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## Chapter 1 : Man and Society

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Chris Harman From International Socialism,. It is thrown up in a whole series of apparently different discussions: These issues have created considerable debate on the left. They have been the subject of an intermittent discussion among contributors to this journal for a decade and a half, and among the wider left there has been much greater confusion. Capitalism, in this view, consists in the pursuit of profits by firms or, more accurately speaking, the self expansion of capitals without regard to where they are based geographically. The state, by contrast, is a geographically based political entity, whose boundaries cut across the operations of the individual capitals. The state may be a structure that developed historically to provide the political prerequisites for capitalist productionâ€”to protect capitalist property, to police the dealings of different members of the ruling class with each other, to provide certain services which are essential for the reproduction of the system, and to carry through such reforms as are necessary to make other sections of society accept capitalist ruleâ€”but it is not to be identified with the system itself. This view of the state claims to be based on the Communist Manifesto: Nevertheless it is the view that is to be found in most modern academic Marxism. So, for instance, it was to be found on both sides of the debate which took place in New Left Review between Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas. If it is the character of its personnel that guarantees the capitalist nature of the state, then changing the personnel could change the character of the state, allowing it to be used for socialist purposes. If the state is a function of the society of which it is part, then if that society is racked by deep class struggles, these would find their expression through the state. More recently, another variant of the view of the state as external to capital has emerged on the left. His writings have always expressed an unbridled hatred for the state and complete contempt for those who believe it is possible to reform capitalism. He argues that the interests of capital are increasingly international interests, not bounded by any national borders. Each individual capital grew up within a particular nation states, but can now operate within virtually any state, bending it to its will. The particular state was a necessary instrument at one stage of capitalist developmentâ€”a superstructure once needed by capital accumulationâ€”but is no longer. The bureaucratic structures of the state remain intact. They have interests of their own to preserve, interests that are tied to a particular national geographic area, interests in maintaining class peace, interests in attracting capital in competition with other states, interests in building up military prowess. And so the modern world is characterised not just by an increasing volume of trade in goods and capital, but by state boundaries which impede that trade in a manner which is, from a capitalist point of view, irrational. The state as capital While most of the left has seen the state and capital as opposed, there has been a minority tradition that equates the state with capital. Its intellectual origins go back to the insights of Lenin and Bukharin in their books on imperialism written at the height of the First World War. If you talk about the interests of British capitalism, you are talking about the interests of the British state; if you talk about the British state, you are talking about the operations of British capitalism. This does not mean that there are no exceptions ruleâ€”no capitals that temporarily escape from the control of national states or no national states that temporarily act against the interests of nationally based capitals. But these exceptions, for Kidron, are a hangover from the past, relics which will disappear with the further development of the system. Indeed, the logic is for all elements of the superstructure, even trade unions, to become simple expressions of the drive of national capital to compete with its foreign rivals. For them, the behaviour of the state is determined by the logic of capital accumulation, although they tend to see it as the logic of private capital within the individual state rather than of a state capital in competition with other state capitals. If the state is simply a superstructure, then it is possible to contend that the problems that arise in the political sphere and those that arise economically are

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separate and distinct from each other. The struggle against the police or against racism then has nothing to do with the class struggle; the blow against the boss ceases to be a blow against the bomb. The implications of the view of the state and capital as merging completely are just as great. The forms of oppression maintained by the state are seen as flowing directly from the accumulation needs of capital. There can be no clash between them. The result is either ultra-leftist spontaneism—as with Lotta Continua and then the Italian autonomists in their heyday—in which the revolution is seen as imminent in each and every struggle, since every form of oppression flows from the immediate requirements of capital accumulation. Or it is a variant of reformism, which sees the structures essential to capital as being undermined by piecemeal rejection of each particular oppression. Instead, you have to understand the concrete ways in which capitals and the capitalist state necessarily interact in the course of historical development. Existing national states did arise out of the developing capitalist organisation of production, as superstructures. But they feed back into that organisation, helping to determine its tempo and direction. Marx pointed out in Volume Two of Capital that capital appears in three forms—as productive capital, as commodity capital and as money capital. Every process of capital accumulation involves repeated changes from one form to the other: The forms of capital are continually interacting as one changes into the other, so that at any given point in time some of the total capital will take the form of means of production, some of commodities waiting to be sold, and some of money. But there can also be a partial separation of these three different forms. The organisation of direct production, the selling of commodities and the supply of finance can devolve upon different groups of capitalists. It is this separation which creates the illusion that capital is an object that grows in size by some magical process. For it does for those capitalists who simply buy and sell commodities, and for those capitalists who simply advance money and reap interest payments in return. Each of these forms of capital has had, historically, a different relationship to the body which has a monopoly of political violence in any particular geographic locality—the state. Money capital can or at least could, in its classical form, when gold was the main means of payment operate regardless of state structures. It could flourish, as Marx noted, long before the development of capitalism generally. So it was that Italian bankers could finance the French absolute monarchy and south German bankers the Spanish absolute monarchy. Financiers did not need to be tied to a particular state to flourish provided they could find ways of making sure the state did not actually confiscate their wealth. Commodity capital could also flourish in all sorts of political structures—in slave societies of medieval antiquity, amid the battling lordships of the early feudal period, in the centralised absolutist states of late feudalism. Yet the more it developed, the more it came to require the protection of state structures it could influence. Otherwise those who controlled states could present obstacles to it: So from quite an early period onwards, merchants tended to encourage the growth of political structures under their own control. As Braudel tells of the medieval period, there arose: Sixteenth century Lyons was dominated by.. Trade circuits and communications were regularly dominated by powerful groups who appropriated them and who might forbid other groups to use them. Such groups are easy to find when one starts looking for them, in Europe and even outside Europe. If local state power prevents these conditions arising, the development of productive capital is stunted: The full development of capitalism requires that productive capital subjugate commodity and money capital to itself. Only productive capital—the exploitation of workers in the labour process—guarantees a continually growing pool of surplus value and, with it, a source of ever larger profits for capitalists of all sorts. If the development of productive capital, and to a lesser extent commodity capital, is entangled with the development of the geographic state, then so is the development of capitalism as a whole—even if in the form of money capital capitalism seems to have no need for the state. And that exploitation needs to be underpinned by the political structures of the state. They are mutually dependent on each other for resources, finance and markets. And they act together to try to shape the social and political conditions in that territory to suit their own purposes. Their efforts to achieve all these things will be aided if they can supplant a mass of local dialects and languages with a single form of spoken and written speech. Their aim, in short, has to be to create a national state power—and with it a national consciousness and language. The national state and

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different nationally based capitals grow up together, like children in a single family. The development of one inevitably shapes the development of the others. This does not mean that the structures of the state are an immediate product of the needs of capital. Many of the elements of the pre-capitalist state are restructured to fit in with the needs of the capitals that arise within them, rather than simply being smashed and replaced. But they are actively remolded, so as to function in a very different way than previously, a way that corresponds to the logic of capitalist exploitation. Industrial and agrarian capitals were usually not nearly powerful enough to shape the whole of the political structure. But their presence could be a significant counterweight to the old baronies, so making it easier for kings to replace the decentralised feudalism of the early medieval period with absolute monarchies. This growing weight of capitalist interests became decisive when the absolutist states themselves entered into crisis. In England in the 17th and France in the late 17th and early 18th they were able to ensure that the social and political crisis was resolved by the establishment of unitary national state structures that would serve their interests. The only viable alternatives to the crisis were those which encouraged capitalist development even if those, like Cromwell in Britain and the Jacobins in France, who imposed these alternatives did so in opposition to the immediate desires of some powerful capitalist interests. These national states then became the model for those elsewhere who wanted to break out of the backwardness of decaying feudalism or to escape foreign colonial control. Sometimes this was a case of already developing bourgeois or petty bourgeois groups seeking to establish a national state under their own control; on other occasions intellectuals or army officers saw their own interests as best advanced by using state power to impose capitalist forms of exploitation and accumulation on the rest of the population. In every case the development of groups of industrial and agrarian capitals is inseparable from the transformation of the geographic area in which they are based into a national state with its own language, system of laws, banking system and so on. Stages in the development of the state and capital

Classical economics provided an account of capitalism in which the state played a negligible role. It was a theory of pure capital, of self expanding capital which took no regard of national frontiers. It was this theoretical account which Marx took up in *Capital* and carried through to its logical conclusion, showing how capitalism contained inbuilt contradictions even when considered in the most abstract manner. But the real, concrete history of capitalism was always very much intertwined with the history of the state. Classical economics was, in fact, an empirical description of only one, historically limited, phase of the system, that of the mid 18th century. To found an empire for the sole purpose of raising up a people of customers may at first sight appear a project fit only for a nation of shop keepers. It is, however, a project altogether unfit for a nation of shop keepers, but extremely fit for a nation whose government is influenced by shop keepers. The enclosure acts, the navigation laws, the great state sponsored monopolies headed by the East India Company, state expenditures on equipping the armed forces, especially the navy, all played a vital part in that growth. The Smithian doctrine did not become the practice of British capitalism until the 1790s and 1800s with the repeal of the Corn Laws and the removal of India from the control of the East India Company and even then the forces of the British state still played a central role in imposing free trade on other parts of the world. The Opium Wars are just one example. By the 1800s and 1850s British governments were carving out new colonies in Africa to supplement their old ones in Asia and the West Indies. Capitals had established themselves in Britain through close links with the national state. Once established they had then used this national base to encompass the rest of the world. And when, after a few decades, capitals from other countries began to challenge their dominating role, they then turned once again to their own national state to establish areas of privileged access for them. The newer centres of capital accumulation that emerged alongside Britain in the 19th century were as dependent upon national state support as British capitalism had been previously. German, Italian and Yankee capitalists all looked to a national state which would use its power to impose protectionist measures against outside competition: Capitals aided the creation of the unified state and success in the struggle for unification usually gave an enormous boost to indigenous capital eg the tremendous growth of American capitalism in the decades after the Civil War and of German capitalism after the Franco-Prussian War. Historically, then, capitals have never

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developed according to the anti-statist schemas of classical economics. They have influenced and been influenced by the state structures in which they have found themselves. This has left its impact on the specific features of the individual capitals.

