

Chapter 1 : Martin Heidegger, "What Is Metaphysics?"

Such a community, whose meaning Heidegger is the only one to decipher in our times, silently conforms to an archaic philosophy. The cosmic game of the Geviert also evokes, for Heidegger, the path of the Tao in the Chinese tradition.

Ereignis is the mutual belonging of man and Being, in which man is enthralled by the world opened up by the event and thus oblivious to the event itself. Now we are in the position to begin to think through the connection that Heidegger draws between metaphysics and nihilism. Traditional metaphysics is constructed around the dualisms of permanence and change and of appearance and reality. The permanent is identified with Being, which is said to be a reality that lies beyond the world of appearances, the world of change, the realm of becoming. Nietzsche seems to overcome these dualisms by collapsing the distinctions between permanence and change, appearance and reality, Being and becoming. Therefore, Nietzsche seems to go beyond metaphysics. How, then, does Heidegger establish Nietzsche as the last metaphysician of the West? Another way of putting this question is: What does Heidegger think that a genuine overcoming of metaphysics requires? Platonism identifies Being with permanence as opposed to change, presence as opposed to absence, identity as opposed to difference. The latter terms of these pairs—change, absence, difference—are identified with non-being. In the world around us, rest and motion, presence and absence, identity and difference are all mixed together. Thus the Platonist concludes that this world is not the true world; it is not the realm of Being, but the realm of becoming, which is a mere blurred image or decayed manifestation of Being. Becoming is merely a veil of appearances which cloaks and hides that which is real, namely Being. The Platonic realm of Being is identified as the place of forms or essences. The world of becoming is the world in which we find individual men, individual dogs, individual chairs, individual tables. All of these individuals come into being, change, and pass out of existence. While particulars that become exist in time, forms of essences exist outside of time in eternity. Because particulars in time are infected with change, absence and difference, we cannot have certain knowledge of them; at best, we can have only tentative opinions about things in the world around us. We can have certain knowledge only of the forms or essences that make up the realm of Being. What is the Will to Power? And what is the Eternal Recurrence of the Same? Nietzsche called the ultimate constituent of the world Will to Power. The Will to Power is the constant exercise of power as an end in itself. The Will to Power makes possible the constant exercise of power by positing limits for itself and then exceeding them; Will to Power first freezes itself into particular forms and then overcomes and dissolves them. Both the Stoics and Epicureans believed that the cosmos is finite. The cosmos consists of matter and void, and there is only so much matter and so much void. Matter, however, is not fully inert. Matter has both inert and animate dimensions. Matter has the tendency to remain at rest or in motion, which the Epicureans represented by matter falling through the void. But matter also has a non-inert aspect that causes it to swerve from its fall or to move from rest to motion by its own power. The Stoics represented this as divine logos, which following Heraclitus, they represented as fire. Matter, in short, is in some sense vital and animate; it is alive and ensouled. Given a finite amount of matter and a finite void, given that matter has both a tendency to give rise to order and dissolve order, and given that time is infinite, the Epicureans and Stoics argued that the random play of chaos within a finite cosmos over an infinite amount of time not only gives rise to order, but gives rise to the same order an infinite number of times. Everything that is happening now has already happened an infinite number of times before and will happen an infinite number of times in the future. Nietzsche takes this argument over completely. The Will to Power corresponds precisely to the two aspects of matter discussed by the Epicureans and Stoics. Nietzsche holds that the Will to Power is finite and that time is infinite. Given the possibility of endlessly rearranging a finite Will to Power over an infinite amount of time, the same kinds of order will inevitably repeat themselves, and they will repeat themselves an infinite number of times: Eternal Recurrence of the Same. Nietzsche claims to have abolished metaphysics because he abolishes the dualism between appearance and reality, Being and becoming, presence and absence, identity and difference, etc. All of these pairs of opposites are found blended together in the Will to Power and the Eternal Recurrence of the Same. There is no realm of pure presence, pristine identity, total rest, and separate

essences, lying behind the world that appears to us. First, he argues that the basic elements of Platonism are still at work in Nietzsche. Second, he argues that Nietzsche really does not understand what it would take to overcome metaphysics. How is Nietzsche a Metaphysician? First, the accounts of Eternal Recurrence and Will to Power still buy into the metaphysics of presence. As Heidegger puts it: What becomes is not the unceasing otherness of an endlessly changing manifold. What becomes is the same itself, and that means the one and selfsame the identical that in each case is within the difference of the other. Will to Power may now be conceived of as the permanentizing of surpassment, that is of becoming; hence as a transformed determination of the guiding metaphysical projection. The Eternal Recurrence of the Same unfurls and displays its essence, so to speak, as the most constant permanentizing of the becoming of what is constant. The second way in which Heidegger argues that Nietzsche is a metaphysician is somewhat more elusive and difficult. Heidegger writes on page To talk about the identity of a thing is to talk about what it is in contrast to the identity of different things, the things that it is not. When we talk about the existence of something, we are talking about the fact that it is, as opposed to the idea of its non-existence. Now, in Platonism, the identity of a particular being is endowed by its form. So, for Platonism, the identity or whatness of a particular being is explained by its essence and its individual existence or thatness is explained by its materiality. Heidegger holds that this Platonic distinction is present in the distinction between the Will to Power and the Eternal Recurrence of the Same. Will to Power names the whatness or identity of all beings. Therefore, it corresponds to the Platonic form. Eternal Recurrence names the thatness or existence of beings. Therefore, it corresponds to the instantiation of the Platonic Form in a bit of the spatio-temporal world. Will to Power is the principle of identity. Eternal Recurrence is the principle of existence. This dualism, Heidegger claims, is not overcome by Nietzsche, so Nietzsche does not overcome metaphysics. Indeed, Heidegger claims that Nietzsche represents the culmination of metaphysics. To understand this, we must understand how, precisely, Nietzsche fails to overcome metaphysics. And to understand this, we need to know what Heidegger thinks a genuine overcoming of metaphysics would require. What Constitutes a True Overcoming of Metaphysics? Heidegger thinks that a genuine overcoming of metaphysics requires that we think his distinctive topic, the distinctive matter of his thinking: Heidegger mentions his distinctive topic in a number of places in these lectures: It first appears on page second paragraph: What this unleashing of power to its essence is [i. Nor can any metaphysics think it, inasmuch as metaphysics cannot put the matter [die Sache, the topic] into question. It also appears on page second paragraph: Out of that enjoining alone does the difference commence. Thought concerning truth, in the sense of the essence of aletheia, whose essential advent sustains Being and allows it to be sheltered in its belonging to the commencement, is more remote than ever in this last projection of beingness. Here aletheia refers to that which both grants a new epoch in the history of Being and shelters its advent in mystery. There is also an extensive discussion of the topic from the bottom of page throughout the entirety of page Heidegger claims that Nietzsche does not overcome metaphysics because the overcoming of metaphysics requires that one think that which grants different epochs in the history of Being and Nietzsche does not think this topic. Heidegger adds, furthermore, that Nietzsche not only fails to overcome metaphysics, he actually make this overcoming more difficult because he fosters the illusion that metaphysics is already overcome, thereby enforcing our oblivion to that which grants metaphysics, thereby making us less likely to think this topic and thus to effect a genuine overcoming of metaphysics. As Heidegger writes on It thus confirms, by assisting those machinations that are oblivious to Being, the utter abandonment of Being. It is at this point that we can understand why Heidegger thinks that Nietzsche is not only a metaphysician, but the culmination of metaphysics. Metaphysics thinks the Being of beings, but does not think the meaning of Being, the clearing of Being, etc. Being as certainty; Being as intelligibility; Being as availability and deployability for human purposes. The world is meaningless because wherever we look, we only encounter projections of our own overweening subjectivity and will to power. The essence of modernity is the idea that everything can be understood and controlled. This view of the world is made possible by our failure to think about what grants it, what makes it possible, the source of this epoch in the history of Being. Trying to understand the origins of nihilism forces us to recognize that there is a mystery that cannot be explained or controlled. And this encounter with mystery is alone sufficient to break the spell that everything can be understood and controlled.

Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics, ed. David Farrell Krell, trans. Harper and Row, , p.

Chapter 2 : Martin Heidegger Quotes (Author of Being and Time)

*Heidegger from Metaphysics to Thought (SUNY series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy) [Dominique Janicaud, Jean-Francois Mattei, Michael Gendrel] on calendrierdelascience.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers.*

Heidegger remained at Freiburg im Breisgau for the rest of his life, declining a number of later offers, including one from Humboldt University of Berlin. He resigned the rectorate in April , but remained a member of the Nazi Party until even though as Julian Young asserts the Nazis eventually prevented him from publishing. Evans , Heidegger was not only a member of the Nazi Party, but "enthusiastic" about participating. His resignation from the rectorate owed more to his frustration as an administrator than to any principled opposition to the Nazis, according to historians. No punitive measures against him were proposed. Hermann was told of this at the age of Arendt was Jewish , and Blochmann had one Jewish parent, making them subject to severe persecution by the Nazi authorities. He helped Blochmann emigrate from Germany before the start of World War II and resumed contact with both of them after the war. He considered the seclusion provided by the forest to be the best environment in which to engage in philosophical thought. In particular, the language is obfuscatory and the logical sequence between one sentence and the next is obscure throughout. Heidegger thought the presence of things for us is not their being, but merely them interpreted as equipment according to a particular system of meaning and purpose. For instance, when a hammer is efficiently used to knock in nails, we cease to be aware of it. This is termed "ready to hand", and Heidegger considers it an authentic mode, saying that the given "past" has presence in an oversimplified way when reduced to possible future usefulness to us. Heidegger claimed philosophy and science since ancient Greece had reduced things to their presence, which was a superficial way of understanding them. Rather, Husserl argued that all that philosophy could and should be is a description of experience hence the phenomenological slogan, "to the things themselves". But for Heidegger, this meant understanding that experience is always already situated in a world and in ways of being. Heidegger argues that describing experience properly entails finding the being for whom such a description might matter. Heidegger thus conducts his description of experience with reference to " Dasein ", the being for whom Being is a question. In everyday German, "Dasein" means "existence. In Being and Time, Heidegger criticized the abstract and metaphysical character of traditional ways of grasping human existence as rational animal, person, man, soul, spirit, or subject. Dasein, then, is not intended as a way of conducting a philosophical anthropology , but is rather understood by Heidegger to be the condition of possibility for anything like a philosophical anthropology. The marriage of these two observations depends on the fact that each of them is essentially concerned with time. That Dasein is thrown into an already existing world and thus into its mortal possibilities does not only mean that Dasein is an essentially temporal being; it also implies that the description of Dasein can only be carried out in terms inherited from the Western tradition itself. For Heidegger, unlike for Husserl, philosophical terminology could not be divorced from the history of the use of that terminology, and thus genuine philosophy could not avoid confronting questions of language and meaning. Being and Time Being and Time German title: In Being and Time, Heidegger investigates the question of Being by asking about the being for whom Being is a question. Heidegger names this being Dasein see above , and he pursues his investigation through themes such as mortality, care , anxiety, temporality, and historicity. Being and Time influenced many thinkers, including such existentialist thinkers as Jean-Paul Sartre although Heidegger distanced himself from existentialism –see below. The Turn[edit] See also: Heidegger often went for a walk on the path in this field. Richardson [55] to at least reflect a shift of focus, if not indeed a major change in his philosophical outlook, which is known as "the turn" die Kehre. For example, in Mark Wrathall [60] argued that Heidegger pursued and refined the central notion of unconcealment throughout his life as a philosopher. Its importance and continuity in his thinking, Wrathall states, shows that he did not have a "turn". Heidegger understands the commencement of the history of Western philosophy as a brief period of authentic openness to being, during the time of the pre-Socratics , especially Anaximander , Heraclitus , and Parmenides. This was followed, according to Heidegger, by a long period increasingly dominated by the forgetting of this initial openness, a period which

commences with Plato , and which occurs in different ways throughout Western history. Heidegger sees poetry and technology as two contrasting ways of " revealing. Technology, on the other hand, when it gets going, inaugurates the world of the dichotomous subject and object, which modern philosophy commencing with Descartes also reveals. But with modern technology a new stage of revealing is reached, in which the subject-object distinction is overcome even in the "material" world of technology. The essence of modern technology is the conversion of the whole universe of beings into an undifferentiated "standing reserve" Bestand of energy available for any use to which humans choose to put it. Despite this, some commentators have insisted that an agrarian nostalgia permeates his later work. What Is Called Thinking? Heidegger and the ground of History[edit] Heidegger believed the Western world to be on a trajectory headed for total war, [66] and on the brink of profound nihilism [67] the rejection of all religious and moral principles , [68] which would be the purest and highest revelation of Being itself, [69] offering a horrifying crossroads of either salvation or the end of metaphysics and modernity ; [70] rendering the West a wasteland populated by tool-using brutes, characterized by an unprecedented ignorance and barbarism [71] in which everything is permitted. Augustine of Hippo[edit] Recent scholarship has shown that Heidegger was substantially influenced by St. Although he later worked less on Aristotle, Heidegger recommended postponing reading Nietzsche, and to "first study Aristotle for ten to fifteen years". Both informed the argument of Being and Time. Heidegger claimed to have revived the question of being, the question having been largely forgotten by the metaphysical tradition extending from Plato to Descartes , a forgetfulness extending to the Age of Enlightenment and then to modern science and technology. In pursuit of the retrieval of this question, Heidegger spent considerable time reflecting on ancient Greek thought , in particular on Plato, Parmenides , Heraclitus , and Anaximander, as well as on the tragic playwright Sophocles. This dating of the influence is much too late. On the relation between the two figures, Gadamer wrote: Dostal understood the importance of Husserl to be profound: Dahlstrom concluded his consideration of the relation between Heidegger and Husserl as follows: Heidegger read The Will to Power as the culminating expression of Western metaphysics, and the lectures are a kind of dialogue between the two thinkers. Adorno, on the other hand, pointed to the dialectic reflection of historical situations, the sociological interpretations of future outcomes, and therefore opposed the liberating principles of intuitive concepts because they negatively surpassed the perception of societal realities. Reinhard May refers to Chang Chung-Yuan who stated "Heidegger is the only Western Philosopher who not only intellectually understands Tao, but has intuitively experienced the essence of it as well. It can be shown, moreover, that in particular instances Heidegger even appropriated wholesale and almost verbatim major ideas from the German translations of Daoist and Zen Buddhist classics. A clearer impact of Heidegger in Iran is associated with thinkers such as Ahmad Fardid and Reza Davari Ardakani who have been closely associated with the unfolding of philosophical thinking in a Muslim modern theological legacy in Iran. This included the construction of the ideological foundations of the Iranian Revolution and modern political Islam in its connections with theology. The Heidegger controversy[edit].

