

Chapter 1 : Hegel on History - Oxford Scholarship

Hegel's philosophy of history is perhaps the most fully developed philosophical theory of history that attempts to discover meaning or direction in history (a, b,). Hegel regards history as an intelligible process moving towards a specific condition—the realization of human freedom.

Now, in the 21st century, Hegelian-Marxist thinking affects our entire social and political structure. The Hegelian dialectic is the framework for guiding our thoughts and actions into conflicts that lead us to a predetermined solution. If we do not understand how the Hegelian dialectic shapes our perceptions of the world, then we do not know how we are helping to implement the vision. When we remain locked into dialectical thinking, we cannot see out of the box. The only way to completely stop the privacy invasions, expanding domestic police powers, land grabs, insane wars against inanimate objects and transient verbs, covert actions, and outright assaults on individual liberty, is to step outside the dialectic. This releases us from the limitations of controlled and guided thought. When we understand what motivated Hegel, we can see his influence on all of our destinies. Hegelian conflicts steer every political arena on the planet, from the United Nations to the major American political parties, all the way down to local school boards and community councils. Dialogues and consensus-building are primary tools of the dialectic, and terror and intimidation are also acceptable formats for obtaining the goal. The ultimate Third Way agenda is world government. Today the dialectic is active in every political issue that encourages taking sides. We can see it in environmentalists instigating conflicts against private property owners, in democrats against republicans, in greens against libertarians, in communists against socialists, in neo-cons against traditional conservatives, in community activists against individuals, in pro-choice versus pro-life, in Christians against Muslims, in isolationists versus interventionists, in peace activists against war hawks. No matter what the issue, the invisible dialectic aims to control both the conflict and the resolution of differences, and leads everyone involved into a new cycle of conflicts. Although Hegel refers to "the two elemental considerations: This was due partly to the rediscovery and reevaluation of him as the philosophical progenitor of Marxism by philosophically oriented Marxists, partly through a resurgence of the historical perspective that Hegel brought to everything, and partly through increasing recognition of the importance of his dialectical method. A thesis versus B anti-thesis equals C synthesis. If A my idea of freedom conflicts with B your idea of freedom then C neither of us can be free until everyone agrees to be a slave. The Soviet Union was based on the Hegelian dialectic, as is all Marxist writing. They merely changed the dialectical language to fit into the modern version of Marxist thinking called communitarianism. A Model Potemkin Village. How is it possible to consider a Hegelian argument? If the ideas, interpretations of experiences, and the sources are all wrong, can a conclusion based on all these wrong premises be sound? The answer is no. Two false premises do not make a sound conclusion even if the argument follows the formula. Three, four, five, or six false premises do not all combine to make a conclusion sound. You must have at least one sound premise to reach a sound conclusion. Logical mathematical formulas are only the basis for deductive reasoning. Equally important is knowledge of semantics, or considering the meanings of the words used in the argument. Just because an argument fits the formula, it does not necessarily make the conclusion sound. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel knew this when he designed his dialectic. Hegel is an imperialist con artist who established the principles of dialectical "no-reason. National governments represent people who are free from imperial controls over private property, trade and production. Twisted logic is why cons are so successful, and Hegel twisted it in such a way as to be "impenetrable. The fallacy is in the language, not in the math. Hegel was an idealist who believed that the highest state of mankind can only be attained through constant ideological conflict and resolution. The rules of the dialectic means mankind can only reach its highest spiritual consciousness through endless self-perpetuating struggle between ideals, and the eventual synthesizing of all opposites. But in the final analysis, this ideology simply justifies conflict and endless war. It is also the reasoning behind using military power to export an illogical version of freedom and false democratic ideals. No matter how many new words they make up to define it, or how many new theories they come up with to give it validity, we can prove beyond a doubt that it is all false. The Hegelian dialectic is

the ridiculous idea that constant conflict and continual merging of opposite ideologies, as established by extreme right or left belief systems, will lead spiritual mankind into final perfection. But like the AA definition of insanity, the world keeps trying it over and over expecting different results. And when Amitai Etzioni used Hegelian reasoning to base the Communitarian Network on a "balance" between A Rights and B Responsibilities, he built the entire theory of C communitarianism on nothing but disproven and unprovable unscientific theories. Already gaining substantial ground against the Americans, British Marxism was bolstered when Charles Darwin published his theory of human evolution in 1859. Since they were slippery customers rather than scientists, they were not likely to relinquish their views just because something did not fit. Marxism and Darwinism by Anton Pannekoek, The Hegelian dialectic presupposes the factual basis for the theory of social evolutionary principles, which coincidentally backed up Marx. The London-Marxist platform in 1848 was "to abolish private property. Marxist societies confiscate wealth and promise to "re-distribute it equally. Modern Marxist adherents openly claim they will "rebuild the world," and they train activist "change agents" to openly support overthrowing the legitimate governments of the world. Since their inception, Marxist agent provocateurs can be linked to every anarchist assassination and student uprising that caused chaos to the established European civilization throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. Modern Americans have succumbed to the conspiracy theory label and will only listen to what the propaganda machines tell them. And he was right. For a well presented Christian overview of the con, see American Babylon: The communitarian synthesis is the final silent move in a well-designed, quietly implemented plot to re-make the world into colonies. The bottom line is the Hegelian dialectic sets up the scene for state intervention, confiscation, and redistribution in the U. The Hegelian dialectic is not a conspiracy theory because the Conspiracy Theory is a fraud. Everything changes, and Dialectics for Kids explains how. If you are old enough to read, you can understand change. They have developed a distinctive political project, exploring the new institutions and forums of a collective society. They twist logic to get to conclusions that will suit the current prejudices. They garnish it with a little Christianity or mysticism or whatever, though these play no important part in their world outlook. The programme links our continuous and what should be all-encompassing agitational work with our ultimate aim of a communitarian, or communist, system. Our programme thus establishes the basis for agreed action and is the lodestar, the point of reference, around which the voluntary unity of the Socialist Alliance is built and concretised. Put another way, the programme represents the dialectical unity between theory and practice. They have not been effective forums for collective action. For Right-wing politics, this is not much of an issue. It has always believed in the supremacy of individual freedom and individual action. For the Left, however, it is a huge problem. The Third Way, by contrast, sees politics as an exercise in communitarianism: It aims to put the social back into social justice. This is an important strategy for combating individualism and generating a sense of collective responsibility in society. This communitarianism is to be "a dialectical synthesis, a new creation, superimposing itself on thesis and antithesis rather than retrieving them. The country you save may be your own.

Hegel, History, and Interpretation is a collection of essays that extend critical discussions of Hegel into contemporary debates about the nature of interpretation and theories of philosophical hermeneutics. Essays by Susan Armstrong, John D. Caputo, William Desmond, Robert Dostal, Shaun Gallagher, Philip T. Grier, H. S. Harris, Walter Lammi.

