Chapter 1 : Metaphor, Allegory, and the Classical Tradition - G. R. Boys-Stones - Oxford University Press

According to the theoretical accounts which survive in the rhetorical handbooks of antiquity, allegory is extended metaphor, or an extended series of metaphors; and both allegory and metaphor are linguistic 'tropes': their purpose is essentially ornamental.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Wayne Booth, in his inimitable fashion, remarks, There were no conferences on metaphor, ever, in any culture, until our own century was already middleâ€"aged. As late as , John Middleton Murry, complaining about the superficiality of most discussions of metaphor, could say, "There are not many of them. Explicit discussions of something called metaphor have multiplied astronomically in the past fifty years. This trend, however, is not a new one; it seems to have its roots back as far as Heraclitus, and, in the modern world, was certainly espoused by Giambattista Vico in his Nuova Scienza What we may call the Viconian tradition was embraced on the continent by Nietzsche, and, in the Angloâ€"American world, by Ivor Richards. Now, it seemed, such simple formulae as "This X is Y" called into question the whole process of naming and predication. But even among those for whom this is an unconvincing position, the problem of metaphor continues to be a fascinating one. How to define [End Page] it? What are its uses? What is its relation to literal, or nonfigured, language? And what its relation to human cognition? Indeed, here as often, even those who wish to propose new or different parameters for the analysis of metaphor must do so against the grain of the Aristotelian tradition. As on many other topics, it is now fashionable to condescend to Aristotle for the limitations of his study of metaphor, orâ€"more aggressively stillâ€"to find fault with its parameters. Certainly he did not preempt any further discussion on the issue; nor, I imagine, would he have wanted to. But I surmise that there is more to be learned from an appreciative study of his methods here than one might initially suppose. In this study, then, after a few remarks on recent studies of metaphor, I propose to examine the state of the question before Aristotle, and then [End Page] to look at what he has to say about metaphor in the Poetics and Rhetoric. In their attempts to cope with the notion of language generally, and specifically with the questions of literal versus figurative language, scholars over the last hundred years or so have themselves appropriated a number of metaphors purporting to describe the phenomenon. These include above all models based on comparison and interaction. The comparison model, it is typically said, conforms more to the classical approach to metaphor, whereas those based on interaction stem primarily from the work of Richards and Black. You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

Chapter 2 : The Thanksgiving Feast: A Lot On My Plate

Metaphor, Allegory, and the Classical Tradition Ancient Thought and Modern Revisions Edited by G. R. Boys-Stones. Range of theoretical approaches to the subject - historical, philosophical, and literary-critical.

Contact Me Tradition and adaptation, metaphor and flying I have written a lot about traditions, and how they can form the scaffolding of family life. As the kids have grown, some of these have fallen by the wayside and others have shifted but remained present. Many years ago, I took Grace and Whit to Storyland for a night at the end of the school year. It was a wonderful trip — so great that we went back the next month. For several years we did that, and then one year we did something else a treetop course at Cranmore and this year we went ziplining. We got to Gunstock on Saturday morning and signed lots of waivers. Matt took a pass on ziplining because of his leg, so Grace, Whit and I went up the chairlift together. As we rode to the top of the mountain, we watched some people pass on the zipline to our left. I could not believe how high they were or how fast they were going. What were we in for? We ziplined a short distance from the chairlift to the top of the longest, highest zipline of the course. The kids went together, ahead of me, and I followed them. As we wound up a rickety spiral staircase to the platform I felt dizzy ad paused. I nodded, but waited a moment to regain my bearings. I felt the world swirl below us, and standing with my feet further apart than normal, to feel balanced, I reached for my phone to take a photo. They got ready to go. The lines soared away from the platform, and with a thumbs up over their shoulders, they did too. I stood and watched them go, leaping into the great wide open, flying away from me. The metaphor hit me over the head and I stood alone on the platform, slightly stunned and grateful at the same time. In a few moments it was my turn. Channeling their openness, I stood while the attendant hooked me to the zipline, and then I jumped. When I arrived at the next platform, I saw Grace and Whit standing there, waiting for me, grinning. I had tears in my eyes as I landed and joined them. I thought back to another day, years ago, when the three of us flew. We went to the hotel we have stayed at for so many years, had dinner at our beloved Red Parka Pub, played at the water park, and fell asleep in a small room. There are few things I love more than the four of us sleeping in one room. Everyone fell asleep before me, and I lay in the dark room, thinking back to the early Storyland years. They were animate in the room, I felt, and the 5 and 7 year old versions of Whit and Grace floated in my memory. As we drove home on Sunday, Grace noted that she loved our annual celebration trip, and I swallowed hard to hide the tears from my voice when I agreed with her. It is only by releasing our grip on what was that we can fully embrace what is. The truth of that hit me hard this weekend. This is ritual at its most powerful, I believe: A reminder of the sturdy underpinning of family life. A confirmation that something bigger than each of us holds us, and a plain say of love. This is who we are, Grace and Whit:

The metaphor implies that culture is beyond individual control or individual characteristics, a system that is dynamic, with actions and reactions, yet mysteriously orderly. A related metaphor from Schein and Lewin is "unfreezing", which happens when cultural difference challenges the ego (the magnetic forces shift).

Your words blessed me and I sincerely appreciate you sharing your feelings about how my poem caused your deep love for your parents to be brought to the surface. We all have a past you know. I choose to believe that the mistakes we make are all used to teach us the value of love and forgiveness. I hope this message finds you healthy and whole, surrounded by your parents, family and loved ones! May you be blessed and covered in grace and love all the days of your life. I truly have been blessed by all your responses. And I am so honored The Lord inspired my heart in a way that took my own personal pain, struggle and life story to reach others who have walked in my shoes. Though we may not share the same family tree I am certain we are all joined together in the same beautifully broken forest. This poem literally became a fulfilled prophecy for me. I wrote it in and since then I have lived out the poem. So as a team we continued her protocol of chemotherapy for a total of 9 months. Just as the poem said "alone I will go and plant the new seeds where a beautiful tree will grow", I went a new direction at that crossroad while taking along my 3 children " NEW SEEDS" we were literally uprooted and The Lord planted us into a whole new life, new way of life and a new family! We started going to a church that a new neighbor invited us to and it was there that God showed us who we are as His children and gave us an amazing church family. So much has happened but to quickly elaborate a little more on the poem and the reality of it springing forth into life is that the truth is, had those tragedies never happened, me and my kids would not be who we are today. Things could have been quite different and painful. Through much prayer my daughter carried them both to at least 38 weeks. And my other wonderful daughter, her twin sister is also getting married to a wonderful man who loves The Lord and they actively serve in their church and community. My amazing son who is almost 19 years old now and instead of continuing down a path of struggles in worldly living he has turned his life into a relentless pursuit of the One who created him. Like me, he is called to an Isaiah 61 life. I live in such peace and joy no matter what life hands me. By the grace of God, my identity and the identities of every new generation that follows me no longer identify with that old tree but instead will only identify with the new tree they were planted or born into. We have not been close for a while now, but soon my family became divided after my uncle was put in jail for sexually assaulting me. Over half my family has turned their backs on me alone, and I usually just get my feelings out through my poems. Now I faced that in my life. We must also ask ourselves, who held the axe? Trust is usually the source of any break where love was the bond. In our tree we found there was a lust for money and accusations of theft after a death. The accusers perpetuated a lie to gain favor with a widow. They achieved their goal and now live in her new home on her land, waiting for their "inheritance". What has this world come to? A love for diamond rings and a loss of honesty and accountability. The disappointment in these "family members" repels us. This is how the family bonds are broken and the foundation of a family is "axed". Those responsible actually consider themselves Christians. Lord please help us down a path to forgive. We will all be in HIS kingdom someday, our greatest family tree. Until then we pray that a bond among us here on Earth will someday be repaired. I will keep my story close to my heart, except in one way, myself and my children miss the laughs, company and love of you Mark and Samantha my brother and sister its heartbreaking. Our family is going thru a very difficult time And her only wish is to see the entire family together, united but no matter what we say or do the separation in our family is getting worse!! This poem has made me realize that the only thing I can do is plant a new seed for the new generation who are my children. When my daughter sent me this poem and I just started to cry and once more picked myself up with faith in God that he will help me conquer all evil that is trying to keeps us from uniting by Kuala, Lumpur 6 years ago I grew up in a very tight knit family my grandmother helped raise all her 15 grand children from her 9 children. I come from a pretty big family as you can see. When she passed all our worlds came crashing she was our light. It brings tears to my eyes to see where our family has ended up. My closest cousins who I

