

**Chapter 1 : Justification, Epistemic | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy**

*This chapter investigates how languages encode justification and truth. The authors argue that many, perhaps all, languages have conventionalized ways to track speakers' justification for and commitment to the truth of their assertions.*

In his interesting and original new book *Justification and the Truth-Connection*, Clayton Littlejohn develops and defends a novel externalist account of epistemic justification. The book is unorthodox both in its brand of externalism, and in its argumentative strategy. The argumentative strategy is unorthodox in relying to a large extent on the kind of deontological considerations about duties and obligations, usually taken to favor internalism. One of the main contributions of the book is to turn the tables on one of the most common internalist lines of argument, by showing that once properly understood, considerations about epistemic obligations seem to favor externalism instead of internalism. On a broader level, the book is innovative in systematically relying on normative theorizing to make headway on traditional questions in epistemology, to an extent that is perhaps unrivaled so far in the literature. The book is extremely rich in argument, densely packed with discussion and detailed engagement with the major interlocutors of the field, displaying an impressive command of a very large and diverse literature in epistemology and ethics. As such, the book will be rewarding reading for anyone interested in understanding the nature of epistemic justification, as well as those working at the intersection of epistemology and practical philosophy. In what follows, I can only summarize some of its main points, and will briefly pursue a few possible avenues of criticism. The long "Introduction" is devoted to outlining some of the main versions of internalism and externalism found in the literature, and assessing the arguments that have shaped the debate between them thus far. The main contention of the chapter is that the debate has reached an impasse, with plausible but not yet compelling arguments on both sides. The introduction unfortunately does not provide a detailed plan of the arguments to be pursued in the book, which would have been useful. In the second chapter, Littlejohn considers whether considerations having to do with epistemic value might help us decide between internalism and externalism, and argues that they do not. Value-driven arguments for internalism do not ultimately decide the case, since the value considerations they rely on can be accommodated by externalist accounts that incorporate certain internalist elements. Epistemic consequentialists often work their way from a conception of epistemic goods to externalist accounts of justification, but despite his overall aim of defending externalism, Littlejohn rejects that support for the position is to be found here, since he rejects epistemic consequentialism. The three claims, to which the majority of the chapter is devoted, are: Although many internalists have opposed one or more of these claims, all of them are in principle compatible with internalism, as long as evidential propositions are restricted to appropriately internal ones. Given this, Littlejohn argues that since my evidence includes the proposition that I have hands, that hands exist in the external world, and that the proposition would be evidence only if I really have hands, my evidence includes facts that go beyond the internal. Are internalists likely to be persuaded by this argument? He assumes that when I have non-inferential knowledge of the proposition that I have hands, my underlying evidence must, simply, be the very proposition that I have hands. But internalists will want to explore other options -- perhaps an internal seeming can provide evidence and thus justification for a belief, without the belief being inferred from it; perhaps my evidence that I have hands is better understood as non-basic, depending on some more basic internal evidence. Littlejohn is aware of these options, but his treatment of them is brief. Internalists will want to hear more. In the central fourth chapter, Littlejohn turns to defend what is likely to be the most controversial thesis of the book, namely the factivity of justification, i. The basic line of argument is simple: This basic line is then pursued in two varieties, one concerning the role of justified belief in justifying further beliefs, and one concerning the justification of actions. Both arguments rely on the assumption, defended in the previous chapter, that any justifying reason for a belief or action must be a true proposition. But what about beliefs justified by non-entailing evidence, which is normally regarded as the most common case? Here things get murkier. Suppose that you justifiably believe that  $p$  on the basis of  $q$ , where  $q$  does not entail  $p$ . Suppose, now, that you competently deduce the obvious logical consequence  $r$  from  $p$ . If this further belief that  $r$  is justified, as

J-Closure ensures, and we have assumed that any justifying reason responsible for justifying other beliefs must be true, your belief that  $p$  must be true, if  $p$  is the justifying reason. But how can we conclude from the above that  $p$  is indeed your justifying reason? After all, it is compatible with J-Closure that  $r$  is justified directly by  $q$ , or in some other way, in which case we cannot conclude that  $p$  must be true. And in that case,  $p$  must be true. In this way, Littlejohn relies on some apparently innocuous assumptions about the factivity of evidence and the ability of deduction to transmit justification in order to derive the decidedly unpopular thesis that justification is factive. As was the case with the central argument of chapter 3, however, the overt simplicity of the argument may well belie some much murkier issues. But critics who are unconvinced of the factivity of justification are likely to object to this principle. If the bloodied glove justifies the false belief that the butler did it, it also justifies believing that the butler or the footman did it, even if the false belief that the butler did it fails to justify anything. Littlejohn sets up this argument as a six-step proof  $p$ . As I read this statement, it comes down to a necessary condition on the justification of belief: It is perhaps telling that in motivating 6, Littlejohn seems to instead focus on standards for when a belief can be justifiably included in deliberation, i. This is an immensely plausible and quite popular claim, which might be the reason that relatively little effort is devoted to justifying it. But if that is how we are to understand 6, the conclusion 7 no longer follows. What are the prospects for justifying the version of 6 needed for the argument? Not as good, perhaps, as Littlejohn lets on. The worry is similar to that arising from the apparently innocuous closure principle for justification. If I am to include a belief in practical deliberation, it had better be justified. But if I am justified in believing  $p$  on the basis of true but misleading evidence, I will not necessarily be allowed to rely on  $p$  in deliberation. This is not to say, of course, that the intended meaning of 6 cannot be supported, but such support is likely to be more controversial than we are told in chapter 4. In the fifth chapter, Littlejohn seeks to strengthen the case for the factivity of justification by comparing norms for belief with norms for assertion. The guiding thought is that if truth is required for warranted assertion, and common standards govern assertion and belief, truth is required for justified belief as well. A central worry for this strategy is, of course, that truth might be required for assertion and belief not because truth is required for justification, but because knowledge is the common standard, and knowledge, as we know, requires truth. In the sixth chapter, Littlejohn returns to the role of justified belief in practical deliberation. A recently prominent proposal is that knowledge of a relevant proposition is necessary and sufficient for justifiably relying on that proposition in deliberation, but Littlejohn argues that this is too strong, mainly on account of cases in which one is blameless for relying on Gettierized beliefs. Littlejohn then turns to the other possible account, namely that justification for believing a proposition is sufficient for one to justifiably include that proposition in deliberation -- a principle similar to that introduced as premise 6 in chapter 4. Again, the independent support for this principle is brief, but that is not the main purpose of the chapter. Rather, what Littlejohn seeks to show is that the principle is tenable only on the assumption that justification is factive. The argument for this is complicated, and turns on some subtle intuitive differences between justifiable and merely excusable acts, and between blame or mere regret being the most appropriate attitude in certain cases of false belief, which I shall not attempt to summarize here. In the final seventh chapter, Littlejohn focuses on what normative reasons demand of us in general, in the hope of thereby further motivating his take on epistemic justification. Littlejohn thinks of justification as a matter of doing all that the norms governing belief demand, and that we do this if our beliefs conform to the undefeated reasons associated with the norms, and we take due care to make sure of this. This leads Littlejohn to reject both evidentialism and knowledge as the fundamental norm for belief. Instead, Littlejohn argues that the fundamental norm for belief is truth: If this is the fundamental epistemic norm, we do what the norms require of us, and thereby believe with justification, only if our beliefs are true and we have taken due care to ensure that they are true, which among other things, involves believing it for reasons that show it to be true. But it is not easy to identify such an account in the few remaining pages. At times, more guiding commentary would have helped the reader to follow the dialectics in the very complicated back-and-forths between Littlejohn and various real and hypothetical opponents, and at several crucial junctions, one also gets the feeling that simplified versions of the arguments could have achieved the same result. For these reasons, the book is perhaps most suitable for those who are already well versed in the intricacies of the debate, and less suitable as

an introduction to the topic. The above reservations notwithstanding, the book is in many ways an impressive achievement, and certainly well worth reading. But they will certainly find in this book a challenging and refreshing new approach to a central debate in epistemology.

