned home to Hicksford, where his father was a wealthy planter, and was engaged in agriculture until the spring of Taking advantage of his military education, he served as aide-de-camp to Governor Henry A. Wise, with the initial rank of major, from 1858 Chambliss was colonel of a regiment of Virginia militia from 1859 He was the brigade inspector general for the Commonwealth for two years. His father was a delegate to the secession convention in 1861, and the younger Chambliss maintained a strong allegiance to Virginia With the outbreak of the Civil War, Chambliss was commissioned colonel of the 13th Virginia Cavalry in July 1861, and until the fall of 1861 was under the orders of Maj. Hill, in the department south of the James River. He received a commendation for his performance from General Robert E. In November he was assigned with his regiment to W. At Beverly Ford with 50 men, he drove two Federal squadrons into the river, capturing a number of prisoners. He and his men were commended for bravery by both Generals R. Solomon Williams killed, Chambliss took command of the brigade, and served in that capacity during the fighting about Aldie and Middleburg. On July 3, he engaged in the fierce fighting at East Cavalry Field. Upon the withdrawal of the army to safety in Virginia, his brigade covered the movement of the Confederate trains. Promoted to brigadier general, Chambliss continued in command of the brigade, through the cavalry fighting from the Rapidan River to the James, gaining fresh laurels in the defeat of the Federals at Stony Creek. Finally, in a cavalry battle on the Charles City Road, on the north side of the James, he was killed while leading his men. It was buried in the family graveyard in Emporia, Virginia. Lee wrote that "the loss sustained by the cavalry in the fall of General Chambliss will be felt throughout the army, in which, by his courage, energy and skill, he had won for himself an honorable name. General John Randolph Chambliss Jr. His father was a delegate to the secession convention in 1861, and the younger Chambliss maintained a strong allegiance to Virginia. With the outbreak of the Civil War, Chambliss was commissioned colonel of the 13th Virginia Cavalry in July 1861, and until the fall of 1861 was under the orders of Maj. Solomon Williams killed, Chambliss took command of the brigade, and served in that capacity during the fighting in Aldie and Middleburg. During the subsequent Bristoe Campaign, still in command of the brigade, Chambliss reinforced Lunsford L. This map of Confederate defenses surrounding Richmond was recovered by Union forces from the body of Chambliss Promoted to brigadier general, Chambliss continued in command of the brigade, through the cavalry fighting from the Rapidan River to the James, gaining fresh laurels in the defeat of the Federals at Stony Creek. Finally, in a cavalry battle on the Charles City Road, on the north side of the James River, Chambliss was killed while leading his men. Thereafter, he was exhumed and delivered to his friends.