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## Chapter 2 : Hegel's Philosophy of Right: The State

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These practices are tremendously important to know how humans act and interact with each other. Society does not exist independently without individual. The individual lives and acts within society but society is nothing, in spite of the combination of individuals for cooperative effort. Human life and society almost go together. Man is biologically and psychologically equipped to live in groups, in society. Society has become an essential condition for human life to arise and to continue. The relationship between individual and society is ultimately one of the profound of all the problems of social philosophy. It is more philosophical rather than sociological because it involves the question of values. Man depends on society. It is in the society that an individual is surrounded and encompassed by culture, as a societal force. It is in the society again that he has to conform to the norms, occupy statuses and become members of groups. The question of the relationship between the individual and the society is the starting point of many discussions. It is closely connected with the question of the relationship of man and society. The relation between the two depends upon one fact that the individual and the society are mutually dependent, one grows with the help of the other. The aim of this paper is to show the questions: Society, Social Life, Individual 1. Introduction Man is a social animal. He has a natural urge to live an associated life with others. Man needs society for his existence or survival. The human child depends on his parents and others for its survival and growth. The inherent capacities of the child can develop only in society. The ultimate goal of society is to promote good and happy life for its individuals. It creates conditions and opportunities for the all round development of individual personality. Society ensures harmony and cooperation among individuals in spite of their occasional conflicts and tensions. If society helps the individuals in numerous ways, great men also contribute to society by their wisdom and experience. Thus, society and individuals are bound by an intimate and harmonious bond and the conflicts between the two are apparent and momentary. In a well-ordered society, there would be lasting harmony between the two. Society liberates and limits the activities of men and it is a necessary condition of every human being and need to fulfillment of life. Society is a system of usages and procedures of authority and mutual aid many divisions of controls of human behavior and of liberties. This changing system, we call society and it is always changing [1]. Society not confined to man [2]. It should be clear that society is not limited to human beings. There are many degrees of animal societies, likely the ants, the bee, the hornet, are known to most school children. It has been contended that wherever there is life there is society, because life means heredity and, so far as we know, can arise only out of and in the presence of other life. All higher animals at least have a very definite society, arising out of the requirements their nature and the conditions involved in the perpetuation of their species [3]. In society each member seeks something and gives something. A society can also consist of likeminded people governed by their own norms and values within a dominant, large society moreover; a society may be illustrated as an economic, social or industrial infrastructure, made up of a varied collection of individuals. Society is universal and pervasive and has no defined boundary or assignable limits. A society is a collection of individuals united by certain relations or modes of behavior which mark them off from others who do not enter into those relations or who differ from them in behavior. In this way we can conclude that, society is the whole complex of social behavior and the network of social relationship [5]. Society exists wherever there are good or bad, proper or improper relationships between human beings. These social relationships are not evident, they do not have any concrete form, and hence society is abstract. Society is not a group of people; it means in essence a state or condition, a relationship and is therefore necessarily an abstraction. Society is organization of relationship. It is the total complex of human relationships. It includes whole range of human relations. Now we can say that society is the union itself, the organization, the sum of formal relations in which associating individuals are bound together. Societies consist in mutual interaction and inter relation of

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individuals and of the structure formed by their relations. Social Life As a human being man cannot live without association. Because individuals cannot be understood apart from their relations with one another; the relations cannot be understood apart from the units or terms of the relationship. A man of society may be aided by the understanding of say, neurons and synapses, but his quest remains the analysis of social relationships [8]. The role of social life is clarified when we consider the process by which they develop in the life of the individual. Social life is the combination of various components such as activities, people and places. While all of these components are required to define a social life, the nature of each component is different for every person and can change for each person, as affected by a variety of external influences. In fact, the complex social life of our day his actions indeed, even his thoughts and feelings are influenced in large measure by a social life which surrounds him like an atmosphere [11]. It is true that, human achievement is marked by his ability to do, so to a more remarkable degree than any other animal. Everywhere there is a social life setting limitations and pre- dominantly influencing individual action. Because they work together, combine and organize for specific purposes, so that no man lives to himself. This unity of effort is to make society [12]. There are different kinds of social life and these are depends on various factors. These types of factors of social life are normal and for normal people. Nevertheless, social life depends on different things such as a The political life; b The economic life; c Voluntary associations; d Educational associations; e Methods of communication and; f The family [14]. Man Is a Social Animal Though accurate information about the exact origin of society is not known still it is an accepted fact that man has been living in society since time immemorial. He cannot live without society, if he does so; he is either beast or God. Man has to live in society for his existence and welfare. In almost all aspect of his life he feels the need of society. Biologically and psychologically he compelled to live in society. The essence of the fact is that man has always belonged to a society of some sort, without which man cannot exist at all. Society fulfills all his needs and provides security. Every human took birth, grows, live and die in society. Hence there exists a great deal of close relationships between man and society. Both are closely inter-related, interconnected and inter-dependent. Relationship between the two is bilateral in nature. But this close relationship between man and society raises one of the most important questions i. No doubt Aristotle said so long ago. However, man is a social animal mainly because of the following three reasons: Sociality or sociability is his natural instinct. All his human qualities such as: All this developed through interaction with others. His nature compels him to live with his fellow beings. The first case was of Kasper Hauser who from his childhood until his seventeenth year was brought up in woods of Nuremberg. In his case it was found that at the age of seventeen he could hardly walk, had the mind of an infant and mutter only a few meaningless phrases. In spite of his subsequent education he could never make himself a normal man. The second case was of two Hindu children who in were discovered in a wolf den. One of the children died soon after discovery. The other could walk only on all four, possessed no language except wolf like growls. She was shy of human being and afraid of them. It was only after careful and sympathetic training that she could learn some social habits. The third case was of Anna, an illegitimate American child who had been placed in a room at age of six months and discovered five years later. On discovery it was found that she could not walk or speech and was indifferent to people around her. All the above cases prove that man is social by nature. Human nature develops in man only when he lives in society, only when he shares with his fellow begins a common life. He knows himself and his fellow beings within the framework of society. Indeed, man is social by nature. The social nature is not super-imposed on him or added to him rather it is inborn. It is said that needs and necessities makes man social. Man has many needs and necessities. Out of these different needs social, mental and physical needs are very important and needs fulfillment. All his needs and necessities compel him to live in society.

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## Chapter 3 : The state and capitalism today – International Socialism

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Man and Society The human being and the group. The problem of man cannot be solved scientifically without a clear statement of the relationship between man and society, as seen in the primary collectivity—the family, the play or instruction group, the production team and other types of formal or informal collectivity. In the family the individual abandons some of his specific features to become a member of the whole. The life of the family is related to the division of labour according to sex and age, the carrying on of husbandry, mutual assistance in everyday life, the intimate life of man and wife, the perpetuation of the race, the upbringing of the children and also various moral, legal and psychological relationships. The family is a crucial instrument for the development of personality. It is here that the child first becomes involved in social life, absorbs its values and standards of behaviour, its ways of thought, language and certain value orientations. It is this primary group that bears the major responsibility to society. Its first duty is to the social group, to society and humanity. Through the group the child, as he grows older, enters society. Hence the decisive role of the group. The influence of one person on another is as a rule extremely limited; the collectivity as a whole is the main educational force. Here the psychological factors are very important. It is essential that a person should feel himself part of a group at his own wish, and that the group should voluntarily accept him, take in his personality. Everybody performs certain functions in a group. Take, for example, the production team. Here people are joined together by other interests as well as those of production; they exchange certain political, moral, aesthetic, scientific and other values. A group generates public opinion, it sharpens and polishes the mind and shapes the character and will. Through the group a person rises to the level of a personality, a conscious subject of historical creativity. The group is the first shaper of the personality, and the group itself is shaped by society. The unity of man and society. All his practical activities are individual expressions of the historically formed social practice of humanity. The implements that he uses have in their form a function evolved by a society which predetermines the ways of using them. When tackling any job, we all have to take into account what has already been achieved before us. This is why the level of individual development is an indicator of the level of development of society, and vice versa. But the individual does not dissolve into society. He retains his unique and independent individuality and makes his contribution to the social whole: The individual is a link in the chain of the generations. His affairs are regulated not only by himself, but also by the social standards, by the collective reason or mind. The true token of individuality is the degree to which a certain individual in certain specific historical conditions has absorbed the essence of the society in which he lives. Consider, for instance, the following historical fact. Who or what would Napoleon Bonaparte have been if there had been no French Revolution? It is difficult or perhaps even impossible to reply to this question. But one thing is quite clear—he would never have become a great general and certainly not an emperor. He himself was well aware of his debt and in his declining years said, "My son cannot replace me. I could not replace myself. I am the creature of circumstances. What tribunes of the people were lifted by the tide of events of the French Revolution— Mirabeau, Marat, Robespierre, Danton. What young, some times even youthful talents that had remained dormant among the people were raised to the heights of revolutionary, military, and organisational activity by the Great October Socialist Revolution. It is sometimes said that society carries the individual as a river carries a boat. This is a pleasant simile, but not exact. An individual does not float with the river; he is the turbulently flowing river itself. The events of social life do not come about by themselves; they are made. The great and small paths of the laws of history are blazed by human effort and often at the expense of human blood. The laws of history are not charted in advance by superhuman forces; they are made by people, who then submit to their authority as something that is above the individual.