Chapter 3 : On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy

Heidegger from Metaphysics to Thought - Ebook written by Dominique Janicaud, Jean-Francois Matt et al. Read this book using Google Play Books app on your PC, android, iOS devices. Download for offline reading, highlight, bookmark or take notes while you read Heidegger from Metaphysics to Thought.

Notes and Fragments 1. His father worked as sexton in the local church. In his early youth, Heidegger was being prepared for the priesthood. In he went to the high school in Konstanz, where the church supported him with a scholarship, and then, in , he moved to Freiburg. By his own account, it was this work that inspired his life-long quest for the meaning of being. In , after completing the high school, he became a Jesuit novice, but was discharged within a month for reasons of health. He then entered Freiburg University, where he studied theology. However, because of health problems and perhaps because of a lack of a strong spiritual vocation, Heidegger left the seminary in and broke off his training for the priesthood. He took up studies in philosophy, mathematics, and natural sciences. It was also at that time that he first became influenced by Edmund Husserl. In he completed a doctorate in philosophy with a dissertation on *The Doctrine of Judgement in Psychologism* under the direction of the neo-Kantian philosopher Heinrich Rickert. He was conscripted into the army, but was discharged after two months because of health reasons. Hoping to take over the chair of Catholic philosophy at Freiburg, Heidegger now began to work on a habilitation thesis, the required qualification for teaching at the university. He taught mostly courses in Aristotelian and scholastic philosophy, and regarded himself as standing in the service of the Catholic world-view. Nevertheless, his turn from theology to philosophy was soon to be followed by another turn. In , Heidegger became a junior colleague of Edmund Husserl when the latter joined the Freiburg faculty. The following year, he married Thea Elfride Petri, a Protestant student who had attended his courses since the fall of . His career was again interrupted by military service in . He served for the last ten months of the war, the last three of those in a meteorological unit on the western front. His lectures on phenomenology and his creative interpretations of Aristotle would now earn him a wide acclaim. In , with the support of Paul Natorp, Heidegger was appointed associate professor at Marburg University. Between and , he enjoyed there the most fruitful years of his entire teaching career. His students testified to the originality of his insight and the intensity of his philosophical questioning. Heidegger extended the scope of his lectures, and taught courses on the history of philosophy, time, logic, phenomenology, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, and Leibniz. However, he had published nothing since , a factor that threatened his future academic career. Finally, in February , partly because of administrative pressure, his fundamental but also unfinished treatise, *Being and Time*, appeared. Within a few years, this book was recognized as a truly epoch-making work of 20th century philosophy. Up to then virtually apolitical, Heidegger now became politically involved. On April 21, , he was elected rector of the University of Freiburg by the faculty. He was apparently urged by his colleagues to become a candidate for this politically sensitive post, as he later claimed in an interview with *Der Spiegel*, to avoid the danger of a party functionary being appointed. But he also seemed to believe that he could steer the Nazi movement in the right direction. There is little doubt that during that time, Heidegger placed the great prestige of his scholarly reputation at the service of National Socialism, and thus, willingly or not, contributed to its legitimization among his fellow Germans. And yet, just one year later, on April 23, , Heidegger resigned from his office and took no further part in politics. His rectoral address was found incompatible with the party line, and its text was eventually banned by the Nazis. Certain restrictions were put on his freedom to publish and attend conferences. He came under attack of Ernst Krieck, semi-official Nazi philosopher. For some time he was under the surveillance of the Gestapo. He was forbidden to teach and in was dismissed from his chair of philosophy. The ban was lifted in . Towards the end of s and the beginning of s, he taught five courses on Nietzsche, in which he submitted to criticism the tradition of western metaphysics, described by him as nihilistic, and made allusions to the absurdity of war and the bestiality of his contemporaries. Finally, his reflection upon the western philosophical tradition and an endeavor to open a space for philosophizing outside it, brought him to an examination of Presocratic thought. The course was not about early Greek thought, yet the Presocratics became there the pivotal center of

discussion. During the 1920s, in addition to giving courses on Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, Heidegger lectured extensively on Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus. During the last three decades of his life, from the mid 1930s to the mid 1960s, Heidegger wrote and published much, but in comparison to earlier decades, there was no significant change in his philosophy. Most of his time was divided between his home in Freiburg, his second study in Messkirch, and his mountain hut in the Black Forest. But he escaped provincialism by being frequently visited by his friends including, among the others, the political philosopher Hannah Arendt, the physicist Werner Heisenberg, the theologian Rudolf Bultmann, the psychologist Ludwig Binswanger and by traveling more widely than ever before. Heidegger died on May 26, 1976, and was buried in the churchyard in Messkirch. He remained intellectually active up until the very end, working on a number of projects, including the massive Gesamtausgabe, the complete edition of his works. As it has been mentioned, Heidegger was interested in Husserl from his early student years at the University of Freiburg when he read *Logical Investigations*. Later, when Husserl accepted a chair at Freiburg, Heidegger became his assistant. His debt to Husserl cannot be overlooked. Following the Cartesian tradition, he saw the ground and the absolute starting point of philosophy in the subject. The goal of phenomenology for Husserl is then a descriptive, detached analysis of consciousness, in which objects, as its correlates, are constituted. What right does Husserl have to insist that the original mode of encounter with beings, in which they appear to us as they are as things in themselves, is the encounter of consciousness purified by phenomenological reduction and its objects? Perhaps because of his reverence for Husserl, he does not subject him to direct criticism in his fundamental work. Nevertheless, *Being and Time* is itself a powerful critique of the Husserlian phenomenology. Heidegger there gives attention to many different modes in which we exist and encounter things. The starting point of philosophy for him is not consciousness, but *Dasein* in its being. The central problem for Husserl is the problem of constitution: How is the world as phenomenon constituted in our consciousness? Heidegger takes the Husserlian problem one step further. Instead of asking how something must be given in consciousness in order to be constituted, he asks: *Dasein* is that being in which any being is constituted. Phenomenology thus receives in Heidegger a new meaning. Heidegger takes it rather to designate a method. For Heidegger the method of ontology is phenomenology. However, being is always the being of a being, and accordingly, it becomes accessible only indirectly through some existing entity. One must direct oneself toward an entity, but in such a way that its being is thereby brought out. It is *Dasein* which Heidegger chooses as the particular entity to access being. Hence, as the basic component of his phenomenology, Heidegger adopts the Husserlian phenomenological reduction, but gives it a completely different meaning. To sum up, Heidegger does not base his philosophy on consciousness as Husserl did. Although he agrees with Husserl that the transcendental constitution of the world cannot be unveiled by naturalistic or physical explanations, in his view it is not a descriptive analysis of consciousness that leads to this end, but the analysis of *Dasein*. Phenomenology for him is not a descriptive, detached analysis of consciousness. It is a method of access to being. For the Heidegger of *Being and Time*, philosophy is phenomenological ontology which takes its departure from the analysis of *Dasein*. The noun is used by other German philosophers to denote the existence of any entity. He relates this question to the question of being. *Dasein*, that being which we ourselves are, is distinguished from all other beings by the fact that it makes issue of its own being. It stands out to being. *Dasein* is essentially temporal. Its temporal character is derived from the tripartite ontological structure: Existence represents thus the phenomenon of the future. Then, as thrownness, *Dasein* always finds itself already in a certain spiritual and material, historically conditioned environment; in short, in the world, in which the space of possibilities is always somehow limited. This represents the phenomenon of the past as having-been. Finally, as fallenness, *Dasein* exists in the midst of beings which are both *Dasein* and not *Dasein*. This represents the primordial phenomenon of the present. It is a movement through a world as a space of possibilities. As authentically temporal, *Dasein* as potentiality-for-being comes towards itself in its possibilities of being by going back to what has been; it always comes towards itself from out of a possibility of itself. Hence, it comports itself towards the future by always coming back to its past; the past which is not merely past but still around as having-been. As authentically temporal, *Dasein* is thus authentically historical. The repetition of the possibilities of existence, of that which has been, is for Heidegger constitutive for the phenomenon of original

