

Chapter 1 : John Dewey Quotes About Reality | A-Z Quotes

*William James and John Dewey rank among the most influential public intellectuals in the history of the United States. They are best known for their advocacy of pragmatism, America's unique contribution to world philosophy.*

Being, nature, and experience In order to develop and articulate his philosophical system, Dewey first needed to expose what he regarded as the flaws of the existing tradition. He believed that the distinguishing feature of Western philosophy was its assumption that true being—that which is fully real or fully knowable—is changeless, perfect, and eternal and the source of whatever reality the world of experience may possess. The Western tradition thus made a radical distinction between true reality on the one hand and the endless varieties and variations of worldly human experience on the other. Dewey held that this philosophy of nature was drastically impoverished. Rejecting any dualism between being and experience, he proposed that all things are subject to change and do change. There is no static being, and there is no changeless nature. Nor is experience purely subjective, because the human mind is itself part and parcel of nature. Human experiences are the outcomes of a range of interacting processes and are thus worldly events. The challenge to human life, therefore, is to determine how to live well with processes of change, not somehow to transcend them. Nature and the construction of ends Dewey developed a metaphysics that examined characteristics of nature that encompassed human experience but were either ignored by or misrepresented by more traditional philosophers. The precarious For Dewey, a precarious event is one that somehow makes ongoing experience problematic; thus, any obstacle, disruption, danger, or surprise of any kind is precarious. As noted earlier, because humanity is a part of nature, all things that humans encounter in their daily experience, including other humans and the social institutions they inhabit, are natural events. The arbitrary cruelty of a tyrant or the kindness shown by a stranger is as natural and precarious as the destruction wrought by a flood or the vibrant colours of a sunset. Human ideas and moral norms must also be viewed in this way. Human knowledge is wholly intertwined with precarious, constantly changing nature. Histories The constancy of change does not imply a complete lack of continuity with the past stages of natural processes. What Dewey meant by a history was a process of change with an identifiable outcome. When the constituent processes of a history are identified, they become subject to modification, and their outcome can be deliberately varied and secured. This is why Dewey was so concerned with developing a philosophy of education. With an appropriate knowledge of the conditions necessary for human growth, an individual may develop in any of a variety of ways. The object of education is thus to promote the fruition of an active history of a specific kind—a human history. Ends and goods Since at least the time of Aristotle (c. 384–322 BCE), many Western philosophers have made use of the notion of end, or final cause. But such ends must be discerned before they can be fully attained. For Dewey, on the other hand, an end is a deliberately constructed outcome of a history. Such an end is a fulfillment of these particular conditions, and it is unique to them. Similarly, there is no such thing as an absolute good against which actions may be evaluated; rather, any constructed end that promotes human flourishing while taking into account the precarious is a good. Instrumentalism Dewey joined and gave direction to American pragmatism, which was initiated by the logician and philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce in the mid-19th century and continued into the early 20th century by William James, among other thinkers. Another theme of early pragmatism, also adopted by Dewey, was the importance of experimental inquiry. In general, pragmatists were inspired by the dramatic advances in science and technology during the 19th century—indeed, many had formal scientific training and performed experiments in the natural, physical, or social sciences. Studio portrait of John Dewey. Inquiry requires an active participation in such processes: For example, experimental inquiry may seek to discern how malignancies in a human organism change in relation to variations in specific forms of treatment, or how students become better learners when exposed to particular methods of instruction. True to the name he gave it, and in keeping with earlier pragmatists, Dewey held that ideas are instruments, or tools, that humans use to make greater sense of the world. Specifically, ideas are plans of action and predictors of future events. A person possesses an idea when he is prepared to use a given object in a manner that will produce a predictable result. Thus, a person has an idea of a hammer when

he is prepared to use such an object to drive nails into wood. An idea in the science of medicine may predict that the introduction of a certain vaccine will prevent the onset of future maladies of a definite sort. Ideas predict that the undertaking of a definite line of conduct in specified conditions will produce a determinate result. Of course, ideas might be mistaken. They must be tested experimentally to see whether their predictions are borne out. Experimentation itself is fallible, but the chance for error is mitigated by further, more rigorous inquiry. Dewey did not provide a thorough, systematic response to the question of how an instrumentalist determines the difference between good and evil. His typical rejoinder was that human fulfillment will be far more widespread when people fully realize that precarious natural events may come under deliberate human direction. Dewey made this claim, however, without sufficiently weighing the problem of how people are to choose between one proposed vision of fulfillment and another, especially when there are honest disagreements about their respective merits. Democracy is also a source of moral values that may guide the establishment and evolution of social institutions that promote human flourishing. However, unlike other moral frameworks e.

**Chapter 2 : The Role of Imagination in James's and Dewey's Understanding of Religious Experience**

*Dewey identified the myriad ways in which supernatural concerns distract religious adherents from pressing social concerns, and sought to reconcile the tensions inherent in science's dual embrace of common sense and the aesthetic.*

*James and Dewey on Belief and Experience is divided into two sections: the former showcases James.*

Educated by tutors and at private schools in New York. Family moves to Europe. William attends school in Geneva, Paris, and Boulogne-sur-Mer; develops interests in painting and science. Family settles in Geneva, where William studies science at Geneva Academy; then returns to Newport when William decides he wishes to resume his study of painting. William abandons painting and enters Lawrence Scientific School at Harvard. Enters Harvard School of Medicine. Returns to medical school. Suffers eye strain, back problems, and suicidal depression in the fall. Travels to Europe for health and education: Severe depression in the fall. Depression and poor health continue. Accepts offer from President Eliot of Harvard to teach undergraduate course in comparative physiology. Accepts an appointment to teach full year of anatomy and physiology, but postpones teaching for a year to travel in Europe. Begins teaching psychology; establishes first American psychology laboratory. Marries Alice Howe Gibbens. Appointed Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Harvard. Continues to teach psychology. Teaches psychology and philosophy at Harvard: Briefer Course with Henry Holt. Publishes *Talks to Teachers on Psychology*: Becomes active member of the Anti-Imperialist League, opposing U. All were reprinted in *Essays in Radical Empiricism* His partially completed manuscript published posthumously as *Some Problems of Philosophy*. Dies of heart failure at summer home in Chocorua, New Hampshire. Survival, James asserts, is merely one of many interests human beings have: We are all teleological creatures at base, James holds, each with a set of a priori values and categories. When he gets the marks, he may know that he has got the rationality. The ideal philosopher, James holds, blends these two passions of rationality, and even some great philosophers go too far in one direction or another: Sentiments of rationality operate not just in logic or science, but in ordinary life. James is sympathetic both to the idea that the universe is something we can be intimate with and to the idea that it is wild and unpredictable. Certainly it is always seen in the philosophy of William James. Little, Brown, , pp. In fact he takes a number of methodological approaches in the book. As the book moves along, he involves himself in discussions with philosophers—for example with Hume and Kant in his hundred-page chapter on the self, and he finds himself making metaphysical claims that anticipate his later pragmatism, as when he writes: The rhythm of a lost word may be there without a sound to clothe it. Our father and mother, our wife and babes, are bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh. When they die, a part of our very selves is gone. If they do anything wrong, it is our shame. If they are insulted, our anger flashes forth as readily as if we stood in their place. There is an excitement during the crying fit which is not without a certain pungent pleasure of its own; but it would take a genius for felicity to discover any dash of redeeming quality in the feeling of dry and shrunken sorrow PP We answer by consents or non-consents and not by words. What wonder that these dumb responses should seem our deepest organs of communication with the nature of things! In this last quotation, James tackles a philosophical problem from a psychological perspective. Our psychic life has rhythm: We rest when we remember the name we have been searching for; and we are off again when we hear a noise that might be the baby waking from her nap. However, the objective world originally experienced is not the world of spatial relations that we think: Certainly a child newly born in Boston, who gets a sensation from the candle-flame which lights the bedroom, or from his diaper-pin [who] does not feel either of these objects to be situated in longitude 71 W. The flame fills its own place, the pain fills its own place; but as yet these places are neither identified with, nor discriminated from, any other places. Many habits must begin early in life: The significance of this view, according to James, is that our emotions are tied in with our bodily expressions. In his survey of a range of cases, James finds that some actions involve an act of resolve or of outgoing nervous energy, but others do not. I sit at table after dinner and find myself from time to time taking nuts or raisins out of the dish and eating them. My dinner properly is over, and in the heat of the conversation I am hardly aware

of what I do; but the perception of the fruit, and the fleeting notion that I may eat it, seem fatally to bring the act about. There is certainly no express fiat here;â€ PP If I am on an isolated mountain trail, faced with an icy ledge to cross, and do not know whether I can make it, I may be forced to consider the question whether I can or should believe that I can cross the ledge. In such a case the belief may be justified by the outcome to which having the belief leads. He extends his analysis beyond the religious domain, however, to a wide range of secular human life: A social organism of any sort is what it is because each member proceeds to his own duty with a trust that the other members will simultaneously do theirsâ€. A government, an army, a commercial system, a ship, a college, an athletic team, all exist on this condition, without which not only is nothing achieved, but nothing is even attempted WB James defends our right to believe in certain answers to these questions anyway. In the higher animals a theoretical or thinking stage intervenes between sensation and action, and this is where, in human beings, the thought of God arises. The blindness to which James draws attention is that of one human being to another, a blindness he illustrates with a story from his own life. Riding in the mountains of North Carolina he comes upon a devastated landscape, with no trees, scars in the earth, here and there a patch of corn growing in the sunlight. But after talking to the settlers who had cleared the forest to make room for their farm, James comes to see it their way at least temporarily: This plurality, he writes: Even prisons and sick-rooms have their special revelations TT Wordsworth and Shelley, Emerson, and W. But at some five hundred pages it is only half the length of *The Principles of Psychology*, befitting its more restricted, if still large, scope. For James studies that part of human nature that is, or is related to, religious experience. Healthy-mindedness can be involuntary, just natural to someone, but often comes in more willful forms. Some sick souls never get well, while others recover or even triumph: The first is ineffability: Thirdly, mystical states are transient; and, fourth, subjects are passive with respect to them: Nevertheless, James articulates his own beliefâ€which he does not claim to proveâ€that religious experiences connect us with a greater, or further, reality not accessible in our normal cognitive relations to the world: They lead to consistency, stability and flowing human intercourse. James holds neither that we create our truths out of nothing, nor that truth is entirely independent of humanity. Gustav Fechner and Henri Bergson. James concludes by embracing a position that he had more tentatively set forth in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*: Certain sequences of pure experiences constitute physical objects, and others constitute persons; but one pure experience say the perception of a chair may be part both of the sequence constituting the chair and of the sequence constituting a person. It is never precisely defined in the *Essays*, and is best explicated by a passage from *The Meaning of Truth* where James states that radical empiricism consists of a postulate, a statement of fact, and a conclusion. His legacy extends into psychology and the study of religion, and in philosophy not only throughout the pragmatist tradition that he founded along with Charles Peirce , but into phenomenology and analytic philosophy. James is one of the most attractive and endearing of philosophers: *The Nation* 3 September Harvard University Press, 17 vol. Library of America, Contained in *Essays in Philosophy*, pp. Harvard University Press, Originally published in [PP]. Harvard University Press, ; first published in [WB]. Henry Holt, [TT]. Originally published in [V]. Originally published in [P]. Originally published in [PU]. Harvard University Press, [MT]. Originally published in Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, [E]. *Some Problems of Philosophy*. The Letters of William James, ed.