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The key to the mysteries of human nature is to be found in society. Society is the human being in his social relations, and every human being is an individual embodiment of social relations, a product not only of the existing social system but of all world history. He absorbs what has been accumulated by the centuries and passed on through traditions. Modern man carries within himself all the ages of history and all his own individual ages as well. His personality is a concentration of various strata of culture. He is influenced not only by modern mass media, but also by the writings of all times and every nation. He is the living memory of history, the focus of all the wealth of knowledge, abilities, skills, and wisdom that have been amassed through the ages. Man is a kind of super-dense living atom in the system of social reality. He is a concentration of the actively creative principle in this system. Sometimes the relation between man and society is interpreted in such a way that the latter seems to be something that goes on around a person, something in which he is immersed. But this is a fundamentally wrong approach. Society does, of course, exist outside the individual as a kind of social environment in the form of a historically shaped system of relations with rich material and spiritual culture that is independent of his will and consciousness. The individual floats in this environment all his life. But society also exists in the individual himself and could not exist at all, apart from the real activity of its members. History in itself does nothing. Society possesses no wealth whatever. It fights no battles. It grows no grain. It produces no tools for making things or weapons for destroying them. It is not society as such but man who does all this, who possesses it, who creates everything and fights for everything. Society is not some impersonal being that uses the individual as a means of achieving its aims. All world history is nothing but the daily activity of individuals pursuing their aims. Here we are talking not about the actions of individuals who are isolated and concerned only with themselves, but about the actions of the masses, the deeds of historical personalities and peoples. An individual developing within the framework of a social system has both a certain dependence on the whole system of social standards and an autonomy that is an absolutely necessary precondition for the life and development of the system. The measure of this personal autonomy is historically conditioned and depends on the character of the social system itself. Exceptional rigidity in a social system fascism, for example makes it impossible or extremely difficult for individual innovations in the form of creative activity in various spheres of life to take place, and this inevitably leads to stagnation. The relationships between the individual and society in history. To return once again to the simile of the river. The history of humankind is like a great river bearing its waters into the ocean of the past. What is past in life does not become something that has never been. No matter how far we go from the past, it still lives to some extent in us and with us. From the very beginning, the character of the man-society relationship changed substantially in accordance with the flow of historical time. The relationship between the individual and a primitive horde was one thing. Brute force was supreme and instincts were only slightly controlled, although even then there were glimpses of moral standards of cooperation without which any survival, let alone development, would have been impossible. In tribal conditions people were closely bound by ties of blood. At that time there were no state or legal relationships. Not the individual but the tribe, the genus, was the law-giver. The interests of the individual were syncretised with those of the commune. In the horde and in tribal society there were leaders who had come to the fore by their resourcefulness, brains, agility, strength of will, and so on. Labour functions were divided on the basis of age and sex, as were the forms of social and other activity. With the development of the socium an ever increasing differentiation of social functions takes place. People acquire private personal rights and duties, personal names, and a constantly growing measure of personal responsibility. The individual gradually becomes a personality, and his relations with society acquire an increasingly complex character. When the society based on law and the state first arose, people were sharply divided between masters and slaves, rulers and ruled. Slave society with its private property set people against one another. Some individuals began to oppress and exploit others. Feudal society saw the emergence of the hierarchy of castes, making some people totally dependent on others. On the shoulders of the common toiler there grew up an enormous parasitic tree with kings or tsars at its summit. This pyramid of social existence determined the rights and duties of its citizens, and the rights were nearly all at the top of the social

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scale. This was a society of genuflection, where not only the toilers but also the rulers bowed the knee to the dogma of Holy Scripture and the image of the Almighty. The age of the Renaissance was a hymn to the free individual and to the ideal of the strong fully developed human being blazing trails of discovery into foreign lands, broadening the horizons of science, and creating masterpieces of art and technical perfection. History became the scene of activity for the enterprising and determined individual. Not for him the impediments of the feudal social pyramid, where the idle wasted their lives and money, enjoying every privilege, and the toilers were kept in a state of subjugation and oppression. At first came the struggle for freedom of thought, of creativity. This grew into the demand for civil and political freedom, freedom of private initiative and social activity in general.

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## Chapter 4 : Karl Marx & the State – Marxist-Humanist Initiative

*The relation between individual and society is very close. Essentially, "society" is the regularities, customs and ground rules of antihuman behavior. These practices are tremendously important to know how humans act and interact with each other.*

It is ethical mind qua the substantial will manifest and revealed to itself, knowing and thinking itself, accomplishing what it knows and in so far as it knows it. The state exists immediately in custom, mediately in individual self-consciousness, knowledge, and activity, while self-consciousness in virtue of its sentiment towards the state, finds in the state, as its essence and the end-product of its activity, its substantive freedom. The Penates are inward gods, gods of the underworld; the mind of a nation Athene for instance is the divine, knowing and willing itself. Family piety is feeling, ethical behaviour directed by feeling; political virtue is the willing of the absolute end in terms of thought. This substantial unity is an absolute unmoved end in itself, in which freedom comes into its supreme right. On the other hand this final end has supreme right against the individual, whose supreme duty is to be a member of the state. If the state is confused with civil society, and if its specific end is laid down as the security and protection of property and personal freedom, then the interest of the individuals as such becomes the ultimate end of their association, and it follows that membership of the state is something optional. Since the state is mind objectified, it is only as one of its members that the individual himself has objectivity, genuine individuality, and an ethical life. His further particular satisfaction, activity and mode of conduct have this substantive and universally valid life as their starting point and their result. Rationality, taken generally and in the abstract, consists in the thorough-going unity of the universal and the single. Rationality, concrete in the state, consists as far as its content is concerned, in the unity of objective freedom. This Idea is the absolutely eternal and necessary being of mind. We are here dealing exclusively with the philosophic science of the state, and from that point of view all these things are mere appearance and therefore matters for history. So far as the authority of any existing state has anything to do with reasons, these reasons are culled from the forms of the law authoritative within it. The philosophical treatment of these topics is concerned only with their inward side, with the thought of their concept. The result is that he reduces the union of individuals in the state to a contract and therefore to something based on their arbitrary wills, their opinion, and their capriciously given express consent; and abstract reasoning proceeds to draw the logical inferences which destroy the absolutely divine principle of the state, together with its majesty and absolute authority. For this reason, when these abstract conclusions came into power, they afforded for the first time in human history the prodigious spectacle of the overthrow of the constitution of a great actual state and its complete reconstruction ab initio on the basis of pure thought alone, after the destruction of all existing and given material. The will of its re-founders was to give it what they alleged was a purely rational basis, but it was only abstractions that were being used; the Idea was lacking; and the experiment ended in the maximum of frightfulness and terror. Confronted with the claims made for the individual will, we must remember the fundamental conception that the objective will is rationality implicit or in conception, whether it be recognised or not by individuals, whether their whims be deliberately for it or not. We must remember that its opposite, i. The opposite to thinking of the state as something to be known and apprehended as explicitly rational is taking external appearances – i. Herr von Haller, however, with his eyes open, has not merely renounced the rational material of which the state consists, as well as the form of thought, but he has even gone on with passionate fervour to inveigh against the form and the material so set aside. This Restoration undoubtedly owes to the fact that, in his exposition, he has deliberately dispensed with thought altogether, and has deliberately kept his whole book all of a piece with its lack of thought. For in this way he has eliminated the confusion and disorder which lessen the force of an exposition where the accidental is treated along with hints of the substantial, where the purely empirical and external are mixed with a reminiscence of the universal and rational, and where in the midst of wretched inanities the reader is now and again reminded of the loftier

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sphere of the infinite. For the same reason again his exposition is consistent. He takes as the essence of the state, not what is substantive but the sphere of accident, and consistency in dealing with a sphere of that kind amounts to the complete inconsistency of utter thoughtlessness which jogs along without looking behind, and is just as much at home now with the exact opposite of what it approved a moment ago. The state in and by itself is the ethical whole, the actualisation of freedom; and it is an absolute end of reason that freedom should be actual. The state is mind on earth and consciously realising itself there. In nature, on the other hand, mind actualises itself only as its own other, as mind asleep. Only when it is present in consciousness, when it knows itself as a really existent object, is it the state. In considering freedom, the starting-point must be not individuality, the single self-consciousness, but only the essence of self-consciousness; for whether man knows it or not, this essence is externally realised as a self-subsistent power in which single individuals are only moments. The march of God in the world, that is what the state is. The basis of the state is the power of reason actualising itself as will. In considering the Idea of the state, we must not have our eyes on particular states or on particular institutions. Instead we must consider the Idea, this actual God, by itself. On some principle or other, any state may be shown to be bad, this or that defect may be found in it; and yet, at any rate if one of the mature states of our epoch is in question, it has in it the moments essential to the existence of the state. But since it is easier to find defects than to understand the affirmative, we may readily fall into the mistake of looking at isolated aspects of the state and so forgetting its inward organic life. The state is no ideal work of art; it stands on earth and so in the sphere of caprice, chance, and error, and bad behaviour may disfigure it in many respects. But the ugliest of men, or a criminal, or an invalid, or a cripple, is still always a living man. The affirmative, life, subsists despite his defects, and it is this affirmative factor which is our theme here. I have described the book sufficiently to show that it is of an original kind. But to save himself from these theories, Herr von Haller has gone to the other extreme by dispensing with thought altogether and consequently it cannot be said that there is anything of intrinsic value in his virulent hatred of all laws and legislation, of all expressly and legally determinate rights. The hatred of law, of right made determinate in law, is the shibboleth whereby fanaticism, flabby-mindedness, and the hypocrisy of good intentions are clearly and infallibly recognised for what they are, disguise themselves as they may. This is how he lays down his most important basic proposition: It is not the might of justice and ethics, but only the irrational power of brute force. He asks with a great elaboration of undergraduate rhetoric [ibid. Herr von Haller forgets here that the point of this rhetoric is to support his proposition that the rule of the mightier is an everlasting ordinance of God; so presumably it is by the same ordinance that the vulture rends the innocent lamb, and that hence the mighty are quite right to treat their unsuspecting clients as the weak and to make use of knowledge of the law to empty their pockets. It would be too much, however, to ask that two thoughts should be put together where there is really not a single one. It goes without saying that Herr von Haller is an enemy of codes of law. And these three methods are "what do you suppose? Lawyers are unfriendly indeed, it appears, in comparison with the friendliness of nature! When we then realise that the author is speaking here of the national liberties of the German Estates, of the English people etc. Under those circumstances, neither the king himself since the resources of the state belong to the state and are not the private property of the king, nor the Prussian citizens can call anything their own, neither their person nor their property; and all subjects are bondslaves to the law, since they may not withdraw themselves from the service of the state. The truth is that the word of God very clearly distinguishes its revelations from the voices of nature and unregenerate man. For the hardest thing which man can experience is to be so far excluded from thought and reason, from respect for the laws, and from knowing how infinitely important and divine it is that the duties of the state and the rights of the citizens, as well as the rights of the state and the duties of the citizens, should be defined by law "to be so far excluded from all this that absurdity can foist itself upon him as the word of God. A has immediate actuality and is the individual state as a self-dependent organism "the Constitution or Constitutional Law; B passes over into the relation of one state to other states "International Law; C is the universal Idea as a genus and as an absolute power over individual states "the mind which gives itself its actuality in the process of

