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Chapter 1 : Husserl's Logical Investigations In The New Century by Juana Hill - Issue

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First of all, this publication is of considerable historico-cultural significance: Whereas all Western contributors to the present volume—Rudolf Bernet, David Carr, Steven Crowell, John Drummond, Bernhard Waldenfels, and Kah-Kyung Cho who is of Korean origin but has had a long and successful career in USA—are scholars who possess indubitable authority in phenomenology, their Chinese counterparts are much less well-known in the Western academic arena. Already the division of this work into two volumes with three different parts was a somewhat confusing arrangement. Oddly, this full title was printed only on the head page of Part I. Thus readers found, not without a certain sense of asymmetry,¹ that Part II of the second volume was bearing its own separate title: *Elements of a Phenomenological Elucidation of Knowledge*. If these three titles did not imply any underlying contradictions, they were certainly not designed to facilitate the understanding of the continuity between the volumes. Much less did they suggest a clue as to the central, unifying theme of the entire work. Yet in truth the fine distinctions and rich insights found in the *Logical Investigations* were not the result of freely shifting foci or pluralistic methods applied to varying fields of objects. Quite to the contrary, it is safe to say that one unique and consistent method opened up a new way of looking at the wealth in consciously experiencing the world that otherwise would have remained largely hidden. *Logical Investigations* quoted hereafter as *LI*. See also its reprint edition Amherst, N. *Western and Chinese Perspectives*, 1997. But in order to reach that goal, we will for the most part let ourselves be guided by what we may call the hindsight of a century-old global reception of the *Logical Investigations*. This means that the question of substance will be taken up more toward the end, when an adequate comprehension of the historical background is achieved. This is no simple recounting of this history. It would be anachronistic to say that the jury is still out and the final verdict is pending. For without doubt the *Logical Investigations* is one of the most closely scrutinized philosophical texts of our time. Its place in the history of 20th century philosophy and possibly beyond should be considered secure. As it stands, the *Logical Investigations* is a high profile case of philosophical literature that has been read very differently in the English-speaking world than in places like Freiburg or Prague. Typically, Anglo-American readers preferred to see in Husserl the logician with a flair for linguistic and syntactic analysis, and an anti-metaphysical bent. His otherwise salutary and scientific reasoning, so clearly demonstrated earlier in his logical analyses, critics say, fell victim to an aggrandized constructivism. This is the gist of criticism 2 by Marvin Farber who refused to follow Husserl beyond the stages of his logical studies. If the *Logical Investigations* was the watershed for two largely unequal interpretations of Husserl—one by the English-speaking world, and the other, more or less, by the rest of the world, then it was Farber who, like hardly anyone else, stood at that cross section, and he has become an instrument of history and its witness at the same time. No philosophical work, certainly not the *Logical Investigations*, can surge into the air of its own accord and claim its place outside of history. It has its roots in the life of an existing philosopher, and its essential content cannot be separated from the concrete existence of the philosopher within a historical world. Thus reflection is required in every sense to right ourselves. The historical reflection we have in mind here concerns our existence *Existenz* as philosophers and correlatively, the existence of philosophy, which, for its part, is through our philosophical existence. What have they neglected or forfeited by this refusal? We require a group of methodological devices and procedures to meet the many types of problems. Farber, *Phenomenology and Existence: Toward a Philosophy within Nature* New York: For him, what is to be revived is not an antiquarian interest in facts and deeds of the bygone days. All other propositions must appeal to this authority for substantiation. And we can reverse the direction to better understand the meaning of the larger connections by recourse to parts that already have well defined, stable meaning. As we have glimpsed above, it is the *Crisis*, more than *Ideas* or *Cartesian Meditations* Paris that offered important insights into certain ideas

