

**Chapter 1 : Differences and similarities between Nietzsche and Kierkegaard : askphilosophy**

*Kierkegaard rejected the world spirit of the Romantics and Hegel and wanted the focus to return to the individual. It is important to continue to view things from the point of view of the person. However, there is something to the holistic way that the Romantics viewed the world.*

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Is despair a merit or a defect? Purely dialectically it is both. If one were to think of despair only in the abstract, without reference to some particular despairer, one would have to say it is an enormous merit. That tension between two aspects of the "self" that must be brought into balance. When the self is out of balance, i. Notably, Anti-Climacus says one can be in despair even if one feels perfectly happy. Despair is not just an emotion, in a deeper sense it is the loss of self, i. The A is an aesthete well aware that he can use the power of interpretation to define who he is and what he takes to be valuable. He knows he can shape and reshape his own self-identity. Nothing binds him to his relationships. Nothing binds him to his past actions. In the end though, he also knows he lacks a consistent understanding of who he is. He lacks a self that resists his own power of reinterpretation. Another perspective, one in which an individual can find some measure of freedom from despair, is available for the person with religious "faith. In *Fear and Trembling*, Johannes de Silentio argues that the choice of Abraham to obey the private, unethical, commandment of God to sacrifice his son reveals what faith entails: His God requires more than being good, he demands that he seek out an inner commitment to him. If Abraham were to blithely obey, his actions would have no meaning. It is only when he acts with fear and trembling that he demonstrates a full awareness that murdering a son is absolutely wrong, ethically speaking. Despair has several specific levels that a person can find themselves, each one further in despair than the last as laid out in *The Sickness Unto Death*. The first level is "The despair that is ignorant of being despair or the despairing ignorance of having a self and an eternal self. In this sense, the person does not recognize his own despair because he often measures the success of his life based on whether he himself judges himself to be happy. Regardless of whether you know you are in despair or not, Kierkegaard asserts, you can still be in that state. He notes that this is the most common in the world. The next level of despair is "The despair that is conscious of being despair and therefore is conscious of having a self in which there is something eternal and then either in despair does not will to be itself or in despair wills to be itself. These three divisions are mostly the self-worth the person has and the amount to which they understand their own despair. The despair to not be oneself is pretty straightforward. A person sees themselves as unworthy and as such does not see themselves as worthy before something they do not understand. The lowest form of this group, however, is the desire to be a new self. Once in despair, without a complete relation to God one will always be in despair, so to be in this level one understands the permanence of the despair. The despair in this group arises from the nature of sensate things and physical desires. These three sub groups are also grouped under the heading "Despair over the earthly. Unlike in the upper level, this weakness is understood and as such, instead of turning to faith and humbling oneself before God, they despair in their own weakness and unworthiness. In this sense, they despair over the eternal and refuse to be comforted by the light of God. The last and lowest form of despair is the desire "In despair to will to be oneself. In this form of despair, the individual finds him or herself in despair, understands they are in despair, seeks some way to alleviate it, and yet no help is forthcoming. As a result, the self becomes hardened against any form of help and "Even if God in heaven and all the angels offered him aid, he would not want it. This is the least common form of despair and Kierkegaard claims it is mostly found in true poets. This despair can also be called the despair of defiance, as it is the despair that strikes out against all that is eternal. One last note is that as one travels further down the forms of despair, the number of people in each group becomes fewer. Silentio argues that Abraham is a knight of faith. The divine command theory is a metaethical theory which claims moral values are whatever is commanded by a god or gods. However, Kierkegaard is not arguing that morality is created by God ; instead, he would argue that a divine command from God transcends ethics. This distinction means that God does not

necessarily create human morality: But any religious person must be prepared for the event of a divine command from God that would take precedence over all moral and rational obligations. Kierkegaard called this event the teleological suspension of the ethical. Abraham, the knight of faith, chose to obey God unconditionally, and was rewarded with his son, his faith, and the title of Father of Faith. Abraham transcended ethics and leaped into faith. But there is no valid logical argument one can make to claim that morality ought to be or can be suspended in any given circumstance, or ever. Thus, Silentio believes ethics and faith are separate stages of consciousness. Either one chooses to live in faith the religious stage or to live ethically the ethical stage. This results in a battle between those who want to live for pleasure and those who demand an ethical existence. But Kierkegaard always points toward the religious goal, an "eternal happiness", or the salvation of the soul as the highest good. He says, be whatever you want, but remember that your soul belongs to God, not to the world. By now you have easily seen that in his life the ethical individual goes through stages we previously set forth as separate stages. He is going to develop in his life the personal, the civic, the religious virtues, and his life advances through his continually translating himself from one stage to another. As soon as a person thinks that one of these stages is adequate and that he dares to concentrate on it one-sidedly, he has not chosen himself ethically but has failed to see the significance of either isolation or continuity and above all has not grasped that the truth lies in the identity of the two. The person who has ethically chosen and found himself possess himself defined in his entire concretion. He then possesses himself as an individual who has these capacities, these passions, these inclinations, these habits, who is subject to these external influences, who is influenced in one direction thus and in another thus. Here he then possesses himself as a task in such a way that it is chiefly to order, shape, temper, inflame, control-in short, to produce an evenness in the soul, a harmony, which is the fruit of the personal virtues. So, too, a dog can be taught to walk on two legs for a moment but then, then comes the mediation, and the dog walks on four legs "mediation also does that. It may be very commendable for a particular individual to be a councilor of justice, a good worker in the office, no. If, then, at the moment of resignation, of collecting oneself, of choice, an individual has understood this, it surely cannot mean that he is supposed to have forgotten it the next moment. Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Hong, pp. Love for the neighbor is therefore the eternal equality in loving. Equality is simply not to make distinctions and eternal equality is unconditionally not to make the slightest distinction, unqualifiedly not to make the slightest distinction. The essential Christian is itself too weighty, in its movements too earnest to scurry about, dancing, in the frivolity of such facile talk about the higher, highest, and the supremely highest. With the neighbor you have the equality of a human being before God. God is the middle term. Soren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, , Hong p. Becoming aware of our true self is our true task and endeavor in life"it is an ethical imperative, as well as preparatory to a true religious understanding. Individuals can exist at a level that is less than true selfhood. We can live, for example, simply in terms of our pleasures "our immediate satisfaction of desires, propensities, or distractions. In this way, we glide through life without direction or purpose. To have a direction, we must have a purpose that defines for us the meaning of our lives. You are a hater of activity in life-quite appropriately, because if there is to be meaning in it life must have continuity, and this your life does not have. You keep busy with your studies, to be sure; you are even diligent; but it is only for your sake, and it is done with as little teleology as possible. Moreover, you are unoccupied; like the laborers in the Gospel standing idle in the marketplace, you stick your hands in your pocket and contemplate life. Now you rest in despair. Wherever there is something going on you join in. You behave in life as you usually do in a crowd. In this sense, a human results from a relation between the Infinite Noumena, spirit, eternal and Finite Phenomena, body, temporal. This does not create a true self, as a human can live without a "self" as he defines it. Instead, the Self or ability for the self to be created from a relation to the Absolute or God the Self can only be realized through a relation to God arises as a relation between the relation of the Finite and Infinite relating back to the human. This would be a positive relation. An individual person, for Kierkegaard, is a particular that no abstract formula or definition can ever capture. Including the individual in "the public" or "the crowd" or "the herd" or subsuming a human being as simply a member of a species is a reduction of the true meaning of life for individuals. What philosophy or politics try to do is to categorize and pigeonhole individuals by group characteristics, each with their own individual

differences. Only in this way is equality the divine law, only in this way is the struggle the truth, only in this way does the victory have validity- only when the single individual fights for himself with himself within himself and does not unseasonably presume to help the whole world to obtain external equality, which is of very little benefit, all the less so because it never existed, if for no other reason than that everyone would come to thank him and become unequal before him, only in this way is equality the divine law. Modern society contributes to this dissolution of what it means to be an individual. Through its production of the false idol of "the public", it diverts attention away from individuals to a mass public that loses itself in abstractions, communal dreams, and fantasies. It is helped in this task by the media and the mass production of products to keep it distracted. Even the fight for temporal equality is a distraction. In Works of Love he writes, To bring about similarity among people in the world, to apportion to people, if possible equally, the conditions of temporality, is indeed something that preoccupies worldliness to a high degree. But even what we may call the well-intentioned worldly effort in this regard never comes to an understanding with Christianity. Well-intentioned worldliness remains piously, if you will, convinced that there must be one temporal condition, one earthly dissimilarity " found by means of calculations and surveys or in whatever other way " that is equality. In community, the individual is, crucial as the prior condition for forming a community.

