

Chapter 1 : Moral | Define Moral at calendrierdelascience.com

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Ethics are inter-personal or social codes of conduct. Niyam is cleanliness, happiness, austerity, studying oneself and surrendering to God. But for every one thought, there is one who had such a thought prior, and the same thought prior to each and every thought beforehand. Morals, derived from the Latin root *mores*, are the norms widely observed by a community. I agree with everything, but your vocabulary needs a switch. All human interaction can be voluntary. That is the number one most important moral of them all. The ethic of that would be for people to live in a true anarchist society. Government is only people providing services on a violent compulsory basis. A tax is money taken at gunpoint. The better way to parse the difference between morality and ethics is to say that morality is the common, everyday evaluation of whether a behavior is socially acceptable. Ethics is the critical reflection on personal and social morality. Groups and societies have moral expectations just as individuals have moral judgments. Equating morality with the individual and ethics with society makes it impossible to see that some social arrangements are immoral and that groups as a whole can be morally wrong. Everyone except some psychopaths has a moral sense. But not everyone has a sense of ethics thinks critically about their moral intuitions and emotions. These questions correlate to these three branches of philosophy as 1 Metaphysics, 2 Epistemology, and 3 Ethics. The philosophical process is approached with varying degrees of capability logic , various levels of intellectual honesty integrity , cultural bias, and of course, ever changing knowledge and new situations to deal with. Consequently, and appropriately, ethics remain in a constant state of change as they attempt to deal with an ever changing world. There for morality changes. Humans once came to the ethical conclusion that slavery was OK. Not long ago, the Founding Fathers came to the ethical conclusion that "All men are created equal," but also chose to persist with the ancient morality justifying slavery. Only recently has morality caught up with ethics concerning slavery. But the world still has plenty of slavers, slave owners, and slavers. We need to pursue ethics because nothing else will overwrite bad morality with good morality. JRR anon Post 77 There is soemthing about what is said concerning scientific morals: After what I saw about morals and ethics here, I think it will be easy to understand what is said about the immortality of politics and international affairs and the worldwide support of corrupt dictators and aggression and injustice, all motivated by interests of the individual, countries, firms, or by fear and ignorance. This is a very dangerous field of study and it might partially explain the vast contradictions between the constitutions and declared programs and policies of some governments and governors and their criminal practices against their people. Thank you again for this very important field of study. It would be because of the poor ethics of the company not the morals of the individual. Ethics are meant to protect individual rights, and this case would be a poor assessment of that. Ethical lines are often blurred, but morals are concrete. It is clear, accurate and concise. Morality but reading through the comments has helped me to understand the differences. Thanks to each of you for your comments. My personal understanding is this: There is a tradition of speaking of an objective order, such as "natural law. Ethics There is also the tradition of speaking of a subjective order, i. A helpful method to use in making a moral decision respects the human person as the locus of three or four spheres that interrelate: Each sphere contributes to the dialogue that is known as conscience formation. Trying to use just one or two of these spheres will render a moral judgment that is less than intellectually and spiritually honest. There is no guarantee one will make the right decision, but there is the guarantee one can be true to their conscience. Morals choose to do either the right or wrong thing. KG Nesta anon Post 70 The difference from a moral man and an ethical man: Morality concerns our conscience, our sense of what is right or not; and ethics has more to do with a code of conduct - professionally or otherwise. My problem is in seeing any evidence of either of them in government, law and medicine. This might be true if the person in question accepts the moral instruction from God, and of course that he believes in God. Dictionaries are rubbish on this issue and fail to draw a practical distinction. However

