

### Chapter 1 : Why Iran's Maritime Ambitions Growing? | New Eastern Outlook

*An animated coming-of-age story offers a personal look at a young girl growing up in Iran during the Islamic revolution. The animated film Persepolis, directed by Marjane Satrapi and Vincent.*

Growing up with cancer in Iran How sanctions affect pediatric patients in the Islamic Republic May 27, 5: At 15, he is very ambitious. At the shrine, he prayed to become a famous actor like Mohammed Reza Golzar and drive a Maserati. Ali, 15, has been in and out of the Mahak Clinic for the last four years. Then a tumor was found in his head. And then another one in his thigh. These sanctions prohibit the sale or supply of dual-use goods, meaning items that can be used in nuclear weapon programs. But the clinic has been unable to use the equipment – an Oncor digital medical linear accelerator, which enables three-dimensional targeting of tumors while sparing healthy tissue – because the provider has not supplied the original software. Even if the sanctions broadly allow the shipment of medicine and medical equipment, restrictions on financial transactions can make such exchanges virtually impossible. Siemens has not said whether sanctions are what is preventing the software transfer. We are in close contact to our customer to discuss how we could help in this situation. None of those, however, have worked properly. Without the original software, the linear accelerator has limited applications and works just like a regular radiotherapy machine – in other words, without the 3-D capability to attack tumors with enhanced accuracy. According to a report published on the Iranian news site Khabar Online in October , at some point 50 lifesaving drugs were unavailable in the country. Medicine shortages exacerbate what is already a stressful situation for families with a cancer patient and are compounded by high inflation rates – more than 30 percent annually – and a devalued currency, the rial. A psychologist who works with pediatric cancer patients in Tehran remembers a mother and her year-old son whose initial cheerfulness slowly mutated into daily arguments between them as his health deteriorated. The woman became a nervous wreck. You sometimes have to increase the dosage in order to get results. Mehdi Khajenouri deputy managing director, the Mahak Clinic But sanctions may not be the sole reason behind the shortages. Sanctions have restricted the availability of certain drugs in Iran. Avedis Hadjian A doctor who was involved in preparing the pediatric cancer report for the JPHO and asked to remain anonymous said that on a recent trip to Iran, colleagues told him about a shortage of anesthetics and other medication. Thanks to the resourcefulness of Mahak oncologists – who made do with the lack of software and therefore less effective equipment – all this will soon be in the past for Ali. He said he was getting ready to be released from the clinic and return to school. A nurse asked Ali to play outside for a few minutes so I could speak to his mother.