**Chapter 2 : Philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard - Wikipedia**

*To ask other readers questions about Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marx, please sign up. Be the first to ask a question about Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marx The subtitle of this book suggests that its subject matter is three great philosophers whose ideas changed the course of civilisation. There's an element of.*

His father, Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard, was a prosperous but retired businessman who devoted the later years of his life to raising his children. He was a man of deep but gloomy and guilt-ridden piety who was haunted by the memory of having once cursed God as a boy and of having begun his family by getting his maid pregnant—and then marrying her—shortly after the death of his first wife. Kierkegaard enrolled at the University of Copenhagen in but did not complete his studies until Like the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel , whose system he would severely criticize, Kierkegaard entered university in order to study theology but devoted himself to literature and philosophy instead. His thinking during this period is revealed in a journal entry, which is often cited as containing the germ of his later work: The thing is to find a truth which is true for me, to find the idea for which I can live and die. While a student at the university, Kierkegaard explored the literary figures of Don Juan , the wandering Jew , and especially Faust , looking for existential models for his own life. The first collision occurred during his student days: On the one hand, he often seemed to be moving away from the faith of his father and back toward it at virtually the same time. On the other hand, he often stressed that conversion is a long process. He saw becoming a Christian as the task of a lifetime. He took his doctoral exams and wrote his dissertation, *Om begrebet ironi med stadigt hensyn til Socrates* On the Concept of Irony, with Constant Reference to Socrates , completing it in June of and defending it in September. In between, he broke his engagement with Regine Olsen, thus initiating the second major collision of his life. They had met in , when she was only 15 years old, and had become engaged in What is clear is that this relationship haunted him for the rest of his life. Saying in his will that he considered engagement as binding as marriage, he left all his possessions to Regine she did not accept them, however, since she had married long before Kierkegaard died. It is also clear that this crisis triggered a period of astonishing literary productivity, during which Kierkegaard published many of the works for which he is best known: Even after acknowledging that he had written these works, however, Kierkegaard insisted that they continue to be attributed to their pseudonymous authors. The pseudonyms are best understood by analogy with characters in a novel, created by the actual author to embody distinctive worldviews; it is left to the reader to decide what to make of each one. Kierkegaard had intended to cease writing at this point and become a country pastor. But it was not to be. The first period of literary activity 46 was followed by a second Instead of retiring, he picked a quarrel with *The Corsair*, a newspaper known for its liberal political sympathies but more famous as a scandal sheet that used satire to skewer the establishment. Although *The Corsair* had praised some of the pseudonymous works, Kierkegaard did not wish to see his own project confused with that of the newspaper, so he turned his satirical skills against it. *The Corsair* took the bait, and for months Kierkegaard was the target of raucous ridicule, the greatest butt of jokes in Copenhagen. Better at giving than at taking, he was deeply wounded, and indeed he never fully recovered. If the broken engagement was the cloud that hung over the first literary period, the *Corsair* debacle was the ghost that haunted the second. The final collision was with the Church of Denmark Lutheran and its leaders, the bishops J. As long as Mynster, the family pastor from his childhood, was alive, Kierkegaard refrained from personal attacks. These are not developmental stages in a biological or psychological sense—a natural and all-but-automatic unfolding according to some DNA of the spirit. But there is a directionality in the sense that the earlier stages have the later ones as their telos, or goal, while the later stages both presuppose and include the earlier ones as important but subordinate moments. The personages Kierkegaard creates to embody the aesthetic stage have two preoccupations, the arts and the erotic. It is tempting to see the aesthete as a cultured hedonist—a fairly obvious offshoot of the Romantic movement—who accepts the distinction made by Immanuel Kant between artistic and sensuous pleasure while combining them in a single existential project. This clue helps one both to define the aesthetic stage and to see what a stage or sphere of existence in general is. What the

various goals of aesthetic existence have in common is that they have nothing to do with right and wrong. The criteria by which the good life is defined are premoral, unconcerned with good and evil. A stage or sphere of existence, then, is a fundamental project, a form of life, a mode of being-in-the-world that defines success in life by its own distinctive criteria. What might motivate an aesthete to choose the ethical? The aesthete, he argues, fails to become a self at all but becomes, by choice, what David Hume <sup>76</sup> said the self inevitably is: Moreover, the aesthete fails to see that in the ethical the aesthetic is not abolished but ennobled. Judge William presents marriage as the scene of this transformation, in which, through commitment, the self acquires temporal continuity and, following Hegel, the sensuous is raised to the level of spirit. In *Fear and Trembling* this ethical stage is teleologically suspended in the religious, which means not that it is abolished but that it is reduced to relative validity in relation to something absolute, which is its proper goal. But Hegel argued that human beings are too deeply embedded in history to attain such purity and that their grasp of the right and the good is mediated by the laws and customs of the societies in which they live. It is this Hegelian ethics of socialization that preoccupies Judge William and that gets relativized in *Fear and Trembling*. These labels do not bother Kierkegaard, because he interprets reason as human, all too human<sup>77</sup> as the rationale of the current social order, which knows nothing higher than itself. In the language of Karl Marx <sup>83</sup>, what presents itself as reason is in fact ideology. Kierkegaard interprets Abrahamic faith as agreeing with Hegel and Marx about this historical finitude of reason, and, precisely because of this, he insists that the voice of God is an authority that is higher than the rationality of either the current establishment Hegel or the revolution Marx. Against both Hegel and Marx, Kierkegaard holds that history is not the scene in which human reason overcomes this finitude and becomes the ultimate standard of truth. Three dimensions of the religious life

The simple scheme of the three stages becomes more complex in *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. The fundamental distinction is now between objectivity and subjectivity, with two examples of each. One example is the aesthetic posture, presented in earlier work; the other is the project of speculative philosophy, to which this text devotes major attention. The target is Hegelian philosophy, which takes the achievement of comprehensive, absolute knowledge to be the highest human task. But, it is argued in the first place, speculative philosophy cannot even keep its own promises. It purports to begin without presuppositions and to conclude with a final, all-encompassing system. The very idea that thought should be without presuppositions, however, is itself a presupposition, and thus the system is never quite able to complete itself. The goal of objective knowledge is legitimate, but it can never be more than approximately accomplished. Reality may well be a system for God, but not for any human knower. Secondly, even if speculative philosophy could deliver what it promises, it would have forgotten that the highest human task is not cognition but rather the personal appropriation or embodiment of whatever insights into the good and the right one is able to achieve. Becoming a self in this way is called existence, inwardness, and subjectivity. This use of existence as a technical term for the finite, human self that is always in the process of becoming can be seen as the birth of existentialism. Many scholars accordingly refer to Kierkegaard as the father of that movement. The two modes of subjectivity are not, as one might expect, the ethical and the religious stages. One does not become a self simply through successful socialization. Besides, in the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, ethics is treated as already recontextualized in a religious rather than merely a social context. Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms refer to the absolute good variously as the Idea, the Eternal, or God. There is something paradoxical about Religiousness A. Socratic ignorance<sup>78</sup>—the claim of Socrates that he is the wisest of men because, while others think that they know, he knows that he does not<sup>79</sup>—reflects the realization that the relation of the existing, and thus temporal, individual to the eternal does not fit neatly into human conceptual frameworks. But Christianity, as Religiousness B, is more radically paradoxical, for the eternal itself has become paradoxical as the insertion of God in time. In this way the task of relating absolutely to the absolute becomes even more strenuous, for human reason is overwhelmed, even offended, by the claim that Jesus is fully human and fully divine. For example, the two halves of *Sickness unto Death* can be read as reprising Religiousness A and B, respectively, in a different voice. These works present the second, specifically Christian, ethics that had been promised as far back as *The Concept of Anxiety*. They also go beyond the religion of hidden inwardness, whether A or B, in which the relation between God and the soul takes place out of public view. Faith, the inward God-relation, must show

itself outwardly in works of love. This commanded love is contrasted with erotic love and friendship. Through its poets, society celebrates these two forms of love, but only God dares to command the love of neighbours. The celebrated loves are spontaneous: Children do not have to be taught to seek friends; nor, at puberty, do they need to be commanded to fall in love. The celebrated loves are also preferential: By contrast, commanded love is not spontaneous, and it needs to be commanded precisely because it is not preferential. For the Christian, this command comes from Christ, who is himself its embodiment to be imitated. As these themes came more clearly into focus in his writings, the attack upon Christendom with which his life ended became inevitable. Kierkegaard says that his writings as a whole are religious. They are best seen as belonging to the prophetic traditions, in which religious beliefs become the basis for a critique of the religious communities that profess them. The 20th-century theologies that were influenced by Kierkegaard go beyond the tasks of metaphysical affirmation and ethical instruction to a critique of complacent piety. In existential philosophies— which are often less overtly theological and sometimes entirely secular—this element of critique is retained but is directed against forms of personal and social life that do not take the tasks of human existence seriously enough. Thus, Friedrich Nietzsche — complains that his secular contemporaries do not take the death of God seriously enough, just as Kierkegaard complains that his Christian contemporaries do not take God seriously enough.

