

Chapter 1 : George Frederick Stout - Oxford Reference

STOUT, GEORGE FREDERICK (-). George Frederick Stout was an English philosopher and psychologist. Records of Stout's early life are scant. He was born in South Shields, Durham.

He went to Cambridge as a classical scholar of St. He was made a fellow of his college in In Stout went to the University of Aberdeen as lecturer in comparative psychology. At that time, comparative psychology did not designate the study of animal behavior; it meant treating psychology in a Darwinian rather than a philosophical context. In he became Wilde reader in mental philosophy at Oxford, and finally he moved north again to become professor of philosophy at St. Andrews University, where he remained from until his retirement in Stout was essentially what is now disparagingly called an armchair psychologist, but this did not detract from his influence on British psychology, which continued into the years following World War i; the fifth edition of his *Manual of Psychology* appeared as late as His first and most original book was *Analytic Psychology*, which appeared in , to be followed by the *Manual* in and the *Groundwork of Psychology* in Thereafter his interests became more philosophical; he was, after all, a professor of philosophy by this time. During the latter half of the nineteenth century the distinctively British account of mental processes, with its empiricism and associationism, as represented by James Mill and Alexander Bain , was influenced and greatly enriched by contemporary developments in Germany and in particular by the sophisticated epistemology of Kant. This raised arguments against associationism that so far have not been satisfactorily answered. Stout was a pupil of Ward, with whom he differed on many points of detail but on few of substance. He advanced some distance beyond his teacher, however, and in the fields of perception and cognition he put forward views that are often credited to later writers. For example, the *Manual* contains an early formulation of the gestalt position that, to be sure, lacks experimental evidence but does not differ in any essential from the theories elaborated in Germany during the decade after Stout was in no sense a behaviorist, but he held that mind and body are always implicated with one another in two basic ways. First of all, minds are embodied; they are never to be found on their own. Second, the concept of awareness, or consciousness, implies the concepts of objectivity and externality. Yet, only introspective analysis is the proper task of the psychologist, and any discussion of the brain or sense organs involves a departure from the strictly psychological point of view. Thus, a great deal of what we now think of as experimental psychology would have been regarded by Stout as irrelevant to his field. Much of his work, therefore, is of merely historical interest, but even today his type of acute theoretical analysis might usefully precede experimental work on many of the more complex cognitive and perceptual processes. Based on the Gifford lectures delivered between and *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy* Cite this article Pick a style below, and copy the text for your bibliography.

Chapter 2 : Stout, G. F. (George Frederick) () - People and organisations - Trove

George Frederick Stout, FBA (/ s t a ʔ t /; 6 January - 18 August), usually cited as G. F. Stout, was a leading English philosopher and psychologist.

