

Chapter 1 : Hegel and Aesthetics - Google Books

Hegel's philosophy of art or "aesthetics" constitutes the first sub-section of his philosophy of absolute spirit, and is followed by his philosophy of religion and his account of the history of philosophy.

Until around 1800, Hegel devoted himself to developing his ideas on religious and social themes, and seemed to have envisaged a future for himself as a type of modernising and reforming educator, in the image of figures of the German Enlightenment such as Lessing and Schiller. In the 1790s the University of Jena had become a center for the development of critical philosophy due to the presence of K. Reinhold and then Fichte, who taught there from until his dismissal on the grounds of atheism at the end of the decade. By that time, Schelling, who had first been attracted to Jena by the presence of Fichte, had become an established figure at the university. By late 1800 Hegel had completed his first major work, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* published in 1807, which showed a divergence from his earlier, seemingly more Schellingian, approach. Now without a university appointment he worked for a short time, apparently very successfully, as an editor of a newspaper in Bamberg, and then from 1808 as the headmaster and philosophy teacher at a gymnasium high school in Nuremberg. During his time at Nuremberg he married and started a family, and wrote and published his *Science of Logic*. In 1817 he managed to return to his university career by being appointed to a chair in philosophy at the University of Heidelberg, but shortly after, in 1818, he was offered and took up the chair of philosophy at the University of Berlin, the most prestigious position in the German philosophical world. In 1817, while in Heidelberg he published the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, a systematic work in which an abbreviated version of the earlier *Science of Logic* the *Encyclopaedia Logic* or *Lesser Logic* was followed by the application of its principles to the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit. In 1820 in Berlin Hegel published his major work in political philosophy, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, based on lectures given at Heidelberg but ultimately grounded in the section of the *Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Spirit* dealing with objective spirit. During the following ten years up to his death in 1831 Hegel enjoyed celebrity at Berlin, and published subsequent versions of the *Encyclopaedia*. After his death versions of his lectures on philosophy of history, philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and the history of philosophy were published. Hegel himself had been a supporter of progressive but non-revolutionary politics, but his followers divided into factions broadly groupable as those of the left, right and centre Toews ; from the left, Karl Marx was to develop his own purported scientific approach to society and history which appropriated many Hegelian ideas into a materialistic outlook. Later, especially in reaction to orthodox Soviet versions of Marxism, many so-called Western Marxists re-incorporated further Hegelian elements back into their forms of Marxist philosophy. In academic philosophy, Hegelian idealism had seemed to collapse dramatically after the failure of the revolutionary movements of that year, but underwent a revival in both Great Britain and the United States in the last decades of the nineteenth century. In Britain, where philosophers such as T. However, a later generation of French philosophers coming to prominence in the 1830s tended to react against Hegel in ways analogous to those in which early analytic philosophers had reacted against the Hegel who had influenced their predecessors. In the 1840s the German philosopher Klaus Hartmann developed what was termed a non-metaphysical interpretation of Hegel which, together with the work of Dieter Henrich and others, played an important role in the revival of interest in Hegel in academic philosophy in the second half of the century. By the close of the twentieth century, even within core logico-metaphysical areas of analytic philosophy, a number of individuals such as Robert Brandom and John McDowell had started to take Hegel seriously as a significant modern philosopher, although generally within analytic circles a favorable reassessment of Hegel has still a long way to go. The contents of philosophical knowledge, we might suspect, will come from the historically changing contents of its cultural context. On the other, there is the hint of such contents being raised to some higher level, presumably higher than other levels of cognitive functioning such as those based in everyday perceptual experience, for example, or those characteristic of other areas of culture such as art and religion. This higher level takes the form of conceptually articulated thought, a type of cognition commonly taken as capable of having purportedly eternal contents think of Plato and Frege, for example. In line with

such a conception, Hegel sometimes referred to the task of philosophy as that of recognising the concept *Der Begriff* in the mere representations *Vorstellungen* of everyday life. In contrast, the British Hegelian movement at the end of the nineteenth century tended to ignore the Phenomenology and the more historicist dimensions of his thought, and found in Hegel a systematic metaphysician whose *Logic* provided the basis for a definitive philosophical ontology. This latter traditional metaphysical view of Hegel dominated Hegel reception for most of the twentieth century, but from the 1950s came to be challenged by scholars who offered an alternative non-metaphysical, post-Kantian view. But in turn, this post-Kantian reading has been challenged by a revised metaphysical view, critical of the purported over-assimilation of Hegel to Kant by the post-Kantians. Thus, for example, Leibniz had contrasted Plato as an idealist with Epicurus as a materialist. The opposition to materialism here, together with the fact that in the English-speaking world the Irish philosopher and clergyman George Berkeley is often taken as a prototypical idealist, has given rise to the assumption that idealism is necessarily an immaterialist doctrine. This assumption, however, is mistaken. The type of picture found in Berkeley was only to be found in certain late antique Platonists and, especially, early Christian Platonists like Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo. It thus had features closer to the more pantheistic picture of divine thought found in Spinoza, for example, for whom matter and mind were attributes of the one substance. The materialists to which he was opposed mechanistic corpuscularists of his time conceived of unformed matter as a type of self-subsistent substance, and it seems to have been that conception to which he was opposed, at least in some periods of his work, not the reality of matter *per se*. In this picture, Hegel is seen as offering a metaphysico-religious view of God qua Absolute Spirit, as the ultimate reality that we can come to know through pure thought processes alone. Indeed, Hegel often seems to invoke imagery consistent with the types of neo-Platonic conceptions of the universe that had been common within Christian mysticism, especially in the German states, in the early modern period. Thus, in our consciousness of God, we somehow serve to realize his own self-consciousness, and, thereby, his own perfection. In English-language interpretations, such a picture is effectively found in the work of Charles Taylor and Michael Rosen, for example. With its dark mystical roots, and its overtly religious content, it is hardly surprising that the philosophy of Hegel so understood has rarely been regarded as a live option within the largely secular and scientific conceptions of philosophy that have been dominant in the twentieth century. To critics, such as Karl Popper in his popular post-war *The Open Society and its Enemies*, Hegel had not only advocated a disastrous political conception of the state and the relation of its citizens to it, a conception prefiguring twentieth-century totalitarianism, but he had also tried to underpin such advocacy with dubious theo-logico-metaphysical speculations. With his idea of the development of spirit in history, Hegel is seen as literalising a way of talking about different cultures in terms of their spirits, of constructing a developmental sequence of epochs typical of nineteenth-century ideas of linear historical progress, and then enveloping this story of human progress in terms of one about the developing self-consciousness of the cosmos-God itself. The pantheistic legacy inherited by Hegel meant that he had no problem in considering an objective outer world beyond any particular subjective mind. But this objective world itself had to be understood as conceptually informed: Thus in contrast to Berkeleian subjective idealism it became common to talk of Hegel as incorporating the objective idealism of views, especially common among German historians, in which social life and thought were understood in terms of the conceptual or spiritual structures that informed them. But in contrast to both forms of idealism, Hegel, according to this reading, postulated a form of absolute idealism by including both subjective life and the objective cultural practices on which subjective life depended within the dynamics of the development of the self-consciousness and self-actualisation of God, the Absolute Spirit. Despite this seemingly dominant theological theme, Hegel was still seen by many as an important precursor of other more characteristically secular strands of modern thought such as existentialism and Marxist materialism. Existentialists were thought of as taking the idea of the finitude and historical and cultural dependence of individual subjects from Hegel, and as leaving out all pretensions to the Absolute, while Marxists were thought of as taking the historical dynamics of the Hegelian picture but reinterpreting this in materialist rather than idealist categories. As for understanding Hegel himself, the traditional metaphysical view remained the dominant interpretative approach of Hegel scholars throughout much of the twentieth century. Thus it is commonly asserted that implicit within

