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Chapter 1 : Public financing of innovation: new questions | Oxford Review of Economic Policy | Oxford Aca

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It persisted as the dominant approach in Western moral philosophy until at least the Enlightenment, suffered a momentary eclipse during the nineteenth century, but re-emerged in Anglo-American philosophy in the late s. Neither of them, at that time, paid attention to a number of topics that had always figured in the virtue ethics traditionâ€”virtues and vices, motives and moral character, moral education, moral wisdom or discernment, friendship and family relationships, a deep concept of happiness, the role of the emotions in our moral life and the fundamentally important questions of what sorts of persons we should be and how we should live. Its re-emergence had an invigorating effect on the other two approaches, many of whose proponents then began to address these topics in the terms of their favoured theory. It has also generated virtue ethical readings of philosophers other than Plato and Aristotle, such as Martineau, Hume and Nietzsche, and thereby different forms of virtue ethics have developed Slote ; Swanton , a. See Annas for a short, clear, and authoritative account of all three. We discuss the first two in the remainder of this section. Eudaimonia is discussed in connection with eudaimonist versions of virtue ethics in the next. It is a disposition, well entrenched in its possessorâ€”something that, as we say, goes all the way down, unlike a habit such as being a tea-drinkerâ€”to notice, expect, value, feel, desire, choose, act, and react in certain characteristic ways. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset. A significant aspect of this mindset is the wholehearted acceptance of a distinctive range of considerations as reasons for action. An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, practices honest dealing and does not cheat. An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, tells the truth because it is the truth, for one can have the virtue of honesty without being tactless or indiscreet. Valuing honesty as she does, she chooses, where possible to work with honest people, to have honest friends, to bring up her children to be honest. She disapproves of, dislikes, deplors dishonesty, is not amused by certain tales of chicanery, despises or pities those who succeed through deception rather than thinking they have been clever, is unsurprised, or pleased as appropriate when honesty triumphs, is shocked or distressed when those near and dear to her do what is dishonest and so on. Possessing a virtue is a matter of degree. To possess such a disposition fully is to possess full or perfect virtue, which is rare, and there are a number of ways of falling short of this ideal Athanassoulis Most people who can truly be described as fairly virtuous, and certainly markedly better than those who can truly be described as dishonest, self-centred and greedy, still have their blind spotsâ€”little areas where they do not act for the reasons one would expect. So someone honest or kind in most situations, and notably so in demanding ones, may nevertheless be trivially tainted by snobbery, inclined to be disingenuous about their forebears and less than kind to strangers with the wrong accent. I may be honest enough to recognise that I must own up to a mistake because it would be dishonest not to do so without my acceptance being so wholehearted that I can own up easily, with no inner conflict. The fully virtuous do what they should without a struggle against contrary desires; the continent have to control a desire or temptation to do otherwise. If it is the circumstances in which the agent actsâ€”say that she is very poor when she sees someone drop a full purse or that she is in deep grief when someone visits seeking helpâ€”then indeed it is particularly admirable of her to restore the purse or give the help when it is hard for her to do so. But if what makes it hard is an imperfection in her characterâ€”the temptation to keep what is not hers, or a callous indifference to the suffering of othersâ€”then it is not. The concept of a virtue is the concept of something that makes its possessor good: These are commonly accepted truisms. But it is equally common, in relation to particular putative examples of virtues to give these truisms up. It is also said that courage, in a desperado, enables him to do far more wicked things than he would have been able to do if he were timid. So it would appear that

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generosity, honesty, compassion and courage despite being virtues, are sometimes faults. Someone who is generous, honest, compassionate, and courageous might not be a morally good person—or, if it is still held to be a truism that they are, then morally good people may be led by what makes them morally good to act wrongly! How have we arrived at such an odd conclusion? The answer lies in too ready an acceptance of ordinary usage, which permits a fairly wide-ranging application of many of the virtue terms, combined, perhaps, with a modern readiness to suppose that the virtuous agent is motivated by emotion or inclination, not by rational choice. Aristotle makes a number of specific remarks about phronesis that are the subject of much scholarly debate, but the related modern concept is best understood by thinking of what the virtuous morally mature adult has that nice children, including nice adolescents, lack. Both the virtuous adult and the nice child have good intentions, but the child is much more prone to mess things up because he is ignorant of what he needs to know in order to do what he intends. A virtuous adult is not, of course, infallible and may also, on occasion, fail to do what she intended to do through lack of knowledge, but only on those occasions on which the lack of knowledge is not culpable. So, for example, children and adolescents often harm those they intend to benefit either because they do not know how to set about securing the benefit or because their understanding of what is beneficial and harmful is limited and often mistaken. Such ignorance in small children is rarely, if ever culpable. Adults, on the other hand, are culpable if they mess things up by being thoughtless, insensitive, reckless, impulsive, shortsighted, and by assuming that what suits them will suit everyone instead of taking a more objective viewpoint. They are also culpable if their understanding of what is beneficial and harmful is mistaken. It is part of practical wisdom to know how to secure real benefits effectively; those who have practical wisdom will not make the mistake of concealing the hurtful truth from the person who really needs to know it in the belief that they are benefiting him. The detailed specification of what is involved in such knowledge or understanding has not yet appeared in the literature, but some aspects of it are becoming well known. Even many deontologists now stress the point that their action-guiding rules cannot, reliably, be applied without practical wisdom, because correct application requires situational appreciation—the capacity to recognise, in any particular situation, those features of it that are morally salient. This brings out two aspects of practical wisdom. One is that it characteristically comes only with experience of life. Amongst the morally relevant features of a situation may be the likely consequences, for the people involved, of a certain action, and this is something that adolescents are notoriously clueless about precisely because they are inexperienced. It is part of practical wisdom to be wise about human beings and human life. It should go without saying that the virtuous are mindful of the consequences of possible actions. How could they fail to be reckless, thoughtless and short-sighted if they were not? The wise do not see things in the same way as the nice adolescents who, with their under-developed virtues, still tend to see the personally disadvantageous nature of a certain action as competing in importance with its honesty or benevolence or justice. These aspects coalesce in the description of the practically wise as those who understand what is truly worthwhile, truly important, and thereby truly advantageous in life, who know, in short, how to live well.

