

# DOWNLOAD PDF METAPHYSICS: NEGATIVITY, POTENTIALITY AND DEATH

## Chapter 1 : Project MUSE - The Sacred and the Unspeakable: Giorgio Agamben's Ontological Politics

*Read this article on Questia. Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics Potentiality, Possibility, and the Irreversibility of Death.*

If one were to look at a tree one day, and the tree later lost a leaf, it would seem that one could still be looking at that same tree. Two rival theories to account for the relationship between change and identity are perdurantism, which treats the tree as a series of tree-stages, and endurantism, which maintains that the organism—the same tree—is present at every stage in its history. Space and time[ edit ] See also: Philosophy of space and time Objects appear to us in space and time, while abstract entities such as classes, properties, and relations do not. What then is meant by space and time such that it can serve this function as a ground for objects? Are space and time entities themselves, of some form, or must they exist prior to other entities? How exactly can they be defined? For example, if time is defined as a "rate of change" then must there always be something changing in order for time to exist? Causality Classical philosophy recognized a number of causes, including teleological future causes. In special relativity and quantum field theory the notions of space, time and causality become tangled together, with temporal orders of causations becoming dependent on who is observing them. The laws of physics are symmetrical in time, so could equally well be used to describe time as running backwards. Why then do we perceive it as flowing in one direction, the arrow of time, and as containing causation flowing in the same direction? Causality is linked by most philosophers to the concept of counterfactuals. To say that A caused B means that if A had not happened then B would not have happened. Causality is usually required as a foundation for philosophy of science, if science aims to understand causes and effects and make predictions about them. Necessity and possibility[ edit ] See also: Modal logic and Modal realism Metaphysicians investigate questions about the ways the world could have been. David Lewis, in *On the Plurality of Worlds*, endorsed a view called Concrete Modal realism, according to which facts about how things could have been are made true by other concrete worlds, just as in ours, in which things are different. Other philosophers, such as Gottfried Leibniz, have dealt with the idea of possible worlds as well. The idea of necessity is that any necessary fact is true across all possible worlds. A possible fact is true in some possible world, even if not in the actual world. For example, it is possible that cats could have had two tails, or that any particular apple could have not existed. By contrast, certain propositions seem necessarily true, such as analytic propositions, e. A less controversial view might be that self-identity is necessary, as it seems fundamentally incoherent to claim that for any x, it is not identical to itself; this is known as the law of identity, a putative "first principle". Aristotle describes the principle of non-contradiction, "It is impossible that the same quality should both belong and not belong to the same thing This is the most certain of all principles Wherefore they who demonstrate refer to this as an ultimate opinion. For it is by nature the source of all the other axioms. Cosmology and cosmogony[ edit ] See also: Cosmology metaphysics Metaphysical cosmology is the branch of metaphysics that deals with the world as the totality of all phenomena in space and time. Historically, it formed a major part of the subject alongside Ontology, though its role is more peripheral in contemporary philosophy. It has had a broad scope, and in many cases was founded in religion. The ancient Greeks drew no distinction between this use and their model for the cosmos. However, in modern times it addresses questions about the Universe which are beyond the scope of the physical sciences. It is distinguished from religious cosmology in that it approaches these questions using philosophical methods e. Cosmogony deals specifically with the origin of the universe. Modern metaphysical cosmology and cosmogony try to address questions such as: What is the origin of the Universe? What is its first cause? Is its existence necessary? Does the cosmos have a purpose? Philosophy of mind Different approaches toward resolving the mind—body problem Accounting for the existence of mind in a world otherwise composed of matter is a metaphysical problem which is so large and important as to have become a specialized subject of study in its own right, philosophy of mind. Substance dualism is a classical theory in

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which mind and body are essentially different, with the mind having some of the attributes traditionally assigned to the soul , and which creates an immediate conceptual puzzle about how the two interact. Idealism postulates that material objects do not exist unless perceived and only as perceptions. Panpsychism and panexperientialism , are property dualist theories in which everything has or is a mind rather than everything exists in a mind. For the last century, the dominant theories have been science-inspired including materialistic monism , Type identity theory , token identity theory , functionalism , reductive physicalism , nonreductive physicalism , eliminative materialism , anomalous monism , property dualism , epiphenomenalism and emergence. Determinism and free will[ edit ] See also: Determinism and Free will Determinism is the philosophical proposition that every event, including human cognition, decision and action, is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences. It holds that nothing happens that has not already been determined. The principal consequence of the deterministic claim is that it poses a challenge to the existence of free will. The problem of free will is the problem of whether rational agents exercise control over their own actions and decisions. Addressing this problem requires understanding the relation between freedom and causation, and determining whether the laws of nature are causally deterministic. Some philosophers, known as Incompatibilists , view determinism and free will as mutually exclusive. If they believe in determinism, they will therefore believe free will to be an illusion, a position known as Hard Determinism. Proponents range from Baruch Spinoza to Ted Honderich. Others, labeled Compatibilists or "Soft Determinists" , believe that the two ideas can be reconciled coherently. Adherents of this view include Thomas Hobbes and many modern philosophers such as John Martin Fischer. Incompatibilists who accept free will but reject determinism are called Libertarians , a term not to be confused with the political sense. Robert Kane and Alvin Plantinga are modern defenders of this theory. Natural and social kinds[ edit ] The earliest type of classification of social construction traces back to Plato in his dialogue Phaedrus where he claims that the biological classification system seems to "carve nature at the joints". In his essay The Analytical Language of John Wilkins , Borges makes us imagine a certain encyclopedia where the animals are divided into a those that belong to the emperor; b embalmed ones; c those that are trained; According to Quine this notion is closely related to the notion of similarity. Philosophy of mathematics There are different ways to set up the notion of number in metaphysics theories. Platonist theories postulate number as a fundamental category itself. Others consider it to be a property of an entity called a "group" comprising other entities; or to be a relation held between several groups of entities, such as "the number four is the set of all sets of four things". Many of the debates around universals are applied to the study of number, and are of particular importance due to its status as a foundation for the philosophy of mathematics and for mathematics itself. Applied metaphysics[ edit ] Although metaphysics as a philosophical enterprise is highly hypothetical, it also has practical application in most other branches of philosophy, science, and now also information technology. Such areas generally assume some basic ontology such as a system of objects, properties, classes, and spacetime as well as other metaphysical stances on topics such as causality and agency, then build their own particular theories upon these. In science for example, some theories are based on the ontological assumption of objects with properties such as electrons having charge while others may reject objects completely such as quantum field theories, where spread-out "electronness" becomes a property of spacetime rather than an object. For example, they may postulate the existence of basic entities such as value, beauty, and God respectively. Then they use these postulates to make their own arguments about consequences resulting from them. When philosophers in these subjects make their foundations they are doing applied metaphysics, and may draw upon its core topics and methods to guide them, including ontology and other core and peripheral topics. As in Science, the foundations chosen will in turn depend on the underlying ontology used, so philosophers in these subjects may have to dig right down to the ontological layer of metaphysics to find what is possible for their theories. For example, a contradiction obtained in a theory of God or Beauty might be due to an assumption that it is an object rather than some other kind of ontological entity. Relationship of metaphysics and science[ edit ] Prior to the modern history of science , scientific questions were addressed as a part of natural philosophy.