*The sections on Marx and Kierkegaard imply much more than they say. Heiss has a clear sense of the importance for Marx's development of Hegel's concept of labor and Hegel's treatment of "civil society."*

General considerations Problems of the Hegelian heritage The Hegelian system, in which German idealism reached its fulfillment, claimed to provide a unitary solution to all of the problems of philosophy. It held that the speculative point of view, which transcends all particular and separate perspectives, must grasp the one truth, bringing back to its proper centre all of the problems of logic, of metaphysics or the nature of Being, and of the philosophies of nature, law, history, and culture artistic, religious, and philosophical. This Absolute, Hegel held, first puts forth or posits itself in the immediacy of its own inner consciousness and then negates this positing—expressing itself now in the particularity and determinateness of the factual elements of life and culture—and finally regains itself, through the negation of the former negation that had constituted the finite world. Such a dialectical scheme immediateness—alienation—negation of the negation accomplished the self-resolution of the aforementioned problem areas—of logic, of metaphysics, and so on. This panoramic system thus had the merit of engaging philosophy in the consideration of all of the problems of history and culture, none of which could any longer be deemed foreign to its competence. Moreover, such a speculative mediation between opposites, when directed to the more impending problems of the time, such as those of religion and politics, led ultimately to the evasion of the most urgent and imperious ideological demands and was hardly able to escape the charge of ambiguity and opportunism. Stages in the history of the interpretation of Hegel The explanation of the success of Hegelianism—marked by the formation of a school that, for more than 30 years, brought together the best energies of German philosophy—lies in the fact that no other system could compete with it in the richness of its content or the rigour of its formulation or challenge its claim to express the total spirit of the culture of its time. Moreover, as Hegelianism diffused outward, it was destined to provoke increasingly lively and gripping reactions and to take on various articulations as, in its historical development, it intermingled with contrasting positions. Four stages can be distinguished within the development of Hegelianism. The first of these was that of the immediate crisis of the Hegelian school in Germany during the period from through Always involved in polemics against its adversaries, the school soon divided into three currents. Thus, the young Hegelians interpreted Hegelianism in a revolutionary sense—i. In the second phase—, in which Hegelianism diffused into other countries, the works of the centre played a preponderant role; thus, in this phase of the history of the interpretation of Hegel, usually called Neo-Hegelian, the primary interest was in logic and a reform of the dialectic. In the fourth stage, after World War II, the revival of Marxist studies in Europe finally thrust into the foreground the interest in the relation between Hegel and Karl Marx and in the value of the Hegelian heritage for Marxism, with particular regard to political and social problems. This fourth phase of the history of Hegelianism thus appropriated many of the polemical themes of the earlier years of the school. Crises in the earlier Hegelian school The earlier development of Hegelianism can be divided, according to predominant concerns, into three periods: Polemics during the life of Hegel: It was not a matter of polemics within the school but only one of objections against the system from various quarters: This book was reviewed by Herbart, who reprimanded Hegel for mixing the monism of the rationalist Benedict de Spinoza with the transcendentalism of Immanuel Kant, which had explored the conditions of the possibility of knowledge in general. There were also certain critics who directed the liberal press against Hegel for attacking Jakob Fries, a psychologizing Neo-Kantian, in the introduction of *The Philosophy of Right*. Some of the polemical writings of Hegel made a notable impact—e. In this preface, Hegel saw the two things as the same in content but different in form—which for faith is the representation and for reason is the concept. Important among these were a review by Hegel that was unexpectedly eulogistic about the thesis that philosophy and evangelical orthodoxy are compatible and another review in which Hegel responded indirectly to arguments of Herbart. Among the most loyal disciples of Hegel were Hermann Hinrichs, his collaborator, and Karl Rosenkranz, who defended the Hegelian solution of the faith-reason problem which had asserted the identity of content and difference of form, thus aptly defending the free

rationality of religion. Period of controversies chiefly in religion: But, inasmuch as conditions in Germany, during the Restoration, inhibited the liberalization of political discussions, the milieu of controversy shifted to the religious realm and became related to problems of immortality, Christology, and general theology. This work brought the problem of the nature of Christ up to date from the point of view that had been reached by biblical criticism; i. In this approach, the narrowly philological outlook was overcome by a reconstruction in terms of a philosophy of history strangely suggestive of the young Hegel. The thesis of the book was that the Gospel account is interwoven with myths that are not the works of individuals but of the collective poetic activity of the first Christian community, myths that resulted in part from messianic expectations, in part from the memory of the historical figure of Jesus, and in part from a transfiguration of the real elements. The aim of the myths was to demonstrate that philosophy and religion are the same in content and to offer, in an imaginative guise as in parables, the meaning of the one truth that Substance is unification of the divine nature and of the human, which Christ symbolized and which is realized in the spirit of all humanity. There were responses from the right and centre and from Bruno Bauer, a philosopher, historian, and biblical critic. At first, the journal maintained a moderate tone, and Hegelians of the centre and right also contributed articles. In June, however, it veered to the democratic-liberal side as Ruge struck out against an accuser of the young Hegelians and as Feuerbach attacked earlier Hegelians. Hegelianism, which marks the culmination of speculative philosophy, Feuerbach charged, does not demonstrate its own truth, because its contrast between sensory reality and intellectual concept comprises an irresolvable contradiction. As for issues in the fields of logic and metaphysics, after several polemical exchanges the interest of philosophers was attracted to the publicist reawakening that came to Schelling, who reactivated certain anti-Hegelian criticisms. These criticisms dealt with the impossibility of building a valid philosophy upon the pure concept assumed as a point of departure and endowed with autonomous movement. Such a philosophy would be vitiated by presuppositions of what ought to be demonstrated and by hypostatizations i. Period of atheistic and political radicalism: Anti-Hegelian criticism Advancing from Aristotelian presuppositions, an important critique against the Hegelian logic was presented by the classical philosopher and philologist Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg in his *Logische Untersuchungen*; Logical Investigations. Secondly, he charged that Hegel confused 1 the logical opposition or contradiction of A against non-A with 2 the real contradiction or contrariety of A against B. Contradiction 1 consists in the mere repetition of the first term with a negative sign; and from it no concrete movement can proceed. In contrariety 2, however, the opposition of the second term to the first is concrete—thus the second term cannot be deduced from the first and instead should be derived on its own account from empirical experience. Thus, Hegel constructed his entire system, Trendelenburg charged, on an arbitrary dialectic of elements intrinsically real contraries, which he mistakenly treated as though they were abstract opposites contradictories and were such by logical necessity. Hence the philosophy of the later Schelling became the target of all of the criticisms from the left and likewise exerted a notable influence on the speculative theists. Meanwhile, the centre, on account of the critique of Trendelenburg, oriented itself toward the future reforms of Hegelianism. In all of his works—but above all in his *Philosophiske Smuler*; Philosophical Fragments and his *Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift*; Concluding Unscientific Postscript—Kierkegaard waged a continuous polemic against the philosophy of Hegel. He regarded Hegel as motivated by the spirit of the harmonious dialectical conciliation of every opposition and as committed to imposing universal and panlogistic resolutions upon the authentic antinomies of life. It was destined to condition the critical relationship of this current of thought to Hegelianism throughout its subsequent history. Courtesy of the Royal Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen At this time the attitude of the centre was oriented toward reforms of the Hegelian system in the field of logic and historiography, as reflected especially in the emergence of Kuno Fischer, one of the foremost historians of philosophy. In the fundamental triad of the dialectic, as Fischer saw it, Being and Nothing are not equally static and neutralizing. The real movement does not interpose itself into their relationship because Being is here to be understood as the Being of thought, which, to the degree that it is a thinking of Nothing, possesses that dynamic surplus that becomes manifest in the moment of Becoming. It was in making responses to this view that the forthcoming Neo-Hegelian movement in Europe found some of its motivations. Theological