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World-History. The state in its actuality is essentially an individual state, and beyond that a particular state. Individuality is to be distinguished from particularity. The former is a moment in the very Idea of the state, while the latter belongs to history. States as such are independent of one another, and therefore their relation to one another can only be an external one, so that there must be a third thing standing above them to bind them together. Now this third thing is the mind which gives itself actuality in world-history and is the absolute judge of states. Several states may form an alliance to be a sort of court with jurisdiction over others, there may be confederations of states, like the Holy Alliance for example, but these are always relative only and restricted, like perpetual peace. The one and only absolute judge, which makes itself authoritative against the particular and at all times, is the absolute mind which manifests itself in the history of the world as the universal and as the genus there operative. But concrete freedom consists in this, that personal individuality and its particular interests not only achieve their complete development and gain explicit recognition for their right as they do in the sphere of the family and civil society but, for one thing, they also pass over of their own accord into the interest of the universal, and, for another thing, they know and will the universal; they even recognise it as their own substantive mind; they take it as their end and aim and are active in its pursuit. The result is that the universal does not prevail or achieve completion except along with particular interests and through the co-operation of particular knowing and willing; and individuals likewise do not live as private persons for their own ends alone, but in the very act of willing these they will the universal in the light of the universal, and their activity is consciously aimed at none but the universal end. The principle of modern states has prodigious strength and depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to progress to its culmination in the extreme of self-subsistent personal particularity, and yet at the same time brings it back to the substantive unity and so maintains this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself. The Idea of the state in modern times has a special character in that the state is the actualisation of freedom not in accordance with subjective whim but in accordance with the concept of the will, i. Immature states are those in which the Idea of the state is still veiled and where its particular determinations have not yet attained free self-subsistence. In the states of classical antiquity, universality was present, but particularity had not then been released, given free scope, and brought back to universality, i. The essence of the modern state is that the universal be bound up with the complete freedom of its particular members and with private well-being, that thus the interests of family and civil society must concentrate themselves on the state, although the universal end cannot be advanced without the personal knowledge and will of its particular members, whose own rights must be maintained. Thus the universal must be furthered, but subjectivity on the other hand must attain its full and living development. It is only when both these moments subsist in their strength that the state can be regarded as articulated and genuinely organised. Duty is primarily a relation to something which from my point of view is substantive, absolutely universal. A right, on the other hand, is simply the embodiment of this substance and thus is the particular aspect of it and enshrines my particular freedom. Hence at abstract levels, right and duty appear parcelled out on different sides or in different persons. In the state, as something ethical, as the inter-penetration of the substantive and the particular, my obligation to what is substantive is at the same time the embodiment of my particular freedom. This means that in the state duty and right are united in one and the same relation. But further, since none the less the distinct moments acquire in the state the shape and reality peculiar to each, and since therefore the distinction between right and duty enters here once again, it follows that while implicitly, i. In the spheres of personal rights and morality, the necessary bearing of right and duty on one another falls short of actualisation; and hence there is at that point only an abstract similarity of content between them, i. The absolute identity of right and duty in the state is present in these spheres not as a genuine identity but only as a similarity of content, because in them this content is determined as quite general and is simply the fundamental principle of both right and duty, i. Slaves, therefore, have no duties because they have no rights, and vice versa. Religious duties are not here in point. In the course of the inward development of the concrete Idea, however, its moments become distinguished and their specific determinacy becomes at the same time a difference of content. This concept of the union of duty and right is a point of vital importance

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and in it the inner strength of states is contained. Duty, taken concretely as Idea, reveals the moment of particularity as itself essential and so regards its satisfaction as indisputably necessary. In whatever way an individual may fulfil his duty, he must at the same time find his account therein and attain his personal interest and satisfaction. Out of his position in the state, a right must accrue to him whereby public affairs shall be his own particular affair. Particular interests should in fact not be set aside or completely suppressed; instead, they should be put in correspondence with the universal, and thereby both they and the universal are upheld. The isolated individual, so far as his duties are concerned, is in subjection; but as a member of civil society he finds in fulfilling his duties to it protection of his person and property, regard for his private welfare, the satisfaction of the depths of his being, the consciousness and feeling of himself as a member of the whole; and, in so far as he completely fulfils his duties by performing tasks and services for the state, he is upheld and preserved. In the state everything depends on the unity of universal and particular. In modern times, however, we make claims for private judgment, private willing, and private conscience. The ancients had none of these in the modern sense; the ultimate thing with them was the will of the state. Whereas under the despots of Asia the individual had no inner life and no justification in himself, in the modern world Man insists on respect being paid to his inner life. The conjunction of duty and right has a twofold aspect: The determinations of the individual will are given an objective embodiment through the state and thereby they attain their truth and their actualisation for the first time. The State is the one and only prerequisite of the attainment of particular ends and welfare. It is therefore to these ideal spheres that the actual Idea assigns the material of this its finite actuality, viz. In many oriental states, this assignment is determined by birth. But subjective freedom, which must be respected, demands that individuals should have free choice in this matter.

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## Chapter 5 : Society and the Individual in Nietzsche's The Will to Power

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Radicals, socialists, and anarchists have long advocated patterns of rule that do not require the capitalist state. Many of them look toward civil society as a site of free and spontaneous associations of citizens. Civil society offers them a non-statist site at which

Civil society and modernity Historians of the idea of civil society suggest that these contemporary reservations have their roots in the complex and multifaceted intellectual genealogy of this term and the different modes of thinking that underpin its usage in modern Western thought. Both of the conceptions outlined at the start of this entry stem from a way of thinking about Western modernity that emerged in European thought in the 18th and 19th centuries—specifically, the idea that modern societies can be analyzed in terms of the development of three separate and rival orders: Civil society is still invoked by many of its advocates as a synonym for the values of authenticity and belonging, neither of which, it is assumed, can be achieved in politics or economic life. More generally, the entry of civil society into the language of modern European thought was bound up with the development and spread of liberal doctrines about society and politics. Since the 18th century it appeared in the context of the broadly individualistic, autonomous, and rationalistic understanding of the human personality that liberal thinkers tended to promote. For many liberals, it followed that social order and political obligation can be understood through the analogy of a social contract between ruler and ruled, that the rule of law is a precondition for the liberty of the citizen, and that the achievement of a commercial order requires and bolsters an improvement in the overall character of the interrelationships of citizens. This broad understanding of civil society as both a precondition for and marker of the distinctive trajectory of Western liberal democracy remains the predominant interpretation of it. That is not to suggest that this view is shared or admired by all. Critics observe the differentials of power and resource that characterize relationships within civil society, the apparent inability of liberal thinking to address the fundamental character of some of these inequities, and the skill and willingness of some states to orchestrate and occasionally manipulate civil society organizations for their own ends. Origins and development This skepticism about liberal ideas of civil society reflects, and has sustained, diverse conceptions of its meaning and potential; a host of more conservative, as well as more radical, ambitions have also been attached to this term. Indeed, the term civil society has carried a number of different associations in the history of political thought, and its original meaning in Western thinking was rather different from its current protean status. This kind of community was understood in contrast to noncivilized or barbarian peoples. This conceptual usage was transformed by different European thinkers throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, with the result that civil society came to acquire a rather different set of connotations. Here are identified three of the prevalent modes of thinking concerning this term that became established during this period, though this list is far from exhaustive. A strand of thinking developed in the Enlightenment era in the writings of English figures like Thomas Hobbes and John Locke that presented the social and moral sources of the legitimacy of the state in relation to the idea of civil society. Though internally diverse, this tradition shared an aversion to the idea, widely held in ancient Greek thought, that societies could be characterized according to the character of their political constitution and institutions. Society, however conceived, was prior to and formative of the establishment of political authority. A different mode of thinking about civil society, which found its most coherent expression in 19th-century German thought, separated civil society from state in both ethical and analytical terms and regarded the two as separable and perhaps as opposites. Standing between and partially overlapping with these perspectives, there developed a different, long-lasting conception in the thinking of some of the major theorists of the Scottish political economy tradition of the 18th century, including Adam Smith and Francis Hutcheson. In their view, civil society should be conceived as

