

Chapter 1 : Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The physicalists' certainties "that these issues are settled and the verdict is in: materialism reigns, and spirituality and any form of survival is self-delusion" is regarded as overheated swagger by many consciousness researchers.

Black Marxists have grappled with the contradictions that emerge when Marxist paradigms are the medium for the articulation of a path to transformation. Whereas Marxism focuses heavily on the activism of a vanguard proletariat, black freedom struggles have revolved around a collective, albeit contested identity shaped by racism. Marxism is a method of analysis and a theoretical critique that sees capitalism as a system which fosters social divisions. A powerful class-consciousness, specifically among the working class, is considered vital to the oppositional upsurge that Marxism contends is essential to revolution. Thus, for many black intellectuals, race, rather than being an incidental dimension of class, provides a significant subtext for the theorizing of radical change. Collaborations between Marxists and black radicals in the United States began in the 1930s and 1940s when African Americans became a focus of organizing by the Communist Party. Robin Kelley charted the history of the connections between southern black resistance and the organizing of the Communist Party in 1930s Alabama. Early black radicalism in 1930s Harlem aligned itself with the traditions of black nationalism and black militancy. In Harlem, Communists organized workers alliances, tenant unions, cultural groups, and legal defense organizations. Within Harlem, socialist ideas were spread through the work of A. His magazine, the Messenger, was accused by the U. Even at the height of the black power discourse of the 1960s, African American activists like Angela Davis "a member of the Communist Party also affiliated with the Black Panthers" continued to forge connections between class struggle and antiracism. Within the African Diaspora, the dialectical method of Marxism proved a useful source of insights for those engaged in anticolonial and postcolonial struggles. Afro Caribbean intellectuals and activists such as Trinidadians C. James, a Trotskyite, lauded the independent and dynamic trajectory of black struggles in the United States. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, Marxism was an instrumental theory in African-based liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau. Also, antiapartheid ideologists in South Africa adopted aspects of Marxist dictum even as they emphasized national and racial identities see Marx Walter Rodney, Revolutionary and Scholar: University of California Press. James, Walter Rodney, and the Caribbean Intellectual. His Intellectual Legacies, ed. Cudjoe and William E. University of Massachusetts Press. Communism and the French Intellectuals, " James, Social Identity, and the Black Rebellion. *Philosophia Africana* 8 1: Autobiography of an Afro-American Communist. *Race and Class* 20 2: Alabama Communists during the Great Depression. University of North Carolina Press. *Culture, Politics, and the Black Working Class. Toward a Sociology of National Liberation from Colonialism: Contemporary Marxism* 7 Fall: Towards a New Protest Paradigm. *Race and Class* 38 4: South African Internal Opposition, " Communists in Harlem during the Depression. University of Illinois Press. *The Voice of Coloured Labour*. African Publication Society, *Race and Class* 19 3: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition. *The Liberation of the Black Intellectual*. *Race and Class* 18 4: Self Pick a style below, and copy the text for your bibliography.

Chapter 2 : Philosophical Materialism

We propose that humor, three subscales of need for uniqueness, materialism, status concern and brand consciousness are positively related to cool identity. Our preliminary correlation analysis supports all our propositions.

There are at least two important reasons for this. First, scientist and layman alike have become aware of the limits and shortcomings of scientific knowledge. Second, we realize that our perpetual hunger for spiritual understanding is real and undeniable. It can neither be defined away by subtle logic, nor be satisfied by viewing the universe as sterile, mechanistic, and accidental. Every decision we make is influenced by how we answer this great question: There is growing awareness that the endless arguments between proponents of these two views are more than hairsplitting disagreements among experts, but they have real consequences for our future on earth, and perhaps whether we shall have a future. Consciousness precedes Being, and not the other way around. If we are no longer threatened by world war or by the danger that the absurd mountains of accumulated nuclear weapons might blow up the world, this does not mean that we have definitely won. We are still capable of understanding that the only genuine backbone of all our actions, if they are to be moral, is responsibility. The Face of Physicalism Physicalism is the doctrine that the real world consists simply of the physical world. Its close cousin is materialism, the creed that nothing exists except matter and its movements and modifications, as well as the doctrine that consciousness and will are wholly due to material agency. What does physicalism actually look like? Cosmically, we are no more significant than mold on a shower curtain. In this outlook, meaning, direction, purpose and free will are absent. What seems to confront us is a plunge into nihilism and despair. We can state that categorically. Among them is the anti-materialist British philosopher Mary Midgley, who said: It tells us to choose one of these and reduce the other to it. There are not two such separate stuffs. There is just a complex world containing complex creatures, about whom many sorts of questions arise. Each question must be answered in its own terms. But actually our thoughts are quite as real as our coffee cups, and "matter" is every bit as obscure a concept as "mind. The dominant physicalist view that mind and consciousness are products of brain function is served up within contemporary science not as a modest hypothesis or humble conjecture, but as an incontrovertible fact, and anyone who disagrees is likely to be considered an apostate or a traitor to science. As consciousness researcher Edward F. For them the truth of the [physicalist view] has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt, and to think anything different is necessarily to abandon centuries of scientific progress, release the black flood of occultism, and revert to primitive supernaturalist beliefs characteristic of bygone times. The unfalsifiable world-view of the [physicalist] Skeptic extends far beyond scientific paradigms to encompass a very cynical view of human nature. The debunker must buy into a world full of frauds, dupes, and the mentally unstable, where most people are less intelligent and less sane than he is, and in which apparently honest people indulge in the most outrageous mendacity for no good reason. For the witnesses are, on the face of it, sincere. How can I account for their apparent sincerity? I have to assume either 1 that this apparent sincerity is a cynical cover for the most base or fatuous motives, or 2 they are ignorant, incapable of distinguishing truth from lies and delusion. No human has ever seen a brain or anything else produce consciousness, and there is no accepted theory as to how this could happen. This weakness is becoming obvious to an increasing number of top-tier scientists, as the following comments show. I include several examples to show that these are not rare, isolated opinions. I have some prejudices, but no idea of how to begin to look for a defensible answer. And neither does anyone else. Hoffman, cognitive scientist at University of California, Irvine: Kauffman, theoretical biologist and complex-systems researcher: Nor does anybody else, including the philosophers of mind. Sperry, Nobel Prize-winning neurophysiologist: They are so far beyond our comprehension at present that no one I know of has been able even to imagine their nature. Wigner, Nobelist in physics: It is not that we possess bad or imperfect theories of human awareness; we simply have no such theories at all. About all we know about consciousness is that it has something to do with the head, rather than the foot. We have no clear idea how the