played with and protected me as a child are now not even speaking to me. Our families are torn apart. No one knows how I feel I keep my thoughts and hurts to myself as I have to be strong for my mother. As much as it huts I have to continually surrender to god and like you said "But alone I will go And plant the new seeds Where a beautiful tree will grow. But I pray that god will bring my family back to me if not on earth then in heaven. Cain, this Poem touched me deeply as it will others. You have captured in words what so many feel It was a honor to read and really feel what you were sharing in the words. You have a gift for tangibly touching the heart through your poem Please continue to share this to touch lives around the world It gave me inspiration to keep going writing poetry, your poem is very touching by Grace, California 8 years ago Beautiful and very touching. I tried and tried to reach out to my family since I was a little girl and repeatedly my heart get crushed over and over. It kills me everytime. I come from a broken family where no one is close it touches my heart. I wish more people would care about their families and realize how important family really is! My son-in-law on his website made a very hurtful remark about my husband, the father of his wife and grandfather of his 4 children along with the rest of the family. He is trying to minimize his comments now. Outsiders who have read the comment have made the following comments "he is sick" "he is tryinig to divide the family" "this is a large stake for our daughter" Unfortunately, he is home all the time as he works unsual shifts and more times than not, we leave messages for out daughter not always to be returned. I realize that perhaps the fact that his mother left him, his brothers and father when he was 3yrs old may haunt him, but our family has done nothing but embrace him, and as my sister has said would give them the shirt off our back and the last dime in our pockets. Reading your poem, I feel those broken branches snapping day by day Were you touched by this poem? Share Your Story Here. All stories are moderated before being published. Check Your Spelling or your story will not be published!

Chapter 4 : Project MUSE - Aristotle On Metaphor

The "Criminal" Metaphor in the Libertarian Tradition by Carl Watner During the last years of constitutional and political struggle in England and the United States, perhaps the most libertarian image to be invoked by political theorists has been the comparison of existing, so-called "legitimate" governments to "organized gangs of.

Why do Americans cheer football and Spaniards hail matadors? Because they are powerful metaphors, a researcher says. Every night he would watch patiently as his bride ate in virtual silence until she was finished. Not until 14 years later when the young business professor moved his family to Kassel, Germany, to conduct research under a Fulbright Fellowship. Doris Gannon, then and still thoroughly American, looked forward to spending a year in the country where she was born and raised before immigrating to the United States at 9. Food is secondary to conversation for them. Three years ago, returning from an extended stay in Bangkok, Gannon had found a way to characterize behavior in terms to promote understanding: With the assistance of doctoral and advanced MBA students, many of them foreigners, he began exploring and reviewing possible characterizations of diverse societies. The three-year effort has produced a page manuscript whose table of contents is a collection of such image-inducing entries as the Mexican Fiesta and Belgian Lace. To understand what "the Fatherland" is all about has little to do with the aggressiveness and rigidity often attributed to Germans. As in a symphony orchestra, conformity is valued, order is important and rules are many, he says. And each person is expected to contribute fully his or her talents for the good of the whole. And the education system further supports full-blown participation by emphasizing efficiency and preparation for a place in society for everyone. Calling this "a sense of combined effort," Gannon says, "the German sees himself as an integral part of society. And if you approach German society that way, it is a lot easier to get integrated in it and understand it. Ask a Frenchman for directions in English? In the vineyard you nurture relationships. It is the proud individualism of the matador and the gang-like relationship of those in the bullring that reflect the personal relationship in Spain. In the United States, the society is individualistic, and we focus on specialization. We try to learn something really well so we as an individual can do better than anyone we are competing with.

Chapter 5 : Tradition Poem, A Broken Family Tree

An entire literary tradition is being forgotten because writers use the term allegory to mean, like, whatever they want. An allegory, in short, is not just another word for a metaphor. In.

