

Chapter 1 : Peter F. Strawson, Freedom and resentment - PhilPapers

First published thirty years ago but long since unavailable, Freedom and Resentment collects some of Strawson's most important work and is an ideal introduction to his thinking on such topics as the philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology and aesthetics.

We have here, under one cover, valuable contributions to the most diverse and broad ranging problems in philosophy. This reissue includes a substantial new foreword by Paul Snowdon and a fascinating intellectual autobiography by Strawson, which together form an excellent introduction to his life and work. Freedom and Resentment And other essays P. Reprinted with kind permission. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays was the second of these collections, coming out in Further, one paper about perception deals with Kant, and the essay on mind engages with Descartes. His writing touched virtually every branch of philosophy. The collection also reveals two other aspects of his writings. Each essay contains and develops a bold and novel hypothesis not necessarily only one. In each, also, the ideas are developed, without exception, with intelligence, subtlety and care. One can liken reading these papers to listening to a succession of performances by a virtuoso of pieces of contrasting complexity, but where the control and the quality are always manifest. Before that I wish to introduce the other papers. The chief characteristic of the review is balance. It attempts to formulate the leading ideas sympathetically but also to maintain a critical distance, and it is in the critical responses that I feel there is most to learn. I shall select one example. Wittgenstein thought that the role of proper philosophy is basically negative, to eliminate philosophical errors, arising, as he thought, from misuse of language. On his conception this is to be done by basically reacquainting the thinker with his or her language. This is sometimes called philosophy as therapy. But it is quite another matter to claim that this is the sole purpose of good philosophy. Moreover, no reason has yet been given to suppose there are no general interesting truths discoverable by philosophical methods. This misconception is supposed to be captured in talk of pain as essentially private. Strawson is right, though, to suggest that when Wittgenstein develops his supposedly myth-free conception of sensations he says much that is hard to accept and, indeed, to understand. Descartes thought that each of us is an individual, non-spatial ego, which is causally linked to a body in space. The central problem is that the Cartesian hypothesis requires that we can understand the notion of a single enduring consciousness, an ego, including such aspects as the contrast between one and another at a time, and of a single one continuing over time. Strawson suggests that no such understanding can exist once we cut our understanding of subjects of consciousness from our normal conception of ourselves as physical and embodied persons. The question raised, though, is not whether such an understanding is required – it obviously is – but by what standards it can be shown that the Cartesian notion is not intelligible. Earlier in the paper Strawson develops another anti-Cartesian problem. His idea is that the analysis of our lives into the lives of two different substances, the ego and the body, requires that statements about us must be reducible to statements about the body conjoined with statements about the ego. But there is another weakness. Surely, a chair, for example, consists of a seat plus back, but the property of being a comfortable chair can hardly be reduced to a conjunction of claims about the seat and others about the back. It depends rather on the relation between seat and back. Similarly, if people are egos with bodies, properties of people do not have to be analysable into conjunctions. One is historical, to make as much sense as one can of the tendency to appeal to imagination in theorizing about perception, as evidenced in the writings of Hume, Kant, and Wittgenstein. But that task is linked to another – to specify, and explain the real character of perceptual experience. Thus, I have to say something like: Strawson accepts and argues for the view propounded by H. Grice that the object must cause an experience in the subject. What else is required? Which ix x foreword causal chains qualify? Strawson objects that this leaves the concept of perceiving quite unilluminated. This is highly ingenious and has attracted considerable discussion. The other issue can be introduced by asking whether, when the subject