**Chapter 3 : Project MUSE - James and Dewey on Belief and Experience**

*Belief and experience were central to the work of James and Dewey, and by comparing what each has to say on these two central themes, we can learn a great deal about their common convictions regarding the nature of philosophical inquiry and about the distinctive qualities of their work.*

The eldest sibling died in infancy, but the three surviving brothers attended the public school and the University of Vermont in Burlington with John. While at the University of Vermont, Dewey was exposed to evolutionary theory through the teaching of G. Perkins and Lessons in Elementary Physiology, a text by T. Huxley, the famous English evolutionist. The formal teaching in philosophy at the University of Vermont was confined for the most part to the school of Scottish realism, a school of thought that Dewey soon rejected, but his close contact both before and after graduation with his teacher of philosophy, H. Torrey, a learned scholar with broader philosophical interests and sympathies, was later accounted by Dewey himself as "decisive" to his philosophical development. After graduation in , Dewey taught high school for two years, during which the idea of pursuing a career in philosophy took hold. With this nascent ambition in mind, he sent a philosophical essay to W. Harris, then editor of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, and the most prominent of the St. With this encouragement he traveled to Baltimore to enroll as a graduate student at Johns Hopkins University. At Johns Hopkins Dewey came under the tutelage of two powerful and engaging intellects who were to have a lasting influence on him. George Sylvester Morris, a German-trained Hegelian philosopher, exposed Dewey to the organic model of nature characteristic of German idealism. Stanley Hall, one of the most prominent American experimental psychologists at the time, provided Dewey with an appreciation of the power of scientific methodology as applied to the human sciences. Upon obtaining his doctorate in , Dewey accepted a teaching post at the University of Michigan, a post he was to hold for ten years, with the exception of a year at the University of Minnesota in While at Michigan Dewey wrote his first two books: At Michigan Dewey also met one of his important philosophical collaborators, James Hayden Tufts, with whom he would later author Ethics ; revised ed. In , Dewey followed Tufts to the recently founded University of Chicago. Dewey also founded and directed a laboratory school at Chicago, where he was afforded an opportunity to apply directly his developing ideas on pedagogical method. This experience provided the material for his first major work on education, The School and Society His philosophical reputation now secured, he was quickly invited to join the Department of Philosophy at Columbia University. Dewey spent the rest of his professional life at Columbia. Now in New York, located in the midst of the Northeastern universities that housed many of the brightest minds of American philosophy, Dewey developed close contacts with many philosophers working from divergent points of view, an intellectually stimulating atmosphere which served to nurture and enrich his thought. During his first decade at Columbia Dewey wrote a great number of articles in the theory of knowledge and metaphysics, many of which were published in two important books: His interest in educational theory also continued during these years, fostered by his work at Teachers College at Columbia. This led to the publication of How We Think ; revised ed. One outcome of this fame was numerous invitations to lecture in both academic and popular venues. Many of his most significant writings during these years were the result of such lectures, including Reconstruction in Philosophy , Human Nature and Conduct , Experience and Nature , The Public and its Problems , and The Quest for Certainty The Theory of Inquiry in Dewey continued to work vigorously throughout his retirement until his death on June 2, , at the age of ninety-two. The commitment of modern rationalism, stemming from Descartes, to a doctrine of innate ideas, ideas constituted from birth in the very nature of the mind itself, had effected this dichotomy; but the modern empiricists, beginning with Locke, had done the same just as markedly by their commitment to an introspective methodology and a representational theory of ideas. The resulting view makes a mystery of the relevance of thought to the world: For Dewey a new model, rejecting traditional presumptions, was wanting, a model that Dewey endeavored to develop and refine throughout his years of writing and reflection. In his early writings on these issues, such as "Is Logic a Dualistic Science? But during the succeeding decade Dewey gradually came to reject this solution as confused and inadequate. For one, Hegelian idealism was not

conducive to accommodating the methodologies and results of experimental science which he accepted and admired. The key to the naturalistic account of species was a consideration of the complex interrelationships between organisms and environments. In a similar way, Dewey came to believe that a productive, naturalistic approach to the theory of knowledge must begin with a consideration of the development of knowledge as an adaptive human response to environing conditions aimed at an active restructuring of these conditions. Thus Dewey adopted the term "instrumentalism" as a descriptive appellation for his new approach. In this article, Dewey argued that the dominant conception of the reflex arc in the psychology of his day, which was thought to begin with the passive stimulation of the organism, causing a conscious act of awareness eventuating in a response, was a carry-over of the old, and errant, mind-body dualism. Dewey argued for an alternative view: The implication for the theory of knowledge was clear: Dewey first applied this interactive naturalism in an explicit manner to the theory of knowledge in his four introductory essays in *Studies in Logical Theory*. Dewey identified the view expressed in *Studies* with the school of pragmatism, crediting William James as its progenitor. James, for his part, in an article appearing in the *Psychological Bulletin*, proclaimed the work as the expression of a new school of thought, acknowledging its originality. Dewey distinguished three phases of the process. It begins with the problematic situation, a situation where instinctive or habitual responses of the human organism to the environment are inadequate for the continuation of ongoing activity in pursuit of the fulfillment of needs and desires. Dewey stressed in *Studies* and subsequent writings that the uncertainty of the problematic situation is not inherently cognitive, but practical and existential. Cognitive elements enter into the process as a response to precognitive maladjustment. The second phase of the process involves the isolation of the data or subject matter which defines the parameters within which the reconstruction of the initiating situation must be addressed. In the third, reflective phase of the process, the cognitive elements of inquiry ideas, suppositions, theories, etc. The final test of the adequacy of these solutions comes with their employment in action. If a reconstruction of the antecedent situation conducive to fluid activity is achieved, then the solution no longer retains the character of the hypothetical that marks cognitive thought; rather, it becomes a part of the existential circumstances of human life. The error of modern epistemologists, as Dewey saw it, was that they isolated the reflective stages of this process, and hypostatized the elements of those stages sensations, ideas, etc. For Dewey, the hypostatization was as groundless as the search for incorrigibility was barren. Rejecting foundationalism, Dewey accepted the fallibilism that was characteristic of the school of pragmatism: Dewey defended this general outline of the process of inquiry throughout his long career, insisting that it was the only proper way to understand the means by which we attain knowledge, whether it be the commonsense knowledge that guides the ordinary affairs of our lives, or the sophisticated knowledge arising from scientific inquiry. The latter is only distinguished from the former by the precision of its methods for controlling data, and the refinement of its hypotheses. In his writings in the theory of inquiry subsequent to *Studies*, Dewey endeavored to develop and deepen instrumentalism by considering a number of central issues of traditional epistemology from its perspective, and responding to some of the more trenchant criticisms of the view. One traditional question that Dewey addressed in a series of essays between and was that of the meaning of truth. Dewey at that time considered the pragmatic theory of truth as central to the pragmatic school of thought, and vigorously defended its viability. Both Dewey and William James, in his book *Pragmatism*, argued that the traditional correspondence theory of truth, according to which the true idea is one that agrees or corresponds to reality, only begs the question of what the "agreement" or "correspondence" of idea with reality is. The pragmatic theory of truth met with strong opposition among its critics, perhaps most notably from the British logician and philosopher Bertrand Russell. Dewey later began to suspect that the issues surrounding the conditions of truth, as well as knowledge, were hopelessly obscured by the accretion of traditional, and in his view misguided, meanings to the terms, resulting in confusing ambiguity. He later abandoned these terms in favor of "warranted assertibility" to describe the distinctive property of ideas that results from successful inquiry. One of the most important developments of his later writings in the theory of knowledge was the application of the principles of instrumentalism to the traditional conceptions and formal apparatus of logical theory. Dewey made significant headway in this endeavor in his lengthy introduction to *Essays in Experimental Logic*, but the project reached full fruition in *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*. What is

distinctive about intelligent inquiry is that it is facilitated by the use of language, which allows, by its symbolic meanings and implication relationships, the hypothetical rehearsal of adaptive behaviors before their employment under actual, prevailing conditions for the purpose of resolving problematic situations. Logical form, the specialized subject matter of traditional logic, owes its genesis not to rational intuition, as had often been assumed by logicians, but due to its functional value in 1 managing factual evidence pertaining to the problematic situation that elicits inquiry, and 2 controlling the procedures involved in the conceptualized entertainment of hypothetical solutions. As Dewey puts it, "logical forms accrue to subject-matter when the latter is subjected to controlled inquiry. One important outcome of this work was a new theory of propositions. Traditional views in logic had held that the logical import of propositions is defined wholly by their syntactical form e. In contrast, Dewey maintained that statements of identical propositional form can play significantly different functional roles in the process of inquiry. Thus in keeping with his distinction between the factual and conceptual elements of inquiry, he replaced the accepted distinctions between universal, particular, and singular propositions based on syntactical meaning with a distinction between existential and ideational propositions, a distinction that largely cuts across traditional classifications. The same general approach is taken throughout the work: Although many of his critics did question, and continue to question, the assumptions of his approach, one that is certainly unique in the development of twentieth century logical theory, there is no doubt that the work was and continues to be an important contribution to the field. Dewey begins to define the general form that an empirical metaphysics should take in a number of articles, including "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism" and "Does Reality Possess Practical Character? In the former article, Dewey asserts that things experienced empirically "are what they are experienced as. But the subsequent inquiry, Dewey argues, does not change the initial status of the noise: Our experience of the world is constituted by our interrelationship with it, a relationship that is imbued with practical import. The initial fearsomeness of the noise is the experiential correlate of the uncertain, problematic character of the situation, an uncertainty that is not merely subjective or mental, but a product of the potential inadequacy of previously established modes of behavior to deal effectively with the pragmatic demands of present circumstances. The subsequent inquiry does not, therefore, uncover a reality the innocuousness of the noise underlying a mere appearance its fearsomeness , but by settling the demands of the situation, it effects a change in the inter-dynamics of the organism-environment relationship of the initial situation--a change in reality. There are two important implications of this line of thought that distinguish it from the metaphysical tradition. First, although inquiry is aimed at resolving the precarious and confusing aspects of experience to provide a stable basis for action, this does not imply the unreality of the unstable and contingent, nor justify its relegation to the status of mere appearance. Thus, for example, the usefulness and reliability of utilizing certain stable features of things encountered in our experience as a basis for classification does not justify according ultimate reality to essences or Platonic forms any more than, as rationalist metaphysicians in the modern era have thought, the similar usefulness of mathematical reasoning in understanding natural processes justifies the conclusion that the world can be exhaustively defined mathematically. Thus the implicit skepticism that underlies the representational theory of ideas and raises questions concerning the veracity of perceptual experience as such is unwarranted. Dewey stresses the point that sensations, hypotheses, ideas, etc. Once inquiry is successful in resolving a problematic situation, mediatory sensations and ideas, as Dewey says, "drop out; and things are present to the agent in the most naively realistic fashion. Opposing narrow-minded positions that would accord full ontological status only to certain, typically the most stable or reliable, aspects of experience, Dewey argues for a position that recognizes the real significance of the multifarious richness of human experience. Dewey offered a fuller statement of his metaphysics in , with the publication of one of his most significant philosophical works, *Experience and Nature*. In the introductory chapter, Dewey stresses a familiar theme from his earlier writings: Dewey finds this procedure so pervasive in the history of thought that he calls it simply the philosophic fallacy, and signals his intention to eschew the disastrous consequences of this approach by offering a descriptive account of all of the various generic features of human experience, whatever their character. Dewey begins with the observation that the world as we experience it both individually and collectively is an admixture of the precarious, the transitory and contingent aspect of things,