**Chapter 2 : Locked up in the Islamic Republic of Iran**

*How sanctions affect pediatric patients in the Islamic Republic.*

The Iranian authorities have never revealed who captured him, who currently holds him, what charges have been laid against him, or even if he is still alive. And no effort has been made to negotiate his release, set a prison term, or work by the rules of international intelligence or diplomacy. An Iranian revolutionary court charged Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe, without the slightest evidence, of "plotting to topple the Iranian regime". This was done in a trial without a defence lawyer, without any details of her "offence", and ended in a sentence to five years in prison. All of you will be familiar with articles on individuals who have been imprisoned, tortured, or even executed in several Muslim countries. Many such individuals are Iranians, imprisoned unjustly for their beliefs or actions that would be considered perfectly innocent or even praiseworthy in the West. In , there were , prisoners overall, a figure that dropped by to , -- still a very high figure. Even North Korea -- which has a vast range of political prison camps, forced labour camps, and other facilities, albeit with a small overall population -- has fewer: State Department human rights report for says that estimates of the prison population total range between 80, and , Iran is also notorious for the number of executions it carries out, often for drug-related crimes, but also on religious and political charges. Since January , Iran has executed at least people, that is at least one person a day on average. The number of executions has recently increased and Iran ranks first in the world, followed by China, when it comes to executions per capita. Iran executed approximately people in In the Amnesty International report on Iran, there appears one paragraph of considerable concern for foreign citizens and Iranians with dual nationality, notably US and British citizenship: These prisoners were sentenced to long prison terms on vague charges such as "collaborating with a hostile government" after grossly unfair trials before Revolutionary Courts. The authorities accused the prisoners of being involved in a foreign-orchestrated "infiltration project" pursuing the "soft overthrow" of Iran. In reality, the convictions appeared to stem from their peaceful exercise of the rights to freedom of expression and association. But their cases testify to the frustration and often powerlessness of the various governments to whom they call for help. The precarious situation for foreign and dual nationality individuals in Iran may grow even riskier given that the US Congress voted on October 26 for the re-imposition of sanctions on Iran under the Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act. The Act "calls on the U. Moreover, should President Trump succeed in decertifying the Iran Nuclear Deal JCPOA , as he intends to do and should do, the Iranian regime will become jittery, setting up yet further risks for internal dissidents and foreigners in the Republic. In July this year, the White House threatened consequences if Iran did not release US citizens whom it holds prisoner or uses as hostages: The White House is demanding the release of all Americans currently being held in Iran and says President Donald Trump is "prepared to impose new and serious" consequences on the country if they are not released and returned. A statement released by the White House Friday [July 21] said the Trump administration is "redoubling" its efforts to bring home Americans "unjustly detained" abroad. The list of those unjustly detained by Iran and denied consular or other access is fairly long. One of the longest in captivity is American Robert Levinson now aged 69 if he is still alive , originally a year veteran of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the FBI. Some years later, it was revealed that he had been working in a private capacity for the CIA. He could legitimately have been arrested as an enemy spy. Just another spy story, perhaps. Iran also broke every rule governing diplomatic understanding when in student revolutionaries took over 60 employees of the US embassy in Tehran captive and held 52 of them hostage for days, creating problems within the US political system. Iran is one of several countries that do not allow dual citizenship. This has meant that several people with genuine Iranian citizenship coupled with equally valid American or British citizenship, when they are detained in Iran, are treated or, rather, mistreated as Iranian nationals with no right to access the help of their second citizen embassy if one exists or consulate. In this respect, Iran again stands out as a rogue state. There is no room here for a full discussion of the many cases that have occurred or are still occurring, but it is worth mentioning several names and their stories. Last year, for example, a Canadian-Iranian professor of social