history which is rooted in temporality. The Quest for the Meaning of Being Throughout his long academic career, Heidegger was preoccupied with the question of the meaning of being. In , the seventeen-year-old Heidegger asked: What does being mean? In short, it is a concept that is mostly taken for granted. However, Heidegger claims that even though we seem to understand being, its meaning is still veiled in darkness. Therefore, we need to restate the question of the meaning of being. In accordance with the method of philosophy which he employs in his fundamental treatise, before attempting to provide an answer to the question of being in general, Heidegger sets out to answer the question of the being of the particular kind of entity that is the human being, which he calls Dasein. The basic concepts such as temporality, understanding, historicity, repetition, and authentic or inauthentic existence were carried over into and further explored in his later works.

Introduction to Metaphysics (German: Einführung in die Metaphysik) is a book by Martin Heidegger (published in Germany in) of a revised and edited lecture course he gave in the summer of at the University of Freiburg.

Messkirch was then a quiet, conservative, religious rural town, and as such was a formative influence on Heidegger and his philosophical thought. In he spent two weeks in the Jesuit order before leaving probably on health grounds to study theology at the University of Freiburg. In he switched subjects, to philosophy. He began teaching at Freiburg in From this platform he proceeded to engage deeply with Kant, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and, perhaps most importantly of all for his subsequent thinking in the s, two further figures: Dilthey whose stress on the role of interpretation and history in the study of human activity profoundly influenced Heidegger and Husserl whose understanding of phenomenology as a science of essences he was destined to reject. In Husserl took up a post at Freiburg and in Heidegger became his assistant. Heidegger spent a period of reputedly brilliant teaching at the University of Marburg , but then returned to Freiburg to take up the chair vacated by Husserl on his retirement. Published in , *Being and Time* is standardly hailed as one of the most significant texts in the canon of what has come to be called contemporary European or Continental Philosophy. A cross-section of broadly analytic reactions to Heidegger positive and negative may be found alongside other responses in Murray *Being and Time* is discussed in section 2 of this article. During the short period of his rectorship he resigned in Heidegger gave a number of public speeches including his inaugural rectoral address; see below in which Nazi images plus occasional declarations of support for Hitler are integrated with the philosophical language of *Being and Time*. After Heidegger became increasingly distanced from Nazi politics. After the war, however, a university denazification committee at Freiburg investigated Heidegger and banned him from teaching, a right which he did not get back until One year later he was made professor Emeritus. Exactly when this occurs is a matter of debate, although it is probably safe to say that it is in progress by and largely established by the early s. If dating the turn has its problems, saying exactly what it involves is altogether more challenging. Indeed, Heidegger himself characterized it not as a turn in his own thinking or at least in his thinking alone but as a turn in *Being*. This uncompromising text was written in '7, but was not published in German until and not in English translation until Heidegger died in Freiburg on May 26, He was buried in Messkirch. According to this latter gloss, the linguistic constructions concerned which involve hyphenations, unusual prefixes and uncommon suffixes reveal the hidden meanings and resonances of ordinary talk. In any case, for many readers, the initially strange and difficult language of *Being and Time* is fully vindicated by the realization that Heidegger is struggling to say things for which our conventional terms and linguistic constructions are ultimately inadequate. It was meant to have two parts, each of which was supposed to be divided into three divisions. What we have published under the title of *Being and Time* are the first two divisions of the intended part one. The reasons for this incompleteness will be explored later in this article. For the young Heidegger, then, it is already the case that phenomenological analysis starts not with Husserlian intentionality the consciousness of objects , but rather with an interpretation of the pre-theoretical conditions for there to be such intentionality. Thus the unity of the different modes of *Being* is grounded in a capacity for taking-as making-present-to that Aristotle argues is the essence of human existence. For more on the philosophical relationship between Husserl and Heidegger, see e. Consider some philosophical problems that will be familiar from introductory metaphysics classes: Does the table that I think I see before me exist? Does mind, conceived as an entity distinct from body, exist? These questions have the following form: But Heidegger does, which is why he raises the more fundamental question: This is one way of asking what Heidegger calls the question of the meaning of *Being*, and *Being and Time* is an investigation into that question. The question of the meaning of *Being* is concerned with what it is that makes beings intelligible as beings, and whatever that factor *Being* is, it is seemingly not itself simply another being among beings. But to think of *Being* in this way would be to commit the very mistake that the capitalization is supposed to help us avoid. For while *Being* is always the *Being* of some entity, *Being* is not itself some kind of higher-order being waiting to be discovered. As long as we remain alert to this worry, we can follow the