**Chapter 2 : Herman Amberg Preus on Justification of World**

*The theory of justification is a part of epistemology that attempts to understand the justification of propositions and beliefs. Epistemologists are concerned with various epistemic features of belief, which include the ideas of justification, warrant, rationality, and probability.*

Subjects[ edit ] Justification focuses on beliefs. More generally, theories of justification focus on the justification of statements or propositions. The subject of justification has played a major role in the value of knowledge as "justified true belief". Kvanvig attempts to show that knowledge is no more valuable than true belief, and in the process dismissed the necessity of justification due to justification not being connected to the truth. Explanation and Argument Justification is the reason why someone properly holds a belief , the explanation as to why the belief is a true one, or an account of how one knows what one knows. In much the same way arguments and explanations may be confused with each other, as may explanations and justifications. Statements that are justifications of some action take the form of arguments. For example, attempts to justify a theft usually explain the motives e. It is important to be aware when an explanation is not a justification. An uncritical listener may believe the speaker is trying to gain sympathy for the person and his or her actions, but it does not follow that a person proposing an explanation has any sympathy for the views or actions being explained. This is an important distinction because we need to be able to understand and explain terrible events and behavior in attempting to discourage it. Theories of justification generally include other aspects of epistemology, such as knowledge. Popular theories of justification include: Epistemic coherentism â€” Beliefs are justified if they cohere with other beliefs a person holds, each belief is justified if it coheres with the overall system of beliefs. Externalism â€” Outside sources of knowledge can be used to justify a belief. Foundationalism â€” Basic beliefs justify other, non-basic beliefs. Foundherentism â€” A combination of foundationalism and epistemic coherentism, proposed by Susan Haack Infinitism â€” Beliefs are justified by infinite chains of reasons. Internalism â€” The believer must be able to justify a belief through internal knowledge. Reformed epistemology â€” Beliefs are warranted by proper cognitive function, proposed by Alvin Plantinga. Skepticism â€” A variety of viewpoints questioning the possibility of knowledge truth skepticism â€” Questions the possibility of true knowledge, but not of justified knowledge epistemological skepticism â€” Questions the possibility of justified knowledge, but not true knowledge Evidentialism â€” Beliefs depend solely on the evidence for them. Justifiers[ edit ] This section possibly contains original research. Please improve it by verifying the claims made and adding inline citations. Statements consisting only of original research should be removed. June Learn how and when to remove this template message If a belief is justified, there is something that justifies it, which can be called its "justifier". If a belief is justified, then it has at least one justifier. An example of a justifier would be an item of evidence. For example, if a woman is aware that her husband returned from a business trip smelling like perfume, and that his shirt has smudged lipstick on its collar, the perfume and the lipstick can be evidence for her belief that her husband is having an affair. Not all justifiers have to be what can properly be called "evidence"; there may be some substantially different kinds of justifiers available. Regardless, to be justified, a belief has to have a justifier. Three things that have been suggested as justifiers are: Beliefs together with other conscious mental states. Beliefs, conscious mental states, and other facts about us and our environment which one may or may not have access to. At least sometimes, the justifier of a belief is another belief. When, to return to the earlier example, the woman believes that her husband is having an affair, she bases that belief on other beliefsâ€”namely, beliefs about the lipstick and perfume. What if she thought that all of that evidence were just a hoax? What if her husband commonly wears perfume and lipstick on business trips? For that matter, what if the evidence existed, but she did not know about it? Consider a belief P. Either P is justified or P is not justified. If P is justified, then another belief Q may be justified by P. If P is not justified, then P cannot be a justifier for any other belief: For example, suppose someone might believe that there is intelligent life on Mars, and base this belief on a further belief, that there is a feature on the surface of Mars that looks like a face , and that this face could only have been made by intelligent life. So the justifying belief is: And the justified belief is: But

suppose further that the justifying belief is itself unjustified. Thus, such a belief is unjustified because the justifier on which it depends is itself not justified. Commonly used justifiers[ edit ].

*Notice that, unlike the truth (or falsity) of a belief, the justification of a belief is relative to persons in the sense that one person may be justified in believing a certain proposition while another person may believe the same thing without justification.*

In the foregoing we have seen how the professor has just invented these signs of this appalling "Wisconsinism," "rational orthodoxy" and "spiritual exclusivism," and applied them to our synod. By this we understand that by raising Christ from the dead God declares him righteous and at the same time acknowledges and declares all people, the whole world, whose Representative and Substitute Jesus Christ was in his resurrection and victory as well as in his suffering and tribulation "He was delivered for our offenses and raised for our justification" , as free from guilt and punishment, and righteous in Christ Jesus. At the same time we maintain and teach in agreement with the Scriptures that the individual sinner must accept and appropriate by faith this righteousness earned for everyone by the death of Christ, pro-claimed by his resurrection, and announced and bestowed through the Gospel, to himself for his comfort and salvation, and that for the sake of Christ whose righteousness the troubled sinner grasps and makes his own in faith, God justifies the believer and counts his faith to him for righteousness. We teach therefore that the expressions "justification" and "to justify" are used in Scripture and in the Lutheran Church in a twofold way: I do not need to express myself more precisely about justification in the latter sense here. I must only call attention to the fact that exactly this doctrine of ours about the justification of sinners by faith shows at what doubtful means Professor Weenaas must grasp when he asserts that our doctrine of the justification of the world "separates justification in Christ from faith and thereby actually from Christ himself," in order to support his foolish case. But that our doctrine of justification in the first sense, as a justification of everyone through the resurrection of Christ from the dead, is biblical, we prove: And when Professor Oftedal, who is acquainted with the Greek text and knows that there is no verb there but only the preposition eis to , which Luther translates: Scripture teaches that Christ "is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world 1 Jo. If Christ has borne the sin of the world and atoned for it, then in the sight of him who gave the ransom for it, the world is loosed and free from sin and its punishment, although it remains in bondage and under the wrath of God if it remains in unbelief. As it says in the Book of Concord: If God is reconciled with the whole world since he does not impute its transgressions to it but to Christ, then the world must be righteous and guiltless in his eyes. God has solemnly testified to this by raising Christ from the dead, as Paul says: When God awakened him from the dead he declared the guilt erased, and Christ free and righteous. Just as "Christ was raised for our justification" Ro. Therefore Paul also says in 1 Corinthians The sinner is to appropriate this to him-self in faith for his comfort and salvation. But it could not possibly be the will of God that anyone should believe it and comfort himself with it, if it had not taken place, if the world was not freed from condemnation through the death and resurrection of Christ and acquitted of its sin and guilt and declared righteous. Therefore God also now lets his messengers admonish the whole world to leave its unbelief and its enmity against God and to reconcile itself with God by believing, and for its comfort, appropriate this blessed message to itself that God does not count its transgressions against it but credits it with the righteousness of Christ. Because what does not exist as a fact cannot justifiably be proclaimed or believed as such. So it is therefore apparent that it is actually Professor Weenaas who subverts the basis of justification, Christ, by his doctrine, and faith as the means by which it is reckoned and in this way destroys justification itself. The second consists in this that justifying faith is not considered as a plain and simple means [organon lepticon], a hand which accepts and is filled by the grace and the gifts which are already at hand, lie ready and are offered and given for nothing. The latter is especially clear from what he says on page In his opinion faith justifies not just because it grasps Christ and his righteousness. In papistical fashion therefore he ascribes to faith, insofar as it justifies, something more. He regards it as a quality, a new nature which a person obtains through the fellowship of life with Christ into which it most certainly comes by faith but which however is hardly why he is justified, and does not cooperate toward justification either. Add to this