Forms of Virtue Ethics While all forms of virtue ethics agree that virtue is central and practical wisdom required, they differ in how they combine these and other concepts to illuminate what we should do in particular contexts and how we should live our lives as a whole. In what follows we sketch four distinct forms taken by contemporary virtue ethics, namely, a eudaimonist virtue ethics, b agent-based and exemplarist virtue ethics, c target-centered virtue ethics, and d Platonistic virtue ethics. A virtue is a trait that contributes to or is a constituent of eudaimonia and we ought to develop virtues, the eudaimonist claims, precisely because they contribute to eudaimonia. It is for me, not for you, to pronounce on whether I am happy. If I think I am happy then I am—it is not something I can be wrong about barring advanced cases of self-deception. Contrast my being healthy or flourishing. Here we have no difficulty in recognizing that I might think I was healthy, either physically or psychologically, or think that I was flourishing but be wrong. Most versions of virtue ethics agree that living a life in accordance with virtue is necessary for eudaimonia. This supreme good is not conceived of as an independently defined state made up of, say, a list of non-moral

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goods that does not include virtuous activity which exercise of the virtues might be thought to promote. It is, within virtue ethics, already conceived of as something of which virtuous activity is at least partially constitutive. Kraut. Thereby virtue ethicists claim that a human life devoted to physical pleasure or the acquisition of wealth is not eudaimon, but a wasted life. But although all standard versions of virtue ethics insist on that conceptual link between virtue and eudaimonia, further links are matters of dispute and generate different versions. For Aristotle, virtue is necessary but not sufficient—what is also needed are external goods which are a matter of luck. For Plato and the Stoics, virtue is both necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia. Annas. According to eudaimonist virtue ethics, the good life is the eudaimon life, and the virtues are what enable a human being to be eudaimon because the virtues just are those character traits that benefit their possessor in that way, barring bad luck. So there is a link between eudaimonia and what confers virtue status on a character trait. For a discussion of the differences between eudaimonists see Baril. It is unclear how many other forms of normativity must be explained in terms of the qualities of agents in order for a theory to count as agent-based. The two best-known agent-based theorists, Michael Slote and Linda Zagzebski, trace a wide range of normative qualities back to the qualities of agents. Similarly, he explains the goodness of an action, the value of eudaimonia, the justice of a law or social institution, and the normativity of practical rationality in terms of the motivational and dispositional qualities of agents. Zagzebski likewise defines right and wrong actions by reference to the emotions, motives, and dispositions of virtuous and vicious agents. Her definitions of duties, good and bad ends, and good and bad states of affairs are similarly grounded in the motivational and dispositional states of exemplary agents. However, there could also be less ambitious agent-based approaches to virtue ethics see Slote. At the very least, an agent-based approach must be committed to explaining what one should do by reference to the motivational and dispositional states of agents. But this is not yet a sufficient condition for counting as an agent-based approach, since the same condition will be met by every virtue ethical account. For a theory to count as an agent-based form of virtue ethics it must also be the case that the normative properties of motivations and dispositions cannot be explained in terms of the normative properties of something else such as eudaimonia or states of affairs which is taken to be more fundamental. Beyond this basic commitment, there is room for agent-based theories to be developed in a number of different directions. The most important distinguishing factor has to do with how motivations and dispositions are taken to matter for the purposes of explaining other normative qualities. If those motives are good then the action is good, if not then not. Another point on which agent-based forms of virtue ethics might differ concerns how one identifies virtuous motivations and dispositions. As we observe the people around us, we find ourselves wanting to be like some of them in at least some respects and not wanting to be like others. The former provide us with positive exemplars and the latter with negative ones. Our understanding of better and worse motivations and virtuous and vicious dispositions is grounded in these primitive responses to exemplars. This is not to say that every time we act we stop and ask ourselves what one of our exemplars would do in this situations. Our moral concepts become more refined over time as we encounter a wider variety of exemplars and begin to draw systematic connections between them, noting what they have in common, how they differ, and which of these commonalities and differences matter, morally speaking. Recognizable motivational profiles emerge and come to be labeled as virtues or vices, and these, in turn, shape our understanding of the obligations we have and the ends we should pursue. However, even though the systematising of moral thought can travel a long way from our starting point, according to the exemplarist it never reaches a stage where reference to exemplars is replaced by the recognition of something more fundamental. At the end of the day, according to the exemplarist, our moral system still rests on our basic propensity to take a liking or disliking to exemplars. The target-centered view developed by Christine Swanton, by contrast, begins with our existing conceptions of the virtues. We already have a passable idea of which traits are virtues and what they involve. Of course, this untutored understanding can be clarified and improved, and it is one of the tasks of the virtue ethicist to help us do precisely that. But rather than stripping things back to something as basic as the motivations we want to imitate or building it up to something as