the metaphysical Hegel is an anti-metaphysical philosopher struggling to get out—“one potentially capable of beating the critical Kant at his own game. More controversially, one now finds it argued that the traditional picture is simply wrong at a more general level, and that Hegel, even in his systematic thought, was not committed to the bizarre, teleological spirit monism that has been traditionally attributed to him because he was free of the type of traditional metaphysical commitments that had been criticized by Kant. Prominent among such interpretations has been the so-called post-Kantian interpretation advanced by North American Hegel scholars Robert Pippin , , and Terry Pinkard , , From an explicitly analytic perspective, broadly similar views have been put forward by Robert Brandom , , and John McDowell With this notion, it is claimed, Hegel was essentially attempting to answer the Kantian question of the conditions of rational human mindedness, rather than being concerned with giving an account of the developing self-consciousness of God. But while Kant had limited such conditions to formal abstractly conceived structures of the mind, Hegel extended them to include aspects of historically and socially determined forms of embodied human existence. Proponents of the post-Kantian view, it is commonly said, are guilty of projecting onto Hegel views they would like to find there rather than what is actually to be found. Here one tends to find interpreters attributing to Hegel some type of conceptual realism, sometimes appealing to contemporary analytic metaphysics for the legitimacy of metaphysics conceived as inquiry into the fundamental features or structures of the world itself. Among the interpreters advancing something like this revised metaphysical view might be counted Stephen Houlgate b , Robert Stern , , Kenneth Westphal , James Kreines , and Christopher Yeomans On a number of points, the proponents of the revised conceptual realist metaphysical interpretation will agree with advocates of the post-Kantian non-metaphysical approach. First, they tend to agree in dismissing much of the extravagant metaphysics traditionally ascribed to Hegel. While it is for the most part clear what sets both post-Kantians and conceptual realists against the traditional view, it is still not clear which issues dividing them are substantive and which are ultimately verbal. After all, Kant himself was not critical of metaphysics per se. His claim was that existing so-called dogmatic metaphysics was in a state analogous to that in which, say, physics had been in before the scientific revolution of sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Rather than wanting to eliminate metaphysics, after the style, say, of Hume or the modern logical positivists, Kant had wanted to put metaphysics itself on a secure scientific basis analogous to what Galileo and Newton had achieved for physics. The relevant differences between revised metaphysical and the non-metaphysical views would need to be established with respect to such particular issues as, for example, the nature of acceptably Kantian metaphysical claims. In the next category are works that were published at the time as handbooks for use in student teaching such as the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences first published in while he was teaching at Heidelberg and subsequently revised and republished in and again in , and Elements of the Philosophy of Right, effectively an expansion of a section of the Encyclopaedia and published in after his move to Berlin. Transcripts of his earlier lectures on this topic delivered in Heidelberg have also since been published. Along with the Encyclopaedia and the Philosophy of Right might be added similar teaching-related writings from the Jena period, prepared as lectures but only published as such much later. Here we will restrict the discussion to the first three categories. The term clearly suited Kant as he had distinguished the phenomena known through the faculty of sensibility from the noumena known purely conceptually. It is meant to function as an induction or education of the reader to the standpoint of purely conceptual thought from which philosophy can be done. As such, its structure has been compared to that of a Bildungsroman educational novel , having an abstractly conceived protagonist—“the bearer of an evolving series of so-called shapes of consciousness or the inhabitant of a series of successive phenomenal worlds—“whose progress and set-backs the reader follows and learns from. Or at least this is how the work sets out: Hegel constructs a series of such shapes that maps onto the history of western European civilization from the Greeks to his own time. When Kant had broached the idea of a phenomenological propaedeutic to Lambert, he himself had still believed in the project of a purely conceptual metaphysics achievable by the use of the regressive or analytic method, but this project conceived as an exercise in theoretical reason was just what Kant in his later critical philosophy had come to disavow. Supporters of the post-Kantian interpretation of Hegel obviously interpret this work and its telos differently. For example, it has been argued e. As Pinkard had pointed out in that work, this was a conception of the