Does this suggest that the mind is a separable platter that the conscious feeds from? What are the subtle differences between these two that may offer insight into how we think? To answer these questions, we first need to examine the meaning of the metaphor "plate" in this context. We recognise that no single event is unbearable, but that the sum of the events is far more than we are able to take in. What is quite interesting is how we phrase this undesirable state as "a lot on my plate": Our experience with life becomes an experience with food. Since our earliest life experiences were quite centred on feeding, it is only natural that metaphors associating our experiences with feeding would work on an intuitive level with us. In our menu of entertainment choices, we may "take in a show" that is dubbed a "smorgasbord of stunning visuals" or a "feast for your eyes". A scene within may be "of poor taste" or the "icing on the cake". This is as true in real life experiences as it is in virtual events. A plate of food is an arrangement of flavours, be they bite size and mixed, such as in a salad or stew, or collected in piles, such as on a Thanksgiving plate, a dim sum, sushi or curry platter. A typical plate, then, is a selection of different foodstuffs within a singular territory. More so, a plate represents a snapshot of our diet. The classic Thanksgiving plate consists of the essentials: So powerful is the drive to feast that we put "as much on our plate as possible", then consciously force ourselves to remember to "save room for dessert" in our feast. How often do we depict such human meals as "a feeding frenzy", finding easy similarity to the behaviour of hungry sharks. The turkey is the kill, made fresh by being served warm and stuffed with new innards. Gravy is the blood of the human carnivore, salty, thick and warm - oozing life from the mashed potatoes that bathe in the warm animal fat of melted butter. This would simply be a kill, if not for the potatoes themselves, the corn and the cranberry sauce. But we are not carnivores, we are omnivores. Which leads us to the supermarket. Trapped in cans, bottles, bags, wrappers and boxes are the foods that will find their way to the plate. Packaging is as natural to humans as it is to all life, whether as the plastic-wrap skin of a grape or the not-quite-tin can of a pecan. The packages are arranged into types - sections - that if intuitive are easy to find and remember. Meats, fruit, vegetables, breads, dairy, personal hygiene and so on. As natural as packing, so to is the arrangement of food in the wild. An ecosystem is a supermarket, allowing each member of its society to feed, and have its preference. The fields yield grains, such as the corn or, ultimately buns. Some soils support the growth of roots, such as potatoes, while other soils make way for fruit-bearing plants. Leafy greens prefer their own type of soil, and like the others, find themselves in groups. And with that roving centrepiece of flesh, the parts of the human feed-lot are complete. A dinner plate is a single-serving feed lot. We graze from food to food, tiring of one, then wandering to the next. What we put on our plate, and what has landed there by other hands, has become ours. As we assume new tasks or responsibilities, take up hobbies or lifestyles, we fill our plates, according to metaphor. Even mere information finds its way to our plate, and may become a lot to digest, or too much to take in. Somehow, this metaphor concludes that "doing" is "eating". That to "take a bite out of life" is to feed by living. What exactly is being fed? The mind hungers for knowledge and experience. With the word "dessert" deriving from "clear the table", and "recess" from "go back", one can see a tone of resetting, as if an original point of reference is somehow desirable. Salt, sour, bitter and sweet - the four classic taste senses. Between turkey salty and cranberry sauce sour, bitter and sweet , the four sensations are pretty much spent. Spuds and bread are pretty timid flavours on their own and we are urged not to "fill up on them". Dessert would appear to balance out the taste buds of a normal meal, but as you may notice, the few who have a remaining appetite are destined for pumpkin pie. Pumpkin pie is not sweet. The Thanksgiving plate, like the ecosystem, supermarket or classroom, offers the necessities in balance. The overloaded Thanksgiving dinner plate, the crowded ecosystem, the overstocked supermarket or the packed curriculum result in the same consequences - food falling off, half-eaten carcasses, products being discounted and students daydreaming or dropping out. Whether ignored or ousted, the excessive load will fall to the floor as being "too much to take". The peas of the overloaded will be pushed

around the plate of life.

For Spanish society, the metaphor is the bullfight, "which really reflects Spanish culture and is not a sport whatsoever," says Gannon. It is the proud individualism of the matador and the gang-like relationship of those in the bullring that reflect the personal relationship in Spain.

The rebels in the American colonies based their revolt against the English Crown on similar grounds of natural law, as outlined in the Declaration of Independence. By the homesteading axiom, the first user, the first person who transforms and uses previously unclaimed and unused resources, becomes their absolute owner. They would reject the use of violence, such a murder, theft, kidnapping and extortion. The uniqueness of libertarianism consists in the manner in which this principle of non-aggression is developed. As one early libertarian said: Whatever constitutes despotism or cruelty will be continually the same. Considerations of rank and power can never alter the genuine character of human action; if the scymeter is stained with innocent blood, it matters nothing whether the fatal blow was struck by a monarch or a robber. Oppression and crime are the same in every corner of the globe; the experience of mankind with respect to their characteristics will be constant and uniform; upon those subjects, therefore, the sentence of human understanding will be ever steady and correspondent. The important consideration for libertarians is that individuals are always responsible for a violation of rights. Groups never act; it is always and necessarily individual members of the group who commit crimes in the name of the larger organization. Though in authority, they are still men and act as men. The acts of a government are acts of individuals â€" of individual men, whose accountability is in no respect changed by their official character. The philosophy of natural law defends the rational dignity of the human individual. It provides the only basis on which the individual may rightfully criticize, in word and deed, every institution and social structure which is incompatible with the universally held moral principles of natural law. By [these] we understand such laws as enjoin men to be just, honest, virtuous, to do no wrong, to kill, rob, deceive, prejudice none; but to do as one would be done unto; to cherish good and to terrify wicked men; in short, Universal Reason, which are not subject to any revolution, because no emergency, time or occasion, can ever justify a suspension of their execution, much less their utter abrogation. An unjust law binds no one, according to the libertarian, since a law higher than that of government holds the individual responsible for his actions. One of the Leveller leaders in the struggle against Charles I thought that: If this be not granted, injustice may be a Law, tyranny may be a Law, lust, will, pride, covetousness and what not? Had there been the letter of the Law directly against me, yea if it were contradicted by the equity of the Law, I had not been at all bound thereto, except to oppose it: The person so invaded may resort to violence in self-defense. In nearly all times and places, this defensive principle has been recognized as the right of the individual against the criminal. It has also been used as the only true basis for revolution against unjust and tyrannical governments. Richard Overton, who was arbitrarily arrested and imprisoned by the House of Lords in , argued that: Having been arrested without a valid, legal warrant, he argued: Those who resisted the impressment officers, Sharp maintained, were acting legally in defense of their own rightful freedom and against unjust violence. Such resisters were not deemed guilty of murder, even if they kill the assailants, provided the killing be inevitable in their defense; and that they cannot otherwise maintain their rights. Nay men are not only justified in defending themselves with force of arms, but may also legally defend and rescue any other persons whatever that are attacked or oppressed by unlawful violence. For what can be more absurd in Nature and contrary to all common sense, than to call him Thief and kill him that comes alone or with a few to rob me; and to call him Lord Protector and obey him that robs me with regiments and troops? As if to rove with 2 or 3 ships were to be a Pirate, but with 50 an Admiral? But if it be the number of Adherents only, not the cause, that makes the difference between a Robber and a Protector: I will that number were defined, that we might know where the Thief ends and the Prince begins. And be able to distinguish between a Robbery and a Tax. But sure no Englishman can be ignorant that it is his Birthright to be Master of his own estate; and that none can command any part of it but by his own grant and consent, either made expressly by himself, or Virtually by a Parliament. All other names are mere Robberies in other names. To rob, to extort, to murder