germinating in the Logical Investigations. Most conspicuous among such early prefigurations is the methodical principle that the philosophical grounding of logic and mathematics must begin with the analysis of the experience that lies before all logical thinking. This insight was to be fully fleshed out in *Experience and Judgment* and formulated specifically in the *Crisis* as the primacy of the lifeworldly evidence over the logico-mathematical evidence. Therefore, to isolate the Investigations from the rest of his writings and give it the status of a self-enclosed universe, however rewarding it may be to read it as such, would seem a rather flawed approach in that it fails to shed light on the inchoate, rich suggestiveness of the Investigations itself. For there has to be a light cast from the side, from other works, that can effectively enhance some of the tentatively carved profiles of the Investigations. Martinus Nijhoff, , When we say a work begins its separate existence from the moment it leaves its author, we do not stipulate that this is so only in peaceful times. Such normalcy within the academia is taken for granted. But the two World Wars disrupted the flow and exchange of thought of mankind in an unprecedented scale. With the exception of those who had to go into exile, few philosophers with such an unblemished, even honorable record as a German citizen, had to endure as much ignominy as Husserl. He and his work were condemned to non-existence under the relapsed barbarism that consumed Germany and soon spread to all of Europe. To be sure, the original edition of the Logical Investigations had been published more than thirty years before the National Socialism came to power. But by , the year World War II broke out, only the Russian and the Spanish translation had seen the light of day. Actually, the Spanish translation was the only one published during the lull between two world wars. And it was still ten years later that the Italian and Japanese translations both followed. The most pivotal translation of all, English, did not arrive until , exactly seventy years after the first German edition. The long interval in which Husserl was incommunicado is significant and may tell something about the need for a healing time in the war-ravaged cultural climate of Europe. However, beneath this surface level stagnation, varied and lively international and personal activities were unfolding. It is a grim irony that the National Socialist policy that had systematically banned phenomenology inside Germany helped it to develop into a thriving multinational and global movement. Manuscripts and personnel were smuggled out of Germany to neutral countries often under dramatic circumstances. To former students of Husserl living overseas in a relative isolation, it was a welcome synergetic event to be joined by many newly exiled or displaced European scholars. And one particular such connection was about to touch the heart and soul of the issue of the English version of the Logical Investigations. In mids, toward the end of his life, Husserl was quite certain that Germany and Europe as a whole no longer held any promise for the future of his philosophy. Fortunately, Prague turned out in many ways to be the alternative haven when his activities in Freiburg were severely restricted under the anti-Semitic policy of the German government. Alone for having safeguarded his guest lectures and eventual publication of his important manuscripts such as *Experience and Judgment* and *The Crisis of European Sciences*, the significance of Prague as the German University town away from Germany could hardly be exaggerated. Moreover, he knew that a number of his former Japanese students had laid early cornerstones upon which to build phenomenology eventually as one of the most widely accepted and productive Western philosophies 5 in modern Japan. But it was to the English-speaking world, especially the United States, that Husserl turned directly for help in an attempt to ensure his legacy. First such contact began with a rather personal note as Husserl and his wife Malvine were deeply concerned about the future of their son Gerhart, a law professor in Kiel recently suspended from his position. They decided to contact Marvin Farber in Buffalo who had studied earlier 24 in Freiburg and had occasionally corresponded with Husserl. Malvine Husserl wrote to Farber on February 17, , beseeching him to help find an academic position in America for Gerhart. Husserl himself on August 18 sent a two-page, minutely hand-written letter to Farber from his Black Forest retreat in Lenzkirch. Demographically, Japan boasts the largest contingent of academically engaged phenomenologists, next only to the U. The quality of the journal invites comparison with any other such major publications. In September, my former assistant Dr. Landgrebe Dozent at the University of Prague , whom I have authorized to secure my manuscripts in archives, will be coming to Freiburg, in order to translate and prepare them for publication. I

shall discuss with him whether an appropriate, smaller manuscript should be readied for English translation, if you so desire. At its first meeting in New York on December 26, , Farber and Cairns were elected president and vicepresident respectively. This was a gathering of stellar international scholars whose names are worth quoting here: Aron Gurwitsch, Charles Hartschorne, W. Hocking, Gerhart Husserl, L. After this event, Farber wasted little time in taking further initiative and, in , inaugurated the journal *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. Husserl had hoped before his death that Farber would, in cooperation with Dorion Cairns, carry out the large task of translating the *Logical Investigations*. But mindful of the voluminous and complex nature of its content, he would settle, for the time being, only on the translation of the *Prolegomena*. Husserl must have felt instinctively that Farber in the early s was probably the only philosopher in America with the overall resources, coupled with a personally compelling sense of obligation to 7 Ibid. His organizational talent and energy exhibited in inaugurating the phenomenological society and its journal as well as in publishing a memorial volume for Husserl after his death, hardly need a special mention. With good reason, perhaps, Husserl did not dare burden Cairns, a more mild-spoken and willing disciple who already was deeply involved in various translations, with this additional workload. It would have obviated the colossal effort of J. Findlay a quarter of a century later. At no point did Farber try to hide the right of due criticism from his motive of studying Husserl. In the beginning, Husserl fascinated him with his finesse in logicomathematical analysis and descriptive rigor in the study of conscious experience. Farber operated with a sense of urgency of an emancipated apostle, who now had to bring his own message to the world. Nor was the translation of *Prolegomena*, as suggested by Husserl, either wholly or in part, included in it. *The Foundation of Phenomenology*, 3rd ed. State University of New York Press, , v. But a commentary, however exhaustive, cannot be a substitute for the complete original text. For those who had more than a passing interest in Husserl and strove for a firsthand knowledge of him, this dependence on a commentary was at best a mixed blessing. It is likely that Farber had also knowingly imposed quarantine on what he often perceived to be an excessively otiose rigmarole that should have been trimmed. In his own mind, there was no alternative to a clearer paraphrasing of selected passages, eliminating much of the drearily technical jargon. Actually it seemed to Farber that time would never be right for this sort of tireless reflection prying into the inner recess of subjectivity. Similarly, one needs to know more about the role of the personality and the philosophical persuasions of the man who was the party to the shaping of the Husserl-Farber understanding. There was a delay, technically speaking, only in the publication of a translation, while the content of the original book itself has been circulating among interested scholars long since. The late delivery of the English version of the *Investigations* had, generally speaking, as little significance as the opposite case of the surprisingly early Russian translation in For phenomenology in the former Soviet Union had no follow-up development thereafter because man like Semen L. By contrast, phenomenological research in America had its own momentum independently of the availability of an English translation of the *Investigations*.