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emerging from the intertwined development of an independent commercial order, within which complex chains of interdependence between predominantly self-seeking individuals proliferated, and the development of an independent public sphere, where the common interests of society as a whole could be pursued. Contemporary political discourse The second and third of these strands have been most influential in shaping the thinking of Western theorists since the late 20th century. After a period of relative philosophical disinterest in the term in the middle decades of the 20th century, the terminology of civil society became ubiquitous in political thinking during the s. Many of the ideas of this phase of its intellectual history can be connected to the three traditions previously identified. The English strand has been powerfully reappropriated in the contemporary period by various neoliberal theorists and ideologues. For them, civil society stands as a synonym for the ideal of the free market accompanied by a constitutionally limited, but powerful, state. This last idea figured powerfully in the idealization of civil society that prevailed in eastern European intellectual circles following the fall of the Berlin Wall in In these settings, civil society signified either the survival in countries like Czechoslovakia and Poland of a web of autonomous associations that were independent of the state and that bound citizens together in matters of common concern or a necessary means of achieving the economic prosperity and civil freedoms of Western democracy. And, third, the Scottish conception was powerfully revived by left-inclined thinkers who hoped to provide a more pluralist, and less statist, reformulation of a socialist ideology that was experiencing a profound political recession among Western publics. As the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor observed, these and other influential ways of thinking about civil society rested upon the twin assumptions that, in empirical terms, independent civil societies did come into existence at various points from the 18th through the 20th century and that their existence depends, in part, upon the separation of the concepts of state and society in the Western political imagination. Neither of these assumptions is uncontroversial. While there clearly does exist a plethora of groups, communities, and associations in relative separation from the state, the boundary between state and civil society in many countries is rarely as clear or firm as the first assumption suggests. In various democracies , the state and other public authorities succeeded in incorporating institutions and organizations from civil societyâ€”for instance, trade unions, environmental groups, and business associationsâ€”into key networks of influence and decision making. Equally, individual groups and even oppositional social movements often expend considerable resources and energy attempting to interact with government officials, elected politicians, and state bureaucracies. The notion that the stateâ€”civil society distinction exists in all Western societies therefore requires considerable clarification and qualification in empirical terms. Likewise, the idea that a fundamental intellectual distinction between state and society underpins the model of liberal democracy begs some rather large questions. Quite different accounts of the distinction and interrelationship between society and the state guided some of the major ideologies of the 19th and 20th centuries and sustained clashing theories about politics, sovereignty , and social order. Above all, the idea that a portion of any societal complex should be portioned off, endowed with ethical, even emancipatory, significance, and understood as the fundamental opponent of political authority and institutional life looks increasingly problematic in the early 21st century. One of the most interesting and contentious manifestations of the terminology of civil society arises from its increasingly common application to non-Western societies. Are supporters of civil society in the West and in newly democratizing states throughout the world talking about the same things when they invoke this term? Can a Western-derived term be usefully employed as a framework for analyzing societies with forms of sociability and state-society relationships that differ markedly from those of the West? Equally, the assumption of some Anglo-American theory that a network of independent associations, cultural practices, and organizations is a necessary feature of a stable democracy is open to considerable doubt when viewed from elsewhere in the world think, for instance, of East Asian countries that have many of the features of civil societies but are not democratic in their political structures. During the s, in particular, many authors, politicians, and public authorities keen to find solutions to some of the different kinds of problems facing developing countries seized upon civil society as a kind of panacea. Relatedly, this term became a conceptual

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mainstay of academic thinking about democratic transitions and a familiar part of the discourse of global institutions, leading nongovernmental organizations, and Western governments. The ideological character and political implications of such ideas have become increasingly clear over time. In philosophical terms, applying civil society in this kind of way raises the profound question of whether it can be removed from its status within the Western political imagination and applied in ways that are appropriate for the indigenous developmental trajectories and political cultures of some of the poorest countries in the world. It is impossible to divest the notion of civil society of normative connotations. The concept remains powerful, in part, because of its often unstated contrastive character. The achievement of a dense forest of groups, networks, and organizations that appears to stand beyond the boundaries of the state and outside the reach of the family and clan remains, for many political thinkers, a major part of what makes Western modernity unique and desirable. When examined closely, this generic idea gives way to a host of different kinds of projects, fantasies, and anxieties about politics, society, and the economy. Since the 1980s, civil society has moved to the centre stage of Western political debate, assuming the character of both the diagnosis for and the solution to the various malaises of Western society—rampant individualism, rising crime, consumerism, and the decline of community, among other maladies. In more philosophical terms, it has held out two different kinds of promise to intellectuals, political actors, and, occasionally, social movements. On one hand, it offers the dream of reconciling some of the major discursive tensions in Western thought—between, for instance, self-interest and the public good, the individual and the community, freedom and social solidarity, and the private and public domains of life. And the second promise, the idea of civil society as a distinct third sector of Western societies distinct from both the state and the private realm, has come to fire parts of the radical imagination in contemporary ideological debate. In this context it offers the thinly veiled promise of the achievement of a collective emancipation from the constraints, compromises, and disappointments of politics. With a growing awareness of the limitations and dangers of both of these ideas has come a desire to rethink the boundaries of civil society and reconsider which political and moral values it promotes.

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## Chapter 6 : What Is Civil Society? | Grantmakers in the Arts

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He was educated at the Royal Highschool in Stuttgart from and steeped in both the classics and the literature of the European Enlightenment. Hegel received an M. Shortly after graduation, Hegel took a post as tutor to a wealthy Swiss family in Berne from During this time he wrote unpublished essays on religion which display a certain radical tendency of thought in his critique of orthodox religion. With the closing of the University, due to the victory of the French in Prussia, Hegel had to seek employment elsewhere and so he took a job as editor of a newspaper in Bamberg, Bavaria in Die Bamberger Zeitung followed by a move to Nuremberg in where Hegel became headmaster of a preparatory school Gymnasium , roughly equivalent to a high school, and also taught philosophy to the students there until During this time Hegel married, had children, and published his Science of Logic Wissenschaft der Logik in three volumes. In he became Professor of Philosophy at the University of Berlin, through the invitation of the Prussian minister von Altenstein who had introduced many liberal reforms in Prussia until the fall of Napoleon , and Hegel taught there until he died in Hegel lectured on various topics in philosophy, most notably on history, art, religion, and the history of philosophy and he became quite famous and influential. He held public positions as a member of the Royal Examination Commission of the Province of Brandenburg and also as a councillor in the Ministry of Education. In he published the Philosophy of Right Philosophie des Rechts and in was given the honor of being elected Rector of the University. Political Writings Apart from his philosophical works on history, society, and the state, Hegel wrote several political tracts most of which were not published in his lifetime but which are significant enough in connection to the theoretical writings to deserve some mention. In it Hegel expresses the view that the constitutional structure of Wurtemberg requires fundamental reform. He condemns the absolutist rule of Duke Ferdinand along with the narrow traditionalism and legal positivism of his officials and welcomes the convening of the Estates Assembly, while disagreeing with the method of election in the Diet. In contrast to the existing system of oligarchic privilege, Hegel argues that the Diet needs to be based on popular election through local town councils, although this should not be done by granting suffrage to an uneducated multitude. The essay ends inconclusively on the appropriate method of political representation. A quite long piece of about pages, The German Constitution Die Verfassung Deutschlands was written and revised by Hegel between and and was not published until after his death in This piece provides an analysis and critique of the constitution of the German Empire with the main theme being that the Empire is a thing of the past and that appeals for a unified German state are anachronistic. Hegel finds a certain hypocrisy in German thinking about the Empire and a gap between theory and practice in the German constitution. Germany was no longer a state governed by law but rather a plurality of independent political entities with disparate practices. Hegel stresses the need to recognize that the realities of the modern state necessitate a strong public authority along with a populace that is free and unregimented. The principle of government in the modern world is constitutional monarchy, the potentialities of which can be seen in Austria and Prussia. Hegel ends the essay on an uncertain note with the idea that Germany as a whole could be saved only by some Machiavellian genius. Hegel sided with King Frederick and criticized the Estates as being reactionary in their appeal to old customary laws and feudal property rights. There has been controversy over whether Hegel here was trying to gain favor with the King in order to attain a government position. A genuine state needs a strong and effective central public authority, and in resisting the Estates are trying to live in the feudal past. As a result, the remainder of the work was printed independently and distributed discretely. Moreover, there are deep problems in English society that cannot be addressed by the proposed electoral reforms, including political corruption in the English burroughs, the selling of seats in parliament, and the general oligarchic nature of social reality including the wide disparities between wealth and poverty, Ecclesiastical patronage, and conditions in Ireland. While Hegel supports the idea of reform with its appeal to rational change as against