normatively structured practices of human reason found in the American pragmatist Wilfrid Sellars, the inspiration behind the Hegelian dimensions of analytic philosophers such as Willem deVries, Robert Brandom and John McDowell. Chapters 1 to 3 effectively follow a developmental series of distinct shapes of consciousness—jointly epistemological and ontological attitudes articulated by criteria which are, regarded from one direction, criteria for certain knowledge, and from the other, criteria for the nature of the objects of such knowledge. In chapter 1, the attitude of Sense-certainty takes immediately given perceptual simples—the sort of role played by the so-called sense-data of early twentieth-century analytic epistemology, for example, with which a subject is purportedly acquainted as bare thises—as the fundamental objects known. Hegel is clear that these contents are not merely qualitative simples that are immediately apprehended, but comprehended instances of the conceptual determination of singularity [Einzelheit]. Phen: The idea seems to be that for Hegel, the same content can play the roles played by both concepts and intuitions in Kant. By the end of this chapter our protagonist consciousness and by implication, we the audience to this drama has learnt that the nature of consciousness cannot be as originally thought: The general truth that was learned about the apparent qualitative simples in Sense-certainty that they were instances of generals is now explicitly taken as the truth of the object of Perception *Wahrnehmung*—in German this term having the connotations of taking *nehmen* to be true *wahr*. In contrast to the purported single object of Sense-certainty the object of Perception is taken as instantiating general properties: But this can be conceived in a variety of ways: Predictably, problems will be revealed in these various different ways of thinking of the nature of those everyday objects of our experience. In fact, such collapse into a type of self-generated skepticism is typical of all the shapes we follow in the work, and there seems something inherently skeptical about such reflexive cognitive processes. But this is not the type of skepticism that is typical of early modern philosophy, such as that used by Descartes in his attempt to find some foundation of indubitability on which genuine knowledge can be built Forster. As is clear from his treatment of ancient philosophy in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hegel was attracted to the type of dialectic employed by Socrates in his efforts to get his interlocutors thinking about something beyond that given immediately in sensation LHP II: For Hegel, the ancient skeptics captured the skeptical moment of thought that is the means by which thought progresses beyond the particular categories that have given rise to contradictions. Just as in the way a new shape of thought, Perception, had been generated from the internal contradictions that emerged within Sense-certainty, the collapse of any given attitude will be accompanied by the emergence of some new implicit criterion that will be the basis of a new emergent attitude. In the case of Perception, the emergent new shape of consciousness, the Understanding, explored in Chapter 3, is a shape identified with the type of scientific cognition that, rather than remaining on the level of the perceived object, posits underlying forces involved in the production of the perceptual episode. The transition from Chapter 3 to Chapter 4, *The Truth of Self-Certainty*, also marks a more general transition from Consciousness to Self-consciousness. It is in the course of Chapter 4 that we find what is perhaps the most well-known part of the *Phenomenology*, the account of the struggle of recognition in which Hegel examines the inter-subjective conditions which he sees as necessary for any form of consciousness. Such complex patterns of mutual recognition constituting objective spirit thereby provide the social matrix within which individual self-consciousnesses can exist as such. But this is only worked out in the text gradually. So we have to see how the protagonist self-consciousness could achieve this insight. It is to this end that we further trace the learning path of self-consciousness through the processes of reason in Chapter 5 before objective spirit can become the explicit subject matter of Chapter 6 *Spirit*. Thus Hegel might be seen as adopting the viewpoint that since social life is ordered by customs we can approach the lives of those living in it in terms of the patterns of those customs or conventions themselves—the conventional practices, as it were, constituting specific, shareable forms of life made actual in the lives of particular individuals who had in turn internalized such general patterns in the process of acculturation. It is not surprising then that his account of spirit here starts with a discussion of religious and civic law. But for non-traditionalists it is not obvious that Hegel, in employing such phrases, is in any way committed to any metaphysical supra-individual conscious being or beings.

Chapter 2 : SparkNotes: Philosophy of History: Summary

Hegel gave lecture series on aesthetics or the philosophy of art in various university terms, but never published a book of his own on this topic. His student, H. G. Hotho, compiled auditors' transcripts from these separate lecture series and produced from them the three volumes on aesthetics in the standard edition of Hegel's collected works.

Handbook of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences Principles of the Philosophy of Law Lectures on the Philosophy of History Lectures on Aesthetics and Philosophy of Religion Hegel emerges in human history and culture, the gradual genesis of the Absolute, which has, in itself, its foundation. The universal idea, the superior form of the Spirit, is at the end of the process, the absolute term. This is the task assigned to philosophy. Philosophy is a system that is to say an organized and closed all of whose elements are independent, knowledge and forming a unity embracing all elements of thought and life. This project to totalize and synthesize basic content for the idea, understood not as a subjective representation, but as spiritual principle dynamic, eternal creation, eternal life, rolling in its waters sparkling, all finite things determined. The essence of this idea which is formed, deepens and grows at different levels. It exists primarily as thought identical with itself first moment. Then it goes out of itself and externalized second time. Finally, during the third time, the Idea returns to itself and as Spirit unfolds, that is to say as Thought is gradually clarifying and reaching finally to the Absolute. Hegel and the dialectical logic: Consider, first, the logic and the laws of dialectics. The idea spreads, indeed dialectically, according to some determinations and laws as the analysis Hegel in the Logic. That means, in this thinker, dialectics? Flower denies the button and at the same time, keeps it. Such is the march in which each term is denied, at the same time, integrated. In this perspective, the negative plays, of course, essential. Negative moment and positive moment are two sides of the Hegelian dialectic. Hegel, human activity and history: The negative is the man who makes us understand. The man is, indeed, fundamentally, a desire denier: But the real object of desire is the Other: Beyond the training of the individual self is in Work and into history as the negation is expressed with full power edifying. History, too understood as the development of the Idea and spiritual process total, fully reveals man who is part of negativity in it: The men are they really what they want? Far from designating an organization relative and contingent, it is the social substance came to full consciousness of itself. History does not, in Hegel, a narrow sense, but it means a comprehensive and universal. The Universal History is nothing but the manifestation of the divine process of absolute Spirit, the gradual progress by which it becomes aware of itself. Hegel, art, religion and philosophy: The final stages of total spiritual process correspond to those of Art, Religion and Philosophy: The idea, conceived as a higher form of the Spirit, fully actualized in the artwork and the Beautiful. Art is for us now, from the past: In Religion training where the individual stands at the thought of God and in union with him, and Philosophy Intelligence and thought of this and the real, system design and what is conceptual grasp of the world in his unit, the Spirit progressively divest himself of its matrix material. Thus the Absolute Spirit, freed from its merits, it reached full equality with himself. Our time is particularly severe in relation to Hegel. In the eyes of Hegel, all that has happened marks, indeed, a step toward the realization of the Spirit. Any historical phenomenon can be found in this context, its full legitimacy, as it is called by the same requirement of Reason. If rationalism is not always full satisfaction of our culture, the teachings of the Hegelian dialectic are by no means obsolete. Negativity, work the contradiction, as many rich Hegelian elements that must be taken into account and remaining analytical instruments.

Chapter 3 : Lectures on Aesthetics - Wikipedia

HEGEL's lectures on Aesthetics have long been regarded as the most attractive of all the lectures which were published after his philosophy of Fine Art, and.