anthropology, Homa Hoodfar , was arrested while carrying out fieldwork in Iran, something she had done before. Formally arrested in June on charges of "dabbling in feminism and security matters", for three months she was subjected to no fewer than thirty interrogations with death threats; forced to sleep in a bare cell in Evin; hospitalized with a lung infection, and finally released. Her Canadian nationality may have aided in that. Years before, however, another Iranian-Canadian woman, Zahra Kazemi , a year-old photojournalist, was arrested in when covering a demonstration in Tehran. She was sent to Evin, raped, tortured and savagely beaten into a coma. She died in Baghiatollah Hospital four days later. The Canadian Embassy was only contacted early the following month. Although an inquiry was held and some of her injuries admitted to, no one was found responsible, nor has anyone been convicted of her death. In , they had a daughter, Gabriella, and in March she took her child to Iran in order to visit her parents who had not yet seen their granddaughter. The child has since been in the care of her grandparents. In September an Iranian revolutionary court charged her , without the slightest evidence, of "plotting to topple the Iranian regime". In Evin prison, she has suffered serious physical and mental problems. On several occasions, the United Nations demanded -- without success -- that she be released. Back in England, her husband has carried on a campaign, receiving little help from the British Foreign Office. But on October 8, he was informed that a second trial had been held, in the course of which his wife had been sentenced to an additional sixteen years in prison. If she survives this period, which seems unlikely, she will be 58 years old, in wretched health and psychologically broken. Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe left , a British-Iranian project manager with the Thomson Reuters Foundation, travelled with her baby to visit her parents in Iran in . She was arrested while preparing to board her flight back to England, and sentenced to 21 years in prison for "plotting to topple the Iranian regime". There is a British embassy in Tehran, re-opened in , four years after it was stormed by Iranian protesters. Even if the US is "the great Satan" and Israel "the smaller Satan", Britain has long been considered a source of interference in Iranian politics. But her case cries out for justice. Unfortunately, Boris Johnson recently made things harder for Nazanin when, referring to her case, he made a serious gaffe , claiming she had gone to Iran to teach journalism. This was taken by the Iranian authorities as proof of their charges of espionage. Johnson has since apologized and stated to parliament that she had, in fact, just gone there on holiday. He has now met after 18 months with Richard Ratcliffe, who asked to accompany Johnson on a forthcoming visit to Iran. Some have suggested that Nazanin be given diplomatic protection , but the Foreign Office says it fears an Iranian reaction. Meanwhile, she now fears she may have breast cancer and is reported to be nearing a nervous breakdown. Four prisoners, all Iranian-Americans, were released and flown back to the United States on that date, despite serious charges laid against them. Arrests of dual-nationals are still being made. After rewarding criminality that lavishly, it is only surprising that there have not been more of them. Since then, "infiltration" [sic] has become a code word for those accused by the authorities of having links with the west. A string of dual nationals, mostly with additional Iranian nationality, have been accused of being part of the so-called infiltration network. The criminal Islamic regime should release Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe and the Chinese-American student, Xiyue Wang , sentenced in July this year to ten years in jail as "an infiltrating American agent". Wang, in his fourth year of a PhD in history at Princeton University, had gone to Iran to carry out research on nineteenth-century Iran -- scarcely a controversial period. Recording materials, accessing archives, and seeking entry to libraries are simply routine activities of academic researchers -- the present author did all these things, including work in a secret archive, on a nineteenth-century topic -- in Tehran many years ago and has lived to tell the tale. Wang is not even a dual-nationality Iranian-American; he only has American citizenship. It is time for the Iranian neurosis to be challenged. If that means putting pressure on officials of the regime and their business interests, it will be a price worth paying if innocent foreigners are released to their families and friends. I will not go. You should not go. No one should go. Denis MacEoin carried out research on a 19th-century Iranian religious minority in Iran while conducting his doctoral studies Cambridge, See details and sign here. Another exists for the release of Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe, here. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute. Get Free Exclusive Gatestone Content:

### Chapter 3 : The World Factbook – Central Intelligence Agency

*It is particularly relevant today because of its subject matter; Iran, the Iranian people, a brief history lesson of the country, and the story of a young Iranian girl growing to womanhood, spanning the days from the fall of the Shah in the late 's through the Iran-Iraq War of the 's, and into the 's.*

Abed and Hamid R. The authors would like to thank Susan Creane for her comments and suggestions, other colleagues in the Middle Eastern Department of the IMF for valuable comments on earlier drafts, Heather Huckstep for administrative support, and Brett Rayner for research assistance. The authors bear the sole responsibility for any remaining errors and omissions. The Middle East and North Africa MENA is an economically diverse region that includes countries with a common heritage, vastly different levels of per capita income, and a common set of challenges see Box 1. The MENA region benefited immensely from the wealth created by the sharp increase in oil prices in the s. The explosion of investment and growth in the oil-exporting countries resonated in other countries of the region through a sharp rise in worker remittances, trade, and capital flows. Gross capital formation, although volatile, was maintained at exceptionally high rates, supporting a strong increase in growth rates of GDP and a vast improvement in living standards. Substantial financial assets were accumulated abroad as national savings exceeded investment, especially in the oil-producing countries. This deterioration in economic conditions brought about pressures for economic reforms, which were undertaken by a number of countries during the mid-to-late s and early s. Fiscal reforms included introducing value-added tax VAT , phasing out subsidies, and improving management of public expenditure. Monetary policy frameworks were strengthened by introducing indirect monetary policy instruments. Trade regimes were liberalized and foreign direct investment FDI was encouraged while exchange rates became more flexible. Although the momentum for reform has slackened more recently, other macroeconomic outcomes have remained positive in much of the region. For example, inflation has been low and on the decline for most of the s; fiscal deficits, while persisting, have narrowed since the mids to levels below those of other developing countries. Financial crises, which plagued other regions during the past two decades, were averted. In addition, for a large number of countries in the region, external and domestic debts are not high by international standards, and debt service is low. Income levels show wide variations within the region. The 24 MENA countries and territories, which include about 7. They share common challenges and cultural links distinct from neighboring economies, including those of Israel and Turkey. In terms of current U. Of the 24 countries and territories, 13 are oil-exporting countries. The dominant religion is Islam, although there are sizable religious minority groups in several countries. However, there are significant linguistic diversities within some countries, including the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq. The countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates formed the GCC in the early s, in addition to launching a customs union in January with plans to establish a monetary union with a single currency by January 1, In sum, while macroeconomic stability was maintained, the MENA region as a whole failed to generate high and sustained growth rates. In contrast to other developing countries, the region underperformed since the s and, as a result, did not reap the full benefits of globalization and world economic integration. The experience of the last 50 years across wide regions of the globe has shown that developing countries, on average, have found it much easier to initiate growth than to sustain it. What is unique is the extent to which growth rates since the s have been volatile and low relative to other developing countries. In the oil-producing countries, the real per capita GDP growth rate hereafter referred to as growth was twice as volatile as in the non-oil economies. Even as economic performance in the region improved in the s, the region achieved an annual average growth rate of only 1. A major consequence of this poor record is persistent high unemployment, which has been reinforced by years of high growth rates of population and labor force. The experience accumulated to date indicates that economies that, over extended periods, embrace openness and globalization tend to grow faster than those that adopt inward-looking growth strategies. And, in this regard, the performance of the MENA region has fallen short, depriving many countries of reaping the full benefits of globalization. The challenges facing the region are daunting. Countries in the region must achieve higher rates