and the stable, the patterned regularity of natural processes that allows for prediction and human intervention. Honest metaphysical description must take into account both of these elements of experience. Dewey endeavors to do this by an event ontology. The world, rather than being comprised of things or, in more traditional terms, substances, is comprised of happenings or occurrences that admit of both episodic uniqueness and general, structured order. Intrinsically events have an ineffable qualitative character by which they are immediately enjoyed or suffered, thus providing the basis for experienced value and aesthetic appreciation. Extrinsically events are connected to one another by patterns of change and development; any given event arises out of determinant prior conditions and leads to probable consequences. The patterns of these temporal processes is the proper subject matter of human knowledge--we know the world in terms of causal laws and mathematical relationships--but the instrumental value of understanding and controlling them should not blind us to the immediate, qualitative aspect of events; indeed, the value of scientific understanding is most significantly realized in the facility it affords for controlling the circumstances under which immediate enjoyments may be realized.

**Chapter 4 : William James (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)**

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George Berkeley for his project to eliminate all unclear concepts from philosophy Peirce 8: Relevant discussion may be found on the talk page. Please do not remove this message until conditions to do so are met. February Learn how and when to remove this template message A few of the various but often interrelated positions characteristic of philosophers working from a pragmatist approach include: Coherentists hold that justification is solely a function of some relationship between beliefs, none of which are privileged beliefs in the way maintained by foundationalist theories of justification. Not to be confused with pragmatics , a sub-field of linguistics with no relation to philosophical pragmatism. Additionally, forms of empiricism , fallibilism , verificationism , and a Quinean naturalist metaphilosophy are all commonly elements of pragmatist philosophies. Many pragmatists are epistemological relativists and see this to be an important facet of their pragmatism, but this is controversial and other pragmatists argue such relativism to be seriously misguided e. Hilary Putnam , Susan Haack. Anti-reification of concepts and theories[ edit ] Dewey, in *The Quest For Certainty*, criticized what he called "the philosophical fallacy": This causes metaphysical and conceptual confusion. Various examples are the " ultimate Being " of Hegelian philosophers, the belief in a " realm of value ", the idea that logic, because it is an abstraction from concrete thought, has nothing to do with the act of concrete thinking, and so on. Hildebrand sums up the problem: They argued that idealist and realist philosophy had a tendency to present human knowledge as something beyond what science could grasp. They held that these philosophies then resorted either to a phenomenology inspired by Kant or to correspondence theories of knowledge and truth. Pragmatism instead tries to explain the relation between knower and known. In , [16] C. Peirce argued that there is no power of intuition in the sense of a cognition unconditioned by inference, and no power of introspection, intuitive or otherwise, and that awareness of an internal world is by hypothetical inference from external facts. Introspection and intuition were staple philosophical tools at least since Descartes. He argued that there is no absolutely first cognition in a cognitive process; such a process has its beginning but can always be analyzed into finer cognitive stages. That which we call introspection does not give privileged access to knowledge about the mindâ€”the self is a concept that is derived from our interaction with the external world and not the other way around De Waal , pp. At the same time he held persistently that pragmatism and epistemology in general could not be derived from principles of psychology understood as a special science: Richard Rorty expanded on these and other arguments in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* in which he criticized attempts by many philosophers of science to carve out a space for epistemology that is entirely unrelated toâ€”and sometimes thought of as superior toâ€”the empirical sciences. Quine, instrumental in bringing naturalized epistemology back into favor with his essay *Epistemology Naturalized* Quine , also criticized "traditional" epistemology and its "Cartesian dream" of absolute certainty. The dream, he argued, was impossible in practice as well as misguided in theory, because it separates epistemology from scientific inquiry. Hilary Putnam asserts that the combination of antiskepticism and fallibilism is a central feature of pragmatism. Reconciliation of anti-skepticism and fallibilism[ edit ] Hilary Putnam has suggested that the reconciliation of anti-skepticism [19] and fallibilism is the central goal of American pragmatism. Genuine doubt irritates and inhibits, in the sense that belief is that upon which one is prepared to act. Inquiry is then the rationally self-controlled process of attempting to return to a settled state of belief about the matter. Note that anti-skepticism is a reaction to modern academic skepticism in the wake of Descartes. The pragmatist insistence that all knowledge is tentative is quite congenial to the older skeptical tradition. Pragmatist theory of truth and epistemology[ edit ] Main article: Pragmatic theory of truth Pragmatism was not the first to apply evolution to theories of knowledge: Here knowledge and action are portrayed as two separate spheres with an absolute or transcendental truth above and beyond any sort of inquiry organisms used to cope with life. Pragmatism challenges this idealism by providing an "ecological" account of knowledge: Real and true are

functional labels in inquiry and cannot be understood outside of this context. It is not realist in a traditionally robust sense of realism what Hilary Putnam would later call metaphysical realism , but it is realist in how it acknowledges an external world which must be dealt with. It is high time to urge the use of a little imagination in philosophy. The unwillingness of some of our critics to read any but the silliest of possible meanings into our statements is as discreditable to their imaginations as anything I know in recent philosophic history. Schiller says the truth is that which "works. Dewey says truth is what gives "satisfaction"! He is treated as one who believes in calling everything true which, if it were true, would be pleasant. See Dewey for a "FAQ. Is a belief valid when it represents reality? Copying is one and only one genuine mode of knowing, James , p. Are beliefs dispositions which qualify as true or false depending on how helpful they prove in inquiry and in action? Is it only in the struggle of intelligent organisms with the surrounding environment that beliefs acquire meaning? Does a belief only become true when it succeeds in this struggle? In Pragmatism nothing practical or useful is held to be necessarily true , nor is anything which helps to survive merely in the short term. In other fields of philosophy[ edit ] While pragmatism started out simply as a criterion of meaning, it quickly expanded to become a full-fledged epistemology with wide-ranging implications for the entire philosophical field. Pragmatists who work in these fields share a common inspiration, but their work is diverse and there are no received views. Philosophy of science[ edit ] In the philosophy of science, instrumentalism is the view that concepts and theories are merely useful instruments and progress in science cannot be couched in terms of concepts and theories somehow mirroring reality. Instrumentalist philosophers often define scientific progress as nothing more than an improvement in explaining and predicting phenomena. Instrumentalism does not state that truth does not matter, but rather provides a specific answer to the question of what truth and falsity mean and how they function in science. Outline of a Theory of Knowledge was that science does not merely provide a copy of reality but must work with conceptual systems and that those are chosen for pragmatic reasons, that is, because they aid inquiry. Lewis is sometimes called a proponent of conceptual pragmatism because of this. Morris and Rudolf Carnap. The influence of pragmatism on these writers is mostly limited to the incorporation of the pragmatic maxim into their epistemology. Pragmatists with a broader conception of the movement do not often refer to them. The other is reductionism, the theory that each meaningful statement gets its meaning from some logical construction of terms which refers exclusively to immediate experience. Logic[ edit ] Later in his life Schiller became famous for his attacks on logic in his textbook, Formal Logic. Schiller sought to undermine the very possibility of formal logic, by showing that words only had meaning when used in context. In this sequel, Logic for Use, Schiller attempted to construct a new logic to replace the formal logic that he had criticized in Formal Logic. What he offers is something philosophers would recognize today as a logic covering the context of discovery and the hypothetico-deductive method. Schiller dismissed the possibility of formal logic, most pragmatists are critical rather of its pretension to ultimate validity and see logic as one logical tool among othersâ€”or perhaps, considering the multitude of formal logics, one set of tools among others. This is the view of C. Peirce developed multiple methods for doing formal logic. Metaphysics[ edit ] James and Dewey were empirical thinkers in the most straightforward fashion: They were dissatisfied with ordinary empiricism because in the tradition dating from Hume, empiricists had a tendency to think of experience as nothing more than individual sensations. To the pragmatists, this went against the spirit of empiricism: Pragmatism is sometimes called American Pragmatism because so many of its proponents were and are Americans. William James gives an interesting example of this philosophical shortcoming: The two were supposed, he said, to have so little to do with each other, that you could not possibly occupy your mind with them at the same time. The world of concrete personal experiences to which the street belongs is multitudinous beyond imagination, tangled, muddy, painful and perplexed. The world to which your philosophy-professor introduces you is simple, clean and noble. The contradictions of real life are absent from it. In it, Schiller argues for a middle ground between materialism and absolute metaphysics. These opposites are comparable to what William James called tough-minded empiricism and tender-minded rationalism. Schiller contends on the one hand that mechanistic naturalism cannot make sense of the "higher" aspects of our world. These include freewill, consciousness, purpose, universals and some would add God. On the other hand, abstract metaphysics cannot make sense of the "lower" aspects of our world e. While Schiller is vague