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Originally, the term "science" Latin *scientia* simply meant "knowledge". The scientific method, however, transformed natural philosophy into an empirical activity deriving from experiment, unlike the rest of philosophy. By the end of the 18th century, it had begun to be called "science" to distinguish it from philosophy. Thereafter, metaphysics denoted philosophical enquiry of a non-empirical character into the nature of existence. For example, any theory of fundamental physics is based on some set of axioms, which may postulate the existence of entities such as atoms, particles, forces, charges, mass, or fields. Stating such postulates is considered to be the "end" of a science theory. Metaphysics takes these postulates and explores what they mean as human concepts. For example, do all theories of physics require the existence of space and time, [10] objects, and properties? Or can they be expressed using only objects, or only properties? Do the objects have to retain their identity over time or do they change? Is the distinction between objects and properties fundamental to the physical world or to our perception of it? Much recent work has been devoted to analyzing the role of metaphysics in scientific theorizing. Since [13] [14] "he showed the ways in which some untestable and hence, according to Popperian ideas, non-empirical propositions can nevertheless be influential in the development of properly testable and hence scientific theories. These profound results in applied elementary logic David Hull has argued that changes in the ontological status of the species concept have been central in the development of biological thought from Aristotle through Cuvier, Lamarck, and Darwin. Whitehead is famous for creating a process philosophy metaphysics inspired by electromagnetism and special relativity. In the eighteenth century, David Hume took an extreme position, arguing that all genuine knowledge involves either mathematics or matters of fact and that metaphysics, which goes beyond these, is worthless. He concludes his *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* with the statement: If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? Commit it then to the flames: Although he followed Hume in rejecting much of previous metaphysics, he argued that there was still room for some synthetic a priori knowledge, concerned with matters of fact yet obtainable independent of experience. These included fundamental structures of space, time, and causality. He also argued for the freedom of the will and the existence of "things in themselves", the ultimate but unknowable objects of experience.

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## Chapter 2 : Metaphysics - PathfinderWiki

*Being-towards-death is the anticipation of a potentiality-for-Being of that entity whose kind of Being is anticipation itself. In the anticipatory revealing of this potentiality-for-Being, Dasein discloses itself to itself as regards its uttermost possibility.*

Physics and metaphysics Aristotle divided the theoretical sciences into three groups: He does, however, recognize the branch of philosophy now called metaphysics: In works such as *On Generation and Corruption* and *On the Heavens*, he presented a world-picture that included many features inherited from his pre-Socratic predecessors. Each element is characterized by the possession of a unique pair of the four elementary qualities of heat, cold, wetness, and dryness: Each element has a natural place in an ordered cosmos, and each has an innate tendency to move toward this natural place. Thus, earthy solids naturally fall, while fire, unless prevented, rises ever higher. As in that work, the Earth is at the centre of the universe, and around it the Moon, the Sun, and the other planets revolve in a succession of concentric crystalline spheres. The abiding value of treatises such as the *Physics* lies not in their particular scientific assertions but in their philosophical analyses of some of the concepts that pervade the physics of different eras—concepts such as place, time, causation, and determinism. Place Every body appears to be in some place, and every body at least in principle can move from one place to another. The same place can be occupied at different times by different bodies, as a flask can contain first wine and then air. So a place cannot be identical to the body that occupies it. What, then, is place? According to Aristotle, the place of a thing is the first motionless boundary of whatever body is containing it. Thus, the place of a pint of wine is the inner surface of the flask containing it—provided the flask is stationary. But suppose the flask is in motion, perhaps on a punt floating down a river. Then the wine will be moving too, from place to place, and its place must be given by specifying its position relative to the motionless river banks. As is clear from this example, for Aristotle a thing is not only in the place defined by its immediate container but also in whatever contains that container. Thus, all human beings are not only on the Earth but also in the universe; the universe is the place that is common to everything. But the universe itself is not in a place at all, since it has no container outside it. Thus, it is clear that place as described by Aristotle is quite different from space as conceived by Isaac Newton—as an infinite extension or cosmic grid see cosmos. Newtonian space would exist whether or not the material universe had been created. For Aristotle, if there were no bodies, there would be no place. The continuum Spatial extension, motion, and time are often thought of as continua—as wholes made up of a series of smaller parts. Aristotle develops a subtle analysis of the nature of such continuous quantities. Two entities are continuous, he says, when there is only a single common boundary between them. On the basis of this definition, he seeks to show that a continuum cannot be composed of indivisible atoms. A line, for example, cannot be composed of points that lack magnitude. Since a point has no parts, it cannot have a boundary distinct from itself; two points, therefore, cannot be either adjacent or continuous. Between any two points on a continuous line there will always be other points on the same line. Similar reasoning, Aristotle says, applies to time and to motion. Time cannot be composed of indivisible moments, because between any two moments there is always a period of time. Likewise, an atom of motion would in fact have to be an atom of rest. Moments or points that were indivisible would lack magnitude, and zero magnitude, however often repeated, can never add up to any magnitude. Any magnitude, then, is infinitely divisible. It is infinitely divisible in the sense that there is no end to its divisibility. The continuum does not have an infinite number of parts; indeed, Aristotle regarded the idea of an actually infinite number as incoherent. Motion Motion kinesis was for Aristotle a broad term, encompassing changes in several different categories. A paradigm of his theory of motion, which appeals to the key notions of actuality and potentiality, is local motion, or movement from place to place. If a body X is to move from point A to point B, it must be able to do so: When this potentiality has been realized, then X is at B. But it is then at rest and not in motion. So motion from A to B is not simply the actualization of a potential at A for

being at B. Is it then a partial actualization of that potentiality? That will not do either, because a body stationary at the midpoint between A and B might be said to have partially actualized that potentiality. One must say that motion is an actualization of a potentiality that is still being actualized. But passing through a point is not the same as being located at that point. Aristotle argues that whatever is in motion has already been in motion. If X, traveling from A to B, passes through the intermediate point K, it must have already passed through an earlier point J, intermediate between A and K. But however short the distance between A and J, that too is divisible, and so on ad infinitum. At any point at which X is moving, therefore, there will be an earlier point at which it was already moving. It follows that there is no such thing as a first instant of motion. Time For Aristotle, extension, motion, and time are three fundamental continua in an intimate and ordered relation to each other. Local motion derives its continuity from the continuity of extension, and time derives its continuity from the continuity of motion. Time, Aristotle says, is the number of motion with respect to before and after. Where there is no motion, there is no time. This does not imply that time is identical with motion: Motions, again, may be faster or slower; not so time. Indeed, it is by the time they take that the speed of motions is determined. In particular, for Aristotle, the days, months, and years are measured by observing the Sun, the Moon, and the stars upon their celestial travels. The part of a journey that is nearer its starting point comes before the part that is nearer its end. The spatial relation of nearer and farther underpins the relation of before and after in motion, and the relation of before and after in motion underpins the relation of earlier and later in time. Matter Change, for Aristotle, can take place in many different categories. Local motion, as noted above, is change in the category of place. Change in the category of quantity is growth or shrinkage, and change in the category of quality e. When a substance undergoes a change of quantity or quality, the same substance remains throughout. But does anything persist when one kind of thing turns into another? He says, By matter, I mean what in itself is neither of any kind nor of any size nor describable by any of the categories of being. For it is something of which all these things are predicated, and therefore its essence is different from that of all the predicates. An entity that is not of any kind, size, or shape and of which nothing at all can be said may seem highly mysterious, but this is not what Aristotle has in mind. It is not in itself of any particular size, because it can grow or shrink; it is not in itself water or steam, because it is both of these in turn. But this does not mean that there is any time at which it is not of any size or any time at which it is neither water nor steam nor anything else. Ordinary life provides many examples of pieces of matter changing from one kind to another. A bottle containing a pint of cream may be found, after shaking, to contain not cream but butter. The stuff that comes out of the bottle is the same as the stuff that went into it; nothing has been added and nothing taken away. But what comes out is different in kind from what went in. It is from cases such as this that the Aristotelian notion of matter is derived. For Aristotle, the form of a particular thing is not separate chōrasta from the thing itself—any form is the form of some thing. A substantial form is a second substance species or kind considered as a universal; the predicate human, for example, is universal as well as substantial. Thus, Socrates is human may be described as predicating a second substance of a first substance Socrates or as predicating a substantial form of a first substance. Whereas substantial forms correspond to the category of substance, accidental forms correspond to categories other than substance; they are nonsubstantial categories considered as universals. Socrates is wise, for example, may be described as predicating a quality wise of a first substance or as predicating an accidental form of a first substance. Substantial forms, in contrast, cannot be gained or lost without changing the nature of the substance of which they are predicated. In the propositions above, wise is an accidental form and human a substantial form; Socrates could survive the loss of the former but not the loss of the latter. When a thing comes into being, neither its matter nor its form is created. When one manufactures a bronze sphere, for example, what comes into existence is not the bronze or the spherical shape but the shaped bronze. Similarly in the case of the human Socrates. But the fact that the forms of things are not created does not mean that they must exist independently of matter, outside space and time, as Plato maintained. The bronze sphere derives its shape not from an ideal Sphere but from its maker, who introduces form into the appropriate matter in the process of his