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the "positivity" of customary law, traditionalism and privilege, he thinks that universalizing suffrage with a property qualification without a thorough reform of the system of Common Law and the existing social conditions will only be perceived as token measures leading to greater disenchantment among the newly enfranchised and possibly inclinations to violent revolution. Hegel claims that national pride keeps the English from studying and following the reforms of the European Continent or seriously reflecting upon and grasping the nature of government and legislation. First, there is the contrast between the attitude of legal positivism and the appeal to the law of reason. Hegel consistently displays a "political rationalism" which attacks old concepts and attitudes that no longer apply to the modern world. Old constitutions stemming from the Feudal era are a confused mixture of customary laws and special privileges that must give way to the constitutional reforms of the new social and political world that has arrived in the aftermath of the French Revolution. Second, reforms of old constitutions must be thorough and radical, but also cautious and gradual. This might sound somewhat inconsistent, but for Hegel a reform is radical due to a fundamental change in direction, not the speed of such change. Hegel suggests that customary institutions not be abolished too quickly for there must be some congruence and continuity with the existing social conditions. Hegel rejects violent popular action and sees the principal force for reform in governments and the estates assemblies, and he thinks reforms should always stress legal equality and the public welfare. Third, Hegel emphasizes the need for a strong central government, albeit without complete centralized control of public administration and social relations. The task of government is not to thoroughly bureaucratize civil society but rather to provide oversight, regulation, and when necessary intervention. Fourth, Hegel claims that representation of the people must be popular but not atomistic. The democratic element in a state is not its sole feature and it must be institutionalized in a rational manner. Hegel rejects universal suffrage as irrational because it provides no means of mediation between the individual and the state as a whole. Hegel believed that the masses lacked the experience and political education to be directly involved in national elections and policy matters and that direct suffrage leads to electoral indifference and apathy. Fifth, while acknowledging the importance of a division of powers in the public authority, Hegel does not appeal to a conception of separation and balance of powers. He views the estates assemblies, which safeguard freedom, as essentially related to the monarch and also stresses the role of civil servants and members of the professions, both in ministerial positions and in the assemblies. The monarchy, however, is the central supporting element in the constitutional structure because the monarch is invested with the sovereignty of the state. However, the power of the monarch is not despotic for he exercises authority through universal laws and statutes and is advised and assisted by a ministry and civil service, all members of which must meet educational requirements. The Jena Writings Hegel wrote several pieces while at the University of Jena that point in the direction of some of the main theses of the Philosophy of Right. In this piece, usually referred to as the essay on Natural Law, Hegel criticizes both the empirical and formal approaches to natural law, as exemplified in British and Kantian philosophy respectively. Empiricism reaches conclusions that are limited by the particularities of its contexts and materials and thus cannot provide universally valid propositions regarding the concepts of various social and political institutions or of the relation of reflective consciousness to social and political experience. Formalist conclusions, on the other hand, are too insubstantial and abstract in failing to properly link human reason concretely to human experience. Traditional natural law theories are based on an abstract rationalism and the attempts of Rousseau, Kant, and Fichte to remedy this through their various ethical conceptions fail to overcome abstractness. For Hegel, the proper method of philosophical science must link concretely the development of the human mind and its rational powers to actual experience. Moreover, the concept of a social and political community must transcend the instrumentalizing of the state. In this work, Hegel develops a philosophical theory of social and political development that correlates with the self-development of essential human powers. Another result of labor is the emergence of private property as an embodiment of human personality as well as of sets of legal relationships that institutionalize property ownership, exchange, etc. Gradually, a system of mutual dependence, a "system of needs," develops, and along with the increasing division of labor there also develops

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class differentiations reflecting the types of labor or activity taken up by members of each class, which Hegel classifies into the agricultural, acquisitive, and administrative classes. However, despite relations of interdependence and cooperation the members of society experience social connections as a sort of blind fate without some larger system of control which is provided by the state which regulates the economic life of society. The details of the structure of the state are unclear in this essay, but what is clear is that for Hegel the state provides an increased rationality to social practices, much in the sense that the later German sociologist Max Weber would articulate how social practices become more rational by being codified and made more predictable. The manuscripts entitled *Realphilosophie* are based on lectures Hegel delivered at Jena University in *Realphilosophie I* and *Realphilosophie II*, and were originally published by Johannes Hoffmeister in 1841. These writings cover much of the same ground as the *System der Sittlichkeit* in explicating a philosophy of mind and human experience in relation to human social and political development. Some of the noteworthy ideas in these writings are the role and significance of language for social consciousness, for giving expression to a people *Volk* and for the comprehending of and mastery of the world, and the necessity and consequences of the fragmentation of primordial social relationships and patterns as part of the process of human development. Also, there is a reiteration of the importance of property relations as crucial to social recognition and how there would be no security of property or recognition of property rights if society were to remain a mere multitude of families. Such security requires a system of control over the "struggle for recognition" through interpersonal norms, rules, and juridical authority provided by the nation state. Moreover, Hegel repeats the need for strong state regulation of the economy, which if left to its own workings is blind to the needs of the social community. In all of this Hegel appears to be providing a philosophical account of modern developments both in terms of the tensions and conflicts that are new to modernity as well as in the progressive movements of reform found under the influence of Napoleon. Finally, Hegel also discusses the forms of government, the three main types being tyranny, democracy, and hereditary monarchy. Tyranny is found typically in primitive or undeveloped states, democracy exists in states where there is the realization of individual identity but no split between the public and private person, and hereditary monarchy is the appropriate form of political authority in the modern world in providing strong central government along with a system of indirect representation through Estates. The relation of religion to the state is undeveloped in these writings, but Hegel is clear about the supereminent role of the state that stands above all else in giving expression to the Spirit *Geist* of a society in a sort of earthly kingdom of God, the realization of God in the world. True religion complements and supports this realization and thus cannot properly have supremacy over or be opposed to the state. Originally intended to be the first part of his comprehensive system of science *Wissenschaft* or philosophy, Hegel eventually considered it to be the introduction to his system. This work provides what can be called a "biography of spirit," i. It has continuity with the works discussed above in examining the development of the human mind in relation to human experience but is more wide-ranging in also addressing fundamental questions about the meaning of perceiving, knowing, and other cognitive activities as well as of the nature of reason and reality. One of the most widely discussed places in the *Phenomenology* is the chapter on "The Truth of Self-Certainty" which includes a subsection on "Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: It is clear that Hegel intended the scenario to typify certain features of the struggle for recognition *Anerkennung* overall, be it social, personal, etc. Although this specific dialectic of struggle occurs only at the earliest stages of self-consciousness, it nonetheless sets up the main problematic for achieving realized self-consciousness—the gaining of self-recognition through the recognition of and by another, through mutual recognition. According to Hegel, the relationship between self and otherness is the fundamental defining characteristic of human awareness and activity, being rooted as it is in the emotion of desire for objects as well as in the estrangement from those objects, which is part of the primordial human experience of the world. The otherness that consciousness experiences as a barrier to its goal is the external reality of the natural and social world, which prevents individual consciousness from becoming free and independent. However, that otherness cannot be abolished or destroyed, without destroying oneself, and so

ideally there must be reconciliation between self and other such that consciousness can "universalize" itself through the other. In the relation of dominance and subservience between two consciousnesses, say lord and bondsman, the basic problem for consciousness is the overcoming of its otherness, or put positively, the achieving of integration with itself. The relation between lord and bondsman leads to a sort of provisional, incomplete resolution of the struggle for recognition between distinct consciousnesses. Hegel asks us to consider how a struggle between two distinct consciousnesses, let us say a violent "life-or-death" struggle, would lead to one consciousness surrendering and submitting to the other out of fear of death. Initially, the consciousness that becomes lord or master proves its freedom through willingness to risk its life and not submit to the other out of fear of death, and thus not identify simply with its desire for life and physical being. Moreover, this consciousness is given acknowledgement of its freedom through the submission and dependence of the other, which turns out paradoxically to be a deficient recognition in that the dominant one fails to see a reflection of itself in the subservient one. Adequate recognition requires a mirroring of the self through the other, which means that to be successful it must be mutual. In the ensuing relationship of lordship and bondage, furthermore, the bondsman through work and discipline motivated by fear of dying at the hands of the master or lord transforms his subservience into a mastery over his environment, and thus achieves a measure of independence. In objectifying himself in his environment through his labor the bondsman in effect realizes himself, with his transformed environment serving as a reflection of his inherently self-realizing activity. Thus, the bondsman gains a measure of independence in his subjugation out of fear of death. In a way, the lord represents death as the absolute subjugator, since it is through fear of this master, of the death that he can impose, that the bondsman in his acquiescence and subservience is placed into a social context of work and discipline. Yet despite, or more properly, because of this subjection the bondsman is able to attain a measure of independence by internalizing and overcoming those limitations which must be dealt with if he is to produce efficiently. However, this accomplishment, the self-determination of the bondsman, is limited and incomplete because of the asymmetry that remains in his relation to the lord. Self-consciousness is still fragmented, i. Only in a realm of ethical life can self-determination be fully self-conscious to the extent that universal freedom is reflected in the life of each individual member of society. Thus, in the Phenomenology consciousness must move on through the phases of Stoicism, Skepticism, and the Unhappy Consciousness before engaging in the self-articulation of Reason, and it is not until the section "Objective Spirit: The Ethical Order" that the full universalization of self-consciousness is in principle to be met with. Here we find a shape of human existence where all men work freely, serving the needs of the whole community rather than of masters, and subject only to the "discipline of reason. However, the ethical life described here is still in its immediacy and is therefore at a level of abstractness that falls short of the mediation of subjectivity and universality which is provided spiritually in revealed Christianity and politically in the modern state, which purportedly provides a solution to human conflict arising from the struggle for recognition. In any case, the rest of the Phenomenology is devoted to examinations of culture including enlightenment and revolution , morality, religion, and finally, Absolute Knowing. The dialectic of self-determination is, for Hegel, inherent in the very structure of freedom, and is the defining feature of Spirit Geist. The full actualization of Spirit in the human community requires the progressive development of individuality which effectively begins with the realization in self-consciousness of the "truth of self-certainty" and culminates in the shape of a shared common life in an integrated community of love and Reason, based upon the realization of truths of incarnation, death, resurrection, and forgiveness as grasped in speculative Religion.