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elaborate as an entire flourishing life, the target-centered view begins where most ethics students find themselves, namely, with the idea that generosity, courage, self-discipline, compassion, and the like get a tick of approval. It then examines what these traits involve. A complete account of virtue will map out 1 its field, 2 its mode of responsiveness, 3 its basis of moral acknowledgment, and 4 its target. Different virtues are concerned with different fields. Courage, for example, is concerned with what might harm us, whereas generosity is concerned with the sharing of time, talent, and property. Courage aims to control fear and handle danger, while generosity aims to share time, talents, or possessions with others in ways that benefit them. A virtuous act is an act that hits the target of a virtue, which is to say that it succeeds in responding to items in its field in the specified way. Providing a target-centered definition of a right action requires us to move beyond the analysis of a single virtue and the actions that follow from it. This is because a single action context may involve a number of different, overlapping fields. Determination might lead me to persist in trying to complete a difficult task even if doing so requires a singleness of purpose.

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Chapter 2 : H H Construction in Keller, TX with Reviews - calendrierdelascience.com

In Honor of Justice Douglas by Robert H. Keller, , available at Book Depository with free delivery worldwide.

He was educated at Rugby School , arriving on the same day as William Temple , a future Archbishop of Canterbury ; they remained friends for life. The experience was to have a profound effect upon him. He realised that charity was insufficient and major structural change was required to bring about social justice for the poor. To fulfil his teaching commitments to the WEA, he travelled first to Longton for the evening class every Friday, before travelling north to Rochdale for the Saturday afternoon class. Tawney clearly saw these classes as a two-way learning process. He was transported to a French field hospital and later evacuated to Britain. The war led Tawney to grapple with the nature of original sin. In , he largely wrote *Christianity and Industrial Problems*, the fifth report the other four were on more ecclesiastical matters from a Church of England commission which included a number of bishops. *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* was his classic work [28] and made his reputation as an historian. Tawney "bemoaned the division between commerce and social morality brought about by the Protestant Reformation , leading as it did to the subordination of Christian teaching to the pursuit of material wealth". In effective intellectual terms it is doubtful whether anyone else had remotely comparable influence in the evolution of British society in his generation". Capitalism, he insisted, encourages acquisitiveness and thereby corrupts everyone. In the latter book, Tawney argues for an egalitarian society. David Ormrod, of the University of Kent, stresses, "intermittent opposition from the Churches to the new idolatry of wealth surfaced from time to time but no individual critics have arisen with a combination of political wisdom, historical insight and moral force to match that of R. Tawney, the prophet who denounced acquisitiveness". In this sense, his mature political thought never really changed". Equal division of membership between union and employer representatives resulted in opposing recommendations on the future organisation of the industry. However, the reforms in the social services which were eventually to be put into effect by the Labour government took place within the confines of the acquisitive society condemned by Tawney. The social advances made by the Labour Party were not to be as permanent as many believed. He promoted equality, through restructuring and curricular innovation. He contributed to several government reports on education. His thinking was influential in the creation of the University College of North Staffordshire which opened in and received its University Charter in as the University of Keele.

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Chapter 3 : University of Dayton : University of Dayton, Ohio

A retrospective chart review was performed on 11 patients (13 feet) who underwent a modified Keller procedure for the treatment of recalcitrant neuropathic diabetic ulcers to the plantar aspect of the hallux between and to evaluate the postoperative results and complications.