Tyrants falsely called to govern, and to make a desolation, they call to settle peace: And not only lawful, and to do ourselves right, but Glorious and to deliver mankind, to free the world of that common Robber, that universal Pirate under whom and for whom these lesser beasts prey. Henry Clarke Wright, an associate of Garrison in the abolition struggle, had exactly the same attitude towards government: States and Nations are to be regarded as we regard combinations of men to pick pockets, to steal sheep, to rob on the road, to steal men, to range over the sea as pirates â€" only on a larger and more imposing scale. When men steal, rob and murder as states and nations, it gives respectability to crime â€" the enormity of their crimes is lost sight of, amid the imposing number that commit them, and amid the glitter and pomp of equipage. The little band of thieves is scorned and hunted down as a felon; the great, or governmental band of thieves, is made respectable by numbers, and their crimes cease to be criminal and hateful in proportion to the number combined to do them. If a community of ten commit piracy, they are all hung, and a man is made infamous if he joins this little band of pirates; but if a community of 25,,, called Great Britain or Austria, do the same deed, it is all right, and Christian, and heaven-ordained, and a man is made infamous if he refuses to join this great band of pirates. Such reasoning is most false. I cast it from me. I can no more join a community of 25,,, that exists by plunder and murder, than I can join one composed of ten. If there were no eternal laws which applied equally to all men, then any kind of banditry might be cloaked in legal forms. In order to reject government sanction of slavery, these radical libertarians had to establish a theory of proprietary justice independent of government law and not subject to re-definition by government. They did this by referring back to the natural law tradition and by accepting the self-ownership axiom. Thomas Paine, an early supporter of the American Revolution, was a critic of slavery and the slave trade. Paine equated slavery with man-stealing and kidnapping. For him, the buying and selling of slaves was not an ordinary commercial transaction. The equation of slaves with stolen property had radical implications for Paine: Such men [the purchasers of slaves] may as well join with a known band of robbers, buy their ill-gotten goods, and help on the trade; ignorance is no more pleadable in one case than in the other; the sellers plainly own how they obtain them [the slaves]. But none can lawfully buy without evidence that they are not concurring with men-stealers; and as the true owner has a right to reclaim his goods that were stolen, and sold; so the slave, who is the proper owner of his freedom, has a right to reclaim it, however often sold. Paine enunciated a dual libertarian argument. Each slave, being a person, was entitled to self-ownership rights. Moreover, since every owner could rightfully recover stolen property that belonged to him, regardless of how many times over it had been sold, a slave could legitimately reclaim his freedom at any time. A thief could never divest the rightful owner of property of his title, even if an innocent purchaser bought the stolen property in good faith. In this fashion, the early radicals made a telling case for justice in property titles. That the claim of a slave to his freedom was necessarily stronger than the claim of an owner whose chattels were stolen was pointed out by Samuel Hopkins in If your neighbor buys a horse. And have not your African] servants as great a right to themselves, to their liberty, as you have to your stolen horse? They have been stolen and sold, and when you bought them, in your own wrong, you had much more reason to think they were stolen than he who bought your horse. It is granted by all, that common pirates may be punished by the laws of any state, when apprehended, wherever or in whatever part of the world their crimes were committed. The slave trader who buys and sells his fellow men, by which traffic he is the death of many, and of reducing others to the most miserable bondage during life, is as really an enemy to mankind as the pirate, and violates common law, which is, or ought to be, the law of all nations, and is guilty of crimes of greater magnitude, exercises more inhumanity and cruelty, sheds more blood and plunders more, and commits greater outrages against his fellow men than most of those who are called pirates. In short, if any men deserve the name of pirates, these [slave traders] ought to be considered in the first and highest class of them. He was one of the few who extended his argument for abolition of slavery to include abolition of the state that sanctioned slavery. Wright saw that if he were successful in using natural law to nullify state-sanctioned slavery, then he could, on similar grounds, attack other forms of state tyranny, such as conscription and taxation. No government that upheld such injustices could be legitimate in his eyes. Slaves have no obligation at all to their masters, who good or bad, deserve no more respect or consideration than a gang of pirates or kidnappers. The individual pirate, as a pirate, has no rights. No laws nor constitutions of human device can

create for and secure to him any rights; and if they attempt to do so, it is the duty of all to ignore such rights, and trample such enactments beneath their feet. This is true of all who hold and use human beings as chattels. It is an organized, systematized banditti, and any individual or State is authorized to destroy it. So, a corporate body of slave-holders, though called Virginia, Maryland, Kentucky, or Missouri, is a self-incorporated body of marauders, and as such, any man, or set of men is authorized to destroy it. It is the sacred duty of the people and States of the North to side with the slaves. As in a conflict between a band of highway robbers or pirates, and those whom they would plunder and murder, it is their duty to side with the wronged and the outraged. Wright claimed that the basis of every governmental organization in America was the right of every person to defend his life, liberty, and property. This was the essence of the American Revolution and was embodied in the Declaration of Independence. The supporters of the Constitution were inconsistent if they refused to allow slaves to exercise this right of self â€" defense. A hundred years earlier, another natural law lawyer, Thomas Rutherforth, had written in his Institutes of Natural Law that: A band of robbers or a company of pirates may be in fact united to one another by compact; and may have stipulated with one another in this compact to be directed by the common understanding and to act by the common force for their general benefit. But they are still by the law of nature only a number of unconnected individuals; and consequently in the view of the law of nations, they are not considered as one co1lective body or public person. The individuals, that form themselves into a civil society, are bound by their social compact to pursue and maintain a common benefit: Whereas the common benefit, which a band of robbers or a company of pirates propose to themselves, consists in doing harm to the rest of mankind. The very fact that all governments are coercive is prima facie evidence that they originated in and perpetuate themselves by violence. Thomas Paine pointed out that it is more than probable, could we take off the dark covering of antiquity and trace them [kings and their government] to their first rise, we should find the first of them nothing better than the principal ruffian of some restless gang, whose savage manners or preeminence in subtility obtained him the title of chief among plunderers; and who by increasing in power, and extending his depredations, overawed the quiet and defenceless, to purchase their safety by frequent contributions. All the great governments of the world â€" those now existing as well as those that have passed away â€" have been of this character. They have been mere bands of robbers, who have associated for purposes of plunder, conquest, and the enslavement of their fellow men. And their laws, as they have ca1led them, have only been such agreements as they have found it necessary to enter into, in order to maintain their organizations, and act together in plundering and enslaving others, and in securing to each his agreed share of the spoils. All these laws have had no more real obligation than have the agreements which brigands, bandits, and pirates find it necessary to enter into with each other, for the more successful accomplishment of their crimes, and the more peaceable division of their spoils. First, governments obtain their revenue by means of taxation; that is, by compulsory levy. Taxation is contrary to the basic principles of libertarianism because it involves aggression against non-aggressive citizens who refuse to pay their taxes. It makes no difference that the government offers goods and services in return for the tax money. What matters is that taxation is not voluntary. Secondly, all governments presume to establish compulsory monopolies of defense services police, courts, and law code over certain geographical areas. Individual property owners who prefer not to subscribe at all or to subscribe to another defense company within that area are not permitted to do so. Government, apart from individual outlaws, is the only organization in society that can use its funds to commit violence against its subjects. Only the government is empowered to aggress against the property rights of its citizens, whether to extract revenue or to impose its own moral code. What distinguishes the edicts of the State from the commands of a bandit gang?

Chapter 7 : George Lakoff - Wikipedia

In the tradition of I. A. Richards () and Black, metaphors are generally taken to implicate entire conceptual domains or semantic fields (Kittay,) through which a metaphor is interpreted, extended, and even systematically integrated into the language (Lakoff and Johnson,).