electrical discharges occurring in nerve cells in our brains are connected with our feelings and desires and actions. Fodor, of Rutgers University: Nobody even knows what it would be like to have the slightest idea about how anything material could be conscious. So much for the philosophy of consciousness. Searle, of the University of California, Berkeley: Although the content of consciousness depends in large measure on neuronal activity, awareness itself does not. To me, it seems more and more reasonable to suggest that the mind may be a distinct and different essence. Despite the marvelous successes of neuroscience in the past century some physicalists tout hypotheses and theories which they believe show decisively how the brain makes consciousness. So it is not quite right to say that physicalism has no theories about the origins of consciousness; we should say, rather, that physicalism has no successful theories for such. As astrophysicist David Darling describes this impasse: Researchers of the stature of Francis Crick, Daniel Dennett, Gerald Edelman, and Roger Penrose have recently come forward with a range of ingenious theories. They fail not because their models are insufficiently accurate or detailed, but because they are trying to do what is, from the outset, impossible. The brain does not produce consciousness at all, any more than a television set creates the programs that appear on its screen. On the contrary, the brain filters and restricts consciousness, just as our senses limit the totality of experience to which we might otherwise have access. Their zeal can be unbounded. For example, philosopher Dennett is reported as saying that he would commit suicide if paranormal phenomena turn out to be real. Special contempt is reserved for the possibility that humans might survive bodily death, for this would be the death knell for the mind-equals-brain assumption on which the physicalist doctrine rests. This is particularly obvious when physicalists themselves have near-death experiences suggesting survival following physical death. When they describe these experiences publicly, they have been bullied by their physicalist colleagues into publicly retracting any implication that something might survive the death of the body. These efforts can shade into a deliberate cover-up that masquerades as an effort to protect science. Harvard psychologist William James reported that a leading biologist once told him, Even if such a thing were true, scientists ought to band together to keep it suppressed and concealed. It would undo the uniformity of Nature and all sorts of other things without which scientists cannot carry on their pursuits. Longing for immortality is seen as a defect of character or a philosophical sellout in people too weak-willed to face their impending doom. In the face of certain extermination, one should simply man up and go quietly, proudly and bravely into that dark night. I should scorn to shiver with terror at the thought of annihilation. We must realize the great unknowns in the material makeup and operation of our brains, in the relationship of brain to mind, in our creative imagination, and in the uniqueness of the psyche. When we think of these unknowns as well as the unknown of how we come to be in the first place, we should be much more humble [emphasis in original]. Annihilation is an inescapable part of the physicalism package. Is he related to something infinite or not? That is the telling question of his life. The problem is that there is no monolithic, agreed-on definition of time in modern physics. The human cost of a failed belief in immortality, which has helped sustain human hope for perhaps the entire span of human history, is not admitted within physicalism. Yet the old channels within the psyche run deep, and merely declaring immortality undesirable or unnecessary does not make it so. Kelly, for example, speaking for his colleagues, states, We believe it takes astonishing hubris to dismiss en masse the collective experience of a large proportion of our forebears, including persons widely recognized as pillars of all human civilization, and we are united in believing that the single most important task confronting all of modernity is that of meaningful reconciliation of science and religion. For instance, quantum theorist Henry P. Stapp, widely considered the current dean of quantum theorists, has expressed concern about the impact of the physicalistic views on the nitty-gritty, practical ways we live our lives. We are not active participants in such a process, but are passive observers at best and victims at worst. Cosmologist and quantum physicist Menas C. Parts and Wholes in Physical Reality. Are these issues yet another set of intellectual arguments that scientists, philosophers and academics make? They are very relevant to your life and your healthy living: We seem to be bound by our minds, often giving us no peace. If we peel back the layers of physicalistic logic behind this view, what do we find? We come face-to-face with serious

illogic, described by philosopher of science Sir Karl Popper in his Compton Lecture in *Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach*. Accordingly, we are deceiving ourselves whenever we believe that there are such things as arguments or reasons which make us accept determinism. Purely physical conditions including our physical environment make us say or accept whatever we say or accept. Nobel laureate and neurophysiologist Sir John Eccles agreed with Popper. He excoriated the physicalist narrative, saying: The more we discover about the brain, the more clearly do we distinguish between the brain events and the mental phenomena, and the more wonderful do both the brain events and the mental phenomena become. Promissory materialism is simply a religious belief held by dogmatic materialists. It has all the features of a messianic prophecy. In asserting such, he presumably believes he was using his own free will to arrive at the conclusion that free will does not exist. The robotic strictures of physicalism do not apply to themselves. Thus they behave as if their conclusions are freely arrived at, and should be taken seriously. They cannot acknowledge that, if physicalism is valid, they arrived at their conclusions not as a result of freely considered data, but because their atoms, molecules and brain made them do so.

Chapter 3 : Consciousness: Why Materialism Fails - Campaign for Open Science

terialists who said it is, known as identity theorists (i.e. the mind is identical to the brain in all respects), were challenged by other materialists known as property dualists[7], functionalists[8], or supervenience[9] theorists.

Philosophical Materialism Richard C. Originated by a series of pre-Socratic Greek philosophers in the 6th and 5th centuries before the Christian era, it reached its full classical form in the atomism of Democritus and Epicurus in the 4th century BCE. Epicurus argued that ultimate reality consisted of invisible and indivisible bits of free-falling matter called atoms randomly colliding in the void. In other words, from the beginning materialists have always based their theory on the best scientific evidence at hand, rather than on some putative "first philosophy" waiting to be discovered through abstract philosophical reasoning. This meant that the official state hangman was authorized to ferret out every copy of the book and have it literally cut to pieces on a beheading block. Like Lucretius, he insists there is no reality other than matter moving in space, as Newton theorized in his laws of motion and gravity. They all realized it rested on assumptions that were ultimately metascientific, though never metaphysical in the Aristotelian sense. That is, the assumptions of materialism reached beyond empirical science, though never beyond physical reality. These metascientific assumptions were, first of all, that material or natural reality formed an unbroken material continuum that was eternal and infinite[1]. Nature had no beginning or end. It was an eternal, self-generating and self-sustaining material fact without any sort of barrier or limit zoning it off from a nonmaterial, non-physical, or supernatural type of being. The only foundational being there was, was material being, and some kind of natural substance underlay all visible phenomena. Of course these assumptions implied, secondly, the lack of any governance or management of the universe by any sort of transcendental intelligence. Materialism has always viewed atheism merely as a necessary consequence of its premises, not as a philosophically important end in itself. Supernatural gods, spiritual deities, or immaterial moralizers could obviously not be taken seriously, or for that matter even imagined to exist, in the materialist hypothesis. Thirdly and last, materialism has always assumed that life is wholly the product of natural processes. All human thought and feeling emerges from the nonliving, inorganic matrix of physical nature and ends at death. Lucretius believed that thoughts and feelings were literally made up of a film of very fine atoms that peeled away from objects and recombined in the brain. Buechner believed that thoughts and feelings were electrical impulses somehow shaped by the human nervous system into coherent patterns. So materialism has always inferred its theories from the best empirical evidence at hand and has as a result always had its metascientific hypotheses scientifically confirmed, because the basic assumption of valid science has also always been that nature is governed by coherent, discoverable physical laws. Indeed, the triumphs of science in the 20th century have been so stunning that today a majority of professional philosophers, at least in the English-speaking world, identify themselves as materialists of one kind or another[2]. When someone today describes himself or herself as a materialist, they generally mean they stand somewhere in a spectrum defined at one end as reductive materialism[3] and at the other end as eliminative materialism[4]. Reductive and eliminative materialism[5] describe the poles of the process known as intertheoretic reduction. Intertheoretic reduction[6] refers to what happens when a new scientific theory either better explains or else completely invalidates an existing scientific theory. If the new theory better explains the old one, it is said to have reduced it to a fuller, more convincing explanation. The other pole of intertheoretic reduction, eliminative materialism, consists of the invalidation or complete displacement of an earlier theory by a new one. Examples of this kind of elimination are: Obviously, modern reductive and eliminative materialists are allies in believing, as preth century materialists did, that science has always confirmed and will most probably always continue to confirm the basic hypotheses of materialist philosophy: Their main disagreement is over the mind-brain problem, which has been the focus of 20th century materialist debate. The so-called mind-brain problem refers to the question of whether or not human consciousness is reducible in all respects to scientific laws. In the s and s those materialists who said it is, known as identity