radicalism In political conditions in Germany changed with the succession of the young Frederick William IV , whose minister began to repress the liberal press and summoned to Berlin in an anti-Hegelian capacity both Schelling and the conservative jurist F. Stahl, a stubborn critic of Hegel. Far from weakening the movement, however, these actions radicalized its revolutionary manifestations. The essence of humanity is reason, will, and love; and these three faculties constitute the consciousness of the human species as a knowledge of the infinity that man must regain. Humanity must thus reverse the theological propositions that express the spurious objectification of its universality in God; for this objectification had been effected through the individual consciousness in its effort to surmount its limitations. Thus, Feuerbach interpreted the Christian mysteries as symbols of the alienation of human properties absolutized as divine attributes, and he criticized the contradictions of theology that are found in such concepts as God, the Trinity, the sacraments, and faith. Differentiating his position from the pantheistic and mysticizing Substance of Strauss, Bauer held that the Gospels were not the unconscious product of the original community but a product of the self-consciousness of the Spirit in a given stage of its development. There followed two works specifically concerning Hegel, in which, feigning an orthodoxy from which he charged Hegel with atheism and radicalism, Bauer maintained, in the form of a parody, the revolutionary interpretation of Hegel that became customary in the current of the Hegelian left. Sociopolitical radicalism In the years 1843, the repressive measures of the government reached ever more decisive extremes: Bauer was debarred from teaching; Feuerbach did not even attempt to teach; and Ruge was enjoined to publish the *Hallsche* in Prussia instead of Leipzig. The inversion of speculative propositions, he held, leads to the philosophical reappropriation of the human essence; the philosophy of the future will achieve mastery through the negation of the Hegelian philosophy—and this is exactly what he entitled his forthcoming book: In place of the immediate Absolute of Hegel, he argued, there must be substituted the immediate individual existent—corporeal, sensible, and rational. Influenced in their theories by Feuerbach, this group directed radicalism toward an experience deepened by the classical Enlightenment and embraced the rising socialism. They thus involved Hegel in their critique of the political, cultural, and philosophical conditions of the time. The work of Marx The years between 1843 and 1845, however, saw the emergence of a figure incomparably more representative of the crisis of German Hegelianism than any already cited, that of Karl Marx , who was destined to guide the experience of this crisis toward a revolution of world historical scope. At first a friend of Bauer, Marx clung closely, however, to the democratic wing of the left. Such absolutizing, he charged, lent itself to generalizations of broad critical scope with respect to the idealistic procedure of hypostatizing the Idea and brought about as allegorical derivatives from it certain concrete political and social determinations, such as family , classes, and the state powers. The historical materialism that Marx counterposed against idealism expressed the conviction that the basis comprising the relations of production, both economic and social, conditions the superstructure of political, juridical, and cultural institutions and that the interchange among these spheres of production within the totality of a historical epoch must be designed to overcome their contradictions. This materialism, though not belonging any more to Hegelianism, was destined nonetheless to remain linked to it by continuing polemical relationships and overlapping problem areas throughout the subsequent history of the movement see also dialectical materialism. Along with Marx must, of course, be mentioned his colleague Friedrich Engels, who was more tied, however, to the Hegelian conception of the dialectic—particularly regarding the dialectic of nature—than Marx was. Page 1 of 2.

**Chapter 4 : HEGEL, KIERKEGAARD, MARX by Robert Heiss | Kirkus Reviews**

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He attempts to show that the whole of history is a process of the actualization of the spirit whose final stages are realized through a progression of art, religion, and philosophy. Spiritual liberation for him consists of authenticating and gaining concrete determination of the actuality of the spirit 1, This paper will attempt to explain this unique doctrine of Hegel and responses to these concepts by Kant, Marx and Kierkegaard. Through art God has a natural phase of existence alongside of his spiritual nature - He contains a unity of nature and spirit. Although a work of art expresses the immediacy in the expression of the Ideal, it is also something which is made by the artist, of his own free will, under the natural immediacy of his production based on his technical and particular abilities. Through an evolution of artistic stages, this unity is expressed through a series of expansion and reconciliation of the particularities of the Idea. The three main types of art in this progression manifest different relations of content and shape of the Idea. So the first form of art, the symbolic form, depicts this struggle for the infinite to take shape. Within this form, natural objects receive significance as a representation of the Idea, e. However, this abstractness also points out the conflict between the Idea and its manifestation in nature; how it has no other reality within which to express itself at this time. It proceeds to express itself by exaggerating the natural shapes, "to intoxicate itself in them, to seethe and ferment in them, to do violence to them. Hegel thinks classical art is the first to establish the Ideal as a realized fact. This is more than the formal aspect, as the content of this art also consists in being itself concrete idea and the concrete spiritual. The shape that has these qualities is the human form. He thinks that classical art employed the human form not merely sensuously, but exclusively as the existence corresponding to mind and therefore devoid of all that is deficient in finite phenomenal things. However, here was its limitation. Mind was confined to be expressed as a particular case of mind, as human mind, and not the absolute and eternal. This caused a transition from the classical into the romantic period of art. While classical art was perfection of form, the defect pointed out the problem with art as a whole. Art is not able to adequately portray an infinite concrete object mind in the shape of sensuous concreteness. Mind in its infinite subjectivity of the Idea, and as absolute inwardness is not capable of finding expression while being confined to a bodily medium. Romantic art can be considered as art transcending itself, while still remaining within the artistic realm. The object of art becomes free, and can reveal itself as spiritual existence. Art addresses itself to the inward mind and finds expression through inward feeling. The significance in this period is the feelings which are inherent in the art and which express the Idea. The higher perfection of spirit and feelings has caused the Idea to move away from any union with the external concreteness. Religion is needed as a fuller expression of Mind. Hegel stresses the importance of revelation. At first God is presented to consciousness as a mental representation, then when the sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded, his content is clear - the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit. This makes it seem that his content is separate from his form and that they are perceived through a successive series of events according to finite reflective categories. The Three Moments Hegel has divided the absolute spirit into three "moments" which he also calls syllogisms, which constitute the one syllogism of the absolute, and which are the revelation of that spirit. In this moment the son was begotten with whom the spirit remains in original identity. The phenomenal world was created during the second "moment" of particularity. That spirit is the extreme of negativity and completes its independence and becomes wicked. This individual is the Son and he is "transplanted into the world of time". Through him wickedness is overcome as he put himself in judgment and expired in the pain of negativity, yet he remains unchanged. He has thus "realized his being as the Idea of the spirit, eternal, but alive and present in the world. But Hegel is telling us there is a reciprocal relation between philosophy and religion; that the misunderstandings are due to an incorrect judging based on the very categories which show that the content of religion and philosophy is the same. Hegel claims that the so-called mysteries are speculative and mysterious to the understanding, but not to reason; that they are rational. The problem is that the understanding does not comprehend the speculative. The Rationalists point out the contradictions of the faith in which the spirit

cannot yield to a finite reflection which would strip religious truth of its infinity and make it in reality worthless. In this case, religion is correct in regarding such philosophy and reason as enemies. But it is wrong to be against philosophy in general, especially one which is speculative. That would mean a failure to know the distinction of the content between the logical form of philosophy and revelation of religion. But these philosophies and religions all have the common needs of identifying God, and of determining the relationship of God and the world. Philosophy especially assumes that by determining the nature of God, we will automatically then have the determination of His relationship with the world. This is where the difficulty lies within the sensuality-knowledge relationship. In order to come to have a "reflective" understanding, we must first reject all systems and modes of conception. In order for God to be pure in consciousness, he is therefore parted from appearance, as infinite from the finite. It is this reflective form that is called incomprehensible by the agnostic. They stick to the thought of identity and instead of determining the different modes of unity, of relationships among various things, the ordinary scientist examines only one mode - composition. This is the pantheism they form and which is ascribed to philosophy. For Hegel, the universal mind exists in art as intuition and imagery, in religion as feeling and representative thinking, and in philosophy as pure freedom of thought. World history contains the actuality of mind in its entirety of internality and externality. Providence is not an incomprehensible plan, but is rather a deliberate concrete moving forward of the Absolute Mind toward its goal. In this course, states, nations, monarchies and other individuals arise as "the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind at work within them" as it makes its way and prepares its transition to its next higher stage. Justice, virtue, wrongdoing, power, talents, etc. What would Kant respond to this if he had the chance? Although it is most presumptuous of me to speculate, with the help of lecture notes I will present a comparison between Hegel and Kant on these issues. For Kant, theoretical and moral philosophy are two equal but different realms. He postulates God, freedom and immortality within another world dualism - i. With a choice between reason and understanding, Kant makes understanding do all the work. Kant knows that reason demands a completion of any inquiry that it starts; but Kant denies that a demand of reason can be satisfied, because he thinks that understanding is that function of bringing reason to bear on particulars in a determinant way. Since the completion of reason means going beyond the senses, Kant thinks reason is operating beyond its sphere of competence in these matters. Hegel is the extreme opposite. He reverses this and has reason do all the work. This makes the Idea the reality for Hegel. While Kant wants to put the brakes on reason, Hegel says you cannot stop reason, it is going to keep on pushing. Kant thinks of understanding as just pushing physics just a little further. Hegel says this concept of rationality is wrong. The intelligible world is very Aristotelian: Kant does not have a developmental and therefore historical view of rationality. Marx While Kant pushed aside reason to make room for faith, Marx had nothing but contempt for religion. Marx sees religious consciousness as nothing but a symptom of social conditions. But man is not an abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the world of men, the state, society. Religion is the generalized theory of this world,. It is the fantastic realization of the human essence inasmuch as the human essence possesses no true reality. Religious suffering is the expression of real suffering and at the same time the protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is the opium of the people. The criticism of religion is thus in embryo a criticism of the vale of tears whose halo is religion. He did not have a much higher regard for the philosophy of his times. Marx feels that the task of philosophy, in the service of history, is to unmask the real truth: In this regard, philosophy is subordinate to history. History has shown the concrete realities and examples for reasons of our self-alienation. Philosophy should clarify these truths. Theory can become a powerful material force once the masses have grasped it. This is the positive influence of philosophy. That man is a species-being, i. He sees the entire movement of history as progressing towards communism, and that ". Communism begins with atheism, but since atheism is but a philosophical abstraction, the philanthropy of communism is real because it is devoted to action 2, Marx perceived the usefulness and practicality of philosophy. He believed that sense perception must be the basis of all science. He had no use, however, for abstract theorizing. If you ask about the creation of nature and man, you thus abstract from man and nature. You assert them as non-existent and yet want me to prove them to you as existing. I say to You: He thinks that philosophers have concluded that

history is always under the sway of ideas, and have picked out the dominant forces in history and considered them as "forms of self-determination" of the Concept developing in history.