Metaphor has been seen within the Western scientific tradition as a purely linguistic construction. In intellectual debate, for instance, the underlying metaphor according to Lakoff is usually that argument is war later revised to "argument is struggle": He won the argument. He shot down all my arguments. His criticisms were right on target. According to Lakoff, the development of thought has been the process of developing better metaphors. He also points out that the application of one domain of knowledge to another offers new perceptions and understandings. Linguistics wars Lakoff began his career as a student and later a teacher of the theory of transformational grammar developed by Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Noam Chomsky. In an interview he stated: Noam claimed then â€" and still does, so far as I can tell â€" that syntax is independent of meaning, context, background knowledge, memory, cognitive processing, communicative intent, and every aspect of the body In working through the details of his early theory, I found quite a few cases where semantics , context, and other such factors entered into rules governing the syntactic occurrences of phrases and morphemes. I came up with the beginnings of an alternative theory in and, along with wonderful collaborators like "Haj" Ross and Jim McCawley , developed it through the sixties. Embodied philosophy When Lakoff claims the mind is "embodied", he is arguing that almost all of human cognition, up through the most abstract reasoning, depends on and makes use of such concrete and "low-level" facilities as the sensorimotor system and the emotions. Therefore, embodiment is a rejection not only of dualism vis-a-vis mind and matter, but also of claims that human reason can be basically understood without reference to the underlying "implementation details". Lakoff offers three complementary but distinct sorts of arguments in favor of embodiment. First, using evidence[which? Finally, based on research in cognitive psychology and some investigations in the philosophy of language , he argues that very few of the categories used by humans are actually of the black-and-white type amenable to analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. On the contrary, most categories are supposed to be much more complicated and messy, just like our bodies. What our bodies are like and how they function in the world thus structures the very concepts we can use to think. We cannot think just anything â€" only what our embodied brains permit. Using the concept of disembodiment, Lakoff supports the physicalist approach to the afterlife. If the soul can not have any of the properties of the body, then Lakoff claims it can not feel, perceive, think, be conscious, or have a personality. If this is true, then Lakoff asks what would be the point of the afterlife? But Lakoff takes this further to explain why hypotheses built with complex metaphors cannot be directly falsified. Instead, they can only be rejected based on interpretations of empirical observations guided by other complex metaphors. This is what he means when he says [9] that falsifiability itself can never be established by any reasonable method that would not rely ultimately on a shared human bias. Lakoff is, with coauthors Mark Johnson and Rafael E. The work of these writers can be traced back to earlier philosophical writings, most notably in the phenomenological tradition, such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger. The basic thesis of "embodied mind" is also traceable to the American contextualist or pragmatist tradition, notably John Dewey in such works as Art As Experience. Mathematics[edit] According to Lakoff, even mathematics is subjective to the human species and its cultures: Lakoff and Rafael E. The philosophy of mathematics ought therefore to look to the current scientific understanding of the human body as a foundation ontology , and abandon self-referential attempts to ground the operational components of mathematics in anything other than "meat". Lakoff claims that these errors have been corrected in subsequent printings[citation needed]. Although their book attempts a refutation of some of the most widely accepted viewpoints in philosophy of mathematics and advice for how the field might proceed, they have yet to elicit much of a reaction from philosophers of mathematics themselves. Therefore, we cannot "tell" that mathematics is "out there" without relying on conceptual metaphors rooted in our biology. This claim bothers those who believe that there really is a way we

could "tell". The falsifiability of this claim is perhaps the central problem in the cognitive science of mathematics , a field that attempts to establish a foundation ontology based on the human cognitive and scientific process. He almost always discusses the latter in terms of the former. Moral Politics , revisited in gives book-length consideration to the conceptual metaphors that Lakoff sees as present in the minds of American " liberals " and " conservatives ". The book is a blend of cognitive science and political analysis. Lakoff makes an attempt to keep his personal views confined to the last third of the book, where he explicitly argues for the superiority of the liberal vision. Both, he claims, see governance through metaphors of the family. Conservatives would subscribe more strongly and more often to a model that he calls the " strict father model " and has a family structured around a strong, dominant "father" government , and assumes that the "children" citizens need to be disciplined to be made into responsible "adults" morality, self-financing. Once the "children" are "adults", though, the "father" should not interfere with their lives: In contrast, Lakoff argues that liberals place more support in a model of the family, which he calls the " nurturant parent model ", based on "nurturant values", where both "mothers" and "fathers" work to keep the essentially good "children" away from "corrupting influences" pollution, social injustice, poverty, etc. Lakoff says that most people have a blend of both metaphors applied at different times, and that political speech works primarily by invoking these metaphors and urging the subscription of one over the other. Lakoff insists that liberals must cease using terms like partial birth abortion and tax relief because they are manufactured specifically to allow the possibilities of only certain types of opinions. Tax relief for example, implies explicitly that taxes are an affliction, something someone would want "relief" from. To use the terms of another metaphoric worldview, Lakoff insists, is to unconsciously support it. Liberals must support linguistic think tanks in the same way that conservatives do if they are going to succeed in appealing to those in the country who share their metaphors. Among his activities with the Institute, which concentrates in part on helping liberal candidates and politicians with re-framing political metaphors, Lakoff has given numerous public lectures and written accounts of his message from Moral Politics. Know Your Values and Frame the Debate, self-labeled as "the Essential Guide for Progressives", was published in September and features a foreword by former Democratic presidential candidate Howard Dean. Lakoff states that he explicitly rejects cognitive relativism, arguing that he is "a realist, both about how the mind works and how the world works. Given that the mind works by frames and metaphors, the challenge is to use such a mind to accurately characterize how the world works. The Little Blue Book:

Chapter 8 : The "Criminal" Metaphor in the Libertarian Tradition -

Thanksgiving Metaphors: "A Lot On My Plate" The phrase "a lot on my plate" is used almost interchangeably with "a lot on my mind". Does this suggest that the mind is a separable platter that the conscious feeds from?