theorists i. What all of these challengers had in common was a belief that in some way human consciousness was irreducible to or inexplicable in terms of natural processes[10]. They argued further that such properties of consciousness as qualia could not be translated into the terms of physical science in any meaningful way and hence represented a reality not amenable to the laws of nature. Two different brains did not have to work exactly the same way, much less intelligences that might be silicon-based rather than biologically-based but capable of sharing thoughts or feelings with biological brains. The fact that the same mental experience might be physically realized in different ways in two different biological or non-biological brains limited the identity of mind and brain to at most a token identity[11] between a specific brain and its unique mental experience. It invalidated broad, "type" identities between mental experiences and brain processes in general. To these objections, current eliminative and reductive materialists make the following reply. Pain can be anaesthetized and disappear, even though the same knife continues to cut your skin. Secondly, a token identity between mental events and brain events is all that is needed for a robust and defensible mind-brain reductionism. No reductive materialist needs to claim that every brain works precisely the same way when it sees a tree, multiplies 2 times 2, or hears a Beethoven symphony. All that is needed is a convincing theory of how brains in general succeed in producing what we call consciousness from their visceral pulps and fluids. Neuroscience has concluded that the firing, or spiking, of cells in the brain known as neurons is the foundation of all brain functioning. Every brain has billions of these neurons, joined together in billions of networks by tiny filaments called dendrites and axons. Incoming signals, in the form of tiny electrical impulses generated by other neurons, pass down the dendrites to circuit-breaker-like gaps around the neuron known as synapses, which chemically monitor all the incoming signals and, when all the signals have reached the appropriate level, suddenly depolarize the electric differential outside and inside the neuron and cause the neuron to fire, or spike. This means that the brain is confined to what is known as the "hundred-step rule," or the fact that the maximum number of sequential steps the brain can take in one second is about a hundred. Since high-powered digital computers that do all their computations sequentially, like a herd of sheep passing one by one through a gate can do millions of steps in a second yet are notoriously poor at doing the perceptual and discriminatory tasks brains do with ease, the brain, it is theorized, is not structured like a linear computer but like a vast number of multi-dimensional computers working in parallel with each other. In what sense is the brain a "multi-dimensional" computer? At bottom, the brain evidently works on the same on-off, binary principle that governs all linear computers: When a neuron spikes or fires, it does so in mechanical, all-or-nothing fashion like a spark plug, entirely as a result of having reached just the level of electrical excitation in its synapses it needs to make it suddenly depolarize. By themselves, neurons are nothing but stupid, mechanically controlled switches. But when they are joined in networks whose signals parallel those of billions of other networks and interact at critical points, the result is human consciousness. How can this happen? How can something oblivious of the world become conscious of the world? Though theoretical neuroscience is still in its infancy, furiously boiling with new ideas, some likely answers are emerging from the steam. One promising theory is that networks of neurons in the brain consist of subsidiary groups of neurons or even individual neurons that serve as the axes of a multi-dimensional system of coordinates that can mathematically translate one kind of value to another kind of value. For example, someone sees an apple hanging from a tree. His brain locates the apple in an abstract visual space calculated in terms of how many degrees above a distant horizon the apple is, how close to him the focusing of his eyes tells him the apple is, and so on. What happens here, it is theorized, is that an array of neuronal networks transforms the values of his visual space into those of his motor space by means of a mathematical tensor, or formula, that translates the multi-dimensional coordinates, or vectors, of visual space into the vectors of motor space -- all the angles of sight are translated into angles of arm-bending. Although it does not seem so to the person reaching for the apple, his behavior is the result of a vast number of mathematical computations in his brain, which, because of its parallel computing capacity, it is able to carry out almost instantly. It may well learn by adjusting the synaptic openings, or weightings, as they are called, of neurons individually and in networks so that the

signals reaching them must produce just the right polarity from just the right dendrites to fire. This could explain, for example, why we recognize faces and other hard-to-distinguish sense experiences so quickly. Our brain has so many neuronal networks available for use -- one researcher has calculated them as totaling more than 10 to the 80th power -- that every single thing we learn may have its own network set at just the right synaptic weightings to be activated only by that bit of learning. And synaptic weightings are flexible enough to readjust to changing circumstances if necessary. The bottom line of this theoretical approach, of course, is that the mind is reducible to natural processes that can be translated into the language of math and physics. Neuronal networks are computing mechanisms that effortlessly transform multi-dimensional vectors of one kind of mathematical value into other vectors of mathematical value. Visual space being changed into motor space has been mentioned, but a great deal of work has already also been done along these lines on how we see and hear. So too with sound. Varying air pressures entering the ear are translated into electrical impulses which are then massively and instantly parallel-processed into noises that seem to be coming to us, direct and unmediated, from the external world. But in fact they too, like our vision, are the result of incredibly complex processes of vector transformation among multi-dimensional coordinate systems performed by the countless neural networks of our brain. Most reductive and eliminative materialists agree that the theory of mathematical transformations just sketched is one of the most promising explanations we have of how our brains work. But the eliminativists hold that the theory is so revolutionary and so much more convincing than current theories of the brain -- for instance, that the brain is basically propositional and language-oriented -- that it will eventually displace and replace the linguistic theory, just as the modern theory of mental disease displaced the medieval theory of demonic possession. A couple of further comments on reductive materialism are in order. First, what is the status of mathematical concepts like numbers, mythical figures like river nymphs, comic-book characters like Donald Duck, and the like? Non-reductionists argue they are non-material, non-physical entities that are able to influence the physical world yet are inexplicable in terms of natural laws[13]. While granting a fictional, artificially man-made status to such phenomena, reductionists, on the other hand, argue that they do physically exist. Even when they are not physically embodied, say, in maps, epic poems, or comic books, they are actively or passively realized in the brains of intelligences capable of understanding and communicating them. In other words, all such ideas must be created, remembered, and transmitted in the form of appropriately processed neuronal firings by conscious intelligences to have whatever effect they do have outside those intelligences. They are in fact always physically embodied, either in brains or in the artifacts produced as a result of conscious effort. When and if no brain ever again lights up with the concept or memory of them, they have ceased to exist in that form, though most of the atomic elements which have produced them in brains in the past and could again produce them in the future will probably persist in some form as long as our present cosmos persists. To the reductionist, human thought and feeling are most definitely material entities capable of influencing other material entities like mountains, rivers, metal ores, and electric and nuclear energy in huge and spectacular ways. The reductionist takes a similar approach to a second objection often raised by non-reductionists: Moral concepts, they say, are not reducible to natural process and physical law. In contrast, the reductionist, convinced that all life is the product of natural selection, sees morality as fundamentally the result of evolutionary survival. They are essentially the residue of human experience on the face of the planet, as are the invention of gods, of creation myths, of apocalyptic destructions of the world, and so on. Furthermore, the reductionist equates moral discrimination with sense discrimination. That is, the ability to sense a difference between heat and cold, light and dark, acid and alkaline is indistinguishable from the ability to decide whether this thing or place or experience is better or worse than that thing, place, or experience. Finally, reductive materialism applauds and identifies itself with the stunning success of the reductive program of 20th century science as a whole. The periodic table and the standard model are outstanding examples of the relentless effort of scientists in this century to uncover deeper and deeper levels of physical explanation and to reduce their findings to more and more comprehensive and fundamental theories. Equally outstanding has been the effort to unify the four basic forces of nature at greater

and greater levels of generalization. Already it has been proven that two of the four forces, electromagnetism and the weak nuclear force, were unified at energy levels that are theorized to have existed until a billionth of a second after the Big Bang had passed, after which they split. Modern scientific reductionism has succeeded in showing that the manifold phenomena of physical nature -- light, heat, rocks, flora, fauna, consciousness -- are probably manifestations of a single, foundational, material reality, perhaps ultimately describable in the terms of some future human science. Materialism welcomes this success as further confirmation of its year-old hypotheses. The consensus view of modern cosmologists is that the universe--that is, all space and time--was created fifteen to twenty billion years ago with the Big Bang. It is clear from his Materialism: The Big Bang would simply be time zero from which the universe began. Other possibilities are that the universe is just one out of an infinite number of universes that preceded it through a Big Bang--Big Crunch--Big Bang cycle such a view introduces a hypothetical metatime that is completely independent of time as we know it , that the Big Bang emerged from a quantum fluctuation in some quantum universe completely independent of and isolated from the universe we inhabit quantum genesis , or that our universe formed when a black hole in another universe pinched off and became causally isolated from ours. Perhaps our universe is just one of an infinite number of other universes; or perhaps our universe is the only universe that ever was, is, or will be. In the Preface to Contemporary Materialism: A Reader, Paul Moser and J.