otherwise helpful path of capitalization. Heidegger means by this that the history of Western thought has failed to heed the ontological difference, and so has articulated Being precisely as a kind of ultimate being, as evidenced by a series of namings of Being, for example as idea, energeia, substance, monad or will to power. In this way Being as such has been forgotten. So Heidegger sets himself the task of recovering the question of the meaning of Being. In this context he draws two distinctions between different kinds of inquiry. The first, which is just another way of expressing the ontological difference, is between the ontical and the ontological, where the former is concerned with facts about entities and the latter is concerned with the meaning of Being, with how entities are intelligible as entities. The second distinction between different kinds of inquiry, drawn within the category of the ontological, is between regional ontology and fundamental ontology, where the former is concerned with the ontologies of particular domains, say biology or banking, and the latter is concerned with the a priori, transcendental conditions that make possible particular modes of Being i. For Heidegger, the ontical presupposes the regional-ontological, which in turn presupposes the fundamental-ontological. As he puts it: The question of Being aims at ascertaining the a priori conditions not only for the possibility of the sciences which examine beings as beings of such and such a type, and, in doing so, already operate with an understanding of Being, but also for the possibility of those ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations. Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task. Being and Time 3: So how do we carry out fundamental ontology, and thus answer the question of the meaning of Being? It is here that Heidegger introduces the notion of Dasein Da-sein: That said, one needs to be careful about precisely what sort of entity we are talking about here. As Haugeland notes, there is an analogy here, one that Heidegger himself draws, with the way in which we might think of a language existing as an entity, that is, as a communally shared way of speaking. This appeal to the community will assume a distinctive philosophical shape as the argument of Being and Time progresses. The foregoing considerations bring an important question to the fore: Here there are broadly speaking two routes that one might take through the text of Being and Time. The first unfolds as follows. If we look around at beings in general—from particles to planets, ants to apes—it is human beings alone who are able to encounter the question of what it means to be e. More specifically, it is human beings alone who operate in their everyday activities with an understanding of Being although, as we shall see, one which is pre-ontological, in that it is implicit and vague and b are able to reflect upon what it means to be. Mulhall, who tends to pursue this way of characterizing Dasein, develops the idea by explaining that while inanimate objects merely persist through time and while plants and non-human animals have their lives determined entirely by the demands of survival and reproduction, human beings lead their lives Mulhall , This gives us a sense of human freedom, one that will be unpacked more carefully below. The second route to an understanding of Dasein, and thus of what is special about human beings as such, emphasizes the link with the taking-as structure highlighted earlier. Sheehan develops just such a line of exegesis by combining two insights. These dual insights lead to a characterization of Dasein as the having-to-be-open. In other words, Dasein and so human beings as such cannot but be open: The two interpretative paths that we have just walked are not necessarily in conflict: Dasein stands out in two senses, each of which corresponds to one of the two dimensions of our proposed interpretation. Second, Dasein stands out in an openness to and an opening of Being see e. As we have seen, it is an essential characteristic of Dasein that, in its ordinary ways of engaging with other entities, it operates with a preontological understanding of Being, that is, with a distorted or buried grasp of the a priori conditions that, by underpinning the taking-as structure, make possible particular modes of Being. Heidegger puts it like this: This resistance towards any unpalatable anti-realism is an issue to which we shall return. But what sort of philosophical method is appropriate for the ensuing examination? In the Heideggerian framework, however, phenomenology is not to be understood as it sometimes is as the study of how things merely appear in experience. Presupposed by ordinary experience, these structures must in some sense be present with that experience, but they are not simply available to be read off from its surface, hence the need for disciplined and careful phenomenological analysis to reveal them as they are. So far so good. But,

in a departure from the established Husserlian position, one that demonstrates the influence of Dilthey, Heidegger claims that phenomenology is not just transcendental, it is hermeneutic for discussion, see e. For Heidegger, this hermeneutic structure is not a limitation on understanding, but a precondition of it, and philosophical understanding conceived as fundamental ontology is no exception. Thus Being and Time itself has a spiral structure in which a sequence of reinterpretations produces an ever more illuminating comprehension of Being. As Heidegger puts it later in the text: What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it the right way. In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing. To be sure, we genuinely take hold of this possibility only when, in our interpretation, we have understood that our first, last and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves. Being and Time And this is a tension that, it seems fair to say, is never fully resolved within the pages of Being and Time. The best we can do is note that, by the end of the text, the transcendental has itself become historically embedded. More on that below. Heidegger argues that we ordinarily encounter entities as what he calls equipment, that is, as being for certain sorts of tasks cooking, writing, hair-care, and so on. Indeed we achieve our most primordial closest relationship with equipment not by looking at the entity in question, or by some detached intellectual or theoretical study of it, but rather by skillfully manipulating it in a hitch-free manner. Entities so encountered have their own distinctive kind of Being that Heidegger famously calls readiness-to-hand. The less we just stare at the hammer-thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is as equipment. While engaged in hitch-free skilled activity, Dasein has no conscious experience of the items of equipment in use as independent objects i. Thus, while engaged in trouble-free hammering, the skilled carpenter has no conscious recognition of the hammer, the nails, or the work-bench, in the way that one would if one simply stood back and thought about them. Tools-in-use become phenomenologically transparent. The carpenter becomes absorbed in his activity in such a way that he has no awareness of himself as a subject over and against a world of objects. Phenomenologically speaking, then, there are no subjects and no objects; there is only the experience of the ongoing task e. Heidegger, then, denies that the categories of subject and object characterize our most basic way of encountering entities. He maintains, however, that they apply to a derivative kind of encounter. When Dasein engages in, for example, the practices of natural science, when sensing takes place purely in the service of reflective or philosophical contemplation, or when philosophers claim to have identified certain context-free metaphysical building blocks of the universe e. With this phenomenological transformation in the mode of Being of entities comes a corresponding transformation in the mode of Being of Dasein.

Chapter 5 : Heidegger, Metaphysics & Wheelbarrows | Issue 32 | Philosophy Now

Get this from a library! Heidegger from metaphysics to thought. [Dominique Janicaud; Jean-François Mattijs] -- "Philosophy has come to an end" claimed Heidegger in the final posthumous interview he granted to Der Spiegel.

He stands it on its head "so he might contend" in order that we may finally see it right-side-up. And in this failure it has institutionalized an interpretation of life and the world that is inauthentic and self-alienated. Perhaps the best way to see this is to examine something that is itself rather simple and everyday, first from the traditional and then from the Heideggerian standpoint. The poem quoted above will serve this purpose well. It is almost too simple to say anything about. We are finished with it before we have begun. And yet it is precisely here, in the obvious, in the everyday, that Heidegger begins his revolutionary investigations. What does the world consist of? If we ask this question of traditional metaphysics the answer we receive, allowing for variations in terminology and approach, is: These entities are of various shapes, sizes and compositions, and among them are we ourselves; human beings. But, however this may be, the mind itself is seen as just another kind of thing in the world. If we can come to understand how all these entities have emerged, what their essential properties are and how they relate to one another, we will have understood all there is to know about the world of which they and we are a part. There are three entities present in the world of this poem. The poem tells us of the wheelbarrow, the rainwater and the chickens. We are told something about the properties of these entities as well: And, further, the poem tells us of the spatial relations of these entities to one another: The poem circumscribes a region of space and tells us what is present there and how it is present; a red wheelbarrow, glazed by rainwater, beside white chickens. From the traditional standpoint we easily understand all of these terms and relations. And having understood them we have more or less exhausted all that can be gleaned about this world from this poem. And yet there is something missing. If we were to reconstruct the poem on this basis we would get something like: Something essential has been left out. We have, of course, entirely neglected the first line of the poem: How are we to fit this line into our foregoing analysis? What sort of an entity is it and where does it stand in relation to the other entities of the poem? But, of course, it is not an entity at all. What is it then? In a world composed entirely of entities and relations it must be either the one or the other. If it is not an entity then perhaps it is a relation. And indeed, at first, this appears to be just what it is. But what sort of a relation would this be? Is it a spatial relation, a temporal relation? But, of course, we will never properly understand the poem by continuing in this vein. There is something else in the poem besides the wheelbarrow, rainwater and chickens. There is something that we have somehow lost sight of, neglected, despite our careful analysis. There is a human being, somehow, in this poem. But where is this person? Why does this person not appear? Where does this person stand in relation to the wheelbarrow and the chickens? But no such entity appears in this poem. We have no idea where the person of this poem is, what he or she looks like, whether he or she is tall or short, young or old, he or she. In a sense there is a person in the poem and in a sense there is not. How are we to resolve this? It is here that Heidegger takes his revolutionary turn: It looks at the world but it forgets what it looks as. And in forgetting what it looks as it distorts and misconstrues the meaning of the things that it looks at. The person of the poem cannot be looked at in the poem because it is the person who is doing the looking. The world of the poem is not separate from the person who is looking. It is the world of this person. Every perspective on the world is a perspective of some person whose world it is. Every Dasein opens up to a world, discloses a world, and lives in relation to the world that it discloses. It is no more possible to separate Dasein from its world than to separate two sides of a coin from each other. So much depends upon them. The very being of Dasein depends upon them. The wheelbarrow glazed with rainwater. Dasein must work with these things, act upon them, create with them the world that is to be. Dasein reaches out to them, works with them, creates its future through them. This is, first of all, their significance. They are significant in terms of what Dasein can do with them for the sake of its future. In this respect they have meaning in relation to their significance for Dasein. Heidegger defines philosophy itself as the attempt to understand the meaning of Being. From the standpoint of traditional thought it is scarcely possible to say what this phrase itself might mean. How can Being have a meaning? Being, after

