

**Chapter 1 : Gul Hassan Khan - Wikipedia**

*Gul Hassan Khan (Urdu: ﻏﻮﻝ ﮬﺴﺎﻥ ﮐﻪﻥ, ‎; b. 10 October ), was a former lieutenant-general and the last Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army, serving under President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from 20 December until 3 March*

We believe in Freedom for all. We accept articles from individuals, please contact. Thursday, July 23, Book Review: Fallacies and Realities An Analysis of Lt. Gen Gul Hassan Memoir Maj. Aboobaker Osman Mitha has a provided a very brief account of Lt. To make it more understandable, I will segregate it into following. Fallacies and Realities provide a brief account for the instances made by Gul Hassan in his Memoir against the then C-in-C, other seniors and Mitha. He was Deputy to Gen. Tikka for the first four weeks of the East Pakistan operation. Mitha laid into eternal rest in It also discusses the duties of senior officers and responsibility to maintain discipline of all kinds that Gul Hassan seems to spare himself off. The booklet also serves as a reminder to Gul Hassan of his unfulfilled duties and inefficiency to do so and an excellent overview of historic events by the eyewitness himself. Gull Hassan, being the then DMO, who was responsible for the defense plans and the issue of operation orders, has composed his Memoirs in which he has dealt with the planning for the war at some length. Gull Hassan had the misfortune of spending nearly the entire period of war as ADC to his very senior Army Commanders, more like a tale of personal services. These postings kept him far from regimental and command encounters, which give a specific shape to an officer character. Gull Hassan as ADC was denied this opportunity, bringing about his unconventional conduct design when stood up to with talking about exceptionally key inquiries with his seniors. Gull Hassan never liked feedback and contrast of feeling. Sher Bahadur, amid the war is a glaring case. Mitha had close contacts with Gen. Sher Bahadur, who was a proficient senior officer and a man of few words who could get a handle on the circumstance obviously. Mitha see him as exceptionally cool and quiet identity in all circumstances. Gull Hassan feedback of Sher Bahadur seems ridiculous. Mitha credits Gull Hassans feedback to his long experience as an ADC, where vicinity to great commanders gave him the sentiment vainglory. Mitha says, he stayed near to them yet not amid their planning meetings rather to personal services. I have learnt the following lessons. One should keep country and his duties above personal grudge and ego. One should put forward his opinion and plans without disrespecting seniors in case not accepted. If someone is senior to you he must have done something extraordinary to have that positions although not necessarily. I have learnt a great deal of how GHQ functioned at that time and the advancement since then. I have grasped the knowledge about GHQ sub-divisions and how they function in both war and peace time. I have also learnt how the brilliant achievement of armour were nullified at Khem Kharan because Gull Hassan failed as DMO to provide infantry cover to the armour and it had to abandon ground captured on two successive days. Recommendations Gull Hassan Memoir is a record of individual stories and accomplishments. This booklet has lifted the drapery to some degree. Gull Hassan did his best to stick it on others, with whom he neglected to make a working relationship. Armed force anticipates that each man will do his duty regardless of individual likes and aversions. One ought not to compose such aggressive comments against his seniors and partners with nobody to affirm and no ethical ground to hold. If Gull Hassan was so critical of his seniors and planning of , he should have resigned in protest. Then he would have been in a better position to comment or criticize them now.

**Chapter 2 : My views: Book Review: Fallacies and Realities An Analysis of Lt. Gen Gul Hassan Memoir**

*The autobiography of the last Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, the book dwells mainly on the author's years with Field Marshal Slim during the Second World War, and on Pakistan's two wars with India.*