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Contemporary analytic philosophers are. In recent years, Paul and Patricia Churchland have advocated a radically contrasting position at least, in regards to certain hypotheses ; eliminativist materialism holds that some mental phenomena simply do not exist at all, and that talk of those mental phenomena reflects a totally spurious " folk psychology " and introspection illusion. That is, an eliminative materialist might believe that a concept like "belief" simply has no basis in fact—the way folk science speaks of demon-caused illnesses would be just one obvious example. Reductive materialism being at one end of a continuum our theories will reduce to facts and eliminative materialism on the other certain theories will need to be eliminated in light of new facts , Revisionary materialism is somewhere in the middle. Is matter a continuous substance capable of expressing multiple forms hylomorphism , [21] or a number of discrete, unchanging constituents atomism? One challenge to the traditional concept of matter as tangible "stuff" came with the rise of field physics in the 19th century. Relativity shows that matter and energy including the spatially distributed energy of fields are interchangeable. This enables the ontological view that energy is prima materia and matter is one of its forms. On the other hand, the Standard Model of Particle physics uses quantum field theory to describe all interactions. On this view it could be said that fields are prima materia and the energy is a property of the field. This extrapolation, however, is impossible Others use the terms "materialism" and "physicalism" interchangeably. Thus materialism has no definite content independent of the particular theory of matter on which it is based. According to Noam Chomsky , any property can be considered material, if one defines matter such that it has that property. In the twentieth century, physicalism has emerged out of positivism. Physicalism restricts meaningful statements to physical bodies or processes that are verifiable or in principle verifiable. It is an empirical hypothesis that is subject to revision and, hence, lacks the dogmatic stance of classical materialism. Herbert Feigl defended physicalism in the United States and consistently held that mental states are brain states and that mental terms have the same referent as physical terms. The twentieth century has witnessed many materialist theories of the mental, and much debate surrounding them. There is still something missing. For consciousness is absolutely fundamental. This extrapolation, however, is impossible—Atoms are not things". In , Gribbin and Davies released their book *The Matter Myth*, the first chapter of which, "The Death of Materialism", contained the following passage: Then came our Quantum theory, which totally transformed our image of matter. The old assumption that the microscopic world of atoms was simply a scaled-down version of the everyday world had to be abandoned. An extension of the quantum theory goes beyond even this; it paints a picture in which solid matter dissolves away, to be replaced by weird excitations and vibrations of invisible field energy. Quantum physics undermines materialism because it reveals that matter has far less "substance" than we might believe. This development is the theory of chaos, which has recently gained widespread attention. Famous physicist and proponent of digital physics John Archibald Wheeler wrote "all matter and all things physical are information-theoretic in origin and this is a participatory universe. As a man who has devoted his whole life to the most clear headed science, to the study of matter, I can tell you as a result of my research about atoms this much: There is no matter as such. All matter originates and exists only by virtue of a force which brings the particle of an atom to vibration and holds this most minute solar system of the atom together. We must assume behind this force the existence of a conscious and intelligent Mind. This Mind is the matrix of all matter. Transcendental experiences like the perception of Brahman are considered to destroy the illusion. All spirit is matter, but it is more fine or pure, and can only be discerned by purer eyes; We cannot see it; but when our bodies are purified we shall see that it is all matter. Philosopher Mary Midgley , [44] among others, [45] [46] [47] [48] argues that materialism is a self-refuting idea , at least in its eliminative form. Idealisms[edit] An argument for idealism , such as those of Hegel and Berkeley , is ipso facto an argument against materialism. Matter can be argued to be redundant, as

in bundle theory , and mind-independent properties can in turn be reduced to subjective percepts. Berkeley presents an example of the latter by pointing out that it is impossible to gather direct evidence of matter, as there is no direct experience of matter; all that is experienced is perception, whether internal or external. As such, the existence of matter can only be assumed from the apparent perceived stability of perceptions; it finds absolutely no evidence in direct experience. If matter and energy are seen as necessary to explain the physical world, but incapable of explaining mind, dualism results. Emergence , holism , and process philosophy seek to ameliorate the perceived shortcomings of traditional especially mechanistic materialism without abandoning materialism entirely. Materialism as methodology[edit] Some critics object to materialism as part of an overly skeptical, narrow or reductivist approach to theorizing, rather than to the ontological claim that matter is the only substance. Particle physicist and Anglican theologian John Polkinghorne objects to what he calls promissory materialismâ€™claims that materialistic science will eventually succeed in explaining phenomena it has not so far been able to explain. Chomsky also states that since the concept of matter may be affected by new scientific discoveries, as has happened in the past, scientific materialists are being dogmatic in assuming the opposite.

Materialism is a form of philosophical monism which holds that matter is the fundamental substance in nature, and that all things, including mental aspects and consciousness, are results of material interactions.

Mind-body Theories Mind-body theories are putative solutions to the mind-body problem. The mind-body problem is that of stating the exact relation between the mind and the body, or, more narrowly, between the mind and the brain. Most of the theories of the mind-body relation exist also as metaphysical theories of reality as a whole. While debates over the mind-body problem can seem intractable, science offers at least two promising lines of research. On the one hand, parts of the mind-body problem arise in research in artificial intelligence and might be solved by a better understanding of the relations between hardware and software. On the other hand, the study of emergence in biological systems may illuminate the mind-body relation.

Mind-body dualism Dualism, or mind-body dualism, is the theory that both minds and brains exist, and no mind is a brain and no brain is a mind, nor is a mind any part of a brain or a brain any part of a mind. Hinduism and non-Advaitic Vedanta entail mind-body dualism because if the soul migrates through distinct incarnations then it is something that can exist independently of the body. The earliest Western philosopher to endorse dualism was the pre-Socratic Pythagoras c. He inherited the ancient Egyptian religious doctrine that a nonphysical part of the person survives death, and he believed in the reincarnation of the soul. In his dialogue *The Phaedo* especially, Socrates advanced arguments for the conclusion that the soul survives bodily death. He was nevertheless a mind-body dualist because he insisted that the intellectual part of the soul is immortal, even though he offered functionalist or materialist accounts of affective and sensory faculties. Orthodox Christianity is not mind-body dualist in that human immortality consists in the hope of bodily resurrection, or the living again of the whole person by the grace of God, not in the immortality of a disembodied soul. Although the term soul is sometimes used in the Old and New Testaments it does not there explicitly denote an immaterial mental substance that could exist whether or not the body exists. The soul in this strong metaphysical sense was introduced into Christianity during the fourth and fifth centuries by Augustine of Hippo who, believing Platonism and Christianity mutually consistent and true, sought to fuse them into a single philosophical system. If that is right, the immortality of the soul is a logical presupposition of the truth of Christianity. The evidence of the senses, the truths of mathematics, and the whole physical world are ultimately dubitable, but his own existence cannot be doubted, because if he doubts, then he exists. On these premises Descartes concludes that he is a thing that thinks and that does not depend on the physical world, which includes his own body. Cartesian dualism is the view that each person is essentially a substantial soul that is distinct from the body.