**Chapter 5 : Conception of Faith with Marx, Feuerbach and Kierkegaard, Academic Philosophy - Contemplation**

*Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marx: Three Great Philosophers Whose Ideas Changed the Course of Civilization [Robert Heiss] on calendrierdelascience.com \*FREE\* shipping on qualifying offers.*

I would probably have been prepared to take it on faith that at least A Triad of Dialectics The subtitle of this book suggests that its subject matter is three great philosophers whose ideas changed the course of civilisation. I would probably have been prepared to take it on faith that at least Hegel and Marx were great philosophers, and I accept that Marx might have changed the course of civilisation, at least for a time. Kierkegaard was somebody about whose philosophy I was quite ignorant. Out of fairness to Heiss, I suspect that the subtitle was the work of his American publishers. The analysis of Hegel occupies about half of the book, while each of the other two receive about one quarter. Heiss attempts to make comparative judgments about the temperament of the three philosophers, based on their writings and their lives. I am unable to assess the veracity of these judgments except on face value. I know little of his academic reputation after the Second World War. However, at a personal level, he is regarded as being compromised by the fact that during the War he provided psychological consultancy services to the Luftwaffe. Thus, rightly or wrongly, he is seen by some as being a Nazi sympathiser. I could not detect any evidence of this in the book, which was first published in 1968. All Dialectics rely on a contradiction, opposition or antagonism between two ideas, objects or forces. Having resolved the contradiction, the outcome becomes the first step in another Dialectical sequence. However, Hegel did not embrace this terminology, instead using Being, Nothing and Becoming thanks to Nathan for highlighting this. Heiss believes that Hegel was optimistic about the direction of the sequential operation of the Dialectic. He saw it as leading to Absolute Truth and the Ideal. When he applied the Dialectic to history, he saw a progressive spirit at play. Over time, humanity would move onwards and upwards to a higher level. However, Hegel inferred this trend more from past history. He tended to focus more on the past, as an explanation of how we got here. He did not spend a lot of time analysing the present in any disciplined manner, at least from the point of view of its role as the second step in the Dialectic. He certainly did not endeavour to extrapolate from the past or the present into the future. He was more concerned with actuality, rather than potentiality. In summary, Heiss considers that Hegel: 1. Used the Dialectic as a method of analysis including a method of analysis of history Note, however, as reinforced in the thread below, that Hegel himself denied that the Dialectic was a "Method" ; 2. Was optimistic about the future operation of the Dialectical Process in the context of history; 3. Did not seek to be predictive which probably reflects the fact that he did not see the Dialectic as a "Method" ; and 4. Did not see any great role for individual action or subjectivity in the outcome of the Dialectical Process in the context of history. Both were highly critical of Hegel. In effect, they developed their own versions of a Dialectic or a Dialectical Method that differed quite significantly. In summary using the above four criteria: All three used the Dialectic as a method of description or analysis, although more so Hegel and Marx; 2. Kierkegaard was pessimistic, while Hegel and Marx were both optimistic about the outcome of the Process; 3. Hegel did not seek to predict the specific outcome of the Dialectic, whereas Kierkegaard to a lesser extent and Marx to a great extent did try to be predictive and prophetic, especially in the latter case in pursuit of a scientific basis for the inevitability of Revolution. Neither Hegel nor Kierkegaard saw much potential for individual human action as a contributor to history. However, once the conditions for Revolution were ripe, Marx envisaged that individuals could make a difference to the manner in which a Revolution was carried out. Heiss paints a picture of Kierkegaard as somebody who locked up his suffering and grief after the break-up of his engagement, and never really recovered. He was miserable, tormented, erratic, sceptical, negative and pessimistic. He saw himself as "confronted by a shattered and disunified existence, as he experienced it in himself and in the world. It seems to have resulted in an emptiness or an abyss. However, in failing to do so, he regarded the process as "making room so that God can come". Man had tampered with the power of God. Now, Religion had to be revived and a new place made for God in the life of the individual, unmediated by the Church. However, Marx agreed that Hegel had correctly understood the flow or movement intrinsic to the Dialectical Process. However, he believed that Hegel had

misapplied his "Method", particularly in relation to history. He also opposed the manner in which Hegel had used it for the purposes of mystification in a religious sense. The allegation of misapplication relates to the subject matter to which each philosopher applied the Dialectical Method. The paramount descriptor was the materialist element. It was a form of Materialism that was Dialectical. Consciousness was a secondary issue for him this is not to deny that he had any interest in Consciousness. He saw history in terms of class conflict that would ultimately witness the Proletariat prevail over the Bourgeoisie and Communism prevail over Capitalism. Importantly, Marx did little to define what Communism would look like or whether it would become the first step in the next sequence of the Dialectical Process. The Dialectical Process required an engine that would achieve the transition to Communism, and Marx believed that this engine was Revolution. He therefore used the Dialectical Method to persuade the Working Class that Revolution was both necessary and inevitable, at least once the economic conditions were ripe. In effect, Marx harnessed his belief in Revolution to the Dialectical Process that dictated the course of history. To the extent that the Dialectical Method was a well-known and credible concept, he co-opted it to drive a revolutionary movement. Thus, Marx differed from Hegel in the sense that he was prepared to be predictive and prophetic. In a way, he created a self-fulfilling prophecy, and then did his best to fulfil it. Indeed, he spent much of his life anticipating that a Revolution in Germany, if not England, was just around the corner. Thus, in addition to creating a philosophy that predicted Revolution, Marx was prepared to participate subjectively in making it happen, by way of agitation, propaganda and action. His analysis of Marx is contained in chapters on each major topic that are usually between three and six pages long. After pages of explication, Heiss leaves us with two principal conclusions: There is not one, but many ways, of looking at things dialectically; and 2. The way the "Dialectical Method" as Heiss uses the term is used is always "situationally determined". Ultimately, the book is a relatively superficial attempt to deal with its subject matter. It is likely that it has been superseded by more robust analyses as the interest in Hegel has become more prevalent in Continental Philosophy.

**Chapter 6 : Johann Karl Mader, Zwischen Hegel Und Marx Zur Verwirklichung D. Philosophie - PhilPapers**

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What all these thinkers share, which distinguishes them from materialists like Epicurus and Thomas Hobbes and from empiricists like David Hume, is that they regard freedom or self-determination both as real and as having important ontological implications for soul or mind or divinity. All three find common ground on the unique position of humans in the scheme of things, known by the discussed categorical differences from animals and inanimate objects. Begriff, "Spirit" and "ethical life" in such a way that the Kantian duality is rendered intelligible, rather than remaining a brute "given". In this way, Hegel intends to defend the germ of truth in Kantian dualism against reductive or eliminative programs like those of materialism and empiricism. Hegel preserves this essential Platonic and Kantian concern in the form of infinity going beyond the finite a process that Hegel in fact relates to "freedom" and the "ought", [54]: Hegel renders these dualities intelligible by ultimately his argument in the "Quality" chapter of the "Science of Logic". The finite has to become infinite in order to achieve reality. The idea of the absolute excludes multiplicity so the subjective and objective must achieve synthesis to become whole. This is because as Hegel suggests by his introduction of the concept of "reality", [54]: Finite things do not determine themselves because as "finite" things their essential character is determined by their boundaries over against other finite things, so in order to become "real" they must go beyond their finitude "finitude is only as a transcending of itself". Modern philosophy, culture and society seemed to Hegel fraught with contradictions and tensions, such as those between the subject and object of knowledge, mind and nature, self and Other, freedom and authority, knowledge and faith, or the Enlightenment and Romanticism. According to Hegel, the main characteristic of this unity was that it evolved through and manifested itself in contradiction and negation. Contradiction and negation have a dynamic quality that at every point in each domain of reality — consciousness, history, philosophy, art, nature and society — leads to further development until a rational unity is reached that preserves the contradictions as phases and sub-parts by lifting them up *Aufhebung* to a higher unity. This whole is mental because it is mind that can comprehend all of these phases and sub-parts as steps in its own process of comprehension. It is rational because the same, underlying, logical, developmental order underlies every domain of reality and is ultimately the order of self-conscious rational thought, although only in the later stages of development does it come to full self-consciousness. The rational, self-conscious whole is not a thing or being that lies outside of other existing things or minds. Rather, it comes to completion only in the philosophical comprehension of individual existing human minds who through their own understanding bring this developmental process to an understanding of itself. Geist combines the meaning of spirit — as in god, ghost, or mind — with an intentional force. Civil society Hegel made the distinction between civil society and state in his *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. This liberal distinction between political society and civil society was followed by Alexis de Tocqueville. For example, while it seems to be the case that he felt that a civil society such as the German society in which he lived was an inevitable movement of the dialectic, he made way for the crushing of other types of "lesser" and not fully realized types of civil society as these societies were not fully conscious or aware — as it were — as to the lack of progress in their societies. Thus, it was perfectly legitimate in the eyes of Hegel for a conqueror such as Napoleon to come along and destroy that which was not fully realized. The State subsumes family and civil society and fulfills them. All three together are called "ethical life" *Sittlichkeit*. The State involves three "moments". In a Hegelian State, citizens both know their place and choose their place. They both know their obligations and choose to fulfill their obligations. The individual has "substantial freedom in the state". The State is "objective spirit" so "it is only through being a member of the state that the individual himself has objectivity, truth, and ethical life" section. Furthermore, every member both loves the State with genuine patriotism, but has transcended mere "team spirit" by reflectively endorsing their citizenship. Members of a Hegelian State are happy even to sacrifice their lives for the State. Heraclitus[ edit ] According to Hegel, "Heraclitus is the one who first declared the