for a third thing, that the professor stubbornly denies that justification is used both in the language of Scripture and the church in a twofold way not only of the fact that God counts his faith to the individual believer for righteousness and declares him righteous, but also of the fact that in his judgment God regards the whole world guiltless and ascribes to it the completed satisfaction of Christ for everyone, the righteousness earned for everyone. We must now consider these basic faults of the professor a little more closely. It can well with reason awaken our surprise that the professor here, where he accuses us of "rational orthodoxy" because we make a logical rational conclusion from the Christian teaching and from the Word of God, makes himself guilty in a rationalistic way of the gross sin of placing reason as judge over the Word of God. Yes, it must seem strange that in the same moment as he censures us for the legitimate use of reason in spiritual things he himself applies it in a way which conflicts with the Word of God and gives it an importance which it can have as little according to its essence as according to the Word of God. And yet this is the way it is. We on the other hand do not let reason make itself lord over the Word of God like that but "take it captive under the obedience of faith. Thus in the doctrine of election. There we insist both that God earnestly wants everyone to be saved and that only some, the elect, are saved, and even that no one can contribute anything to his conversion but that God does everything. But because a divine mystery is here which reason cannot grasp, then the Calvinists deny the one truth that God earnestly wants everyone to be saved and say that the reason that some are saved and others condemned is to be sought alone in the will of God who from eternity has elected some people to salvation and others to condemnation, while on the other hand the papists, in a Pelagian way, try to solve the mystery by denying the second truth that man can contribute nothing to his salvation when they teach that the reason that some people are saved and others condemned is to be sought in man himself, because some people use their innate power toward conversion but others do not. This is also what Professor Weenaas is now doing in this instance. The Holy Scriptures teach both that God has loved the whole world, that he has reconciled it, that he "does not impute its transgressions unto it" but is reconciled with it 2 Co. Because if God has not let wrath cease upon the world, then of course he has not loved it either. If the world is not actually favored according to merit and justified on the part of God through the satisfaction of Christ, then neither is it true that God is reconciled with it and that "the justification of life is come upon all men. On the other hand he must preach "another gospel" in which the right faith, as a hand, does not merely grasp the righteousness already gained and bestowed, but obtains a deserving character as a work of a good nature. According to his new gospel the professor must preach that through his suffering and death Christ has only accomplished so much that God has now become willing to let his wrath cease and to be reconciled and to loose, confer grace, forgive, justify and open access to salvation, but that in actuality he can only do and does all this if man on his part fulfills the condition placed on him by God, namely that he is supposed to believe. Thus 2 the Gospel no longer becomes the Good News which bestows the forgiveness of sins and justification and thereby works faith which appropriates this gift to itself, but it becomes a new law which demands faith from man for complete satisfaction. And finally 4 salvation no longer comes by grace alone for the sake of Christ, but by merit, namely by the merit of faith. I will readily believe that Professor Weenaas has not comprehended the whole range of his teaching. Likewise that he himself has not drawn all these consequences from his doctrine. But the fact that the professor gives faith such an unevangelical meaning no doubt comes from the good portion of pharisaic self-righteousness in which he still takes cover, just as also, as we saw above, from the fact that he does not take his reason captive under the Word of God in the obedience of faith but finds fault with and rejects this because he cannot grasp it with his reason. When God looks upon the world in his Son, Christ, then he looks upon it with the most fervent love. On the other hand, when he looks upon the world apart from Christ, he cannot look upon it without consuming wrath. He himself well knows that we build our doctrine of justification upon the Word of God and not at all on any rational reasoning whatsoever, and that we therefore would not come into doubt about the truth of this doctrine in the slightest way either, though we are not prepared to give any satisfactory explanation by way of any rational reasoning. But when the professor says that such talk about God looking upon the world apart from Christ is not biblical, then I shall admit that this expression itself is not found in the Bible. He was of course then at one and the same time the Righteous One and he who was made "sin," the Beloved of the Father, and cursed by him. How could God love and

curse his Son at the same time? However, there is no contradiction here. One merely notes the fact that God looks upon his Son in a twofold way. When he looks upon him as he actually is in himself, then the Son stands before him as the Righteous One. Then he loves him. We have seen above that our doctrine is biblical, just as also that our expressions are biblical, because "justification" is surely used in the meaning employed by us in Romans 5: That our expressions are not foreign to the ecclesiastical use of language either is seen from the fact that "justification" and "to justify" are used in the way mentioned in our Confessions and by our religious writers. Rohrborg died as court preacher in Stockholm in his Postil, pages , , , Rosenius in his commentary on Romans 5: Dietrich Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, p. That the latter is however the case we must conclude from the more precise explanation the professor gives when he says: Bergh, and which are in part gossip. It is however only less enlightened Christian people who could charge it against the Gospel, so that "one sees the indifferent comfort himself, the drunkard rejoice and the impenitent die peace-fully because it is preached to them that God has forgiven everyone their sins. And with this we proceed to the next characteristic the professor discusses. Thus it is the same doctrine which our synod, most recently in opposition to the errors of the Norwegian-Danish Conference, confessed in the following theses at its meeting in But how does the professor attempt to prove the correctness of this assertion of his? Yes, he sets forth the following accusations in regard to our doctrine of absolution. Surely these are some serious charges which Professor Weenaas raises here against our synod. Nor can we see here a "false objectivism" or a "hollow, rational objectivism. As far as I can see from his confusing reasoning, with the following two reasons: Now concerning the first of these reasons, it does not hold water. But when the professor says: Therefore, neither can God perform this act of justifying except where faith is. On the other hand, this, that God forgives sin, signifies only the action of God that he proclaims to the sinner that his sin is taken away by the death of Christ and that he therefore gives him forgiveness so that he is to believe it, but without regard to whether he has already believed it or not, so that this act of forgiving sin by God cannot only happen without faith being there but first must occur without faith being there since faith cannot be worked otherwise, or know what it is to believe. With this assertion the professor surely subverts also the fundamental Christian doctrine that we are justified and saved by the grace of God alone. Namely, when a person posits something else, a condition, which he has to fulfill so that he will give him something, and this person fulfills the conditions and does what is expected of him, then he can also demand the gift as payment for works, and the other cannot say that he has given the gift by grace alone, unmerited. If faith is set by God as such a condition which a person has to fulfill so that God can forgive sin, then it is thereby taught that God requires of a person that he is to do something on his part first and fulfill the requirement and the commands God has placed on it in order that God again on his part can forgive sin. But this teaching also leads to other dangerous consequences which the professor would rather not draw but which however necessarily follow from his assertion however much he even defends himself against them. We will consider some of them. Because if this were the case, then in the very moment the reconciliation occurred, God would have been reconciled, ceased his wrath against people and forgiven them. But now it is said that before he can do this God is not properly reconciled. Therefore Christ has not fully reconciled us with God. But this conflicts with Matthew 3: Because then there is no Gospel of God through which it can be worked. We consider also that the Word of God surely does not say that God will give us his Son when we believe in him or on the condition that we believe in him. In 1 John 5: And Paul says in Romans 8: Therefore Paul also says in Ephesians 1: But we have already been redeemed and reconciled with God through the death of Christ, and this is to be and must be proclaimed to us in the Gospel so that we can believe and be saved Mk. Thus neither shall the forgiveness of sins and righteousness first be procured for us and given us on the condition that we believe, but they are, God be praised, already procured! Through the death and resurrection of Christ the whole world is already justified before God in Christ and its sin which was laid on Jesus, the Lamb of God, is forgiven it by God in him. This Gospel is to be proclaimed to all creatures so that everyone can believe it, find comfort and be saved. If then a person has let himself be convinced of his sins by the Law so that he comes to grief and feels miserable, then it is only through such a Gospel, and only through it, that he comes to faith and obtains the forgiveness of his sins. Then he also becomes righteous and saved by grace alone, for the sake of Christ alone, by faith alone. In this way alone

God also receives all the glory and man none. We therefore teach also that over toward an obvious unbeliever a person is to use the Law and the binding key in order to lead them to the knowledge of sin and repentance without which they will not trouble themselves about the Gospel and grace "they that are whole need not a physician, but they who are sick". Just as we also employ private confession and announcements before the imparting of absolution to that end. When the Savior warningly says: If that could not possibly happen, as Professor Weenaas thinks, then the Lord would not have given such a warning.

**Chapter 4 : The Glorious Truth Of Justification**

*A second intuition about justification that is widely shared is that justification is related to truth in a substantive way. Justification is a means to truth: having 1 Philosophers who have advocated this idea relatively recently include Alston (*