What all these thinkers share, which distinguishes them from materialists like Epicurus and Thomas Hobbes and from empiricists like David Hume, is that they regard freedom or self-determination both as real and as having important ontological implications for soul or mind or divinity. All three find common ground on the unique position of humans in the scheme of things, known by the discussed categorical differences from animals and inanimate objects. Begriff, "Spirit" and "ethical life" in such a way that the Kantian duality is rendered intelligible, rather than remaining a brute "given". In this way, Hegel intends to defend the germ of truth in Kantian dualism against reductive or eliminative programs like those of materialism and empiricism. Hegel preserves this essential Platonic and Kantian concern in the form of infinity going beyond the finite a process that Hegel in fact relates to "freedom" and the "ought", [54]: Hegel renders these dualities intelligible by ultimately his argument in the "Quality" chapter of the "Science of Logic". The finite has to become infinite in order to achieve reality. The idea of the absolute excludes multiplicity so the subjective and objective must achieve synthesis to become whole. This is because as Hegel suggests by his introduction of the concept of "reality", [54]: Finite things do not determine themselves because as "finite" things their essential character is determined by their boundaries over against other finite things, so in order to become "real" they must go beyond their finitude "finitude is only as a transcending of itself". Modern philosophy, culture and society seemed to Hegel fraught with contradictions and tensions, such as those between the subject and object of knowledge, mind and nature, self and Other, freedom and authority, knowledge and faith, or the Enlightenment and Romanticism. According to Hegel, the main characteristic of this unity was that it evolved through and manifested itself in contradiction and negation. Contradiction and negation have a dynamic quality that at every point in each domain of reality — consciousness, history, philosophy, art, nature and society — leads to further development until a rational unity is reached that preserves the contradictions as phases and sub-parts by lifting them up *Aufhebung* to a higher unity. This whole is mental because it is mind that can comprehend all of these phases and sub-parts as steps in its own process of comprehension. It is rational because the same, underlying, logical, developmental order underlies every domain of reality and is ultimately the order of self-conscious rational thought, although only in the later stages of development does it come to full self-consciousness. The rational, self-conscious whole is not a thing or being that lies outside of other existing things or minds. Rather, it comes to completion only in the philosophical comprehension of individual existing human minds who through their own understanding bring this developmental process to an understanding of itself. Geist combines the meaning of spirit — as in god, ghost, or mind — with an intentional force. Civil society Hegel made the distinction between civil society and state in his *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. This liberal distinction between political society and civil society was followed by Alexis de Tocqueville. For example, while it seems to be the case that he felt that a civil society such as the German society in which he lived was an inevitable movement of the dialectic, he made way for the crushing of other types of "lesser" and not fully realized types of civil society as these societies were not fully conscious or aware — as it were — as to the lack of progress in their societies. Thus, it was perfectly legitimate in the eyes of Hegel for a conqueror such as Napoleon to come along and destroy that which was not fully realized. The State subsumes family and civil society and fulfills them. All three together are called "ethical life" *Sittlichkeit*. The State involves three "moments". In a Hegelian State, citizens both know their place and choose their place. They both know their obligations and choose to fulfill their obligations. The individual has "substantial freedom in the state". The State is "objective spirit" so "it is only through being a member of the state that the individual himself has objectivity, truth, and ethical life" section. Furthermore, every member both loves the State with genuine patriotism, but has transcended mere "team spirit" by reflectively endorsing their citizenship. Members of a Hegelian State are happy even to sacrifice their lives for the State. Heraclitus[edit] According to Hegel, "Heraclitus is the one who first declared the

nature of the infinite and first grasped nature as in itself infinite, that is, its essence as process. The origin of philosophy is to be dated from Heraclitus. His is the persistent Idea that is the same in all philosophers up to the present day, as it was the Idea of Plato and Aristotle". Hegel asserted that in Heraclitus he had an antecedent for his logic: Sein und Nichts sei dasselbe Being and non-being are the same. Heraclitus does not form any abstract nouns from his ordinary use of "to be" and "to become" and in that fragment seems to be opposing any identity A to any other identity B, C and so on, which is not-A. However, Hegel interprets not-A as not existing at all, not nothing at all, which cannot be conceived, but indeterminate or "pure" being without particularity or specificity. This interpretation of Heraclitus cannot be ruled out, but even if present is not the main gist of his thought. Just as humans continually correct their concepts of reality through a dialectical process, so God himself becomes more fully manifested through the dialectical process of becoming. Whatever the nous thinks at any time is actual substance and is identical to limited being, but more remains to be thought in the substrate of non-being, which is identical to pure or unlimited thought. The universe as becoming is therefore a combination of being and non-being. The particular is never complete in itself, but to find completion is continually transformed into more comprehensive, complex, self-relating particulars. The essential nature of being-for-itself is that it is free "in itself;" that is, it does not depend on anything else such as matter for its being. The limitations represent fetters, which it must constantly be casting off as it becomes freer and more self-determining. This means that Jesus as the Son of God is posited by God over against himself as other. Hegel sees both a relational unity and a metaphysical unity between Jesus and God the Father. To Hegel, Jesus is both divine and human. Hegel further attests that God as Jesus not only died, but "[God, that is to say, maintains himself in the process, and the latter is only the death of death. God rises again to life, and thus things are reversed". Kaufmann admits that Hegel treated many distinctively Christian themes and "sometimes could not resist equating" his conception of spirit Geist "with God, instead of saying clearly: So he, too, sometimes spoke of God and, more often, of the divine; and because he occasionally took pleasure in insisting that he was really closer to this or that Christian tradition than some of the theologians of his time, he has sometimes been understood to have been a Christian. Verlag von Duncker und Humblot, He formulates an early philosophical example of a disenchantment narrative, arguing that Judaism was responsible both for realizing the existence of Geist and, by extension, for separating nature from ideas of spiritual and magical forces and challenging polytheism. During the last ten years of his life, Hegel did not publish another book, but thoroughly revised the Encyclopedia second edition, ; third, He also published some articles early in his career and during his Berlin period. A number of other works on the philosophy of history, religion, aesthetics and the history of philosophy were compiled from the lecture notes of his students and published posthumously. This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.

Chapter 4 : Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Over the last forty years in the Anglophone philosophical world, the face of Hegel's aesthetics has been a sprawling two-volume work of almost pages, Hegel's Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, the product of the venerable Scottish Hegel scholar and translator Sir Thomas Malcolm Knox ().