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Susi Ferrarello Phenomenology and Mind, 4, , pp. Are values representational states that work differently from epistemological truths? Are our perceptual experiences representational states? To simplify the inquiry, I will theoretically divide the questions into two groups: How can we explain an instinctive evaluation that is performed without the support of any reflection? I would like to begin my analysis with a story whose protagonist is a kouros, a statue bought by an art dealer, Gianfranco Becchina. Federico Zeri, the well-known art critic, was called to make an evaluation concerning the authenticity of the statue. Later on, other tests confirmed what Zeri felt Gladwell , I use this story to display the sense of my research. For this reason, my aim here is to describe the moments of this kind of intention. The questions that might arise from this challenging topic are several: Is the value a bodily concept which comes before the representation of the object itself? Is it possible to appreciate the value of a melody without consciously listening to it? If we come in a room and our attention is completely focused on another object, are we able to appreciate the value of the melody spread in the room as well? To simplify the inquiry, I will divide the questions into two groups: I would like to understand if a practical intention can be independent from any signitive or epistemological basis and, accordingly, if values might be described independently from the objects holding a value. These texts can be taken as a reference point to explain the analysis of validity from a static to a genetic viewpoint. In this way we could get an overall 1 phenomenological definition of validity pointing out its differences respect to a signitive acts and showing its in fieri nature. As for the critics, Husserl scholars seem to be divided on this issue: Schuhmann as well as Melle maintain that this debate can only lead to an aporetic conclusion. Drummond and Rinofner-Kreidl consider the possibility of carrying out a two level analysis of evaluative acts as intentional acts where it is possible to distinguish the experience of a valuable object from the corresponding values themselves. Finally, Smith but naturally there are many other scholars involved in this debate construes the object of values as a universal object grasped by the categorical experience of the universal. In this paper I would like to expound these deficiencies focusing on practical intentionality and the meaning of value. Indeed, a value is defined by Husserl as the content or noema of an intentional act of evaluation. The issue here is to examine which kind of intentionality, if any, belongs to evaluating acts. As these acts are commonly considered instinctive and spontaneous, their intentionality is problematic because they seemingly arise without any proper intentio Husserl, , For instance, when I enter a room, a melody makes me feel well, though I may not be listening to it attentively. This means that I or my body can evaluate it positively while I am doing something else. In this case the evaluating act functions without a proper intention and probably a proper object. Something happens listening to a melody and I recognize it with a feeling but my aware intention is addressed toward another actual object talking to another person, for instance. In paragraph 97 of Ideas I Husserl explains the moments that constitute a simple act through the following example. This observation encompasses a plentitude of information that is given in the unity of one perception. In fact, seen phenomenologically, the tree becomes that mental phenomenon by means of which I perceive the tree. Phenomenological analysis focuses on what affects the perception as a pure mental object. Noesis is the field of constituting multiplicities and noema is the field of constituted unities. From a phenomenological point of view the noesis is not the colour of the tree which changes according to the intensity of the light, but the colour itself as we perceive it. This latter is an identical and unchangeable unit encompassing all the data pertaining to the perception of colour as they are grasped by the noesis. Husserl holds that we have different kinds of noeseis and noemata that are displayed within a specific hierarchy Husserl, , , , It is possible to intend an object in different ways phantasy, memory, representation , but all