Types[edit] In contemporary philosophy a distinction is made between critical philosophy of history also known as analytic and speculative philosophy of history. The names of these types are derived from C. Sometimes critical philosophy of history is included under historiography. Philosophy of history should not be confused with the history of philosophy , which is the study of the development of philosophical ideas in their historical context. Accordingly, classical historians felt a duty to ennoble the world. In keeping with philosophy of history, it is clear that their philosophy of value imposed upon their process of writing historyâ€”philosophy influenced method and hence product. Herodotus, regarded by some[who? History was supposed to teach good examples for one to follow. The assumption that history "should teach good examples" influenced how writers produced history. In the fourteenth century, Ibn Khaldun , who is considered one of the fathers of the philosophy of history, discussed his philosophy of history and society in detail in his Muqaddimah His work represents a culmination of earlier works by medieval Islamic sociologists in the spheres of Islamic ethics , political science , and historiography , such as those of al-Farabi c. He introduced a scientific method to the philosophy of history which Dawood considers something "totally new to his age" and he often referred to it as his "new science", [8] which is now associated with historiography. His historical method also laid the groundwork for the observation of the role of the state , communication , propaganda , and systematic bias in history. Starting with Fustel de Coulanges â€” and Theodor Mommsen â€” , historical studies began to move towards a more modern scientific[citation needed] form. In the Victorian era , historiographers debated less whether history was intended to improve the reader , and more on what causes turned history and how one could understand historical change. Cyclical and linear history[edit] Further information: Social cycle theory Narrative history tends to follow an assumption of linear progression: Many ancient cultures held mythical concepts of history and of time that were not linear. Such societies saw history as cyclical, with alternating Dark and Golden Ages. Plato taught the concept of the Great Year , and other Greeks spoke of aeons eons. According to Jainism , this world has no beginning or end but goes through cycles of upturns utsarpini and downturns avasarpini constantly. Many Greeks believed that just as mankind went through four stages of character during each rise and fall of history so did government. The story of the Fall of Man from the Garden of Eden , as recounted and elaborated in Judaism and Christianity , preserves traces of a moral cycle; this would give the basis for theodicies which attempt to reconcile the existence of evil in the world with the existence of a God, providing a global explanation of history with belief in a coming Messianic Age. Some theodicies claimed that history had a progressive direction leading to an eschatological end, such as the Apocalypse , organized by a superior power. Leibniz based his explanation on the principle of sufficient reason , which states that anything that happens, does happen for a specific reason. In this way theodicies explained the necessity of evil as a relative element that forms part of a larger plan of history. Confronted with the antique problem of future contingents , Leibniz invented the theory of " compossible worlds " , distinguishing two types of necessity, to cope with the problem of determinism. During the Renaissance , cyclical conceptions of history would become common, with proponents illustrating decay and rebirth by pointing to the decline of the Roman Empire. Cyclical conceptions continued in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the works of authors such as Oswald Spengler â€” , Nikolay Danilevsky â€” , and Paul Kennedy â€” , who conceived the human past as a series of repetitive rises and falls. Spengler, like Butterfield , when writing in reaction to the carnage of the First World War of â€” , believed that a civilization enters upon an era of Caesarism [9] after its soul dies. The development of mathematical models of long-term secular sociodemographic cycles revived interest in cyclical theories of history see, for example, Historical Dynamics by Peter Turchin , or Introduction to Social Macrodynamics [10] by Andrey Korotayev et al. Sustainable history[edit] "Sustainable History and the Dignity of Man" is a philosophy of history proposed by Nayef

Al-Rodhan , where history is defined as a durable progressive trajectory in which the quality of life on this planet or all other planets is premised on the guarantee of human dignity for all at all times under all circumstances. Among other things, human dignity means having a positive sense of self and instilling individuals with respect for the communities to which they belong. Basic welfare provision and security are fundamental to ensuring human dignity. Environment and ecological considerations need to be addressed as well. Finally, cultural diversity, inclusiveness and participation at all levels, of all communities are key imperatives of human dignity. Within this civilisation are many geo-cultural domains that comprise sub-cultures. Nayef Al-Rodhan envisions human civilisation as an ocean into which the different geo-cultural domains flow like rivers, "The Ocean Model of one Human Civilization". At points where geo-cultural domains first enter the ocean of human civilisation, there is likely to be a concentration or dominance of that culture. However, over time, all the rivers of geo-cultural domains become one. Nevertheless, there are cases where geographical proximity of various cultures can also lead to friction and conflict. Nayef Al-Rodhan concludes that within an increasingly globalised, interconnected and interdependent world, human dignity cannot be ensured globally and in a sustainable way through sole national means. A genuine global effort is required to meet the minimum criteria of human dignity globally. Areas such as conflict prevention, socio-economic justice, gender equality, protection of human rights, environmental protection require a holistic approach and a common action. In *What is Enlightenment?* One is responsible for this immaturity and dependence, if its cause is not a lack of intelligence or education, but a lack of determination and courage to think without the direction of another. In a paradoxical way, Kant supported in the same time enlightened despotism as a way of leading humanity towards its autonomy. He had conceived the process of history in his short treaty *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose* On one hand, enlightened despotism was to lead nations toward their liberation, and progress was thus inscribed in the scheme of history; on the other hand, liberation could only be acquired by a singular gesture, *Sapere Aude!* Hegel developed a complex theodicy in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* , which based its conception of history on dialectics: Hegel argued that history is a constant process of dialectic clash, with each thesis encountering an opposing idea or event antithesis. The clash of both was "superated" in the synthesis , a conjunction that conserved the contradiction between thesis and its antithesis while sublating it. Hegel thought that reason accomplished itself, through this dialectical scheme, in History. Through labour , man transformed nature so he could recognize himself in it; he made it his "home. Roads, fields, fences, and all the modern infrastructure in which we live is the result of this spiritualization of nature. Hegel thus explained social progress as the result of the labour of reason in history. However, this dialectical reading of history involved, of course, contradiction, so history was also conceived of as constantly conflicting: Hegel theorized this in his famous dialectic of the lord and the bondsman. According to Hegel, One more word about giving instruction as to what the world ought to be. Philosophy in any case always comes on the scene too late to give it When philosophy paints its gray in gray, then has a shape of life grown old. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk. Philosophy is always late, it is only an interpretation of what is rational in the real"and, according to Hegel, only what is recognized as rational is real. The Whig interpretation of history , as it was later called, associated with scholars of the Victorian and Edwardian eras in Britain , such as Henry Maine or Thomas Macaulay , gives an example of such influence, by looking at human history as progress from savagery and ignorance toward peace, prosperity, and science. However, it was quickly transposed from its original biological field to the social field, in " social Darwinism " theories. These nineteenth-century unilineal evolution theories claimed that societies start out in a primitive state and gradually become more civilised over time, and equated the culture and technology of Western civilisation with progress. Ernst Haeckel formulated his recapitulation theory in , which stated that " ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny ": Hence, a child goes through all the steps from primitive society to modern society. This was later discredited. Progress was not necessarily, however, positive. After the first world war , and even before Herbert Butterfield " harshly criticized it, the Whig interpretation had gone out of style. The bloodletting of that conflict had indicted the whole notion of linear progress. The *End of History and the Last Man* by Francis Fukuyama proposed a similar notion of progress, positing that the worldwide adoption of liberal democracies as the single accredited political system and even

modality of human consciousness would represent the " End of History ". Unlike Maurice Godelier who interprets history as a process of transformation, Tim Ingold suggests that history is a movement of autopoiesis [17] A key component to making sense of all of this is to simply recognize that all these issues in social evolution merely serve to support the suggestion that how one considers the nature of history will impact the interpretation and conclusions drawn about history. The critical under-explored question is less about history as content and more about history as process. In Steven Pinker wrote a history of violence and humanity from an evolutionary perspective in which he shows that violence has declined statistically over time. His history of great men, of geniuses good and evil, sought to organize change in the advent of greatness. Most philosophers of history contend that the motive forces in history can best be described only with a wider lens than the one he used for his portraits. Danto, for example, wrote of the importance of the individual in history, but extended his definition to include social individuals, defined as "individuals we may provisionally characterize as containing individual human beings amongst their parts. Examples of social individuals might be social classes [Dray, Rainbow-Bridge Book Co. For example, to read about what is known today as the " Migrations Period ," consult the biography of Attila the Hun. Before he can remake his society, his society must make him. Some argue that geography see geographic determinism , economic systems see economic determinism , or culture see cultural determinism prescribe "the iron laws of history" that decide what is to happen. Others see history as a long line of acts and accidents, big and small, each playing out its consequences until that process gets interrupted by the next. It should be noted that even determinists do not rule that, from time to time, certain cataclysmic events occur to change course of history. Their main point is, however, that such events are rare and that even apparently large shocks like wars and revolutions often have no more than temporary effects on the evolution of the society. Karl Marx is, perhaps, the most famous of the exponents of economic determinism. For him social institutions like political system, religion and culture were merely by-products of the basic economic system see Base and superstructure. Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under given circumstances directly encountered and inherited from the past. Social progress and Progress history Theodicy claimed that history had a progressive direction leading to an eschatological end, given by a superior power. However, this transcendent teleological sense can be thought as immanent to human history itself. Hegel probably represents the epitome of teleological philosophy of history. Thinkers such as Nietzsche , Michel Foucault , Althusser , or Deleuze deny any teleological sense to history, claiming that it is best characterized by discontinuities, ruptures, and various time-scales, which the Annales School had demonstrated. Schools of thought influenced by Hegel also see history as progressive, but they saw, and see, progress as the outcome of a dialectic in which factors working in opposite directions are over time reconciled see above. History was best seen as directed by a Zeitgeist , and traces of the Zeitgeist could be seen by looking backward. Hegel believed that history was moving man toward " civilization ", and some also claim he thought that the Prussian state incarnated the " End of History ". In his *Lessons on the History of Philosophy*, he explains that each epochal philosophy is in a way the whole of philosophy; it is not a subdivision of the Whole but this Whole itself apprehended in a specific modality. Historical accounts of writing history[edit] Further information:

Chapter 3 : Claudio Cesa, Hegel's Philosophy of History. Problems of Interpretation - PhilPapers

Hegel, History, and Interpretation is a collection of essays that extend critical discussions of Hegel into contemporary debates about the nature of interpretation and theories of philosophical hermeneutics.

