

Chapter 1 : In defense of Red Dead Redemption 2's realism - Caffeine Gaming

In Defence of Realism is a powerful indictment of the fog of bad philosophy and worse linguistics that has shrouded much contemporary literary theory and criticism.

Theoretical origins[edit] Defensive neorealism is a structural theory that is part of structural realism, also known as neorealism , which is a subset of the realist school of thought in International Relations theory. States inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the ability to hurt and possibly destroy each other. States can never be certain about the intentions of other states. The basic motive driving states is survival. States think strategically about how to survive in the international system. It is on these key neorealist assumptions that defensive and offensive neorealists base their competing understandings of state behavioural patterns. Main tenets[edit] As Kenneth Waltz asserted in his seminal defensive neorealist text Theory of International Politics, defensive realists argue that the anarchic nature of the international system encourages states to undertake defensive and moderate policies. They argue that states are not intrinsically aggressive and that "the first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system". While offensive realists believe states inherently desire hegemony, defensive realists argue that states are socialised and aware of historical precedent, which defensive realists assert, generally displays state aggression and expansion to fulfil the aim of hegemony as attracting resistance from other states. Indeed, Jack Snyder asserts, "international anarchy punishes aggression; it does not reward it". Defensive realists state that the problems conquest faces are diverse, existing both during the opening phases of expansion and during occupation. This increases the already expensive process of occupation, especially in societies that rely on freedom of movement and transportation for economic prosperity because these are vulnerable to sabotage and embargo. In addition, newly acquired infrastructure must be protected and rebuilt when destroyed, the defence of new borders must be consolidated, and the possible resistance of local workers to contributing skilled labour to the new authorities, all combine to place heavy strain on the economic and production capabilities of the conquering state. In contrast to offensive realists, defensive realists assert that these strains outweigh the economic benefits states can attain from conquered territory, resources and infrastructure. Defensive realists also point to the disconnect between individual security and state security, which they believe offensive realists conflate. Defensive realists assert that "states are not as vulnerable as men are in a state of nature" [13] and their destruction is a difficult and protracted task. They contend that states, especially major powers, can afford to wait for definitive evidence of attack rather than undertaking pre-emptive strikes or reacting inappropriately to inadvertent threats. This aspect is crucial. It allows the possibility of overcoming, or at least reducing, the impact of one of the prominent theories of neorealism: Coined by John H. Herz in his work Political Realism and Political Idealism, defensive realists believe the security dilemma, as expanded by Robert Jervis in "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma" in , is defined by the assumption that the offense-defense balance tends to favour defensive capability over offensive capability. Defensive realists argue that just as in World War I, offensive dominance tends to be disjoined from reality and is in fact, only perceived. These operational and logistical problems only increase as the areas of operations move further away from the aggressor. This is used as evidence that defensive capabilities ultimately trump offensive ones, and that they encourages states to employ defensive and restrained policies. Power and the Roots of Conflict, sometimes states that wish to maintain the status quo must become the aggressor in order to prevent later aggression against themselves or their allies. Here, balancing behaviour is undertaken more abruptly, it is more likely to intimidate other states and offensive policies are more likely to be implemented. Defensive realists however, contend that a favourable offensive balance is the exception rather than the rule, and that unnecessary aggression and expansion is self-defeating and counterproductive. Lastly, defensive realists claim that elite perceptions and beliefs are key to the outbreak of conflict between states. Along with geography and the security dilemma, defensive realists believe these perceptions are a structural modifier, an anomaly that upsets the balance of power, rather than evidence of the fundamental offensive realist assumption that the anarchical structure of the international system encourages security through the increase of relative state