of sustainable growth and integrate more fully into the global economy if they are to succeed in creating meaningful employment for a rapidly rising labor force and, more generally, reduce poverty and improve living conditions. In this pamphlet, we take a closer look at economic performance in the region, particularly with respect to growth, unemployment, and global integration, followed by an exploration of possible reasons for the weak performance. In part, this reflects the extended weakness in the oil markets as producers outside of the MENA region gained market share at the expense of oil exporters in the region. Purchasing power parity GDP weights are used for all aggregate averages except for Asia Eight, which is a simple average. Within the region, the contrast in the growth experience of the oil and non-oil economies is striking. On the one hand, in the last 30 years, per capita income in the oil-producing countries declined at a rate of 1. Even during the booming s, oil-producing countries grew, in real per capita terms, at about half the rate of non-oil-producing countries in the region. Again, much higher rates of population growth in the oil-producing countries, among other factors, pulled down per capita growth rates. On the other hand, non-oil economies, enjoyed positive growth rates over the last 30 years, matching those of developing countries in the s and s. It was only in the s that growth in the non-oil economies at 1. In addition to differences in growth volatility and demographic dynamics, the oil-producing countries seem to have experienced what has become known as the "resource curse. Aggregate economic growth in oil-producing countries continues to be dominated by developments in the oil sector. In many of the larger oil economies, oil and other hydrocarbon products, on average, account for 75 percent of total exports. The non-oil sectors, on the other hand, have yet to generate sustained growth high enough to absorb the growing numbers of entrants into the labor force. Volatility and low growth in several of the oil economies are aggravated further by highly procyclical fiscal policy as government spending tends to rise and fall with oil revenue. This is, in part, because of the absence of effective automatic stabilizers, which could cushion the severity of economic fluctuations. Other oil-producing countries in the region have chosen not to establish formal OSFs with precommitted fiscal rules, but have tended to conduct fiscal management with a "virtual" OSF that, in effect, invests the excess oil receipts abroad. Unemployment Economic growth and job creation are closely linked. The outlook for employment generation in the MENA region as a whole becomes even more challenging in the face of the widespread unemployment in the post-conflict states of Iraq, the Islamic State of Afghanistan, and the West Bank and Gaza. These three economies have a combined estimated population of 53 million, with unemployment rates that are well in excess of those in the rest of the region. Of course, employment growth depends not only on output growth but also the elasticity of employment with respect to output, that is, the employment intensity of such growth. Assuming a relatively high elasticity of 0. Only two countries, Qatar and Sudan, have achieved 6 percent or higher average rates of real GDP growth over the last five years. The region receives only one-third of the FDI expected for a developing country of comparable size, and most is concentrated in a handful of countries. Portfolio investment is virtually nonexistent because of the poor state of development of equity markets. Global financial integration lags behind that of other developing countries. Non-oil export growth varied during this period but, on the whole, grew at a slower rate than for all developing countries. Although the number of Internet users is growing in the region, it has remained low by international standards. Exports Shares Exports share indices: Differences also arise between oil producers and non-oil producers in the region and between countries that undertook reforms, and hence grew at higher rates, and those that were less vigorous in pursuing reforms and fell behind. Nevertheless, the economic structures and institutions of the MENA countries do tend to exhibit common features and, given the need for a policy focus on the challenges and opportunities that face the region, there is a strong case for treating the region as a unit of analysis. However, the variations, the differences, and the distinctions between countries, which are relevant to the arguments being made, must always be highlighted. Although population growth in the MENA countries is projected to decline to 1. In the s and s, annual population growth rates in the oil economies exceeded those of non-oil economies by 2 percentage points. Although the rates in these subgroups converged by late s to about 2. Population growth in developing countries averaged 1. There were substantial cross-country differences in population growth rates. In the majority of countries in the region, over two-thirds of the population is under 30 years of age. Over the last 20 years, the labor force has grown in excess of population growth and is