about the exact sort of middle ground he is trying to establish, he suggests that metaphysics is a tool that can aid inquiry, but that it is valuable only insofar as it does help in explanation. In the second half of the twentieth century, Stephen Toulmin argued that the need to distinguish between reality and appearance only arises within an explanatory scheme and therefore that there is no point in asking what "ultimate reality" consists of. More recently, a similar idea has been suggested by the postanalytic philosopher Daniel Dennett, who argues that anyone who wants to understand the world has to acknowledge both the "syntactical" aspects of reality. These questions feature prominently in current debates about the relationship between religion and science, where it is often assumed—most pragmatists would disagree—that science degrades everything that is meaningful into "merely" physical phenomena. Philosophy of mind[ edit ] Both John Dewey in *Experience and Nature* and half a century later Richard Rorty in his *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* argued that much of the debate about the relation of the mind to the body results from conceptual confusions. They argue instead that there is no need to posit the mind or mindstuff as an ontological category. Pragmatists disagree over whether philosophers ought to adopt a quietist or a naturalist stance toward the mind-body problem. Pragmatic ethics Pragmatism sees no fundamental difference between practical and theoretical reason, nor any ontological difference between facts and values. Both facts and values have cognitive content: Pragmatist ethics is broadly humanist because it sees no ultimate test of morality beyond what matters for us as humans. Good values are those for which we have good reasons, viz. The pragmatist formulation pre-dates those of other philosophers who have stressed important similarities between values and facts such as Jerome Schneewind and John Searle. William James tried to show the meaningfulness of some kinds of spirituality but, like other pragmatists, did not see religion as the basis of meaning or morality. On its own terms it argues that ethics always involves a certain degree of trust or faith and that we cannot always wait for adequate proof when making moral decisions. Moral questions immediately present themselves as questions whose solution cannot wait for sensible proof. A moral question is a question not of what sensibly exists, but of what is good, or would be good if it did exist. Wherever a desired result is achieved by the co-operation of many independent persons, its existence as a fact is a pure consequence of the precursive faith in one another of those immediately concerned. A government, an army, a commercial system, a ship, a college, an athletic team, all exist on this condition, without which not only is nothing achieved, but nothing is even attempted.

**Chapter 5 : John Dewey Quotes About Imagination | A-Z Quotes**

*Pragmatism was a philosophical tradition that originated in the United States around The most important of the 'classical pragmatists' were Charles Sanders Peirce (), William James () and John Dewey ().*

Several themes recur throughout these writings. Dewey continually argues that education and learning are social and interactive processes, and thus the school itself is a social institution through which social reform can and should take place. In addition, he believed that students thrive in an environment where they are allowed to experience and interact with the curriculum, and all students should have the opportunity to take part in their own learning. Dewey makes a strong case for the importance of education not only as a place to gain content knowledge, but also as a place to learn how to live. He notes that "to prepare him for the future life means to give him command of himself; it means so to train him that he will have the full and ready use of all his capacities" My Pedagogic Creed, Dewey, In addition to helping students realize their full potential, Dewey goes on to acknowledge that education and schooling are instrumental in creating social change and reform. He notes that "education is a regulation of the process of coming to share in the social consciousness; and that the adjustment of individual activity on the basis of this social consciousness is the only sure method of social reconstruction". In addition to his ideas regarding what education is and what effect it should have on society, Dewey also had specific notions regarding how education should take place within the classroom. In *The Child and the Curriculum*, Dewey discusses two major conflicting schools of thought regarding educational pedagogy. The first is centered on the curriculum and focuses almost solely on the subject matter to be taught. Dewey argues that the major flaw in this methodology is the inactivity of the student; within this particular framework, "the child is simply the immature being who is to be matured; he is the superficial being who is to be deepened", p. At the same time, Dewey was alarmed by many of the "child-centered" excesses of educational-school pedagogues who claimed to be his followers, and he argued that too much reliance on the child could be equally detrimental to the learning process. In this second school of thought, "we must take our stand with the child and our departure from him. It is he and not the subject-matter which determines both quality and quantity of learning" Dewey, , pp. According to Dewey, the potential flaw in this line of thinking is that it minimizes the importance of the content as well as the role of the teacher. In order to rectify this dilemma, Dewey advocated for an educational structure that strikes a balance between delivering knowledge while also taking into account the interests and experiences of the student. He notes that "the child and the curriculum are simply two limits which define a single process. Just as two points define a straight line, so the present standpoint of the child and the facts and truths of studies define instruction" Dewey, , p. It is through this reasoning that Dewey became one of the most famous proponents of hands-on learning or experiential education, which is related to, but not synonymous with experiential learning. The works of John Dewey provide the most prolific examples of how this limited vocational view of education has been applied to both the K-12 public education system and to the teacher training schools who attempted to quickly produce proficient and practical teachers with a limited set of instructional and discipline-specific skills needed to meet the needs of the employer and demands of the workforce. In *The School and Society* Dewey, and *Democracy of Education* Dewey, , Dewey claims that rather than preparing citizens for ethical participation in society, schools cultivate passive pupils via insistence upon mastery of facts and disciplining of bodies. Rather than preparing students to be reflective, autonomous and ethical beings capable of arriving at social truths through critical and intersubjective discourse, schools prepare students for docile compliance with authoritarian work and political structures, discourage the pursuit of individual and communal inquiry, and perceive higher learning as a monopoly of the institution of education Dewey, ; For Dewey and his philosophical followers, education stifles individual autonomy when learners are taught that knowledge is transmitted in one direction, from the expert to the learner. Dewey not only re-imagined the way that the learning process should take place, but also the role that the teacher should play within that process. As Dewey notes, this limited vocational view is also applied to teacher training schools who attempt to quickly produce proficient and practical teachers with a limited set of instructional and discipline skills needed to meet the needs of the

employer and demands of the workforce Dewey, For Dewey, the school and the classroom teacher, as a workforce and provider of a social service, have a unique responsibility to produce psychological and social goods that will lead to both present and future social progress. As Dewey notes, "The business of the teacher is to produce a higher standard of intelligence in the community, and the object of the public school system is to make as large as possible the number of those who possess this intelligence. Skill, ability to act wisely and effectively in a great variety of occupations and situations, is a sign and a criterion of the degree of civilization that a society has reached. It is the business of teachers to help in producing the many kinds of skill needed in contemporary life. If teachers are up to their work, they also aid in the production of character. However, although Dewey is steadfast in his beliefs that education serves an immediate purpose Dewey, DRT, ; Dewey, MPC, ; Dewey, TTP, , he is not ignorant of the impact imparting these qualities of intelligence, skill, and character on young children in their present life will have on the future society. As Dewey notes, there is a lack of these goods in the present society and teachers have a responsibility to create them in their students, who, we can assume, will grow into the adults who will ultimately go on to participate in whatever industrial or economical civilization awaits them. According to Dewey, the profession of the classroom teacher is to produce the intelligence, skill, and character within each student so that the democratic community is composed of citizens who can think, do and act intelligently and morally. The classroom teacher does not have to be a scholar in all subjects; rather, a genuine love in one will elicit a feel for genuine information and insight in all subjects taught. For Dewey, this desire for the lifelong pursuit of learning is inherent in other professions e. For Dewey, it is not enough for the classroom teacher to be a lifelong learner of the techniques and subject-matter of education; she must aspire to share what she knows with others in her learning community. As Dewey notes, "I have often been asked how it was that some teachers who have never studied the art of teaching are still extraordinarily good teachers. The explanation is simple. They have a quick, sure and unflagging sympathy with the operations and process of the minds they are in contact with. Their own minds move in harmony with those of others, appreciating their difficulties, entering into their problems, sharing their intellectual victories" Dewey, APT, , p. Such a teacher is genuinely aware of the complexities of this mind to mind transfer, and she has the intellectual fortitude to identify the successes and failures of this process, as well as how to appropriately reproduce or correct it in the future. Perhaps the most important attributes, according to Dewey, are those personal inherent qualities which the teacher brings to the classroom. As Dewey notes, "no amount of learning or even of acquired pedagogical skill makes up for the deficiency" Dewey, TLS, p. According to Dewey, the successful classroom teacher occupies an indispensable passion for promoting the intellectual growth of young children. In addition, they know that their career, in comparison to other professions, entails stressful situations, long hours and limited financial reward; all of which have the potential to overcome their genuine love and sympathy for their students. For Dewey, "One of the most depressing phases of the vocation is the number of care worn teachers one sees, with anxiety depicted on the lines of their faces, reflected in their strained high pitched voices and sharp manners. While contact with the young is a privilege for some temperaments, it is a tax on others, and a tax which they do not bear up under very well. And in some schools, there are too many pupils to a teacher, too many subjects to teach, and adjustments to pupils are made in a mechanical rather than a human way. Human nature reacts against such unnatural conditions" Dewey, APT, , p. It is essential, according to Dewey, that the classroom teacher has the mental propensity to overcome the demands and stressors placed on them because the students can sense when their teacher is not genuinely invested in promoting their learning Dewey, PST, Such negative demeanors, according to Dewey, prevent children from pursuing their own propensities for learning and intellectual growth. It can therefore be assumed that if teachers want their students to engage with the educational process and employ their natural curiosities for knowledge, teachers must be aware of how their reactions to young children and the stresses of teaching influence this process. According to Dewey, teacher education programs must turn away from focusing on producing proficient practitioners because such practical skills related to instruction and discipline e. As Dewey notes, "The teacher who leaves the professional school with power in managing a class of children may appear to superior advantage the first day, the first week, the first month, or even the first year, as compared with some other teacher who has a much more vital command of the