Advanced Search Abstract Campaigners on public health issues face a number of dilemmas when tactical choices in public debating involve uncomfortable mixtures of benefits and costs. Key dilemmas for campaigners are whether to acknowledge weaknesses in their own position, whether to advocate research to address claims by opponents, whether to acknowledge vested interests on their own side, whether to debate with opponents, whether to launch attacks on opposition individuals and groups and whether to criticize extreme behaviour by those on their own side. Drawing on the literature on scientific controversies, these dilemmas are outlined, with illustrations from the Australian vaccination debate. Dilemmas in health campaigning warrant attention because choices made can affect both the success of policy initiatives and the image of professions, sometimes with trade-offs between these. However, dilemmas have been neglected because most studies of health controversies give little attention to campaigning tactics. Campaigners can choose options that seem to maximize the likelihood of winning in the short term. However, options for short-term advantage may establish a precedent for approaches to campaigning that undermine commitment to free and open debate to possible long-term disadvantage. Some of these controversies are incredibly bitter and may seem never ending. For example, the fluoridation controversy has been going strong in English-speaking countries since the s Freeze and Lehr, Public health advocates have much to gain by entering debates but can find them frustrating and sometimes distressing. Health controversies are a subset of the wider category of scientific and technological controversies, about which there is a considerable literature Nelkin, ; Engelhardt and Caplan, ; Kleinman et al. Research on controversies suggests why they can be so intractable: Furthermore, public controversies also involve social, ethical and political differences that cannot be resolved by science. Another complication is the presence of vested interests, typically corporate, government or professional groups with a financial or reputational stake in a particular outcome. Vested interests can use their powerful resources to thwart consensus, discourage opposition or enforce a dominant viewpoint Primack and von Hippel, ; Boffey, ; Michaels, ; Orestes and Conway, Research on scientific controversies can be classified into four approaches: Social scientists using a positivist approach assume that scientific orthodoxy is correct and typically analyse social reasons for opposition. The social structural approach uses concepts such as class, patriarchy, the state and professions to analyse players and alignments in controversies. The constructivist approach, drawing on the sociology of scientific knowledge Barnes, ; Bloor, ; Mulkay, , involves examining the social construction of knowledge claims on both sides of a debate. Some debates so analysed are largely between scientists Collins, ; Pinch, ; others involve governments, corporations and citizens Martin, ; Richards, Actor-network theory Latour, ; Callon et al. Constructivist approaches help explain the intractability of controversies: However, even using a positivist approach, it is possible to understand that controversies can involve different beliefs about nature overlaid with social factors Mazur, , so reaching a resolution is not a straightforward matter. Although social science approaches are valuable for understanding controversy dynamics, they give surprisingly little guidance for campaigners. For example, when partisans cite evidence in support of their views, a positivist might decide whether the evidence is correct i. A constructivist might analyse the social influences on the creation and deployment of the evidence, but this does not provide any way to evaluate courses of action. For public health campaigners, controversy studies can offer background insights but seldom much practical direction. Public health advocates might prefer a process involving respectful discussion leading to evidence-based policy-making, but on many issues the reality is quite different. Tactics used in controversies can include censorship, deception, false claims, abusive comment and suppression of dissent Deyo et al. Some controversies are so polarized and vicious that anyone who, seeking

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rationality and balance, advocates a middle position may come under attack from one side or the other. Most research on controversies addresses the issues being disputed, especially scientific, ethical and public health dimensions. Simon Chapman [Chapman, , p. Because of the relative neglect of campaigning, a number of difficult decisions encountered by campaigners are seldom discussed openly. How should campaigning methods be evaluated? There is no standard set of criteria, indeed very little discussion of evaluation: One approach is to assess effectiveness in achieving outcomes, but even this is problematical. Effectiveness could be assessed on the basis of media impact, changes in opinions, increased participation in campaigning, decreased campaigning by opponents, changes in imagery, policy change or changes in behaviour, any one of which is difficult to measure and correlate with campaigning methods. Another approach is to examine the ethics of campaigning options, for example in terms of their compatibility with the goal of public deliberation or free speech. Campaigning is further complicated by the array of options available for intervention to promote public health, including communication as researched in the field called public understanding of science , government regulation, designing the decision-making context Thaler and Sunstein, and market mechanisms. Anti-smoking campaigning can involve messages to citizens, government controls over advertising and taxes, among other options. Campaigning can be directed towards citizens, scientists, the medical profession, politicians and public servants, among others. Coalitions can be built between different constituencies to make a campaign more effective. There is also the question of goals, for example whether to prevent disease or foster positive health. These issues are all important in the wider context of health campaigning. Here, the focus is on a particular aspect within this broader picture, namely public disputation on highly contentious issues, typically when citizen campaigners challenge orthodox scientific views, resulting in public claims and counter claims. The aim here is to outline some of the dilemmas encountered in such circumstances. A dilemma occurs when there is a choice between two or more options, each containing a mixture of benefits and costs. Typically, there are two options, each of which has different sorts of benefits and costs that cannot be readily predicted or compared. Dilemmas often point to choices that reflect underlying and unarticulated values. One important feature of health controversies that affects the existence and evaluation of campaigning methods is the role of vested interests. In some controversies, public health campaigners are on the opposite side to powerful vested interests. The canonical example of this configuration is smoking. In other controversies, vested interests are on the same side as public health campaigners: Here, I use an example fitting in the latter configurationâ€”vaccinationâ€”because some of the dilemmas are more acute for proponents. In the following sections, I describe a series of dilemmas, spelling out options and likely benefits and costs. Possible counter tactics are mentioned: I give a few examples, especially from the vaccination controversy in Australia. I selected the dilemmas discussed here based on my studies of a large number of public controversies, including informal conversations with prominent as well as lower-profile campaigners. Because campaigning dilemmas are seldom discussed openly, it is possible to give only a limited number of references to published literature. A key aim of this paper is to make these dilemmas explicit so they can be given the scrutiny they deserve. Every position has both strong and weak points. A common approach in campaigning is to emphasize strong points and ignore or gloss over weak points. Is it wise to admit weaknesses? Supporters of vaccination emphasize the large benefits from being vaccinated, notably a reduction in disease, including associated deaths and disabilities. They also emphasize the social benefits, due to herd immunity, from high levels of vaccination Andre et al. But is it wise to mention that a small number of individuals will have adverse reactions, including death and permanent disability? The advantage of sticking to positives and not admitting shortcomings is that the message is much more powerful. Furthermore, any admission of weakness is likely to be seized upon by opponents and trumpeted far and wide. The disadvantage of not admitting weaknesses is that any evidence of risks, if taken seriously, potentially undermines the strong position and thereby the credibility of advocates. Not admitting weakness is thus open to the counter tactic of challenging a position based on a few counter examples. Admitting weakness can be interpreted a sign of strength, indicating a belief that the case, even with full disclosure, is strong. Critics of

