

Chapter 1 : NY Daily News - We are currently unavailable in your region

Bolton: A Prime Mover Of The Iraq WMD Fiasco. March 22, Guest 10 Comments. by Greg Thielmann all-source intelligence and skillfully interpreting that intelligence. Although responsive to.

In the near future, you will be seeing more satellite photos of non-descript buildings that experts will say are housing elements of a nuclear bomb factory. There will be more diagrams of supposed nuclear devices. Bush and his neocon-dominated administration. For instance, in the run-up to war in Iraq, Albright co-authored a Sept. This site was where Iraq extracted uranium for its nuclear weapons program in the s. Unless inspectors go to the site and investigate all activities, the international community cannot exclude the possibility that Iraq is secretly producing a stockpile of uranium in violation of its commitments under Security Council resolutions. The uranium could be used in a clandestine nuclear weapons effort. Over the years, Albright had been cited in hundreds of news articles and made scores of television appearances as an authority on Iraqi weapons. How many, how could they deliver them? I mean, these are the big questions. I certainly accepted the administration claims on chemical and biological weapons. I figured they were telling the truth. If there is no [unconventional weapons program], I will feel taken, because they asserted these things with such assurance. The article by Joby Warrick stated: The institute performs widely respected independent analyses of nuclear programs in countries around the world, often drawing from IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] data. These charges compress a small sphere of enriched uranium or plutonium to trigger a nuclear chain reaction. It is a fair assumption that Amano will prove more malleable than his predecessor, and surely more naive. Republican presidential hopefuls are already lining up to beat the war drums and accuse President Barack Obama of softness on Iran. CIA analysts are sure to come under new pressure to back away from an important National Intelligence Estimate from which concluded that the Iranians had halted work on a nuclear weapons program in President Bush said the NIE tied his hands when he was considering a military attack on Iran before he left office. Not only do the Washington Post and New York Times routinely leave out the existence of the Israeli arsenal of possibly hundreds of atomic bombs when writing stories about Iran conceivably building its first, but experts like Albright also largely ignore the former while obsessing on the latter. It is that sort of even-handedness that Americans can expect in the next days and weeks as the U. For details, click here. His latest book, Neck Deep: The Disastrous Presidency of George W. Bush, was written with two of his sons, Sam and Nat, and can be ordered at [neckdeepbook](#).

Chapter 2 : Bolton: A Prime Mover Of The Iraq WMD Fiasco – LobeLog

Fiasco is a masterful reckoning with the planning and execution of the American military invasion and occupation of Iraq through mid, now with a postscript on recent developments. Ricks draws on the exclusive cooperation of an extraordinary number of American personnel, including more than one hundred senior officers, and access to more.

February 3, Exclusive: A bipartisan group of U. Despite all this, the question of who exactly is responsible for the providing WikiLeaks with the emails of high Democratic Party officials does not lend itself to easy answers. And yet, for months, despite the lack of publicly disclosed evidence, the media, like these senators, have been as one: The prevailing sentiment of the media establishment during the months prior to the disastrous March invasion of Iraq was that of certainty: In September , without an ounce of skepticism, Gordon and Miller regurgitated the claims of unnamed U. By , no one had any right to be surprised by what Bush and Cheney were up to; since at least when the U. And in , the media walked in lock step with yet another administration in pushing for an unnecessary and costly war. I believe that the coming invasion of Iraq will be remembered as an act of profound morality. I have no doubt about that. The idea that our inability to thus far find the weapons proves that the threat was phony and hyped is simply false. They espouse a potentially self-fulfilling defeatism. They publicize wild conspiracy theories. Also present is Chief of Staff Andy Card on right. Antipathy to Bush has, for example, led many liberals not only to believe the costs of the Iraq war outweigh the benefits but to refuse to acknowledge any benefits at all. Saddam was busy writing novels in He was no longer running the government. The hubris that many in the mainstream media displayed in marginalizing liberal and conservative anti-war voices was to come back to haunt them. But not, alas, for too long. Today something eerily similar to the pre-war debate over Iraq is taking place regarding the allegations of Russian interference in the U. In late December, the Post published an op-ed by Rep. Adam Schiff and former Rep. Jonathan Chait, now a columnist for New York magazine, is clearly convinced by what the government has thus far provided. And Andrew Sullivan is certain as to the motive. Foreign Special Interests Another, equally remarkable similarity to the period of is the role foreign lobbyists have played in helping to whip up a war fever. Ahmed Chalabi Chalabi was also a trusted source of Judy Miller of the Times, which, in an apology to its readers on May 26, , wrote: He became a favorite of hard-liners within the Bush administration and a paid broker of information from Iraqi exiles. Though we do not know how widespread the practice has been as of yet, something similar is taking place today. Perhaps the most egregious example of this newly popular genre appeared on Jan. Records show her work for the consulting firm Fianna Strategies frequently takes her to Capitol Hill to lobby U. Senate and Congressional staffers, as well as prominent U. Russia teaches us a very important lesson: The fight is the American way. New developments are emerging almost daily. It has no apparent relationship with Russian intelligence and it would be an indicator of compromise for any website. In May, the company, CrowdStrike, determined that the hack was the work of the Russians. Yet CrowdStrike is hardly a disinterested party when it comes to Russia. In recent years, it has emerged as a leading voice calling for a new Cold War with Russia. William Binney, a year veteran of the National Security Agency and the man responsible for creating many of its collection systems, thinks so. Unless we are dealing with a leak from an insider, not a hack. Jacob Appelbaum None of this is to say, of course, that Russia did not and could not have attempted to influence the U. But as it now stands the publicly available evidence is open to question. According to a recent you. It also does not appear that a congressional inquiry will start from scratch and critically examine the evidence. But they already seemed to have made up their minds about the conclusion: Could the rush into a new Cold War with Russia be as disastrous and consequential – if not more so – as was the rush to war with Iraq nearly 15 years ago? We may, unfortunately, find out.