An Introduction to Hegel. Freedom, Truth and History. Blackwell Kainz, Howard P. Kaufmann, Walter , Doubleday reissued Notre Dame IN: Blackwell Singer, Peter , A Very Short Introduction. Translated by Shierry M. Nichol森, with an introduction by Nichol森 and Jeremy J. The Cambridge Companion to Hegel. The Hegel Myths and Legends. Biograpiya Pagliwat Althaus, Horst, Hegel und die heroischen Jahre der Philosophie. Michael Tarsh as Hegel: An Intellectual Biography, Cambridge: Polity Press, Pinkard, Terry P. Rosenkranz, Karl , Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben. Makasaysayan Pagliwat Rockmore, Tom , Before and After Hegel: From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought. Translated by David E. Towards the Sunlight â€” Clarendon Press Harris, H. Night Thoughts Jena â€” Clarendon Press Dilthey, Wilhelm , Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels repr. IV Haering, Theodor L. The Explanation of Possibility. Temple University Press Westphal, Kenneth, Advocates a stronger continuity between Hegel and Kant. State University of New York Press. Winfield, Richard Dien, Studies in Systematic Philosophy. Phenomenolohiya han Kalag Pagliwat Stern, Robert, Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit. An introduction for students. Le sacrifice de Hegel. A Thing of This World: University of Wisconsin Press.

Chapter 4 : Project MUSE - Hegel on Reason and History: A Contemporary Interpretation (review)

Hegel's interpretation of the Chinese state as despotic is intended to be descriptive, not normative. It is not an Implied criticism, but an account of what.

Rachel Zuckert and James Kreines eds. *Hegel on Philosophy in History* Published: January 23, Rachel Zuckert and James Kreines eds. Reviewed by Kristin Gjesdal, Temple University This volume, published to honor the work of Robert Pippin, includes contributions by an impressive range of German and Anglophone scholars: Attention is paid both to the limits and nature of subjectivity autonomy, self-consciousness, self-legislation, recognition, spontaneity and to the nature of the modern project -- i. In the following, I will provide a brief overview of the contributions to this volume and then offer some reflections on what questions remain in its wake. The friendly disagreement between Pippin and McDowell goes back a good decade or more. Sedgwick is, strangely, the only woman contributing to the volume the bibliography only strengthens the sense that the discipline needs to change in this respect. In her contribution, Sedgwick plays out a different kind of interanimation with the work of Pippin. According to Siep, one of the things contemporary philosophers can learn from Hegel is that to give up "the pretense to an external standpoint overseeing the general direction of cultural history" need not amount to an abandonment of the project of modernity itself p. For Siep, the project of modernity, and of critical reasoning, can also be pursued from within cultural life. Paul Redding offers a provocative reading of the master and slave dialectic, emphasizing its roots in Greek Stoicism and its relationship to Aristotelian philosophy. Indicating a possible mediation between the positions defended by McDowell and Pippin, Stern argues that Hegel has a perfectionist philosophy, but that this is indeed of a distinctively post-Kantian kind see pp. This, it seems, is but another way of addressing the question as to where the commitments to Kantian transcendentalism end and the historical-dynamical commitments to post-Kantian idealism take over. As the irrationalities of a failing way of life make themselves felt, agents move beyond merely conceiving of themselves as responding to reasons and develop conceptions of what reasons they are authorized to take up in action p. Rolf-Peter Horstmann defends an interpretation of Hegel that, at least to this reader, appears incompatible with that of Pippin. In his intertwinement of metaphysic and logic, Hegel is thought to steer clear of "erroneous beliefs about the nature of concepts and objects and. In a different vein, Karl Ameriks seeks to question a dominant historical narrative, though this time it is a narrative that is, by and large, established by Hegel himself -- namely that of the constitutive shortcomings of philosophical romanticism. In this way, Ameriks airs the legitimate concern that "even non-imperialist readings of Hegel -- whatever their advantages -- may still tend, at times, to obscure the value of non-Hegelian late modern positions and may needlessly encourage the common presumption that these positions are distinguished by a kind of subjectivism, aestheticism, or historicism" p. From his point of view, history emerges not as a progressive path towards freedom and self-determination but as driven by power struggles of the kinds we find more aptly analyzed in the works of Marx and Nietzsche. At stake is an alternative in which "others are not experienced, as in the usual case, as limitations, but rather as conditions of the possibility of forming and realizing our own intentions" p. While the line-up of contributors is impressive and the overall quality of the chapters is high, the topic of the present volume is at one and the same time somewhat narrow and not quite spelled out to its full potential. Consisting of a panel of fairly senior contributors, many of whom have been engaged in past exchanges with Pippin, one cannot help wondering what traces his work has left among a younger generation of philosophers. As I see it, the real legacy of his work will not simply be summed up by those with whom he has spent his career conversing, but also by his paving the way for new generations of Hegel scholars. More significant, though, is perhaps a concern about how the volume sets up the very topic of philosophy in history. It would have made sense to invite a few more critical readers and to have Pippin himself respond to the concerns discussed, be they launched from within a position that is compatible with his own or not. Pippin has definitely been a primus motor behind the recent upsurge both in Hegel scholarship and European philosophy more broadly. The present volume corroborates one strand of this influence, yet leaves the broader scope of his work unaddressed.

Chapter 5 : Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel - Wikipedia

An important consequence of Hegel's metaphysics, so understood, concerns history and the idea of historical development or progress, and it is as an advocate of an idea concerning the logically-necessitated teleological course of history that Hegel is most often derided.

General considerations Problems of the Hegelian heritage The Hegelian system, in which German idealism reached its fulfillment, claimed to provide a unitary solution to all of the problems of philosophy. It held that the speculative point of view, which transcends all particular and separate perspectives, must grasp the one truth, bringing back to its proper centre all of the problems of logic, of metaphysics or the nature of Being, and of the philosophies of nature, law, history, and culture artistic, religious, and philosophical. This Absolute, Hegel held, first puts forth or posits itself in the immediacy of its own inner consciousness and then negates this positing—expressing itself now in the particularity and determinateness of the factual elements of life and culture—and finally regains itself, through the negation of the former negation that had constituted the finite world. Such a dialectical scheme immediateness—alienation—negation of the negation accomplished the self-resolution of the aforementioned problem areas—of logic, of metaphysics, and so on. This panoramic system thus had the merit of engaging philosophy in the consideration of all of the problems of history and culture, none of which could any longer be deemed foreign to its competence. Moreover, such a speculative mediation between opposites, when directed to the more impending problems of the time, such as those of religion and politics, led ultimately to the evasion of the most urgent and imperious ideological demands and was hardly able to escape the charge of ambiguity and opportunism. Stages in the history of the interpretation of Hegel The explanation of the success of Hegelianism—marked by the formation of a school that, for more than 30 years, brought together the best energies of German philosophy—lies in the fact that no other system could compete with it in the richness of its content or the rigour of its formulation or challenge its claim to express the total spirit of the culture of its time. Moreover, as Hegelianism diffused outward, it was destined to provoke increasingly lively and gripping reactions and to take on various articulations as, in its historical development, it intermingled with contrasting positions. Four stages can be distinguished within the development of Hegelianism. The first of these was that of the immediate crisis of the Hegelian school in Germany during the period from through Always involved in polemics against its adversaries, the school soon divided into three currents. Thus, the young Hegelians interpreted Hegelianism in a revolutionary sense—i. In the second phase—, in which Hegelianism diffused into other countries, the works of the centre played a preponderant role; thus, in this phase of the history of the interpretation of Hegel, usually called Neo-Hegelian, the primary interest was in logic and a reform of the dialectic. In the fourth stage, after World War II, the revival of Marxist studies in Europe finally thrust into the foreground the interest in the relation between Hegel and Karl Marx and in the value of the Hegelian heritage for Marxism, with particular regard to political and social problems. This fourth phase of the history of Hegelianism thus appropriated many of the polemical themes of the earlier years of the school. Crises in the earlier Hegelian school The earlier development of Hegelianism can be divided, according to predominant concerns, into three periods: Polemics during the life of Hegel: It was not a matter of polemics within the school but only one of objections against the system from various quarters: This book was reviewed by Herbart, who reprimanded Hegel for mixing the monism of the rationalist Benedict de Spinoza with the transcendentalism of Immanuel Kant, which had explored the conditions of the possibility of knowledge in general. There were also certain critics who directed the liberal press against Hegel for attacking Jakob Fries, a psychologizing Neo-Kantian, in the introduction of *The Philosophy of Right*. Some of the polemical writings of Hegel made a notable impact—e. In this preface, Hegel saw the two things as the same in content but different in form—which for faith is the representation and for reason is the concept. Important among these were a review by Hegel that was unexpectedly eulogistic about the thesis that philosophy and evangelical orthodoxy are compatible and another review in which Hegel responded indirectly to arguments of Herbart. Among the most loyal disciples of Hegel were Hermann Hinrichs, his collaborator, and Karl Rosenkranz, who defended the Hegelian solution of the faith-reason