projected to grow at 3 percent per annum till The ensuing high and rising share of working age population could, under the appropriate circumstances, be seen as a demographic gift capable of contributing positively to growth rate in the region. However, this gift is not automatic because it has to be translated into employment growth and a skill mix that is demanded in the global economy. Moreover, other policies and institutions conducive to complementary growth need to be in place to support the growing working age population. Most of the output growth in the region has occurred as a result of increases in capital and labor rather than in TFP, particularly in non-oil economies. A sustained rise in living standards is difficult if higher rates of accumulation of physical capital and labor are not accompanied by positive TFP growth, which is often seen as a prerequisite for employing the largely young labor force in the region while avoiding a real wage erosion. The importance of TFP growth cannot be underestimated in any analysis of growth. Research shows that TFP growth accounts for about 60 percent of cross-country variations in output growth. This research also shows that the importance of TFP growth increases further if allowance is made for the contribution of human capital—“job experience and level of schooling”—to output growth. MENA countries with negative TFP growth rates, many of which are oil-producing countries, often tend to have relatively poor growth performance. Limited evidence on TFP growth for selected oil-producing MENA countries in the s, according to research conducted by the staff of the IMF, is consistent with these long-run studies. Fortunately, these are the same factors that promote investment and GDP growth, which in turn help boost employment growth. Political fragmentation, recurring conflicts, and authoritarian rule have hampered the development of democratic institutions and remain major obstacles to economic reform. As noted in the widely discussed Arab Human Development Report United Nations, , the region performs poorly in the areas of civil and political freedoms, gender equality, and, more generally, opportunities for the full development of human capabilities and knowledge. To overcome these handicaps, modern institutions, such as freely elected legislatures and competent and independent judiciaries, and institutions that safeguard civil and human rights need to be strengthened. The demarcation line between the public and private sectors in many MENA countries is often unclear, encouraging conflicts of interest, rent seeking i. Civil society organizations such as professional associations, the nonofficial media, and "autonomous" nongovernmental entities tend to be weak and are often co-opted by governments. While there are exceptions, transparency in government is poor and accountability remains a problem, as seen from perception-based measures of governance. Recent empirical studies, based on data from a large number of countries, show that quality of institutions and governance are significant not only for stimulating growth over time but also for explaining differences in the levels of per capita incomes and TFP among countries. On most measures of good governance and institutions, especially voice and accountability, regulatory quality, and control of corruption, the MENA region did not fare as well as other developing and emerging economies Figure 3. Governance Indicators, Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, Each entry indicates percent of countries worldwide that rate below selected country or a region for each governance indicator. Higher score for any indicator shows better governance outcome. Aggregates are simple averages. Some progress, however, has been made recently though it has yet to influence perception-based measures of governance. In most countries, elections for representative legislatures are becoming more open and meaningful, and the political leadership is becoming more aware of the need for political reform.