Chapter 3 : Cinema wars : Hollywood film and politics in the Bush-Cheney era (Book,) [calendrierdelascien

Iraq's invasion of Iran in September , which precipitated the eight-years-long First Gulf War, and the August invasion of Kuwait, with the attendant Second Gulf War of January-February , highlighted the ongoing danger Iraq posed to regional and global stability.

We were controlled by the Interior Ministry, and security people observed us constantly. But I was able to use my English. I spoke very well and interviewed many foreigners. That would be inconceivable today. The political situation is atrocious. The religious leaders are mixing politics with religion. But this new religious fervor has taken hold of the entire country. We have too little education and too little freedom. I consider myself a broad-minded person. I am unmarried and have no children, and I am an intellectual. I studied art and design in Leeds, England. I had great talent. For me, the happiest moment was when Baghdad was liberated from this dictator. The city began to flourish after that, and it was peaceful. But the occupation resulted in Sunnis and Shiites attacking each other, and in al-Qaida and former Saddam supporters joining forces. I live in Mansur, a mixed neighborhood. But even as a Sunni, I never feel safe there. Most residents are pro-Saddam. American and Iraqi troops often search the area. They also come to my house. I think this is good, in a certain way. But there is often something missing after the searches: I have wanted to sell my house and move to a different area for a long time.

Chapter 4 : Obama's Interpretation of the War on Iraq | Dissident Voice

Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq () is a book by Washington Post Pentagon correspondent Thomas E. Ricks. Fiasco deals with the history of the Iraq War from the planning phase to combat operations to and argues that the war was badly planned and executed.

In the near future, you will be seeing more satellite photos of non-descript buildings that experts will say are housing elements of a nuclear bomb factory. There will be more diagrams of supposed nuclear devices. Bush and his neocon-dominated administration. For instance, in the run-up to war in Iraq, Albright co-authored a Sept. This site was where Iraq extracted uranium for its nuclear weapons program in the s. The uranium could be used in a clandestine nuclear weapons effort. Over the years, Albright had been cited in hundreds of news articles and made scores of television appearances as an authority on Iraqi weapons. How many, how could they deliver them? I mean, these are the big questions. I certainly accepted the administration claims on chemical and biological weapons. I figured they were telling the truth. If there is no [unconventional weapons program], I will feel taken, because they asserted these things with such assurance. The article by Joby Warrick stated: The institute performs widely respected independent analyses of nuclear programs in countries around the world, often drawing from IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] data. These charges compress a small sphere of enriched uranium or plutonium to trigger a nuclear chain reaction. Republican presidential hopefuls are already lining up to beat the war drums and accuse President Barack Obama of softness on Iran. CIA analysts are sure to come under new pressure to back away from an important National Intelligence Estimate from which concluded that the Iranians had halted work on a nuclear weapons program in President Bush said the NIE tied his hands when he was considering a military attack on Iran before he left office. Not only do the Washington Post and New York Times routinely leave out the existence of the Israeli arsenal of possibly hundreds of atomic bombs when writing stories about Iran conceivably building its first, but experts like Albright also largely ignore the former while obsessing on the latter. It is that sort of even-handedness that Americans can expect in the next days and weeks as the U.