who discriminates the black patch is in fact seeing a dark island, we should say that the black patch is the island, or that there is the island and the black patch. Strawson proposes that we can say either. Gilbert Ryle talked often about category mistakes without giving a general foreword explanation of them. Strawson proposes that given, roughly, the ideas of picking out an object in an adequate way and of a priori derivations from such modes of reference, the notion has a chance of being explained. In a certain way of thinking about natural language, associated with Davidson, the attempt is made to say what the words of ordinary language are doing, by assigning them a logical form. The assignment is effected by pairing ordinary language sentences with formulae in the predicate calculus. Strawson shows that to answer this is not straightforward, and his discussion of alternatives is highly illuminating. Eventually he suggests a satisfactory account can be given. However, what that leaves is the question as to why we should accept such proposals. Strawson suggests that there is no evident reason that forces us to accept it. Obviously Strawson is not able to survey all possible replies to his question, but his paper forces anyone inclined to play the logical form assignment game in this way to justify their practice. The second is the idea of the moral, the idea of constraints and obligations acknowledged in our social lives. Whether the perspective he adopts in thinking about morality is the most illuminating one is, perhaps, the main question the essay prompts. By contrast, with moral evaluation we can locate such properties, say cruelty or kindness. This claim about the aesthetic certainly has the ring of truth. One might push the question further and ask why there are no such properties. One might also ask whether the absence of such properties is unique to aesthetic appraisal. And, indeed, whether it is the sole mark of aesthetic evaluation. What implications does the possible truth of determinism have for our status as agents susceptible of moral evaluation? How does Strawson try to do this? He initially focuses on certain participant reactive attitudes that are central to human life. Examples are resentment and gratitude. As Strawson characterizes them, these are feelings we get in response to our sense of the attitudes towards ourselves of those around us. We feel resentment if we think that in their actions they wish us harm or display no concern. Gratitude is felt where we sense their actions are expressions of liking or regard. However, it is, according to Strawson, impossible to maintain such an objective attitude towards normal people most of the time, since these attitudes are inevitable and central. This would remain impossible even if we were convinced of determinism. Strawson concludes that it cannot be said that the rationality of such attitudes depends on the falsity of determinism. He then isolates certain parallel reactions which are moral and vicarious, rather than participant, such as the disgust or anger one feels on hearing of the slaughter of innocents. His claim is, though, that the same impossibility of a general suspension applies here, and there is a similar lack of dependence of such responses on a rejection of determinism. Determinism similarly cannot impugn their rationality either. Strawson is stressing two things. First, that there is no rational dependence of our responses on the falsity of determinism. Strawson hopes that this offering of a more realistic account of our thinking will remove the problems that pessimists have with optimism. Strawson is right, surely, that social life as we know it must include what we might describe as living and regarding others as living under the idea of responsibility for their actions. It would, therefore, be highly inconvenient should it be true that falling under the idea of responsibility requires something that we lack. Naturally, a novel attempt to ground optimism attracts attention. That conception is one that has considerable appeal and lasting attractions. Despite these attractions the crucial question is whether Strawson has done enough to really persuade us that the pessimist is wrong. What precisely does Strawson offer? The crucial page is The pessimist will reply that my claim is not that people already do this, but that in fact if we are determined then we do not qualify as responsible. Strawson next points out that we cannot envisage abandoning holding each other responsible. The pessimist will reply that this simply means that we are bound to treat each other in ways that are not merited, but why is that impossible? That is the fundamental question. My response is a personal one and quite other aspects would have been highlighted by others. Dancy, *Perceptual Knowledge* Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. Hahn *The Philosophy of P.* Open Court, pp. Strawson *Philosophical Logic* Oxford: Clarendon Press, ch. I was the second child, with two brothers and one much younger sister. My parents were both school teachers, though my mother gave up teaching on marriage. My mother retained an excellent memory for verse, which I inherited. Unlike him, I declined to join the Cadet Corps. I still feel grateful to the French teacher Miss Jacobi at the earlier school, who required us to

learn the phonetic alphabet and strove to inculcate a correct pronunciation of the language she taught.

Chapter 2 : Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays - PDF Free Download

To ask other readers questions about Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays, please sign up. Be the first to ask a question about Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays I sludged through the titular essay. Strawson is a pretty dull writer. The essay pretty much tries to see what would happen if we.

An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. German translation by F. Reclam, French translation by A. Editions du Seuil, Italian translation by E. Feltrinelli, Japanese translation by N. Misuzu Shobo, Polish translation by B. Wydawniczy Pax, Spanish translation by A. Taurus, The Bounds of Sense: Spanish translation by C. Revista de Occidente, German translation by E. Lange Hain, Italian translation by M. Laterza, Japanese translation, Logico-Linguistic Papers. Methuen, Freedom and Resentment and other Essays. Methuen, Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar. Methuen, Skepticism and Naturalism: Columbia University Press, An Introduction to Philosophy. Oxford University Press , Oxford University Press, Schlipp La Salle III.: Open Court, " A Problem about Truth: A reply to Mr. Warnock" in Truth, ed. Pitcher, Englewood Cliffs N. Prentice Hall, "Truth: University of Massachusetts Press , "Categories" in Ryle: A Collection of Critical essays, ed. Reidel, "Perception and its Objects" in Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. Zak Van Straaten Oxford: Nathan Rotenstreich and Norma Schneider Jerusalem: Bruce Vermazen and J. Poshast Frankfurt am Main: Dieter Henrich and R. Klett Cotta, "Ma Philosophie: Robert Barrett and Roger Gibson Oxford: Brown, Peter Strawson, Routledge, , p.

Chapter 3 : P.F. Strawson: Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (PDF) - ebook download - english

Freedom and resentment and other essays by , Methuen edition.

Chapter 4 : Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays - ePub - P.F. Strawson - Achat ebook | fnac

Beginning with the title essay Freedom and Resentment, this invaluable collection is testament to the astonishing range of Strawson's thought as he discusses free will, ethics and morality, logic, the mind-body problem and aesthetics. The book is perhaps best-known for its three interrelated.

Chapter 5 : Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays: 1st Edition (e-Book) - Routledge

By the time of his death in , Sir Peter Strawson was regarded as one of the world's most distinguished philosophers. First published thirty years ago but long since unavailable, Freedom and Resentment collects some of Strawson's most important work and is an ideal introduction to his thinking on such topics as the philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology and aesthetics.

Chapter 6 : Citation Tool: Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays. Strawson, P.F. (Routledge,)

asks them would normally be taken to be committed to the belief that the phenomenon which is the subject of his inquiry is something publicly perceptible.

Chapter 7 : Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays by Peter Frederick Strawson

Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays was the second of these collections, coming out in The i-rst, Logico-Linguistic Papers, contained many of Strawson's.

Chapter 8 : Freedom and resentment and other essays (edition) | Open Library

'Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays' by P.F. Strawson is a digital PDF ebook for direct download to PC, Mac, Notebook, Tablet, iPad, iPhone, Smartphone, eReader - but not for Kindle. A DRM capable reader equipment is required.

Chapter 9 : Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays - P.F. Strawson - Google Books

In his essay, "Freedom and Resentment", Strawson aims to prove human freedom by evaluating two opposing viewpoints, the optimist and the pessimist toward determinism, and discrediting various ideas within each argument in order to arrive at his own conclusion.