nature of the infinite and first grasped nature as in itself infinite, that is, its essence as process. The origin of philosophy is to be dated from Heraclitus. His is the persistent Idea that is the same in all philosophers up to the present day, as it was the Idea of Plato and Aristotle". Hegel asserted that in Heraclitus he had an antecedent for his logic: Sein und Nichts sei dasselbe Being and non-being are the same. Heraclitus does not form any abstract nouns from his ordinary use of "to be" and "to become" and in that fragment seems to be opposing any identity A to any other identity B, C and so on, which is not-A. However, Hegel interprets not-A as not existing at all, not nothing at all, which cannot be conceived, but indeterminate or "pure" being without particularity or specificity. This interpretation of Heraclitus cannot be ruled out, but even if present is not the main gist of his thought. Just as humans continually correct their concepts of reality through a dialectical process, so God himself becomes more fully manifested through the dialectical process of becoming. Whatever the nous thinks at any time is actual substance and is identical to limited being, but more remains to be thought in the substrate of non-being, which is identical to pure or unlimited thought. The universe as becoming is therefore a combination of being and non-being. The particular is never complete in itself, but to find completion is continually transformed into more comprehensive, complex, self-relating particulars. The essential nature of being-for-itself is that it is free "in itself;" that is, it does not depend on anything else such as matter for its being. The limitations represent fetters, which it must constantly be casting off as it becomes freer and more self-determining. This means that Jesus as the Son of God is posited by God over against himself as other. Hegel sees both a relational unity and a metaphysical unity between Jesus and God the Father. To Hegel, Jesus is both divine and human. Hegel further attests that God as Jesus not only died, but "[God, that is to say, maintains himself in the process, and the latter is only the death of death. God rises again to life, and thus things are reversed". Kaufmann admits that Hegel treated many distinctively Christian themes and "sometimes could not resist equating" his conception of spirit Geist "with God, instead of saying clearly: So he, too, sometimes spoke of God and, more often, of the divine; and because he occasionally took pleasure in insisting that he was really closer to this or that Christian tradition than some of the theologians of his time, he has sometimes been understood to have been a Christian. Verlag von Duncker und Humblot, He formulates an early philosophical example of a disenchantment narrative, arguing that Judaism was responsible both for realizing the existence of Geist and, by extension, for separating nature from ideas of spiritual and magical forces and challenging polytheism. During the last ten years of his life, Hegel did not publish another book, but thoroughly revised the Encyclopedia second edition, ; third, He also published some articles early in his career and during his Berlin period. A number of other works on the philosophy of history, religion, aesthetics and the history of philosophy were compiled from the lecture notes of his students and published posthumously. This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.

**Chapter 7 : Hegel on Absolute Spirit**

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The project of the Phenomenology is inseparable from the project of his Logic. It begins from the idea that we can understand the nature of being through thought. In fact, he says in the preface to the Phenomenology that non-philosophical consciousness has a right to be shown why it should move from its point of view to that of philosophy. So the task of the Phenomenology is to take ordinary consciousness "or those who attached to ordinary consciousness" from its own perspective to the perspective of philosophy. Phenomenology is not doing that. This new object then becomes the object of a new shape of consciousness and in this way the shapes form a chain "a chain that takes us from the simplest consciousness sense-certainty, which we will discuss shortly to the standpoint of philosophy. Phenomenology thus justifies the standpoint of philosophy by showing how ordinary consciousness is led by its own commitments, when their implications are worked out, to that standpoint. Hegel claims that you start with shapes of consciousness that are more usually seen as the objects of philosophy of mind or epistemology, but that you are then taken on to new shapes, such as desire, mutual recognition, the life or death struggle and the master-slave dialectic. Those are much more practical. And then later in the text you encounter discussions of Antigone, the French Revolution, religion and so on. What have these to do with sense-certainty? Nothing, if you approach the text in terms of certain fixed categories. But if you focus on the way each shape of consciousness transforms itself into a subsequent shape, you can see that the later, more practical or historical shapes are in fact made necessary by the earlier, more epistemic ones. Does Hegel think that there is a correct way to look at consciousness? What is the source of the rightness? Hegel says in the introduction that the standard that consciousness uses to evaluate its own standpoint is what it sets up itself as being the truth. What Hegel means is that each shape of consciousness has in view a different kind of object: And he claims that the experience of one shape of consciousness transforms it into a new shape with a new kind of object. But the kind of object consciousness takes the pen to be "its conception of what it is to be an object" is different. So, the form of its object is simple immediacy: But in experience, that simplicity gets lost and the object becomes more complex. When we get to perception, the same sensory material is understood as a thing with properties: Then when we get to understanding, the object is now taken to be held together by certain forces and also governed by laws. What understanding wants to do is understand the relationship between those laws and those forces. And that generates a new transformation of both consciousness and its object. When we get to desire, the object is then understood to be something that feeds my sense of self. I thus assert myself through consuming the pen in some way, perhaps by breaking it or destroying it. For aesthetic consciousness, the object might be a work of beauty, and for religion it might be an object of veneration. What Hegel is interested in is always the conception of an object that a certain shape of consciousness has and the experience that that very conception generates. And he claims that in each case the way the object is first taken to be produces a distinctive experience of it. Hegel demonstrates this by rendering explicit what is implicit in the object as it is first taken to be. The paradox "and what makes it difficult for people to follow" is that in each case the very conception of an object with which consciousness begins produces an experience in which that conception is altered. That is the dialectical moment in the experience Hegel describes. Hegel stands under the self-imposed obligation to be as immanent as possible in thinking about consciousness and not to import his own views about what consciousness should be saying. Each shape of consciousness is governed by a norm that it sets for itself, namely its own conception of its object. Consciousness has a certain conception of what it counts as the truth or the object, but it undergoes an experience of that object in which the latter is changed and in which consciousness itself is changed too. You start by looking at the world in a certain way, but then find both that world and yourself transformed by the experience you undergo. But note that Hegel is not describing an empirical process, such as thinking about Brexit in one way on one day and then thinking something different about it the next day. Of course, in life people do not always follow the logic of their standpoint. In other