Oxford University Press, ; pp. Despite its controversial claims, the Aesthetics is not only celebrated to this day as a masterful philosophical achievement, but also studied as a pivotal moment for both critical theory and art history. Indeed, the role it played in the development of the latter was so crucial that E. Gombrich has even proclaimed that Hegel is the father of art history. It makes a textâ€”itself only published in German in â€”available to a wide range of specialists. After his sudden death in , Hegel left his system incomplete: Cornell University Press, , pp. Dialogue , Page 1 of 4. The task of editing it was given to Henrich Gustav Hotho, himself a self-professed Hegelian art historian. It does not pass the test of current historical-critical standards. Hotho had access to both a manuscript by Hegel that served as a basis for his lecture courses on aesthetics and multiple exemplars of transcripts from these courses: Hotho explains all of this in his preface to the Aesthetics, which unfortunately was not included in the now standard Knox translation of the second edition, preventing it from being well-known information. The above evidence is already more than ample to cast doubt on the authenticity of the Aesthetics. This had two effects. First, any doubt concerning its authenticity remained mere speculation. But, her introduction, some pages long, is as long as the Hotho transcript itself and, as one can surmise, deserves scholarly attention of its own. We only need to mention one example she draws upon to vividly make this point. If the claim to fame of the Aesthetics is a dialectical systematization of art, early on in the Hotho transcript of , Hegel himself says he will not give such a system. For Gethmann-Siefert, this entails that Hegel aims to do something more akin to a phenomenology of art that attempts to determine its function from its historical appearance. By placing the stress on system, Hotho is thus deliberately moving beyond Hegel, using the transcripts available to him to do something that Hegel himself never did in any of his lecture courses. But he is not dialectically led to this thesis because of a priori reasoning; he is led to it, on the contrary, phenomenologically, by looking at how art did, and no longer can, play a historical role in the mediation of truth. This translation is therefore necessary reading for anyone interested in Hegel, the history of aesthetics, or aesthetic theory broadly construed. But with the high cost of the hardcover version, we will have to wait for softcover edition for that. Interpreters of Our Cultural Tradition.

Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Art In his philosophy of fine art, Hegel goes to great lengths to argue that art is an end in itself and cannot be truly appreciated as a means of achieving another goal.

His philosophy of art proper, however, forms part of his philosophy rather than phenomenology of spirit. The system itself comprises three parts: The philosophy of spirit is in turn divided into three sections: Hegel read both Greek and Latin indeed, he wrote his diary partly in Latin from the age of fourteen ; he also read English and French. He never travelled to Greece or Italy, but he did undertake several long journeys from Berlin where he was appointed Professor in to Dresden , , the Low Countries , , Vienna and Paris Hegel was also on close personal terms with Goethe and knew his drama and poetry especially well as he did those of Friedrich Schiller. This may or may not be true of Kant, but it is clearly quite untrue of Hegel: This is available in English as: Lectures on Fine Art, trans. Does he believe that only Greek art is beautiful? Does he hold that art comes to an end in the modern age? The answers one gives to such questions should, however, be offered with a degree of caution, for, sadly, there is no fully worked out philosophy of art by Hegel that was officially endorsed by Hegel himself. In order to understand his philosophy of art, therefore, one must understand the main claims of his philosophy as a whole. In the philosophy of nature, however, he goes on to show that logic tells only half the story: What there is, according to Hegel, is thus not just pure reason but physical, chemical and living matter that obeys rational principles. Life is more explicitly rational than mere physical matter because it is more explicitly self-determining. Life itself becomes more explicitly rational and self-determining when it becomes conscious and self-conscious—that is, life that can imagine, use language, think and exercise freedom. Reason, or the Idea, comes to be fully self-determining and rational, therefore, when it takes the form of self-conscious spirit. Human beings, for Hegel, are thus not just accidents of nature; they are reason itself—the reason inherent in nature—that has come to life and come to consciousness of itself. In his philosophy of objective spirit Hegel analyses the institutional structures that are required if spirit—that is, humanity—is to be properly free and self-determining. These include the institutions of right, the family, civil society and the state. The highest, most developed and most adequate understanding of spirit is attained by philosophy the bare bones of whose understanding of the world have just been sketched. Philosophy provides an explicitly rational, conceptual understanding of the nature of reason or the Idea. It explains precisely why reason must take the form of space, time, matter, life and self-conscious spirit. In religion—above all in Christianity—spirit gives expression to the same understanding of reason and of itself as philosophy. Furthermore, this process is one in which we put our faith and trust: Religion, however, believes in a representation of the truth, whereas philosophy understands that truth with complete conceptual clarity. It may seem strange that we would need religion, if we have philosophy: For Hegel, however, humanity cannot live by concepts alone, but also needs to picture, imagine, and have faith in the truth. Such objects—conjured out of stone, wood, color, sound or words—render the freedom of spirit visible or audible to an audience. The purpose of art, for Hegel, is thus the creation of beautiful objects in which the true character of freedom is given sensuous expression. The principal aim of art is not, therefore, to imitate nature, to decorate our surroundings, to prompt us to engage in moral or political action, or to shock us out of our complacency. It is to allow us to contemplate and enjoy created images of our own spiritual freedom—images that are beautiful precisely because they give expression to our freedom. Kant also maintained that our experience of beauty is an experience of freedom. He argued, however, that beauty is not itself an objective property of things. In contrast to Kant, Schiller understands beauty to be a property of the object itself. It is the property, possessed by both living beings and works of art, of appearing to be free when in fact they are not. We can never see freedom at work in, or embodied in, the world of space and time. Hegel agrees with Schiller against Kant that beauty is an objective property of things. In his view, however, beauty is the direct sensuous manifestation of freedom, not merely the appearance or imitation of freedom. It shows us what freedom actually looks like and sounds like when it gives itself sensuous expression albeit with varying degrees of idealization. Since true beauty is the direct sensuous expression of the freedom of spirit, it must be