psychology, logic and ethics of development. Such persons seem to know how to teach, but they are not students of teaching. Unless a teacher is such a student, he may continue to improve in the mechanics of school management, but he cannot grow as a teacher, an inspirer and director of soul-life" Dewey, , p. For Dewey, teacher education should focus not on producing persons who know how to teach as soon as they leave the program; rather, teacher education should be concerned with producing professional students of education who have the propensity to inquire about the subjects they teach, the methods used, and the activity of the mind as it gives and receives knowledge. According to Dewey, such a student is not superficially engaging with these materials, rather, the professional student of education has a genuine passion to inquire about the subjects of education, knowing that doing so ultimately leads to acquisitions of the skills related to teaching. As Dewey notes, other professional fields, such as law and medicine cultivate a professional spirit in their fields to constantly study their work, their methods of their work, and a perpetual need for intellectual growth and concern for issues related to their profession. As Dewey notes, "An intellectual responsibility has got to be distributed to every human being who is concerned in carrying out the work in question, and to attempt to concentrate intellectual responsibility for a work that has to be done, with their brains and their hearts, by hundreds or thousands of people in a dozen or so at the top, no matter how wise and skillful they are, is not to concentrate responsibility—it is to diffuse irresponsibility" Dewey, PST, , p. For Dewey, the professional spirit of teacher education requires of its students a constant study of school room work, constant study of children, of methods, of subject matter in its various adaptations to pupils. Such study will lead to professional enlightenment with regard to the daily operations of classroom teaching. As suggested by the title of the book, his concern was of the transactional relationship between publics and problems. Also implicit in its name, public journalism seeks to orient communication away from elite, corporate hegemony toward a civic public sphere. Publics are spontaneous groups of citizens who share the indirect effects of a particular action. Anyone affected by the indirect consequences of a specific action will automatically share a common interest in controlling those consequences, i. In his model, Lippmann supposed that the public was incapable of thought or action, and that all thought and action should be left to the experts and elites. Dewey refutes this model by assuming that politics is the work and duty of each individual in the course of his daily routine. The knowledge needed to be involved in politics, in this model, was to be generated by the interaction of citizens, elites, experts, through the mediation and facilitation of journalism. In this model, not just the government is accountable, but the citizens, experts, and other actors as well. Dewey also said that journalism should conform to this ideal by changing its emphasis from actions or happenings choosing a winner of a given situation to alternatives, choices, consequences, and conditions , [53] in order to foster conversation and improve the generation of knowledge. Journalism would not just produce a static product that told what had already happened, but the news would be in a constant state of evolution as the public added value by generating knowledge. The "audience" would end, to be replaced by citizens and collaborators who would essentially be users, doing more with the news than simply reading it. Concerning his effort to change journalism, he wrote in *The Public and Its Problems: Communication can alone create a great community*" Dewey, p. Dewey believed that communication creates a great community, and citizens who participate actively with public life contribute to that community. This Great Community can only occur with "free and full intercommunication. What Humanism means to me is an expansion, not a contraction, of human life, an expansion in which nature and the science of nature are made the willing servants of human good.

*James and Dewey on Belief and Experience* Donald Capps, John M. Capps Published by University of Illinois Press  
Capps, Donald & Capps, M.. *James and Dewey on Belief and Experience*.

Universities Throughout the United States and the world at large, the name of John Dewey has become synonymous with the Progressive education movement. Dewey has been generally recognized as the most renowned and influential American philosopher of education. During his lifetime the United States developed from a simple frontier-agricultural society to a complex urban-industrial nation, and Dewey developed his educational ideas largely in response to this rapid and wrenching period of cultural change. John, the third of their four sons, was a shy boy and an average student. He delivered newspapers, did his chores, and enjoyed exploring the woodlands and waterways around Burlington. His father hoped that John might become a mechanic, and it is quite possible that John might not have gone to college if the University of Vermont had not been located just down the street. There, after two years of average work, he graduated first in a class of 18 in 1884. There were few jobs for college graduates in Burlington, and Dewey spent three anxious months searching for work. After two years of teaching high school Latin, algebra, and science, Dewey returned to Burlington to teach in a rural school closer to home. With the encouragement of H. Torrey, his former philosophy professor at the University of Vermont, Dewey wrote three philosophical essays a; b; which were accepted for publication in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, whose editor, William Torrey Harris, hailed them as the products of a first-rate philosophical mind. There he studied philosophyâ€”which at that time and place primarily meant Hegelian philosophy and German idealismâ€”and wrote his dissertation on the psychology of Kant. In his first year at Michigan, Dewey not only taught but also produced his first major book, *Psychology*. In addition, he met, wooed, and married Alice Chipman, a student at Michigan who was herself a former schoolteacher. In 1894 the University of Chicago offered Dewey the chairmanship of the department of philosophy, psychology, and pedagogy. At Chicago he established the now-famous laboratory school commonly known as the Dewey School, where he scientifically tested, modified, and developed his psychological and educational ideas. An early statement of his philosophical position in education, *My Pedagogic Creed*, appeared three years after his arrival at Chicago. The first two, *The School and Society*, which was first published in 1899, and *The Child and the Curriculum*, were lectures which he delivered to raise money and gain support for the laboratory school. Both works stressed the functional relationship between classroom learning activities and real life experiences and analyzed the social and psychological nature of the learning process. Two later volumes, *How We Think* and *Democracy and Education*, elaborated these themes in greater and more systematic detail. Dewey felt that he had no recourse but to resign and wrote to William James at Harvard and to James M. Cattell at Columbia University, informing them of his decision. Because the salary offer was quite low for a man with six children three more had been born during his ten years at Chicago, arrangements were made for Dewey to teach an additional two hours a week at Columbia Teachers College for extra compensation. For the next twenty-six years at Columbia, Dewey continued his illustrious career as a philosopher and witnessed the dispersion of his educational ideas throughout the world by many of his disciples at Teachers College, not the least of whom was William Heard Kilpatrick. Dewey retired in 1930 but was immediately appointed professor emeritus of philosophy in residence at Columbia and held that post until his eightieth birthday in 1938. The previous year he had published his last major educational work, *Experience and Education*. In this series of lectures he clearly restated his basic philosophy of education and recognized and rebuked the many excesses he thought the Progressive education movement had committed. He chastised the Progressives for casting out traditional educational practices and content without offering something positive and worthwhile to take their place. He offered a reformulation of his views on the intimate connection between learning and experience and challenged those who would call themselves Progressives to work toward the realization of the educational program he had carefully outlined a generation before. At the age of ninety he published his last large-scale original philosophical work, *Knowing and the Known*, in collaboration with Arthur F. White. Unlike many philosophers, Dewey did not search beyond the realm of ordinary experience to

find some more fundamental and enduring reality. For Dewey, the everyday world of common experience was all the reality that man had access to or needed. He considered the scientific mode of inquiry and the scientific systematization of human experience the highest attainment in the evolution of the mind of man, and this way of thinking and approaching the world became a major feature of his philosophy. In fact, he defined the educational process as a "continual reorganization, reconstruction and transformation of experience" , p. Dewey was careful in his writings to make clear what kinds of experiences were most valuable and useful. Some experiences are merely passive affairs, pleasant or painful but not educative. An educative experience, according to Dewey, is an experience in which we make a connection between what we do to things and what happens to them or us in consequence; the value of an experience lies in the perception of relationships or continuities among events. Thus, if a child reaches for a candle flame and burns his hand, he experiences pain, but this is not an educative experience unless he realizes that touching the flame resulted in a burn and, moreover, formulates the general expectation that flames will produce burns if touched. In just this way, before we are formally instructed, we learn much about the world, ourselves, and others. It is this natural form of learning from experience, by doing and then reflecting on what happened, which Dewey made central in his approach to schooling. Reflective thinking and the perception of relationships arise only in problematical situations. As long as our interaction with our environment is a fairly smooth affair we may think of nothing or merely daydream, but when this untroubled state of affairs is disrupted we have a problem which must be solved before the untroubled state can be restored. For example, a man walking in a forest is suddenly stopped short by a stream which blocks his path, and his desire to continue walking in the same direction is thwarted. He considers possible solutions to his problem—finding or producing a set of stepping-stones, finding and jumping across a narrow part, using something to bridge the stream, and so forth—and looks for materials or conditions to fit one of the proposed solutions. He finds an abundance of stones in the area and decides that the first suggestion is most worth testing. Then he places the stones in the water, steps across to the other side, and is off again on his hike. A real problem arises out of present experiences, suggestions for a solution come to mind, relevant data are observed, and a hypothesis is formed, acted upon, and finally tested. Learning For Dewey, learning was primarily an activity which arises from the personal experience of grappling with a problem. This concept of learning implied a theory of education far different from the dominant school practice of his day, when students passively received information that had been packaged and predigested by teachers and textbooks. Thus, Dewey argued, the schools did not provide genuine learning experiences but only an endless amassing of facts, which were fed to the students, who gave them back and soon forgot them. Dewey distinguished between the psychological and the logical organization of subject matter by comparing the learner to an explorer who maps an unknown territory. The explorer, like the learner, does not know what terrain and adventures his journey holds in store for him. He has yet to discover mountains, deserts, and water holes and to suffer fever, starvation, and other hardships. Finally, when the explorer returns from his journey, he will have a hard-won knowledge of the country he has traversed. Then, and only then, can he produce a map of the region. The map, like a textbook, is an abstraction which omits his thirst, his courage, his despairs and triumphs—the experiences which made his journey personally meaningful. The map records only the relationships between landmarks and terrain, the logic of the features without the psychological revelations of the journey itself. To give the map to others as a teacher might is to give the results of an experience, not the experience by which the map was produced and became personally meaningful to the producer. Although the logical organization of subject matter is the proper goal of learning, the logic of the subject cannot be truly meaningful to the learner without his psychological and personal involvement in exploration. Only by wrestling with the conditions of the problem at hand, "seeking and finding his own way out, does he think". If he cannot devise his own solution not, of course, in isolation but in correspondence with the teacher and other pupils and find his own way out he will not learn, not even if he can recite some correct answer with one hundred percent accuracy" Dewey , p. Although learning experiences may be described in isolation, education for Dewey consisted in the cumulative and unending acquisition, combination, and reordering of such experiences. Just as a tree does not grow by having new branches and leaves wired to it each spring, so educational growth does not consist in mechanically adding information, skills, or even educative experiences