all, just is. Beyond that what is there to say of its meaning? But for Heidegger Being is revealed only through the being of Dasein. Dasein is forever procuring its future, through its present, out of its past. And each future becomes a new past out of which a new future must be shaped. Time, for Heidegger, is not a mere succession of moments, any more than things are mere entities in relation. Dasein is a being fundamentally concerned with its being. Dasein, as being-toward, is always concerned with what it will become. Things have meaning because so much depends upon them. Perhaps, Heidegger suggests, too much depends upon them. In the face of its concern with what will become of it Dasein is anxious. Dasein does not know where it has come from nor where it is going. Dasein always finds itself already in a world it has not created, projected upon a future it cannot be sure of. In response to this anxiety Dasein seeks to flee from itself. It seeks to become something else, to lose itself in forgetfulness, to escape the burden of being itself. But where is Dasein to flee? How can a being escape its own being without ceasing to be? Dasein flees from itself by immersing itself in its world, and then forgetting that it has done so. Dasein comes to see itself as just another entity in the world. An entity among entities. A face in the crowd. Dasein becomes one of the many. Just like the others. Lost among the multitude. It absolves itself of responsibility for choosing itself and finds comfort in the anonymity of the conventional. It becomes everybody—and nobody. Dasein is naturally drawn into inauthenticity. It depicts the human being as just another extant entity within the world, a thing among things. It depicts entities themselves as stripped of all meaning, stripped of their relevance to concerned being-in-the-world. Things are to be seen, somehow, in terms of what they would look like were nobody looking. But Dasein is not content to lose itself forever. They reveal what Dasein is as being-thrown and being-toward. They cannot be escaped. The call of conscience calls Dasein back to itself from its immersion in the conventional world and demands of Dasein that it come into ownership of itself. It calls Dasein to its possibility of being itself authentically, affirming itself as what it is, and living in active pursuit of its authentic possibilities. In resoluteness authentic Dasein affirms itself, chooses itself, and acts knowingly toward its emergent possibilities.

Chapter 6 : Martin Heidegger

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Potts When I was a much! Cultural relativism seemed to me then, and still does, to be an absurdly, obviously even contemptibly false doctrine. One argument, which I thought quite devastating to cultural relativism and, again, still do , is from self-referential inconsistency. That is, since cultural relativism holds that there is no objective truth, but only truth relative to a given culture, it is therefore impossible, within cultural relativism, to assert the objective truth of cultural relativism. I found, however, that when I deployed self-referential inconsistency against cultural relativists, it never fazed them. Not that they denied the point, as you would expect of ordinary ideologues. They would usually in fact accept it when pushed far enough. I was complaining about this sad state of affairs one day to a fellow student. In so doing he is claiming that the concept of everything somehow requires that of nothing. He goes on to acknowledge that logic itself rules out the nothing, since thinking can only be of something But then he asserts without argument that perhaps negation the logical operation depends upon some other, prior nothing It is a tissue of obscure assertions one is supposed to fit together into a satisfying total picture. The twenty-six posts that I have read cover a comprehensive range of issues: The central issue is whether man is to submit to or to control everything else. The first instance is the discussion of science in the beginning of the article The second instance is the discussion of modern science, as opposed to the science discussed before The process brings man back to submission, but not the submission of obeying the laws of Nature. It is a submission to a commandment for total self-annihilation. Heidegger scholarship contains controversy on all these points, exacerbated no doubt by the obscurity of the text. To that discussion let me add the following. Given the impossibility of capturing the Nothing in terms acceptable to logic, Bryan Register raises the question of the extent to which Heidegger is rejecting logic or merely traditional and inadequate logics. This suggests a more radical rejection of logic. Thus, it is the entire tradition of philosophy as initiated by the Greeks that Heidegger is targeting and calling into question. Let me add two quotations about logic from Introduction to Metaphysics that speak to this issue: It cannot be vulgarized. Hicks on Heidegger, Part Deux, by Stephen Hicks The following remarks, like those in my earlier post, are brief and intended as complementary to those interpretations of Heidegger in the pillar essays and commentaries. Having rejected reason and logic, Heidegger feels *furcht*. This angst is the metaphysically revelatory state for Heidegger. Here, Heidegger seems to emphasize two features of pure *Da-sein*: Angst is the metaphysically revelatory state for Heidegger. It is the being projecting that is *Da-sein*--not that, if anything, which is projected or does the projecting. Here a comparison to Sartre may be helpful: The theme of indefiniteness appears on page There Heidegger seems to indicate that one loses identity to the extent that one projects into Nothing. This contrasts with some other Existentialists who hold that we acquire identity to the extent we make commitments. Or, to put it more precisely, dread holds us in suspense because it makes what-is-in-totality slip away from us. Hence we too, as existents in the midst of what-is, slip away from ourselves along with it. This is for Heidegger more than a metaphysical or phenomenological characterization: In their posts, Bryan Register and Roger Donway present a more humanistic version of Heideggerian ethics, emphasizing the themes of freedom, choice, self-creation, and self-determination. These themes dominate Sartrean versions of Existentialism, and there is much debate about the extent to which they are Heideggerian or not. Therefore it is that sacrifice brooks no calculation, for calculation always miscalculates sacrifice in terms of the expedient and the inexpedient, no matter whether the aims are set high or low. Such calculation distorts the nature of sacrifice. We are not to ask why sacrifice is needed, for that would be to seek calculable purposes. We do know from earlier in the essay, however, that the truth of Being is that Being is Nothing. So if we are still allowed to be logical at this point, we seem to have in Heidegger a call for unquestioning sacrifice of everything human for Nothing. As Michelle Fram-Cohen suggested, this is a call for self-annihilation. I would like to highlight three similarities. Two differences strike me as significant. If so, please consider making a donation. Our digital channels garner over 1 million views

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Chapter 7 : Introduction to Metaphysics (Heidegger) - Wikipedia

1. Biographical Sketch. Martin Heidegger was born in Messkirch, Germany, on September 26, Messkirch was then a quiet, conservative, religious rural town, and as such was a formative influence on Heidegger and his philosophical thought.