He was the son of Muhammad Akram Khan. He belonged to a village named Utmanzai Parichkhail Family in the district of Charsadda. He returned to India and he was attached to a battalion of the Hampshire Regiment [2] from 1935, after which he was admitted to the Indian Army on 18 March and was posted to the 6th battalion, 13th Frontier Force Rifles. As a Captain and temporary Major he was awarded the Distinguished Service Order for conspicuous gallantry and leadership displayed during the Battle of Kwanlan Ywathit. His original role was in arranging guns and devising strategies for the Poonch rebels organised by Sardar Ibrahim with the assistance of the Pakistan Army. He makes clear he had no involvement in the Pashtun lashkars organised by Khurshid Anwar , which invaded the state on 22 October Less than two months after Independence, fighting started in Kashmir , the Indian Army landed in Srinagar and confronted the Pathan tribesmen who were advancing towards the valley. Akbar Khan, who was then a Brigadier, assumed command of the regulars and irregulars fighting against the Indian forces and was given the code name "General Tariq". He also had a grudge against General Douglas David Gracey , then Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, who had put a brake on the deeper involvement of the Pakistani army on the Kashmir front. The constraints under which Akbar Khan had to conduct the battle in Kashmir made him a very frustrated and dissatisfied man. By nature he was extremely brave and, in fact, rather rash. He was also very ambitious. The conspiracy begins[ edit ] In sheer frustration, Akbar Khan started discourses with other armed forces officers to form a group to stage a military coup. The government also became suspicious of his moves. He thus came under the watch of the intelligence agencies. Brigadier Akbar was now due for promotion on the basis of his seniority. Meanwhile, Akbar Khan continued his surreptitious meetings and discussions with various army officers and later with the civilians too. It was not being allowed to function openly as a political party. Ordinary workers and even sympathizers were often arrested, beaten, sent to the fearful Lahore Fort for interrogation and threatened with dire consequences if they did not break all connections with the CP. This was the climate of oppression of the left at that time. Apparently the general had promised the CP leadership that if he came to power he would stop the continuous governmental assault on the leftists; the CP would be allowed to function as a legitimate political party like any other party and to take part in the elections which General Akbar promised to hold a few months after consolidating his power. In return the CP and its affiliated trade unions, kissan peasant committees, etc. In this meeting were also present Lt-Colonel Siddique Raja MC, and Major Mohammed Yousuf Sethi both of whom later obtained state pardon and became approvers in the case against the others. The Governor-General was to be forced to announce the dismissal of the Liaquat Government and the formation of an interim government presumably under General Akbar Khan. The general also spoke about Kashmir , land reforms, eradication of corruption and nepotism and some such other topic. This police officer had been a confidant of the general for over two years or more and had never leaked out any secret. The governor wasted no time in contacting the Prime Minister. Later some other people were also picked up. But one of the accused, Mohammed Hussain Ata , who was underground eluded arrest for a long time. He was eventually arrested in East Pakistan about a month after the trial proceedings had commenced. Most of the accused were originally kept in various Lahore jails and later shifted to Hyderabad jail where a special compound inside the jail had been renovated and turned into the court premises. A special tribunal had been formed by the government to hear the case. The trial[ edit ] The trial began on 15 June at 8. The prosecution was led by the formidable A. Brohi - this was one of his earlier cases. Later he was to achieve great fame and notoriety as a legal adviser of dictators and authoritarians. Lari on behalf of General Akbar. Gradually as the case proceeded and continued month after month, many of the counsel departed due to the inability of their clients to pay them. But credit goes to H. Suhrawardy who fought till the very end even when his client had stopped paying him anything more. The basic charge against all the accused was one of "Conspiracy to wage war against the King". The latter was of "persons, who, without being either parties or