problem which had asserted the identity of content and difference of form, thus aptly defending the free rationality of religion. Period of controversies chiefly in religion: But, inasmuch as conditions in Germany, during the Restoration, inhibited the liberalization of political discussions, the milieu of controversy shifted to the religious realm and became related to problems of immortality, Christology, and general theology. This work brought the problem of the nature of Christ up to date from the point of view that had been reached by biblical criticism; i. In this approach, the narrowly philological outlook was overcome by a reconstruction in terms of a philosophy of history strangely suggestive of the young Hegel. The thesis of the book was that the Gospel account is interwoven with myths that are not the works of individuals but of the collective poetic activity of the first Christian community, myths that resulted in part from messianic expectations, in part from the memory of the historical figure of Jesus, and in part from a transfiguration of the real elements. The aim of the myths was to demonstrate that philosophy and religion are the same in content and to offer, in an imaginative guise as in parables, the meaning of the one truth that Substance is unification of the divine nature and of the human, which Christ symbolized and which is realized in the spirit of all humanity. There were responses from the right and centre and from Bruno Bauer, a philosopher, historian, and biblical critic. At first, the journal maintained a moderate tone, and Hegelians of the centre and right also contributed articles. In June, however, it veered to the democratic-liberal side as Ruge struck out against an accuser of the young Hegelians and as Feuerbach attacked earlier Hegelians. Hegelianism, which marks the culmination of speculative philosophy, Feuerbach charged, does not demonstrate its own truth, because its contrast between sensory reality and intellectual concept comprises an irresolvable contradiction. As for issues in the fields of logic and metaphysics, after several polemical exchanges the interest of philosophers was attracted to the publicist reawakening that came to Schelling, who reactivated certain anti-Hegelian criticisms. These criticisms dealt with the impossibility of building a valid philosophy upon the pure concept assumed as a point of departure and endowed with autonomous movement. Such a philosophy would be vitiated by presuppositions of what ought to be demonstrated and by hypostatizations i. Period of atheistic and political radicalism: Anti-Hegelian criticism Advancing from Aristotelian presuppositions, an important critique against the Hegelian logic was presented by the classical philosopher and philologist Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg in his *Logische Untersuchungen*; Logical Investigations. Secondly, he charged that Hegel confused 1 the logical opposition or contradiction of A against non-A with 2 the real contradiction or contrariety of A against B. Contradiction 1 consists in the mere repetition of the first term with a negative sign; and from it no concrete movement can proceed. In contrariety 2, however, the opposition of the second term to the first is concrete—thus the second term cannot be deduced from the first and instead should be derived on its own account from empirical experience. Thus, Hegel constructed his entire system, Trendelenburg charged, on an arbitrary dialectic of elements intrinsically real contraries, which he mistakenly treated as though they were abstract opposites contradictories and were such by logical necessity. Hence the philosophy of the later Schelling became the target of all of the criticisms from the left and likewise exerted a notable influence on the speculative theists. Meanwhile, the centre, on account of the critique of Trendelenburg, oriented itself toward the future reforms of Hegelianism. In all of his works—but above all in his *Philosophiske Smuler*; Philosophical Fragments and his *Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift*; Concluding Unscientific Postscript—Kierkegaard waged a continuous polemic against the philosophy of Hegel. He regarded Hegel as motivated by the spirit of the harmonious dialectical conciliation of every opposition and as committed to imposing universal and panlogistic resolutions upon the authentic antinomies of life. It was destined to condition the critical relationship of this current of thought to Hegelianism throughout its subsequent history. Courtesy of the Royal Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen At this time the attitude of the centre was oriented toward reforms of the Hegelian system in the field of logic and historiography, as reflected especially in the emergence of Kuno Fischer, one of the foremost historians of philosophy. In the fundamental triad of the dialectic, as Fischer saw it, Being and Nothing are not equally static and neutralizing. The real movement does not interpose itself into their relationship because Being is here to be understood as the Being of thought, which, to the degree that it is a thinking of Nothing, possesses that dynamic surplus that becomes manifest in the moment of Becoming. It was in making responses to this

view that the forthcoming Neo-Hegelian movement in Europe found some of its motivations. Theological radicalism In political conditions in Germany changed with the succession of the young Frederick William IV , whose minister began to repress the liberal press and summoned to Berlin in an anti-Hegelian capacity both Schelling and the conservative jurist F. Stahl, a stubborn critic of Hegel. Far from weakening the movement, however, these actions radicalized its revolutionary manifestations. The essence of humanity is reason, will, and love; and these three faculties constitute the consciousness of the human species as a knowledge of the infinity that man must regain. Humanity must thus reverse the theological propositions that express the spurious objectification of its universality in God; for this objectification had been effected through the individual consciousness in its effort to surmount its limitations. Thus, Feuerbach interpreted the Christian mysteries as symbols of the alienation of human properties absolutized as divine attributes, and he criticized the contradictions of theology that are found in such concepts as God, the Trinity, the sacraments, and faith. Differentiating his position from the pantheistic and mysticizing Substance of Strauss, Bauer held that the Gospels were not the unconscious product of the original community but a product of the self-consciousness of the Spirit in a given stage of its development. There followed two works specifically concerning Hegel, in which, feigning an orthodoxy from which he charged Hegel with atheism and radicalism, Bauer maintained, in the form of a parody, the revolutionary interpretation of Hegel that became customary in the current of the Hegelian left. Sociopolitical radicalism In the years 1843, the repressive measures of the government reached ever more decisive extremes: Bauer was debarred from teaching; Feuerbach did not even attempt to teach; and Ruge was enjoined to publish the *Hallische* in Prussia instead of Leipzig. The inversion of speculative propositions, he held, leads to the philosophical reappropriation of the human essence; the philosophy of the future will achieve mastery through the negation of the Hegelian philosophy—and this is exactly what he entitled his forthcoming book: In place of the immediate Absolute of Hegel, he argued, there must be substituted the immediate individual existent—corporeal, sensible, and rational. Influenced in their theories by Feuerbach, this group directed radicalism toward an experience deepened by the classical Enlightenment and embraced the rising socialism. They thus involved Hegel in their critique of the political, cultural, and philosophical conditions of the time. The work of Marx The years between 1843 and 1845, however, saw the emergence of a figure incomparably more representative of the crisis of German Hegelianism than any already cited, that of Karl Marx , who was destined to guide the experience of this crisis toward a revolution of world historical scope. At first a friend of Bauer, Marx clung closely, however, to the democratic wing of the left. Such absolutizing, he charged, lent itself to generalizations of broad critical scope with respect to the idealistic procedure of hypostatizing the Idea and brought about as allegorical derivatives from it certain concrete political and social determinations, such as family , classes, and the state powers. The historical materialism that Marx counterposed against idealism expressed the conviction that the basis comprising the relations of production, both economic and social, conditions the superstructure of political, juridical, and cultural institutions and that the interchange among these spheres of production within the totality of a historical epoch must be designed to overcome their contradictions. This materialism, though not belonging any more to Hegelianism, was destined nonetheless to remain linked to it by continuing polemical relationships and overlapping problem areas throughout the subsequent history of the movement see also dialectical materialism. Along with Marx must, of course, be mentioned his colleague Friedrich Engels, who was more tied, however, to the Hegelian conception of the dialectic—particularly regarding the dialectic of nature—than Marx was. Page 1 of 2.