Moore among his students. He was the editor of *Mind* from to As editor of *Mind*, he must have been intimately familiar with the work of William James , whose *Principles of Psychology* were published in In , he published "Voluntary Action" in *Mind*. It contained a very perceptive analysis of the lack of a necessary connection between a "will" or "volition" and the success of the willed action. The question as to the nature of a certain mode of consciousness is quite independent of the question whether or not this mode of consciousness will be followed by a certain train of occurrences in the organism and in the environment. If I will to produce an explosion by applying a lighted match to gunpowder, my volition is none the less a volition because in the course of its execution the match goes out or the powder proves to be damp. Similarly, the volition is none the less a volition if it turns out that my muscular apparatus refuses to act, or acts in a way contrary to my intentions When the conscious state is one of volition, it is indeed necessary that the subject should look forward to the bodily movements either as practically certain, or at least as possible. A belief of this kind is an essential ingredient of the voluntary attitude. But the existence of the belief is in itself sufficient. Its truth or falsehood is a matter of indifference. In a precisely analogous way we must, in determining to produce a gunpowder explosion, assume that the powder is or may be dry enough to take fire. But it is by no means necessary that the gunpowder in point of fact should be dry. But I do want to dispute, first, what Anscombe thinks "everyone will allow. You would of course deprive me of considerable freedom of movement if you did that; you would thereby diminish my already unimpressive capacity to do what I will. They seem to me to mix up incoherently two different things: Returning to "Voluntary Action," Stout reads Henry Sidgwick as wanting to support our psychological sense, our consciousness, of being able to choose between alternatives. Sidgwick dismisses the psychology as irrelevant, but Stout says it is possible support for contingent human freedom. Professor Sidgwick has said that "against the formidable array of cumulative evidence offered for Determinism there is but one opposing argument of real force; the immediate affirmation of consciousness in the moment of deliberate action. And certainly, in the case of actions in which I have a distinct consciousness of choosing between alternatives of conduct, one of which I conceive as right or reasonable, I find it impossible not to think that I can now choose to do what I so conceive, however strong may be my inclination to act unreasonably, and however uniformly I may have yielded to such inclinations in the past. Sidgwick does not himself definitely accept this as a valid argument. He refuses to discuss it because he thinks the psychological issue is irrelevant to his purpose. Our interest being purely psychological, we cannot adopt this course. We have to inquire how this consciousness of freedom arises, and what support it lends to the argument in favour of contingent freedom. At the outset we must notice that it is not confined to the case contemplated by Professor Sidgwick. Wherever there is full and prolonged deliberation, the subject is up to the time when the decision is formed, under the impression that it is possible for him to choose either of two alternative courses of action. The reason is I think plain. Before he has decided, he does not know what he is going to do. This is what his indecision means. He must therefore regard all the alternative ends which he has in mind as possible objects of volition. But this obviously constitutes no argument for contingent freedom. Indeed, the fall of a coin may not be strictly determined. It is the paradigm of probability We might as well argue that the fall of a penny is not causally determined, because when we throw it we do not know whether head or tail will turn up. There is however a further complication when one of the courses of action is judged to be reasonable and opposing courses unreasonable. We here not merely regard it as possible that the reasonable course may or may not be chosen; we also affirm that it is what we ought to choose. And this, I take it, means that it is what we would choose, if the grounds for it were fully brought home to us, instead of being arrested in their development by the impulse of the moment, or by desires which, if not momentary, are at least comparatively isolated in the total organisation of the self. When we say that we ought to choose a certain course, we mean, I think, that it would be chosen by an ideal self. The contrast between the ideal self