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the dominant epistemological position—the position supported by an overwhelming majority of experts in the field—often claim that research is not conclusive. They might point to weaknesses in studies or to contrary findings and insist that further research is needed. Critics of vaccination say, for example, that better data are needed on adverse reactions, claiming that many of these are unfairly dismissed as anecdotal. They also say that more research is needed to explain the increase in auto-immune disorders, and that vaccinations could be contributing to the increase Wolfe et al. Supporters of the dominant position often say that the existing research base is more than sufficient to conclusively support their stand. Sticking with this claim has the advantage of not admitting weakness. It also can have an economic justification: The disadvantage of rejecting calls for more research is that the critics have a continual source of complaint. When critics have little capacity to undertake their own research—at least research requiring substantial funding—they can portray the defenders of orthodoxy as stonewalling in the face of legitimate doubt. As mentioned earlier, new evidence hardly ever resolves a scientific controversy, because the findings can be challenged and because there are non-scientific factors underlying the dispute. Nevertheless, new evidence can be a powerful campaigning tool: One option that might thwart opponents more effectively would be to invite some of them to be participants in the research or in monitoring research protocols. If critics have a personal stake in the research, it is much harder for them to disown the findings. If the findings vindicate orthodoxy, as expected, then the participating critics may be neutralized or, if they persist with their claims, discredited. However, if the findings are ambiguous or even support the critics, then the orthodox position is weakened. If critics are never brought on board, or if they are not provided data for their own studies, they can claim the reason is fear of the results. For those who advocate further research to address claims by critics, there is an additional hurdle: Those who openly accept the value of more research, but who are unable to deliver, may give even more fuel to opponents. If public health campaigners are supported by powerful groups with stakes in measures being advocated, should campaigners acknowledge the potential influence of these groups and, if so, how? It is common to attack the role of vested interests on the other side; therefore, it can be predicted that opponents will claim that corporations, government departments, religious or professional groups, if they fund research or profit from policies, are a source of bias or worse Krinsky, ; Kassirer, In the vaccination debate, critics point to the role of pharmaceutical companies that produce vaccines, suggesting that corporate influence, for example through sponsoring research, leads to the unwarranted adoption of new vaccines and the continued use of unnecessary ones. Pharmaceutical industry funding—for example of research, conferences and journals—is claimed to create a conflict of interest for scientific researchers and policy-makers. However, this stance leaves the stage open for opponents to exaggerate the role of vested interests. Another approach is to acknowledge and defend the role of corporations or other vested interests, for example by saying that research is peer reviewed and that all conflicts of interest are declared. This can partially counter the claims of opponents, but has the disadvantage of allowing the role of vested interests to be on the table. Yet another approach is to acknowledge the potential for bias due to vested interests and to leave campaigning to those who are least tainted, for example to scientists who have never received corporate funding or to citizen activists without careers at stake. However, this can be difficult to achieve when most key players have connections with vested interests. Challengers to the dominant position often seek to promote public debate.

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Chapter 4 : Guidelines for the clinical management of Lynch syndrome (hereditary non- μ -polyposis cancer

Domingo E, Niessen R C, Oliveira C, Alhopuro P, Moutinho C, Espin E, Armengol M, Sijmons R H, Kleibeuker J H, Seruca R, Aaltonen L A, Imai K, Yamamoto H, Schwartz S, Jr, Hofstra R M. BRAF μ VE is not involved in the colorectal tumorigenesis of HNPCC in patients with functional MLH1 and MSH2 genes.