Chapter 5 : The U.S. and Iraq After the War | Foreign Policy Journal

Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq - Kindle edition by Thomas E. Ricks. Download it once and read it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Use features like bookmarks, note taking and highlighting while reading Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq.

Tap here to turn on desktop notifications to get the news sent straight to you. Hayden, provided so many fanciful explanations for the failures of the US intelligence community before and during the period he was director of the National Security Agency that one has to wonder about the quality of the new office of the Director of National Intelligence. What had changed was the political climate. At all levels the Bush administration was applying pressure to intelligence bureaucrats to disprove that Saddam had WMD. Proving a negative is usually impossible. Hayden glossed over that. Instead he couched the WMD fantasy in terms of an intelligence failure and dodged any real responsibility. He said that as NSA chief he was only required to assess the use of intercepted information in the estimate and that satisfied with that he had voted for it. He then, by implication, blamed the other intelligence services for bringing evidence to the estimate drafting table that was not properly sourced. Hayden then went on to assure the House intelligence subcommittee that in future each member of the board that approves NIEs must sign off on the quality of their information and that as a result the estimates are now more tentative. Although they varied in quality, it would come as a shock to the generations that wrote them to learn that they were traditionally characterized by shoddy sources and incautious predictions. They would also be shocked to learn that the intelligence chiefs who signed off on them were only supposed to be sure that the stuff that their people supplied was properly used. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the CIA -- the chief drafter of these estimates -- has declassified a ton of them. Just look at a handful and it is hard not to conclude that Hayden was misrepresenting the entire process to conceal the political nature of the NIE of October. Despite what Hayden recalled, intelligence chiefs traditionally disagreed on the substance of the predictions -- the estimates are littered with footnotes where an intelligence chief could not bring himself to accept a particular judgment -- not on picky points of how one piece of information was used. The satellite information -- from the Corona program -- was an unusually precise piece of information for an estimate. The NIEs were generally quite tentative and always highly speculative. As a result they reflected a kaleidoscope of information and rarely rested on a couple of sources. Indeed these estimates were so vague that many key policymakers often ignored them. In its shaky foundation and political intent, the NIE of October was much more the exception than the rule. Granting Hayden the benefit of the doubt about his lack of understanding of the history of US estimates, there is still the question of his own judgment in shaping those estimates that came his way when he was at the NSA. Hayden signed off on that information and presumably that interpretation. In dodging any discussion of his own interpretive errors today, Hayden leaves open the question of his ability to help his new boss supervise the intelligence analysis process. Do you have information you want to share with HuffPost?

Chapter 6 : Robert Parry - An Iraq-WMD Replay on Iran? - Home - The Gary Null Blog

The Iraq Fiasco, Life in Religion is important, but the religious leaders interpret it only to their own advantage. I am terrified of the day when the Americans withdraw from the.

Amine Kabbaj Book Review: The author Ricks is known for his long experience with the pentagon as a correspondent for the Washington Post. Most importantly, he has been focusing on the Iraq war by making intensive interviews to the officials of the Bush administration. He went even further by traveling to the war zone, Iraq, and had access to official military documents. In his book Fiasco, Ricks starts with a strong argument that shows what has more likely been the case of the Iraq war. This latter is known for the challenge it represents to the world most dominant institutions, which relatively contributes in instigating "the most profligate actions in the history of American foreign policy"³. The Bush administration was cautious about the recurrence of a similar mistake, attempting to transform the military force into a deadly machine that can be able to establish a well implemented system of power. It takes more than one person to make a mess as big as Iraq. Thomas Ricks expressed his displeasure about Pentagon seniors such as the secretary of Defense and other respective deputies. In this regard, the author says in his book: In this regard, the bloody events might seem normal to the international community, where in fact the American military operations were heading to the establishment of an abusive system. The author precisely mentions that the administrators in charge denied any responsibility in this regard, stating that the mistreatment of Iraqis is to be seen as an individual act of military soldiers. Yet, US forces kept degrading and provoking Iraqis. Military soldiers followed 9 Ibid, 10 Thomas E. In this respect Ricks eventually assumes that "when assumptions are wrong, everything built on them is undermined" Moreover, he points out in details to military and political US officials who were directly involved in the Iraq war, Paul Wolfowitz and the US General Odierno; this latter "turned a blind eye to [â€] brutalities". This latter consists of implementing democratic institutions that could maintain a stable restructuration of the country and ensure unity within. However and with reference to current events in the Middle East and Iraq in particular, the pre Iraq war status quo seems more stable than post Iraq war situation. Consequently, this has led to the emergence of an independent Kurdish state and various oppositional factions seeking power in the country through violent means. I believe that Thomas Ricks displays some of the defective measures of the American war architects in Iraq. What seems most puzzling to me, are the promises given by the Bush administration to avoid the mistake committed in the Vietnam War. What to do after getting to Baghdad? My attention was grabbed by the possible predictions Ricks have about a post-war Iraq, who says: In short, it was hard for political and military leaders to admit their inaccuracy and shortsightedness. They 19 Mills, Kevin "Fiasco:

Chapter 7 : Iraq: Mass Media & Military Policy – Media Psychology Review

And the WMD fiasco is a perfect comparison, because the same people drove the same sort of fact-free theme for private reasons, as Wolfowitz put it, the story around which varying separate.

He virtually damned the war with the faintest of praise. Obama thus resorted to conveying a deceptively selective history of former President George W. It was a credit card war that will burden future generations with debt, not them, and the troops were volunteers, not conscripts. People often waved the flag with gusto and participated in pro-forma displays of support for the troops and concern for their families, but not much more. Reporting about the official war-ending, flag-lowering ceremony in Washington Dec. Many millions protested the war even before it began. The mass antiwar movement remained large and viable for several years, but dissipated, except for the dedicated left and pacifists, when Democrat Obama won the election. The movement had a much larger impact on public opinion and government policy than has been recognized. In his speech Obama made no mention of such highlights as the nonexistent weapons of mass destruction, the shame of Abu Ghraib, or the astonishing cost of the war. At that time some , U. Instead of facts the president resorted to embellishing trifles and vacuous tributes to the troops: But still, there is something profound about the end of a war that has lasted so long. At the beginning, the Bush Administration estimated the war would end in victory in three months. It groaned to an ambiguous finale in months. But defeat is the only suitable word. Any war between a rich, overwhelmingly powerful state deploying a military juggernaut and a small poor state with a broken army that ends in a stalemate after nearly nine years is a humiliating defeat. It is being covered up, but in time we assume historians will unite around this verdict. As such it is essential to maintain the public belief that the U. Can one participate with honor – even with bravery or at least showing up and following the leader – in a civilian gang attack on innocent people, or for burning down a block of urban housing, or for acts of vandalism in a rural village? How do conventional criminal deeds differ from the massive criminality of U. He is essentially on trial for exposing war crimes. Others include those who joined Iraq Veterans Against the War IVAW or March Forward, another veteran group, who turned against and condemned the conflict and devoted themselves to working for peace. Also, we assume there were many soldiers who consciously avoided harming civilians and performed acts of kindness as well. But an undetermined number of U. The public testimony of IVAW members a couple of years ago was chilling, as well as the many revelations of murder and abuse that have managed to become known to the media, such as the Haditha massacre of dozens of Iraqis in

Interpreting the Iraq Fiasco. Iraq and Its Aftermath in Fiction Films. Get PDF (K) More content like this. Find more content: like this article; Find more content.