Each question is itself always the whole. This all may sound rather obvious, and perhaps it is, but what is crucial for Heidegger here is what science does not ever do. Heidegger wonders whether the nothing can only arise because of negation, or whether it is the other way round. If the nothing itself is to be questioned as we have been questioning it, then it must be given beforehand. We must be able to encounter it. How do we experience the negation of the totality of beings? In our everyday Dasein, we are always in some mood or another, and this mood colours our experience of the world, disclosing it to us in various ways. This defines my experience of the world for that time: Conversely, when I am in ecstasy, existence appears miraculous and joyful. Moods are a fundamental and essential part of what it means to be the kind of beings that we are. However, in the case of all of our moods apart from one, as we shall see, they direct themselves towards beings and Being. The world and the beings in front of me appear differently to me depending on the mood I am in. The nothing does not make itself manifest in any of our moods except one. As we saw last week, this may not be the best translation. Disposedness, or attunement, is our capacity to find ourselves in the world in a certain way, to be able to be disposed to it in various ways. Moods are these ways of being disposed to the world. In fear, we are always fearful of something, someone, or something that may happen. Something is disclosed to us as being worthy of fear. Our fear is always directed towards something, directed towards some entity or possibility within the world. What does this entail for his enquiry into the nothing? Thus, in anxiety, there is just our Dasein, our existence, in the midst of Being. Being is made manifest to us through anxiety because beings slip away from us, thus making us aware that these things are in being and not nothing. Thus, the nothing makes itself known. It therefore cannot be its origin. When we are in the fundamental mode of anxiety, beings slip away as a whole and are made to mean nothing for us. This is how we first become aware that they are beings, and not nothing. Heidegger sees questioning the nothing by means of anxiety to be metaphysical. He phrases it so: In the question concerning the nothing such an inquiry beyond or over beings, beings as a whole, takes place. But given what Heidegger has already said about the nothing in this lecture, this cannot be true. It is therefore not the negation of beings but a part of Being: It is only then that we see beings for what they are and we can adopt a stance towards them – we realise that they are beings, and not nothing. It is only because of this that we can adopt a stance towards beings themselves. This is because the nothing is what originally reveals beings to us as beings, in the fundamental mode of anxiety. The nothing is what makes us aware that they are beings and not nothing. Furthermore, since every metaphysical question encompasses metaphysics as a whole and the nothing is a metaphysical question, science must exist on the basis of metaphysics. Heidegger concludes the lecture by extending even further the function of the nothing. Not only is it the condition for negation, nihilation and our even knowing that beings are in existence and not nothing, it is the condition for wonder. Only when the strangeness of beings oppresses us does it arouse and evoke wonder. It is thus the condition for, and a part of, metaphysics. In light of all this, it is apparent, Heidegger tells us, that any science wanting to disclose the complete truth about beings must at some point have to investigate the origin of its capacity to take a stance towards said beings, and such an investigation would have to include a confrontation with the nothing, of which science currently wants to know nothing of. Science must therefore exist on the basis of metaphysics. It is only because in our essence we are held out into the nothing as it affects our experience of beings in anxiety, that we are able to transcend beings and thus do metaphysics. The nothing overwhelms us significantly enough that not only we first of all realise that beings are in existence, but are moved to wonder why they are instead of not. Metaphysics is this going beyond that happens in our essential encounter with the nothing.

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In our text, an indication of this occurs about three pages before the end of the "Postscript," when Heidegger says, in rejecting calculative thought's relevance to metaphysics, that "Calculative thought places itself under compulsion to master everything in the logical terms of its procedure.

Heidegger on East-West Dialogue: Anticipating the Event Published: Anticipating the Event, Routledge, , pp. This includes remarks that have been discussed multiple times in previous literature without sufficient attention to their context and trajectory. She also considers a number of previously unexamined remarks from recently published works and collections of correspondence. Heidegger never carefully distinguishes the various cultures nor the varieties of what he considers Eastern thought, which is neither philosophy metaphysics nor genuinely inceptive thinking insofar as these both concern Being. This book is not another creative yet ahistorical work in "comparative philosophy," which is one of the dangers of cross-cultural philosophy. It should be noted, however, that previous interpreters have been more aware of these difficulties than admitted in this work, which is precisely why they stressed and over-emphasized the few resonances, influences, and connections that they recognized. She rightly dismantles and demystifies much of this literature. On careful reading, the few actual remarks and passages of Heidegger reflect his own philosophical and cultural preoccupations and little concern for Asian texts, contexts, or even for his Asian students and interlocutors. Although these individuals developed original works of their own, Heidegger does not take interest in this dimension of their thought or underestimates and misinterprets them. Despite occasional expressions of interest in Eastern languages and texts, Heidegger never engaged in a systematic and sustained inquiry into them. The one serious potential counterexample of his brief study and "co-translation" of the Daodejing confirms his lack of sustained effort. He broke it off, either -- according to Heidegger himself on different occasions -- because of difficulties with the translator Paul Shih-Yi Hsiao or due to the radical alienness of the Chinese language. This radical alienness is not merely an empirical issue of the difficulty of learning Eastern languages; it reflects an ontological incommensurability between East and West and for which neither is prepared. His uses of it reflect his own philosophical preoccupation with the question of Being, emptiness, and language, so that he freely adopts the translations according to his own linguistic priorities without considering its Daoist or Chinese contexts. This is undoubtedly true of his uses of the other principal text associated with early philosophical Daoism: Although they are both literally translated as "way," and Heidegger knew of and played with the significance of dao, it is unclear whether they mean the same thing or "resonate" in any lucid manner given their radically divergent contexts and uses. Heidegger himself is ambivalent about "dao. It is unclear, but perhaps the author wants to distinguish the concreteness of emptiness in the Daodejing from its abstraction in the later third-century Daoist thinkers of the xuanxue "dark learning" and in Heidegger. Here she would be following Confucian critics such as Pei Wei, who wrote On the Exaltation of Being Chong you lun that decries the emphasis on nothingness. In such portrayals, Heidegger is interpreted as a universalistic, egalitarian, or pluralistic thinker of common humanity, of perspectives from divergent yet somehow equal primordial sources, or of radical multiplicity. Whether it is philosophy and thinking, the first and other beginning, the overcoming of metaphysics and thoughtful remembrance, or technological and poetic dwelling, these do not concern or address non-Western sources insofar as they are first and foremost about Greek origins. In relation to this unique Western history of Being, and its needed transformation through confronting that history, the Eastern is constructed as an ahistorical realm. Eastern ways of thinking and living are secondary and derivative to a historical transformation that can only be a Western self-transformation. Heidegger is concerned with how Eastern traditions supposedly deemphasize the privilege of the human -- as the guardian of the clearing and openness of Being -- and links the East with the irrational, mystic, and nihilistic. Such a discussion could shed important light on the contested issue of humanism and anthropocentrism in his thought. Whereas the West is world-historic, the East -- despite its long practice of writing history and its significance in Confucian thought -- is unlike the West in being fundamentally ahistorical. The rhetoric of the "Asiatic" indicates a radical alienness, fatalism, and threat.