Chapter 6 : Hegel For Beginners

Hegel on Reason and History: A Contemporary Interpretation (review) Lawrence S. Stepelevich Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 16, Number 2, April , pp.

What all these thinkers share, which distinguishes them from materialists like Epicurus and Thomas Hobbes and from empiricists like David Hume , is that they regard freedom or self-determination both as real and as having important ontological implications for soul or mind or divinity. All three find common ground on the unique position of humans in the scheme of things, known by the discussed categorical differences from animals and inanimate objects. Begriff , "Spirit" and "ethical life" in such a way that the Kantian duality is rendered intelligible, rather than remaining a brute "given". In this way, Hegel intends to defend the germ of truth in Kantian dualism against reductive or eliminative programs like those of materialism and empiricism. Hegel preserves this essential Platonic and Kantian concern in the form of infinity going beyond the finite a process that Hegel in fact relates to "freedom" and the "ought" , [54]: Hegel renders these dualities intelligible by ultimately his argument in the "Quality" chapter of the "Science of Logic". The finite has to become infinite in order to achieve reality. The idea of the absolute excludes multiplicity so the subjective and objective must achieve synthesis to become whole. This is because as Hegel suggests by his introduction of the concept of "reality", [54]: Finite things do not determine themselves because as "finite" things their essential character is determined by their boundaries over against other finite things, so in order to become "real" they must go beyond their finitude "finitude is only as a transcending of itself". Modern philosophy, culture and society seemed to Hegel fraught with contradictions and tensions, such as those between the subject and object of knowledge, mind and nature, self and Other , freedom and authority, knowledge and faith, or the Enlightenment and Romanticism. According to Hegel, the main characteristic of this unity was that it evolved through and manifested itself in contradiction and negation. Contradiction and negation have a dynamic quality that at every point in each domain of reality "consciousness , history, philosophy, art, nature and society" leads to further development until a rational unity is reached that preserves the contradictions as phases and sub-parts by lifting them up *Aufhebung* to a higher unity. This whole is mental because it is mind that can comprehend all of these phases and sub-parts as steps in its own process of comprehension. It is rational because the same, underlying, logical , developmental order underlies every domain of reality and is ultimately the order of self-conscious rational thought, although only in the later stages of development does it come to full self-consciousness. The rational, self-conscious whole is not a thing or being that lies outside of other existing things or minds. Rather, it comes to completion only in the philosophical comprehension of individual existing human minds who through their own understanding bring this developmental process to an understanding of itself. Geist combines the meaning of spirit "as in god, ghost, or mind" with an intentional force. Civil society Hegel made the distinction between civil society and state in his *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. This liberal distinction between political society and civil society was followed by Alexis de Tocqueville. For example, while it seems to be the case that he felt that a civil society such as the German society in which he lived was an inevitable movement of the dialectic, he made way for the crushing of other types of "lesser" and not fully realized types of civil society as these societies were not fully conscious or aware "as it were" as to the lack of progress in their societies. Thus, it was perfectly legitimate in the eyes of Hegel for a conqueror such as Napoleon to come along and destroy that which was not fully realized. The State subsumes family and civil society and fulfills them. All three together are called "ethical life" *Sittlichkeit*. The State involves three " moments ". In a Hegelian State, citizens both know their place and choose their place. They both know their obligations and choose to fulfill their obligations. The individual has "substantial freedom in the state". The State is "objective spirit" so "it is only through being a member of the state that the individual himself has objectivity, truth, and ethical life" section Furthermore, every member both loves the State with genuine patriotism, but has transcended mere "team spirit" by reflectively endorsing their citizenship. Members of a Hegelian State are happy even to sacrifice their lives for the State. Heraclitus[edit] According to Hegel, " Heraclitus is the one who first declared the

nature of the infinite and first grasped nature as in itself infinite, that is, its essence as process. The origin of philosophy is to be dated from Heraclitus. His is the persistent Idea that is the same in all philosophers up to the present day, as it was the Idea of Plato and Aristotle". Hegel asserted that in Heraclitus he had an antecedent for his logic: Sein und Nichts sei dasselbe Being and non-being are the same. Heraclitus does not form any abstract nouns from his ordinary use of "to be" and "to become" and in that fragment seems to be opposing any identity A to any other identity B, C and so on, which is not-A. However, Hegel interprets not-A as not existing at all, not nothing at all, which cannot be conceived, but indeterminate or "pure" being without particularity or specificity. This interpretation of Heraclitus cannot be ruled out, but even if present is not the main gist of his thought. Just as humans continually correct their concepts of reality through a dialectical process, so God himself becomes more fully manifested through the dialectical process of becoming. Whatever the nous thinks at any time is actual substance and is identical to limited being, but more remains to be thought in the substrate of non-being, which is identical to pure or unlimited thought. The universe as becoming is therefore a combination of being and non-being. The particular is never complete in itself, but to find completion is continually transformed into more comprehensive, complex, self-relating particulars. The essential nature of being-for-itself is that it is free "in itself;" that is, it does not depend on anything else such as matter for its being. The limitations represent fetters, which it must constantly be casting off as it becomes freer and more self-determining. This means that Jesus as the Son of God is posited by God over against himself as other. Hegel sees both a relational unity and a metaphysical unity between Jesus and God the Father. To Hegel, Jesus is both divine and human. Hegel further attests that God as Jesus not only died, but "[God, that is to say, maintains himself in the process, and the latter is only the death of death. God rises again to life, and thus things are reversed". Kaufmann admits that Hegel treated many distinctively Christian themes and "sometimes could not resist equating" his conception of spirit Geist "with God, instead of saying clearly: So he, too, sometimes spoke of God and, more often, of the divine; and because he occasionally took pleasure in insisting that he was really closer to this or that Christian tradition than some of the theologians of his time, he has sometimes been understood to have been a Christian. Verlag von Duncker und Humblot, He formulates an early philosophical example of a disenchantment narrative, arguing that Judaism was responsible both for realizing the existence of Geist and, by extension, for separating nature from ideas of spiritual and magical forces and challenging polytheism. During the last ten years of his life, Hegel did not publish another book, but thoroughly revised the Encyclopedia second edition, ; third, He also published some articles early in his career and during his Berlin period. A number of other works on the philosophy of history, religion, aesthetics and the history of philosophy were compiled from the lecture notes of his students and published posthumously. This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.

Chapter 7 : Philosophy of History (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Hegel begins by outlining three major types of historical method: original history, which is written during the historical period in question; reflective history, which is written after the period has passed and which brings reflective thought and interpretation to bear on it; and philosophic history, which uses a priori philosophical thought.

Until around 1800, Hegel devoted himself to developing his ideas on religious and social themes, and seemed to have envisaged a future for himself as a type of modernising and reforming educator, in the image of figures of the German Enlightenment such as Lessing and Schiller. In the 1790s the University of Jena had become a center for the development of critical philosophy due to the presence of K. Reinhold and then Fichte, who taught there from 1794 until his dismissal on the grounds of atheism at the end of the decade. By that time, Schelling, who had first been attracted to Jena by the presence of Fichte, had become an established figure at the university. By 1807 Hegel had completed his first major work, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* published in 1807, which showed a divergence from his earlier, seemingly more Schellingian, approach. Now without a university appointment he worked for a short time, apparently very successfully, as an editor of a newspaper in Bamberg, and then from 1808 as the headmaster and philosophy teacher at a gymnasium high school in Nuremberg. During his time at Nuremberg he married and started a family, and wrote and published his *Science of Logic*. In 1817 he managed to return to his university career by being appointed to a chair in philosophy at the University of Heidelberg, but shortly after, in 1818, he was offered and took up the chair of philosophy at the University of Berlin, the most prestigious position in the German philosophical world. In 1818, while in Heidelberg he published the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, a systematic work in which an abbreviated version of the earlier *Science of Logic* the *Encyclopaedia Logic* or *Lesser Logic* was followed by the application of its principles to the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit. In 1820 in Berlin Hegel published his major work in political philosophy, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, based on lectures given at Heidelberg but ultimately grounded in the section of the *Encyclopaedia* *Philosophy of Spirit* dealing with objective spirit. During the following ten years up to his death in 1831 Hegel enjoyed celebrity at Berlin, and published subsequent versions of the *Encyclopaedia*. After his death versions of his lectures on philosophy of history, philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and the history of philosophy were published. Hegel himself had been a supporter of progressive but non-revolutionary politics, but his followers divided into factions broadly groupable as those of the left, right and centre Toews ; from the left, Karl Marx was to develop his own purported scientific approach to society and history which appropriated many Hegelian ideas into a materialistic outlook. Later, especially in reaction to orthodox Soviet versions of Marxism, many so-called Western Marxists re-incorporated further Hegelian elements back into their forms of Marxist philosophy. In academic philosophy, Hegelian idealism had seemed to collapse dramatically after and the failure of the revolutionary movements of that year, but underwent a revival in both Great Britain and the United States in the last decades of the nineteenth century. In Britain, where philosophers such as T. However, a later generation of French philosophers coming to prominence in the 1840s tended to react against Hegel in ways analogous to those in which early analytic philosophers had reacted against the Hegel who had influenced their predecessors. In the 1840s the German philosopher Klaus Hartmann developed what was termed a non-metaphysical interpretation of Hegel which, together with the work of Dieter Henrich and others, played an important role in the revival of interest in Hegel in academic philosophy in the second half of the century. By the close of the twentieth century, even within core logico-metaphysical areas of analytic philosophy, a number of individuals such as Robert Brandom and John McDowell had started to take Hegel seriously as a significant modern philosopher, although generally within analytic circles a favorable reassessment of Hegel has still a long way to go. The contents of philosophical knowledge, we might suspect, will come from the historically changing contents of its cultural context. On the other, there is the hint of such contents being raised to some higher level, presumably higher than other levels of cognitive functioning such as those based in everyday perceptual experience, for example, or those characteristic of other areas of culture such as art and religion. This higher level takes the form of conceptually articulated thought, a type of cognition commonly