For the past 2, years God has used this book alone to change the lives of millions of people all around the world. Romans is a revolutionary book that will change your life. When Paul wrote this epistle to the church in Rome, there was a large Jewish contingent in the church, Gentile converts from paganism, and both free men as well as slaves. According to the end of the book, there were several congregations meeting in the city. Rome was the most important city in the world in the first century – it had a vast army, and it controlled all of the countries that surrounded the Mediterranean Sea. The rulers of Rome were extremely powerful and wealthy. The theme of the book centers on the Gospel of Christ Rom 1: Paul is deeply concerned that his readers understand how a sinner may be received as righteous by a righteous God; and how a justified sinner should live daily to the glory of God. He traces his conversion to a few verses in Romans His godly mother, Monica, had been praying for him for decades that he would come to faith in Christ. In AD , he found himself in great despair. In his own words, he said, "I grabbed it and read the first passage my eyes fell upon! Augustine would later write, "In an instant I came to the end of the sentence and it was as if the light of faith flooded into my heart, and all the gloom and darkness of doubt vanished away. He studied and prayed and tried all sorts of religious practices, denying himself, even inflicting pain on himself. As a last resort he decided he would go to the Holy City itself, Rome, with its hundreds of shrines. There perhaps by visiting the shrines he could avoid thousands of years in Purgatory. When he got to Rome, he was shocked at what he found – Rome was far from being the Holy City. Nevertheless, he went ahead and visited all the shrines he could. The last great pilgrimage he embarked upon was one at the Lateran Church, which is famous for its sacred stairway – supposedly, it was the very staircase that Jesus stood on when Pilate condemned him to die; they believed it to be supernaturally transported from Jerusalem. Pilgrims from all over the world would come to Rome they still do to this day , and climb the steps, one at a time on their knees. So Luther got on his knees and he would kiss and pray the rosary at every single step. Finally, Luther stopped his ascent and stood to his feet and felt like a man who had come to his senses. The just shall live by faith! He ran down those stairs, quickly went back to Germany, where he did a critical study of the book of Romans in the original language – and the Christian world has never been the same since. At that point Luther began to see that the Church of Rome in his day did not jibe with what Paul had taught them in his epistle years earlier. Night and day Luther pondered Romans until he grasped the truth that the righteousness of God is that righteousness whereby, through grace and sheer mercy, He justifies us by faith cf. The cry of the Reformation was "The just shall live by faith! He said this about it: It is a book of Christian doctrine, and doctrine is very important, because your doctrine will affect the way you live – right doctrine will lead towards right living; wrong doctrine will lead towards wrong living. When he finally translated Romans into English in , he wrote this statement in the preface to the book – "I think it is important that every Christian not only know the book by rote, but that he also continually exercise himself in it as the daily bread of the soul. No man can read it too often, or study it too well; for the more it is studied. He spent years desperately trying to minister to people without a personal relationship with Jesus Christ. He had ritual and religion, but not a relationship with God. Then one evening in he reluctantly attended a little church gathering where his life would forever be changed. Later he wrote of that night: If you are spiritually dry or dead, this book can quicken your spirit and can cause you to come alive by the power of the Holy Spirit. One cannot read the book of Romans without the power of God affecting your life and motivating you to move for God. Romans includes the most systematic presentation of theology found anywhere in Scripture. New believers learn of their identification with Christ and of victory through the power of the Holy Spirit. And Mature believers find never-ending delight in its wide spectrum of Christian truth. The three main reasons why Paul wrote this letter were these: In many churches, there were serious arguments between Jewish and Gentile Christians – the Jewish Christians said that God had given His law in the Bible; therefore it was incumbent upon the Gentiles to obey it as well. But

the Gentile Christians said that God had given them freedom; so they did not want to obey any Jewish rules or traditions. How did Christianity first reach Rome? Scripture tells us that a number of Jews from Rome were converted in Jerusalem on the Day of Pentecost cf. That was in about AD Paul had never been in Rome when he wrote this letter from Corinth in AD 57, but he knew quite a few of the Christians there, as is seen in chapter One further historical note: Most of the commentary on each verse will follow that verse or verses in a different, indented typeset. Just as God had chosen Jeremiah from before his birth to be His spokesperson cf. So Paul emphasizes here that it was God who took the initiative in their salvation. These two spiritual qualities come to us directly from God the Father and Lord Jesus. Although he was not responsible for their becoming believers, he recognized how strategic the church in Rome was. Coupled with that, Paul desired to visit them in the not too distant future “ according to the will of God. Paul was careful not to emphasize himself as the giver “ therefore he humbly acknowledged that his life would be enriched by their faith as well. In all edifying, there is spiritual enrichment: Paul desired to visit the believing community in Rome and have a fruitful ministry there, just as he had in other places. Paul proclaims here that the gospel is both for the both the educated and the uneducated; for both the wise and the foolish. Paul realized many people would be ashamed to follow Christ. Jesus Himself recognized that cf. Paul warned Timothy not be ashamed of it cf. Paul had suffered much for the gospel. But the message of the gospel is not wrong or stupid. It is a message of which to be proud; a message to honorably proclaim. Ashamed of the gospel? On one level Christianity has no quarrel with that analysis, so long as it corresponds with a personal knowledge of God, and our intrinsic need for salvation. According to the book of Genesis, God placed man in the Garden of Eden to be His vice regents on earth. He gave them maximum freedom, authority, and dominion over all the earth Gen 1: There were no apparent restrictions on how they were to do it, except one “ they were not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil Gen 2: As such, man is faithless, rebellious, and full of pride. So sin is everything within our being that is contrary to the expressed will of God cf. How bad is sin? The fall affected every part of man “ his spirit died, for his fellowship with God was broken. Ultimately, men have their own self-interests at stake in everything they do; in some way, their intent is always to satisfy and gratify themselves. This proposition will become very clear as you continue in this study. If you are a child of God, you are a new creation! Your sins are forgiven “ forever! You are now indwelt by the Holy Spirit, that you might walk in newness of life “ we were all meant to live in intimacy with Christ on the day of creation! We have now been re-created! Now, if the foregoing is indeed the case, that He bought you in the slave-market of sin and made you His own, how can you possibly be ashamed of the redemptive work of Christ? The remedy for your problem? Stop focusing on yourself! This is a very common problem for believers. The fight of faith must be intentionally fought. Either you are progressing! Embrace the spiritual disciplines with renewed vigor! Since His righteous demands were fully satisfied at the cross, God can righteously save all who place their trust in the work of Christ. Unbelief and Its Consequences 1: Sinful humanity can mentally perceive the revealed truth of God, but they have chosen to suppress it vv. Nature reveals God as great and good “ its gentle rains and rich soils provide humans with all varieties of delicious food; nature speaks so eloquently of its Creator that men are without excuse cf. In response to the evil lusts of their hearts, God abandoned them to heterosexual uncleanness “ adultery, fornication, lewdness, prostitution, harlotry, etc. Life became for them a round of sex orgies in which to dishonor their bodies among themselves. To repeat, this abandonment by God was because they first abandoned the truth about Him for the lie of idolatry “ an idolater worships the image of a creature, and thus dishonors the Creator, who alone is worthy of honor and glory. For this same reason God gave people up to erotic activity with members of their own sex “ women became lesbians, and men became sodomites; turning away from the marriage relationship ordained by God, they burned with lust for other men and practiced homosexuality. In the OT this sin was punishable by death Lev While society tends to rationalize certain sins, God judges all sin. The gospel offers pardon and forgiveness to homosexuals, as it does to all sinners who repent and believe in the Lord Jesus Christ. Though some individuals may be more inclined toward homosexuality than others, still this behavior is looked upon as sin. It should be noted that sin does not consist in the inclination toward it, but in the yielding to and practicing it.

Chapter 5 : What is sanctification?

*Habermas, Jurgen, Truth and Justification, edited and with translations by Barbara Fulmer, MIT Press, , pp, \$ (hbk), ISBN Reviewed by Richard Rorty, Stanford University The range of issues discussed in this collection of recent essays by Jürgen Habermas is suggested by the.*

This principle has an adequate explicit counterpart: Axiom Internalization can then be emulated by using!! The notion of Constant Specification can also be simplified accordingly. Such modifications are minor and they do not affect the main theorems and applications of Justification Logic. This is normally the case for computer proof verifiers, proof checkers in formal theories, etc. This motivation is, however, nuanced: More recently it has been discovered that there is an infinite family of modal logics that have justification counterparts, but for which the connection with arithmetic proofs is weak or missing. We discuss a single case in some detail, and sketch others. Semantically these schemes correspond to generalized versions of confluence. Some people have begun referring to the schemes as Geach schemes, and we will follow this practice. Geach logics constitute an infinite family. Every Geach logic has a justification counterpart. In any context one of the disjuncts must hold. It is a strong assumption, but not implausible at least in some circumstances. Even though the Geach family is infinite, these logics do not cover the full range of logics with justification counterparts. A Realization Theorem holds; this is shown in Fitting b. We speculate that all logics axiomatized with Sahlquist formulas will have justification counterparts, but this remains a conjecture at this point. Semantics The now-standard semantics for justification logic originates in Fitting “the models used are generally called Fitting models in the literature, but will be called possible world justification models here. Possible world justification models are an amalgam of the familiar possible world semantics for logics of knowledge and belief, due to Hintikka and Kripke, with machinery specific to justification terms, introduced by Mkrtychev in Mkrtychev , cf. This maps justification terms and formulas to sets of worlds. One should not think of relevant evidence as conclusive. Rather, think of it as more like evidence that can be admitted in a court of law: Evidence functions must meet certain conditions, but these are discussed a bit later. These just say that atomic truth is specified arbitrarily, and propositional connectives behave truth-functionally at each world. The key item is the next one. This condition breaks into two parts. It is important to realize that, in this semantics, one might not believe something for a particular reason at a world either because it is simply not believable, or because it is but the reason is not appropriate. Some conditions must still be placed on evidence functions, and the constant specification must also be brought into the picture. One can combine these in two different ways: The following condition on evidence functions is assumed: The following requirement is imposed on evidence functions. Recall that constants are intended to represent reasons for basic assumptions that are accepted outright. Despite their similarities, possible world justification models allow a fine-grained analysis that is not possible with Kripke models. A completeness theorem now takes the expected form. The completeness theorem as just stated is sometimes referred to as weak completeness. Comments on this point follow. On the other hand it is very general, working for all Constant Specifications. In Fitting a stronger version of the semantics was also introduced. So, fully explanatory really says that if a formula is believable at a possible world, there is a justification for it. Not all weak models meet the fully explanatory condition. Models that do are called strong models. Indeed, in an appropriate sense completeness with respect to strong models is equivalent to being able to prove Internalization. In turn, strong models can be used to give a semantic proof of the Realization Theorem cf. Now things are broadened to encompass justification analogs of other familiar modal logics. The same applies to the logics discussed below. Second, a monotonicity condition on evidence functions is required: Models for justification logics that include this operator add three conditions. First R is symmetric. Second, one adds a condition that has come to be known as strong evidence: Finally, there is a condition on the evidence function: Axiomatic soundness and completeness can be proved. In a similar way, related logics and can be formulated semantically. Moving to Geach logics as introduced in Section 2. We add the following requirements. Completeness and soundness results follow in the usual way. In a similar way every modal logic axiomatized by Geach schemes in this family has a justification