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work. Thus, Aristotle reverses the question asked by Plato: Matter, not form, is the principle of individuation. Causation In several places Aristotle distinguishes four types of cause, or explanation. First, he says, there is that of which and out of which a thing is made, such as the bronze of a statue. This is called the material cause. The fourth and last type of cause is the end or goal of a thing—that for the sake of which a thing is done. In these cases, in fact, formal and final causes coincide, the mature realization of natural form being the end to which the activities of the organism tend. The growth and development of the various parts of a living being, such as the root of a tree or the heart of a sheep, can be understood only as the actualization of a certain structure for the purpose of performing a certain biological function. Whenever Aristotle explains the meaning of being, he does so by explaining the sense of the Greek verb to be. Being contains whatever items can be the subjects of true propositions containing the word is, whether or not the is is followed by a predicate. Thus, both Socrates is and Socrates is wise say something about being.

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## Chapter 3 : Adorno's Negativity: Suffering Devoid of Sense, Sense Without Suffering

*The negative criterion Actuality and Potentiality. In Metaphysics I–, Aristotle introduces the distinction between matter and form synchronically.*

Bibliography INTRODUCTION Humanity throughout the ages have seen death as something loathsome and gruesome; something dreadful, something preferable to avoid at all cost--that is, if a choice were given--but without any other option, are forced to succumb for lack of any power over its occurrence. Anticipating the termination of life at an unexpected moment and the possible prospect of annihilation of self-identity, humanity views death as a state or condition to be feared. This fear is sustained when all around, most of the dying are seen to seemingly suffer in anguish and in agony in the death process. Knowing the true nature of death releases man from his bondage to his fears and to the clinging of his varied superstitions pertaining to it. Such knowledge based upon personal experience may be acquired--beliefs to the contrary places an illusory boundary upon the unfolding soul. The identification of the Self with the physical form misleads one into thinking that the dissolution of the physical body results in the annihilation of the Self. Sri Sankaracharya, the eminent exponent of Advaita Vedanta, taught that the deluded mind with its beliefs in the reality of form causes bondage to Maya, or Cosmic Illusion. Philosophically speaking, this is the state of duality, and unless man perceives the One Reality underlying the dualistic worlds, and as his true nature, he lives in fear and in a state of slavery. What is Real cannot be destroyed, what is unreal does not exist apart from our false perception and understanding. This is avidya, or ignorance. To apprehend the true state of things is to be truly liberated from death. What Bailey does not mention is that the soul-process of "death" may be experienced in the meditative state. Mystics call this "dying while living," and advanced mystics have reached a state where they may predetermine and trigger the time and process of their physical and mystical deaths--these are executed with divine permission. Mystical deaths offers one the opportunity to acquire the beautiful vision called Marifatullah by Islamic gnostics. We will not dwell on this mystical aspect in this paper but focus more on the physical side of death and dying. Before continuing further, let us first provide a definition of the branch of study dealing with death. The study is properly termed, "Thanatology" from Greek thanatos, "death". The Encyclopedia Britannica explains it thus: Generally, psychologists have agreed that there are two overall concepts concerning death that help in understanding the simultaneous processes of living and dying. The "my death versus your death" concept emphasizes the irrational belief that while "your death" is a certainty, an exemption may be made in "my case. Death itself is defined in dictionaries as "an extinction of life," the "ceasing to be. Death has always been a taboo subject in unenlightened social circles. They paint horrible conditions of the after-death state, ranging from eternal punishment and torture in fashions exceeding the cruelties and atrocities of the Inquisition, to the materialistic view of nihilism and annihilation. Religion and the academic institutions offer no real comfort or solace to those whose loved ones have faced the great change. The only recourse for individuals seeking a greater understanding of death is by acquiring metaphysical knowledge concerning its nature and by developing a greater awareness of multi-dimensional life; for life simply is, it cannot cease to be. Life is Real and eternal for it is not compounded. Forms are compounded, therefore, they are evanescent. In order to be relieved from suffering in the form of bereavement and anguish, humanity as a whole would have to be re-educated as to the true nature of death, its value, its process, and regarding the state of life after the great transition. Concomitant to this cleansing process of the mind of its false beliefs and notions concerning death--both the result of social conditioning and brainwashing--there should also be a search, an investigation into the true purpose of life. It is said that to die well we must first learn to live well, and this is true, for our negative karma and our wrong attitudes and apprehension of death causally leads us to pain and suffering in the bardo, the death process--of which we will deal in later chapters. For this reason it is incumbent upon us all to embark upon the study of thanatology--the science of death, as understood by metaphysics, to live a worthwhile life, to relieve the sense of suffering, and

to efface our misgivings regarding death and the after-death state. Death is simply a transformation, a process analogous to a caterpillar-turned-butterfly through metamorphosis. Our "fate" and experiences in the afterlife and in the death process are both determined largely by our karma, beliefs, knowledge or lack of it, purity, righteousness, and understanding of the mission and purpose of our sojourn in the physical plane. Life in this physical dimension should be seen as an opportunity to mature and to liberate oneself from all mortal restrictions even though functioning through an organic vessel. Some people experiencing the vicissitudes and hardships of life often complain that it was not their wish to be born, implying that it was not their wish to live or to be here in this physical world, and yet, in this they contradict themselves by expressing a fear of death, saying that they do not wish to die--implying that they wish to live. Such inconsistencies reflect the state of non-awareness of spiritual realities and verities. Death should be perceived as an initiation into the higher mysteries of Nature. In ancient cultures, the existence of the afterlife was taken for granted. In former eras there have been concepts or beliefs in the afterlife such as the "Happy Hunting Grounds" "Olympus" and the "Elysian Fields. Mainstream science, although faced with many positive data concerning the survival of the consciousness acquired by researchers in the paranormal and related fields, still express incredulity as to its reality. Why is it that the life-force, soul, and consciousness are not seen by these scientists as energy-fields, just as all objects down to their minuscule component, the electrons, protons and neutrons are known to be such? More succinctly, why do scientists not recognize the soul? Is it, perhaps, because of the unconscious opposition and antagonism towards Religion that has long persecuted Science in the centuries past? From the occult point of view, group minds form living entities or currents of energy with certain qualities in accord with the thoughts and feelings generated by the originators or individuals of the same group-mind. This is called an egregore. Such egregores may have an indefinite life span, living for centuries, and influencing all that comes within its mental and emotional force fields. It is through these egregores that an individual, a scientist, for instance, living in the distant past may influence a scientist living in the present. Prejudicial feelings toward Religion and its tenets, such as its declaration of the living soul that survives the dissolution of the physical body, may therefore, be carried from the past to the present. As can be understood from the above, the antagonism of scientists may not be truly directed to the concept of the afterlife, or soul-survival, but towards religion as a whole, and this discord is an unconscious feeling--the result of centuries of maltreatment in the hands of Religion--executed in the name of the Almighty. Investigators and exponents of mainstream science, however, have not proved in their laboratories the cessation of life, and the non-survival of consciousness after death. On the contrary, they are very close to discovering and proving its reality and validity. Without personal experience there would be an element of doubt, the truth would elude our comprehension, and the false delude our understanding. Knowledge pertaining to the the truth of death eliminates fear, pain and sorrow. When one understands the nature and mechanism of life and death, one begins to lead a philosophical and mystical life, open to spiritual verities and impressions. One commences to live in harmony with the forces and laws of Nature, in accord with the purposes of the Divine Plan. Scientists would have to become philosophers and mystics in order to break through any bias constraining their minds from the truth of life after death. It is a fallacy to think that the nature of death and the afterlife state cannot be known while one is embodied and functioning in the three-dimensional sphere. Religious fundamentalism, in general, would have us believe this. Man dies temporarily every night during the sleep-state, and he calls his activities during such a state as "dreams. Spiritual development improves the recollection of astral activities and the awareness of the "no-dream" state. Refinement of the soul disperses the etheric web at the crown chakra and forms a link between the brain and higher mind allowing for free movement of the personal-consciousness to higher dimensions without a break in awareness. Fundamentally, the only difference between death and the sleep-state is that death is the permanent evacuation of the awareness-principle from the physical body, whereas in sleep it is merely a temporary condition. In death the sutratma, or silver cord, snaps, and the personal-consciousness leaves the physical body to disintegrate and return to the ground from whence it came. In the sleep state, this cord which connects the physical body to the