these ways can be figured out and collocated in a specific order. To every way of perceiving objects there belongs a characteristic of reflection: For instance, we cannot seize upon the object-tree by memory if we have not represented it yet. The various noeses by which an object can be given are all built up on signitive or doxic acts, that is, on acts capable of performing the representation of the sensed object. We can perceive the tree and reflect on its properties only after we have recognized it as an object, as something which stands in front of us. Therefore, I can have an overall idea of the tree thanks to the mixture of different levels of my perception. I can draw a pleasant feeling from the sight of the tree because this feeling generally arises after I have seen the tree standing before me and have instantly processed this representation. Hence evaluating objectivations are possible only on the basis of signitive or positing acts. Every evaluating act which appears just like a second kind of act is based on the signitive stratum of perception, judgement and fantasy Husserl, , Consequently, an evaluative act does not seem to hold its own object as it always requires the representations of a signitive act in order to evaluate something. The value seems to be a different kind of signitive noema. For example, if I enter a room and I listen to a melody, the process of evaluating this melody is probably grounded on the realization that a melody is being played and then I can evaluate it. The melody is a signitive object that is predicatively given to the act of evaluation. The former is the noema of a signitive act by which I know what I am experiencing and the latter is a noematic modification of what I am experiencing. Accordingly the noema of an evaluating act is an intentional object in a twofold sense. As a matter of fact, any value is an actual and axiological object, that is, the thing as valuable, with its value- characteristics and value-qualities, and the concrete value in itself, which should be considered as a value-objectiveness and a mere predicatively formed value-complex. Hence, on this first founding act, another process of objectivation takes place. This distinction should be conducive to form a whole idea of the lived experience as something static that is taken in itself and in that moment as a unit which is always in fieri since it is experienced by a living subject. The first layer of a passive intention is mainly a perception Husserl, , Within a passive perception, noesis consists in an act of uninhibited intentions and the noema is the free fulfillment of several modes of being. Since in this correlation there is no hierarchy, consciousness can be directed wherever it likes without being regulated by any kind of knowledge. To use the example given before, while I am staring at the tree, probably a lot of intentions impinge upon my staring. All these stimuli are simultaneous and force my consciousness toward different directions. It is likely that my consciousness can only knowingly follow a part of these, and only a few uninhibited intentions can become real active or actual intentions. The hierarchy, as it was displayed in Ideas I, comes into action only when consciousness decides to choose among the interwoven, uninhibited intentions through an active acceptance. In this case we have an active intentionality where, as stated before with Ideas I, the doxic or signitive act holds a primal position. As with every mode of consciousness, we have a noematic correlate. The perceptual concordance is exactly that balance between what is given to consciousness as self-giving and the presentation of what is expected to be presented to consciousness. In that sense the confirmation that lies behind the very first step of an active intention seems to be essentially a normative act of regulation by which the first balance can be restored Husserl, , Here something more is added to Ideas I. In this hierarchy the former act of an active intentionality is still a signitive one but, in contrast to Ideas I, it springs from a validation act. According to Husserl, passive intentionality turns into an active one by a judgment of acceptance and its first noema ends up being what is accepted as valid or invalid. Let us take the previous example: Mary is staring at a tree absentmindedly. After a while her passive intention is translated into the decision to do something. Whatever this doing is about, it always passes through a decision and a judgment. She decides to see its shape or rejoice over its sight or evaluate its beauty. What ignited the motor of this decision to accept a very specific intention among many others? When someone is absentmindedly staring at a tree, she is exposed to a free horizon of expectations where all uninhibited intentions are possible. Then, the ego actively takes up a position of judging or talking, or fantasizing etc. Husserl, , 95 To understand this acceptance, it is necessary to go through its moments as they appear in the flow of time. The moments of this unit are always made up of time. Every moment is made

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up of impression, protension and retention. Impression represents the presentification of a temporal being, that is what is given to the subject, in that moment by shadows and uncertain forms. Protention is the expectation of the future. It represents what we could see or expect to see. It constitutes a kind of norm or rule about what we are experiencing. In fact, while we are experiencing the surrounding, we build up an idea of what we are perceiving and expectations are precisely the presentifications of the idea we have created from the former glimpses. Finally, retention is the empty presentation of what we have already felt. It is the passive law built on the memories just collected in our mind Husserl, , 5 This empty representation can be fulfilled by the contents given with evidence. Therefore, the decision made by the ego is mainly determined by these phases. The confirmation granted by the unit of continual concordance allows the ego to go ahead with its intentions following the proper hierarchy. This is the way in which the consistency of empty presentations, presentifications and expectations can be achieved. In each phase we have primordial impression, retention and protention and unity arises in this progression by the protention of each phase being fulfilled by the primordial impression [â€]. These moments bring a lawfulness to the act of perception which allows the stream to flow. If the expectation is fulfilled by the actual presentation, the confirmation is possible and the noema is valid. In a word, the expectation seems to be the main stimulus of an active acceptance and the acceptance is what gives validity to the noema of a passive uninhibited intention. The idea of validity seems to be embedded in this temporal structure, especially in the expectations which give the norm of what has to be fulfilled. These seem to be the moments grasped by the very first Wertnehmung. The validity of this truth consists in this expectation.

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