and the actual self is in the first place a contrast between the self as a systematic unity and relatively detached tendencies. In the second place, it is a contrast between an undeveloped and a developed self. The development intended is the development of the self as a whole in the direction at once of more perfect unity and of greater differentiation. The, developed self would recognise itself as the goal to which the undeveloped self was on the whole tending. Thus when we say we ought to pursue a certain course, we mean that we should actually decide on pursuing it if we were more completely what we already are. We mean therefore that there is in us a possibility of so deciding. Hart wrote an article, said to be influenced by Stout, in which they claimed a necessary connection between a decision and a future voluntary action The necessary connexion between certainty about future voluntary action and decision emerges in the following entailments: If action in the situation envisaged were entirely voluntary, then it must be up to him to decide what he will do. If it is up to him to decide what he is going to do, then he must still be uncertain what he will do until he has made a decision or until his intentions are formed. While he is making the decision, and while he is reviewing reasons for acting in one way rather than another, he must be in a state of uncertainty about what he is going to do. The certainty comes at the moment of decision, and indeed constitutes the decision, when the certainty is arrived at in this way, as a result of considering reasons, and not as a result of considering evidence. But there is nothing "necessary" or "certain" about the connection between the decision and the action. It is enough that the decision will lead to the action with a high degree of probability. Stout on Libertarian Free Will In his Manual on Psychology, Stout tries to understand what the Libertarian is looking for when making a decision that is likely to be the result of prior de-liberations. Stout considers thanks to JL Speranza for this quotation , "how the state of decision supervenes on that of deliberation. At this point the vexed question of free-will arises. According to the libertarians, the decision, at least in some cases, involves the intervention of a new factor, not present in the previous process of deliberation, and not traceable to the constitution of the individual as determined by heredity and past experiences. The opponents of the libertarians say that the decision is the natural outcome of conditions operating in the process of deliberation itself. There is according to them no new factor which abruptly emerges like a Jack-in-the-box in the moment of deciding. This makes it difficult or impossible to give a definite disproof of the libertarian hypothesis on psychological grounds. But certainly the onus probandi rests with those who maintain the intervention of a new factor which is not a development or outcome of previous conditions. If we cannot definitely disprove the presence of such a factor, we can at least say that the facts are far from compelling to assume its existence. The mind oscillates between alternatives. First one conative tendency becomes relatively dominant and then another. The play of motives passes through all kinds of vicissitudes, as the alternative courses of action and their consequences are more fully apprehended in relation to the Self. As the process advances, equilibrium tends to be restored. New developments of conative tendency cease to take place; deliberation comes to a standstill because it has done its work. In this relatively stationary condition, it may be that one of the alternatives, with the motives for it, has a decided and persistent predominance in consciousness, so that the mind no longer tends to revert to the others. At this point the mind is made up, and the result is formulated in the judgement, "I will do this rather than that. It may happen that deliberation comes to a standstill without any alternative acquiring any definite predominance. The mind tends first to one and then to the other without result. No new developments occur which tend to give a superiority to either, and the result is hopeless suspense. Now as a matter of fact we find that under such conditions voluntary decisions frequently do come into existence. But probably in all such instances one or both of two traceable and recognisable conditions of a psychological kind are operative. Inaction may be obviously worse than either of the alternative lines of conduct. In view of the necessity of action, a comparatively slight predominance of the motives for one alternative may be sufficient to determine decision, though it would have been ineffective under other conditions. Or again, being pressed to decide, either by aversion to the state of irresolution, or by the necessity of doing something, we may simply adopt the course which seems to be uppermost in our minds at the moment, although we have no confidence that it would remain uppermost if we continued to deliberate. Stout here describes what we call an undetermined liberty Or we may mentally consent to allow the decision to be determined by some irrelevant circumstance such as the fall of a penny. We determine that if heads turn up we shall do A, and that if tails turn up we shall

do B. Curiously enough, the reverse frequently happens. If heads turn up we do B, and if tails turn up we do A. But it often happens that immediately after the appeal to chance has been made, and it has issued in favour of one alternative, the motives for the other alternative are mentally set in contrast, not with the opposing motives present in preceding deliberation, but with the trivial result of the appeal to chance. They thus acquire a momentary predominance which determines voluntary decision. In this way, acts come to be decided on which would have been suppressed if they had been more fully considered. Here again, the necessity of acting in some way, and impatience of the state of indecision, are operative factors. But the reason often lies in the intensity of some impulse of the present Self which derives its strength, not from its relation to the total system of conduct, but from the circumstances of the moment. In the vicissitudes in which the process of deliberation passes, it will often happen that this isolated impulse through its momentary intensity will acquire such a predominance as to arrest the full development of other motives which, if they had come into play, would have given rise to a different decision. It is not supposed to be voluntary in the same degree as that which takes place after fuller deliberation. The agent often commits the act knowing that he will live to repent it. Most cases of yielding to temptation are cases of deliberation arrested and cut short by the transient strength of a present impulse. It is in such instances that the agent is most keenly aware in retrospect that he might have acted otherwise than he actually did. He feels that the act does not fully represent his true self. If he had fully developed all the motives which were inoperative owing to imperfect deliberation the momentary impulse might have been suppressed instead of realised.

Chapter 3 : George Stout - Wikipedia

George Frederick Stout, (born Jan. 6, , South Shields, Durham, Eng.â€”died Aug. 18, , Sydney, Australia), English psychologist and philosopher who advanced a system of psychology emphasizing mental acts. While a student at the University of Cambridge, Stout studied principally with the.