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subtle bodies is maintained. Essentially, death is an illusion. Death is actually an interval between two states or planes of consciousness. It eventuates in the return of every component of the microcosm to its proper place. This truth is embodied in the poetic verse of Ovid: This is accomplished in what has come to be called lucid dreaming and astral projection, or "OBE" out-of-the-body experience as a modern designation for the phenomenon. Paul, it is possible for all of us to say that we "knew a man who went to the third heaven," and hear of things not suitable for the non-initiate. Death is a change of focus of our consciousness, from one plane to another. This is also accomplished through the above means. Astral projection is an ability that all metaphysicians should seek to acquire--for it is educational and it opens-up avenues of services that one may render. Most, if not all mystical traditions teach of this occult ability. The practitioner of Taoist Yoga, for instance, learns in the course of his studies how to separate the soul and spirit from the physical body. Advance mystics and occultists are all able to function in full awareness in the physical, astral and mental worlds. Such individuals are not concerned with the arguments of materialists--arguments stating the non-survival of self, for every mystic knows the truth of the matter through personal experience. Dying, to the initiate, is a science and an art. The technique of death is known to the inter-dimensional consciousness-traveller. The psychonaut is familiar with the many phases of the bardo that leads to one of the "six realms," or to liberation from the cycle of reincarnation. It is the reality of reincarnation that proves to us that we are no stranger to death. We incarnate and pass through the change of death repeatedly until we emancipate ourselves from the wheel of birth and rebirth. We have all met the angel of death countless times and shall meet that specter once again in the future. All religions refer to this life-death cycle, though some metaphorically. Every metaphysician should be familiar with the subject of death, as understood in the esoteric sense, and as to its occult process. The metaphysician should be able to offer the kind of solace that goes beyond the service of the burial ceremony and the pronouncement of the words, "ashes to ashes, dust to dust. He should play the role of Anubis, guiding the departed soul to its proper place. This should be an integral part to any last rites or sacraments given. There is much superstition, fear and ignorance regarding the nature of death among the masses. It, therefore, behooves the metaphysical counselor to play his or her part in enlightening society; and this ministration would benefit humanity as a whole. We feel that this paper should be written to remind metaphysicians of the importance of conveying the truths to the masses regarding the continuity of life, personal identity, and consciousness. In order to augment or instill this sincerity and pure motive when absent, the master would speak to the candidate regarding death. The master would advise the candidate to contemplate upon the meaning of death and the opportunity that life provides. The chela is made to ask, "what is the purpose of life if death cuts us down at our prime, leaving us with ambitions, aspirations and unfulfilled dreams? What is the purpose of life--and death, if we are not able to take along with us through the portals of death our prized possessions, our titles, our fame, our temporal power? Earthly acquisitions fail to offer any help to the one undergoing transition. We each face death alone; and in death, stripped of all mundane superficialities, we come to realize our own true worth. And so, the chela, with perhaps impure motives at the outset, comes to understand after some spiritual guidance, and a prolonged contemplation and analysis of death--as related to life--that the aim, purpose, importance and goal of personal existence in this physical sphere with its many opportunities are for gaining freedom, perfection, salvation, enlightenment, and the ascension. We should all be aware that death may come to us at any moment, this will motivate us to direct our minds into proper perspectives, and to get our priorities straight.

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## Chapter 4 : Aristotle - Wikipedia

*Catherine Mill's critical introduction covers the full range of Agamben's work, presenting his key concerns - metaphysics, language and potentiality, aesthetics and poetics, sovereignty, law and biopolitics, ethics and testimony - as well as his powerful vision of post-historical humanity.*

Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity Published: However, the whole is only the essence completing itself through its own development. Even if we assume that making Hegel more plausible to a wider audience is one of our goals, that goal seems no longer to be well-served by arguing against metaphysics. Brady Bowman frames his account as part of this pro-metaphysical counter-wave, The ambition of the account, and its complexity, comes out in the following description: Ultimately, the structure of the Concept and the dynamic of absolute negation serve to integrate the two great models from which post-Kantian philosophers drew their inspiration: They do so by supporting a unified account of the source of determinacy in nature and intentionality, that is, by identifying a single structure that is at once the structure of being and the structure of thought. Just when I would find myself thinking the interpretation was one-sided, he would introduce complexities that demonstrate his grasp of the alternatives. Bowman is also keenly aware of the communicative perils of Hegel interpretation "Some reader are sure to find observations like this akin to numerology and about as meaningful" ; "One has to be very careful in expressing this relation since at this level of abstraction it is easy to stray into nonsense. He builds on the work of previous commentators, but always discharges the burden of making the points intelligible in his own voice. He writes that "the logic of absolute negativity" is "the generative dynamic that gives rise to the structure of the Concept" This is "autonomous negation" because Hegel "ceases to view it as fundamentally standing in complementary correlation to affirmation" According to this idea, negation can be indeed must be applied to itself, and in the process it generates an internal structure of identity and difference. In the following, Bowman describes a potential problem with this idea, and its solution: Qua self-relating negation, autonomous negation immediately gives rise to a positive term affirmation, being to which it stands in an external relation, that is, a relation-to-other. Absolute negativity takes a back seat for much of the next four chapters, as Bowman delves into the specific criticisms of pre-Kantian metaphysics and the domains of "finite cognition. Bowman takes this to imply that Hegel is "a radical skeptic" about what we ordinarily call knowledge. Jacobi alleges that 1 the essential role of tautologies "identical propositions" in demonstrative reasoning, 2 the primacy of relations over intrinsic properties or qualities, and 3 the closely related primacy of the whole over the parts semantic and especially metaphysical holism are what entail fatalism and nihilism. And the Hegelian absolute. Bowman thus insists that Hegel does find a place for the finite: The discussion here is difficult but illuminating, as Bowman guides us through the dialectic of these two kinds of reality in their relation to each other. One helpful way of looking at Hegelian speculative science is to see it as starting with a certain analysis of the "logic" of knowing i. The language of positing is also central in the following conclusion: The Hegel that emerges on this reading thus clearly subscribes to idealism, though a "non-psychological" idealism that is compatible with metaphysical structural realism. I turn now to raise some questions about the argument. As autonomous, it seems that absolute negativity is supposed to be a first principle, a ground from which everything else flows. The bulk of his writings concern finite objects and finite cognition, and the arrival at the "Absolute Idea," when according to Bowman we finally get beyond finite cognition, consists mainly of a discussion of the method by which the forms of finite cognition have been interpreted to form a systematic whole. In that context, Bowman writes, "the perennial recurrence of a self-external, finite content. This seems basically right to me, except that it is rather confusing to call the finite the foundation of cognition, especially after calling Hegel a radical skeptic of the finite. The judgment-inference relation is perhaps the key to making sense of how the infinite the inference as the form of reason is built on the "foundation" of the finite the judgment as the form of the understanding. It could be reformulated as the claim that the real is just what it

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can be known to be through finite cognition. Perhaps one could make the case that only a metaphysical argument could get us to this claim about the original determinacy of substance, but then I start wondering whether the self-negating character of such an argument practice metaphysics in order to undermine the metaphysical separation of being and finite thought is compatible with the kind of robust metaphysics that Bowman aims to establish. There is a different sense of metaphysics that would align it closely with semantics, a sense in which metaphysics is about ultimate intelligibility or sense-making. But any well-focused book on Hegel has to leave many topics out of consideration. *The Satisfaction of Self-consciousness*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, , p.