Advanced Search Abstract Economic theory justifies policy when there are concrete market failures. The article shows how in the case of innovation, successful policies that have led to radical innovations have been more about market shaping and creating through direct and pervasive public financing, rather than market fixing. The paper reviews and discusses evidence for this in three key areas: We further illustrate these three characteristics for the case of clean technology, and discuss how a market-creating and -shaping perspective may be useful for understanding the financing of transformative innovation needed for confronting contemporary societal challenges. He did not, however, look at the problem of what kind of finance is the best to serve the purposes of innovation. The works of other prominent economists such as Veblen, Keynes, and Minsky have focused instead precisely on the problem of the quality of finance. Unlike the Modigliani μ Miller theorem which assumes that financial structures are inconsequential to the workings of the real economy Modigliani and Miller, , they saw the quality of finance as central to understanding the workings of capitalism. Veblen , for instance, distinguished between industrial and pecuniary motives, and emphasized how the pursuit of pecuniary gains by business managers and investment bankers is often in stark opposition to technological industrial advances Wray, So what do we know about the relationship between finance and innovation? Financial institutions are indeed central to any system of innovation because they provide access to high-risk capital for firms interested in engaging with new technologies: Innovation is highly uncertain, has long lead times, is collective and cumulative Lazonick and Mazzucato, These four characteristics reveal much about the kind of finance that is needed. The uncertainty means that finance must be willing to bear high risks; the long-run nature of innovation and its cumulateness imply that the kind of finance must be patient; and the collective nature means that there is not only one type of finance that is involved μ but rather different forms, from a variety of public and private sources. In turn, the type of finance that is provided depends heavily on its source, whether it is the private or the public sector and the multitude of different types of public and private financial actors. Why is this happening? This has been caused both by corporate governance structures that prioritize quarterly returns Kay, , as well as macroeconomic conditions, such as low interest rates, that make share buybacks more profitable. In telecoms, for example, Huawei and Ericsson reinvest their profits back into production, while Cisco has become increasingly financialized Lazonick, Other authors have concentrated on the problems associated with short-term finance in science-based industries, which are better served by long-term finance Pisano, ; Mirowski, When companies receive long-term finance, they can learn more and dare to invest in areas that will require much trial and error Janeway, For all these reasons, the type of finance that innovators receive is not neutral and can affect both the rate and the direction of innovation. This debate about what sort of finance is relevant for innovation is particularly significant given the importance that policy-makers are attributing to innovation policy as a way to address the so-called grand societal challenges such as climate change, natural resource scarcity, ageing, and improved healthcare European Commission, Is there enough patient finance to fund long-term investments in the real economy and in particular for such high-risk societal challenges? To answer this question we can learn from the lessons of previous technological revolutions e. IT, biotech, nanotech , where different forms of public funds had been essential in providing the high-risk and early funding Block and Keller, ; Mazzucato, a. The green technological revolution today is witnessing a similar dynamic whereby it is mission-oriented public funds that are investing in the most capital-intensive and high-risk areas Mazzucato and Semieniuk, Such investment is provided not only for the supply side research and development but also for the demand side: And yet the classic market failure perspective on public investment in innovation does

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not justify the breadth and depth of public investments that we observed across the entire innovation chain, from basic research to applied research, early-stage financing of companies, and demand-side procurement policies Mazzucato, a. At best it can justify investments where there are clear market failures, such as the presence of positive externalities e. But as the history of innovation shows, the great extent of public commitment that is required entails more of a market-making and market-shaping approach than a simple market-fixing one Mazzucato, Furthermore, the systems-of-innovation literature has also not adequately addressed the issue of the quantity and quality of public investment needed to address the market-creating process. In this paper we review evidence of market-shaping public financing of innovation, and discuss views of the state that are helpful for understanding it. Section II confronts market-failure arguments with the recent history of financing innovation, especially in the IT and pharmaceutical sectors in the US. It is argued that the quantity and quality of public finance for innovation cannot be explained through a standard market-fixing framework. Here we focus on the need to understand the market-making and market-shaping, not only market-fixing role of public finance. We conclude that without a market-making agenda, climate change targets and the required technological revolution in energy will not take off. Beyond fixing markets The idea that the state is at best a fixer of markets has its roots in neoclassical economic theory, which sees competitive markets as bringing about optimal outcomes if left to themselves. On top of this, the literature on systems of innovation has also highlighted the presence of system failuresâ€”for example, the lack of linkages between science and industryâ€”requiring the creation of new institutions enabling those linkages Lundvall, And yet the recent history of capitalism depicts a different storyâ€”one in which it is the state that has often been responsible for actively shaping and creating markets and systems, not just fixing them; and for creating wealth, not just redistributing it. Indeed, markets themselves are outcomes of the interactions between both public and private actors, as well as actors from the third sector and from civil society. More thinking is required to understand the role of the public sector in the market creation process itself. This is what the work on mission-oriented innovation has argued Mowery, , but only indirectly. Missions are about the creation of new markets, not the fixing of new onesâ€”and yet this framework has not debunked the market-fixing policy framework. In her book *The Entrepreneurial State* a , Mazzucato has attempted to use this work to consider the lead investment role of public agencies, taking on extreme risk in the face of uncertainty, which then generates animal spirits and investment in the private sector. Before considering what a new framework for thinking about financing innovation might look like, we first consider key evidence to show the degree to which the market failure framework is limited in its ability to justify the depth and breadth of public activity. We focus on three key areas: Yet while technological revolutions have always required publicly funded science, what is often ignored by the market-failure framework are the complementary public funds that were spent by a network of different institutions further on in the innovation process as well. In other words, the public sector has been crucial for basic research as well as for applied research, and for providing early-stage high-risk finance to innovative companies willing to invest. It was also important for the direct creation of markets through procurement policy Edler and Georghiou, and bold demand policies that have allowed new technologies to diffuse Perez, Thus, Perez argues that without the policies for suburbanization, mass production would not have had the effect it did across the economy. Downstream investments included the use of procurement policy to help create markets for small companies, through the public Small Business Innovation Research SBIR scheme, which historically has provided more early-stage high-risk finance to small and medium-sized companies than private venture capital Keller and Block, , as Figure 3 shows.

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Chapter 5 : Dealing with dilemmas in health campaigning | Health Promotion International | Oxford Academic

"Her conclusions are way off," Jan Smit, the Dutch scientist, told me. After nearly 40 years of arguing, the two sides still cannot agree on fundamental facts.