counterpart, with a Fitting semantics and a realization theorem connecting the justification counterpart with the corresponding modal logic. In particular, this tells us that the justification logic family is infinite, and certainly much broader than it was originally thought to be. It is also the case that some modal logics not previously considered, and not in this family, have justification counterparts as well. Investigating the consequences of all this is still work in progress. Today they can most simply be thought of as possible world justification models that happen to have a single world. What completeness with respect to single world justification models tells us is that information about the possible world structure of justification models can be completely encoded by the admissible evidence function, at least for the logics discussed so far. Complexity results have further been used to address the problem of logical omniscience. The formal semantics for Justification Logic described above in 3. These models have been playing a prominent role in Justification Logic. In addition, there is a different kind of semantics, so-called modular semantics, which focuses on making more transparent the ontological status of justifications. Within modular semantics propositions receive the usual classical truth values and justifications are interpreted syntactically as sets of formulas. The principal issue is how to interpret justification terms. Justification terms  $T_m$  are interpreted as subsets of the set of formulas: Note that whereas propositions in modular models are interpreted semantically, as truth values, justifications are interpreted syntactically, as sets of formulas. This is a principal feature: In Fagin and Halpern a simple mechanism for avoiding the problems was introduced. Awareness functions can serve as a practical tool for blocking knowledge of an arbitrary set of formulas. However as logical structures, awareness models can exhibit unusual behavior due to the lack of natural closure properties. Possible world justification logic models use a forcing definition reminiscent of the one from the awareness models: This shows that Justification Logic models absorb the usual epistemic themes of awareness, group agency and dynamics in a natural way. The forgetful projection extends in the natural way from sentences to logics. However, it is easily observed that the forgetful projection always maps valid formulas of Justification Logic  $e$ . The converse also holds: This follows from the Correspondence Theorem 3. At the core of the Correspondence Theorem is the following Realization Theorem. Known realization algorithms which recover evidence terms in modal theorems use cut-free derivations in the corresponding modal logics. In principle, these semantic arguments also produce realization procedures which are based on exhaustive search. It would be a mistake to draw the conclusion that any modal logic has a reasonable Justification Logic counterpart. But this is intuitively false for factive justification. The Correspondence Theorem gives fresh insight into epistemic modal logics. Most notably, it provides a new semantics for the major modal logics. Justification semantics plays a similar role in Modal Logic to that played by Kleene realizability in Intuitionistic Logic. In both cases, the intended semantics is existential: In both cases there is a possible-world semantics of universal character which is a highly potent and dominant technical tool. It does not, however, address the existential character of the intended semantics. Again, this new component was, in fact, an old and central notion which has been widely discussed by mainstream epistemologists but which remained out of the scope of classical epistemic logic. The Correspondence Theorem tells us that justifications are compatible with Hintikka-style systems and hence can be safely incorporated into the foundation for Epistemic Modal Logic. Generalizations So far in this article only single-agent justification logics, analogous to single-agent logics of knowledge, have been considered. Justification Logic can be thought of as logic of explicit knowledge, related to more conventional logics of implicit knowledge. A number of systems beyond those discussed above have been investigated in the literature, involving multiple agents, or having both implicit and explicit operators, or some combination of these. Axiomatic completeness is also rather straightforward. This is not the only way of doing it. More generally, an explicit knowledge accessibility relation could be a proper extension of that for implicit knowledge. This represents the vision of explicit knowledge as having stricter standards for what counts as known than that of implicit knowledge.

**Chapter 6 : Truth, Belief and Justification**

*1 Justification and truth: Evidence from languages of the world Lisa Matthewson and Jennifer Glougie1 This paper investigates whether and how languages encode the epistemological.*

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Does Justification Aim at Truth? Graham bio Does epistemic justification aim at truth? Joseph Cruz and John Pollock surprisingly say no. I shall show their argument falls short. In so doing I shall sketch an account where justification [End Page 51] functions so as to promote truth and avoid error. Justification aims at truth, and they should think so too. For their confidence that justification does not aim at truth derives not only from their rejection of traditional reliabilism, but also from the widely shared conviction that the traditional reliabilist has the upper hand when it comes to connecting justification and truth, a conviction that I shall critically examine. If the account I sketch is on the right track, then I shall have found a place for truth in their epistemology. And so my paper has four aims: For Pollock and Cruz, justification is first and foremost a procedural notion, where a belief is justified iff formed or sustained by rational procedures of belief-formation. Some beliefs are formed in ways that justify those beliefs; some are not. Justified beliefs result from following the correct rational or good cognitive procedures; unjustified beliefs result from incorrect procedures. Suppose Susan believes P [End Page 52] and if P then Q, and then infers Q on the basis of those beliefs and sensitivity to modus ponens. She formed the belief that Q in a correct or rational way. Paradigmatically, rational belief formation preserves truth. If your premises are true, and you reason in a rational way, then your conclusions are likely to be true as well. Pollock and Cruz “like many other moderate internalist foundationalists” extend this way of seeing justification to perceptual justification. A perceptual representation normally leads to perceptual belief. The normal transition from perception to belief is a rational or good cognitive procedure. You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

**Chapter 7 : Justification Logic (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)**

*Thus we can imagine two inhabitants of this world. i. this cannot be calendrierdelascience.com* **ICATION AND TRUTH** "the justificational status of a belief is a function of the reliability of the processor processes that cause it" (p. the cognitive processes she lists are indistinguishable from the perspective of epistemic justification.

References and Further Reading 1. Starting Points Consider your simplest, most obvious beliefs: Are these beliefs justified for you? What would explain the rightness or fittingness of these beliefs? One prominent account of justification is that a belief is justified for a person only if she has a good reason for holding it. If you were to ask me why I believe the sky is blue and I were to answer that I am just guessing or that my horoscope told me, you would likely not consider either a good reason. In either case, I am not justified in believing the sky is blue, even if it really is blue. However, if I were to say, instead, that I remember seeing the sky as blue or that I am currently seeing that it is blue, you would likely think better of my reason. So, having good reasons is a very natural explanation of how our beliefs are justified. Further, the possibility that my belief that the sky is blue is not justified, even if it is true that the sky is blue, suggests that justification is more than simply having a true belief. All of my beliefs may be true, but if I obtained them accidentally or by faulty reasoning, then they are not justified for me; if I am seeking knowledge, I have no right to hold them. Further still, true belief may not even be necessary for justification. We can imagine this was the situation of many physicists in the late s. If this is right, justification is fallible—it is possible to be justified in believing false propositions. Though some philosophers have, in the past, rejected fallibilism about justification, it is now widely accepted. Having good reasons, it turns out, does not guarantee having true beliefs. But the idea that justification is a matter of having good reasons faces a serious obstacle. Normally, when we give reasons for a belief, we cite other beliefs. I see that the cat is on the mat. Seeing that X implies that X. Together, these seem to constitute a good reason for believing the proposition: The cat is on the mat. But does this mean that proposition 3 is epistemically justified for you? Even if the combination of propositions 1 and 2 counts as a good reason to believe 3, proposition 3 is not justified unless both 1 and 2 are also justified. Do we have good reasons for believing 1 and 2? If not, then according to the good reasons account of justification, propositions 1 and 2 are unjustified, which means that 3 is unjustified. If we do have good reasons for believing 1 and 2, do we have good reasons for believing those propositions? How long does our chain of good reasons have to be before even one belief is justified? These questions lead to a classic dilemma. If there are no good reasons to believe proposition 1, then proposition 1 is unjustified, which means 3 is unjustified. If there is a good reason to believe proposition 1, say proposition 1a, then either 1a is unjustified or we need another belief, proposition 1b, to justify 1a. If this process continues infinitely, then 1 is ultimately unjustified, and, therefore, 3 is unjustified. Either way, proposition 3 is unjustified. Horn A of the dilemma is the problem of skepticism about justification. If our most obvious beliefs are unjustified, then no belief derived from them is justified; and if no belief is justified, we are left with an extreme form of skepticism. Horn B of the dilemma is called the regress problem. If every reason we offer requires a reason that also requires a reason, and so on, infinitely, then no belief is ultimately justified. Responses to this dilemma typically take one of two forms. On one hand, we might embrace Horn A, which is, in effect, to adopt skepticism and eschew any further attempts to justify our beliefs. This is the classic route of the Pyrrhonian skeptics, such as Sextus Empiricus, and some later Academic skeptics, such as Arcesilaus. For more on these views, see Ancient Greek Skepticism. On the other hand, we might offer an explanation of how beliefs can be justified in spite of the dilemma. In other words, we might offer an account of epistemic justification that resolves the dilemma, either by constructing a third, less problematic option or by showing that Horn B is not as troublesome as philosophers have traditionally supposed. This non-skeptical route is the majority position and the focus of the remainder of this article. Philosophers tend to agree that any adequate account of epistemic justification—that is, an account that resolves the dilemma—must do at least three things: Among those who reject the inferential assumption, some argue that justification is grounded in special beliefs, called basic beliefs, that are either obviously true or supported by non-belief states, such as perceptions foundationalism. Others who reject the inferential