taken as capable of having purportedly eternal contents think of Plato and Frege, for example. In line with such a conception, Hegel sometimes referred to the task of philosophy as that of recognising the concept *Der Begriff* in the mere representations *Vorstellungen* of everyday life. In contrast, the British Hegelian movement at the end of the nineteenth century tended to ignore the Phenomenology and the more historicist dimensions of his thought, and found in Hegel a systematic metaphysician whose Logic provided the basis for a definitive philosophical ontology. This latter traditional metaphysical view of Hegel dominated Hegel reception for most of the twentieth century, but from the s came to be challenged by scholars who offered an alternative non-metaphysical, post-Kantian view. But in turn, this post-Kantian reading has been challenged by a revised metaphysical view, critical of the purported over-assimilation of Hegel to Kant by the post-Kantians. Thus, for example, Leibniz had contrasted Plato as an idealist with Epicurus as a materialist. The opposition to materialism here, together with the fact that in the English-speaking world the Irish philosopher and clergyman George Berkeley “ is often taken as a prototypical idealist, has given rise to the assumption that idealism is necessarily an immaterialist doctrine. This assumption, however, is mistaken. The type of picture found in Berkeley was only to be found in certain late antique Platonists and, especially, early Christian Platonists like Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo. It thus had features closer to the more pantheistic picture of divine thought found in Spinoza, for example, for whom matter and mind were attributes of the one substance. The materialists to which he was opposed mechanistic corpuscularists of his time conceived of unformed matter as a type of self-subsistent substance, and it seems to have been that conception to which he was opposed, at least in some periods of his work, not the reality of matter per se. In this picture, Hegel is seen as offering a metaphysico-religious view of God qua Absolute Spirit, as the ultimate reality that we can come to know through pure thought processes alone. Indeed, Hegel often seems to invoke imagery consistent with the types of neo-Platonic conceptions of the universe that had been common within Christian mysticism, especially in the German states, in the early modern period. Thus, in our consciousness of God, we somehow serve to realize his own self-consciousness, and, thereby, his own perfection. In English-language interpretations, such a picture is effectively found in the work of Charles Taylor and Michael Rosen , for example. With its dark mystical roots, and its overtly religious content, it is hardly surprising that the philosophy of Hegel so understood has rarely been regarded as a live option within the largely secular and scientific conceptions of philosophy that have been dominant in the twentieth century. To critics, such as Karl Popper in his popular post-war *The Open Society and its Enemies* , Hegel had not only advocated a disastrous political conception of the state and the relation of its citizens to it, a conception prefiguring twentieth-century totalitarianism, but he had also tried to underpin such advocacy with dubious theo-logico-metaphysical speculations. With his idea of the development of spirit in history, Hegel is seen as literalising a way of talking about different cultures in terms of their spirits, of constructing a developmental sequence of epochs typical of nineteenth-century ideas of linear historical progress, and then enveloping this story of human progress in terms of one about the developing self-conscious of the cosmos-God itself. The pantheistic legacy inherited by Hegel meant that he had no problem in considering an objective outer world beyond any particular subjective mind. But this objective world itself had to be understood as conceptually informed: Thus in contrast to Berkeleian subjective idealism it became common to talk of Hegel as incorporating the objective idealism of views, especially common among German historians, in which social life and thought were understood in terms of the conceptual or spiritual structures that informed them. But in contrast to both forms of idealism, Hegel, according to this reading, postulated a form of absolute idealism by including both subjective life and the objective cultural practices on which subjective life depended within the dynamics of the development of the self-consciousness and self-actualisation of God, the Absolute Spirit. Despite this seemingly dominant theological theme, Hegel was still seen by many as an important precursor of other more characteristically secular strands of modern thought such as existentialism and Marxist materialism. Existentialists were thought of as taking the idea of the finitude and historical and cultural dependence of individual subjects from Hegel, and as leaving out all pretensions to the Absolute, while Marxists were thought of as taking the historical dynamics of the Hegelian picture but reinterpreting this in materialist rather than idealist categories. As for understanding Hegel himself, the traditional metaphysical view remained the dominant interpretative approach

of Hegel scholars throughout much of the twentieth century. Thus it is commonly asserted that implicit within the metaphysical Hegel is an anti-metaphysical philosopher struggling to get out—“one potentially capable of beating the critical Kant at his own game. More controversially, one now finds it argued that the traditional picture is simply wrong at a more general level, and that Hegel, even in his systematic thought, was not committed to the bizarre, teleological spirit monism that has been traditionally attributed to him because he was free of the type of traditional metaphysical commitments that had been criticized by Kant. Prominent among such interpretations has been the so-called post-Kantian interpretation advanced by North American Hegel scholars Robert Pippin , , and Terry Pinkard , , From an explicitly analytic perspective, broadly similar views have been put forward by Robert Brandom , , and John McDowell With this notion, it is claimed, Hegel was essentially attempting to answer the Kantian question of the conditions of rational human mindedness, rather than being concerned with giving an account of the developing self-consciousness of God. But while Kant had limited such conditions to formal abstractly conceived structures of the mind, Hegel extended them to include aspects of historically and socially determined forms of embodied human existence. Proponents of the post-Kantian view, it is commonly said, are guilty of projecting onto Hegel views they would like to find there rather than what is actually to be found. Here one tends to find interpreters attributing to Hegel some type of conceptual realism, sometimes appealing to contemporary analytic metaphysics for the legitimacy of metaphysics conceived as inquiry into the fundamental features or structures of the world itself. Among the interpreters advancing something like this revised metaphysical view might be counted Stephen Houlgate b , Robert Stern , , Kenneth Westphal , James Kreines , and Christopher Yeomans On a number of points, the proponents of the revised conceptual realist metaphysical interpretation will agree with advocates of the post-Kantian non-metaphysical approach. First, they tend to agree in dismissing much of the extravagant metaphysics traditionally ascribed to Hegel. While it is for the most part clear what sets both post-Kantians and conceptual realists against the traditional view, it is still not clear which issues dividing them are substantive and which are ultimately verbal. After all, Kant himself was not critical of metaphysics per se. His claim was that existing so-called dogmatic metaphysics was in a state analogous to that in which, say, physics had been in before the scientific revolution of sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Rather than wanting to eliminate metaphysics, after the style, say, of Hume or the modern logical positivists, Kant had wanted to put metaphysics itself on a secure scientific basis analogous to what Galileo and Newton had achieved for physics. The relevant differences between revised metaphysical and the non-metaphysical views would need to be established with respect to such particular issues as, for example, the nature of acceptably Kantian metaphysical claims. In the next category are works that were published at the time as handbooks for use in student teaching such as the *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences* first published in while he was teaching at Heidelberg and subsequently revised and republished in and again in , and *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, effectively an expansion of a section of the *Encyclopaedia* and published in after his move to Berlin. Transcripts of his earlier lectures on this topic delivered in Heidelberg have also since been published. Along with the *Encyclopaedia* and the *Philosophy of Right* might be added similar teaching-related writings from the Jena period, prepared as lectures but only published as such much later. Here we will restrict the discussion to the first three categories. The term clearly suited Kant as he had distinguished the phenomena known through the faculty of sensibility from the noumena known purely conceptually. It is meant to function as an induction or education of the reader to the standpoint of purely conceptual thought from which philosophy can be done. As such, its structure has been compared to that of a *Bildungsroman* educational novel , having an abstractly conceived protagonist—“the bearer of an evolving series of so-called shapes of consciousness or the inhabitant of a series of successive phenomenal worlds—“whose progress and set-backs the reader follows and learns from. Or at least this is how the work sets out: Hegel constructs a series of such shapes that maps onto the history of western European civilization from the Greeks to his own time. When Kant had broached the idea of a phenomenological propaedeutic to Lambert, he himself had still believed in the project of a purely conceptual metaphysics achievable by the use of the regressive or analytic method, but this project conceived as an exercise in theoretical reason was just what Kant in his later critical philosophy had come to disavow. Supporters of the post-Kantian interpretation of Hegel obviously interpret this work and its telos differently.