to students in grade after grade. Rather, educational growth consists in combining past experiences with present experiences in order to receive and understand future experiences. To grow, the individual must continually reorganize and reformulate past experiences in the light of new experiences in a cohesive fashion. School and Life Ideas and experiences which are not woven into the fabric of growing experience and knowledge but remain isolated seemed to Dewey a waste of precious natural resources. The dichotomy of in-school and out-of-school experiences he considered especially wasteful, as he indicated as early as in *The School and Society*: From the standpoint of the child, the great waste in the school comes from his inability to utilize the experiences he gets outside the school in any complete and free way within the school itself; while on the other hand, he is unable to apply in daily life what he is learning in school. That is the isolation of the school—its isolation from life. When the child gets into the schoolroom he has to put out of his mind a large part of the ideas, interests and activities that predominate in his home and neighborhood. So the school being unable to utilize this everyday experience, sets painfully to work on another tack and by a variety of [artificial] means, to arouse in the child an interest in school studies. Dewey maintained that unless the initial connection was made between school activities and the life experiences of the child, genuine learning and growth would be impossible. Nevertheless, he was careful to point out that while the experiential familiar was the natural and meaningful place to begin learning, it was more importantly the "intellectual starting point for moving out into the unknown and not an end in itself" , p. To further reduce the distance between school and life, Dewey urged that the school be made into an embryonic social community which simplified but resembled the social life of the community at large. A society, he reasoned, "is a number of people held together because they are working along common lines, in a common spirit, and with reference to common aims. The common needs and aims demand a growing interchange of thought and growing unity of sympathetic feeling. Thus Dewey affirmed his fundamental belief in the two-sidedness of the educational process. Neither the psychological nor the sociological purpose of education could be neglected if evil results were not to follow. To isolate the school from life was to cut students off from the psychological ties which make learning meaningful; not to provide a school environment which prepared students for life in society was to waste the resources of the school as a socializing institution. Democracy and Education Dewey recognized that the major instrument of human learning is language, which is itself a social product and is learned through social experiences. To transmit the contents of the language to the young and to initiate the young in the ways of civilized life was for Dewey the primary function of the school as an institution of society. But, he argued, a way of life cannot be transmitted by words alone. Essential to acquiring the spirit of a way of life is immersion in ways of living. More specifically, Dewey thought that in a democratic society the school should provide students with the opportunity to experience democracy in action. For Dewey, democracy was more than a form of government; it was a way of living which went beyond politics, votes, and laws to pervade all aspects of society. Dewey recognized that every social group, even a band of thieves, is held together by certain common interests, goals, values, and meanings, and he knew that every such group also comes into contact with other groups. He believed, however, that the extent to which democracy has been attained in any society can be measured by the extent to which differing groups share similar values, goals, and interests and interact freely and fruitfully with each other. A democratic society, therefore, is one in which barriers of any kind—class, race, religion, color, politics, or nationality—among groups are minimized, and numerous meanings, values, interests, and goals are held in common. In a democracy, according to Dewey, the schools must act to ensure that each individual gets an opportunity to escape from the limitations of the social group in which he was born, to come into contact with a broader environment, and to be freed from the effects of economic inequalities. The schools must also provide an environment in which individuals may share in determining and achieving their common purposes in learning so that in contact with each other the students may recognize their common humanity: I believe that education is the fundamental method of social progress and reform. All reforms which rest simply upon the enactment of law, or the threatening of certain penalties, or upon changes in mechanical or outward arrangements, are transitory and futile. By law and punishment, by social agitation and discussion, society can regulate and form itself in a more or less haphazard and chance way. But through education society can formulate its own purposes, can organize its own means and

resources, and thus shape itself with definiteness and economy in the direction in which it wishes to move. Education thus conceived marks the most perfect and intimate union of science and art conceivable in human experience.

**Chapter 7 : John Dewey Quotes - BrainyQuote**

*James and Dewey on Belief and Experience is divided into two sections: the former showcases James, the latter is devoted to Dewey. Two transitional passages in which each reflects on the work of the other bridge these two main segments.*

Ideas may not have by themselves the power to determine or motivate our active nature. Ethical and religious problems are therefore central to the pragmatist anthropology. Such is the human ontological imagination, and such is the convincingness of what it brings to birth. Unpicturable beings are realized, and realized with intensity almost like that of a hallucination. They determine our vital attitude as decisively as the vital attitude of lovers is determined by the habitual sense, by which each is haunted, of the other being in the world. An idea, in order to be a rule of action, needs to be felt as real and for that needs to be imagined. Thus different levels of reality are constructed imaginatively before any separation between imagination and perception is possible. I will also argue that, although James Will to Believe doctrine does not mention imagination, the idea is central to give us a better understanding of how religious experiences and religious belief are related. The central problem in James understanding of religion is to go beyond the opposition between affirming in *The Will to Believe* the role of religious belief as the condition of religious experience, while affirming, in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, the primacy and suddenness of religious experience. For James, imagination is intentional in the sense that it points towards an object that it poses as real. It has therefore a cognitive content, however minimum. On the contrary, according to Dewey, the fact that imagination points towards real entities entices the fallacy of supernaturalism. It is therefore a worthy point of departure in order to see more clearly where and how James and Dewey differ. In *Interpretation of Poetry and Religion*, Santayana writes: Imagination and intelligence do not differ in their origin, but in their validity. Those conceptions which, after they have spontaneously arisen, prove serviceable in practice, and capable of verification in sense, we call idea of the understanding. The other remains idea of the imagination. Those ideas do have a role in practical affairs since Religion and Poetry are identical in essence, and differ merely in the way in which they are attached to practical affairs. Poetry is called religion when it intervenes in life, and religion, when it merely supervenes upon life, is seen to be nothing but poetry. It helps him to articulate the religious dimension of experience with ethical and esthetical dimensions through imagination. The difference between the imagination that only supervenes and imagination that intervenes is the difference between one that completely interpenetrates all the elements of our being and one that is interwoven with only special and partial factors. Following Santayana, it entails that religion cannot be said to deal with matters of fact: It would naturally follow from this conception that religious doctrine would do well to withdraw their pretention with matters of fact. That pretention is the cause of the impurity and incoherence of religion in the soul, when it seeks its sanction in the sphere of reality, and forgets that its proper concern is to express the ideal. It is therefore not surprising, if James, in a letter to Palmer on 2nd April, while writing the Edinburgh Lectures writes: I never understood him before. But what a perfection of rottenness in a philosophy! Their disagreement, at the same time, helps James to make his own position more boldly affirmed. The unity of the ideal and the real is for him a living concrete unity. In a draft of the *Varieties*, he writes: Before coming back to James position and his underlying theory of imagination, we will go through a closer reading of *A Common Faith*, where Dewey explains the role of imagination in the religious experiences. In , he published *Art and Experience* and *A Common Faith*, whose common points lies in the emphasis on the creative dimension of the mind and the role that imagination has in the religious and esthetical dimensions of experience. As we have seen, Santayana helps him to connect those two dimensions. For him, they are not different kind of experiences. This poses two issues which I would like to raise. First, it raises the issue of the relation of perception to imagination. Imagination thus connects perceptual knowledge of the world to our practice. Imagination is thus merely a continuation of the observation of brute facts. For him, to surrender to an already existing being has lead supernaturalistic creeds to weaken the active moral impulse that urges the realisation of the ideal. Ideals should be regarded merely as possible and not as real: What I have been criticizing is the

identification of the ideal with a particular Being, especially when the identification makes necessary the conclusion that this being is outside of Nature, and what I have tried to show is that the ideal itself has its roots in natural conditions; it emerges when the imagination idealizes existence by laying hold of the possibilities offered to thought and action. I will argue that he replaces the idea of surrendering with the experience of an emotional oneness with the universe. This operates again largely through imagination, which should be broadly understood as to include some subconscious effects: This strengthened his belief that the truth of the universe is an organic unity, not a separation. Along with Rockefeller, Russell B. It is therefore justified to suspect, in *A Common Faith*, certain naturalised and secularised aspect of the Hegelian idea of God as union of the ideal and the real. We therefore see that, when Dewey tries to differentiate religion from morality, he is bound to compare it with a kind of an esthetical dimension with a strong sense of unity and totality. The difficulty in Dewey attempt is that imagination must unite the real and the ideal, without postulating the ideal as a real being. The same things follow for emotion, but I shall not consider this point here but stay concentrated on the question of imagination. How can we not believe that whatever is imagined is, in a certain sense, real? According to Dewey, we should differentiate between the theoretical faith and practical faith. Thus it is not imagination which is responsible for the delusion caused by the postulation of supernatural beings: But is religious faith not always mixed up with some intellectual content, however minimum, about some existing fact? Are the practical and the theoretical faith not essentially connected as James says? Dewey links imagination with totalities. This, perhaps, shows an influence of monistic tendencies. On the contrary, James, as she shall now see connect imagination with a more pluralistic concept of a multi-layered reality, of a plurality of spaces and times. Dewey explains how imagination and perception are complementary, imagination being a continuation of perceptive experiences on the side of the ideal possibilities of the perceived object. James let the imagination plays a more fundamental role in the constitution of reality itself, refusing a priori distinction between real and unreal, perception and hallucination. For James, we may even say that imagination would not have any practical effect unless the ideals which are imagined would be really believed to be part of a larger form of consciousness. The value of the religious imagination is known only through its effects but not through its cause. It is of no use rationalising the visions of the mystic. But the Varieties are not only defending such a pragmatist agenda. Perhaps, the most interesting these of the Varieties is not his theory of the subconscious origin of religious experience but his theory of the reality of religious experience. Reality, for James, is not an abstract attribute of things but a quality of living, concrete experience. On one hand, James look for the neural basis of the mind which is considered as an object in a world of already made objects. Nevertheless, it ends by denying that the neural basis of sensation and that of imagination can be radically different. Hence, James starts to prepare the reader to admit a more radical thesis, affirmed in the 19th and 21st chapters, of a strong connection between imagination and perception. If the progress of art and science can be explained by creativity found in the conceptualising power of the mind, Why may it not have been so of the original elements of consciousness, sensation, time, space, resemblance? Why may they not, in short, be pure idiosyncrasies, spontaneous variations, fitted by good luck. However, this does not mean that there is no object independent of it but rather that the mind is creative, even at the elementary level of sense perception. This history of consciousness, either biological or cultural, is generally ignored, because we live through the experiences of others. This feeling of reality is a common feature of all kind of experiences, including sensational experience as well as religious experience. In religious experiences, there is something that strikes this feeling of reality, and can even make the conception felt intensely more real than ordinary sense perception: This is essential to make room for a psychological or empirical understanding of religious experience. James feels that concepts are by themselves rather powerless unless they are connected with a reality-feeling or with imagination. Objectivity requires an esthetical dimension in concepts as well as a cognitive content of feelings. We find in a draft of the Varieties an interesting autobiographical passage on religious imagination: I cannot find in myself a trace of personal religion in the sense, in which so many possess it nor any live belief in a conscious spirit of the universe with whom I may hold communion. Secondly, it shows that religious belief and religious experience are simultaneous. In other words, the element of surrendering is not caused by the belief in any divine being, since

believing itself required to be already able to imagine actively the content of the belief and cannot be caused by will. At the same time the act of surrendering is not causing the belief since to surrender, we already need to have a belief in some kind of existing being. This is a strong argument in favour of an understanding of the relation between the will to believe doctrine, and the accent put on religious experiences in the Varieties which could be read as not presupposing any belief. Imagination makes us experience our beliefs to be of realities; and neither imagination nor belief or our feeling of reality is under the control of the will. This is, as I would like to conclude, what gives us good reasons to believe that reality is not mind-dependant. This as been recently defended by Slater against a current reading that sees, under the influence of Putnam, James as defending a kind of internal realism in a Kantian manner. Nevertheless, if we take metaphysical realism not in the elaborated sense given by Putnam but simply as posing the existence of mind-independent objects, there are plenty of evidence of it in James affirmation about the supernatural world. Religion is therefore not true only because it has a value for human life but because it puts us into contact with non-human higher form of experience which have a value for our life WWJ For example, this passage, at the end of the Varieties is clearly realistic about the existence of ideals and of a supernatural world: Name it the mystical region, or the supernatural region, whichever you choose. Yet the unseen region in question is not merely ideal, for it produces effects in this world. But that which produces effects within another reality must be termed a reality itself, so I feel as if we had no philosophic excuse for calling the unseen or mystical world unreal. It adds some spices to our moral life. Besides being a religious realist, James is thus also an ethical realist Slater Moreover, any objectivism regarding ethical values is grounded in the sort of religiosity that James argues for in The Varieties. If for Dewey, to surrender to a being already there has leaded supernaturalist creeds to weaken the active moral impulse that urge to the realisation of the ideal, it is the contrary for James. The postulation of a divine being encompassing our ideals form the basic esthetical condition under which our moral efforts are at best. In the last chapter of The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life, James indeed try to show how moral objectivism is not possible on purely naturalistic grounds. Moral objectivity demands the postulating of a God as one of the claimant WWJ 6: If the entities that are postulated are not imagined as real entities, they lack the power to motivate us.