produced by free spirit for free spirit, and so cannot be a mere product of nature. Beauty, for Hegel, has certain formal qualities: Hegel gives an example of genuinely beautiful form in his discussion of Greek sculpture: Beauty, however, is not just a matter of form; it is also a matter of content. As we have seen, the content that Hegel claims is central and indispensable to genuine beauty and therefore genuine art is the freedom and richness of spirit. To put it another way, that content is the Idea, or absolute reason, as self-knowing spirit. The content of beautiful art must thus be the divine in human form or the divine within humanity itself as well as purely human freedom. In both cases, the focus of attention is on the human figure in particular. Colors and sounds by themselves can certainly communicate a mood, but only the human form actually embodies spirit and reason. Truly beautiful art thus shows us sculpted, painted or poetic images of Greek gods or of Jesus Christ—that is, the divine in human form—or it shows us images of free human life itself. Art and Idealization Art, for Hegel, is essentially figurative. This is not because it seeks to imitate nature, but because its purpose is to express and embody free spirit and this is achieved most adequately through images of human beings. We will consider the exceptions to this—architecture and music—below. Its role is to show us or remind us of the true character of freedom. Art fulfills this role by showing us the freedom of spirit in its purest form without the contingencies of everyday life. That is to say, art at its best presents us not with the all too familiar dependencies and drudgery of daily existence, but with the ideal of freedom see Aesthetics, 1: This ideal of human and divine freedom constitutes true beauty and is found above all, Hegel claims, in ancient Greek sculptures of gods and heroes. Note that the work of idealization is undertaken not like modern fashion photography to provide an escape from life into a world of fantasy, but to enable us to see our freedom more clearly. Idealization is undertaken, therefore, in the interests of a clearer revelation of the true character of humanity and of the divine. The paradox is that art communicates truth through idealized images of human beings and indeed—in painting—through the illusion of external reality. Hegel thinks that the account he gives describes the principal features of the greatest works of art in the Western tradition, such as the sculptures of Phidias or Praxiteles or the dramas of Aeschylus or Sophocles. At the same time, his account is normative in so far as it tells us what true art is. This, he claims, is to give intuitive, sensuous expression to the freedom of spirit. The realm of the sensuous is the realm of individual things in space and time. Such an individual must not be abstract and formal as, for example, in the early Greek Geometric style, nor should he be static and rigid as in much ancient Egyptian sculpture, but his body and posture should be visibly animated by freedom and life, without, however, sacrificing the stillness and serenity that belongs to ideal self-containment. It does not, however, exhaust the idea of beauty, for it does not give us beauty in its most concrete and developed form. The gods represented in Greek sculpture are beautiful because their physical shape perfectly embodies their spiritual freedom and is not marred by marks of physical frailty or dependence. These heroes are not allegorical representations of abstract virtues, but are living human beings with imagination, character and free will; but what moves them is a passion for an aspect of our ethical life, an aspect that is supported and promoted by a god. This distinction between pure beauty, found in Greek sculpture, and the more concrete beauty found in Greek drama means that ideal beauty actually takes two subtly different forms. Beauty is the sensuous expression of freedom and so must exhibit the concreteness, animation and humanity that are missing, for example, in Egyptian sculpture. Yet since pure beauty, as exemplified by Greek sculpture, is spiritual freedom immersed in spatial, bodily shape, it lacks the more concrete dynamism of action in time, action that is animated by imagination and language. This means that it must move beyond pure beauty to the more concrete and genuinely human beauty of drama. It falls short of ideal beauty when it takes the form of symbolic art, and it goes beyond such beauty when it takes the form of romantic art. The form of art that is characterized by works of ideal beauty itself is classical art. The development of art from one form to another generates what Hegel regards as the distinctive history of art. What produces these three art-forms is the changing relation between the content of art—the Idea as spirit—and its mode of presentation. The changes in this relation are in turn determined by the way in which the content of art is itself conceived. In symbolic art the content is conceived abstractly, such that it is not able to manifest itself adequately in a sensuous, visible form. In classical art, by contrast, the content is conceived in such a way that it is able to find perfect expression in sensuous, visible form. In romantic art, the content is

conceived in such a way that it is able to find adequate expression in sensuous, visible form and yet also ultimately transcends the realm of the sensuous and visible. Symbolic art, by contrast, falls short of genuine beauty altogether. This does not mean that it is simply bad art: Hegel recognizes that symbolic art is often the product of the highest level of artistry. Symbolic art falls short of beauty because it does not yet have a rich enough understanding of the nature of divine and human spirit. Not all of the types of symbolic art Hegel discusses, however, are fully and properly symbolic. So what connects them all? Art proper, for Hegel, is the sensuous expression or manifestation of free spirit in a medium such as metal, stone or color that has been deliberately shaped or worked by human beings into the expression of freedom. This is either because it is the product of a spirit that does not yet understand itself to be truly free, or because it is the product of a spirit that does have a sense of its own freedom but does not yet understand such freedom to involve the manifestation of itself in a sensuous medium that has been specifically shaped to that end. He says nothing, for example, about prehistoric art such as cave painting, nor does he discuss Chinese art or Buddhist art even though he discusses both Chinese religion and Buddhism in his lectures on the philosophy of religion. The first stage is that in which spirit is conceived as being in an immediate unity with nature. This stage is encountered in the ancient Persian religion of Zoroastrianism. The Zoroastrians, Hegel claims, believe in a divine power—the Good—but they identify this divinity with an aspect of nature itself, namely with light. Light does not symbolize or point to a separate God or Good; rather, in Zoroastrianism as Hegel understands it light is the Good, is God. Aesthetics, 1: Light is thus the substance in all things and that which gives life to all plants and animals. This light, Hegel tells us, is personified as Ormuzd or Ahura Mazda. Unlike the God of the Jews, however, Ormuzd is not a free, self-conscious subject. He or it is the Good in the form of light itself, and so is present in all sources of light, such as the sun, stars and fire. This vision, however, does not constitute a work of art, even though it finds expression in well-crafted prayers and utterances.

Chapter 6 : Hegels End of Art by K We on Prezi

Lectures on the Philosophy of History Lectures on Aesthetics and Philosophy of Religion Hegel emerges in human history and culture, the gradual genesis of the Absolute, which has, in itself, its foundation.

Their topic is the spacious realm of the beautiful; more precisely, their province is art, or, rather, fine art. In this sense it has its origin as a new science, or rather as something which for the same time was to become a philosophical discipline, [1] in the school of Wolff at the period in Germany when works of art were treated with regard to the feelings they were supposed to produce, as, for instance, the feeling of pleasure, admiration, fear, pity, and so on. Because of the unsatisfactoriness, or more accurately, the superficiality of this word, attempts were made after all to frame others, e. But this too appears inadequate because the science which is meant deals not with the beautiful as such but simply with the beauty of art. As a name then it may be retained, but the proper expression for our science is Philosophy of Art and, more definitely, Philosophy of Fine Art. Such a limitation of our topic may appear to be laid down arbitrarily, on the principle that every science has authority to demarcate its scope at will. But this is not the sense in which we should take the limitation of aesthetics to the beauty of art. In ordinary life we are of course accustomed to speak of a beautiful colour, a beautiful sky, a beautiful river; likewise of beautiful flowers, beautiful animals, and even more of beautiful people. We will not here enter upon the controversy about how far the attribute of beauty is justifiably ascribed to these and the like, and how far, in general, natural beauty may be put alongside the beauty of art. But we may assert against this view, even at this stage, that the beauty of art is higher than nature. The beauty of art is beauty born of the spirit and born again, [2] and the higher the spirit and its productions stand above nature and its phenomena, the higher too is the beauty of art above that of nature. Indeed, considered formally [i. Of course, considered in its content, the sun, for example, appears as an absolutely necessary factor [in the universe] while a false notion vanishes as accidental and transitory. But, taken by itself, a natural existent like the sun is indifferent, not free and self-conscious in itself; and if we treat it in its necessary connection with other things, then we are not treating it by itself, and therefore not as beautiful. But what is higher about the spirit and its artistic beauty is not something merely relative in comparison with nature. On the contrary, spirit is alone the true, comprehending everything in itself, so that everything beautiful is truly beautiful only as sharing in this higher sphere and generated by it. In this sense the beauty of nature appear only as reflection of the beauty , that belongs to spirit, as an imperfect incomplete mode [of beauty], a mode which inns substance is contained in the spirit itself. A treatment from the point of view of utility has indeed been made and, for example, a scientific account of natural objects useful against diseases has been composed, a materia medica, a description of the minerals, chemical products, plants, or animals, which are useful for cures. But the realms of nature have not been classified and examined from the point of view of beauty. In [discussing] natural beauty we feel ourselves too much in a vague sphere, without a criterion, and therefore such a classification would provide too little interest for us to undertake it. These preliminary remarks on beauty in nature and art, on the relation of the two, and the exclusion of the former from the scope of our proper subject, should dispose of the idea that the limitation is due merely to caprice and arbitrariness. The proof of this relation should not come here yet, since its consideration falls within our science itself and is therefore not to be further explained and proved until later [see Part I, ch. But if we now limit ourselves provisionally to the beauty of art, this first step brings us at once up against new difficulties. Beauty and art does indeed pervade all the business of life like a friendly genius and brightly adorns all our surroundings whether inner or outer, mitigating the seriousness of our circumstances and the complexities of the actual world, extinguishing idleness in an entertaining way, and, where there is nothing good to be done, filling the place of evil always better than evil itself. Yet even though art intersperses with its pleasing forms everything from the war-paint of the savages to the splendour of temples with all their riches of adornment, these forms themselves nevertheless seem to fall outside the true ends and aims of life. Even if artistic creations are not detrimental to these serious purposes, if indeed they sometimes even seem to further them, at least by keeping evil away, still, art belongs rather to the indulgence and relaxation of the spirit, whereas