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## Chapter 7 : Hegel: Social and Political Thought | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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At the same time, however, there are a number of ideas herein which an understanding of his other works can help illuminate. Whether a person is giving gifts, claiming to be in love with someone, giving someone praise, or physically harming someone, the psychological motive is the same: This presupposition entails that all human beings are ultimately and exclusively egoistic by nature. Therefore, according to Nietzsche, there are no truly altruistic actions. The will to power is not, however, limited to the psychology of human beings. Rather, it is the underlying noematic reality of the universe, which manifests itself in various ways in everything and everyone. Growth, self-preservation, domination, and upward mobility are some of the basic elements of this will, which everything in the world exhibits, according to Nietzsche. Ideas and representations are the outward manifestations of the "Will," while the "Will" itself is the inner nature or essence of the universe. This "Will," according to Schopenhauer, is never satisfied. Once one desire is satisfied, it merely gives rise to another, and then another, and so on. The "Will" is thus the source of all of the evil and suffering in the world. These ideas lead Schopenhauer to adopt a life-denying view of the world, since it contains nothing but suffering and the burden of satisfying unrelenting desires. So, as Nietzsche concludes in the very last lines of *The Will to Power*: A solution for all its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men? And you yourselves are also this will to power--and nothing besides! States act in ways toward each other for which individuals do not have the strength or courage, because states do not feel responsible for their actions as do individuals. The external behavior of the state is that of conquest and war, acting in accordance with the will to power. It instills in its people values such as obedience, duty, and patriotism, while it outwardly exudes values such as strength, pride, and revenge. In other words, they cannot exert their will to power in the violent ways which they otherwise would naturally. Instead, the will to power can be found in individuals in certain disguised forms, as we will see when the will to power as individual is explicated. Feelings of potential guilt and fear of punishment whether institutional or in a life beyond for breaking moral and legal rules prevent them from acting in such a manner. The state, however, is not bound by Judeo-Christian-type moral duties and imperatives, so it is therefore unrestrained in the exertion of its will to power, which comes in the natural forms of violence and conquest. It seems then, that Nietzsche is trying to say that the violence inherent in the way a society exerts its will to power is evidence that the true nature of man is one of violence also. Other than that, however, their views differ considerably. Nietzsche seems to approve of the violent conquest of others while Noam Chomsky, of course, does not. What Nietzsche certainly does not approve of, however, is the fact that the state suppresses the natural, violent instincts of the individual to acquire power in an effort to keep one at the level of the herd. This keeping-in-check of the individual is done through the aforementioned values which are instilled and enforced by the overwhelming power of the state which represents the herd. Those who do try to act upon these instincts are branded as criminals and are removed from society. Therefore, in this respect, all truly great men, according to Nietzsche, are criminals in some respect, in that they are individuals who are courageous enough to act in a way that goes against the conformity of the herd. Crime belongs to the concept "revolt against the social order. A rebel can be a miserable and contemptible man; but there is nothing contemptible in a revolt as such--and to be a rebel in view of contemporary society does not in itself lower the value of a man. There are even cases in which one might have to honor a rebel, because he finds something in our society against which war ought to be waged--he awakens us from our slumber. The criminal points out something about society that is in need of change, helping to jolt the rest of us out of our complacency. The concept of "punishment" for criminals then, simply amounts to the "suppression of a revolt," 6 in that it is nothing more

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than an attempt to maintain the mediocre status quo of the herd by imprisoning or in some cases, executing those who deviate from it. That the society looks upon the punished in a derogatory manner is a terrible mistake to Nietzsche. Punishment, in ancient times, was meant as a way to purify someone; to make them feel as if their debt to society had been paid. The suffering of a punishment was something which was done willingly, in order to help one to feel a sense of relief and restored dignity. Today, however, punishment does not purify in this manner; rather it heaps more indignity upon the individual due to the derogatory aspects it has taken on in modern society. Nietzsche attributes this derogatory evaluation of punishment to a time when it "became associated with contemptible men. For doing so does not help the criminal to be less of a contemptible man: One can enhance only those men whom one does not treat with contempt; moral contempt causes greater indignity and harm than any crime. In this way, society the herd keeps its individuals strongly in check. Specifically, those who are punished are looked upon with moral contempt even after they have served their sentences. Once one gets out of jail, he is simply referred to as an "ex-con," and carries around with him a police record of his past transgressions against society for the rest of his life. Every time such a person fills out a job application, he must answer the question: Nietzsche argues further that finding a punishment which will cause as much suffering as the suffering inflicted by the criminal is impossible, since every criminal experiences different degrees of pain and pleasure. Being that it is not possible to measure these degrees, how are we supposed to determine a punishment for such a person which would be fitting for the nature of the crime? Nietzsche suggests here that the institution of punishment thus fails to do what it sets out to do, in that it cannot possibly provide punishments which offer the same amount of pain to the criminal as the crime did to its victim. All this seems to suggest to Nietzsche that punishment as a practice should be abolished, but at the same time, he laments that it would be a great loss. By this statement, it is likely that he means it would be a loss of the pleasure one gets in being able to inflict suffering on those who have wronged one, as he discusses in *On The Genealogy of Morals*, second essay, section five: They were legally given free reign to cut off as much as they felt would satisfy their loss. Overall, however, Nietzsche sees the criminalization of those who go against the grain as simply the herd keeping people down to their level through the use of the state. Schopenhauer wanted rascals to be castrated and silly geese to be shut up in convents: The rascal has this advantage over many other men, that he is not mediocre; and the fool has this advantage over us, that he does not suffer at the sight of mediocrity. It would be more desirable that the gulf should be made wider; so rascality and folly should increase. In this way human nature would be expanded--But, after all, this is dictated by necessity; it does not depend on whether we desire it or not. Socialism, democracy, and anarchism all rest on the idea that there are no great or superior individuals, and therefore Nietzsche rejects them all. These forms of society represent nothing more than the rule of the herd; the rule of mediocrity. Nietzsche rejects such forms of society in favor of the aristocratic ideal, which values a higher form of man; a model for society which does in fact demonstrate a belief in great and talented individuals and an elite class. For here the herd does not have any power, and therefore does not keep in check those who stand out among them who deserve rank and recognition, or in other words, individuals are free to act upon their will to power in the natural ways. The blaming of others for the condition that one happens to be in is nothing more than the act of searching for a scapegoat. People feel this need to find others responsible for their miserable condition because they do not want to feel as though there is no reason that they are what they are. Nietzsche attributes this practice to the Christian instinct for revenge. This instinct has taken the innocence out of existence itself, in that it has attempted to find responsibility for everything in some past intentional act. A psychological presupposition thus arose that every action has a conscious origin, and that a punishment is thus appropriate. Nietzsche sees this idea as a product of the priestly class, who wanted to invent a right for themselves to take revenge upon those who were their oppressors. The fact of the matter, as Nietzsche claims, is that no one is responsible for the situation into which a person finds oneself born, or the qualities that a person has: We others, who desire to restore innocence to becoming, would like to be the missionaries of a cleaner idea: There is no being that could be held responsible for the fact that anyone exists

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at all, that anyone is thus and thus, that anyone was born in certain circumstances, in a certain environment. The Will to Power as Individual within Society Nietzsche takes it to be a fundamental error to place the goal of society in the masses, and not in the individual, as democracy and socialism do. He also considers it a mistake to treat sympathy as the most valuable trait in human beings, because, as he clearly states in section seven of *The Antichrist*, pity asks for the multiplication of suffering I take Nietzsche to be using pity and sympathy interchangeably enough. It helps foster the herd, by guiltting us into helping to preserve those who would otherwise perish of their weakness and life-denying attitudes. The most redeeming quality of humans is, of course, their instinctive will to power. The "ego" subdues and kills: It wants to regenerate itself--pregnancy. It wants to give birth to its god and see all mankind at his feet. It takes much more than that: Every living thing reaches out as far from itself with its force as it can, and overwhelms what is weaker: The increasing "humanizing" of this tendency consists in this, that there is an ever subtler sense of how hard it is really to incorporate another: The individual also has this "subtler sense" that physical violence alone will most likely make others resentful and indignant toward us, and may actually drive them farther away from being truly under our power. Rather, the ego learns to find other ways to exert its will to power than through the violent or forceful domination of others. No matter what type of situation individuals find themselves in, their will to power comes through in some way or another. The first of these disguised forms of the will to power is a desire for freedom, independence, and peace. What this is at bottom, according to Nietzsche, is simply the will toward self-preservation and existence in general. One wants peace and independence so that one is not at risk from the possibly violent actions of others. Also, one does not want to become enslaved or subjugated by others. The second disguised form is that which Nietzsche calls enrollment. This form involves submission to those in power in order to acquire a certain aspect of control over them. One simply does what his superior asks and does it to the best of his ability, so much that his superior begins to see him as vital and irreplaceable. Love is also a form of enrollment, according to Nietzsche, in that it is also a way in which one gains control over the other person, while at the same time appearing to be submissive. The way in which Nietzsche talks about love is also one of the many examples of his poor attitude toward women. We are already aware that Nietzsche sees sympathy and pity as weaknesses, but he also lumps love in with this assessment as well. He looks upon women as the epitome of these "weaknesses," and often refers to love and sympathy as "effeminate" virtues. Nietzsche attributes to women exclusively, it seems, this use of love as a cunning way to gain control of others. Or is it not rather to an unbridled urge? It is strange that he does not attribute love to people in general; rather just women. Anyhow, a third disguised form of the will to power is that of a sense of duty and conscience in which one feels a type of superiority over those who are really in power. Here one, or rather a group, creates and abides by a new set of values to which they hold even those who are in power accountable.

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## Chapter 8 : modern state in relation to society and the individual; : :

*Society is composed of individuals and each individual is an inseparable part of the social whole. A society refers to the whole and individuals represent only its parts. It is obvious that individual is both a social factor as well as a social product.*

Etymology[ edit ] In the English language , the word "individualism" was first introduced, as a pejorative, by the Owenites in the late s, although it is unclear if they were influenced by Saint-Simonianism or came up with it independently. Although an early Owenite socialist, he eventually rejected its collective idea of property, and found in individualism a "universalism" that allowed for the development of the "original genius. Individual An individual is a person or any specific object in a collection. In the 15th century and earlier, and also today within the fields of statistics and metaphysics , individual means "indivisible", typically describing any numerically singular thing, but sometimes meaning "a person. From the 17th century on, individual indicates separateness, as in individualism. Individuation The principle of individuation , or principium individuationis, [15] describes the manner in which a thing is identified as distinguished from other things. It is a completely natural process necessary for the integration of the psyche to take place. Thus, the individual atom is replaced by a never-ending ontological process of individuation. Individuation is an always incomplete process, always leaving a "pre-individual" left-over, itself making possible future individuations. For Stiegler "the I, as a psychic individual, can only be thought in relationship to we, which is a collective individual. On a societal level, the individualist participates on a personally structured political and moral ground. Independent thinking and opinion is a common trait of an individualist. Ruth Benedict made a distinction, relevant in this context, between "guilt" societies e. Methodological individualism[ edit ] Methodological individualism is the view that phenomena can only be understood by examining how they result from the motivations and actions of individual agents. Becker and Stigler provide a forceful statement of this view: On the traditional view, an explanation of economic phenomena that reaches a difference in tastes between people or times is the terminus of the argument: On our preferred interpretation, one never reaches this impasse: The function of the system is to maintain an inequality in the society and fields of human engagement. It supports the privilege theories that affirms position of certain individuals higher in the hierarchy of ranks at the expense of others. For better individuality cooperation is considered to be a better remedy for personal growth. Nobody will waste his life in accumulating things, and the symbols for things. To live is the rarest thing in the world. Most people exist, that is all. Oscar Wilde , The Soul of Man under Socialism , Individualists are chiefly concerned with protecting individual autonomy against obligations imposed by social institutions such as the state or religious morality. Susan Brown "Liberalism and anarchism are two political philosophies that are fundamentally concerned with individual freedom yet differ from one another in very distinct ways. Because of this, a civil libertarian outlook is compatible with many other political philosophies, and civil libertarianism is found on both the right and left in modern politics. They demanded greater personal autonomy and self-determination and less outside control.