assumption argue that justification is either a function of the quality of the mechanisms by which beliefs are formed externalism or at least partly a function of certain qualities or virtues of the believer virtue epistemology. In addition to resolving the DIJ, theories of justification must explain what it is about forming or holding a belief that justifies it in order to explain how a belief is justified. The former view is called internalism because the justifying reasons—whether beliefs, experiences, testimony, and so forth—are internal mental states, that is, states consciously available to a person. Explaining the Role of Justification A second central aim of epistemology is to identify and explain the role that justification plays in our belief-forming behavior. Some argue that justification is required for the practical work of having responsible beliefs. Having certain reasons makes it possible for us to choose well which beliefs to form and hold and which to reject. This is called the guidance model of justification. Clifford, pair it with a strongly normative role according to which justification is a matter of fulfilling epistemic obligations. Other epistemologists reject the guidance and guidance-deontological models for more descriptive models. Justification, according to these philosophers, is simply a feature of our psychology, and though our minds form beliefs more effectively under some circumstances than others, the conditions necessary for forming justified beliefs are outside of our access and control. This objective, naturalistic model of justification has it that our understanding of justification should be informed, in large part, by psychology and cognitive science. Explaining Why Justification is Valuable A third central aim of theories of justification is to explain why justification is epistemically valuable. Some epistemologists argue that justification is crucial for avoiding error and increasing our store of knowledge. Others argue that knowledge is more complicated than attaining true beliefs in the right way and that part of the value of knowledge is that it makes the knower better off. These philosophers are less interested in the truth-goal in its unqualified sense; they are more interested in intellectual virtues that position a person to be a proficient knower, virtues such as intellectual courage and honesty, openness to new evidence, creativity, and humility. Though justification increases the likelihood of knowledge under some circumstances, we may rarely be in those circumstances or may be unable to recognize when we are; nevertheless, these philosophers suggest, there is a fitting way of believing regardless of whether we are in those circumstances. A minority of epistemologists reject any connection between justification and knowledge or virtue. Instead, they focus either on whether a belief fits into an objective theory about the world or whether a belief is useful for attaining our many and diverse cognitive goals. Other philosophers, whom we might call relativists and pragmatists, argue that epistemic value is best explained in terms of what most concerns us in practice. Debates surrounding these three primary aims inspire many others. There are questions about the sources of justification: Is all evidence experiential, or is some non-experiential? Are memory and testimony reliable sources of evidence? And there are additional questions about how justification is established and overturned: How strong does a reason have to be before a belief is justified? In what follows, we look at the strengths and weaknesses of prominent theories of justification in light of the three aims just outlined, leaving these secondary questions to more detailed studies. Justification and Knowledge The type of knowledge primarily at issue in discussions of justification is knowledge that a proposition is true, or propositional knowledge. Propositional knowledge stands in contrast with knowledge of how to do something, or practical knowledge. For more on this distinction, see Knowledge. Second, that person must believe the proposition, that is, she must mentally assent to its truth. And third, her belief that the proposition is true must be justified for her. Knowledge, according to this traditional account, is justified true belief JTB. And though philosophers still largely accept that justification is necessary for knowledge, it turns out to be difficult to explain precisely how justification contributes to knowing. Historically, philosophers regarded the relationship between justification and knowledge as strong. Holbo and Waring, This idea of tethering came to mean that justification—when one is genuinely justified—guarantees or significantly increases the likelihood that a belief is true, and, therefore, we can tell directly when we know a proposition. But a series of articles in the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated that this strong view is mistaken; justification, even for true beliefs, can be a matter of luck. For example, imagine the following three things are true: Therefore, your justified true belief seems not to be an instance of knowledge. During the Gettier Era, philosophers were pressed to revise or reject the traditional relationship. In response, some have maintained that the relationship between justification and

knowledge is strong, but they modify the concept justification in attempt to avoid lucky true beliefs. Others argue that the relationship is weaker than traditionally supposed—something is needed to increase the likelihood that a belief is knowledge, and justification is part of that, but justification is primarily about responsible belief. Still others argue that whether we can tell we are justified is irrelevant; justification is a truth-conducive relationship between our beliefs and the world, and we need not be able to tell, at least not directly, whether we are justified. But before we consider these developments, we address the DIJ. Internalist Foundationalism One way of resolving the DIJ is to reject the inferential assumption, that is, to reject the claim that all justification involves inference from other beliefs. The most prominent way of doing this while avoiding skepticism is to show that all chains of good inference culminate at a unique kind of belief called a basic belief. Basic beliefs are beliefs that need not be inferred from any other beliefs in order to be justified. Foundationalism comprises a family of views, all of which claim, at minimum, that all justified beliefs are either basic or inferred from other justified beliefs. Classically, foundationalists combine this view with the claims that we can know whether a belief is justified—that is, whether it stands in an evidential chain that starts with a basic belief—and the claim that knowing whether we are justified helps us fulfill our epistemic duties—in other words, we do well when we form or keep beliefs that are well supported and discard or refuse beliefs that are not; we do poorly when we do not. The view that justification is a matter of having certain internal mental states is called internalism, and the family of views that include both is called internalist foundationalism. There is a further debate among internalists as to whether justification requires simply having certain mental states propositional justification or whether justified beliefs must be based on those mental states doxastic justification. Another debate among internalists is whether justification helps us to fulfill epistemic duties—that is, it tells us which beliefs are epistemically permissible, obligatory, or impermissible the deontological conception of justification—or whether it is simply a descriptive fact about our belief systems. For an example of the latter, see Conee and Feldman

**Chapter 8 : Justification and Truth: Evidence from Languages of the World - Oxford Scholarship**

» Summary of "Myth, Truth, and the Justification in Religion" William L. Power Phil In the article, "Myth, Truth, and Justification in Religion", the author, William L. Power states and thoroughly explains his opinions and thoughts on theology and religion.