the distinction that is frequently used in philosophical circles is that morality is a claimed objective and divinely inspired position from a transcendent source, whereas ethics is immanent in human practice and responsive to the contingencies and vicissitudes of living. Spinoza, in his grand opus "Ethics," makes this distinction, and it is a useful one. Ethics by dictionary definition is moral philosophy. The common misconception is that ethics is defined by a group such as medical ethics. Ethics should apply to everyone in the world. Again, Ethics is the study of Morality. Morals are generally based on religion but do not have to be. Whereas, ethics are based on philosophy but do not have to be. Both morality and ethics tell us, or at least attempt to tell us, what we should do, as both individuals and group all humans worldwide. You can talk about ethics for medicine as you can talk about algebra for calculus. But algebra is a subject in and of itself. Usually you will hear religious people talk about morality and professional people talk about ethics. Morality based on things such as the 10 Commandments, whereas ethics are based on fairness, and acting justly-- basically the same thing. Ethics does explore societies and tries to answer questions like "Is it fair that old females in Eskimo society are shunned when they lose their teeth and can no longer perform their job of gnawing of seal skin to soften it," for example, for which they would need strong teeth. If it is, then we have Cultural Relativism, which is not a tenant of ethics. Also, if on an individual basis Winston Churchill was ethical, when and if, he allowed the city of Coventry to be bombed without evacuating the citizenry so it would not tip off the Germans that they the British had cracked their code. So, ethics deals with both the individual and the society all humans. This confusion, I believe, comes from the fact that we are trying to leave religion or morality out of, say business or medicine, and it call it ethics. It is ethics but not just for business or medicine. Ethics is about what ought to be, not what is. Making sense of why you do what you do. Morality is simply good vs evil. Morality comes from environment, symbols, genetics, experiences. Based on how you feel about something, ethics would logically explain your moral decisions. Michael Polatis Post 64 Morals, Morality are natural laws. It is truth that is unchangeable. All natural law has consequences or cause and effect. Value is a degree to which an individual or group gives acceptance. Value is independent of truth, right or wrong. Ethics, Ethical is specifically a social system of beliefs or values. Ethics is independent of truth, right or wrong. Legal is a social system that people often mistake to be synonymous with lawful. You can "value" anything, then get together with your peers, call it "ethical," legislate and make it "legal. Values, ethics and legislation will never clash if they align with moral law. There is no ethical violation if I do so. It is not something you can make. I believe ethics and morals are not for rich people. It is part of the heritage and legacy from family and ancestors. Sometimes, people born that way with somewhat of higher intelligence of morality and ethics. It is something that comes from family and ancestors. But, it depends on the society in which we live. Just to respect them and help them feel good about themselves. This helped a bundle in writing my essay. But if I abort a baby, it is immoral but not unethical. From this I conclude that morals are a personal code and ethics are a civil code. From what i have read in your comments and from the author himself, I came up with the conclusion that ethics is the distinction between what is right and what is wrong and morality is the degree of how you will behave towards these ethics. I want to know. Same goes for lying, and as for cheating, it depends on whether or not your spouse is cheating on you. Still i find this differentiation between morals and ethics somewhat correct, especially in the context of homosexuality. We have so garbled our language that nobody knows what anybody else is talking about. It is quite simple.

Chapter 2 : Ethics - Wikipedia

For a topic as subjective as morality, people sure have strong beliefs about what's right and wrong. Yet even though morals can vary from person to person and culture to culture, many are.

But the existence of large and heterogeneous societies raises conceptual problems for such a descriptive definition, since there may not be any such society-wide code that is regarded as most important. This is strikingly illustrated by the fact that both C. But according to the taxonomy at the heart of this entry, all of these are versions of the descriptive sense, distinguished primarily by the size of the relevant group. Etiquette is sometimes included as a part of morality, applying to norms that are considered less serious than the kinds of norms for behavior that are more central to morality. When etiquette is included as part of morality, morality is almost always being understood in the descriptive sense. One reason for this is that it is clear that the rules of etiquette are relative to a society or group. Law is distinguished from morality by having explicit written rules, penalties, and officials who interpret the laws and apply the penalties. Although there is often considerable overlap in the conduct governed by morality and that governed by law, laws are often evaluatedâ€”and changedâ€”on moral grounds. Some theorists, including Ronald Dworkin , have even maintained that the interpretation of law must make use of morality. Although the morality of a group or society may derive from its religion, morality and religion are not the same thing, even in that case. Morality is only a guide to conduct, whereas religion is always more than this. For example, religion includes stories about events in the past, usually about supernatural beings, that are used to explain or justify the behavior that it prohibits or requires. Although there is often a considerable overlap in the conduct prohibited or required by religion and that prohibited or required by morality, religions may prohibit or require more than is prohibited or required by guides to behavior that are explicitly labeled as moral guides, and may allow some behavior that is prohibited by morality. Even when morality is not regarded as the code of conduct that is put forward by a formal religion, it is often thought to require some religious explanation and justification. However, just as with law, some religious practices and precepts are criticized on moral grounds, e. It is also being used in the descriptive sense when it refers to important attitudes of individuals. Just as one can refer to the morality of the Greeks, so one can refer to the morality of a particular person. In the 20th century R. Hare, in his earlier books , , regarded moral judgments as those judgments that override all nonmoral judgments and that would be universalized by the person making the judgment. This account of moral judgments naturally leads to a view of morality as being concerned with behavior that a person regards as most important and as a guide to conduct that he wants everyone to adopt. Guides to behavior that are regarded as moralities normally involve avoiding and preventing harm to others Frankena , and perhaps some norm of honesty Strawson But all of them involve other matters as well. This view of morality as concerning that which is most important to a person or group allows matters related to religious practices and precepts, or matters related to customs and traditions, e. A society might have a moral code according to which practices as necessary for purity or sanctity are more important than practices related to whether other persons are harmed. A society may take as morally most important that certain rituals are performed or that certain sexual practices are prohibited, than that harms are avoided or prevented. Some societies may claim that their morality, which is more concerned with purity and sanctity, is based on the commands of God. Moreover, most normative accounts entail that all moral agents would endorse morality, at least under certain circumstances. And most accounts of moral agency at work in such accounts do not include any negative attitudes toward harmless consensual sexual behavior. Many religions condemn certain harmless consensual sexual behavior as immoral, but other religions, which hold that morality is primarily concerned with avoiding and preventing harm, condemn these attitudes themselves as harmful and immoral. A society might have a morality that takes accepting its traditions and customs, including accepting the authority of certain people and emphasizing loyalty to the group, as more important than avoiding and preventing harm. Such a morality might not count as immoral any behavior that shows loyalty to the preferred group, even if that behavior causes significant harm to innocent people who are not in that group. Acting altruistically, at least with regard to those in the group, might be