This article has been cited by other articles in PMC. Abstract A continuing need for care for elderly, combined with looser family structures prompt the question what filial obligations are. Do adult children of elderly have a duty to care? Several theories of filial obligation are reviewed. The reciprocity argument is not sensitive to the parent-child relationship after childhood. A theory of friendship does not offer a correct parallel for the relationship between adult child and elderly parent. Arguments based on need or vulnerability run the risk of being unjust to those on whom a needs-based claim is laid. The good of being in an unchosen relationship seems the best basis for filial obligations, with an according duty to maintain the relationship when possible. We suggest this relationship should be maintained even if one of the parties is no longer capable of consciously contributing to it. This implies that care for the elderly is not in the first place a task for adult children. Filial obligations, Care, Elderly parents, Adult children, Ethics, Health care policy Introduction In most cultures, some care for elderly parents by adult children is generally expected. These expectations may be found among elderly parents or adult children, in social norms and in the practice of allocation decisions for state-funded home help. Expectations of different parties often do not converge, which brings up the question what expectations are legitimate in the relationship between adult child and elderly parent. A number of demographic trends increase the need for a clarification of filial expectations or obligations. In the future, there will be a larger percentage of elderly in our population CBS Even if it is probable that they will be in better health than generations of elderly before them Perenboom et al. At the same time, smaller nuclear families limit the availability of adult children for support giving. Furthermore, many nuclear families undergo changes in their composition over the course of their existence: An account of obligations of adult children towards elderly parents needs to allow for a variety of situations. The provision of support to family members, neighbors or friends is not self-evident under a doctrine of individualism, and the question what a correct interpretation of filial obligations ought to be becomes even more pressing. We will present five theories of filial obligations, discussed in the literature over the past decades: Theories of filial obligations The argument of reciprocity A popular idea of why we have obligations towards our elderly parents is that of reciprocity Blieszner and Hamon ; Dykstra and Fokkema Among these could be the fact that parents brought children into existence, nurtured them, educated them, and provided them with material things, among which the most basic ones of food, clothes and shelter: The idea that adult children owe their parents something in return can be viewed as a commonsense moral belief: Collingridge and Miller ; English English claims that a debt comes into existence in response to a favor 1 , and that the proper way to discharge a debt is to return the favor with a favor of equal magnitude. English rejects the idea of the parent-child relationship as one in which favors are exchanged. She claims that past parental sacrifices are as good as irrelevant when the relationship between adult children and elderly parents is considered, and that the current relationship is what really matters see below for a discussion of the friendship model of filial obligation. Wicclair instead asserts that not debt but gratitude is the appropriate basis of filial obligations. In addition, gratitude is owed also for unrequested favors Wicclair , p. In other words, showing gratitude is not enough-filial obligations require actions. When we think about the argument of reciprocity as a commonsense moral belief, this belief does probably not involve keeping a checkbook of what is given and received, nor the notion that exactly that should be given which is received. It cannot be meant to imply the repayment of a debt in the literal sense, and to portray the argument thus makes it a caricature. The arguments against this norm are probably best understood in a context of duties and corresponding rights. In the absence of such strict duties and rights, it would be hard to build policies based on such duties. But it would still be possible to defend the existence of an indeterminate, imperfect duty of gratitude at the individual level. A quite different view on the parent-child relationship is offered by the

friendship model of filial obligations. Duties emanating from friendship The friendship model of filial obligation focuses not on past favors or sacrifices by parents, but instead on the present relationship between an adult child and her parent. Adult children, it is argued, do not owe their parents anything in the sense of favors that need to be returned. What adult children owe their parents according to this argument is solely based on the present relationship between them, which ideally, is one of friendship. What parents have done for their children in the past is in this view considered as voluntarily distributed favors, of which it can only be hoped that they will lead to a form of friendship, in which support is exchanged out of a liking for each other English ; Dixon English distinguishes two kinds of favors. But if I do not ask anything and in my absence the neighbor is so kind as to mow my lawn twice weekly, this is not a favor that needs to be returned, but rather a kindness which may be responded to with a favor in return. In this last case, however, this would be done purely out of friendship, and not because I owe the neighbor anything. According to English, the favors of parents are more like mowing the lawn without being asked to. She concludes that adult children have no obligation towards their elderly parents, although they may consider doing them a favor in return, if they feel friendly towards them, and wish to cultivate their friendship. English acknowledges that previous sacrifices from the part of the parent may play a role in forming the friendship between parents and children, but emphasizes the importance of the current relationship. Seen from this angle, if adult children unfortunately enough have no friendly feelings for their parents, they owe their parents nothing. As long as the friendship exists, friends are supposed to behave towards each other in a way that is appropriate in their friendship, which may include the exchange of favors in order to sustain the friendship. But when the friendship is over, the obligation to act as friends is over, and no favors are owed anymore, according to English. However, the experience of feelings of obligation for elderly parents is frequent, even if one does not feel friendly towards them, as Dixon acknowledges. Why then would we object to such a model? We wish to mention two arguments. This rebuttal is a general one, applicable to any relationship in which one person is benefited very much by another person, but it is a feature which is present in many parentâ€”child relationships. The other reason for not fully embracing the friendship model of filial obligation, and one which is cited by Dixon, is that the parentâ€”child relationship simply is not a relationship between friends. One of the features of friendship is that the relationship is voluntarily engaged in by two separate people. This is clearly not the case in parentâ€”child relationships. According to Dixon, the fact that the parentâ€”child relationship does not conform to this model need not pose a problem. Far from excluding friendship as a possible basis of filial actions, we are inclined to think that friendly feelings may be a motivator for support giving, but that it is not the only possible one. It seems rather that feelings of friendship may shape the amount and form of support giving of adult children to their parents, but that the basis for filial obligations lies elsewhere. This line of thought is proposed by Goodin , who presents a principle of protecting the vulnerable, and by Miller , who sees filial obligations as a special case of beneficence, an imperfect Kantian duty. It does not matter how the situation came into being, or whether other persons have a causal role in creating the situation. Kittay criticizes the principle of vulnerability by saying that needs-based claims may not be legitimate, depending on the history of the situation. Collingridge and Miller argue that from the existence of the need alone, we cannot deduce that adult children are the ones who are responsible for alleviating the need: In the same line, saliency of the need does not seem enough to explain why we should care for our parents, and not for instance for our elderly neighbor, whose needs may be at least as salient to us. We suspect that it is not saliency which is important, but something like emotional closeness, maybe shared history or in any case something that binds the adult child to the elderly parent in a morally relevant way. It seems fair to say that the legitimacy of a needs-based claim depends on the type of claim and the relationship between claimant and potential benefactor. Some types of vulnerability do not produce legitimate claims, as in the example of the distant admirer. But if someone close to me, with whom I have a relational history, is vulnerable to my actions, his needs are meaningful to me. This does not mean that I should provide whatever the vulnerable party sees as their need. But because of our relationship I owe the other person a careful consideration of his needs. A need