According to this analysis, justified, true belief is necessary and sufficient for knowledge. The Tripartite Analysis of Knowledge: S knows that p iff p is true; S believes that p; S is justified in believing that p. Much of the twentieth-century literature on the analysis of knowledge took the JTB analysis as its starting-point. It became something of a convenient fiction to suppose that this analysis was widely accepted throughout much of the history of philosophy. In fact, however, the JTB analysis was first articulated in the twentieth century by its attackers. Consequently, nobody knows that Hillary Clinton won the election. One can only know things that are true. Many people expected Clinton to win the election. Not all truths are established truths. If you flip a coin and never check how it landed, it may be true that it landed heads, even if nobody has any way to tell. Truth is a metaphysical, as opposed to epistemological, notion: Knowledge is a kind of relationship with the truth—'to know something is to have a certain kind of access to a fact. The general idea behind the belief condition is that you can only know what you believe. Failing to believe something precludes knowing it. Outright belief is stronger see, e. Suppose Walter comes home after work to find out that his house has burned down. Critics of the belief condition might argue that Walter knows that his house has burned down he sees that it has , but, as his words indicate, he does not believe it. A more serious counterexample has been suggested by Colin Radford Suppose Albert is quizzed on English history. One of the questions is: E Elizabeth died in Radford makes the following two claims about this example: Albert does not believe E. The fact that he answers most of the questions correctly indicates that he has actually learned, and never forgotten, such historical facts. Since he takes a and b to be true, Radford holds that belief is not necessary for knowledge. But either of a and b might be resisted. David Rose and Jonathan Schaffer take this route. The justification condition is the topic of the next section. Why not say that knowledge is true belief? The standard answer is that to identify knowledge with true belief would be implausible because a belief might be true even though it is formed improperly. Suppose that William flips a coin, and confidently believes—'on no particular basis—that it will land tails. For William to know, his belief must in some epistemic sense be proper or appropriate: For example, if a lawyer employs sophistry to induce a jury into a belief that happens to be true, this belief is insufficiently well-grounded to constitute knowledge. Internalists about justification think that whether a belief is justified depends wholly on states in some sense internal to the subject. Conee and Feldman present an example of an internalist view. Given their not unsubstantial assumption that what evidence a subject has is an internal matter, evidentialism implies internalism. Propositional justification concerns whether a subject has sufficient reason to believe a given proposition; [ 9 ] doxastic justification concerns whether a given belief is held appropriately. The precise relation between propositional and doxastic justification is subject to controversy, but it is uncontroversial that the two notions can come apart. Suppose that Ingrid ignores a great deal of excellent evidence indicating that a given neighborhood is dangerous, but superstitiously comes to believe that the neighborhood is dangerous when she sees a black cat crossing the street. Since knowledge is a particularly successful kind of belief, doxastic justification is a stronger candidate for being closely related to knowledge; the JTB theory is typically thought to invoke doxastic justification but see Lowy This view is sometimes motivated by the thought that, when we consider whether someone knows that p, or wonder which of a group of people know that p, often, we are not at all interested in whether the relevant subjects have beliefs that are justified; we just want to know whether they have the true belief. For example, as Hawthorne One could allow that there is a lightweight sense of knowledge that requires only true belief; another option is to decline to accept the intuitive sentences as true at face value. In what follows, we will set aside the lightweight sense, if indeed there be one, and focus on the stronger one. Although most agree that each element of the tripartite theory is necessary for knowledge, they do not seem collectively to be sufficient. There seem to be cases of justified true belief that still fall short of knowledge. Here is one kind of

example: Imagine that we are seeking water on a hot day. We suddenly see water, or so we think. In fact, we are not seeing water but a mirage, but when we reach the spot, we are lucky and find water right there under a rock. Can we say that we had genuine knowledge of water? The answer seems to be negative, for we were just lucky. The 14th-century Italian philosopher Peter of Mantua presented a similar case: Let it be assumed that Plato is next to you and you know him to be running, but you mistakenly believe that he is Socrates, so that you firmly believe that Socrates is running. However, let it be so that Socrates is in fact running in Rome; however, you do not know this. Gettier presented two cases in which a true belief is inferred from a justified false belief. He observed that, intuitively, such beliefs cannot be knowledge; it is merely lucky that they are true. Since they appear to refute the JTB analysis, many epistemologists have undertaken to repair it: Above, we noted that one role of the justification is to rule out lucky guesses as cases of knowledge. A lesson of the Gettier problem is that it appears that even true beliefs that are justified can nevertheless be epistemically lucky in a way inconsistent with knowledge. Epistemologists who think that the JTB approach is basically on the right track must choose between two different strategies for solving the Gettier problem. The first is to strengthen the justification condition to rule out Gettier cases as cases of justified belief. No False Lemmas According to one suggestion, the following fourth condition would do the trick: There are examples of Gettier cases that need involve no inference; therefore, there are possible cases of justified true belief without knowledge, even though condition iv is met. Suppose, for example, that James, who is relaxing on a bench in a park, observes an apparent dog in a nearby field. So he believes There is a dog in the field. Suppose further that the putative dog is actually a robot dog so perfect that it could not be distinguished from an actual dog by vision alone. Given these assumptions, d is of course false. And since this belief is based on ordinary perceptual processes, most epistemologists will agree that it is justified. If so, then the JTB account, even if supplemented with iv, gives us the wrong result that James knows d. Suppose there is a county in the Midwest with the following peculiar feature. The landscape next to the road leading through that county is peppered with barn-facades: Observation from any other viewpoint would immediately reveal these structures to be fakes: Suppose Henry is driving along the road that leads through Barn County. Naturally, he will on numerous occasions form false beliefs in the presence of barns. Since Henry has no reason to suspect that he is the victim of organized deception, these beliefs are justified. Now suppose further that, on one of those occasions when he believes there is a barn over there, he happens to be looking at the one and only real barn in the county. This time, his belief is justified and true. Yet condition iv is met in this case. His belief is not the result of any inference from a falsehood. Once again, we see that iv does not succeed as a general solution to the Gettier problem. Sensitivity, to a first approximation, is this counterfactual relation: Given a Lewisian Lewis semantics for counterfactual conditionals, the sensitivity condition is equivalent to the requirement that, in the nearest possible worlds in which not-p, the subject does not believe that p. One motivation for including a sensitivity condition in an analysis of knowledge is that there seems to be an intuitive sense in which knowledge requires not merely being correct, but tracking the truth in other possible circumstances. This approach seems to be a plausible diagnosis of what goes wrong in at least some Gettier cases. For if there were no water there, you would have held the same belief on the same grounds—viz. However, it is doubtful that a sensitivity condition can account for the phenomenon of Gettier cases in general. It does so only in cases in which, had the proposition in question been false, it would have been believed anyway. But, as Saul Kripke Consider for instance the Barn County case mentioned above. Henry looks at a particular location where there happens to be a barn and believes there to be a barn there. The sensitivity condition rules out this belief as knowledge only if, were there no barn there, Henry would still have believed there was. But this counterfactual may be false, depending on how the Barn County case is set up. Relatedly, as Kripke has also indicated We assume Henry is unaware that colour signifies anything relevant. Since intuitively, the former belief looks to fall short of knowledge in just the same way as the latter, a sensitivity condition will only handle some of the intuitive problems deriving from Gettier cases. Most epistemologists today reject sensitivity requirements on knowledge. For example, George, who can see and use his hands perfectly well, knows that he has hands.

*1 Evidentialism and Truth One might well begin a discussion of epistemic justification by wondering why a philosopher should be particularly interested in the concept.*

Chapter 2 The Connection to Truth A salient point of our internalist resolution of the Gettier problem is the centrality of the concept of rationality. Indeed, an emphasis on the primacy of rationality in the hierarchy of epistemic concepts is one of the hallmarks of internalist metaepistemology. But this very point is the target of one of the most common complaints against internalism -- that in emphasizing rationality we have completely divorced epistemic rationality from knowledge. Such a divorce is not unprecedented in the literature. Richard Foley, for example, argues that knowledge and epistemic rationality have so little to do with one another that one must simply choose which one to investigate at any given time. But the externalist can press the question: If not, then arguably it has no place in the analysis of knowledge. Knowledge comprises various conditions, but we do want these conditions to be related to one another rather than being an arbitrary and heterogenous collection. Furthermore, as Stewart Cohen has argued, a non-trivial connection to truth seems required for distinctively epistemic as opposed to pragmatic or ethical justification. A survey of statements of this objection will not only illustrate the problem but also point towards the distinctions necessary to its solution. Fumerton, himself no externalist, states lucidly the motivation behind a rejection of internalist justification. When a belief is justified it has a virtue. There is something good about it. From the epistemic perspective, virtue has to do with truth. The reason epistemologists want epistemically justified beliefs At the same time, we must understand justification in such a way that we allow the possibility of justified false belief. The answer is to focus on the processes that produce beliefs. He first states that the best "doxastic-decision-procedure" DDP which should guide people in accepting beliefs will be one that produces an "optimal" combination of true belief and error avoidance. This, it seems to him, follows directly from the plausible idea that the goals of cognition are believing truth and avoiding error. He then argues that these goals present a problem for internalism. Unfortunately, the foregoing characterization of the right DDP ignores a crucial aspect of traditional epistemology. The foregoing conception rests on an "externalist" perspective: Traditional epistemology has not adopted this externalist perspective. It has been predominantly internalist The objective optimality of a DDP, on this view, does not make it right. A DDP counts as right only if it is "certifiable" from within. He therefore concludes that internalism is a "will-o-the-wisp" and that we should be satisfied with externalism, with its emphasis on the de facto optimal DDP. If induction is to serve the purposes which we expect it to serve in science, "probability" must be so interpreted that a probability statement asserts a fact; this requires that the kind of probability involved should be derivative from truth and falsehood, not an indefinable; and this, in turn, makes the finite-frequency interpretation more or less inevitable. If the [inductive] principle is to serve its purpose, we must interpret "probable" as meaning "what in fact usually happens"; that is to say, we must interpret a probability as a frequency. Probability, according to Russell, must be "derivative from truth and falsehood. Michael Friedman also ties justification to truth in an externalist fashion when he addresses the possibility of an a priori defense of non-deductive inference forms in scientific methodology: The impossibility of such a justification follows, it seems to me, from two simple and fundamental facts: There is no inductive method that is more reliable in every logically possible world than every other method; consequently, there is no method that is a priori best, there is no method that is a priori the most reliable. We have to know facts about the actual world if we are to know which method is best; and we have to know facts about the actual world to know even that any given method has any chance at all of leading to truth. If there is "some kind of link" between justification and truth, then non-deductive justification can only occur when one is using an actually reliable "method" of induction. David Miller brings the point down to the level of practical application, expressing impatience with those who emphasize good reasons. I often ask those who continue to find this Which ticket would you prefer to draw in a sweepstake: The answer I receive is almost always that the winning ticket is, of course, the best one to draw; It is the "therefore" here that takes my breath away. If the tactical preference for the most favoured ticket is not to be simply an