Materialism Materialism is the theory that the mind is the brain, or nothing over and above the brain. The ancient Greek atomist Democritus maintains that there exist only atoms and the void. Atoms are indivisible material particles and the void is the infinite empty space in which atoms are in motion. If atomism is true, then everything is either an atom or reducible to atoms. If there are minds or mental states then they are reducible to atoms and if atoms are physical then minds are physical. Thomas Hobbes, the seventeenth-century English political theorist and philosopher, was a foundationalist about geometry: Unless the statements of geometry are true then no statement can be true. Geometry is the mathematics of space so it follows that everything is spatial. If everything spatial is physical then everything is physical, and so materialism is true. Hobbes has an account of how people come to be misled into dualism or otherwise believing in nonphysical realities. Because a mind does not seem to be straightforwardly a physical object, people falsely assume it is a nonphysical object, but this is an abstraction caused by thinking away just some material properties, notably solidity. Hobbes thinks that if people think of anything they can only think of it as physical. One thinks of a ghost as having certain physical properties, perhaps extension and indeterminate shape. This sort of criticism of putative nonphysical realities was later adopted in the 19th century by the Vienna Circle, who sought to replace religion by natural science. The mind-brain identity theory was influential from the

minds into the s. The main claim of the British philosopher U. The identity in question is a contingent and a posteriori one, not a necessary and a priori one. Idealism Idealism is the theory that only minds exist and that physical objects, including the human body, are dependent on minds or consciousness for their existence. Although nondualistic, Vedanta entails the idealist doctrine that only subjective centers of experience exist and the empirical world is only an appearance. The first systematic thinker who could be construed as an idealist is the pre-Socratic monist Parmenides of Elea in the sixth and fifth centuries b. Parmenides believed that only what can be thought exists. Plato insists that the Forms *eidos* are nonphysical types or essences that exist independently not only of space and time but the human mind. However, the Forms are in principle graspable by the human mind given appropriate training, and the soul "participates" in them before birth and after death. To the extent that the Forms are ideal, Plato is an idealist because he thinks the empirical world depends upon the Forms for its existence. The third-century neo-Platonist philosopher Plotinus " c. The eighteenth-century Anglo-Irish Bishop George Berkeley argues that it makes no sense to claim that physical objects exist independently of the possibility of thinking of them or perceiving them. He also argues that the concept of matter, or a physical substratum of which the properties of a physical object are properties, is incoherent. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant " is usually read as an idealist because his own name for his philosophy was transcendental idealism. However, transcendental idealism is the epistemological doctrine that humans are cognitively constituted in such a way that people may only know things as they appear to them, not as they really are in themselves. People are psychologically equipped to formulate philosophical questions but not to answer them. There are no metaphysical propositions because putative claims about a reality beyond space and time are neither true nor false. So the word idealism in transcendental idealism is best read as antirealism. On this thesis, which is partly Brahmanist and partly neo-Platonist, the distinction between mental and physical ultimately depends on Geist. Logical behaviorism Logical or analytical behaviorism is the theory that minds can be reduced to publicly observable bodily behavior. According to this theory, any statement about minds or mental states may be translated into a claim or set of claims about actual or possible bodily behavior that is in principle observable. Logical behaviorism is a reduction of the inner to the outer, the subjective to the objective, the private to the public, the first person singular to the third person singular. The German-born American positivist philosopher Carl Gustav Hempel " is a logical behaviorist in this defined sense. Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein " and British philosopher Gilbert Ryle " offer subtle analyses of the uses of ordinary psychological language designed to show that seemingly Cartesian or introspective language in fact takes on its meaning from shared uses in a public world. In particular, Wittgenstein argues in his Private Language Argument in *Philosophical Investigations* that there have to be public third-person criteria for psychological ascriptions. In that case, there would be no criterion for the correctness of a putative ascription: There would be nothing it would consist in for the ascription to be true or false. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein would strongly resist being called a behaviorist. Functionalism Functionalism is the theory that a mind is a set of states essentially causally related to sensory inputs, behavioral outputs, and one another. Functionalism may be partly understood as an attempt to overcome certain shortcomings of logical behaviorism. Behavior seems neither necessary nor sufficient for mentality. It is not sufficient because it does not follow from the fact that someone behaves in a particular way that they are in a particular mental state. Behavior is not necessary for mentality because from the fact that a person is in a particular mental state it does not follow that they behave in a particular way. Mind does not seem to be behavior. Mind seems to be the inner cause of behavior. The contemporary philosophers David Lewis and Hilary Putnam have argued that being in a mental state is being in a functional state, a state caused by sensory inputs and causing behavioral outputs. Functionalism does not entail a view about the intrinsic nature of a mental state, so in a sense avoids the mind-body problem. However, with the addition of just one extra premise"only physical events may be causes or effects"functionalism is a kind of materialism. Functionalism is consistent with the assumption of cognitive science that a person is best viewed as an information processing system. Double aspect theories According to double aspect theories, mind and body

are two aspects of some jointly presupposed reality that is intrinsically neither mental nor physical. Dutch-Jewish philosopher Baruch Spinoza " argued that reality has two essential properties: The totality of what is could appropriately be called "God" or "Nature" deus sive natura. As parts of the whole, human minds and bodies are two aspects of an underlying reality. Thought cannot exist without extension, nor extension without thought. As in many double aspect theories, this raises the question of what the underlying reality is if it is allegedly neither mental nor physical. However, the concept of existence or being has proved recalcitrant to analysis by philosophers from the ancient Greek Parmenides to Martin Heidegger in the twentieth century. Bertrand Russell " endorsed two kinds of double aspect theories at different stages of his intellectual career. He endorsed the empiricist view that mind and matter are logical constructions of sense data: Intrinsically, mind and matter are neither mental nor physical. In *An Outline of Philosophy* Russell argues that there can be no distinction between mental and physical unless fundamentally there exist events that are not clearly mental or physical. Peter Strawson argues in *Individuals* that the concept of a person is primitive with regard to the distinction between mind and body. Unless humans are already possessed of the concept of the person as a whole, they are not in a position to draw a mind-body distinction. There is a considerable class of predicates that are not clearly only mental or only physical, for example "is smiling," or "is running. Phenomenology offers ways of marking the distinction between mental and physical, and diagnoses of how the mind-body problem is thinkable. Phenomenology is the description of appearances just as they are given to consciousness. The ambition of phenomenology is to show how knowledge, including all scientific, religious, and philosophical knowledge is possible. The transcendental ego is purportedly neither mental nor physical, and phenomenology is purportedly prior to the drawing of that distinction. However, the construction of the world out of acts of consciousness on some interpretations entails idealism and Husserl sometimes called his own philosophy transcendental idealism. As is the case with Kant, however, the claim that consciousness of an object is necessary and sufficient for the objective givenness of that object does not appear to entail that the object is dependent on consciousness for its existence. Twentieth century phenomenologists Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty , and Jean Paul Sartre all reject the epoche and the transcendental ego and argue that the mental-physical distinction is dependent on the fundamental existential category being-in-the-world. Conclusion The mind-body problem cannot be solved scientifically. The brain is billions of atoms in motion in empty space. No amount of empirical observation and experimental testing will explain how awareness is generated by matter in motion. Although it is obvious that ordinary mental states depend empirically on the brain, their subjective interiority of those same states is scientifically inexplicable.