power. These perceptions manifest in a number of ways and are often employed in an irregular way, which intimidates other states. They can lead elites to inflate threats in order to mobilise resources and promote expansion, or conversely, inhibit elites from recognising or rectifying their declining power in the international system due to domestic concerns being prioritised over international concerns. This occurs because the multiple groups dominate a very centralised system and each enacts its often differing aims. Effective restriction and balancing of expansion is therefore difficult or ignored. Despite vast territorial gains, they are not effectively consolidated, the population is not subjugated or enfolded into the state narrative, resources are not effectively exploited, and the rapid expansion becomes unsustainable. If the elites realise their mistake, it is incredibly difficult to rectify their grand strategy due to the narrative sold both to its own members and to the general public, effectively condemning the state to defeat. Glaser, it has been criticised both by offensive realists and other scholars. A major point of contention is the difficulty states face in accurately assessing the offense-defense balance. This is further compounded when state policies, strategy and relations are considered. Depending on the political context and history between the state s assessing and the state s assessed, some pieces of military equipment could reasonably be determined to be for offensive or defensive use, regardless of the reality. They assert that states will naturally assume the worst-case scenario to ensure their own security in the "self-help" environment, which realists assume dominates the anarchic international system. This view is summarised concisely by Stephen Walt: Building on the offense-defense ambiguity, it has also been suggested that it is impossible to accurately gauge when a state has attained a satisfactory level of relative power. This can combine with unfavourable structural modifiers such as geography to contradict the idea that states can afford to wait for definitive signs of attack. Finally, Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou contends that defensive neorealism as outlined by Waltz, only explains the impact external forces have on state behaviour and ignores the impact of internal forces. Also, intrastate warfare, conflict and international terrorism is becoming increasingly prominent, while traditional notions of interstate conflict are receding: Theory of International Politics. Defensive Realism Revisited" International Security Politics Among Nations, New York: McGraw Hill p. Power and the Roots of Conflict Ithaca: State of the Discipline New York: The rise of America and the fall of structural realism", International Politics

Chapter 2 : Hans Morgenthau - Wikipedia

In Defense of Realism 21 for reasons as disinterested as are invariably alleged. These are all empirical observations, and though they certainly bear on the ethical questions raised by.

He taught and practiced law in Frankfurt before emigrating to the United States in 1933, after several interim years in Switzerland and Spain. On moving to New York, Morgenthau separated from his wife, who remained in Chicago partly because of medical issues. He is reported to have twice tried to initiate plans to start a new relationship while in New York, once with the political philosopher Hannah Arendt, [9] and a second time with Ethel Person d. Morgenthau died on July 19, 1966, shortly after being admitted to Lenox Hill Hospital in New York with a perforated ulcer. In an autobiographical essay written near the end of his life, Morgenthau related that, although he had looked forward to meeting Schmitt during a visit to Berlin, the meeting went badly and Morgenthau left thinking that he had been in the presence of in his own words, "the demonic".

Foundations of a Theory of Norms. It has not been translated into English. Kelsen was among the strongest critics of Carl Schmitt. Kelsen and Morgenthau became lifelong colleagues even after both emigrated from Europe to take their respective academic positions in the United States. In 1941, Morgenthau published a second book in French, *La notion du "politique"*, which was translated into English and published in 1943 as *The Concept of the Political*. The questions driving the inquiry are: For Morgenthau, the end goal of any legal system in this context is to "ensure justice and peace. In Morgenthau set out a research program for legal functionalism in the article "Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law". This school of thought holds that nation-states are the main actors in international relations and that the main concern of the field is the study of power. Morgenthau emphasized the importance of "the national interest", and in *Politics Among Nations* he wrote that "the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. Starting with the second edition of *Politics Among Nations*, Morgenthau included a section in the opening chapter called "Six Principles of Political Realism". Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. Political realism avoids reinterpreting reality to fit the policy. A good foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits. Realism recognizes that the determining kind of interest varies depending on the political and cultural context in which foreign policy, not to be confused with a theory of international politics, is made. It does not give "interest defined as power" a meaning that is fixed once and for all. Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political action. Realism maintains that universal moral principles must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place, because they cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation. Dissent on the Vietnam War[edit] Morgenthau was a consultant for the Kennedy administration from 1961 to 1964. Morgenthau was a strong supporter of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. When Johnson became President, Morgenthau became much more vocal in his dissent concerning American participation in the Vietnam war, [34] for which he was dismissed as a consultant to the Johnson administration in 1964. Aside from his writing of *Politics Among Nations*, Morgenthau continued with a prolific writing career and published the three volume collection of his writings in 1964. Morgenthau dedicated the book to Hans Kelsen, "who has taught us through his example how to speak Truth to Power. *Servant or Master*, was dedicated to his colleague Reinhold Niebuhr and published in 1954. *Love and Power*," where Morgenthau engaged some of the themes that Niebuhr and the theologian Paul Tillich were addressing. The number of book reviews he wrote approached nearly a hundred, and included almost three dozen book reviews for *The New York Review of Books* alone. The second phase of the discussion of his writings and contributions to the study of international politics and international law was between 1964 and the one hundred year commemoration of his birth that took place in 1993. The third phase of the reception of his writings is between the centenary commemoration and the present, which shows a vibrant discussion of his continuing influence. Schmitt had become a leading juristic voice for the rising National Socialist movement in Germany and Morgenthau came to see their positions as incommensurable. He wrote in this connection about Kissinger