willing parties to it, either deposed to the existence of the conspiracy or stated facts which might lead a court to draw a conclusion in favour of its existence; and of persons who were either, on their own statements, or on account of admissions of facts made by them, or due to existence of other reasonable grounds, held to be willing parties to the conspiracy. It was not a false case at all. In general the bulk of the evidence was true. But there was a major falsehood which negated all the claims of the state of presenting a truthful case before the tribunal. The prosecution induced the approvers to state that at the end of the crucial meeting of 23 February the people present had agreed to overthrow the government. They had to tell this lie because otherwise the allegation of conspiracy would have fallen flat. If there is no agreement there is no conspiracy under the law. There was no agreement, and therefore no conspiracy! General Akbar could have very well been punished under the Army Act for even presenting such a plan and for trying to subvert the loyalty of others. In jail the military officers and the intellectual civilians managed to get along together reasonably well, in spite of wide differences in ideology and thinking between some individuals. Actually, General Akbar had somehow managed to gather quite a diverse bunch of characters. So was Major Ishaq Mohammed, but at that time he was still a beginner. Later, of course, Major Ishaq became a symbol of militant left-wing politics in Pakistan. He was a fearless person and used to argue with vehemence even with the judges of the Tribunal. After an exchange of hot words, Justice Sir Abdul Rahman thundered: Ishaq and Ata were both hot-tempered and indulged in blistering polemics when discussing politics in jail. The two coolest customers in that circle were the senior members of the group, Syed Sajjad Zaheer and Faiz Ahmed Faiz. Aftermath[ edit ] Of the fifteen, the only woman, Begum Nasim , was acquitted, while Major General Nazir Ahmad was dismissed from service and sentenced till the rising of the court. All the others received prison sentences ranging from a minimum of four years civilians and junior officers to a maximum of 12 years for Major General Akbar Khan. In the words of the principal accused, Akbar Khan, it was General Ayub Khan the Army C-in-C who was the choreographer of this comic strip conspiracy case and who apparently had feared that Akbar Khan had about two divisions at his disposal, to support him. His ordeal after his arrest is best described in his own words: In the early hours of the morning on 9 March I was arrested and carried away the whole of that day, a long distance from Pindi, to jail. In the deserted suburbs of what looked like a dead town, distant and asleep, that cold night, at 11 p. That morning while I had been sleeping peacefully, a hundred men had surrounded my house and successfully overpowered my one unarmed watchman. Then Major-General Mian Hayauddin knocked at my bedroom window and said that he had to see me about something most urgent. I had gone at once, without even putting on shoes, through the study door to meet him. I had only a split second to think and I had let them come on. I think it had been the complete failure of this melodrama to impress me at all that had stopped the men mid-stride. A mere telephone call would have sufficed to tell me that I was under arrest. The UK High Commissioner in his 3rd report to his Government on the Rawalpindi Conspiracy ending 17 March on the question of evidence against the conspirators, stated that "General Akbar Khan was a dangerous man, under the influence of an ambitious wife, and that he had been regarded as very anti- Commonwealth before he went to the United Kingdom last year to attend the Joint Services Staff College. The impression was that on his return, he would be less anti-British, and it was felt that he might be sobered up by being given a responsible job under the eye of the Commander-in-Chief at GHQ. According to an informant In spite of all this those in charge were, last December, quite happy to appoint the General to a key post in the Pakistan Army". Akbar Khan was also one of three generals the others being Lt. Death[ edit ] Muhammad Akbar Khan died in at the age of 81 in Karachi. He was buried in Defense Military graveyard Karachi. Lt Gen Attiqur Rahman Back to the Pavilion. Riza, Major Gen Shaukat The Pakistan Army â€”

**Chapter 3 : Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan by Gul Hassan Khan**

*In his candid autobiography Lieutenant-General Gul Hassan Khan recounts his experiences as ADC to the Quaid-i-Azam which gave him an insight into the character of the founder of Pakistan.*