This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated.

The book is both a survey of the contemporary debate and a defense of a distinctive position. Consciousness as defined in Those who believe the former are materialists; those who conclude the latter are dualists. As the currently dominant metaphysic is materialism – also sometimes called physicalism – the challenge appears to be to slot phenomenal properties among the physical properties that ultimately make up the world. David Chalmers argued powerfully that we can go very far in situating many mental properties in the physical world – namely, the properties that can be understood in functional terms – but that phenomenal properties resist such a treatment. But there are also some quite powerful positive arguments for dualism. The two most influential ones are the modal argument, also offered by Chalmers, and the knowledge argument invented by Frank Jackson. Chalmers invites us to conceive of creatures that are exactly like human beings – physically, functionally, behaviorally – only bereft of phenomenal consciousness. If such creatures are conceivable, says Chalmers, they are metaphysically possible. And if they are metaphysically possible, materialism is false. Jackson, for his part, suggests we imagine Mary who has spent her entire life inside a black-and-white room and has seen the world through a black-and-white TV screen. But she also happens to know everything there is to know about the physics of color. And yet, Jackson suggests that once Mary is finally released from her room and sees a lawn outside, she learns something new: The current work on consciousness is by and large characterized by attempts to answer these two dualistic arguments. I try to make sense of the positions within the domain of philosophy of consciousness by means of two major distinctions that mutually intersect. First, there is a distinction between dualism and materialism. An apparent third alternative currently on offer, the so-called Russellian monism, is unstable, collapsing into either dualism panpsychism or materialism Russellian physicalism. Materialism comes in two main flavors: The second major distinction is between phenomenism and representationalism. But I believe that the distinction actually intersects the one between materialism and dualism. We thus arrive at a table with six slots, representing six main positions in the philosophy of consciousness: However, this scheme is in fact somewhat misleading. It is true that Dennett is usually classified as an apriori materialist or, more precisely an apriori materialist representationalist , but I believe that needs to be corrected. In order to understand why, I first analyze varieties of materialist representationalism in detail, in particular various construals of phenomenal character in terms of representation, or intentionality, which includes a discussion of the identity of its content the issue of externalism. By contrast, Dennett rejects the concept of phenomenal character. Consciousness has no intrinsic, publicly inaccessible properties. On that ground, Dennett builds an empirical, fully functionalist theory of consciousness, which he also tries to integrate within a general Darwinian framework. From that point of view, one can contrast Dennettian and representationalist views on the issue of animal consciousness. In addition to his rejection of phenomenal character, Dennett also abstains from the regular metaphysical departure point of regular materialism. He does not so much ask how an enigmatic property of consciousness fits an antecedently characterized world, but rather how far we can investigate all aspects of the world, including consciousness, using the scientific method. He is thus a methodological naturalist, rather than a metaphysical materialist. The hardest problem consists in the fact that our intentional discourse involves conflicting commitments that prevent a coherent metaphysic of representational states. However, it does not follow that we should give up on this discourse as a theoretical means of reduction as well as a practical tool of explanation. But it might be that intentional discourse is a somewhat pseudo one.

Chapter 7 : "A Critique of Habermas" ()

From the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Materialism George J. Stack Philosophical Concept Materialism is a set of related theories which hold that all entities and processes are composed of.

References and Further Reading 1. Various Concepts of Consciousness The concept of consciousness is notoriously ambiguous. It is important first to make several distinctions and to define related terms. We sometimes speak of an individual mental state, such as a pain or perception, as conscious. However, some kind of state consciousness is often implied by creature consciousness, that is, the organism is having conscious mental states. Most contemporary theories of consciousness are aimed at explaining state consciousness; that is, explaining what makes a mental state a conscious mental state. More common is the belief that we can be aware of external objects in some unconscious sense, for example, during cases of subliminal perception. Finally, it is not clear that consciousness ought to be restricted to attention. An organism, such as a bat, is conscious if it is able to experience the outer world through its echo-locatory senses. There is also something it is like to be a conscious creature whereas there is nothing it is like to be, for example, a table or tree. For example, philosophers sometimes refer to conscious states as phenomenal or qualitative states. There is significant disagreement over the nature, and even the existence, of qualia, but they are perhaps most frequently understood as the felt properties or qualities of conscious states. The former is very much in line with the Nagelian notion described above. Access consciousness is therefore more of a functional notion; that is, concerned with what such states do. Block himself argues that neither sense of consciousness implies the other, while others urge that there is a more intimate connection between the two. Some History on the Topic Interest in the nature of conscious experience has no doubt been around for as long as there have been reflective humans. It would be impossible here to survey the entire history, but a few highlights are in order. In the history of Western philosophy, which is the focus of this entry, important writings on human nature and the soul and mind go back to ancient philosophers, such as Plato. As we shall see, Descartes argued that the mind is a non-physical substance distinct from the body. He also did not believe in the existence of unconscious mental states, a view certainly not widely held today. Our mental states are, according to Descartes, infallibly transparent to introspection. Perhaps the most important philosopher of the period explicitly to endorse the existence of unconscious mental states was G. He also importantly distinguished between perception and apperception, roughly the difference between outer-directed consciousness and self-consciousness see Gennaro for some discussion. The most important detailed theory of mind in the early modern period was developed by Immanuel Kant. Although he owes a great debt to his immediate predecessors, Kant is arguably the most important philosopher since Plato and Aristotle and is highly relevant today. Kant basically thought that an adequate account of phenomenal consciousness involved far more than any of his predecessors had considered. Over the past one hundred years or so, however, research on consciousness has taken off in many important directions. In psychology, with the notable exception of the virtual banishment of consciousness by behaviorist psychologists e. The writings of such figures as Wilhelm Wundt , William James and Alfred Titchener are good examples of this approach. The work of Sigmund Freud was very important, at minimum, in bringing about the near universal acceptance of the existence of unconscious mental states and processes. It must, however, be kept in mind that none of the above had very much scientific knowledge about the detailed workings of the brain. The relatively recent development of neurophysiology is, in part, also responsible for the unprecedented interdisciplinary research interest in consciousness, particularly since the s. There are now several important journals devoted entirely to the study of consciousness: For a small sample of introductory texts and important anthologies, see Kim , Gennaro b, Block et. The Metaphysics of Consciousness: Dualism Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy concerned with the ultimate nature of reality. There are two broad traditional and competing metaphysical views concerning the nature of the mind and conscious mental states: While there are many versions of each,

the former generally holds that the conscious mind or a conscious mental state is non-physical in some sense. On the other hand, materialists hold that the mind is the brain, or, more accurately, that conscious mental activity is identical with neural activity. For something to be non-physical, it must literally be outside the realm of physics; that is, not in space at all and undetectable in principle by the instruments of physics. However, something might be physical but not material in this sense, such as an electromagnetic or energy field. Thus, to say that the mind is non-physical is to say something much stronger than that it is non-material. Dualists, then, tend to believe that conscious mental states or minds are radically different from anything in the physical world at all.