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## Chapter 5 : The Metaphysical View of Death and Life After Death

*Chapter One - Metaphysics- Negativity, Potentiality and Death 9 Chapter Two - Aesthetics- Language, Representation and the Object*

Metaphysics substance, cause, form, potentiality Nicomachean Ethics soul, happiness, virtue, friendship Eudemian Ethics Politics best states, utopias, constitutions, revolutions Rhetoric elements of forensic and political debate Poetics tragedy, epic poetry 3. From their perspective, logic and reasoning was the chief preparatory instrument of scientific investigation. Aristotle himself, however, uses the term "logic" as equivalent to verbal reasoning. They seem to be arranged according to the order of the questions we would ask in gaining knowledge of an object. For example, we ask, first, what a thing is, then how great it is, next of what kind it is. Substance is always regarded as the most important of these. Substances are further divided into first and second: Notions when isolated do not in themselves express either truth or falsehood: The elements of such a proposition are the noun substantive and the verb. The combination of words gives rise to rational speech and thought, conveys a meaning both in its parts and as a whole. The truth or falsity of propositions is determined by their agreement or disagreement with the facts they represent. Thus propositions are either affirmative or negative, each of which again may be either universal or particular or undesignated. A definition, for Aristotle is a statement of the essential character of a subject, and involves both the genus and the difference. To get at a true definition we must find out those qualities within the genus which taken separately are wider than the subject to be defined, but taken together are precisely equal to it. For example, "prime," "odd," and "number" are each wider than "triplet" that is, a collection of any three items, such as three rocks ; but taken together they are just equal to it. The genus definition must be formed so that no species is left out. Having determined the genus and species, we must next find the points of similarity in the species separately and then consider the common characteristics of different species. Definitions may be imperfect by 1 being obscure, 2 by being too wide, or 3 by not stating the essential and fundamental attributes. Obscurity may arise from the use of equivocal expressions, of metaphorical phrases, or of eccentric words. All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal. The syllogistic form of logical argumentation dominated logic for 2, years until the rise of modern propositional and predicate logic thanks to Frege, Russell, and others. Aristotle begins by sketching the history of philosophy. For Aristotle, philosophy arose historically after basic necessities were secured. It grew out of a feeling of curiosity and wonder, to which religious myth gave only provisional satisfaction. The earliest speculators i. Thales, Anaximenes, Anaximander were philosophers of nature. The Pythagoreans succeeded these with mathematical abstractions. The level of pure thought was reached partly in the Eleatic philosophers such as Parmenides and Anaxagoras, but more completely in the work of Socrates. For Aristotle, the subject of metaphysics deals with the first principles of scientific knowledge and the ultimate conditions of all existence. More specifically, it deals with existence in its most fundamental state i. This can be contrasted with mathematics which deals with existence in terms of lines or angles, and not existence as it is in itself. In its universal character, metaphysics superficially resembles dialectics and sophistry. However, it differs from dialectics which is tentative, and it differs from sophistry which is a pretence of knowledge without the reality. The axioms of science fall under the consideration of the metaphysician insofar as they are properties of all existence. Aristotle argues that there are a handful of universal truths. Against the followers of Heraclitus and Protagoras, Aristotle defends both the laws of contradiction, and that of excluded middle. He does this by showing that their denial is suicidal. Carried out to its logical consequences, the denial of these laws would lead to the sameness of all facts and all assertions. It would also result in an indifference in conduct. Plato tried to solve the same question by positing a universal and invariable element of knowledge and existence -- the forms -- as the only real permanent besides the changing phenomena of the senses. Forms are not causes of movement and alteration in the physical objects of sensation. However, the forms place knowledge outside of particular things. Further, to

suppose that we know particular things better by adding on their general conceptions of their forms, is about as absurd as to imagine that we can count numbers better by multiplying them. Finally, if forms were needed to explain our knowledge of particular objects, then forms must be used to explain our knowledge of objects of art; however, Platonists do not recognize such forms. However, that substance of a particular thing cannot be separated from the thing itself. Further, aside from the jargon of "participation," Plato does not explain the relation between forms and particular things. In reality, it is merely metaphorical to describe the forms as patterns of things; for, what is a genus to one object is a species to a higher class, the same idea will have to be both a form and a particular thing at the same time. In the *Metaphysics*, though, it frequently inclines towards realism that is, substance has a real existence in itself. We are also struck by the apparent contradiction in his claims that science deals with universal concepts, and substance is declared to be an individual. In any case, substance is for him a merging of matter into form. The term "matter" is used by Aristotle in four overlapping senses. First, it is the underlying structure of changes, particularly changes of growth and of decay. Secondly, it is the potential which has implicitly the capacity to develop into reality. Thirdly, it is a kind of stuff without specific qualities and so is indeterminate and contingent. Fourthly, it is identical with form when it takes on a form in its actualized and final phase. It was intended to solve the difficulties which earlier thinkers had raised with reference to the beginnings of existence and the relations of the one and many. There are four causes: Take, for example, a bronze statue. Its material cause is the bronze itself. Its efficient cause is the sculptor, insofar as he forces the bronze into shape. The formal cause is the idea of the completed statue. The final cause tends to be the same as the formal cause, and both of these can be subsumed by the efficient cause. Of the four, it is the formal and final which is the most important, and which most truly gives the explanation of an object. The final end purpose, or teleology of a thing is realized in the full perfection of the object itself, not in our conception of it. Final cause is thus internal to the nature of the object itself, and not something we subjectively impose on it. To Aristotle, God is the first of all substances, the necessary first source of movement who is himself unmoved. God is a being with everlasting life, and perfect blessedness, engaged in never-ending contemplation. Philosophy of Nature Aristotle sees the universe as a scale lying between the two extremes: The passage of matter into form must be shown in its various stages in the world of nature. It is important to keep in mind that the passage from form to matter within nature is a movement towards ends or purposes. Everything in nature has its end and function, and nothing is without its purpose. Everywhere we find evidences of design and rational plan. No doctrine of physics can ignore the fundamental notions of motion, space, and time. Motion is the passage of matter into form, and it is of four kinds: Of these the last is the most fundamental and important. Aristotle rejects the definition of space as the void. Empty space is an impossibility. Hence, too, he disagrees with the view of Plato and the Pythagoreans that the elements are composed of geometrical figures. Space is defined as the limit of the surrounding body towards what is surrounded. Time is defined as the measure of motion in regard to what is earlier and later. It thus depends for its existence upon motion. If there were no change in the universe, there would be no time. Since it is the measuring or counting of motion, it also depends for its existence on a counting mind. If there were no mind to count, there could be no time. After these preliminaries, Aristotle passes to the main subject of physics, the scale of being. The first thing to notice about this scale is that it is a scale of values. What is higher on the scale of being is of more worth, because the principle of form is more advanced in it. Species on this scale are eternally fixed in their place, and cannot evolve over time. The higher items on the scale are also more organized. Further, the lower items are inorganic and the higher are organic. The principle which gives internal organization to the higher or organic items on the scale of being is life, or what he calls the soul of the organism. Even the human soul is nothing but the organization of the body. Plants are the lowest forms of life on the scale, and their souls contain a nutritive element by which it preserves itself. Animals are above plants on the scale, and their souls contain an appetitive feature which allows them to have sensations, desires, and thus gives them the ability to move. The scale of being proceeds from animals to humans. The human soul shares the nutritive element with plants, and the appetitive element with animals, but also has a rational

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element which is distinctively our own. The details of the appetitive and rational aspects of the soul are described in the following two sections. For a fuller discussion of these topics, see the article Aristotle: Motion and its Place in Nature.