substantial interests require its exertion. Thus it may look as if it would be inappropriate and pedantic to propose to treat with scientific seriousness what is not itself of a serious nature. In any case, on this view, art appears as a superfluity, even if the softening of the heart which preoccupation with beauty can produce does not altogether become exactly deleterious as downright effeminacy. From this point of view, granted that the fine arts are a luxury, it has frequently been necessary to defend them in their relation to practical necessities in general, and in particular to morality and piety, and, since it is impossible to prove their harmlessness, at least to give grounds for believing that this luxury of the spirit may afford a greater sum of advantages than disadvantages. With this in view, serious aims have been ascribed to art itself, and it has frequently been recommended as a mediator between reason and sense, between reason and duty, as a reconciler of these colliding elements in their grim strife and opposition. But it may be maintained that in the case of these aims of art, admittedly more serious, nothing is gained for reason and duty by this attempt at mediation, because by their very nature reason and duty permit of no mixture with anything else; they could not enter into such a transaction, and they demand the same purity which they have in themselves. Besides, it may be argued, art is not by this means made any worthier of scientific discussion, since it always remains a servant on both sides [between which it is supposed to mediate], and along with higher aims it all the same also promotes idleness and frivolity. Indeed, to put it simply, in this service, instead of being an end in itself, it can appear only as a means. The beautiful [Schöne] has its being in pure appearance [Schein]. For the means should correspond to the dignity of the end, and not pure appearance and deception but only the truth can create the truth, just as science too has to treat the true interests of the spirit in accordance with the true mode of actuality and the true mode of envisaging it. In these respects it may look as if fine art is unworthy of scientific treatment because [it is alleged] it remains only a pleasing play, and, even if it pursues more serious ends, it still contradicts their nature; but [the allegation proceeds] in general it is only a servant both of that play and of these ends, and alike for the element of its being and the means of its effectiveness it can avail itself of nothing but deception and pure appearance. But, secondly, it is still more likely to seem that even if fine art in general is a proper object of philosophical reflection, it is yet no appropriate topic for strictly scientific treatment. For the beauty of art presents itself to sense, feeling, intuition, imagination; it has a different sphere from thought, and the apprehension of its activity and its products demands an organ other than scientific thinking. Further, it is precisely the freedom of production and configurations that we enjoy in the beauty of art. In the production as well as in the perception of works of art, it seems as if we escape from every fetter of rule and regularity. In place of the strictness of conformity to law, [4] and the dark inwardness of thought, we seek peace and enlivenment in the forms of art; we exchange the shadow realm of the Idea for bright and vigorous reality. Finally, the source of works of art is the free activity of fancy which in its imaginations is itself more free than nature is. Art has at its command not only the whole wealth of natural formations in their manifold and variegated appearance; but in addition the creative imagination has power to launch out beyond them inexhaustibly in productions of its own. In face of this immeasurable fullness of fancy and its free products, it looks as if thought must lose courage to bring them completely before itself, to criticize them, and arrange them under its universal formulae. The result is that, on the one hand, imagination with its whim and caprice, the organ, i. On the other hand, they say that while art does brighten and vivify the unilluminated and withered dryness of the Concept, does reconcile its abstractions and its conflict with reality, does enrich the Concept with reality, a purely intellectual treatment [of art] removes this means of enrichment, destroys it, and carries the Concept back to its simplicity without reality and to its shadowy abstractness. Further, in its content, science is occupied with what is inherently necessary. If aesthetics leaves natural beauty aside, we have in this respect apparently not only not gained anything, but rather have removed ourselves still further from the necessary. But in the sphere of the spirit in general, especially in the imagination, what seems, in comparison with nature, to be peculiarly at home is caprice and the absence of law, and this is automatically incapable of any scientific explanation. These scruples, and others like them, against a truly scientific preoccupation with fine art are derived from common ideas, points of view, and considerations; their more prolix elaboration you can read ad nauseam in older books, especially French ones, [6] about beauty and the fine arts. And in part they contain facts that are right enough, and, in part too, argumentation is derived from them which at first