He was born in South Shields, Durham. A clever boy at school, he went in to St. In he was elected a fellow of his college, and in he succeeded George Croom Robertson as editor of *Mind*. He was appointed Anderson lecturer in comparative psychology at Aberdeen in ; Wilde reader in mental philosophy at Oxford in ; and professor of logic and metaphysics at the University of St. He remained at St. Andrews, where he was instrumental in establishing a laboratory of experimental psychology, until his retirement in In he went to Sydney, Australia, to live with his son Alan, who had been appointed to the chair of moral and political philosophy at the University of Sydney. He spent the remaining years of his life joining vigorously in the discussions of a lively circle of younger philosophers at that university. He was a pupil of James Ward but not a mere disciple. Although he was formidable in polemical discussion, his bent was to constructive thinking. He assimilated many systems, boasting in later years, "I have got them all in my system" idealism, realism, rationalism, and empiricism. He acknowledged indebtedness to philosophers as diverse as Benedict de Spinoza and Thomas Hobbes and to the last was preoccupied with the ideas of his contemporaries Bertrand Russell, G. Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein , and he was far from being unsympathetic to the increasingly influential schools of psychology: In his earlier writings, for example, he was content to describe the ultimate data of our knowledge of the external world as "sensations. The readiness to change his terminology was most striking in his many attempts to convey his distinctive doctrine of thought reference. Thought and Sentience Since the time of George Berkeley there has been a widely accepted doctrine that cognition begins with simple sensations which are mental states and "in the mind"; that these sensations and their corresponding images are associated in order to form complex ideas; that some of these sensations and images are projected so as to appear as phenomena of the external world; and that these sensations are the ultimate basis of our beliefs about and our knowledge of the external world. Against this Stout set up the proposition that sense experience involves "thought reference" to real objects. This thesis, prominent in his *Analytic Psychology*, was expressed in terms of the concept of "noetic synthesis. In the elaboration of this thesis he offered a paradoxical theory of errorâ€”one difficult to refute or proveâ€”to the effect that there can be no complete error, no sheer illusion, no pure hallucination. All errors are misinterpretations of fact. This thesis was later expressed in terms of "original meaning," in saying that every sense experience is apprehended as "conditioned by something other than itself," or as an "inseparable phase of something other than itself. Following Ward, Stout attempted to give a natural history of the development of human awareness of the world which also offered grounds for our knowledge of what the world is really like. The central thesis here is that we must accept as primary not only the particular sense data of experience but also the categories or ultimate principles of unity: These are not so much a priori cognitions as dispositions to organize experience in certain ways. We do not, for instance, have a priori knowledge that every event has a cause, but we have a disposition to look for causes. So, *mutatis mutandis*, with the other categories. The Embodied Self Stout, like Ward, accepted a two-dimensional, tripartite division of mental functions into cognition, feeling, and conation; and he distinguished self, attitude, and object in each function. However, in the analysis of every concept in this scheme Stout modified every idea he took from Ward. His most fundamental divergence from Ward was in his account of the knowing, feeling, and willing subject self or ego. His differences from Ward are set out in detail in his important article "Ward as a Psychologist" *Monist*, January The *Manual of Psychology* contains a puzzling and confusing chapter, "Body and Mind," that combines a critique of the classical theories of interactionism, epiphenomenalism, and parallelism, all of which presupposed Cartesian dualism, with a defense of a version of parallelism that did not. This chapter puzzled students until, many years later, Stout was able to set out more clearly especially in the Gifford Lectures his basic philosophical thesis. This was a rejection of a dualistic ontology that there are two sorts of substance, material things and minds and a defense of a dualism