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## Chapter 6 : Aristotle - Physics and metaphysics | calendrierdelascience.com

*For this reason it is incumbent upon us all to embark upon the study of thanatology--the science of death, as understood by metaphysics, to live a worthwhile life, to relieve the sense of suffering, and to efface our misgivings regarding death and the after-death state.*

References and Further Reading 1. In this, Agamben argues that the contemporary age is marked by the destruction or loss of experience, in which the banality of everyday life cannot be experienced per se but only undergone, a condition which is in part brought about by the rise of modern science and the split between the subject of experience and of knowledge that it entails. Against this destruction of experience, which is also extended in modern philosophies of the subject such as Kant and Husserl, Agamben argues that the recuperation of experience entails a radical rethinking of experience as a question of language rather than of consciousness, since it is only in language that the subject has its site and origin. Infancy, then, conceptualizes an experience of being without language, not in a temporal or developmental sense of preceding the acquisition of language in childhood, but rather, as a condition of experience that precedes and continues to reside in any appropriation of language. Agamben continues this reflection on the self-referentiality of language as a means of transforming the link between language and metaphysics that underpins Western philosophical anthropology in *Language and Death*, originally published in 1981. While this collapse of metaphysics into ethics is increasingly evident as nihilism, contemporary thought has yet to escape from this condition. Here, Agamben draws upon the linguistic notion of deixis to isolate the self-referentiality of language in pronouns or grammatical shifters, which he argues do not refer to anything beyond themselves but only to their own utterance. The problem for Agamben, though, is that both Hegel and Heidegger ultimately maintain a split within language - which he sees as a consistent element of Western thought from Aristotle to Wittgenstein - in their identification of an ineffability or unspeakability that cannot be brought into human discourse but which is nevertheless its condition. Instead, he suggests, this is only possible in an experience of infancy that has never yet been: This is the problem of potentiality, the rethinking of which Agamben takes to be central to the task of overcoming contemporary nihilism. While this relation is central to the passage of voice to speech or signification and to attaining toward the experience of language as such, Agamben also claims that in this formulation Aristotle bequeaths to Western philosophy the paradigm of sovereignty, since it reveals the undetermined or sovereign founding of being. In this way then, the relation of potentiality to actuality described by Aristotle accords perfectly with the logic of the ban that Agamben argues is characteristic of sovereign power, thereby revealing the fundamental integration of metaphysics and politics. These reflections on metaphysics and language thus yield two inter-related problems for Agamben, which he addresses in his subsequent work; the first of these lies in the broad domain of aesthetics, in which Agamben considers the stakes of the appropriation of language in prose and poetry in order to further critically interrogate the distinction between philosophy and poetry. While dedicated to the memory of Martin Heidegger, whom Agamben here names as the last of Western philosophers within this book, also most evidently bears the influence of Aby Warburg. In order to pursue this task, Agamben develops a model of knowledge evident in the relations of desire and appropriation of an object that Freud identifies as melancholia and fetishism. Yet, Agamben argues that Derrida does not achieve the overcoming he hopes for, since he has in fact misdiagnosed the problem: Metaphysics is not simply the interpretation of presence in the fractures of essence and appearance, sensibility and intelligibility and so on. This enigmatic text is perhaps especially difficult to understand, because these fragments do not constitute a consistent argument throughout the book. In bringing into play various literary techniques such as the fable, the riddle, the aphorism and the short story, Agamben is practically demonstrating an exercise of criticism, in which thought is returned to a prosaic experience or awakening, in which what is known is representation itself. In this volume, Foucault argued that modern power was characterized by a fundamentally different rationality than that of sovereign power.

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Suggesting that Foucault has failed to elucidate the points at which sovereign power and modern techniques of power coincide, Agamben rejects the thesis that the historical rise of biopower marked the threshold of modernity. This is because in modern democracies, that which was originally excluded from politics as the exception that stands outside but nevertheless founds the law has now become the norm: For Schmitt, it is precisely in the capacity to decide on whether a situation is normal or exceptional, and thus whether the law applies or not—since the law requires a normal situation for its application—that sovereignty is manifest. Further, what is required is the inauguration of a real state of exception in order to combat the rise of Fascism, here understood as a nihilistic emergency that suspends the law while leaving it in force. In addressing this conflict between Schmitt and Benjamin, Agamben argues that in contemporary politics, the state of exception identified by Schmitt in which the law is suspended by the sovereign, has in fact become the rule. The subject of the law is simultaneously turned over to the law and left bereft by it. The importance of this distinction in Aristotle is that it allows for the relegation of natural life to the domain of the household *oikos*, while also allowing for the specificity of the good life characteristic of participation in the polis—*bios politikos*. More importantly though, for Agamben, this indicates the fact that Western politics is founded upon that which it excludes from politics—the natural life that is simultaneously set outside the domain of the political but nevertheless implicated in *bios politikos*. The question arises, then, of how life itself or natural life is politicized. The answer to this question is through abandonment to an unconditional power of death, that is, the power of sovereignty. According to Agamben, the camp is the space opened when the exception becomes the rule or the normal situation, as was the case in Germany in the period immediately before and throughout World War 2. For Aristotle, the transition from voice to language is a founding condition of political community, since speech makes possible a distinction between the just and the unjust. Hence, for Agamben, the rift or caesura introduced into the human by the definition of man as the living animal who has language and therefore politics is foundational for biopolitics; it is this disjuncture that allows the human to be reduced to bare life in biopolitical capture. In this way then, metaphysics and politics are fundamentally entwined, and it is only by overcoming the central dogmas of Western metaphysics that a new form of politics will be possible. This damning diagnosis of contemporary politics does not, however, lead Agamben to a position of political despair. Rather, it is exactly in the crisis of contemporary politics that the means for overcoming the present dangers also appear. Ethics Given this critique of the camps and the status of the law that is revealed in, but by no means limited to, the exceptional space of them, it is no surprise that Agamben takes the most extreme manifestation of the condition of the camps as a starting point for an elaboration of an ethics without reference to the law, a term that is taken to encompass normative discourse in its entirety. Taking up the problem of skepticism in relation to the Nazi concentration camps of World War II—also discussed by Jean-Francois Lyotard and others—Agamben casts *Remnants* as an attempt to listen to a lacuna in survivor testimony, in which the factual condition of the camps cannot be made to coincide with that which is said about them. The question that arises here then is what Agamben means by testimony, since it is clear that he does not use the term in the standard sense of giving an account of an event that one has witnessed. Instead, he argues that what is at stake in testimony is bearing witness to what is unsayable, that is, bearing witness to the impossibility of speech and making it appear within speech. In this way, he suggests, the human is able to endure the inhuman. As the account of subjectification and desubjectification indicates, there can be no simple appropriation of language that would allow the subject to posit itself as the ground of testimony, and nor can it simply realise itself in speaking. Instead, testimony remains forever unassumable. Against juridical accounts of responsibility that would understand it in terms of sponsorship, debt and culpability, Agamben argues that responsibility must be thought as fundamentally unassumable, as something which the subject is consigned to, but which it can never fully appropriate as its own. What Agamben means by this is particularly unclear, not least because he sees elaboration of these concepts as requiring a fundamental overturning of the metaphysical grounds of western philosophy, but also because they gesture toward a new politics and ethics that remain largely to be thought. Drawing on this figuration, Agamben appears to construe happiness as that which allows

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for the overturning of contemporary nihilism in the form of the metaphysico-political nexus of biopower. In taking up the problem of community, Agamben enters into a broader engagement with this concept by others such as Maurice Blanchot and Jean-Luc Nancy, and in the Anglo-American scene, Alphonso Lingis. The broad aim of the engagement is to develop a conception of community that does not presuppose commonality or identity as a condition of belonging. Importantly though, this entails neither a mystical communion nor a nostalgic return to a *Gemeinschaft* that has been lost; instead, the coming community has never yet been. Interestingly, Agamben argues in this elliptical text that the community and politics of whatever singularity are heralded in the event of Tianenmen square, which he. He takes this event to indicate that the coming politics will not be a struggle between states, but, instead, a struggle between the state and humanity as such, insofar as it exists in itself without expropriation in identity. States of things are irreparable, whatever they may be: How you are, how the world is—this is the irreparable. The enigma presented by the image of the righteous with animal heads appears to be that of the transformation of the relation of animal and human and the ultimate reconciliation of man with his own animal nature on the last day. But for Agamben, reflection on the enigma of the posthistorical condition of man thus presented necessitates a fundamental overturning of the metaphysico-political operations by which something like man is produced as distinct from the animal in order for its significance to be fully grasped. But how Agamben will develop this resolution and the ethico-political implications of it in large part remains to be seen.