sight seems plausible as well. Thus, for example, it is a fact that the shapes that beauty takes on are as multifarious as its occurrence is universal. If you like, you can infer from this a universal bent in human nature for the beautiful, and then go on to the further inference that because the ideas of the beautiful are so infinitely various, and, therefore, at first sight, something particular, there cannot be any universal laws of beauty and taste. Now before we can turn away from such considerations to our proper subject, our next task must consist in a short introductory discussion of the scruples and doubts that have been raised. Thus regarded, art is indeed not independent, not free, but ancillary. But what we want to consider is art which is free alike in its end and its means. The fact that art in general can serve other ends and be in that case a mere passing amusement is something which it shares equally with thought. For, on the one hand, science may indeed be used as an intellectual servant for finite ends and accidental means, and it then acquires its character not from itself but from other objects and circumstances. Yet, on the other hand, it also cuts itself free from this servitude in order to raise itself, in free independence, to the truth in which it fulfils itself independently and conformably with its own ends alone. Now, in this its freedom alone is fine art truly art, and it only fulfils its supreme task when it has placed itself in the same sphere as religion and philosophy, and when it is simply one way of bringing to our minds and expressing the Divine, the deepest interests of mankind, and the most comprehensive truths of the spirit. In works of art the nations have deposited their richest inner intuitions and ideas, and art is often the key, and in many nations the sole key, to understanding their philosophy and religion. What is thus displayed is the depth of a suprasensuous world which thought pierces and sets up at first as a beyond in contrast with immediate consciousness and present feeling; it is the freedom of intellectual reflection which rescues itself from the here and now, called sensuous reality and finitude. But this breach, to which the spirit proceeds, it is also able to heal. It generates out of itself works of fine art as the first reconciling middle term between pure thought and what is merely external, sensuous, and transient, between nature and finite reality and the infinite freedom of conceptual thinking. But appearance itself is essential to essence. Truth would not be truth if it did not show itself and appear, if it were not truth for someone and for itself, as well as for the spirit in general too. Consequently, not pure appearance in general, but only the special kind of appearance in which art gives reality to what is inherently true can be the subject of reproof. To both these worlds, in our life of experience, our own phenomenal life, we are accustomed to ascribe the value and name of actuality, reality, and truth, in contrast to art which lacks such reality and truth. But it is precisely this whole sphere of the empirical inner and outer world which is not the world of genuine actuality; on the contrary, we must call it, in a stricter sense than we call art, a pure appearance and a harsher deception. Only beyond the immediacy of feeling and external objects is genuine actuality to be found. For the truly actual is only that which has being in and for itself, the substance of nature and spirit, which indeed gives itself presence and existence, but in this existence remains in and for itself and only so is truly actual. It is precisely the dominion of these universal powers [7] which art emphasizes and reveals. In the ordinary external and internal world essentiality does indeed appear too, but in the form of a chaos of accidents, afflicted by the immediacy of the sensuous and by the capriciousness of situations, events, characters, etc. Art liberates the true content of phenomena from the pure appearance and deception of this bad, transitory world, and gives them a higher actuality, born of the spirit. Thus, far from being mere pure appearance, a higher reality and truer existence is to be ascribed to the phenomena of art in comparison with [those of] ordinary reality. Neither can the representations of art be called a deceptive appearance in comparison with the truer representations of historiography. For the latter has not even immediate existence but only the spiritual pure appearance thereof as the element of its portrayals, and its content remains burdened with the entire contingency of ordinary life and its events, complications, and individualities, whereas the work of art brings before us the eternal powers that govern history without this appendage of the immediate sensuous present and its unstable appearance. But if the mode in which artistic forms appear is called a deception in comparison with philosophical thinking and with religious and moral principles, of course the form of appearance acquired by a topic in the sphere of thinking is the truest reality; but in comparison with the appearance of immediate existence and of historiography, the pure appearance of art has the advantage that it points through and beyond itself, and itself hints at something spiritual of which it is to give us an idea, whereas immediate appearance does not present itself as deceptive

but rather as the real and the true, although the truth is in fact contaminated and concealed by the immediacy of sense. The hard shell of nature and the ordinary world make it more difficult for the spirit to penetrate through them to the Idea than works of art do. But while on the one hand we give this high position to art, it is on the other hand just as necessary to remember that neither in content nor in form is art the highest and absolute mode of bringing to our minds the true interests of the spirit. For precisely on account of its form, art is limited to a specific content. Only one sphere and stage of truth is capable of being represented in the element of art. In order to be a genuine content for art, such truth must in virtue of its own specific character be able to go forth into [the sphere of] sense and remain adequate to itself there. This is the case, for example, with the gods of Greece. On the other hand, there is a deeper comprehension of truth which is no longer so akin and friendly to sense as to be capable of appropriate adoption and expression in this medium. The Christian view of truth is of this kind, and, above all, the spirit of our world today, or, more particularly, of our religion and the development of our reason, appears as beyond the stage at which art is the supreme mode of our knowledge of the Absolute. The peculiar nature of artistic production and of works of art no longer fills our highest need. We have got beyond venerating works of art as divine and worshipping them. The impression they make is of a more reflective kind, and what they arouse in us needs a higher touchstone and a different test. Thought and reflection have spread their wings above fine art. Those who delight in lamenting and blaming may regard this phenomenon as a corruption and ascribe it to the predominance of passions and selfish interests which scare away the seriousness of art as well as its cheerfulness; or they may accuse the distress of the present time, the complicated state of civil and political life which does not permit a heart entangled in petty interests to free itself to the higher ends of art. This is because intelligence itself subserves this distress, and its interests, in sciences which are useful for such ends alone, and it allows itself to be seduced into confining itself to this desert. However all this may be, it is certainly the case that art no longer affords that satisfaction of spiritual needs which earlier ages and nations sought in it, and found in it alone, a satisfaction that, at least on the part of religion, was most intimately linked with art. The beautiful days of Greek art, like the golden age of the later Middle Ages, are gone. The development of reflection in our life today has made it a need of ours, in relation both to our will and judgement, to cling to general considerations and to regulate the particular by them, with the result that universal forms, laws, duties, rights, maxims, prevail as determining reasons and are the chief regulator. But for artistic interest and production we demand in general rather a quality of life in which the universal is not present in the form of law and maxim, but which gives the impression of being one with the senses and the feelings, just as the universal and the rational is contained in the imagination by being brought into unity with a concrete sensuous appearance. Consequently the conditions of our present time are not favourable to art. It is not, as might be supposed, merely that the practising artist himself is infected by the loud voice of reflection all around him and by the opinions and judgements on art that have become customary everywhere, so that he is misled into introducing more thoughts into his work; the point is that our whole spiritual culture is of such a kind that he himself stands within the world of reflection and its relations, and could not by any act of will and decision abstract himself from it; nor could he by special education or removal from the relations of life contrive and organize a special solitude to replace what he has lost. In all these respects art, considered in its highest vocation, is and remains for us a thing of the past.

Chapter 7 : Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel - Wikipedia

This is the first of two volumes of the only English edition of Hegel's Aesthetics, the work in which he gives full expression to his seminal theory of calendrierdelascience.com substantial Introduction is his best exposition of his general philosophy of art.

Chapter 8 : Hegel's Aesthetics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Lectures on Fine Art. Source: G.W See also Lectures on Aesthetics. Volume I Position of Art in Relation to the Finite

World and to Religion and Philosophy.

Chapter 9 : Hegel's Aesthetics. Introduction

Hegel devoted himself primarily to delivering his lectures; and his lecture courses on aesthetics, the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of history and the history of philosophy were published posthumously from lecture notes taken by his students.