Mona Baker The Translator. For reasons to do with the spread and intensity of armed conflicts since the early s and the increased visibility of transla- tors and interpreters that accompanied this development, scholars both within and outside translation studies have begun to engage with various aspects of the role and positioning of translators and interpreters in war zones. Drawing on available studies and recent media reports on contemporary conflicts, and adopting a narrative perspective to make sense of the findings, this article focuses on two issues. The first is how translators and interpreters are narrated by other participants in the war zone, including military personnel, war correspondents, mainstream media, alternative media and local populations. The second is how they themselves participate in elaborating the range of public narratives of the conflict that become available to us, and, in so doing, influence the course of the war in ways that are subtle, often invisible, but nevertheless extremely significant. The discussion is set within the broader context of recurrent, stock political narratives that constrain and define relationships and identities in all war contexts, and demonstrates that despite attempts to contain them within those narratives, translators and interpreters retain their agency and exercise their power in diverse ways. Two essential and interrelated elements of the public narratives that precede and accompany all wars constrain practically every form of interaction in this context, including the interaction between translators and their employers, compatriots, the media, government agents and other members of the societies in which they operate. The same stock political narrative is sold to publics on either side of every conflict, past and present: It represents the opposite of everything we stand for: We value life and freedom, they are out to kill and enslave us or our allies, or their own people. Where the translator or interpreter is then positioned, as one of us or potentially one of them, becomes extremely important and has concrete and often life-threatening consequences. Germans in general were widely narrated as Nazis in the s and s; the word German itself became synonymous with Nazi. Similarly, Serbs were widely narrated as murderous during the recent Balkan wars, with Bosnians generally perceived as peace- ful, helpless victims. See also Baker Mona Baker Packer A variant on the narrative of homogeneity, as far as the them side of the equation is concerned, involves constructing the enemy as consisting of a number of clearly delineated groups fighting with each other, with perhaps one group needing our assistance and worthy of some accommodation because, though still very different, at least they aspire to become like us one day. Ultimately, both elements of this storyline difference and homogeneity work to ensure that there is no room for ambiguity and ambivalence in a war context, no space for critical reflection or inconvenient questioning of the underlying narrative, nothing that might interfere with and slow down the operation of the war machine. To justify such brute violence, the enemy must be dehumanized, depicted as an undifferentiated, homogeneous mass. The corollary of this on our side is that we have to be narrated as a cohesive, united community with shared values, despite minor disagreements here and there, and these shared values cannot be open to negotiation. This push for homogeneity extends even to the use of language and can involve suppressing any form of linguistic diversity. But in doing so, he also places him or her in relation to the menacing presence of his or her shadowy other: This is the oppressive backdrop against which translators and interpret- ers work during wartime. On the one hand, each translator or interpreter is ultimately an individual with a personal history, with a potentially complex, shifting and perhaps even ambivalent position in relation to different elements of the public narratives that orient the war, and often with a network of per- sonal relations on both sides of the war. And yet translators and interpreters, like other members of society, soon find out that there is no place in war for fluid, shifting identities, for split or even strained loyalties, nor for negotiated narratives of any kind. Witness, for example, the forced relocation of all Japanese nationals and American nationals of Japanese origin to internment camps on the West Coast during World War II, irrespective of their individual views and behaviour. Mona Baker closely aligned with the public narratives that inform and justify the war: These observations are important for making sense of some of the ways in which translators and interpreters in

the war zone can reassert or disrupt the public narratives that fuel the conflict, and the way they themselves are made to fit within those narratives. In what follows, I will largely focus on two issues that interest me from a narrative perspective: I will return to these issues as I try to summarize the rather limited literature on translation and interpreting in or around war zones and look ahead to potential research avenues. The scarcity of data and dearth of research in the field Very little scholarly research is available on translators and interpreters in war zones. The two studies by media specialist Jerry Palmer Palmer , Palmer and Fontan are unique in their focus on the role of translators and interpreters on the ground, in war-torn Iraq, and the fact that they are based on interviews with media personnel who have direct experience of working with translators and interpreters in this context. War documents – such as war archives and memoirs of key protagonists – typically pay little or no attention to language mediation. Usually, interpreters are the occasion for a story about the devastation of the area in which the memoirist served, the destruction of pre-war multi-ethnic Sarajevo or the atmosphere of suspicion among the three ethnic groups involved in the conflict. The interpreter flits in and out of recollections of meetings with hard-drinking generals, tense moments on patrol or off-duty nightlife. Any attempt to address the two issues I wish to pursue here – how translators and interpreters are narrated in war contexts and how they themselves participate in narrating the war – thus has to contend with the dearth of research in this area and the fact that translators and interpreters are largely invisible in existing accounts of any war. Slightly more scholarly literature is available on the role played by translators and interpreters in the aftermath of war, especially in the asylum system as it relates to political refugees: Given that people who document the war pay little or no attention to issues of language mediation, war archives clearly have their limitations as a source of data. This type of ethnographic field work is very rare. Mona Baker or the military and accused of terrorism or insurgency. Inghilleri also draws on a wide range of published accounts of the Iraq war which occasionally make mention of translators and interpreters, such as Thomas E. To the best of my knowledge, the only study that examines the use of translators in intelligence gathering in the context of war is Footitt , in press , who focuses on intelligence activities based at Bletchley Park UK during World War II, and specifically on the involvement of linguists in translating material from decrypted coded messages and captured enemy documents. By its very nature, and given official secrets acts and other restrictions on accessing such data during and for some time after a war has ended, research on the role of translators in intelligence gathering activities is inevitably scarce and subject to the same limitations as other research based on the examination of war archives. There is no doubt, however, that translators and interpreters continue to play an important though often undocumented role in intelligence gathering activities. Packer mentions several examples in the context of the recent invasion and ongoing occupation of Iraq. Journalists are better equipped to investigate the actual war context, and in more recent years, media reports – often quite detailed – of firsthand, witness accounts and interviews with translators and interpreters working on the battleground have been easier to find. These reports have appeared in a wide range of print and online media, both mainstream and alternative. In recent conflicts, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan, journalists have begun to engage with the issue of language mediation and to register more awareness of the translator as a distinct participant in the events being narrated. This is a largely untapped source that scholars ought to make much better use of in future. Surprisingly, to the best of my knowledge, virtually no sustained analysis of media reporting on the role of translators and interpreters in war contexts has been undertaken to date, nor have many scholars drawn on these reports as sources of data. Maier takes a very cursory glance at media reports. Inghilleri , draws on media reports occasionally, but not systematically. This observation is relevant to the first of the two issues I wish to address here: The turmoil that interpreters and translators experience clearly results not just from what they witness of the violence of war but also from the way they are narrated by others, and the chasm that gradually opens up between their own sense of identity, their own personal narrative, and the identity and narrative imposed on them by other parties who both need and fear them. As will become clear in the discussion that follows, different parties tend to cast the translator in different roles within the broader narrative of war: From the perspective of a number of narrators, most typically the war correspondent, translators and interpreters tend to be readily depicted as victims of the ongoing violence. In the context of recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, they are often portrayed as victims of