I will introduce two notions related to metaphor that seem to me to be especially promising in this task: Americans are members of groups that have more or less social power; they belong to different ethnic groups; they live in geographical regions that leave their mark on the groups of people inhabiting the region; they pursue similar jobs with many other people; they observe certain customs and conventions in particular situations in which they communicate with others; and, of course, they all have their own idiosyncrasies as individual human beings. These divisions of the complexities of social and cultural life are well known to sociologists, anthropologists, and others. They are also well known to sociolinguists who study variation in the use of language. All of these scholars point out that languages reveal a great deal of variation according to these and other divisions of society. They also tell us that languages vary because the experiences of the people divided by these dimensions of experience vary. Indeed, this will be my hypothesis in the present paper. I will suggest that an obvious place to look for variation in metaphor in American culture are the social, cultural, stylistic, individual, etc. The social dimension Social dimensions include the differentiation of society into men and women, young and old, middle-class and working class, and so forth. Do men, the young, or the middle-class in American society use different metaphors than women, the old, or the working-class? At present we do not have the relevant studies from a cognitive linguistic perspective. But we do have some indication that some of these social factors might produce variation in metaphorical conceptualization. One example of this is the men-woman dimension. This dimension seems to be operative in several distinct cases: In American English, it is common for men to use expressions such as bunny, kitten, bird, chick, cookie, dish, sweetie pie, and many others, of women. These metaphorical expressions assume certain conceptual metaphors: However, when women talk about men, they do not appear to use these metaphors of men, or use them in a more limited way. Men are not called bunnies or kittens by women. Men thought of the frontier as a virgin land to be taken, whereas women as a garden to be cultivated. Based on her careful examination of hundreds of literary and non-literary documents in the period, Kolodny concludes: Later, they [the women] eagerly embraced the open and rolling prairies of places like Illinois and Texas as a garden ready-made. Avoiding for a time male assertions of a rediscovered Eden, women claimed the frontiers as a potential sanctuary for an idealized domesticity. They dreamed, more modestly, of locating a home and a familial human community within a cultivated garden. The general point of these examples is this: A language community may employ differential metaphorical conceptualization along a social division that is relevant in that society. As we saw above, the particular division of members of a society into men and women may be reflected in various ways of differentially treating men and women in metaphorical language and thought. We can perhaps hypothesize that the more varied these ways are, the more important or entrenched the particular division is. Furthermore, it makes sense to believe that when a particular metaphorical conceptualization is linguistically obligatory for all the participants of the division e. The ethnic dimension Metaphorical conceptualization appears to vary from ethnic group to ethnic group in American society and this factor can also possibly combine with various social factors, such as men-women, working class-middle class. One would expect that variation along the ethnic dimension should especially be noticeable in societies with highly segregated ethnic groups. Another interesting aspect of the ethnic factor is to see whether and how the metaphors that have been created by a particular ethnic group become integrated into another group, and why. The answers to these questions could be used as the first steps to a sociology and sociolinguistics of metaphor in the cognitive linguistic paradigm. The following is a sample from a more extended conversation taken from Kochman, The example demonstrates the social relevance of metaphorical creativity. The success of the participants depends on verbal and conceptual skills in producing metaphorical imagery at the expense of the other. In other words, in this particular speaking style that is characteristic of certain segments of African-American youth culture metaphorical creativity is emphasized and is a precondition for success. The

regional dimension It seems that regional varieties of the same language also reveal metaphor variation. Regional varieties can be national or local dialects. One would expect certain differences of metaphorical patterns in both. To the best of my knowledge, there has been no work done on the issue in local varieties. There has been some work done on national varieties. We can observe differences in metaphorical conceptualization in national dialects. This has several aspects: Both expressions are motivated by the same conceptual metaphor, but the actual linguistic expressions differ. There are a large number of metaphorical expressions used in British English that originated in American English. The English spoken in Britain was carried to North America by the settlers. Among several others, Baugh and Cable provide a useful comment: He [the American] is perhaps at his best when inventing simple homely words like apple butter, sidewalk, and lightning rod, spelling bee and crazy quilt, low-down, and know-nothing, or when striking off a terse metaphor like log rolling, wire pulling, to have an ax to grind, to be on the fence. The American early manifested the gift, which he continues to show, of the imaginative, slightly humorous phrase. To it we owe to bark up the wrong tree, to face the music, fly off the handle, go on the warpath, bury the hatchet, come out at the little end of the horn, saw wood, and many more, with the breath of the country and sometimes of the frontier about them. In this way, the American began his contributions to the English language, It is an open question whether metaphors are used differentially along these dimensions or factors. Some examples seem to suggest that some, or maybe most, of the factors can be regarded as dimensions along which metaphors vary. Let us take subject matter or topic as our illustration of the point. Jean Aitchison noted that it commonly occurs that in newspaper articles and headlines about American football games the names of the teams may select particular metaphors for defeat and victory. Here are some examples from Aitchison Metaphors used in these sentences are selected on the basis of the names of football teams. Since beavers live in water, defeat can be metaphorically viewed as drowning; since cowboys corral cattle, the opponent can be corralled; since navy ships can be torpedoed, the opponent can be torpedoed, too; and since rice can be cooked, the same process can be used to describe the defeat of the opponent. The metaphors in the above sentences indicate that the target domain of defeat can be variously expressed as drowning, corralling, etc. The subcultural dimension Subcultures often define themselves in contradistinction to mainstream culture and, often, they can in part be defined by the metaphors they use. And sometimes the self-definition of a subculture involves the unique metaphorical conceptualization of important concepts on which the separateness of the subculture is based. Some of the most obvious subcultures consist of closely-knit religious groups. The tight cohesion of the group often assumes the acceptance of core values and key ideas that are based on particular conceptual metaphors. Let us briefly examine one of these groups as described by American anthropologist Victor Balaban If they behave in ways that do not suggest this notion of agency, they are regarded as mentally and emotionally unstable. The notion that a person must exhibit agency with coherent intentions in his behavior leads to an understanding of mental illness: People who lack agency with coherent intentions are mentally unstable or deranged. Now some religious subcultures in American society work under the communicative pressure of reducing their agency by reason of being members of the subculture. However, if they do that, they are branded by mainstream society as being mentally unstable. One such group is the people who regularly attend a Marian apparition site. These pilgrims give accounts of miraculous signs that they have experienced. At their meetings, they tell each other about the divine events that happened to them, the miraculous visions and thoughts they had, etc. They give accounts of knowledge that comes from outside their selves; they do not function as agents in the thoughts that they experienced. The knowledge that they possess comes from an outside agent. But they have to face a problem here: A lack of coherent agency indicates in mainstream American society that a person is mentally unstable. For this reason, the pilgrims to the Marian apparition site must conform to two contradictory pressures. In the words of Balaban How can this dilemma be resolved? The pilgrims have to use language that simultaneously presents them as nonvolitional speakers to maintain the view of the divine nature of their experiences and, at the same time, as reliable sources of authentic knowledge to maintain the view that they are not unstable. What specific linguistic devices can accomplish this complicated task? Balaban suggests the hypothesis that a very important device that they use for this purpose is nonvisual metaphors for knowledge. Seeing is a perceptual domain. Other perceptual domains include taste,

touch, hearing, and smelling. Why is knowledge predominantly understood as seeing? These verbs emphasize less intellectual ways of knowledge than seeing does. The vision metaphor produces an intellectual kind of knowledge that comes from the active and focused functioning of the visual system. The active agent that is presupposed by this metaphor would be, as Balaban suggests, inappropriate for the pilgrims, who attempt to portray themselves as passive but reliable sources of their divine knowledge. To test this hypothesis, Balaban collected narratives from pilgrims in Conyers, Georgia and from the Apparition-list. Four categories of narratives were distinguished: The metaphors were then analyzed in four types of narratives. The overall result of the study was that pilgrims in Conyer used substantially more non-visual than visual metaphors, thus confirming the initial hypothesis offered by Balaban. This finding, although not conclusive, shows that pilgrims may employ more nonvisual than visual metaphor in order to meet two different cultural pressures: More generally, the study shows how the use of metaphors by subcultures may depend on sometimes contradictory pressures that influence a social group from the outside. The individual dimension It is a fairly common observation that the metaphor usage of key cultural figures, such as presidents and media stars, as well as that of writers and poets can differ markedly from one person to another. A recent illustration of this point comes from Time magazine that lists some of the metaphors that anchorman Dan Rather of CBS used in his election coverage. Here are some examples of his metaphors from Time magazine Time, November 20, I do not know whether other reporters who also come from the south use or would use the exact same metaphors to describe the election campaign. The fact that the metaphors were noted and commented on by the magazine shows that there is something unique or peculiar about them and that they are likely to characterize a particular person.