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alone cannot function as a moral guideline to decide who is responsible for satisfying the need, because the significance of the need and the obligation to fulfill it cannot be separated from the context in which the need arises. The relationship between an elderly parent and an adult child seems an appropriate context in which needs of one party are meaningful to the other party, but an argument based on needs alone cannot sufficiently explain why this is so. What is needed, is a clarification of the relationship between adult children and their elderly parents which shows why adult children would have a larger than average responsibility to satisfy needs of their elderly parents. Filial obligations as an assumed promise According to Hoff Sommers , conventional expectations arise in certain social structures, such as friendship or nurturing relationships, and these expectations are comparable to making promises. In promising, the promisee can lay a claim on what the promiser has agreed to do. There are problems in the comparison of conventional expectations with a promise. It is true that promises oblige, but expectations simply do not have the same status, even if they arise in certain conventional relationship structures. To first equate conventional expectations with promises, and thus deduce obligations from conventions is at best an indirect way of describing obligations, as Smith points out: Why would we need to pretend that there is an unspoken promise when in fact there is not? At worst, the argument begs the question. Compare this view with the friendship view of filial obligations and the case Smith of the neighbor spontaneously mowing my lawn in my absence. The neighbor might expect a favor in return, but I did not promise anything. If I owe the neighbor a favor in return, it is not because of her expectations, but because of what she has done for me. Such an idea comes close to the argument of reciprocity. And what to think of parents who do not expect anything from their children, but rather hope for a pleasurable sustained relationship? Do high expectations oblige children more than low expectations? It is also questionable whether an aging parent will be satisfied if a son grudgingly performs an obligation to do the grocery shopping. But the question remains whether fulfilling these obligations and being a good carer is ever possible out of duty alone. It remains difficult to view filial obligations within a discourse on duties and rights. The variety of parent-child relationships and the fact that one has little choice in establishing this relationship with a particular person makes it difficult to define rigid duties as in the case of conscious choice, for which one is accountable. One of the special features of the parent-child relationship is that it is unchosen. Claudia Mills focuses on this feature in her account of filial obligations. We are simply stuck with the family we have and cannot decide to find new family, as we can in the case of friends. This is clear in the case of children. Children simply happen to be born to the parents they have. But Mills points out that the same could be said about parents. Although they in this time, in our society, usually decide to become parents, they do not choose the particular child they will be the parents of. They get a child, love it and care for it, whoever the child turns out to be.

Chapter 6 : Oskar R. Lange - Wikipedia

United States v. Werner, No. 3 accordance with R.C.M. , any unexecuted part of the appellant's sentence will be remitted at the conclusion of the period of suspension

Chapter 7 : R. H. Tawney - Wikipedia

Dependent variables were effectiveness, perceived motivation (both overall motivation and each of A, R, C, & S components), efficiency, and continuing motivation. The motivationally adaptive CAI showed higher effectiveness, overall motivation, and attention than the other two CAI types.

Chapter 8 : NYS Veterinary Medicine: Continuing Education Providers

The Keller Plan (Keller,) was launched in the early s and it is an early attempt to use new technologies in teaching and

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learning environments. The Plan, also called the Personalized System of Instruction (PSI), was developed by Fred S. Keller with J. Gilmour Sherman, Carolina Bori and Rodolpho Azzi, among others, in the middle s.

Chapter 9 : Virtue Ethics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

A continuing need for care for elderly, combined with looser family structures prompt the question what filial obligations are. Do adult children of elderly have a duty to care? Several theories of filial obligation are reviewed. The reciprocity argument is not sensitive to the parent-child.