respects, however, the logical process described by Hegel can be seen to work itself out in history itself. The French Revolution is a good example. So it works against particular institutions and associations of people and deems all individuals to be free in the same way as citizens citoyens. But Hegel thinks that such freedom abstracts from the particular differences that make us human, and that this abstractness reveals itself in death: Death thus becomes the conclusion. That is not what the original revolutionaries of want, but, for Hegel, it is the dialectical consequence of taking freedom in such an abstract way. So Hegel thinks that the Reign of Terror in is an intrinsic, necessary consequence of the revolution. And that is really interesting and thought-provoking. How can you be committed to genuine freedom, and yet this good turns out to be bad? Tragedy is in many ways about doing the wrong thing while doing the right thing, where doing the right thing itself turns out to be the wrong thing and proves to be destructive and self-destructive. This dialectical element is what either frustrates you when you read Hegel or excites and exhilarates you. It just caught me. Right from the very beginning, I thought it really exciting. In his phenomenology Hegel is not self-consciously personal, as Descartes is in his Meditations. Hegel is doing something that in principle anybody can do and discovering the same transformations as anyone else would see. It is human self-consciousness in its many social, political, historical and religious forms. Phenomenology is thus not an activity of private introspection – a study by a solitary self of itself. It traces an inexorable logic within consciousness, but one that is publicly understandable. But can such a discipline be challenged by solipsism or scepticism? On the one hand, scepticism is itself undermined by phenomenology, for scepticism, of a radical Greek kind, is one of the shapes of consciousness that Hegel examines. But it proves unable to sustain its self-understanding and transforms itself into a new shape of self-consciousness. Such scepticism, Hegel claims, always seeks to undermine whatever it puts forward. So he says that the sceptic ends up like two naughty children squabbling with one another – one of whom says yes when the other says no – just for the sake of being stubborn. I say this; but I say not this; then I say not not this, and so on. If, however, we render this implicit two-in-one explicit, we are taken on to a new shape of consciousness that is no longer that of scepticism. The logic of scepticism thus carries us forward to a new shape in which the two selves in the sceptic are no longer just two, but are explicitly bound together as two-in-one: Furthermore, solipsism undermines itself as well. But Hegel thinks that the very immediacy of that experience turns it into something vacuous and universal. So there are arguments in the Phenomenology against both scepticism and solipsism. In one sense, however, you can regard the Phenomenology itself as a work of scepticism. The relation to Descartes is interesting. The Phenomenology is also the process of gradually and sceptically undermining certain standpoints that we take to be obvious: There is, however, an important difference between Cartesian and Hegelian scepticism. I think that something similar is true of the thought of Kant and Spinoza too. There are some philosophers for whom philosophy is their philosophy – Nietzsche is one of those, and Descartes in certain moods – but Hegel is exactly the opposite. Can you say a little about what this amounts to? Your readers need to know that. To put it simply, ordinary consciousness in its various forms has one thing in common: For Hegel, it is true that I am not the world, but in another sense I am the world because I am – we are – the world that has come to consciousness of itself in thought. So thinking is able to understand being because thinking is itself a form of being. This distinction begins to be broken down earlier in the book, but at the end – in absolute knowledge – it is undermined most thoroughly. It is simply consciousness or thought that no longer regards the distinction between itself and being as absolute, and so now knows that it can understand being through thought alone. Understanding as a way of thinking has got to disclose those laws through its own activity. Of course, all practical consciousness does that, too, by transforming the object that it knows. So there is no sharp distinction between subject and object there either. So, once again, there is no sharp distinction between the self and what is other than it. Then with absolute knowledge consciousness recognises that the form of its own thought and the form of being itself are one and the same, and that thought can thus understand being through its own autonomous activity. Above all, however, absolute knowing is a form of knowing that has been freed from what Hegel calls the opposition of consciousness and so is free to do philosophy. All we have is indeterminate being that is no longer understood to be something other than thought, but is known to be one with the thought that thinks it. In saying this, I differ from someone like Frederick Beiser. Yes, it has some

extraordinarily exciting scenarios in it. These are some of the most engaging parts of the book. You almost think a great filmmaker like Eisenstein could have filmed this. But there are insights into the dynamic of human interaction in the Phenomenology that really make this a remarkable book to study.

**Chapter 8 : The best books on Hegel | Five Books Expert Recommendations**

*Hegel's account of the "Unhappy Consciousness" is well known and one of the sources of a persisting interest in his work. What is less clearly recognized is that two of Hegel's most brilliant epigoni – Soren Kierkegaard and Karl Marx – present in their early writings a significant.*

A world-spirit in which indeed human individuals were contained, but who as subject certainly did not get the first attention. The taking under close consideration of the concepts of faith of the above mentioned three post-Hegelian philosophers can with this given in the back of the mind result in an interesting consideration. Concept of Faith with Feuerbach Ludwig Feuerbach was an atheist and a materialist,<sup>3</sup> and the contrast with a Hegelian image of a spiritual world-spirit may with this be set clear. Although completely different from Kierkegaard as shall show later did also Feuerbach put man central. Thus is God a projection of human nature. Man cannot think, dream, imagine, feel, believe in, want, love and worship any other being as absolute than the essence of human nature. Instead of religion staying as institute on the highest and first place does now the inter-human relation come first. This is according to Feuerbach the true religion, and the love between humans becomes the first commandment. And what goes for marriage goes for all moral relations. When morals are grounded in theology can the most immoral things be justified. Feuerbach brought religion back to a pure human essence. That human essence stays according to Marx however, when related to an isolated human individual, an abstract idea without practical value. Philosophers have always been too theoretical according to Marx. They always have interpreted the world in different ways while it is the point to change it. Marx finds this by not stopping at the human essence of Feuerbach, but to place it in a social context. Marx, looking at the social context of his time, saw that that was one of alienation. In the social structure that led to divided and specialised labour did Marx see that humans alienated from their products of labour, and with that alienated from their own essence. This is according to Marx a dialectical process. After that is the ruling class the cause of a new class difference because that new ruling class unjustly claims to speak for the whole population, after which the new underclass after a course of time dethrones again the then ruling class. Where however Hegel saw a dialectic of ideas there sees Marx thus a dialectic of classes. And like Hegel sees Marx an end of this dialectical process. An end that will be established when the labour class, the proletariat, after a revolution will be victorious. Then according to Marx there will be no more contradictory interests because there will be no division of labour. The end of alienation of labour and human essence shall deliver an excess of products by which money and pay can be done away with and everyone can take from the general stock which he needs. Religion as illusionary happiness must be conquered for the true happiness. All those theoretical philosophies were considered by Kierkegaard as not relevant for daily life as it is experienced and lived by the individual. Human reality then can only be seen adequately from the first person perspective. The acting individual and not the onlooker has to be the philosopher. Being human means choosing. This is a brute truth, for that means that there is no external authority on which man can rely to come to choice. It is then not the character or the essence of man that determines his choice, but it is the choice that determines his character or essence. Not for nothing do people engage in theoretical concepts that withhold them from coming eye to eye with this reality. The first of the three is the aesthetic, in which man searches egoistically for the satisfaction of his own senses. In the second stage, the ethical, has man accepted general applied norms and values by which he lets himself being led. The third stage then calls Kierkegaard the religious stage. This religious stage is with Kierkegaard certainly no institutional religious given. The step towards it is also certainly no objective and rational thought out step. No, it is a jump into the deep. It is a letting go of all dogmatic and rational securities for a devotion of the passionate inwardness. This is for Kierkegaard the earlier mentioned brute truth. No, man can only have true faith with objective insecurity. This form of faith is according to Kierkegaard the true concept of faith. Hereby it can be stated that Feuerbach in his method still stayed reasonably faithful to the academic philosophical tradition by positing a structured and rational theory. His philosophical thought was thus perhaps a reasonably radical turnaround, his method was this due to the theoretical line of approach definitely not. Philosophers always had interpreted the world, but according to Marx the point was to change

it. Now we can here ask two critical and to each other related questions. The first regards the question what the task of the philosopher has to be. Must he be out to change the world, and if this is so, then in which way can he do this as a philosopher? The thereto related second question regards the practical influence of the theoretical philosophical frameworks throughout history. For have these only been the product of the thought of the time, or did philosophers by making their insights theoretically known also have an influence on the world and brought about a change? Or is it not at all important that the philosopher changes the world? So although Marx thus wanted to break with the theoretical nature of the philosophical tradition it was Kierkegaard that succeeded more in that than Marx himself. Where Marx not just theoreticising but also acting still stayed in the third person perspective the same perspective as the considering philosopher wanted Kierkegaard to break this tradition by asserting that philosophising should take place from the first person perspective. Not the onlooker but the acting individual had to be the philosopher. Now it seems difficult to put man more central than that, however such a statement does carry a paradox within itself. Namely at the moment that the reader takes in and accepts the statement that the acting man himself must be the philosopher he stopped being himself the philosopher. Perhaps he himself had seen through this, for publishing in many genres and under many pseudonyms he gave the reader little grip to start to see in any case in him a philosophical authority. We have seen three philosophers, three generation and time companions who in their time opposed the Hegelian thoughts, and even the whole academic philosophical tradition. Feuerbach, Marx and especially Kierkegaard have taken up the sword to wage battle against the "phantom like theories of the academic philosophy of that time. The ironical question resounds if with a counter reaction on their philosophies eventually the dialectical principle of Hegel not became the victorious. From Descartes to Searle, Harcourt, Orlando, , p. Aber das menschliche Wesen ist kein dem einzelnen Individuum inwohnendes Abstraktum.