Chapter 4 : Pakistan - Wikipedia

*The growing potential of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy makes it possible to complicate the military-technical level and expand the borders of the naval maneuvers (an area of approximately 2 million square kilometers) to the Red Sea (this is important for access to the Mediterranean and further to the Atlantic, as planned by Iranian.*

Iran Many leading politicians, experts, and the media could no doubt not fail to notice that, almost from the first days of his stay at the White House, US President Donald Trump has methodically darkened the clouds over the skies of Iran: On 29 January , Mr. Trump warned the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran IRI of playing with fire after the testing of the Iranian ballistic missiles, which was conducted on the same day. This is clearly not in the interests of the Pentagon strategists, as it means losing the multifunctional essential base from which the US can project its military force onto East Africa, the Middle East, South and South-East Asia, and the South China Sea. In the course of last summer, the clashes which had previously occurred in the Persian Gulf – PG between Iranian ships and American vessels, which were accompanied by helicopters and the aircraft carrier Nimitz, and were deliberately and repeatedly undertaking a show of force, as if testing the capabilities, course of action and reaction of the Iranian side, all the more became more frequent. At the same time, the US began to point to the aggressiveness of the actions of the Iranian fleet and conducting of numerous maneuvers in the Hormuz and Bab el Mandeb straits, the PG and the northern part of the Indian Ocean, which interfere with the freedom of navigation, etc. On 13 October, Mr. Trump promulgated a harsh strategy on Iran. How convincing and complete is the list of these highly controversial US claims for developing such tough pressure against Iran? Indeed, it has actually helped Iran to rise to a higher economic and political level in the region and beyond its borders. But according to what mechanisms? Secondly, this also involves the aspirations of the country to create a circular arc from its own borders to Lebanon. The project, on the one hand, will greatly expand its sphere of influence and, on the other, is a matter of concern to the United States and Israel, near the borders of which Iran will stake its presence. With a view to reinforcing both the first and the second, Tehran intends to build a railroad to the Mediterranean Sea, a move that is also unacceptable to the United States. He pointed to the need to create a fleet capable of projecting force outside the offshore of the country and operating in the open ocean. A similar project was drawn up during the time of the Shah regime, when even the search for bases in Mauritius and the Maldives was envisaged, but after its overthrow, it was not up to the task. A strong fleet makes it more flexible for displaying the flag in places where it is needed; establishing a front line of defense and setting up operating bases outside the Strait of Hormuz; patrolling of Iranian communications; creating an additional network of links with partners and reference points, and generally for projecting influence and force. By , eighteen thousand seamen were serving at sea, not counting the twenty thousand in the IRGC Navy. Priorities in the negotiations in Beijing were given to cooperation in the naval sphere and the possibility of Iran purchasing ships, submarines and missiles from China. The growing potential of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy makes it possible to complicate the military-technical level and expand the borders of the naval maneuvers an area of approximately 2 million square kilometers to the Red Sea this is important for access to the Mediterranean and further to the Atlantic, as planned by Iranian strategists and the northern part of the Indian Ocean, the development of which is extremely important, including for the further testing of ballistic missiles. Clearly understanding the increased role of the Indo-Ocean region in world affairs, Tehran has become more active in using naval diplomacy. Russian local and foreign media have widely publicized the first visit of a detachment of ships of the Iranian 44th flotilla to the Atlantic, which, however, was not confirmed by some experts. Iran is actively strengthening its ties with a number of coastal countries Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Djibouti, etc. At the same time, Iranian strategists are drawing up long-term plans to fully mark their naval presence just off the coast of India and in the waters of the Strait of Malacca, which, together with Ormus and the PG, form a strategic triangle of the most intensive flow of oil and goods in a region where Iranian participation in managing it in the interests of the IRI is required. This seems to be the result of a fairly unexpected official statement by the Iranian authorities in November on the need to establish their own bases in addition to 6 bases already operating in the

PG and 2 bases located on the islands. Of these, Bender-Abbas is the main naval base in Yemen and Syria. According to the admirals of Iran, they will be 10 times more effective than nuclear weapons, and will expand Iranian presence to the shores of the Mediterranean and its ability to render assistance to the allies of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It appears that, while there is much rhetoric regarding these plans, not all of them will succeed, as the power for their implementation is still rather limited. IRI does not seem ready to turn away from its path in its desire to become one of the most active actors of international relations in the Indian Ocean area.