and his role in the Nixon administration. Christoph Rohde published a biography of Morgenthau in , still available only in German. Bush Administration in the context of the Iraq war. University of Chicago Press. A Look Into the American Future ed. Co-published with a separate text by David Hein. The Concept of the Political ; orig. Morgenthau Page" at Google Sites.

Chapter 3 : Realism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Red Dead Realism In defense of Red Dead Redemption 2's realism Red Dead Redemption 2 is the largest entertainment opening of all time, taking over \$ million dollars in its first weekend.

Preliminaries Three preliminary comments are needed. Firstly, there has been a great deal of debate in recent philosophy about the relationship between realism, construed as a metaphysical doctrine, and doctrines in the theory of meaning and philosophy of language concerning the nature of truth and its role in accounts of linguistic understanding see Dummett and Devitt a for radically different views on the issue. Independent of the issue about the relationship between metaphysics and the theory of meaning, the well-known disquotational properties of the truth-predicate allow claims about objects, properties, and facts to be framed as claims about the truth of sentences. As Devitt points out b: To say that it is a fact that the moon is spherical is just to say that the object, the moon, instantiates the property of being spherical, which is just to say that the moon is spherical. There are substantial metaphysical issues about the nature of facts, objects, and properties, and the relationships between them see Mellor and Oliver and Lowe , part IV , but these are not of concern here. However, such trivial dependencies are not what are at issue in debates between realists and non-realists about the mental and the intentional. Against the Existence Dimension I: Error-Theory and Arithmetic There are at least two distinct ways in which a non-realist can reject the existence dimension of realism about a particular subject matter. The first of these rejects the existence dimension by rejecting the claim that the distinctive objects of that subject-matter exist, while the second admits that those objects exist but denies that they instantiate any of the properties distinctive of that subject-matter. This will show how realism about a subject-matter can be questioned on both epistemological and metaphysical grounds. This object is abstract because it has no spatial or temporal location, and is causally inert. A certain kind of nominalist rejects the existence claim which the platonic realist makes: Platonists divide on their account of the epistemology of arithmetic: The main arguments against platonic realism turn on the idea that the platonist position precludes a satisfactory epistemology of arithmetic. For the classic exposition of the doubt that platonism can square its claims to accommodate knowledge of arithmetical truth with its conception of the subject matter of arithmetic as causally inert, see Benacerraf Benacerraf argued that platonism faces difficulties in squaring its conception of the subject-matter of arithmetic with a general causal constraint on knowledge roughly, that a subject can be said to know that P only if she stands in some causal relation to the subject matter of P. In response, platonists have attacked the idea that a plausible causal constraint on ascriptions of knowledge can be formulated Wright Ch. Rather, Field conceives what is potentially a far more powerful challenge to platonic realism when he suggests that not only has the platonic realist no recourse to any explanation of reliability that is causal in character, but that she has no recourse to any explanation that is non-causal in character either. T here seems prima facie to be a difficulty in principle in explaining the regularity. The problem arises in part from the fact that mathematical entities as the [platonic realist] conceives them, do not causally interact with mathematicians, or indeed with anything else. This means we cannot explain the mathematicians beliefs and utterances on the basis of the mathematical facts being causally involved in the production of those beliefs and utterances; or on the basis of the beliefs or utterances causally producing the mathematical facts; or on the basis of some common cause producing both. Perhaps then some sort of non-causal explanation of the correlation is possible? Perhaps; but it is very hard to see what this supposed non-causal explanation could be. Recall that on the usual platonist picture [i. The problem is that the claims that the [platonic realist] makes about mathematical objects appears to rule out any reasonable strategy for explaining the systematic correlation in question. Any causal explanation of reliability is incompatible with the acausality of mathematical objects. Any non-causal explanation of reliability is incompatible with the language- and mind-independence of mathematical objects. Any explanation of reliability must be causal or non-causal. There is no explanation of reliability that is compatible with both the acausality and language- and mind-independence of mathematical objects. Therefore, There is no explanation of reliability that is compatible with platonic realism. What does Field propose as an alternative to platonic realism in arithmetic?