For example, it has been argued e. As Pinkard had pointed out in that work, this was a conception of the normatively structured practices of human reason found in the American pragmatist Wilfrid Sellars, the inspiration behind the Hegelian dimensions of analytic philosophers such as Willem deVries , Robert Brandom and John McDowell. Chapters 1 to 3 effectively follow a developmental series of distinct shapes of consciousness – jointly epistemological and ontological attitudes articulated by criteria which are, regarded from one direction, criteria for certain knowledge, and from the other, criteria for the nature of the objects of such knowledge. In chapter 1, the attitude of Sense-certainty takes immediately given perceptual simples – the sort of role played by the so-called sense-data of early twentieth-century analytic epistemology, for example, with which a subject is purportedly acquainted as bare thises – as the fundamental objects known. Hegel is clear that these contents are not merely qualitative simples that are immediately apprehended, but comprehended instances of the conceptual determination of singularity [Einzelheit] Phen: The idea seems to be that for Hegel, the same content can play the roles played by both concepts and intuitions in Kant. By the end of this chapter our protagonist consciousness and by implication, we the audience to this drama has learnt that the nature of consciousness cannot be as originally thought: The general truth that was learned about the apparent qualitative simples in Sense-certainty that they were instances of generals is now explicitly taken as the truth of the object of Perception Wahrnehmung – in German this term having the connotations of taking nehmen to be true wahr. In contrast to the purported single object of Sense-certainty the object of Perception is taken as instantiating general properties: But this can be conceived in a variety of ways: Predictably, problems will be revealed in these various different ways of thinking of the nature of those everyday objects of our experience. In fact, such collapse into a type of self-generated skepticism is typical of all the shapes we follow in the work, and there seems something inherently skeptical about such reflexive cognitive processes. But this is not the type of skepticism that is typical of early modern philosophy, such as that used by Descartes in his attempt to find some foundation of indubitability on which genuine knowledge can be built Forster As is clear from his treatment of ancient philosophy in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel was attracted to the type of dialectic employed by Socrates in his efforts to get his interlocutors thinking about something beyond that given immediately in sensation LHP II: For Hegel, the ancient skeptics captured the skeptical moment of thought that is the means by which thought progresses beyond the particular categories that have given rise to contradictions. Just as in the way a new shape of thought, Perception, had been generated from the internal contradictions that emerged within Sense-certainty, the collapse of any given attitude will be accompanied by the emergence of some new implicit criterion that will be the basis of a new emergent attitude. In the case of Perception, the emergent new shape of consciousness, the Understanding, explored in Chapter 3, is a shape identified with the type of scientific cognition that, rather than remaining on the level of the perceived object, posits underlying forces involved in the production of the perceptual episode. The transition from Chapter 3 to Chapter 4, The Truth of Self-Certainty, also marks a more general transition from Consciousness to Self-consciousness. It is in the course of Chapter 4 that we find what is perhaps the most well-known part of the Phenomenology, the account of the struggle of recognition in which Hegel examines the inter-subjective conditions which he sees as necessary for any form of consciousness. Such complex patterns of mutual recognition constituting objective spirit thereby provide the social matrix within which individual self-consciousnesses can exist as such. But this is only worked out in the text gradually. So we have to see how the protagonist self-consciousness could achieve this insight. It is to this end that we further trace the learning path of self-consciousness through the processes of reason in Chapter 5 before objective spirit can become the explicit subject matter of Chapter 6 Spirit. Thus Hegel might be seen as adopting the viewpoint that since social life is ordered by customs we can approach the lives of those living in it in terms of the patterns of those customs or conventions themselves – the conventional practices, as it were, constituting specific, shareable forms of life made actual in the lives of particular individuals who had in turn internalized such general patterns in the process of acculturation. It is not surprising then that his account of spirit here starts with a discussion of religious and civic law. But for non-traditionalists it is not obvious that Hegel, in employing such phrases, is in any way committed to any metaphysical supra-individual conscious being or beings.

Chapter 8 : Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

A substantial survey and interpretation of Hegel's philosophy using a topical approach, as distinct from one that focuses on Hegel's major works. Section 11, "Freedom, Morality, and the End of History," has several chapters relating to Hegel's philosophy of history, with the last one discussing the idea of the end of history.

In a sense, this question is best answered on the basis of a careful reading of some good historians. But it will be useful to offer several simple answers to this foundational question as a sort of conceptual map of the nature of historical knowing. First, historians are interested in providing conceptualizations and factual descriptions of events and circumstances in the past. This effort is an answer to questions like these: What was it like? What were some of the circumstances and happenings that took place during this period in the past? How did participants and contemporaries think about it? What were the conditions and forces that brought it about? And providing an explanation requires, most basically, an account of the causal mechanisms, background circumstances, and human choices that brought the outcome about. We explain an historical outcome when we identify the social causes, forces, and actions that brought it about, or made it more likely. What were the processes through which the outcome occurred? How did Truman manage to defeat Dewey in the US election? Fourth, often historians are interested in piecing together the human meanings and intentions that underlie a given complex series of historical actions. They want to help the reader make sense of the historical events and actions, in terms of the thoughts, motives, and states of mind of the participants. Why has the Burmese junta dictatorship been so intransigent in its treatment of democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi? Answers to questions like these require interpretation of actions, meanings, and intentions of individual actors and of cultures that characterize whole populations. And, of course, the historian faces an even more basic intellectual task: Historical data do not speak for themselves; archives are incomplete, ambiguous, contradictory, and confusing. The historian needs to interpret individual pieces of evidence; and he or she needs to be able to somehow fit the mass of evidence into a coherent and truthful story. In short, historians conceptualize, describe, contextualize, explain, and interpret events and circumstances of the past. They sketch out ways of representing the complex activities and events of the past; they explain and interpret significant outcomes; and they base their findings on evidence in the present that bears upon facts about the past. Their accounts need to be grounded on the evidence of the available historical record; and their explanations and interpretations require that the historian arrive at hypotheses about social causes and cultural meanings. Historians can turn to the best available theories in the social and behavioral sciences to arrive at theories about causal mechanisms and human behavior; so historical statements depend ultimately upon factual inquiry and theoretical reasoning. Two preliminary issues are relevant to almost all discussions of history and the philosophy of history. These are issues having to do with the constitution of history and the levels at which we choose to characterize historical events and processes. The first issue concerns the relationship between actors and causes in history: The second issue concerns the question of scale of historical processes in space and time: Both issues can be illustrated in the history of France. Should we imagine that twentieth-century France is the end result of a number of major causes in its past—the collapse of the Roman order in the territory, the military successes of Charlemagne, the occurrence of the French Revolution, and defeat in the Franco-Prussian War? Or should we acknowledge that France at any point in time was the object of action and contest among individuals, groups, and organizations, and that the interplay of strategic actors is a more fertile way of thinking about French history than the idea of a series of causal events? Scale is equally controversial. Should we think of France as a single comprehensive region, or as the agglomeration of separate regions and cultures with their own historical dynamics Alsace, Brittany, Burgundy? Further, is it useful to consider the long expanse of human activity in the territory of what is now France, or are historians better advised to focus their attention on shorter periods of time? The following two sections will briefly consider these issues. Is history largely of interest because of the objective causal relations that exist among historical events and structures like the absolutist state or the Roman Empire? Or is history an agglomeration of the actions and mental frameworks of myriad individuals, high and low? Historians often pose questions like these: But what