### Chapter 5 : Over , Join Iranian House Church Movement, 'Great Number of Muslims Turning to Christ'

*Locked up in the Islamic Republic of Iran. by The precarious situation for foreign and dual nationality individuals in Iran may grow even riskier given that the US Congress voted on October.*

The meeting, set in Moscow, highlights the debate surrounding the real nature of post-Cold War relations between Moscow and Tehran. According to Western – particularly neoconservative – strategists, there is a way to stop Russian-Iranian military cooperation in Syria. For its part, Iran favours an alliance with the Lebanese Hezbollah and Shia militias largely made up of Pakistani, Afghan and Iraqi fighters. These non-government military groups fought on the ground to recapture Aleppo, a city emblematic of the revolt against the Syrian government. In November, military groups allied with Iran and the Syrian governments suffered between ten and 15 fatal casualties every day, according to personal interviews I conducted with French military officials at that time. Russia, on the other hand, is keen to preserve Syrian state institutions and does not support the Shiite religious proselytism of some of these military groups, such as the Hezbollah and Shia militias. Russia wants to remain a major player in Syria. But does that spell the end of the Russian-Iranian post-Cold War understanding? Several factors tend to suggest otherwise. Since the Soviet-Afghan War of the s, Tehran and Moscow have a shared distrust of Western powers and their possible links with rebel Sunni Islamist groups. And Russia is sceptical of a Trump administration that is already proving unpredictable. Russia will no doubt continue to leverage its relationship with Iran in its dealings with Washington to obtain concessions, such as the easing of economic sanctions targeting Moscow since the annexation of Crimea. Russia is currently helping Iran build two new reactors for the Bushehr nuclear power plant on the Iranian gulf coast. And it has provided its S anti-aircraft system to the country. A view from the Busher nuclear power plant in Iran in A new Middle East driven by Russia? Above and beyond a circumstantial deepening of ties arising from the emergence of a new Middle East, Russian military presence in Syria has led these two countries into a new military alliance against Sunni jihadists. But the Russian military intervention in Syria also represents a challenge to Iranian military doctrine on regional security. Iranian diplomats often make a distinction between so-called independent states, such as Iran, Russia and China, and those subservient to the United States, such as the oil-rich kingdoms of the Persian Gulf. Russian military intervention in Syria then constitutes a challenge to Iran, which opposes the international system dominated by major powers. Despite the inherent limits of an asymmetrical partnership between a world power and a regional one, the Iranian political elite must be given their due for transforming the old Russian enemy into a partner, a feat which the Iranian communists from the Tudeh party failed to achieve in the time between the end of the second world war and their exit from the Iranian political stage in

### Chapter 6 : Rouhani: Iran citizens –lost faith in Islamic republic– | News | DW |

*It is more likely frustrated young Gambians will over time become even more vulnerable to being radicalised because this "Islamic republic" will offer little new and growing inequality, poverty.*

### Chapter 7 : Growing up with cancer in Iran | Al Jazeera America

*Persepolis begins with a short introduction. It is an abbreviated history of Iran from its first occupation by Indo-European nomads, to the establishment of the Persian Empire, to the Islamic revolution. The author writes that the purpose of her book is to show that Iran is not a country of.*

### Chapter 8 : Russia And Iran's Growing Cooperation Hints At A New Middle East | HuffPost

*The regular armed forces have an estimated , personnel: the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Ground Forces, , personnel, of which , are conscripts; the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy, 18, personnel, and the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force,*

30, airmen.

**Chapter 9 : The Gambia: Africa's new Islamic republic - BBC News**

*Pakistan (Urdu: اِسْلامی جمہوریہ پاكستان), officially the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Urdu: اِسْلامی جمہوریہ پاكستان), is a country in South Asia. It is the sixth-most populous country with a population exceeding 230 million people. [19].*