For Field, the utility of mathematical theories resides not in their truth but in their conservativeness, where a mathematical theory *S* is conservative if and only if for any nominalistically respectable statement *A* i. Against the Existence Dimension II: How might one argue for such a radical-sounding thesis? The conceptual claim is that our concept of a moral fact is a concept of an objectively prescriptive fact, or, equivalently, that our concept of a moral property is a concept of an objectively prescriptive quality what Mackie means by this is explained below. The ontological claim is simply that there are no objectively prescriptive facts, that objectively prescriptive properties are nowhere instantiated. The conclusion is that there is nothing in the world answering to our moral concepts, no facts or properties which render the judgements formed via those moral concepts true. Our moral judgements are all of them false. We can thus construe the error-theory as follows: This argument is clearly valid, so the question facing those who wish to defend at least the existence dimension of realism in the case of morals is whether the premises are true. Note that strictly speaking the conclusion of the argument is that there are no moral facts as-we-conceive-of-them. Thus, it may be possible to block the argument by advocating a revisionary approach to our moral concepts. What does this mean? To say that moral requirements are prescriptive is to say that they tell us how we ought to act, to say that they give us reasons for acting. Thus, to say that something is morally good is to say that we ought to pursue it, that we have reason to pursue it. To say that something is morally bad is to say that we ought not to pursue it, that we have reason not to pursue it. The reasons for action that moral requirements furnish are not contingent upon the possession of any desires or wants on the part of the agent to whom they are addressed: I cannot release myself from the requirement imposed by the claim that torturing the innocent is wrong by citing some desire or inclination that I have. I can release myself from the requirement imposed by this claim by citing my desire to lose my job perhaps because I find it unfulfilling, or whatever. Reasons for action which are contingent in this way on desires and inclinations are furnished by what Kant called hypothetical imperatives. So our concept of a moral requirement is a concept of a categorically prescriptive requirement. But Mackie claims further that our concept of a moral requirement is a concept of an objectively categorically prescriptive requirement. What does it mean to say that a requirement is objective? Mackie says a lot of different-sounding things about this, and the following is by no means a comprehensive list references are to Ch. To call a requirement objective is to say that it can be an object of knowledge 24, 31, 33, that it can be true or false 26, 33, that it can be perceived 31, 33, that it can be recognised 42, that it is prior to and independent of our preferences and choices 30, 43, that it is a source of authority external to our preferences and choices 32, 34, 43, that it is part of the fabric of the world 12, that it backs up and validates some of our preferences and choices 22, that it is capable of being simply true 30 or valid as a matter of general logic 30, that it is not constituted by our choosing or deciding to think in a certain way 30, that it is extra-mental 23, that it is something of which we can be aware 38, that it is something that can be introspected 39, that it is something that can figure as a premise in an explanatory hypothesis or inference 39, and so on. Mackie plainly does not take these to be individually necessary: But his intention is plain enough: This issue cannot be discussed in detail here, except to note that while it seems plausible to claim that if our concept of a moral fact is a concept of a reason for action then that concept must be a concept of a categorical reason for action, it is not so clear why we have to say that our concept of a moral fact is a concept of a reason for action at all. For exposition and critical discussion, see Miller a, Ch. For a useful discussion, see Brink The argument from queerness has both metaphysical and epistemological components. Expounding the metaphysical part of the argument from queerness, Mackie writes: An objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not because of any contingent fact that this person, or every person, is so constituted that he desires this end, but just because the end has to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it. Similarly, if there were objective principles of right and wrong, any wrong possible course of action would have not-to-be-doneness somehow built into it. Thus, the world contains no moral states of affairs, situations which consist in the instantiation of a moral quality. Mackie now backs up this metaphysical argument with an epistemological argument: If we were aware [of objective values], it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ways of knowing everything else. These points were recognised by Moore when he spoke of non-natural qualities, and by the intuitionists in their talk about a faculty of moral intuition.