*In Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel Reconsidered, Jon Stewart provides a detailed historical argument which challenges the standard assumption that Kierkegaard's position was developed in opposition to Hegel's philosophy, and as such is antithetical to it.*

It argues, contrary to conventional accounts that see them as opposed, that the two thinkers are actually deeply complementary halves of a larger whole. He can be reached through his website at [www.thankyouforjoiningme.com](http://www.thankyouforjoiningme.com). Thank you for joining me. Your research is about intersubjectivity and recognition theory, which deals with a particular, more truthful way that two people can apprehend one another. I know that much of your work also deals with community. The things that come up in an individual interaction can disturb accepted ideas of how we should interact. Theories of recognition are not only interested in understanding how more honest or truthful forms of intersubjective disclosure might come about. For instance, theorists of recognition see community itself as a social form maintained through recognition. That is, it exists in how we, as members of a community, see ourselves. And these social selves are themselves the product of recognition, because our sense of self develops within the context of how others see us, just as we serve as the context in which other people form their sense of self. Contemporary theories of recognition largely derive from Hegel. Charles Taylor is another important neo-Hegelian, who works on questions of identity and recognition. Their work has shaped how many contemporary theorists think about identity and recognition. First, recognition is ultimately interested in what it means to apprehend our true selves, so we need to understand what actually constitutes our true selves. For Hegel, our most fundamental nature lies in self-consciousness: I just exist – one could say, naively. For instance, as I mentioned earlier, this is how communities are formed. Our sense of self develops within the context of our society, so that social beliefs about who we are come to constitute how we see ourselves. This sense of self then circumscribes our sense of possibility – it forms the horizon of how we imagine possible actions for ourselves – and we then live within that horizon of possibilities. Consequently, we can notice all the types of similarities, such as in beliefs, customs, and behaviours, that we typically associate with any particular community. So, we might not always be aware that we are self-conscious creatures, but we always are, because acting in the world depends on it. For instance, Nietzsche is quite insightful on this point. At the end of *On the Genealogy of Morals*, he says that we would rather will nothingness than not will. And in this latter case, meaninglessness is actually a meaning that allows us to exercise our will. For Hegel, what would it look like if man was exclusively aware of his self-awareness? This Hegelian picture of freedom reminds me of a line from Sartre in *Existentialism*: I think we have a tendency to view freedom as a sort of absence, as the ability to do anything we want. Therefore, becoming free is not only a process of overcoming limitations that impede our freedom, but it also entails the process of discovering the freedom that exists within us. Consequently, true freedom means that we are taking actions consistent with our freedom, and a free society is not an anarchic free for all, but a society organized in a way that is similarly consistent with our freedom. Hegel imagines human development within a social context, because he believes that our sense of self is primary formed within this context. What follows is that he imagines that the difference between a free society, and the more limited societies that precede it, resides in the fact that a free society offers its members a social identity consistent with our true identity as free selves. But herein lies the problem. Rather than having authentically appropriated our individual freedom, we would be living according to an idea of freedom that happened to be true, but without necessarily recognizing that we are free in a deeper sense. In other words, we might come to believe that we are free in the same way that we tend to believe whatever identity our society offers us, but unless we have existentially appropriated our freedom more directly, unless we have a deeper and immediate experience of our freedom, we might merely be conforming to an idea of freedom without truly become free. Whether a society that socializes us into freedom produces freedom, seems a problem of means and ends. That term, religious, tends to scare people away. But I think that, in part, what Kierkegaard is trying to say is that freedom cannot be encapsulated within any social context, no matter how expansive the social identity is, so that we have to imagine emancipation in transcendental, or religious, language. Those are two

sides of the same coin. If you give people more autonomy and freedom in social life, that generally reflects a more expansive view of who we are. Identity and action are correlated for Hegel. The way we see ourselves circumscribes our range of action, just as our range of action reflects how we see ourselves. Is it fair to say that if you allow a broader range of action, you not only accept the existence of more aspects of the self, but you also grant them legitimacy? For example, a repressive, Christian society might believe that man is inherently sinful. Sin is then a human characteristic, but not one that society is willing to translate into permitted action. Or take a traditional valuation of promiscuity. At some level, the religiously repressive individual and the sexually liberal individual might actually have a similar understanding of who we are, insofar as they both recognize sexuality as constitutive of human identity. But this point aside, the underlying question of human identity pertains to the expansiveness by which we recognize what it means to be human. That is, it pertains to that which we include in our definition of human beings, regardless of how we judge those qualities. But then the second, and primary, part of your question had to do with morality. And these questions are often answered within the context of that underlying question of human identity. As you pointed out, we might accept that human beings have a sexual aspect to their nature, but we might disagree about what should follow from that. Should we repress our sexual instincts or act on them? And if so, to what degree and in what way? But I think that generally these latter types of questions are less interesting to Hegel and Kierkegaard, because in some ways they come off as petty moralisms, and both Hegel and Kierkegaard have a more expansive understanding of morality that related to the underlying question of philosophical anthropology. For instance, while Hegel saw our struggle for truer recognition as the driving force propelling history, it was less against the repression that acknowledges but attempts to control an aspect of our personality, and more a matter of the very frameworks through which we see ourselves. So, we might adopt a social identity that fails to account for human sexuality, thereby failing to give it expression, but this is different from a social identity that recognizes the diversity of human sexuality, and that then attempts to repress part of it. But I think that however common this idea is, it actually reflects an impoverished understanding of what freedom and morality are. And this is also where theories of recognition can help, because they would generally argue that the process by which we recognize freedom in ourselves also entails the reciprocal recognition of freedom in others too, so that freedom and mutual respect are one and the same. It is therefore here, rather than in some particularist attempt to control our behaviour, that true morality resides. How does one overcome instinctual life without repressing it? And, for Hegel, I think the story is similar, in that the essential narrative is about freeing the will, and not explicitly about freeing the instincts to express themselves. That said, while recognition is not about recognition for sexual identity per se, it does require recognition of the whole person, which means accepting sexuality as part of who we are. For instance, given that sexuality is clearly a part of human life, if we failed to afford this part of ourselves a proper role, we find ourselves in the territory of psychoanalysis, because this is going to have all types of unhealthy consequences. For Hegel, recognition is a social process that ultimately resolves itself when we arrive at a society that offers us a truthful conception of who we are. In such a case, we might say that we know the truth of ourselves because we possess knowledge about what a human being is. Instead, when we truly recognize the other for the unique and valuable human being that they are, Kierkegaard would say that we love them. True disclosure is terrifying, as our most intimate fears and desires are laid bare for the other to see. But when we are loved, we find the courage to disclose ourselves. And this is not the same thing as passion? Kierkegaard would call it a passion. Kierkegaard thought that we were an overly reflective and distant culture, and that we spent too much time out of touch with the activity of living. And he wanted us to be passionate about life; he wanted us to take the activity of living seriously. When I think of living passionately, I think of more sensual things, like beauty. And we can see this with one of his most known concepts, the leap of faith, which is the existential movement by which we find love. You can feel a rush of excitement in an intellectual process, if you discover something that you think is right. Physicists can feel this way, or philosophers can feel this way. But Kierkegaard might ask if this truth is one that fundamentally alters your life? It would be like Moses going up Mount Sinai and saying that God spoke to him, but that on second thought, worshipping the Golden Calf seems alright too. Love, for Kierkegaard, is exactly this way. It sounds like Kierkegaard is saying there is a passion for recognizing others

as equal, and our obligations to others. Maybe if you have God in the picture it then makes it easier to turn moral claims into metaphysical claims. Well, for Kierkegaard, there is no taking God out of the picture, but there is the very good question of what, for Kierkegaard, God is. In his *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality*, Rousseau does want us to get back in touch with this part of our instinctual life, but only so we can then decide to act according to it. For instance, should we decide to act according to our pity, as Rousseau might want, or should a more dispassionate notion of reason guide our behaviour, as Kant might counsel? And our answer to the question of how we should act reflects our underlying belief about who we are as human beings. And this is where Hegelian recognition appears: Instead, our very capacity for mediation, our very self-consciousness, constitutes the essential nature of human beings. And in a way, this is both liberating and truthful, because Hegel overcomes all particular definitions of human beings in favor of a truly universal one. And we do this through love, which is the type of accepting relationship that allows us to be honest about who we are. Love therefore becomes the relation of recognition through which we see ourselves and others, and it compels us to act, because it reveals the true value of the people around us. But it sounds like Kierkegaard is saying that you should train yourself to feel that way all the time. If anything, I think this is an accusation that Kierkegaard levies at Hegel. In other words, for Kierkegaard, even the idea of equality is something that can inhibit our ability to more intimately experience ourselves and others, because it exists as an idea through which our relationships are mediated, so that we need to overcome even this truthful form of mediation if we want to see clearly. And for Kierkegaard, this experience transforms us in a way that remains with us ever after. Or, we can think of this in terms of a secular example, which I think gets even closer to the truth. She realizes that this sense of self-worth is irreconcilable with her oppressive marriage. Thinking about self-worth can help us understand the kind of transformation that Kierkegaard has in mind. In some abstract sense, Nora was always worth the value that she only later discovered, because every human being is similarly valuable. How does that transformation happen?