**Chapter 8 : John Dewey - Wikipedia**

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An Historical Overview a. Club members included proto-positivist Chauncey Wright , future Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes , and two then-fledgling philosophers who went on to become the first self-conscious pragmatists: Charles Sanders Peirce , a logician, mathematician, and scientist; and William James , a psychologist and moralist armed with a medical degree. A Sequel to Pragmatism Peirce, unfortunately, never managed to publish a magnum opus in which his nuanced philosophical views were systematically expounded. Still, publish he did, though he left behind a mountain of manuscript fragments, many of which only made it into print decades after his death. Peirce and James traveled different paths, philosophically as well as professionally. James, less rigorous but more concrete, became an esteemed public figure and a Harvard professor thanks to his intellectual range, his broad sympathies, and his Emersonian genius for edifying popularization. Professional success within academe eluded Peirce; after his scandal-shrouded dismissal from Johns Hopkins University “his sole academic appointment” he toiled in isolation in rural Pennsylvania. True, Peirce was not entirely cut off: Nevertheless, his philosophical work grew increasingly in-grown, and remained largely unappreciated by his contemporaries. The well-connected James, in contrast, regularly derived inspiration and stimulation from a motley assortment of fellow-travellers, sympathizers, and acute critics. It should be noted, however, that Royce was also significantly influenced by Peirce. His mature works “Reconstruction in Philosophy , Experience and Nature , and The Quest for Certainty “boldly deconstruct the dualisms and dichotomies which, in one guise or another, had underwritten philosophy since the Greeks. According to Dewey, once philosophers give up these time-honoured distinctions “between appearance and reality, theory and practice, knowledge and action, fact and value” they will see through the ill-posed problems of traditional epistemology and metaphysics. Mead was a colleague and collaborator. After leaving Chicago for Columbia University in , Dewey became even more prolific and influential; as a result, pragmatism became an important feature of the philosophical landscape at home and abroad. Dewey, indeed, had disciples and imitators aplenty; what he lacked was a bona fide successor “someone, that is, who could stand to Dewey as he himself stood to James and Peirce. The Theory of Inquiry “pragmatism had lost much of its momentum and prestige. This is not to say that pragmatists became an extinct species; C. Lewis and Sidney Hook , for instance, remained prominent and productive. But to many it must have seemed that there was no longer much point in calling oneself a pragmatist “especially with the arrival of that self-consciously rigorous import, analytic philosophy. As American philosophers read more and more of Moore , Russell, Wittgenstein , and the Vienna Circle , many of them found the once-provocative dicta of Dewey and James infuriatingly vague and hazy. The age of grand synoptic philosophizing was drawing rapidly to a close; the age of piecemeal problem-solving and hard-edged argument was getting underway. From Quine to Rorty And so it was that Deweyans were undone by the very force that had sustained them, namely, the progressive professionalization of philosophy as a specialized academic discipline. Of the original pragmatist triumvirate, Peirce fared the best by far; indeed, some analytic philosophers were so impressed by his technical contributions to logic and the philosophy of science that they paid him the dubious compliment of re-making him in their own image. But the reputations of James and Dewey suffered greatly and the influence of pragmatism as a faction waned. Ramsey , Nelson Goodman , Wilfrid Sellars , and Thomas Kuhn “mainstream analytic philosophers tended to ignore pragmatism until the early s. In the absence of an Archimedean point, philosophy can only explore our practices and vocabularies from within; it can neither ground them on something external nor assess them for representational accuracy. Post-epistemological philosophy accordingly becomes the art of understanding; it explores the ways in which those voices which constitute that mutable conversation we call our culture “the voices of science, art, morality, religion, and the like” are related. In subsequent writings “Consequences of Pragmatism , Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity , Achieving Our Country , Philosophy and Social Hope , and

three volumes of *Philosophical Papers*, Rorty has enthusiastically identified himself as a pragmatist; in addition, he has urged that this epithet can be usefully bestowed on a host of other well-known philosophers— notably Donald Davidson. Though Rorty is the most visible and vocal contemporary champion of pragmatism, many other well-known figures have contributed significantly to the resurgence of this many-sided movement. Prominent revivalists include Karl-Otto Apel. There is much disagreement among these writers, however, so it would be grossly misleading to present them as manifesto-signing members of a single sect or clique. Some Pragmatist Themes and Theses

What makes these philosophers pragmatists? There is, alas, no simple answer to this question. For there is no pragmatist creed; that is, no neat list of articles or essential tenets endorsed by all pragmatists and only by pragmatists. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify certain ideas that have loomed large in the pragmatist tradition— though that is not to say that these ideas are the exclusive property of pragmatists, nor that they are endorsed by all pragmatists. Here, then, are some themes and theses to which many pragmatists have been attached. A Method and A Maxim

Pragmatism may be presented as a way of clarifying and in some cases dissolving intractable metaphysical and epistemological disputes. According to the down-to-earth pragmatist, bickering metaphysicians should get in the habit of posing the following question: This maxim points to a broadly verificationist conception of linguistic meaning according to which no sense can be made of the idea that there are facts which are unknowable in principle that is, truths which no one could ever be warranted in asserting and which could have absolutely no bearing on our conduct or experience. In a sense, then, the maxim-wielding pragmatist agrees with Oscar Wilde: Moreover, theories and models are to be judged primarily by their fruits and consequences, not by their origins or their relations to antecedent data or facts. The basic idea is presented metaphorically by James and Dewey, for whom scientific theories are instruments or tools for coping with reality. As Dewey emphasized, the utility of a theory is a matter of its problem-solving power; pragmatic coping must not be equated with what delivers emotional consolation or subjective comfort. What is essential is that theories pay their way in the long run— that they can be relied upon time and again to solve pressing problems and to clear up significant difficulties confronting inquirers. See Section 2b below, for more on fallibilism.

Anti-Cartesianism From Peirce and James to Rorty and Davidson, pragmatists have consistently sought to purify empiricism of vestiges of Cartesianism. They have insisted, for instance, that empiricism divest itself of that understanding of the mental which Locke, Berkeley, and Hume inherited from Descartes. Once we accept this picture of the mind as a world unto itself, we must confront a host of knotty problems— about solipsism, skepticism, realism, and idealism— with which empiricists have long struggled. Pragmatists have expressed their opposition to this Cartesian picture in many ways: Pace Descartes, no statement or judgment about the world is absolutely certain or incorrigible. All beliefs and theories are best treated as working hypotheses which may need to be modified— refined, revised, or rejected— in light of future inquiry and experience. Pragmatists have defended such fallibilism by means of various arguments; here are sketches of five: How then can we be absolutely sure we have chosen the right theory? But how could we ever know that? Fallibilism, it is said, is the only sane alternative to a cocksure dogmatism, and to the fanaticism, intolerance, and violence to which such dogmatism can all too easily lead. Pragmatists have also inveighed against the Cartesian idea that philosophy should begin with bold global doubt— that is, a doubt capable of demolishing all our old beliefs. Peirce, James, Dewey, Quine, Popper, and Rorty, for example, have all emphatically denied that we must wipe the slate clean and find some neutral, necessary or presuppositionless starting-point for inquiry. Inquiry, pragmatists are persuaded, can start only when there is some actual or living doubt; but, they point out, we cannot genuinely doubt everything at once though they allow, as good fallibilists should, that there is nothing which we may not come to doubt in the course of our inquiries. In sum, we must begin in *media res*— in the middle of things— and confess that our starting-points are contingent and historically conditioned inheritances. One meta-philosophical moral drawn by Dewey and seconded by Quine was that we should embrace naturalism: There is thus no special, distinctive method on which philosophers as a caste can pride themselves; no transcendentalist faculty of pure Reason or Intuition; no Reality immutable or otherwise inaccessible to science for philosophy to ken or limn. Moreover, philosophers do not invent or legislate standards from on high; instead, they make explicit the norms and