Chapter 9 : Metaphors for "Culture"

The metaphor hit me over the head and I stood alone on the platform, slightly stunned and grateful at the same time. In a few moments it was my turn. Channeling their openness, I stood while the attendant hooked me to the zipline, and then I jumped.

References and Further Reading 1. The phenomenological interpretation of metaphor, at times presented as a critique, is a radical alternative to the conventional analysis of metaphor. In this view, metaphor is none other than a kind of categorical mistake, a deviance of sense produced in order to create a lively effect. This view, first and most thoroughly articulated by Aristotle, reinforces the epistemic primacy of the literal, where metaphor can only operate as a secondary device, one which is dependent on the prior level of ordinary descriptive language, where the first-order language in itself contains nothing metaphorical. For example, Aristotle mentions, in Poetics: For the purposes of traditional rhetoric and poetics in the Aristotelian mode, metaphor may serve many purposes; it can be clever, creative, or eloquent, but never true in terms of referring to new propositional content. This is due to the restriction of comparison to substitution, such that the cognitive impact of the metaphoric transfer of meaning is produced by assuming similarities between literal and figurative domains of objects and the descriptive predicates attributed to them. The phenomenological interpretation of metaphor, however, not only challenges the substitution model, it advances the role of metaphor far beyond the limits of traditional rhetoric. They all, in slightly different ways, see figurative language as the primary vehicle for the disclosure and creation of new forms of meaning which emerge from an ontological, rather than purely epistemic or objectifying engagement with the world. His briefer descriptions of how metaphors are to be used can be found in Rhetoric and Poetics, while his extended analysis of how metaphor operates within the context of language as a whole can be inferred by reading On Interpretation together with Metaphysics. It is to be understood as a linguistic device, widely applied but remaining within the confines of rhetoric and poetry. Though it does play a central role in social persuasion, metaphor, restricted by the mechanics of similarity and substitution, does not carry with it any speculative or philosophical importance. Metaphors may point out underlying similarities between objects and their descriptive categories, and may instruct through adding liveliness and elegance to speech, but they do not refer, in the strong sense, to a form of propositional knowledge. The formal structure of substitution operates in the following manner: The metaphorical attribution occurs when certain select properties from the second entity are imposed on the first in order to characterize it in some distinctive way. Similarly, in poetry, metaphor serves not as a foundation for knowledge, but as a tool for mimesis or artistic imitation, representing the actions in epic tragedy or mythos in order to move and instruct the emotions of the audience for the purpose of catharsis. Thus, the noun-name can work as a signifier of meaning in two domains, the literal and the non-literal. However, there remains an unresolved problem: Furthermore, the denotative theory has served in support of the referential function of language, one which assumes a system of methodological connections between language, sense perceptions, mental states, and the external world. The referential relation between language and its objects serves the correspondence theory of truth, in that the truth-bearing capacity of language corresponds to valid perception and cognition of the external world. The theory assumes that these sets of correspondences allow for the consistent and reliable relation of reference between words, images, and objects. Aristotle accounts for this kind of correspondence in the following way: These states are actually likenesses isomorphisms of the external objects. Thus, names for things refer to the things themselves, mental representations of those things, and to the class-based meanings. Here, Aristotle creates a metaphor based on physical movement in order to explain metaphor. Furthermore, the transference or substitution , borrowing as it does the alien name for the thing, does not disrupt the overall unity of meaning or logical order of correspondence within the denotative system; all such movement remains within the classifications of genus and species. The metaphoric transfer of meaning will become a significant point of debate and speculation in later philosophical discussions. Although Aristotle himself does not explore the latent philosophical questions in his own theory, subsequent philosophers of language have over the years recast these issues, exploring the

challenges to meaning, reference, and correspondence that present themselves in the substitution theory. By virtue of the epiphoric movement, species and genus attributes of disparate objects fall into relations of kinship, opposition, or deviation among the various ontological categories. These relations allow for the metaphoric novelty which will subsequently fuel the development of alternative theories, those which view as fundamental to our cognitive or conceptual processes. At this point the analysis of metaphor opens up the philosophical space for further debate and interpretation. The Philosophical Issues In any theory of metaphor, there are significant philosophical implications for the transfer of meaning from one object-domain or context of associations to another. The metaphor, unlike its sister-trope the analogy, creates a new form of predication, suggesting that one category or class of objects with certain characteristics can be projected onto another separate class of entities; this projection may require a blurring of the ontological and epistemological distinctions between the kinds of objects that can be said to exist, either in the mind or in the external world. What are the perceptual and ontological connections between fire and human existence? Another problem comes to the forefront when we try to account for how metaphors enable us to think in new ways. The metaphor, understood as a new name, is conceived as a function of individual terms, rather than sentences or wider forms of discourse narratives, texts. As Continental phenomenology develops in the late 19th and 20th centuries, we are presented with radically alternative theories which obscure strict boundaries between the literal and the figurative, disrupting the connections between perception, language, and thought. Namely, the phenomenological, interactionist, and cognitive treatments of metaphor defend the view that metaphorical language and symbol serve as indirect routes to novel ways of knowing and describing human experience. In their own ways, these theories will call into question the validity and usefulness of correspondence and reference, especially in theoretical disciplines such as philosophy, theology, literature, and science. Although this article largely focuses on explicating phenomenological theories of metaphor, it should be noted that in all three theories mentioned above, metaphor is displaced from its formerly secondary position in substitution theory to occupying the front and center of our cognitive capabilities. Understood as the product of intentional structures in the mind, metaphor now becomes conceptual, rather than merely ornamental, acting as a conduit through which we take apart and re-assemble the concepts we use to describe the varieties and nuances of experience. They all share in the assumption that metaphors suggest, posit, or disclose similarities between objects and domains of experience where there seem to be none , without explicitly recognizing that a comparison is being made between two sometimes very different kinds of things or events. In doing so, he deconstructs our conventional reliance on the idea that meaningful language must reflect a system of logical correspondences. But Nietzsche boldly suggests that we are, from the outset, already in metaphor and he works from this starting point. The concepts and judgments we use to describe reality do not flatly reflect pre-existing similarities or causal relationships between themselves and our physical intuitions about reality, they are themselves metaphorical constructions; that is, they are creative forms of differentiation emerging out of a deeper undifferentiated primordiality of being. Even in his early work, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche rejects the long-held assumption that truth is an ordering of concepts expressed through rigid linguistic categories, putting forth the alternative view which gives primacy to symbol as the purest, most elemental form of representation. In the Dionysian dithyramb man is incited to the greatest exaltation of all his symbolic faculties; something never before experienced struggles for utteranceâ€"the annihilation of the veil of maya, â€¦ oneness as the soul of the race and of nature itself. The essence of nature is now to be expressed symbolically; we need a new world of symbols. They emerge through construction indirectly based in vague images or names for things, willed into being out of the unnamed flowing elements of biological existence. Even Thales the pre-Socratic, we are reminded, in his attempt to give identity to the underlying unity of all things, falls back on a conceptualization of it as water without realizing he is using a metaphor. Once we construct and begin to apply our concepts, their metaphorical origins are forgotten or concealed from ordinary awareness. The layering of metaphors, the archeological ancestors of concepts, is specifically linked to our immediate experiential capacity to transcend the proper and the individual levels of experience and linguistic signs. We cannot, argues Nietzsche, construct metaphors without breaking out of the confines of singularity, thus we must reject the artificiality of designating separate names for separate things. To assume that an