Intuitionism has long been out of favour, and it is indeed easy to point out its implausibilities. What is not so often stressed, but is more important, is that the central thesis of intuitionism is one to which any objectivist view of values is in the end committed: In short, our ordinary conceptions of how we might come into cognitive contact with states of affairs, and thereby acquire knowledge of them, cannot cope with the idea that the states of affairs are objective values. So we are forced to expand that ordinary conception to include forms of moral perception and intuition. But these are completely unexplanatory: Evaluating the argument from queerness is well outwith the scope of the present entry. Examples of the latter version, and attempts to provide the owed response to the argument from queerness, can be found in Smith , Ch. Mackie claims that the error-theory of moral judgement is a second-order theory, which does not necessarily have implications for the first order practice of making moral judgements. Whatever we may once have thought, as soon as philosophy has taught us that the world is unsuited to confer truth on any of our claims about what is right, or wrong, or obligatory, etc. If it is of the essence of moral judgement to aim at the truth, and if philosophy teaches us that there is no moral truth to hit, how are we supposed to take ourselves seriously in thinking the way we do about any issue which we regard as of major moral importance? Suppose we can extract from this story some subsidiary norm distinct from truth, which governs the practice of forming moral judgements. The question may have a good answer. The error-theorist may be able to argue that the superstition that he finds in ordinary moral thought goes too deep to permit of any construction of moral truth which avoids it to be acceptable as an account of moral truth. But I do not know of promising argument in that direction. See Kalderon and Joyce for examples. For a book-length treatment of moral error-theory, see Olson. The error-theories proposed by Mackie and Field are non-eliminativist error-theories, and should be contrasted with the kind of eliminativist error-theory proposed by e. Paul Churchland concerning folk-psychological propositional attitudes see Churchland. Churchland argues that our everyday talk of propositional attitudes such as beliefs, desires and intentions should eventually be abandoned given developments in neuroscience. Mackie and Field make no analogous claims concerning morality and arithmetic: Reductionism and Non-Reductionism. Although some commentators e. There are a number of reasons for this, with the reasons varying depending on the type of reduction proposed. Suppose, first of all, that one wished to deny the existence claim which is a component of platonic realism about arithmetic. One way to do this would be to propose an analytic reduction of talk seemingly involving abstract entities to talk concerning only concrete entities. This can be illustrated by considering a language the truth of whose sentences seemingly entails the existence of a type of abstract object, directions. A number of contextual definitions are now introduced: After all, A , B , and C allow us to paraphrase any sentence whose truth appears to entail the existence of abstract objects into a sentence whose truth involves only the existence of concrete inscriptions. There is a powerful argument, first developed by William Alston , and recently resuscitated to great effect by Crispin Wright , Ch. The analytic reductionist who wishes to wield the contextual definitions against the existence claim at the heart of platonic realism takes them to show that the apparent reference to abstract objects on the left-hand sides of the definitions is merely apparent: But the platonic realist can retort:

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What kind of policy can the United States pursue that ensures its security while minimizing the likelihood of war? We describe and defend a realist theory of foreign policy to guide American.