He got his early education from a school in his village. He was a squadron commander during the war with India. He attended the Command and Staff College Quetta in Thus, Gul had already cemented his ties with General Zia by serving under him when both were officers in the Armoured regiments of the II Corps. Gul was promoted to Brigadier in and steadily rose to be the Martial Law Administrator of Bahawalpur and then the Commander of the 1st Armoured Division, Multan in , his appointments expressly wished by Zia himself. Inter-Services Intelligence activities in Afghanistan During his time as head of the ISI amid the Sovietâ€”Afghan War , Gul was said to have planned and executed the operation to capture Jalalabad from the Soviet-backed Afghan army in the spring of This switch to conventional warfare was seen as a mistake by some since the mujahideen did not have the capacity to capture a major city, and the battle did not yield expected ground results. However, the Pakistani army was intent on installing a resistance-backed government in Afghanistan, with Jalalabad as their provisional capital, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf as Prime Minister , and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as Foreign Minister. Contrary to Pakistani expectations, this battle proved that the Afghan army could fight without Soviet help, and greatly increased the confidence of government supporters. Conversely, the morale of the mujahideen involved in the attack slumped and many local commanders of Hekmatyar and Sayyaf concluded truces with the government. As a result of this failure, Hamid Gul was sacked by Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and replaced by Shamsur Rahman Kallu, who pursued a more classical policy of support to the rebels fighting in Afghanistan. Domestic politics[ edit ] During his tenure as ISI chief in , General Gul successfully gathered conservative politicians and helped them create Islami Jamhoori Ittehad IJI , a centre-right conservative coalition united against the left-leaning Pakistan Peoples Party. When she asked him to stop playing that card, he reportedly told her: Madam, keeping Punjab destabilized is equivalent to the Pakistan army having an extra division at no cost to the taxpayers. According to him, "Iran should come clear on the nature of agreement with India. He also added that in case doubts about the agreement came true and Iran was seen as working with India against " Kashmir freedom struggle", then it would be concluded that the country also supports Mossad , the Israeli external intelligence agency. However, he became dispassionate with the United States after it turned its back on Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal, as the United States had promised to help build a prosperous Afghanistan. General Gul then went on to declare that "the Muslim world must stand united to confront the U. General Gul faced down riot police when they tried to arrest him at a rally outside the Supreme Court in Islamabad protesting against attempts to dismiss Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. He was shown a U. Gul rejected these allegations.

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Almost none discuss its wartime decision making. His year career in the army culminated in his becoming the commander-in-chief C-in-C. And, as he reminds us in the sub-title of the book, he was the last C-in-C. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto replaced the C-in-C position with Chief of Army Staff in the vain hope that it would diminish the risks of an army take over. When Pakistan became independent, he became aide-de-camp to Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Gul Hassan was the director of military operations during the war and the chief of general staff during the war. Thus, Gul Hassan did not just see history in the making. He was part of history. In the ensuing two decades, he reflected on the great calamity of in which Pakistan lost half the country and its respect in the community of nations. In he published his memoir. It came to a devastating conclusion: The disaster that came could have been prevented. The problem was that General Yahya wore three hats. He was the president, the chief martial law administrator, and the C-in-C. He had no time for running the army since he was busy holding general elections and managing the subsequent tension between the leaders of the majority party which was based entirely in the east and the minority party which was based entirely in the west. Yahya lost his grip on events when he launched Operation Searchlight in the east. Instead of restoring law and order, it gave birth to an interminable insurgency. He appointed Vice Admiral Ahsan as the governor. He panicked and lost control. Next, Yahya appointed Lt. Yaqub Khan as the governor and martial law administrator. Based on his assessment of the situation, Yaqub invited Yahya to engage in a dialogue with the Sheikh. When Yahya refused, Yaqub resigned. Much later, Yahya appointed a Bengali civilian governor to stem the tide. Then, in quick succession, amnesty for the rebels was announced. This did not elicit even a lukewarm response. In that role, he was the de facto C-in-C since General Yahya was the president. However, he failed to function as the C-in-C, nor did he carry out his duties as CoS. For example, GHQ did not know what was happening on the diplomatic front or what was being planned on the western border with India. The Chinese had told him to find a political solution. He was now praying that that Pakistan would be rescued by angles. And Niazi was oblivious to the ground realities. He did not expect an Indian invasion. His troop deployments were designed to prevent India from creating a minor encroachment to set up a puppet government, not to forestall the coordinated, full-scale assault that came in December. The intelligence system had broken down totally since most of the officers were Bengali. At the same time, the martial law authorities had been unable to resolve the problem politically. Gul Hassan visited the east and apprised Hamid of what he saw. Until the very end, the president remained blind to the conflict between his political and military aims. On my second reading, I discovered that they were equally rich on strategy and decision making within the high-command. Unfortunately there are no references or footnotes in the text. But that is not a fatal flaw, just a limitation common to most memoirs.