of attributes—“physical and mental”—combined in a single entity, the embodied mind, which has both physical and mental attributes united somewhat as the primary and secondary characteristics are united in a material object as it is apprehended in naive perceptual situations. This view of the self entailed a corresponding reanalysis of the mental attitudes of cognition, feeling, and conation. Stout discarded the dualism of substances but retained the dualism of qualities in his account of mental dispositions. These came to be described as “psychophysical dispositions” in accounts of the instincts, sentiments, attitudes, and other proposed ultimate sources of behavior. In this he anticipated and inspired the hormic psychology of William McDougall and, less directly, the theory of personality elaborated by Gordon Allport. McDougall was to describe the ultimate springs of human conduct in terms of certain innate primary psychophysical dispositions to perceive and attend to certain objects, to feel emotional excitement in the presence of such objects, and to experience an impulse to act in certain ways in regard to those objects. Allport later defined these sources of behavior as mental and neural “states of readiness” for such experiences and activities. In Stout these concepts are embodied in a more radical account of conative activity and conative dispositions. Conation Although he accepted the classical tripartite division of mental functions, Stout accorded a certain priority to conation, so much so that he encouraged what has been described as the “conative theory of cognition,” such as that developed by his contemporary Samuel Alexander. The term conative activity covers all psychophysical processes which are directed to a goal whether anticipated or not. It includes such cognitive processes as observation, recollection, and imagination, which are directed to the attainment of clearer and fuller perception of things present, the reconstruction of the past, and the comprehension of future possibilities. Conation is divided into practical and theoretical conation. Practical conative activity is directed to producing actual changes in the objects and situations with which the subject has to deal in the real world. Theoretical conation is directed to the fuller and clearer apprehension of such objects and situations. Attention is theoretical conation, although it incorporates practical conation through determining sensory-motor adjustments and the manipulation of instruments that facilitate clarity of perception. Traditional accounts of association and reproductive and productive thinking were similarly revised and restated in conative terms. The law of association by contiguity was reformulated as the law of association by continuity of interest. In his treatment of all these concepts, Stout advanced beyond Ward and contributed significantly to the transition of psychology from a branch of philosophy to a science of human experience and behavior. These contributions were largely ignored, however, because of the powerful movements in psychology that were adverse to what had come to be described as “armchair psychology,” that is, the purely formal analysis of psychological concepts. His final position is most fully set out in the two volumes of Gifford Lectures. These embody many clarifications of concepts in the philosophy of mind and some acute criticism of earlier expositions of materialism and of contemporary phenomenism. There is probably no philosopher who in his own thinking so smoothly made the transition from the prevailing idealism of the late nineteenth century to the prevailing critical, nonspeculative philosophy of the mid-twentieth century. Something of the idealist tradition is preserved in his sophisticated defense of philosophical animism, but more important are his detailed contributions to the transition from the philosophy of mind of the nineteenth century to that of the twentieth. Bibliography works by stout Analytic Psychology. A Manual of Psychology. University Correspondence College Press, ; 4th ed. Mace, London, ; 5th and last ed. University Tutorial Press, The 5th edition contains an appendix on gestalt psychology by R. Thouless and a supplementary note by Stout. Studies in Philosophy and Psychology. London and New York: Cambridge University Press, I of the Gifford Lectures. Edited by Alan Stout. II of the Gifford Lectures with a memoir by J. Passmore and a full bibliography. Allen and Unwin, ; 2nd ed. Harper and Row, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, “ and passim. Mace Pick a style below, and copy the text for your bibliography.

Chapter 4 : Stout, George Frederick (“”) | calendrierdelascience.com

G. F. (George Frederick) Stout, born in , has been regarded as both a philosopher and a psychologist. In the University of Aberdeen appointed him to a new lectureship in Comparative Psychology.

Chapter 5 : C. A. Mace, George Frederick Stout, - PhilPapers

george frederick stout an appreciation by rex knight. I N many British Universities, from Aberdeen to Otago, psychology is being taught, and psychological researches are being conducted, by men and women who, at some time in their lives, enjoyed the friendship and formative influence of Stout.

Chapter 6 : List of philosophers born in the 19th century - Wikipedia

Stout, George Frederick, The nature of universals and propositions, (London, Pub. for the British academy by H. Milford, Oxford university press.

Chapter 7 : Stout, George Frederick, | The Online Books Page

Note: Citations are based on reference standards. However, formatting rules can vary widely between applications and fields of interest or study. The specific requirements or preferences of your reviewing publisher, classroom teacher, institution or organization should be applied.

Chapter 8 : George Frederick Stout | British philosopher and psychologist | calendrierdelascience.com

Mind & matter / by G.F. Stout; the first of two volumes based on the Gifford lectures delivered in the University of Edinburgh in and Stout, G. F. (George Frederick), [Book:].

Chapter 9 : Results for George-FrederickStout | Book Depository

Research genealogy for George Frederick Stout, as well as other members of the Stout family, on Ancestry.