Whereas Hegel argued that the Asiatic was sublimated into the Greek, Heidegger demands radical opposition and overcoming of its slavish fatalism and barbaric mythos. Heidegger connects Asia with "dark fire" in However, Heidegger notes that this is a fire to be reordered rather than guarded: Between a Japanese and an Inquirer. Heidegger contends that more dialogue under modern technological conditions perpetuates enframing Ge-stell, according to which everything is a mobilized resource of standing-reserve Bestand. Another more primordial way of saying Sage is needed. This saying only occurs in Western languages and particularly in Greek and German. The linguistic ethnocentrism of the mid- and later Heidegger cannot be bracketed and his approach to Being and language retained. Its particular unique configuration is central to his argument given the formative world-disclosing essence of words. The uniqueness of Being and language in the West precludes drawing any general conclusions about a universalism or homeless cosmopolitanism that includes all human languages or relativism between an incommensurable multiplicity of languages. The morning-land Morgenland that matters for the modern West or evening land Abendland is Greece and not a land in Asia. Other beginnings do not plausibly refer to non-Western sources. The Greek-European dialogue could be interpreted as a model for intercultural encounter and dialogue. Heidegger mentions how this planetary civilization rooted in Western metaphysics has impacted the East and the world, and interpreters consequently sense that there is an anti-Eurocentric dimension to his thinking. This is correct to the extent that the West is identified with modernity and globalization; it is incorrect insofar as the West is still inherently beholden to its Greek beginnings. For the sake of both West and East, Europe must encounter again anew and renew its origins, which are Greek. While the West awaits the saving power, the world awaits the renewal of the West from out of itself and only then can a genuine encounter and dialogue take place. It inhibits acknowledging and reflecting on the fact that such encounters and dialogues have been and are already underway from ancient Greece to modernity. *The Journey to Greece*, Albany: State University of New York Press, , p.

Heidegger becomes concerned with overcoming metaphysics, he will claim that Hegel's system is the highest point in the history of western philosophy, constituting the completion of metaphysics.

Heidegger, Metaphysics and the Univocity of Being Published: This is the explicit thesis of the book, which is repeated in every chapter. It claims to be a radically new thesis. There is an Introduction, a conclusion and an appendix. This serves as background to the remaining chapters, which deal with Heidegger and Duns Scotus Thomas of Erfurt is not examined, and no mention is made of recent research such as S. McGrath, The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy, , univocity and phenomenology, univocity in Being and Time and related works from the s, univocity in the later Heidegger c. As noted in the introduction, the primary explicit thesis of the book is based on the view of Rudolf Allers that "Being is a univocal term" for Heidegger. The Appendix is concerned with "The Univocity of Being: It is the key to the thesis of the book. Further, the author seems to agree with Deleuze that "The central concern of the new onto-philosophy is the univocity of being" p. He argues that Heidegger and Deleuze both reject the medieval doctrine of analogy of being as representative of medieval ontotheology and assert the need to move beyond analogy at least in a strong medieval ontotheological sense and affirm univocity as a necessary condition for doing contemporary philosophy. Heidegger is seen to have fallen short of a complete reduction to univocity. Rather, one has a pure metaphysics of immanence that rejects concern with "God, the world and the self. The imputation of the Deleuzean doctrine of immanence to Heidegger in parts of the text is questionable. It was precisely the residue of Cartesian immanence theory in Husserl that Heidegger in Being and Time sought to overcome. How does the author relate univocity of being to the mature Heidegger. As such, all being is understood in terms of time. To that extent, being is univocally understood in terms of time and being itself is temporal" p. The concept of analogy of being is something associated only with medieval and Cartesian ontotheology. Chapter one begins with Aristotle on substance and ends with Scotus on univocity of being. Paronymy is seen as playing the central role in both metaphysics and theology. He sees Heidegger as holding that being is said in many ways. Further, "By contrast to Aristotle on substance , Heidegger conceives Dasein as the ultimate ontological center to which all other regions of being are related" p. Here one might ask: Is that not the question that inspired Heidegger throughout his ways of doing Philosophy? The second part of this chapter deals with medieval philosophy. The general characterization of medieval philosophy may not sit well with its modern interpreters: Faith grounded the intelligibility of the world" p. That is, there was no proper philosophy in the middle ages. Scotus is held to be less of a medieval thinker than Aquinas. Chapter two, "Heidegger, Scotus and Univocity," is divided into two sections. The first is titled "The Question of Being" and consists of a very general review of diverse themes: The author touches on the passage from the primacy of the theoretical attitude to that of practical concern with the unifying term, care. This in turn deals with the ecstases of time. What is at stake in my interpretation of Heidegger is the elaboration of a philosophy of immanence in Heideggerian terms. Chapter three is titled "Univocity and Phenomenological Philosophy. There follows a section on univocity from to , the connections between Husserl and Descartes, and a final summary on "Dasein, Univocity and the Question of Analogy. Thus, analogy leads to ontotheology" p. Is it not also privileged over other entities? Is it not the condition of analogy? Yes, states the author, it is, but "Its privilege may however be regarded as part of the vestiges of the tradition that Heidegger had not yet overcome in Being and Time" p. Yet, he concludes that for Heidegger being is primarily univocal. That is, analogy presupposes univocity. Following Scotus, analogy logically presupposes univocity. In this way, for Heidegger, the diverse regions of being find an ontological foundation. Thus, the temporality of Da-sein as the transcendental horizon of being is univocal. This remark is qualified on the next page: From a logical point of view analogy presupposes univocity. Chapter four is titled "Univocity and Fundamental Ontology. Heidegger is seen to reject Husserl as a representative of the ontology of presence. The last part returns to a summary of the phenomenology of Da-sein and then the teaching on univocity. The former is conventional Heidegger doctrine. The latter is a recapitulation on "Univocity and Analogy. Those who read Heidegger in terms of analogy do not take account of "his temporal univocity of

being. For example, in the late s animals and stones are in discrete analogy with the focal reference to Da-sein. Reference is made to the final question in Being and Time in regard to time and being. The conclusion is that "Time is a univocal concept for Heidegger and being, since it is understood in terms of time, is understood univocally" p. This reference to the final question in the last lines of Being and Time raises issues. It does not give sufficient notice to the fact that Heidegger is asking a question; he is not making an ontological assertion. Again, the text is truncated at this point. Heidegger did not think that the language of transcendental thinking was adequate to the question of Being as he posed it. The first section is a very cursory account of Heidegger and Mysticism. In regard to Eckhart, he repeats his view that the world of the medievals was essentially religious and adds: This is true only if one equates "philosophy proper" with atheism. Early Heidegger adopted a "methodological" atheism of modern science. He declined to be called an atheist. Are there no faith-commitments of one kind or another present in modernity? Various themes such as difference and aletheia, Socrates, the principle of sufficient reason and mysticism, the affinity between Eckhart and Heidegger, Being and Nothing, ontology and the reduction to a being, Da-sein and Being, are discussed. There is to be no God perspective: Emphasis is placed on Space-Time as the site for epochal change. That fundamental sense is meaningful presence or presencing. Ultimately, for Heidegger, the being of beings is the presence of that which is present. Chapter six is titled "Univocity and the Problem of History. Again, the "Scotist-Deleuze" notion of univocity is invoked. Heideggerian Ereignis seems to be treated as "an event. The author favors an advocacy of a relative a priori. He recognizes the primacy of poetry in Later Heidegger and acknowledges that Heidegger has moved beyond "Metaphysics. It is clear that the author speaks about salvaging what he can from the Heideggerian corpus. He will take what can be of use in constructing a radically immanentist philosophy which explicitly excludes the "divine," the self, and the world. I am willing to grant the author that concerns about univocity are germane to the period up to and including Being and Time. But even here I have questions. The question of univocity in early Heidegger is a very good one. It is the merit of the author to have seen this influence of Scotus on early Heidegger. Later Heidegger, however, is another matter.