We examine in detail four arguments against fictional realism, and present a version of fictional realism which can withstand those arguments. Fictional realism is a doctrine which takes this talk seriously and endorses the principle FR1. There are fictional entities, in the same sense as that in which, setting aside philosophical disputes, there are people, Mondays, numbers and planets. According to the fictional realist we are concerned with, fictional characters do not have much in common with real people, because the realist holds that FR2. Fictional entities are abstract objects. Still, fictional entities have some things in common with real people: In this paper, we defend fictional realism against some powerful arguments which Anthony Everett has recently produced. Such arguments have to be deferred to another occasion. The arguments share the basic idea that because indeterminacy and inconsistency may occur in fiction, fictional realism has to export them, and so generates indeterminacy and inconsistency in reality. We shall discuss and rebut the arguments in turn plus an argument inspired by Lewis ; in due course, we shall make some general points about fiction, and propose workable existence-conditions and identity-conditions. The principle is a fairly natural way of stating identity-conditions for fictional entities within the framework of realism: It is hard to see what truths in a fiction might ground the identity or non-identity of fictional entities, if not truths about identity. Everett, considering an example with the same structure as the following nursery rhyme, Bah-Tale There once was a man called Bahrooh There once was a man called Bahraah But nobody knew if Bahraah was Bahrooh Or if they were actually two, asserts p. In other words, Everett takes principle Everett. His argument can be parsed as follows: Premise 2 is derived from an instance of principle Everett. So the fictional realist is apparently committed to indeterminate identities. We shall show, however, that no such commitments arise. It is scope-ambiguous between the following two claims: It is indeterminate whether in the world of Bah-Tale: In the world of Bah-Tale: To say this is to make a statement about the story, not to report some truth which is part of the story. The world of Bah-Tale is not extraordinary to that extent compare: Admittedly, something strange is going on in the world of Bah-Tale. But of course such situations are a recurring theme in literature. Oedipus does not know that he is the murderer of his father; and on one interpretation of the movie Adaptation, Charlie Kaufman is unwittingly identical with his putative brother Donald Kaufman. This rhyme warrants a claim of internal indeterminacy: In the world of Bah-Tale II: Bah-Tale II then contains a necessary falsehood and is an instance of inconsistent fiction. Not so Bah-Tale; the story is perfectly consistent. Talk about indeterminacy is often cashed in terms of truth-value gaps: In claiming this, Jude would evidently make a mistake: Nevertheless, there is some indeterminacy about whether Bah-Tale has it that Bahraah is Bahrooh, in the sense that Bah-Tale leaves it open whether Bahraah is Bahrooh. But that claim has nothing to do with truth-value gaps. That Bahraah has a mole, for instance, is not part of Bah-Tale, nor is its negation. Bah-Tale leaves it open whether Bahraah has or has not a mole. This proposal about being left open by a story does not presuppose any particular account of what a story is, or of what the conditions of truth in stories are. Any instance of Everett. But on this reading, Everett. The transition to the conclusion would only be warranted if premise 1 were understood analogously, i. But we have shown that this interpretation of 1 is not licensed by the natural understanding of Bah-Tale. The indeterminacy of Bah-Tale consists in leaving it open whether Bahraah is Bahrooh, not in any truth-value gap of the said proposition. So the argument would need a mixed reading of Everett. While this reading of Everett. If Everett thought this to be the case here, he erred. The required reading of Everett. Unless realists can answer that, their position is still weakened; moreover, the answer should be guided by some principled reasoning. We accept a slightly modified version of principle Everett. Authors other than Conan Doyle may write a story about Sherlock Holmes in which he surprisingly turns out to be identical with his arch-enemy Moriarty. This would not make the fictional entities identical, because the author lacks the required authority to tamper with their nature. Applied to the case of Bah-Tale, Identity yields the non-identity of the fictional characters Bahraah and Bahrooh. This verdict is not just ad hoc,