the insensitivity and indifference of the military and the politicians who exploit their skills but offer them no protection and treat them as second class citizens. They are also narrated as victims of sectarian violence or insurgency: A widely read and detailed media account that casts translators and interpreters in this role appeared in *The New Yorker* in March. Both the article and the play revolve around the various forms of injustice endured by Iraqi interpreters since the start of the war. In particular, Packer condemns the indifference of the politicians who refuse to give visas to these individuals, whom he identifies as faithful, hard-working allies of the US. He is extremely critical of the military who treat them as second-class citizens, who would not allow them to wear face masks¹⁰ to protect themselves and their families from attacks by insurgents, nor give them accommodation on the base when their lives are being threatened. Interestingly, although media accounts such as these acknowledge that locally hired wartime translators are largely seen by their compatriots as traitors, this element of the narrative is used not to question their ethics or role in the unfolding conflict but to further affirm their status as victims. This unquestioning sympathy may be explained by the fact that many wartime correspondents come to rely on and in some cases develop a close personal relationship with their interpreters. Likewise, a number of military personnel come to form a bond with their interpreters over time and begin to see them as allies who need protection, as victims, rather than as potentially complicit in the violence of war, or even merely as service providers. Media reports tend to romanticize this relationship between correspondent and interpreter or officer and interpreter and to project the interpreter as a helpless protagonist, an innocent victim whose cause is being championed by a fair and caring member or members of the US group: Michael Zacchea left Iraq in , he was torn. But leaving Iraq also meant leaving Jack, his Iraqi interpreter, to face an insurgency that has made a point of brutalizing those who help the Americans. In their year together the two had, among other things, thwarted an assassination plot and survived the second battle of Falluja. Even before he departed, Colonel Zacchea began working to ensure that Jack would not be left. Soldier Jason Faler and his friend Mustafa had the same mission when they met in Iraq in . They worked long hours gathering intelligence for high level U. But there was one crucial difference: Faler was an American living in the Green Zone, while Mustafa was an Iraqi living without protection. These public narratives project local protagonists such as the insurgents in Iraq as extremist and the invading army as moral “whatever the merits or otherwise of individuals within it, and whatever the limitations and unintended, unforeseen failings of the enterprise. Casting interpreters in the role of victims is an integral part of this overall narrative, as evident in an exchange on *Face the Facts*, a programme aired on BBC Radio Four on 20 July. At one point, the presenter of the programme says the following emphasis added: The Ministry of Defence told us it only knows of four deaths among interpreters “which had occurred whilst they were working alongside British forces. The interpreter is clearly positioned here as a member of the coalition, on the US side of the conflict. Comparing deaths among interpreters with deaths among soldiers “rather than deaths among Iraqi civilians, or even insurgents “implies that interpreters who work for the coalition belong to the US group. Neither the interpreters nor the soldiers are narrated as perpetrators of violence when they suffer casualties, but only as victims and heroes. This positioning of locally hired interpreters within the overall narrative of the war explains why so many US and British journalists and returning soldiers felt it necessary to pressure their governments to grant visas and rights of residence to interpreters who served in Iraq and Afghanistan “rather than to all Iraqis or Afghans who have been displaced by the war. Once depicted in this broad public narrative constructed by the media as victims who are targeted by our enemies because their work is vital to our mission, the way translators and interpreters are narrated by other parties, most notably their compatriots, can then be acknowledged and simultaneously dismissed as unfair, extremist, criminal. Interviewed on the same radio programme, the General Secretary of the Institute of Translation and Interpreting in Britain, Alan Wheatley, continues in the same vein: The interpreter offers a method of communication that brings trust and understanding in very, very difficult circumstances. They understand the Iraqi culture. An interpreter is also a local knowledge specialist. The translator who works for foreign forces is not a victim in this narrative but a villain who deserves the same treatment as the invading army. As already noted, although media reports acknowledge that locally hired interpreters are considered collaborators and villains by their own people, they tend to weave this element within a narrative of insurgency and factionalism in which