if the reality of history is significantly different from what is implied by this approach? What if the causes of some very large and significant historical events are themselves small, granular, gradual, and cumulative? What if there is no satisfyingly simple and high-level answer to the question, why did Rome fall? What if, instead, the best we can do in some of these cases is to identify a swarm of independent, small-scale processes and contingencies that eventually produced the large outcome of interest? More radically, it is worth considering whether this way of thinking about history as a series of causes and effects is even remotely suited to its subject matter. What if we think that the language of static causes does not work particularly well in the context of history? What if we take seriously the idea that history is the result of the actions and thoughts of vast numbers of actors, so history is a flow of action and knowledge rather than a sequence of causes and effects? What if we believe that there is an overwhelming amount of contingency and path dependency in history? Do these alternative conceptions of history suggest that we need to ask different questions about large historical changes? Here is an alternative way of thinking of history: We might couch historical explanations in terms of how individual actors low and high acted in the context of these conditions; and we might interpret the large outcomes as no more than the aggregation of these countless actors and their actions. Such an approach would help to inoculate us against the error of reification of historical structures, periods, or forces, in favor of a more disaggregated conception of multiple actors and shifting conditions of action. This orientation brings along with it the importance of analyzing closely the social and natural environment in which actors frame their choices. Our account of the flow of human action eventuating in historical change unavoidably needs to take into account the institutional and situational environment in which these actions take place. Part of the topography of a period of historical change is the ensemble of institutions that exist more or less stably in the period: So historical explanations need to be sophisticated in their treatment of institutions and practices. Social circumstances can be both inhibiting and enabling; they constitute the environment within which individuals plan and act. It is an important circumstance that a given period in time possesses a fund of scientific and technical knowledge, a set of social relationships of power, and a level of material productivity. It is also an important circumstance that knowledge is limited; that coercion exists; and that resources for action are limited. Within these opportunities and limitations, individuals, from leaders to ordinary people, make out their lives and ambitions through action. What all of this suggests is an alternative way of thinking about history that has a different structure from the idea of history as a stream of causes and effects, structures and events. It is a view of history that gives close attention to states of knowledge, ideology, and agency, as well as institutions, organizations, and structures, and that gives less priority to the framework of cause and effect. Suppose we are interested in Asian history. Are we concerned with Asia as a continent, or China, or Shandong Province? Or in historical terms, are we concerned with the whole of the Chinese Revolution, the base area of Yenan, or the specific experience of a handful of villages in Shandong during the s? And given the fundamental heterogeneity of social life, the choice of scale makes a big difference to the findings. Historians differ fundamentally around the decisions they make about scale. William Hinton provides what is almost a month-to-month description of the Chinese Revolution in Fanshen village—a collection of a few hundred families Hinton, The book covers a few years and the events of a few hundred people. Likewise, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie offers a deep treatment of the villagers of Montaillou; once again, a single village and a limited time Le Roy Ladurie, William Cronon provides a focused and detailed account of the development of Chicago as a metropolis for the middle of the United States Cronon, In each of these cases, the historian has chosen a scale that encompasses virtually the whole of the globe, over millennia of time. The first threatens to be so particular as to lose all interest, whereas the second threatens to be so general as to lose all empirical relevance to real historical processes. There is a third choice available to the historian that addresses both points. This is to choose a scale that encompasses enough time and space to be genuinely interesting and important, but not so much as to defy valid analysis. This level of scale might be regional—for example, G. It might be national—for example, a social and political history of Indonesia. And it might be supra-national—for example, an economic history of Western Europe or comparative treatment of Eurasian history. The key point is that historians in this middle range are free to choose the scale of analysis that seems to permit the best level of conceptualization of history, given the evidence that is available and the

social processes that appear to be at work. Continental philosophy of history The topic of history has been treated frequently in modern European philosophy. A long, largely German, tradition of thought looks at history as a total and comprehensible process of events, structures, and processes, for which the philosophy of history can serve as an interpretive tool. This approach, speculative and meta-historical, aims to discern large, embracing patterns and directions in the unfolding of human history, persistent notwithstanding the erratic back-and-forth of particular historical developments. Modern philosophers raising this set of questions about the large direction and meaning of history include Vico, Herder, and Hegel. A somewhat different line of thought in the continental tradition that has been very relevant to the philosophy of history is the hermeneutic tradition of the human sciences. Human beings make history; but what is the fundamental nature of the human being? Can the study of history shed light on this question? When we study different historical epochs, do we learn something about unchanging human beings—or do we learn about fundamental differences of motivation, reasoning, desire, and collectivity? Is humanity a historical product? The common features of human nature give rise to a fixed series of stages of development of civil society, law, commerce, and government: Two things are worth noting about this perspective on history: Johann Gottfried Herder offers a strikingly different view about human nature and human ideas and motivations. Herder argues for the historical contextuality of human nature in his work, *Ideas for the Philosophy of History of Humanity*. He offers a historicized understanding of human nature, advocating the idea that human nature is itself a historical product and that human beings act differently in different periods of historical development —, Philosophers have raised questions about the meaning and structure of the totality of human history. Some philosophers have sought to discover a large organizing theme, meaning, or direction in human history. The ambition in each case is to demonstrate that the apparent contingency and arbitrariness of historical events can be related to a more fundamental underlying purpose or order. This approach to history may be described as hermeneutic; but it is focused on interpretation of large historical features rather than the interpretation of individual meanings and actions. In effect, it treats the sweep of history as a complicated, tangled text, in which the interpreter assigns meanings to some elements of the story in order to fit these elements into the larger themes and motifs of the story. Ranke makes this point explicitly. A recurring current in this approach to the philosophy of history falls in the area of theodicy or eschatology: Theologians and religious thinkers have attempted to find meaning in historical events as expressions of divine will. In the twentieth century, theologians such as Maritain, Rust, and Dawson offered systematic efforts to provide Christian interpretations of history.

Chapter 9 : Differences in Ideas of Marx and Hegel

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (/ ˈh eɪˈ ɡ eɪ ˈ ɛ ɪ ˈ ɛ ɪ ˈ ɛ ɪ /; German: [ˈɡeːɔ̯ɪlhɛːlm ˈfɛːi̯çˌdɛːaːʃ ˈheːɪl]; August 27, - November 14,) was a German philosopher and an important figure of German idealism.

Differences in Ideas of Marx and Hegel Article shared by: This article will help you to differentiate between the ideas of Marx and Hegel. Hegel emphasizes the concept of Idea, but Marx talks about matter. The differences between Hegel and Marx are important. The dialectic provided clue to this development. He also said that dialectic was also the clue to progress but this progress is not history and the culmination of progress is neither history nor Absolute Idea not even the National State of Germany. Marx also differed from Hegel on another standpoint. Hegel had simply interpreted the history dialectically but he did not suggest how to change the history as well as society. Hegel idealized the state through dialectical method and ultimately it culminated to fascism. Marx had no interest in metaphysics. It is essentially an abstract way of thinking. Idea and metaphysics failed to allure Marx. To him matter was of primary importance. Both Marx and Engels had admitted that Hegelian dialectics had both idealistic and revolutionary aspects. Marx and Engels accepted the latter. In this background we can say that Marx and Engels have converted Hegelian dialectics into materialist dialectics and this is not only a method but also a theory a theory of development of the most general laws of development of nature, society and knowledge. Marxist method is materialist as well as dialectical. In Marxism, dialectics and materialism are not separate from each other. Finally, we say that Marx expressed his indebtedness to Hegel in regard to dialectics but simultaneously he categorically stated his differences with Hegelian dialectics. To Hegel the life process of human brain, i. With me, on the contrary the idea is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind and translated into forms of thought. In the thoughts of both Hegel and Marx there are seeds of revolution. For the first time Hegel pointed out that history is always in movement. It never stands at a particular pointer stage. Its movement is dialectical. According to Marx the society also progresses and the method is dialectic. In the process of progress the latter stage is different from the former. Marx also said that the latter stage is developed from the former. Both Hegel and Marx insisted that there was reason behind the dialectical process and it is not guided and motivated by any external or any other force.