but is supportable by two principles: Since stories seldom explicitly state the non-identity of an entity x and an independently mentioned entity y , their non-identity is the warranted but defeasible default assumption in interpreting a story. The interplay of the two principles grants some principled basis for our suggestion that the fictional realist should take Bahraah and Bahrooh to be distinct. The non-identity of the fictional characters does not imply that any corresponding non-identity statement is true in the fiction. The basic idea of fictional realism is that fictional characters exist because of the stories that concern them. This idea, according to Everett, is reflected in the following principle: If a story concerns a creature a , which is not a real thing, then if the story has it that a exists, then the fictional entity a exists. Yet nobody has ever seen it. In a plausible interpretation of *The Slynx* which we accept, for the sake of the argument, as its best interpretation it is left open by the story whether the Slynx exists or not. Everett thinks that for a fictional realist, the indeterminacy in *The Slynx* will carry over into an indeterminacy concerning the existence of the fictional creature Slynx. If a story concerns a creature a , which is not a real thing, then if it is indeterminate whether the story has it that a exists, then it is indeterminate whether the fictional entity a exists. It is indeterminate whether *The Slynx* has it that the Slynx exists 2. If it is indeterminate whether *The Slynx* has it that the Slynx exists, then it is indeterminate whether the fictional entity Slynx exists 3. Therefore it is indeterminate whether the fictional entity Slynx exists. Assuming that indeterminate existence is at least as dubious as indeterminate identity, fictional realism is threatened again. But then the argument would require a mixed reading of principle Everett. But on that reading, Everett. Fictional indeterminate existence and fictions within fictions But the fictional realist still has to decide whether there is the fictional creature Slynx or not. According to *The Slynx*, 10 Everett, p. Either the Slynx is a creature living in the woods or the Slynx is a mythical creature. By the standards of fictional realism, the story has it in both cases that the Slynx exists. It is just that in the second case the Slynx would not be a real but only a fictional creature. That fictional entities exist, however, is the cornerstone of fictional realism. What distinguishes the two alternatives in *Alt* is not that in only one of them the Slynx exists, but rather that in only one of them the Slynx is a creature made of flesh and blood. It is the ontological status of the Slynx in which the options come apart, not its existence. Nevertheless, the realist should not simply conclude that the fictional creature Slynx exists: If there is no story having it that the creature Slynx exists, then there is no story in which the fictional creature Slynx could originate; and then no such fictional creature exists. But does the Slynx not simply and clearly originate in *The Slynx*? Unfortunately, this is not very clear. Some fictions have it that there are other fictions. Some of the fictions said to exist by another fiction really exist, because i some fictions refer to previously existing fictions, and ii some fictions incorporate other fictions if a story is explicitly told in a fiction, the story non-fictionally exists, just like other stories. But some fictions just have it that there is some other story while its content remains obscure. Then no such story exists, but only a fictional story. So whether the fictional creature Slynx exists depends on what exactly is going on in *The Slynx*. There are two possibilities: One need not decide whether a or b is actually true of *The Slynx*. Since both cases are possible, the realist should have something to say about both of them. In the latter case no such story exists. But then there cannot be the fictional creature Slynx, because it requires a story to originate in. We call an attribute in the former case determining and in the latter modifying. Since no abstract object is a creature an animated being, no fictional creature is a creature. A fictional entity is indeed an entity, and not something which is merely, according to some fiction, an entity. Returning to the problematic Slynx case b , we assume *The Slynx* has it that there is a mythical or true story left untold about the Slynx. Since the story is untold, there is actually no story which has it that the creature Slynx exists. There only is a story, i . In both cases, the fictional realist can say that the fictional entity Slynx exists; it originates in *The Slynx* because that story definitely has it that the Slynx exists. The Slynx is not a fictional creature, though, because *The Slynx* does not have it that it is a creature. Nor is the Slynx a fictional-fictional-creature, because *The Slynx* does not have it that it is a fictional creature.