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## Chapter 7 : Metaphysics - Wikipedia

*Beginning from Heidegger's suggestion of an essential relation between language and death, Agamben argues that Western metaphysics have been fundamentally tied to a negativity that is increasingly evident at the heart of the ethos of humanity.*

Only now we may become aware of how important it was to the generation whose grandparents have fought and suffered in the War to be confronted with living memory; and no matter how hard historians, filmmakers and writers have tried to capture these experiences for future generations, it appears that the attitude towards the Second World War will radically change, starting with the current generation of children and teenagers. With the good guys vs. Hence, we might be facing an important historical moment that asks for an intense glance at an experience that defined the generation that is slowly leaving this world – the incisive rift that the Shoah left in our own humanity and the even more dangerous rift that awaits us if we let the monstrosity decompose in cynicism. The arguably most radical formulation of the relation between the utter meaninglessness of the catastrophic event and its consequences for humanity and modernity was written down in Theodor W. Adorno's *Meditations on Schopenhauer*. In the beginning of the *Meditations*, Adorno refers to the historical experience of the Shoah and its consequences for the possibility of sense: And these feelings do have an objective side after events that make a mockery of the construction of immanence as endowed with a meaning radiated by an affirmatively posited transcendence. In this very dense passage, the themes of the *Meditations* are conjoined. First of all, Adorno speaks of a feeling that lays claim to an objective side, meaning that the experience is valid as evidentness. Second, Auschwitz as a pars pro toto for the Shoah lead to a crisis of sense, meaning not only that the deaths of its victims were senseless but also that all lives, past or present, are affected by it. While the past was not devoid of human suffering, wars have found legitimacy in many sources – honor and glory, the need for land and food, the claim for higher ideals, internal conflicts – which, in the obvious senselessness of the Shoah, sound more like excuses. It is in the unvarnished materialistic motive only that morality survives. To expose oneself mentally to the suffering of others humanizes the victims and makes us aware that while the suffering of Auschwitz might be over, there is still suffering in this world, and that by profiting from it, we are just as guilty as the ones who have profited from the evictions and expropriations that went along with the Shoah say, from inhumane conditions in certain factories nowadays thanks to which certain products become affordable. Adorno complements this correction of an approximation towards the victims with a dissociation, namely the dissociation from oneself. And the more the thinking mind suppresses this initiating urge, its fear of death, the more authoritarian its urges to control the world, leading to the instrumental reason that directly lead us to the monstrosities of WWII this is the primary topic of the *Dialectics of Enlightenment*. The pressing question is though, if such a turn will lead to the self-dissolution of thought or not. It can only escape the current crisis – not only could philosophy and bourgeois education not avert the Shoah, for Adorno and Horkheimer it directly lead to it due to instrumental reason – if human beings can decrease their distance to the others and increase the distance to themselves. No suffering has sense, ever. Emerson – Uithangende visnetten We all know that the cruelties of war come along with the dehumanization of the other. The evidentness of the objective wrongness of it, meaning the evidentness that human beings are more than things leads to the pertinent question, why it is so. Hence, such a conclusion is only possible if you exclude yourself from the danger and distance yourself from its potential and actual victims. Objective evidence follows from true experience, not from cold arguments. The core experience is: There is suffering, but there should be none. This is the starting point of true philosophy, meaning that philosophy is inherently normative. If humans are mere things and humans were destroyed as things in the Shoah, then the Shoah is the point where humanity comes to itself. This would render all critique void. Therefore, only in the possibility of the end of suffering can there still be hope for humanity. This possibility is incredibly small, it is barely conceivable. The only stance that you can take is a negative one, because

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positive utopias would once again try to give suffering a sense, while absolute nihilism not only leads to absurd and impossible conclusions that can only lead to silence and death each breath that the nihilist takes disproves him but also simply disintegrates in the most mundane of all humane gestures: And yet the lighting up of an eye, indeed the feeble tail-wagging of a dog one gave a tidbit it promptly forgets, would make the ideal of nothingness evaporate. What remains is the necessary question of why humans are more than things, and the ethical impulse that it must be so. This is not a comfortable position to be in but necessarily so. Because the only possibility of sense that we can attain for ourselves and that we can attribute to others is by striving to reduce suffering in this world. He is also a co-editor of this magazine.

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## Chapter 8 : Aristotle | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

*Metaphysics* (Greek: ἡ μετὰ τὴ φυσική; Latin: *Metaphysica*) is one of the principal works of Aristotle and the first major work of the branch of philosophy with the same name. The principal subject is "being qua being," or being insofar as it is being.

Overview[ edit ] The *Metaphysics* is considered to be one of the greatest philosophical works. Its influence on the Greeks , the Muslim philosophers , the scholastic philosophers and even writers such as Dante , was immense. According to Plato, the real nature of things is eternal and unchangeable. However, the world we observe around us is constantly and perpetually changing. What is existence, and what sorts of things exist in the world? How can things continue to exist, and yet undergo the change we see about us in the natural world? And how can this world be understood? By the time Aristotle was writing, the tradition of Greek philosophy was only two hundred years old. It had begun with the efforts of thinkers in the Greek world to theorize about the common structure that underlies the changes we observe in the natural world. Two contrasting theories, those of Heraclitus and Parmenides , were an important influence on both Plato and Aristotle. Heraclitus argued that things that appear to be permanent are in fact always gradually changing. Therefore, though we believe we are surrounded by a world of things that remain identical through time, this world is really in flux, with no underlying structure or identity. By contrast, Parmenides argued that we can reach certain conclusions by means of reason alone, making no use of the senses. What we acquire through the process of reason is fixed, unchanging and eternal. The world is not made up of a variety of things in constant flux, but of one single Truth or reality. Given, any object that changes is in an imperfect state. Then, the form of each object we see in this world is an imperfect reflection of the perfect form of the object. For example, Plato claimed a chair may take many forms, but in the perfect world there is only one perfect form of chair. Aristotle encountered the theory of forms when he studied at the Academy, which he joined at the age of about 18 in the s B. He believed that in every change there is something which persists through the change for example, Socrates , and something else which did not exist before, but comes into existence as a result of the change musical Socrates. Thus all the things around us, all substances, are composites of two radically different things: This doctrine is sometimes known as Hylomorphism from the Greek words for "matter" and "form".