underhand repudiation of the abstract preference for the winning ticket, then the agent must have conjectured that the ticket most likely to win actually will win. Both emphasize the desire to have beliefs that are in fact true, regardless of whether one possesses good reasons for them. Finally, and most interestingly, Laurence Bonjour has been so greatly influenced by the connection to truth consideration that he nearly capitulates to externalism on the quintessential internalist notion of having good reasons. But Bonjour is clearly worried by it himself. It seems apparent that an adequate third condition for knowledge must be one whose satisfaction yields an objectively good reason, not merely a subjectively good one, which is just to insist that justification or warrant must be objectively, and not merely subjectively, truth-conducive. The question then is whether the answer to this question seems to hinge in large part on just how unusual this kind of case is in relation to the total class of actual and possible oak tree experiences. The first, frequently ignored in the philosophical literature, is the distinction between "sources of belief" or "belief-forming practices" and inference forms. In externalist writings one frequently encounters lists of belief-forming practices including everything from using induction to trusting our senses to trusting our friends. Alvin Plantinga groups together perception, the inclination to form beliefs about other minds, induction, memory, and the *sensus divinitatis*. But *prima facie*, there is an important difference between induction and deduction, on the one hand, and such "sources" as memory and perception on the other. The former are contentless forms of reasoning, while the latter are not forms of argument at all but rather types of experience that typically move us to form beliefs. The importance of the distinction between inference forms and other "sources" of belief becomes more evident when we consider another distinction -- the distinction between an intrinsic connection to truth and an extrinsic connection to truth, where the latter denotes some form of reliability in the world. In all of the quotations above where any determination can be made at all, it is clear that the authors are looking for an extrinsic connection to truth. Bonjour moves from a concern for an "objectively good reason" to the actual ratio of non-veridical oak-tree experiences to veridical ones. He seems convinced that reliability is an indispensable virtue for an argument form; otherwise, he fears, it provides only a "subjectively good reason. Both he and Alston 17 have examined the possibilities for an a priori argument for reliability e. Whether sensation or any other "belief-producing mechanism" is actually reliable is not an a priori matter but an empirical one. In one of its meanings, "objectivity" is opposed to something like relativism. An objectively good reason would, on this interpretation, be one that is equally good for any reasoner who possesses it, as opposed to an argument that a reasoner merely happens to like or feels inclined to follow. Obviously, this is not what Bonjour intends by "objectively good reason. But there are strong reasons to believe that the first concept of objectivity is the one that carries epistemic weight. We naturally want the epistemic resources to evaluate negatively the beliefs of lazy, inept, or biased reasoners; we do not want each person to be able to declare that something constitutes a "good reason for him. The possession of this virtue would mean that the argument constitutes an "objectively good reason" for its conclusion in the sense of a non-relativistically good reason, regardless of whether that argument form, or the inference from those sorts of sensations to that sort of conclusion, has in some further sense an external-world "propensity" to yield true conclusions. What might such an intrinsic virtue look like, and in what non-trivial sense could we call it a "connection to truth"? The answer to this question will depend in part upon whether the belief in question is foundational. Foundational beliefs will be evaluated solely in terms of generative epistemic principles, while an evaluation of the epistemic status of inferred beliefs will also require the use of transmissive epistemic principles. The epistemic principles will show that the foundational beliefs and the arguments based upon them have the relevant intrinsic virtue. It is therefore the epistemic principles themselves that must have -- or make evident -- the "connection to truth. For generative epistemic principles, not just anything will do. If the principle is to spell out an intrinsic connection between the foundational belief and truth, it cannot include the requirement that the belief be produced by a reliable mechanism or "proper function," for these would be extrinsic connections. It is in no sense a characteristic of a belief in itself that it is produced by a properly functioning or reliable mechanism. Moderate foundationalists, with their emphasis upon merely probable foundational beliefs, are especially likely to endorse extrinsic foundational connections. Robert Audi, for example, writes that grounding in experience "seems to explain why a belief so grounded may be expected to be true; for experience seems to connect the beliefs [it]

ground[s] to the reality constituting their object, in such a way that what is believed about that reality tends to be the case. If, on the other hand, Audi means to give an account of the source of justification or some sort of epistemically positive status for experiential foundations, he is describing only an extrinsic connection to truth, since in a different world such beliefs might not "tend" to be true. Other moderate foundationalists have argued that some beliefs really are intrinsically probable. It would take a different book to argue for incorrigibilist foundationalism of the sort we espouse. One philosopher after another has slid down the reliabilist slope to the conclusion that any method of reasoning that purports to confer probability upon a proposition must itself produce a favorable proportion of true beliefs if consistently followed as a practice. If inference forms are separated from general "belief-forming practices," however, we can see that the reliability standard need not be applied to inference forms in order to grant them a connection to truth. There is a helpful analogy here between deductive and non-deductive principles. In his polemic against a priori justifications of scientific method, Michael Friedman emphasizes that scientific method is "not guaranteed of producing true results" and is "incurably non-deductive. The problem with non-deductive inferences on this view is that they possess no similar guarantee of external-world reliability. It is true that when people start with true premises and reason correctly in accordance with the rules of deduction they invariably end up believing truths. Indeed, the fact that correct deductions are defined by the rules of a deductive system enables us to investigate deduction non-empirically. The truth-preserving nature of deduction can be investigated a priori, both by our grasp of simple deductive rules and by way of proofs that display the consistency of a logical language in a way that can be clearly grasped. The truth-preserving nature of deduction is therefore the only "connection to truth" which it has in itself. Since its rules concern only connections between propositions, deduction does not possess a connection to external-world truth except insofar as it transmits the truth of external-world premises. But the fact that deduction preserves truth is not contingent but necessary. Hence, the distinctive deductive "connection to truth" is entirely a matter of the structure of deductive logic and owes nothing to the structure of the external world. Correct non-deductive reasoning, like correct deductive reasoning, follows certain general and necessary rules. It is true that there is far more debate over the proper rules of non-deductive inference than over the parallel questions for deductive inference. But the correct rules of non-deductive reasoning -- whether direct inference, Bayesian, or yet more complex forms -- are neither equivalent to nor reducible to mere human "practices" or mechanisms generating readings in causal response to the environment, such as watches or thermostats. The premises of non-deductive arguments confer a certain degree of epistemic probability on their conclusions, and this is not a matter of what the external world is like but rather a necessary relation that can be determined a priori. As with deductive logic, the connection of probabilities to truth is intrinsic. Non-deductive inference and the epistemic interpretation of deduction An obvious objection to any analogy between deductive and non-deductive inference is that the latter does not preserve truth in the sense that deductive inference does. Deductive systems are checked by metatheoretic consistency proofs to demonstrate that they are truth-preserving; in deduction, there is no partial credit, no points for a system that usually yields true conclusions from true premises. In non-deductive inference there is an ineliminable slippage between premises and conclusion, so that even a conclusion inferred from premises known with certainty may turn out to be false. Even if we say that non-deductive inference preserves or conveys probability, probability is not truth. It makes no sense to say that non-deductive inference preserves "probable truth," as if this were a species of truth, for truth does not come in degrees.