interpreters are ultimately portrayed as innocent victims of extremism. Humphrey headed down from the roof to get a briefing. He found his lieutenant, John D. DeGiulio, with a couple of sergeants. They were snickering like schoolboys. The Iraqi interpreter took to the roof, bullhorn in hand. The sun was setting. Humphrey heard the keening of the call to prayer, then the crackle of the bullhorn with the interpreter answering "â€" in Arabic, then in English for the troops, insulting the prophet. The head and the window and the wall around it disappeared. This is one of several media and other types of eyewitness reports that narrate translators and interpreters not as victims but as complicit in the violence of war. The involvement of translators contracted by the Titan corporation in the Abu Ghraib scandal, for instance, has received wide coverage. Another report in *The Independent* quoted one Abu Ghraib prisoner describing part of his ordeal in graphic terms Buncombe and Huggler

Chapter 9 : A Reprise of the Iraq-WMD Fiasco? – Consortiumnews

The Iraq War began on March 20, , when US airstrikes targeted strategic facilities across the country, as well as Saddam Hussein and senior members of his regime. The US-led coalition forces.

Citation Author Bio Schnell, J. Mass Media Implications, U. Military Policy, and Cross-Cultural Communication. He was tenured in and promoted to full professor in During , he served as a Fulbright Senior Specialist at the Royal University of Phnom Penh in Cambodia, where he assisted with the development of the new Cambodia Communication Institute and the training of a new generation of journalists whose predecessors were killed or fled during the Khmer Rouge genocide and subsequent civil strife. Schnell is a sustaining member of the National Communication Association and has presented research findings each year since at their annual meeting. He has functioned as a paid political analyst on television and radio. His primary area of research focuses on U. He has served as a visiting professor at Northern Jiaotong University in Beijing on numerous occasions since his initial assignment there in Schnell is a Colonel in the U. He earned the Defense Meritorious Service Medal in and has held a Top Secret security clearance since entering active duty in This reporting has, in turn, impacted U. In this manner, the mass media coverage conveys the story and has become part of the story it is reporting. Thus, there is a communicative nexus between mass media and war. From the perspective of 17 years in the USAF and extensive familiarity with military doctrine, I argue that the primary tenets of established military theory were consistently ignored after the start of the Iraq war in The inability to consider and plan for cross-cultural ramifications has been a central communication failure that has proven problematic. The mass media have reported on these matters which has modified public understanding of the matters being reported on. Mass media is a formidable construct that must be acknowledged as foundation for understanding context. We periodically have illustrations of this that can serve as substance for case study analysis as exemplified by the power of pictures from Somalia and U. Pictures of starving Somali children created considerable public outrage in resulting in the U. These example in Somalia illustrate how mass media can wield considerable influence with U. The cultural continuum in such portrayals shows a move from negative to positive realities across a progression from cultural destructiveness that acknowledges only one way of being to cultural blindness stressing people are basically the same to cultural awareness involving enhanced insights with other ethnic groups to cultural sensitivity based on growth through actively learning about other groups to cultural competence emphasizing a gauged proficiency working with people from varied cultural backgrounds. This progression signifies growth of an individual through the enhanced ability to interact with culturally different individuals Deymaz, , pp. Such competence is often offered as an abstract ideal that can be attained or at least sought. It can be understood more concretely via the levels of cross-cultural competence. The situation involving U. While images have been both positive and negative, most have been negative; some with lasting damaging impressions. The theoretical underpinnings, and resulting interpretations, regarding mass media and cross-cultural communication serve as context for this report. Professional Military Education can enhance understanding of military thinking and doctrine in relation to these variables. Each branch of the military has intermediate and senior service schools. Communication processes are consistently recognized as being primary concerns in these courses. During this period, U. This speculation was proven inaccurate as a result of the events of September 11, Hindsight provides an enhanced position for interpreting what has transpired since Travers wrote those words. However, for the most part, the Professional Military Education readings tend to be accurate and relevant in the assessments offered. Most of the Professional Military Education readings lay a foundation for understanding, among other things, under what conditions the United States should commit military troops and, when those troops are committed, considerations for guiding the deployment of troops. What follows is a general overview of some of the more common tenets. The second is that the objective can be turned into a crusade that appeals to our moral sense. The third is that the objective must represent a self-interest perceived to be worth the cost of the war. Drew and Snow stress the importance of national security objectives in Making Strategy: They state the initial task of the strategist is to define the national security objectives that support an intended operation. They go on to