General Support and Related Issues There are a number of reasons why some version of dualism has been held throughout the centuries. For one thing, especially from the introspective or first-person perspective, our conscious mental states just do not seem like physical things or processes. That is, when we reflect on our conscious perceptions, pains, and desires, they do not seem to be physical in any sense. Consciousness seems to be a unique aspect of the world not to be understood in any physical way. Although materialists will urge that this completely ignores the more scientific third-person perspective on the nature of consciousness and mind, this idea continues to have force for many today. The metaphysical conclusion ultimately drawn is that consciousness cannot be identical with anything physical, partly because there is no essential conceptual connection between the mental and the physical. Arguments such as these go back to Descartes and continue to be used today in various ways Kripke , Chalmers , but it is highly controversial as to whether they succeed in showing that materialism is false. Materialists have replied in various ways to such arguments and the relevant literature has grown dramatically in recent years. Historically, there is also the clear link between dualism and a belief in immortality, and hence a more theistic perspective than one tends to find among materialists. Indeed, belief in dualism is often explicitly theologically motivated. If the conscious mind is not physical, it seems more plausible to believe in the possibility of life after bodily death. On the other hand, if conscious mental activity is identical with brain activity, then it would seem that when all brain activity ceases, so do all conscious experiences and thus no immortality. After all, what do many people believe continues after bodily death? There is perhaps a similar historical connection to a belief in free will, which is of course a major topic in its own right. To put it another way: Although materialism may not logically rule out immortality or free will, materialists will likely often reply that such traditional, perhaps even outdated or pre-scientific beliefs simply ought to be rejected to the extent that they conflict with materialism. After all, if the weight of the evidence points toward materialism and away from dualism, then so much the worse for those related views. Somewhat related to the issue of immortality, the existence of near death experiences is also used as some evidence for dualism and immortality. In response, materialists will point out that such experiences can be artificially induced in various experimental situations, and that starving the brain of oxygen is known to cause hallucinations. Various paranormal and psychic phenomena, such as clairvoyance, faith healing, and mind-reading, are sometimes also cited as evidence for dualism. However, materialists and even many dualists will first likely wish to be skeptical of the alleged phenomena themselves for numerous reasons. There are many modern day charlatans who should make us seriously question whether there really are such phenomena or mental abilities in the first place. Second, it is not quite clear just how dualism follows from such phenomena even if they are genuine. A materialist, or physicalist at least, might insist that though such phenomena are puzzling and perhaps currently difficult to explain in physical terms, they are nonetheless ultimately physical in nature; for example, having to do with very unusual transfers of energy in the physical world. The dualist advantage is perhaps not as obvious as one might think, and we need not jump to supernatural conclusions so quickly. For example, my desire to drink something cold causes my body to move to the refrigerator and get something to drink and, conversely, kicking me in the shin will cause me to feel a pain and get angry. But a modern day interactionist would certainly wish to treat various areas of the brain as the location of such interactions. Three serious objections are briefly worth noting here. The first is simply the issue of just how does or could such radically different substances causally interact. How something non-physical causally interacts with something physical, such as the brain? No such explanation is

forthcoming or is perhaps even possible, according to materialists. Moreover, if causation involves a transfer of energy from cause to effect, then how is that possible if the mind is really non-physical? So any loss of energy in the cause must be passed along as a corresponding gain of energy in the effect, as in standard billiard ball examples. But if interactionism is true, then when mental events cause physical events, energy would literally come into the physical world. On the other hand, when bodily events cause mental events, energy would literally go out of the physical world. At the least, there is a very peculiar and unique notion of energy involved, unless one wished, even more radically, to deny the conservation principle itself. Third, some materialists might also use the well-known fact that brain damage even to very specific areas of the brain causes mental defects as a serious objection to interactionism and thus as support for materialism. This has of course been known for many centuries, but the level of detailed knowledge has increased dramatically in recent years. Now a dualist might reply that such phenomena do not absolutely refute her metaphysical position since it could be replied that damage to the brain simply causes corresponding damage to the mind. However, this raises a host of other questions: Why not opt for the simpler explanation, i. Will the severe amnesic at the end of life on Earth retain such a deficit in the afterlife? If proper mental functioning still depends on proper brain functioning, then is dualism really in no better position to offer hope for immortality? It should be noted that there is also another less popular form of substance dualism called parallelism, which denies the causal interaction between the non-physical mental and physical bodily realms. It seems fair to say that it encounters even more serious objections than interactionism. Other Forms of Dualism While a detailed survey of all varieties of dualism is beyond the scope of this entry, it is at least important to note here that the main and most popular form of dualism today is called property dualism. Substance dualism has largely fallen out of favor at least in most philosophical circles, though there are important exceptions e. Property dualism, on the other hand, is a more modest version of dualism and it holds that there are mental properties that is, characteristics or aspects of things that are neither identical with nor reducible to physical properties. There are actually several different kinds of property dualism, but what they have in common is the idea that conscious properties, such as the color qualia involved in a conscious experience of a visual perception, cannot be explained in purely physical terms and, thus, are not themselves to be identified with any brain state or process. Two other views worth mentioning are epiphenomenalism and panpsychism. The latter is the somewhat eccentric view that all things in physical reality, even down to micro-particles, have some mental properties. All substances have a mental aspect, though it is not always clear exactly how to characterize or test such a claim. Finally, although not a form of dualism, idealism holds that there are only immaterial mental substances, a view more common in the Eastern tradition. The most prominent Western proponent of idealism was 18th century empiricist George Berkeley. The idealist agrees with the substance dualist, however, that minds are non-physical, but then denies the existence of mind-independent physical substances altogether. Such a view faces a number of serious objections, and it also requires a belief in the existence of God.

Twenty-three philosophers examine the doctrine of materialism find it wanting. The case against materialism comprises arguments from conscious experience, from the unity and identity of the person, from intentionality, mental causation, and knowledge.

What does Habermas mean by "reconstruction"? The infrastructure of the United States needs reconstruction, it is clear, because trains derail, bridges and dams collapse, water mains burst, etc. But what of historical materialism? This theoretical programme is necessary, Habermas tells us, because historical materialism "needs revision in many respects" Habermas has sharply differentiated instrumental and strategic action from communicative action in the following terms. While instrumental action involves technical knowledge of means-ends relationships and strategic action involves organizational knowledge of social cooperation, he holds that communicative action or human interaction involves intersubjective knowledge incorporated both in the personality and in the redistributive processes of society. Such a project is not without its perils, however; and Habermas acknowledges some sensitivity to these. Thus we are understandably reluctant to pursue homologies between the spheres of personality and society. Habermas has vigorously disputed this charge, denying that he "wished to play off the methods of understanding against those of explanation" Habermas, He fails to recognize the significance of social classes and social antagonism for morality and personality, and he incorrectly differentiates the individual and the group in his analysis of ego identity. We reject this claim, both as it pertains to personality and to the redistributive processes of society, for reasons we will now set out. Habermas holds that there are three moments of personality. First, there is the moment of moral consciousness. Next, there is the moment of ego development ontogenesis. On the one hand, he claims that "the ego is formed in a system of demarcations" On the other hand, his analysis of ego-identity depends no less upon his discussion of ontogenesis. But if these dialectical moments are to be separated in the case of the ego, then they should not be joined in the case of morality, i. Hence personality consists of moral consciousness and its developmental stages on the one hand and ego-identity, and ontogenesis, on the other. Habermas on Moral Consciousness Habermas understands moral consciousness to comprise judgments about "morally relevant conflicts. However, Habermas has failed to recognize this social foundation of moral consciousness. The concept of moral consciousness must therefore be reconsidered. Viewed more broadly, moral consciousness is a moment of social consciousness. As Lenin emphasized in his Materialism and Empirio-criticism, social consciousness reflects social being, the latter term referring to the ensemble of social relations in "social formations of any complexity" Lenin, , Vol. Due to the complexity of these social forms, "social consciousness is only the reflection of being, at best an approximately true reflection of being" Lenin, , Vol. Social consciousness must strive for what is at most a law-like nomothetic understanding of that social being. But due to the contradictions which inhere in the social being of the antagonistic social order -- and especially capitalist society -- social consciousness is also a contradictory reflection of social being. Hence social consciousness cannot fulfil itself within the antagonistic social orders. Under such conditions, what is made of oneself tends to be made in the interest of some part of society, with at most consciousness of the self as a partial being. That part of society can be the clan, tribe, or family, the regional group, the religious congregation, the nationality, the occupational stratum or corporation, or some composite of these, to mention some of the more prominent historical possibilities. The global extension and deepening antagonisms of capitalism, i. On the one hand, this is indirect, mediated through stages trade-union consciousness, etc. On the other hand, all this is of course a tendency, as the particularistic counterexamples of religious partiality in Belfast, or ethnic partiality in Georgetown, attest. In sum, class consciousness is the form fully attained by social consciousness within the antagonistic social order, i. Moral consciousness is a moment of social consciousness, hence it cannot transcend class consciousness so long as it is trammelled by the antagonistic social order. And only the failure to resolve intra-class conflicts can occasion sanctions. In any case, two