individual name would completely and transparently describe its referent in perception is to also assume that language and external experience mirror one another in some perfect way. It is rather the case that language transfers meaning from place to place. Thus the meaningful expression of the real is seen and experienced most directly in the endlessly creative activity of art and music, rather than philosophy. Taken together, these philosophers call into question the position that truth entails a relationship of correspondence between dual aspects of reality, one internal to our minds and the other external. We consider Heidegger, Ricoeur, and Derrida as the primary examples. For Heidegger, metaphoric language signals a totality or field of significance in which being discloses or reveals itself. These structures point beyond themselves in symbols and texts, serving as mediums which reveal new worlds of meaning and existential possibilities. French philosopher Jacques Derrida, on the other hand, reiterates the Nietzschean position; metaphor does not subvert metaphysics, but rather is itself the hidden source of all conceptual structures. He means to address here the former distinction made by Kant between the phenomenal appearances of the real to consciousness and the noumenal reality of the things-in-themselves. If those objects are knowable, it is because they are immediate in conscious experience. Here, the act of description is a method for avoiding a metaphysical trap: Noesis, for Husserl, achieves its aim by including within itself giving an account of the role that context or horizon plays in delineating possible objects for experience. This will have important implications for later phenomenological theories of metaphor, in that metaphors may be said intend new figurative contexts in which being appears to us in new ways. In Ideen 30 , Husserl explains how such a horizon or domain of experience presents a set of criteria for us to apply. We choose and identify an object as a single member of a class of objects, and so these regions of subjective experience, also called regions of phenomena, circumscribe certain totalities or generic unities to which concrete items belong. Drawing upon the work of Brentano and Meinong, Husserl develops a set of necessary structural relations between the knower ego , the objects of experience, and the horizon within which those objects are given. The relation is characterized in an axiomatic manner as intentionality, where the subjective consciousness and its objects are correlates brought together in a psychological act. Subjectivity contributes to and makes possible cognition; specifically, it must be the case that perception and cognition are always about something given in the stream of consciousness, they are only possible because consciousness intends or refers to these immanent objects. Communicable linguistic expressions, such as names and sentences, exist only in so far as they exhibit intentional meanings for speakers. Written or spoken expressions only carry references to objects because they have meanings for speakers and knowers. If we examine all of our mental perceptions, we find it impossible to think without intending an object of some sort. Both Continental and Anglo-American thinkers agree that metaphor holds the key to understanding these processes, as it re-organizes our senses of perception, temporality, and relation of subject to object, referring to these as subjects of existential concern and possibility. Heidegger rejects the notion that the structures of consciousness are internally maintained as transcendentally subjective and also directed towards their transcendental object. Heidegger adopts these terms for his own purposes, utilizing them to reinforce the dependence of ontological disclosure or presence: The turn to language, in this case, must be more than simple communication between persons; it is a primordial feature of subjectivity. Language is to be the interpretive medium of the understanding through which all forms of being present themselves to subjective apprehension. In this way, Heidegger replaces the transcendental version of phenomenology with the disclosive, where the structure of interpretation provides further insight into his ontological purposes of the understanding. Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics, and Metaphor The linguistic turn in phenomenology has been most directly applied to metaphor in the works of Paul Ricoeur, who revisits Husserlian and Heideggerian themes in his extensive treatment of metaphor. He extends his analysis of metaphor into a fully developed discursive theory of symbol, focusing on those found in religious texts and sacred narratives. His own views follow from what he thinks are overly limited structuralist theories of symbol, which, in essence, do not provide a theory of linguistic reference useful for his own hermeneutic project. Metaphor must then include the notion that such language is expressive and constitutive of the being of those who embark on philosophical reflection. His foundational work in The Symbolism of Evil and The Rule of Metaphor places the route to human understanding concretely, via symbolic expressions which allow for the phenomenological

constitution, reflection, and re-appropriation of experience. At various points he enters into conversation with Max Black and Nelson Goodman, among others, who also recognize the cognitive contributions to science and art found in the models and metaphors. In The Rule of Metaphor, Ricoeur, departing from Aristotle, locates the signifying power of metaphor primarily at the level of the sentence, not individual terms. Metaphor is to be understood as a discursive linguistic act which achieves its purpose through extended predication rather than simple substitution of names. Ricoeur, like so many language philosophers, argues that Aristotelian substitution is incomplete; it does not go far enough in accounting for the semantic, syntactic, logical, and ontological issues that accompany the creation of a metaphor. The standard substitution model cannot do justice to potential for metaphor create meaning by working in tandem with propositional thought-structures sentences. The discussion begins with the linguistic movement of epiphora transfer of names-predicates taken from an example in Poetics. A central dynamic exists in transposing one term, with one set of meaning-associations onto another. In this act the phenomenological space for the creation of new meaning is opened up, precisely because we cannot find a conventional word to take the place of a metaphorical word. The nameless act implies that the transfer of an alien name entails more than a simple substitution of concepts, and is therefore said to be logically disruptive. Rather, a new meaning association has been created through the semantic gap between the objects. The metaphorical statement allows us to say that an object is and is not what we usually call it. Following the movement of the Hegelian Aufhebung, through the aforementioned negation and displacement the new name has opened up a new field of meaning to be re-appropriated into our reflective consciousness. This is how Ricoeur deconstructs first-order reference in order to develop an ontology of sacred language based on second-order reference. We are led to the view that myths are modes of discourse whose meanings are phenomenological spaces of openness, creating a nearly infinite range of interpretations.