**Chapter 5 : Taleem e Ghousia By Gul Hassan Qadri Qalandari Pdf - The Library Pk**

*General Gul Hassan also narrates and analyses dispassionately the events of the India-Pakistan wars of and The final section of the book covers events after the fall of Dhaka, and deals with the author s relationship with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.*

After the match is over, you shake hands with your enemy," says the former Pakistani army chief disarmingly. In he was commissioned in the British army. After Partition, he served the Pakistani army for 25 years. He resigned as army chief following differences with the then Pakistan prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He now spends half the year in Vienna, Austria; the other half he spends in Rawalpindi. A lively and illuminating encounter. After Benazir Bhutto was defeated, she said she had paid for her hawkish position on India. She is highly immature and so was her father. One American journalist, who was writing a book on Bhutto, came and asked me, "Everybody say that Bhutto was intelligent. Do you find him intelligent? During the elections, did she not take an anti-India stance? Look, this was just in the last phase of the elections, for political purposes. When Rajiv Gandhi came to Pakistan, she was all over him. She had private meetings with him and his family. We must not forget one thing. That our people are fed up, your people are fed up too. All of us want development. Do you think at the ground level, at the common man on the street level, there is a genuine desire for peace with India? Last year my friends from India came to Pakistan and went all over the place. They were received very warmly. They want to the Khyber Pass and Peshawar. They were treated as State guests. And the same is the case in India. Pakistani and Indian people, you see, are very simple. There is great suspicion in India about your Inter Service Intelligence? Is the ISI really an extra constitutional organisation in Pakistan? Why is it whenever something goes wrong in India fingers are pointed at the ISI? Laughs Because there is no one to blame. The same is the case in Pakistan. Whenever something goes wrong, we blame RAW. They are not that powerful. They can be put in their place. They are not an autonomous body. The problem with the ISI is that sometimes, the government wants to control it and sometimes the army wants to control it. So there is a lot of confusion. How does it operate? I have no idea at all. You must be joking. I have no idea. I have heard only that much. But in my time they were not doing that. Is it true that when Pakistani generals, especially President Zia realised that it was not possible for Pakistan to vanquish India in battle that the idea of Operation Topac and K2 was born to create insurgencies in Kashmir and Punjab? I was not there in Pakistan. I was in Vienna. And I had no contacts with Zia those days. Can you accurately state that the ISI and other Pakistani agencies were not involved in training Punjabi and Kashmiri militants? Firstly, because I cannot read newspapers. My eyes are very bad. Is it not true that ISI has operatives in many parts of Kashmir? Let me give you one example. Yesterday, I met some Indians who asked me how we were treating Indian prisoners. I asked, which Indian prisoners? They said 90, Indian prisoners from the war are languishing in Pakistani jails. I said, "look, you must be out of your head Our country has no food to feed our own chaps. How will our country feed 90, prisoners? But there are thousands of Indian prisoners in Pakistan? These chaps must be smuggling and must be caught for spying. But I believe many Indian prisoners of war from the conflict still languish in Pakistani jails? Let me tell you one thing: As soon as the Bangladesh war ended, Indian prisoners were the first whom Bhutto sent back. How many prisoners were there? I think there were , Will you agree that some disgruntled sections of the Muslim community in India are being added with arms and finance by Pakistani agencies like the ISI? The Muslim population in India is larger than our population. So what can we do for these Muslims? Some section of the Muslim population in India may appear more loyal to Pakistan. During an India- Pakistan cricket match, if Pakistan wins, some sections of Muslims celebrate the event in their localities. This is one reason why some Hindus feel that Muslims in India are more loyal to Pakistan than to India. Have you heard of this? No, I have never heard of this. The Hindu-Muslim problem has been there since British days. This is a normal phenomenon. I have never met those Muslims. I have met many Muslims in India and I did not find anyone lenient towards us. Muslims are quite neutral in India. Neutral in what sense? I found that Hindus and Muslims interact with each other very much as they used to do in my college days before Independence. Atul Chowdhury Have you read the first part of the interview?