methods implicit in our best current practice. Finally, it should be noted that pragmatists are unafraid of the Cartesian global skeptic—that is, the kind of skeptic who contends that we cannot know anything about the external world because we can never know that we are not merely dreaming. Pragmatists typically think, for instance, that Kant was right to say that the world must be interpreted with the aid of a scheme of basic categories; but, they add, he was dead wrong to suggest that this framework is somehow sacrosanct, immutable, or necessary. Our categories and theories are indeed our creations; they reflect our peculiar constitution and history, and are not simply read off from the world. But frameworks can change and be replaced. And just as there is more than one way to skin a cat, there is more than one sound way to conceptualize the world and its content. Which interpretative framework or vocabulary we should use—that of physics, say, or common sense—will depend on our purposes and interests in a given context. The upshot of all this is that the world does not impose some unique description on us; rather, it is we who choose how the world is to be described. Though this idea is powerfully present in James, it is also prominent in later pragmatism. Then there is the matter of appealing to raw experience as a source of evidence for our beliefs. According to the tradition of mainstream empiricism from Locke to Ayer, our beliefs about the world ultimately derive their justification from perception. Sellars, Rorty, Davidson, Putnam, and Goodman are perhaps the best-known pragmatist opponents of this foundationalist picture. More generally, pragmatists from Peirce to Rorty have been suspicious of foundationalist theories of justification according to which empirical knowledge ultimately rests on an epistemically privileged basis—that is, on a class of foundational beliefs which justify or support all other beliefs but which depend on no other beliefs for their justification. Their objections to such theories are many: What these august metaphors seem intended to convey among other things is the idea that observation is pure reception, and that the mind is fundamentally passive in perception. Here, in other words, the knower is envisioned as a peculiar kind of voyeur: Not so, says Dewey. For Dewey, Peirce, and like-minded pragmatists, knowledge or warranted assertion is the product of inquiry, a problem-solving process by means of which we move from doubt to belief. Inquiry, however, cannot proceed effectively unless we experiment—that is, manipulate or change reality in certain ways. Since knowledge thus grows through our attempts to push the world around and see what happens as a result, it follows that knowers as such must be agents; as a result, the ancient dualism between theory and practice must go by the board. This repudiation of the passivity of observation is a major theme in pragmatist epistemology. According to James and Dewey, for instance, to observe is to select—to be on the lookout for something, be it for a needle in a haystack or a friendly face in a crowd. Hence our perceptions and observations do not reflect Nature with passive impartiality; first, because observers are bound to discriminate, guided by interest, expectation, and theory; second, because we cannot observe unless we act. But if experience is inconceivable apart from human interests and agency, then perceivers are truly explorers of the world—not mirrors superfluously reproducing it. And if acceptance of some theory or other always precedes and directs observation, we must break with the classical empiricist assumption that theories are derived from independently discovered data or facts. Again, it is proverbial that facts are stubborn things. If we want to find out how things really are, we are counseled by somber common-sense to open our eyes literally as well as figuratively and take a gander at the world; facts accessible to observation will then impress themselves on us, forcing their way into our minds whether we are prepared to extend them a hearty welcome or not. Facts, so understood, are the antidote to prejudice and the cure for bias; their epistemic authority is so powerful that it cannot be overridden or resisted. This idea is a potent and reassuring one, but it is apt to mislead. According to holists such as James and Schiller, the justificatory status of beliefs is partly a function of how well they cohere or fit with entrenched beliefs or theory. But this venerable view is vague and beset with problems, say pragmatists. Here are just four: Not as copying, surely; but then how? For we cannot know whether our beliefs are correspondence-true: What sense, then, can be made of the suggestion that true thoughts correspond to thought-independent things?

**Chapter 9 : Deweyan Pragmatism | William James Studies**

*Where James may be satisfied to accept certain beliefs and experiences (including "special" beliefs and experiences) at face-value and to judge them by their consequences, Dewey demands a reconstruction of the meaning of a belief before he is willing to discuss its value; and value, for Dewey, involves the power to exert an influence at the.*

The tender minded tend to be idealistic, optimistic and religious, while the tough minded are normally materialist, pessimistic and irreligious. But this has not weakened religious belief. People need a philosophy that is both empiricist in its adherence to facts yet finds room for religious belief. For James, then, Pragmatism is important because it offers a way of overcoming the dilemma, a way of seeing that, for example, science, morality and religion are not in competition. To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve—what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. This human witness tries to get sight of the squirrel by moving rapidly round the tree, but no matter how fast he goes, the squirrel moves as fast in the opposite direction, and always keeps the tree between himself and the man, so that never a glimpse of him is caught. The resultant metaphysical problem now is this: Does the man go round the squirrel or not? Pragmatic clarification disambiguates the question, and once that is done, all dispute comes to an end. So James offers his pragmatism as a technique for clarifying concepts and hypotheses. He proposed that if we do this, metaphysical disputes that appear to be irresolvable will be dissolved. When philosophers suppose that free will and determinism are in conflict, James responds that once we compare the practical consequences of determinism being true with the practical consequences of our possessing freedom of the will, we find that there is no conflict. As James admitted, he explained the pragmatic method through examples rather than by giving a detailed analysis of what it involves. He made no claim to originality: Peirce and James participated in these discussions along with some other philosophers and philosophically inclined lawyers. As we have already noted, Peirce developed these ideas in his publications from the s. As we shall see there were differences in how they understood the method and in their views of how it was to be applied. Later thinkers, for example John Dewey and C. Lewis, developed pragmatism further. This was tied to the study of the normative standards we should adopt when carrying out inquiries, when trying to find things out. Sections 2 and 3 will be concerned, primarily, with pragmatism in the narrow sense. Then, in section 4, we shall explore some of the views that are associated with pragmatism in the wider sense. The pragmatist maxim As we have seen, the pragmatist maxim is a distinctive rule or method for becoming reflectively clear about the contents of concepts and hypotheses: This raises some questions. What sort of thing does it recognize as a practical consequence of some theory or claim? Second, what use does such a maxim have? Why do we need it? And third, what reason is there for thinking that the pragmatist maxim is correct? Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the object. For all his loyalty to it, Peirce acknowledged that this formulation was vague: The principle has a verificationist character: This is clear from his later formulations, for example: The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all general modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol. We become clearer about the concept hard, for example, by identifying how there can be conceivable circumstances in which we have desires that would call for different patterns of action if some object were hard from those it would call for if the object were not hard. If I want to break a window by throwing something through it, then I need an object which is hard, not one which is soft. It is important that, as Peirce hints here, the consequences we are concerned with are general ones: Sometimes he writes as if the practical consequences of a proposition can simply be effects upon the believer: Peirce sees uses for his maxim which extend beyond those that James had in mind. He insisted that it was a logical principle and it was defended as an important component of the method of science, his favoured method for carrying out inquiries. This is reflected in the applications of the maxim that we find in his writings. First, he used it to clarify hard concepts that had a role in scientific reasoning: We shall discuss his

view of truth below. It also had a role in scientific testing. The pragmatist clarification of a scientific hypothesis, for example, provides us with just the information we need for testing it empirically. In later work, Peirce insisted that the maxim revealed all the information that was need for theory testing and evaluation EP2: The pragmatist clarification revealed all the information we would need for testing hypotheses and theories empirically. As Peirce described contemporary versions of this distinction, the highest grade of clarity, distinctness is obtained when we can analyze a concept for example into its elements by providing a verbal definition. This was provided by applying the pragmatist maxim. As well as treating the pragmatist maxim as part of a constructive account of the norms that govern inquiry, Peirce, like James, gave it a negative role. A more vivid non-logical example of using the concept to undermine spurious metaphysical ideas was in showing that the Catholic understanding of transubstantiation was empty and incoherent EP1: Here another difference between James and Peirce emerges. James made no concerted attempt to show or prove that the principle of pragmatism was correct. In his lectures, he put it into practice, solving problems about squirrels, telling us the meaning of truth, explaining how we can understand propositions about human freedom or about religious matters. But in the end, inspired by these applications, we are encouraged to adopt the maxim and see how well things work out when we do so. Since Peirce presented the maxim as part of the method of science, as a logical or, perhaps better, methodological principle, he thought that it was important to argue for it. Indeed, after , he devoted much of his energy to showing that the maxim could receive a mathematical proof. He used several strategies for this. In , he relied upon the idea that beliefs are habits of action: Applying the pragmatist maxim to the clarification of a proposition, he argued, involved describing the habits of action we would acquire if we believed it EP1: In the lectures on pragmatism which he delivered at Harvard in , he adopted a different strategy. He offered a detailed account of the cognitive activities we carried out when we used the method of science: His strategy then was to argue that the pragmatist clarifications brought to the surface all the information that was required for responsible abductive reasoning, and that our use of inductive and deductive arguments made no use of conceptual resources that could show that pragmatism was mistaken. Although he remained optimistic of success in this, he was never satisfied with his results. Pragmatist theories of truth These differences in motivation become clearest when we consider how both Peirce and James applied their pragmatist maxims to the clarification of the concept of truth. It possesses a form of unreflective clarity: It is at this stage that the concept of truth enters the discussion: So we have to turn to his remarks about truth to see how the kind of mind-independence captured in the abstract definition of reality is to be understood from a pragmatist perspective. This reflects a law which is evident from scientific experience: So with all scientific research. Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion. This activity of thought by which we are carried, not where we wish, but to a foreordained goal, is like the operation of destiny. No modification of the point of view taken, no selection of other facts for study, no natural bent of mind even, can enable a man to escape the predestinate opinion. The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality. These thoughts, however, have been caused by sensations, and those sensations are constrained by something out of the mind. This thing out of the mind, which directly influences sensation, and through sensation thought, because it is out of the mind, is independent of how we think it, and is, in short, the real. It is explained in terms of this fated agreement of convergence through the process of inquiry rather than in terms of an independent cause of our sensations. It articulates a metaphysical picture that all pragmatists tried to combat. See Misak , 69f where Cheryl Misak emphasises that Peirce does not offer a traditional analysis of truth. Rather, he provides an account of some of the relations between the concepts of truth, belief, and inquiry, She describes this as a naturalistic understanding of truth, and calls it an anthropological account of how the concept is used. And his writings on this topic rapidly became notorious. They are characteristically lively, offering contrasting formulations, engaging slogans, and intriguing claims which often seem to fly in the face of common sense. We can best summarize his view through his own words: The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite assignable reasons. Expedient in almost any fashion; and expedient in the long run and on the whole,

of course. Ideas are not become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relations with other parts of our experience. This suggests that a belief can be made true by the fact that holding it contributes to our happiness and fulfilment. This is unfair; at best, James is committed to the claim that the happiness that belief in Santa Claus provides is truth-relevant. It is easy to see that, unless it is somehow insulated from the broader effects of acting upon it, belief in Santa Claus could lead to a host of experiential surprises and disappointments. The pragmatist tradition So far, we have concentrated on the pragmatist maxim, the rule for clarifying ideas that, for both Peirce and James, was the core of pragmatism. When we think of pragmatism as a philosophical tradition rather than as a maxim or principle, we can identify a set of philosophical views and attitudes which are characteristic of pragmatism, and which can lead us to identify as pragmatists many philosophers who are somewhat sceptical about the maxim and its applications. Some of these views may be closely related to the maxim and its defence, but we shall now explore them rather as distinctive characteristics of the pragmatist tradition. Like some other philosophers, the pragmatists saw themselves as providing a return to common sense and the facts of experience and, thus, as rejecting a flawed philosophical heritage which had distorted the work of earlier thinkers. In each case, Descartes self-consciously made a break with the scholastic tradition, and, in each case, the outlook that he rejected turns out to be the outlook of the successful sciences and to provide the perspective required for contemporary philosophy. We are to try to doubt propositions and we should retain them only if they are absolutely certain and we are unable to doubt them. The test of certainty, as Peirce next points out, lies in the individual consciousness: And the examination of our beliefs is guided by reflection on hypothetical possibilities: See Hookway , chapters 2,3.