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## Chapter 9 : What is the relation between Society and Individual?

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Not surprisingly, both were producing revolutionary propaganda. Discussing the Russian situation, Voline told Trotsky that he considered it certain that the Bolsheviks would come to power. He went on to say he was equally certain that the Bolsheviks would persecute the anarchists once their power had been consolidated. Voline relates that in December, less than three years later, he was arrested by Bolshevik military authorities in the Makhnovist region. Since he was a well-known militant, the authorities notified Trotsky of his arrest and asked how he should be handled. Years later, another prominent anarcho-syndicalist emphasized the main lesson of the Russian experience: The assertion that the state must continue to exist until class conflicts, and classes with them, disappear, sounds, in the light of all historical experience, almost like a bad joke. But does this verdict discredit the theories of the supposed originator of Marxism, Karl Marx himself? There are two main lines of argument that we should pay close attention to: The state stands above civil society both to act as a limiting force on competition by declaring certain forms of competition to be illegal, and to provide the basic framework in which competition is to take place through legal contract, property laws, and so forth. In this way, the state is supposed to guarantee the equal rights of all citizens. Marx vehemently attacked this theory as it was found in Hegel. Far from seeing the state as a neutral arbiter that served to realize individual freedom, Marx considered the state to be a sphere of social life not only separate from, but also opposed to civil society. For Marx, this contradiction between the state and civil society is characteristic of a society divided against itself, in which the functions of government are administered against society. Instead, the individuals enter into political life with those class distinctions: This radical conception of democracy must be differentiated from a representative democracy in which it is the representatives who, although elected, hold the real power. The contradictions of modern, bourgeois government are briefly drawn out by Marx: The separation of the political state from civil society takes the form of a separation of the deputies from their electors. Society simply deposes elements of itself to become its political existence. There is a twofold contradiction: They have a formal authorization but as soon as this becomes real they cease to be authorized. They should be deputies but they are not. In respect to actual interests. Here we find the converse. They have authority as representatives of public affairs, whereas in reality they represent particular interests. Even from a formal point of view, the deputies recognized as deriving their mandate solely from the popular masses, become, once elected, independent of their electors, and are free to make political decisions on their behalf. The political state leads an existence divorced from civil society. For its part, civil society would cease to exist if everyone became a legislator. Where the political state has attained its full degree of development man leads a double life, a life in heaven and a life on earth, not only in his mind, in his consciousness, but in reality. He lives in the political community, where he regards himself as a communal being, and in civil society, where he is active as a private individual, regards other men as means, debases himself to a means and becomes a plaything of alien powers. The relationship of the political state to civil society is just as spiritual as the relationship of heaven to earth. The state stands in the same opposition to civil society and overcomes it in the same way as religion overcomes the restrictions of the profane world, i. Man in his immediate reality, in civil society, is a profane being. Here, where he regards himself and is regarded by others as a real individual, he is an illusory phenomenon. In the state, on the other hand, where he is considered to be a species-being, he is the imaginary member of a fictitious sovereignty, he is divested of his real individual life and filled with an unreal universality. Humans engage in purposive, conscious social production, transforming themselves and their environment. But when the social links between people, through which they express their species-character, become a mere means of individual existence, man is estranged, or alienated from this social essence. Thus, there is an evident parallelism between the hypostasis of the state, of God, and of money. It was the bourgeois

expression of the illusory general interest in a divided society: It is not a question simply of equalizing social conditions, but of overthrowing a social class relationship that has spread over the entire globe: Any state nonetheless requires some organization of armed force, legislation, justice, etc. Through the emancipation of private property from the community, the state has become a separate entity, alongside and outside civil society; but it is nothing more than the form of organisation which the bourgeois are compelled to adopt, both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interests. When the workers-the vast majority-reclaim the political power alienated to bureaucratic hierarchies, they subordinate the state power to their economic needs, or elevate civil society to the realm of politics. But without revolution socialism cannot be made possible. It stands in need of this political act just as it stands in need of destruction and dissolution. But as soon as its organizing functions begin and its goal, its soul emerges, socialism throws its political mask aside. The working class, in the course of its development, will substitute for the old civil society an association which will exclude classes and their antagonism, and there will be no more political power properly so-called, since political power is precisely the official expression of antagonism in civil society. Do not say that social movement excludes political movement. There is never a political movement which is not at the same time social. It is only in an order of things in which there are no more classes and class antagonisms that social evolutions will cease to be political revolutions. Later Marx would label this transitional phase the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This quite simply meant the political rule of the working class. This transitional period, as Marx conceived it, did not entail the existence of a transitional form of society intervening between, and distinct from, capitalism and communism. The transitional period is essentially a period of revolutionary change. A state without slavery, open or camouflaged, is inconceivable-that is why we are enemies of the state. It is the entire proletariat that is to exercise this power. For the system starts with the self-government of the communities. Bakunin understand the government of the people by a small number of representatives chosen elected by the people. This is a rather clear indication that Marx is still faithful to his critique of bourgeois democracy. Most anarchists, unlike Marx, define the state in terms of minority rule. The problem is that interpreting Marx in this way creates a number of contradictions in his writings that vanish when his basic theoretical framework is better understood. Marx recognizes that the workers must struggle against the bourgeois state, but also that a revolutionary form of state is needed before social classes as such disappear. Marx pretends to speak for his opponents: If in the political struggle against the bourgeois state the workers succeed only in extracting concessions, then they are guilty of compromise; and this is contrary to eternal principles. In , a Spanish politician even made a speech in parliament declaring: I choose the dictatorship from above, since it comes from a purer and loftier realm. Blanqui, for example, advocated an educative dictatorship of a small group of revolutionaries. Engels emphasizes this point in a passage on Blanqui: One can see that Blanqui is a revolutionary of the previous generation. Its true secret was this. It was essentially a working-class government, the produce of the struggle of the producing against the appropriating class, the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economic emancipation of labour. It was not a revolution to transfer it from one fraction of the ruling classes to the other, but a Revolution to break down this horrid machinery of Class domination itself. The frequent claim that Marx simply adopted the anarchist view of the state after the Paris Commune could not be further from the truth. The parasitic French state of the bourgeoisie was to be destroyed, but in Marx did not cease to call for working class state power. The Parisians stormed heaven in that they conquered the political power that had previously been sharply separated from their profane existences. The opposition to Blanquist conceptions could not be more self-evident. In his Second Draft, Marx makes an even clearer statement of the prefigurative nature of the proletarian dictatorship: The political instrument of their enslavement cannot serve as the political instrument of their emancipation. What needs to be understood is that Marx is being every bit as materialist here as in his critique of the Anarchists. In a rough sketch of national organization which the Commune had no time to develop, it states clearly that the Commune was to be the political form of even the smallest country hamlet, and that in the rural districts the standing army was to be replaced by a national militia, with an

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extremely short term of service. The few but important functions which still would remain for a central government were not to be suppressed, as has been intentionally misstated, but were to be discharged by Communal, and therefore strictly responsible agents. The unity of the nation was not to be broken, but, on the contrary, to be organised by the Communal Constitution and to become a reality by the destruction of the State power which claimed to be the embodiment of that unity independent of, and superior to, the nation itself, from which it was but a parasitic excrescence. While the merely repressive organs of the old governmental power were to be amputated, its legitimate functions were to be wrested from an authority usurping pre-eminence over society itself, and restored to the responsible agents of society. Instead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to misrepresent the people in Parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people, constituted in Communes, as individual suffrage serves every other employer in the search for the workmen and managers in his business. And it is well known that companies, like individuals, in matters of real business generally know how to put the right man in the right place, and, if they for once make a mistake, to redress it promptly. On the other hand, nothing could be more foreign to the spirit of the Commune than to supersede universal suffrage by hierarchic investiture. In an letter to Laura Lafargue, Engels spoke of French political illusions: In the Commune Marx saw the destruction of a bourgeois state and the democratization of executive power. Hal Draper writes on this theme: The machinery of government cannot be too simple. It is always the craft of knaves to make it complicated and mysterious. The workers must understand their government if they are to govern. In a remarkable passage, Engels draws together some of these different ideas to make a valuable contrast between proletarian state power and previous forms of state power. It is worth quoting at length: From the very outset the Commune was compelled to recognise that the working class, once come to power, could not go on managing with the old state machine; that in order not to lose again its only just conquered supremacy, this working class must, on the one hand, do away with all the old repressive machinery previously used against it itself, and, on the other, safeguard itself against its own deputies and officials, by declaring them all, without exception, subject to recall at any moment. What had been the characteristic attribute of the former state? Society had created its own organs to look after its common interests, originally through simple division of labor. But these organs, at whose head was the state power, had in the course of time, in pursuance of their own special interests, transformed themselves from the servants of society into the masters of society. It is precisely in America that we see best how there takes place this process of the state power making itself independent in relation to society, whose mere instrument it was originally intended to be.