Chapter 5 : Realism | Define Realism at calendrierdelascience.com

In defense of the realism, as if defending realism would have been a thing back then. (calendrierdelascience.comdredeemption2) submitted 1 day ago by sirjohnsrud.

See also Ryckman for a transcendental idealist structuralism. It seems that Worrall now advocates ESR2. They defend the received view that quantum particles are not individuals, and develop a formal framework for non-individual objects. See also Ladyman and Ross , Chapter 3. Hence, the received view. This is the option advocated by Ladyman. Clearly, there is potential question-begging here. The structuralist could adopt something This notion of lonely objects plays a crucial role in the scholastic distinction between individuality and distinguishability drawn on by French in his interminable discussions of quantum individuality. See Langton and Lewis and Weatherson on intrinsic properties. Leibniz, for example, understood it as whatever conformed with his metaphysical principles, notably the Principles of Sufficient Reason and Identity of Indiscernibles, which would hardly be appropriate here. One might approach this by suggesting that there is a relationship between a point x , time t , or the relevant space-time point. As indeed they have been see Ch. Again crudely speaking, we might think of at least two alternatives: Is that inherent empowerment non-structural? How is Quantum Field Theory Possible? What structures could not be. Conceptual Development of 20th Century Field Theories. Structural realism and the interpretation of quantum field theory. The structuralist conception of objects. Philosophy of Science Structuralism as a form of scientific realism. Models and mathematics in physics: The role of group theory. Scribbling on the blank sheet: Structure as a weapon of the realist. Keeping quiet on the ontology of models. Reinflating the semantic approach. Between platonism and phenomenalism: Quantum physics and the identity of indiscernibles. What is structural realism? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Modality and constructive empiricism: A reply to van Fraassen. Mathematical structuralism and the identity of indiscernibles. On the identity and diversity of individuals. Shared structure need not be shared set-structure. Criteria of identity and structuralist ontology. The ontological status of theoretical entities. Structural realism and the meaning of theoretical terms. Theories, perception and structural realism. University of Pittsburgh Press. Scientific methodology and the causal theory of perception. Moderate Realism and its Logic. On the foundations of geometry. Points, particles and structural realism. The structure, the whole structure and nothing but the structure? Journal of Philosophy Harvard University Press, Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity. Ontic structural realism and economics. The Analysis of Matter. The Reign of Relativity: Philosophy in Physics Indiscernibles, general covariance, and other symmetries. Festschrift in Honour of John Stachel. Are quantum particles objects? Chicago and LaSalle, IL: Structural realism and contextual individuality. Structure, individuality and quantum gravity. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; http: Its shadow and substance. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. The best of both worlds? Author Queries Chapter No.: Please provide details in the list. AU4 His changed to Worrall AU5 da Costa and French is not provided in reference list. AU7 French ibid has been changed to French AU8 French and Krause ibid. AU9 Following references are not cited in text: AU10 Please update this reference, if possible. AU11 Please provide complete details in ref. Stanford and Yablo in list. AU12 Please provide volume number and page range in Weatherson

Chapter 6 : Defensive realism - Wikipedia

"In Defence of Realism is a powerful indictment of the fog of bad philosophy and worse linguistics that has shrouded much contemporary literary theory and criticism.

Chapter 7 : In Defence of Realism by Raymond Tallis

In Defense of Democratic Realism Charles Krauthammer-ON FEBRUARY 10, , I delivered the Irving Kristol Lecture to

the American Enterprise Institute outlining a theory of.

Chapter 8 : . In Defence of Rational Realism - Oxford Scholarship

Theoretical origins. Defensive neorealism is a structural theory that is part of structural realism, also known as neorealism, which is a subset of the realist school of thought in International Relations theory.

Chapter 9 : In Defence of Ontic Structural Realism | James Ladyman - calendrierdelascience.com

Some realism detracts from, rather than enhancing, a game experience. Having to eat, while a drudgery by itself, isn't realistic without also having to sh er, use the latrine. And wipe.