points should be stressed against Habermas: Habermas on Identity and Ontogenesis Turning next to the ego and ontogenesis, Habermas points out that object-identity can be imputed to things and events within the spheres of technical or strategic knowledge. Habermas notes that spatio-temporal coordinates are the most abstract terms for identification. Further, says Habermas, collective identity can be avowed to ourselves, viz when we mutually express ourselves as I and Thou This appears to contradict ethnographic data which indicates that members of archaic tribes characteristically understood themselves as comprising all of humanity. It is difficult to imagine the circumstances under which they would avow identity to themselves. Identity in face of what difference? Habermas concludes that where object-identity is only imputed, the domain of the objective is delimited; avowed object-identity demarcates that of the subjective. Of course, this substantive distinction is suggestive of the methodological dualism of neo-Kantianism. Theoretically fruitful distinctions can, of course, be drawn between the personality and the collectivity, but only in scientific terms. The concept of exploitation is scientifically devoid of meaning when predicated of the individual person, while it is the fundamental characteristic when predicated of the collectivity, since it thereby defines the antagonistic social order. Marx and Engels, , Vol. Two points follow directly. In the second place, this totality must itself be addressed at a theoretically appropriate level of discourse. This totality is the social formation, and the appropriate level of discourse is that of Marxist anthropology. The distinction can surely be drawn, but scientifically only in terms of the possibility of antagonistic social relations, etc. Social forms are constituted of the social relations of specifically human beings, relationships which are characteristically either non-antagonistic or else antagonistic. In general, the personality and its ontogenesis presuppose the social relations of an historically specific form. In particular, personality distortions and disorders presuppose the alienated social relations of the antagonistic social order. In the German Ideology, for instance, they state that the mode of production manifests the mode of life of humanity Marx and Engels, , Vol. For the historical materialist, it comprises social relations, i. Thus the mode of life includes the subsistence of the individual and the continuation of the collectivity. Marx and Engels continue that this can be understood in terms of means, needs, kind or species , and cooperation. Indeed, these are precisely the four fundamental moments of social activity Marx and Engels, , Vol. Let us briefly consider each of these moments, and their immediate consequences, in turn. Means Hominids walking upright had their hands freed to hold food rather than being obliged to devour it immediately as did other animals who could carry food only in their mouth. The human mouth was likewise freed for vocalization, facilitating the coordination of collective labor. Likewise, the satisfaction of needs generates new needs, another moment of this first historical act. Thus in poiesis the production and utilization of instruments coincide in a natural relation which means that deliberation is not presupposed in the first historical act. Primordial social relations have two particular forms which will be noted here and addressed more fully below, viz. These primordial social relations are later subordinated to other social relationships, but are initially manifested in the earliest human institution, the matrilineal gens Morgan, Cooperation The mode of production and reproduction with its means and needs entails, then, a mode of cooperation in human relations. In any case, this cooperation is itself a productive force and the fourth and final moment of the first historical act cf. For the historical materialist, however, once language or practical subjectivity is historic, man is differentiated from other fabricators, say the social insects, by planning or deliberation, an activity of practical subjectivity as Marx later details The Dialectics of Community In order to understand the development of personality, further comments on the topic of the matrilineal gens and its social relations are required. Habermas similarly "imagines how the family might have emerged" It is scientifically appropriate instead to begin with that which has substance ousia in the domain of praxis. That is substantial which is self-sufficient, sui generis. That which is self-sufficient reproduces itself. The Self-identical The community is that which is identical to itself through itself. The characteristics of community, the terms in which it can self-sufficiently reproduce itself, include a territory and associated natural resources, b endogamous mating patterns, and c a communal name, and religious faith and rituals Morgan, Such a community must be endogamous, i. Hence the primitive inclination to identify the

community with what is, the totality at least of the practical. In his *Ancient Society*, Morgan discussed the "organic series" of gentes, tribes, and nations. The gens was the social element of the non-antagonistic primitive social order. Its important characteristics were given in the *jus gentilicum* -- they were a matrilineality and matrifocality, and b the rule of exogamy Morgan, Because of its exogamous character, the gens was not self-sufficient -- it could not reproduce itself from generation to generation -- and thus was a component of the tribe, which was the self-sufficient community. The Differentiated But the very act by which the community identifies itself dirempts it into identificans and identificandum. Thus the community is also a diversity of associates. These associates are alike in their common forebears and in values held in common as a consequence of their similar modes of life; they are unlike hence their need to communicate, to reaffirm community. Hence the associates are interdependent in community, in peer relations. Marx had recognized the primacy of simple variety in social organization very early when he wrote that "democracy alone can be understood in its own terms; each element therein is merely an element of the community. The peer relationship embodies the resocializing mutually accommodating interaction of humans, i. On the one hand, a form of this facilitation is the attraction of the sexes. On the other hand, the relative equivalence of the interdependent peers is finally grounded in the sexual relationship, naturalized human interaction hence presupposing peer relations or friendship. Ground Grounded being comes into exist through the maternal relation, the natural dependency of the fetus on its mother. Thus it presupposes the naturalization of human interaction. Such an argument would manifest a mechanical mode of conceptualization, however, because the dependency of fetus on its mother has a crucial cultural moment; this dependency can be terminated either during pregnancy by primitive modes of abortion or during infancy by primitive modes of infanticide such as exposure. As this natural dependency is socialized, rather than terminated, the uniqueness of the relationship declines as the salience remains high; the relation is transformed into the nurturant relation of increasing autonomy of the child towards any adult, including the natural mother. Dialectics of Personality Of the four relationships -- peer, sexual, maternal, and nurturant -- it is the latter which is the most significant for the natural division of labor, since the difference between child and adult is initially the greatest of any within the community. He reifies the sexual relation as it appears in an historically particular institutionalization, viz the "father role," then discovers that adult males had no place in the pre-patriarchal "family. Young and Willmott, Habermas could thereupon found that place for the adult male -- an avuncular role in the egalitarian gens. On the one hand, Engels cautioned us about over-emphasizing the difference between the sexes Marx and Engels, , Vol.

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> consciousness, and perhaps, consciousness receives matter -- thus the > efficacy of practices which emphasize awareness. Matter is what emerges, from the universal machine's pot from the infinitely many computations below their substitution level.