Title, date, and the arrangement of the treatises[ edit ] Book 7 of the *Metaphysics*: He called the study of nature or natural philosophy "second philosophy" *Metaphysics* a The second book was given the title "little alpha," apparently because it appears to have nothing to do with the other books and, very early, it was supposed not to have been written by Aristotle or, although this is less likely, because of its shortness. This, then, disrupts the correspondence of letters to numbers, as book 2 is little alpha, book 3 is beta, and so on. For many scholars, it is customary to refer to the books by their letter names. It is possible that Aristotle did not write the books in the order in which they have come down to us; their arrangement is due to later editors, and there is little reason to think that it reflects how Aristotle himself would have arranged them. Based on a careful study of the content of the books and of the cross-references within them, W. In the 20th century two general editions have been produced by W. Ross and by W. Editing the *Metaphysics* has become an open issue in works and studies of the new millennium. Differences from their more-familiar 20th Century critical editions W. Relevant discussion may be found on the talk page. Please help improve this article by introducing citations to additional sources. June Books Î€”VI: Alpha, little Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta and Epsilon[ edit ] Book I or Alpha outlines "first philosophy", which is a knowledge of the first principles or causes of things. The wise are able to teach because they know the why of things, unlike those who only know that things are a certain way based on their memory and sensations. Because of their knowledge of first causes and principles, they are better fitted to command, rather than to obey. Book Alpha also surveys previous philosophies from Thales to Plato, especially their treatment of causes. Book II or "little alpha": Aristotle replies that the idea of an infinite causal series is absurd, and thus there must be a first cause which is not itself caused. This idea is

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developed later in book Lambda, where he develops an argument for the existence of God. Chapters 2 and 3 argue for its status as a subject in its own right. The rest is a defense of a what we now call the principle of contradiction, the principle that it is not possible for the same proposition to be the case and not to be the case, and b what we now call the principle of excluded middle: Book V or Delta "philosophical lexicon" is a list of definitions of about thirty key terms such as cause, nature, one, and many. Book VI or Epsilon has two main concerns. Aristotle is first concerned with a hierarchy of the sciences. As we know, a science can be either productive, practical or theoretical. The study of being qua being, or First Philosophy, is superior to all the other theoretical sciences because it is concerned the ultimate causes of all reality, not just the secondary causes of a part of reality. Aristotle dismisses the study of the per accidens as a science fit for Sophists, a group whose philosophies or lack thereof he consistently rejects throughout the Metaphysics. The purpose of philosophy is to understand being. The primary kind of being is what Aristotle calls substance. What substances are there, and are there any substances besides perceptible ones? Aristotle considers four candidates for substance: He dismisses the idea that matter can be substance, for if we eliminate everything that is a property from what can have the property, we are left with something that has no properties at all. You are not musical by your very nature. But you are a human by your very nature. Your essence is what is mentioned in the definition of you. Chapters 13-15 consider, and dismiss, the idea that substance is the universal or the genus, and are mostly an attack on the Platonic theory of Ideas. Aristotle argues that if genus and species are individual things, then different species of the same genus contain the genus as individual thing, which leads to absurdities. Moreover, individuals are incapable of definition. Chapter 17 takes an entirely fresh direction, which turns on the idea that substance is really a cause. Eta[ edit ] Book Eta consists of a summary of what has been said so far i. Theta[ edit ] Theta sets out to define potentiality and actuality. Chapters 1-5 discuss potentiality. In chapter 6 Aristotle turns to actuality. We can only know actuality through observation or "analogy;" thus "as that which builds is to that which is capable of building, so is that which is awake to that which is asleep Actuality is the completed state of something that had the potential to be completed. The relationship between actuality and potentiality can be thought of as the relationship between form and matter, but with the added aspect of time. Actuality and potentiality are diachronic across time distinctions, whereas form and matter are synchronic at one time distinctions. Discussion of unity, one and many, sameness and difference. Book XI or Kappa: Briefer versions of other chapters and of parts of the Physics. Book XII or Lambda: Further remarks on beings in general, first principles, and God or gods. Philosophy of mathematics, in particular how numbers exist. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Metaphysics - Ibn Sina Avicenna, one of the greatest Medieval Islamic philosophers, said that he had read the Metaphysics of Aristotle forty times, but still did not understand it. Critics, noting the wide variety of topics and the seemingly illogical order of the books, concluded that it was actually a collection of shorter works thrown together haphazardly. Translations and influence[ edit ] Some of the earlier scholars of the Metaphysics were Arabs, who relied on Arabic translations from early Syriac translations from the Greek see Medieval Philosophy. The book was lost in the Latin West from the collapse of Rome until the twelfth century. These were sometimes inaccurate, having been through so many stages of translation. In the thirteenth century, following the Fourth Crusade, the original Greek manuscripts became available. One of the first Latin translations was made by William of Moerbeke. They were also used by modern scholars for Greek editions, as William had access to Greek manuscripts that are now lost.

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## Chapter 9 : Beyond Bartleby. An essay on Possibility and Negativity | Darin Tenev - calendrierdelascience.com

*Physics and metaphysics. Aristotle divided the theoretical sciences into three groups: physics, mathematics, and calendrierdelascience.coms as he understood it was equivalent to what would now be called "natural philosophy," or the study of nature (physis); in this sense it encompasses not only the modern field of physics but also biology, chemistry, geology, psychology, and even meteorology.*

In this system, heavy bodies in steady fall indeed travel faster than light ones whether friction is ignored, or not [47] , and they do fall more slowly in a denser medium. Four causes Aristotle argued by analogy with woodwork that a thing takes its form from four causes: His term *aitia* is traditionally translated as "cause", but it does not always refer to temporal sequence; it might be better translated as "explanation", but the traditional rendering will be employed here. Thus the material cause of a table is wood. It is not about action. It does not mean that one domino knocks over another domino. It tells us what a thing is, that a thing is determined by the definition, form, pattern, essence, whole, synthesis or archetype. It embraces the account of causes in terms of fundamental principles or general laws, as the whole *i*. Plainly put, the formal cause is the idea in the mind of the sculptor that brings the sculpture into being. A simple example of the formal cause is the mental image or idea that allows an artist, architect, or engineer to create a drawing. Representing the current understanding of causality as the relation of cause and effect, this covers the modern definitions of "cause" as either the agent or agency or particular events or states of affairs. In the case of two dominoes, when the first is knocked over it causes the second also to fall over. The final cause is the purpose or function that something is supposed to serve. This covers modern ideas of motivating causes, such as volition. History of optics Aristotle describes experiments in optics using a camera obscura in *Problems* , book The apparatus consisted of a dark chamber with a small aperture that let light in. He also noted that increasing the distance between the aperture and the image surface magnified the image. Accident philosophy According to Aristotle, spontaneity and chance are causes of some things, distinguishable from other types of cause such as simple necessity. Chance as an incidental cause lies in the realm of accidental things , "from what is spontaneous". History of geology Aristotle was one of the first people to record any geological observations. Empirical research Aristotle was the first person to study biology systematically, [60] and biology forms a large part of his writings. He spent two years observing and describing the zoology of Lesbos and the surrounding seas, including in particular the Pyrrha lagoon in the centre of Lesbos. He describes the catfish , electric ray , and frogfish in detail, as well as cephalopods such as the octopus and paper nautilus. His description of the hectocotyl arm of cephalopods, used in sexual reproduction, was widely disbelieved until the 19th century. For Aristotle, accidents, like heat waves in winter, must be considered distinct from natural causes. He was correct in these predictions, at least for mammals: Aristotle did not do experiments in the modern sense. It does not result in the same certainty as experimental science, but it sets out testable hypotheses and constructs a narrative explanation of what is observed. Among these correct predictions are the following. Brood size decreases with adult body mass, so that an elephant has fewer young usually just one per brood than a mouse. Lifespan increases with gestation period , and also with body mass, so that elephants live longer than mice, have a longer period of gestation, and are heavier. As a final example, fecundity decreases with lifespan, so long-lived kinds like elephants have fewer young in total than short-lived kinds like mice. *Scala naturae* Aristotle recorded that the embryo of a dogfish was attached by a cord to a kind of placenta the yolk sac , like a higher animal; this formed an exception to the linear scale from highest to lowest. His system had eleven grades of animal, from highest potential to lowest, expressed in their form at birth: Animals came above plants , and these in turn were above minerals. Those with blood were divided into the live-bearing mammals , and the egg-laying birds , reptiles , fish. Those without blood were insects, crustacea non-shelled " cephalopods, and shelled and the hard-shelled molluscs bivalves and gastropods. He recognised that animals did not exactly fit into a linear scale, and noted various exceptions, such as that sharks had a placenta like the tetrapods. To a modern

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biologist, the explanation, not available to Aristotle, is convergent evolution.