stress that, without attention to this detail, the result will most likely be a decline in American national will and military morale p. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry clarifies three elements to be considered regarding the use of force. He states there are three different cases in which we may employ military power: Our second category is when important, but not vital, national interests are threatened. A caveat to this position by Michael Howard is acknowledged. Perry cautions against fighting wars with limited political objectives as we are doing in Iraq. For example, Americans generally have supported unlimited political objectives in war. An overall theme that is consistently reinforced in professional military education centers on clarity. An exit strategy should be established and there should be public support. William Snyder stresses this line of thinking when he explains the importance of military strategy. Friction is the only conception which in a general way corresponds to that which distinguishes real war from war on paper. A sub-mission can become larger than the original mission. Such has been the situation in Iraq. The original primary mission was to oust Saddam Hussein. This was accomplished in short order. However the aftermath, which was barely planned for i. As a result we find the U. Donald Snow, former professor at the Army War College, warns of this very phenomenon. Do not think of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement either as an extension of what the Army does or as parallel and compatible missions. The Army has limited experience in peacekeeping. Significant involvement in peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations will require the Army to modify the way it does business. The following excerpts from Fiasco Ricks, , illustrate how many of these tenets have not only been disregarded but, in many cases, have been directly contradicted. The book is provocative and relevant given the loss of life, on all sides of the issue, that occurs on a daily basis. I submit that the contradictions it presents on how our professional military education system prepares our military leaders to fight wars underscores the degree of confusion that exists within the U. According to Ricks , a significant feature is a lack of awareness regarding cross-cultural communication dynamics. The continual mass media reporting of the war, gains and losses, informs the emerging and evolving public mind. According to Ricks, the impact of mass media reporting is inherent in our understanding many areas, such as the focus on the role of military doctrine, the Bush rationale for military intervention in Iraq, problems associated with strategy, confusion regarding the notion of counterinsurgency, misuse of the U. Army, cross-cultural issues and parallels with U. Ricks opens with an interpretive foundation to build on: Henceforth, the United States was prepared to attack before threats became full-fledged. Ricks proceeds to interpret the rationale used by Bush to defend his use of the military in this manner. The Bush administration offered three basic rationales for U. In the spring of , the first two arguments were undercut by the official findings by the same government that had invaded Iraq, and the third was tarred by the revelation of the Abu Ghraib scandal. The implication being that such a scenario is a recipe for tragic results. Ricks details his view of the absence of meaningful strategy that is an outgrowth of faulty doctrine and misguided rationale for military intervention in Iraq. An overly simplistic conception of the war led to a cascading undercutting of the war effort: A confused strategy can be every bit as lethal as a bullet. A vacant strategy makes the U. Army one of the victims of U. In spite of Army leadership cautions, and that we see clearly in hindsight, is that there was not a clear overarching strategy in place prior to the invasion. Ricks describes where this strategic void has led to tragic results. S Army divisions operated like fingers without an operational hand or strategic arm to guide themâ€. The Abu Ghraib prison situation reflects one of the more pronounced examples of how the U. Army subsequently went off course. The tragedy of the Abu Ghraib abuses can be attributed to a large degree to the lack of strategy. The mass mediated visual images of Abu Ghraib prison abuses will haunt U. Key misunderstandings have flowed from this situation, including what a counterinsurgency is and how to combat it. The Bush administration was slow to grasp that U. Many problems come from a lack of awareness in this area. Every time you treat an Iraqi disrespectfully, you are working for the enemyâ€. The confusion about what kind of war we are fighting places the U. Kalev Sepp is a retired Special Forces officer who earned his Ph. These were his hallmarks of failure: Army; 8 peacetime government processes; 9 open borders, airspace, coastlines. One of the ways for soldiers to function in such an environment is being able to remove themselves from that environment, even if it is counter to best practices for fighting a counterinsurgency. Since the Iraq invasion, quality of life issues for U. In order to keep a volunteer force relatively happy and willing to come back for third and perhaps fourth tours, the Pentagon had

to provide a high quality of life for its people. But counterinsurgency doctrine says that the only way to win such a campaign is to live among the people.