nearly equated with acting morally, regardless of its effects on those outside of the group. The familiarity of this kind of morality, which makes in-group loyalty almost equivalent to morality, seems to allow some comparative and evolutionary psychologists, including Frans De Waal , to regard non-human animals to be acting in ways very similar to those that are regarded as moral. It is possible for a society to have a morality that is concerned primarily with minimizing the harms that human beings can suffer. Such a society might claim that their morality is based on some universal features of human nature or of all rational beings. Although all societies include more than just a concern for minimizing harm to some human beings in their moralities, this feature of morality, unlike purity and sanctity, or accepting authority and emphasizing loyalty, is included in everything that is regarded as a morality by any society. Because minimizing harm can conflict with accepting authority and emphasizing loyalty, there can be fundamental disagreements within a society about the morally right way to behave in particular kinds of situations. Some psychologists, such as Haidt, take morality to include concern with, at least, all three of the triad of 1 harm, 2 purity, and 3 loyalty, and hold that different members of a society can and do take different features of morality to be most important. Most societies have moralities that are concerned with, at least, all three members of this triad. Concern with harm appears in the form of enforceable rules against killing, causing pain, mutilating, etc. But beyond a concern with avoiding and preventing such harms to members of certain groups, there may be no common content shared by all moralities in the descriptive sense. Nor may there be any common justification that those who accept morality claim for it; some may appeal to religion, others to tradition, and others to rational human nature. Beyond the concern with harm mentioned above, the only other features that all descriptive moralities have in common is that they are put forward by an individual or a group, usually a society, in which case they provide a guide for the behavior of the people in that group or society. Ethical relativists such as Harman , Westermarck , Prinz , and Wong , deny that there is any universal normative morality and claim that the actual moralities of societies or individuals are the only moralities there are. The harm caused by Christian missionaries who used morality as a basis for trying to change the practices of the societies with which they came in contact may have been one of the reasons why many anthropologists endorsed ethical relativism. As a result, when the guide to conduct put forward by, for example, a religious group conflicts with the guide to conduct put forward by a society, it is not clear whether to say that there are conflicting moralities, conflicting elements within morality, or that the code of the religious group conflicts with morality. Members of the society who are also members of a religious group may regard both guides as elements of morality and differ with respect to which of the conflicting elements of the moral guide they consider most important. There are likely to be significant moral disputes between those who consider different elements to be more important. In small homogeneous societies there may be a guide to behavior that is put forward by the society and that is accepted by almost all members of the society. However, in larger societies people often belong to groups that put forward guides to behavior that conflict with the guide put forward by their society, and members of the society do not always accept the guide put forward by their society. If they accept the conflicting guide of some other group to which they belong often a religious group rather than the guide put forward by their society, in cases of conflict they will regard those who follow the guide put forward by their society as acting immorally. When relativized to an individual in this way, morality has less limitation on content than when it is taken to refer to the code of conduct put forward by a society or group. Still, if the person is rational, this guide will include prohibitions on causing harm. It is not clear whether it refers to 1 a guide to behavior that is put forward by a society, to which that person might or might not belong; 2 a guide that is put forward by a group, to which that person might or might not belong; 3 a guide that someone, perhaps that very person, regards as overriding and wants adopted by everyone else, or 4 a universal guide that all rational persons would put forward for governing the behavior of all moral agents. However, if the individual is referring to his own morality, he is usually using it normatively; that is, he would usually accept the claim that all rational persons, at least under certain conditions, would endorse it. However, Sidgwick regarded moral rules as any rational rules of conduct. Because all moralities in the descriptive sense include a prohibition on harming others, ethical egoism is not a morality in the descriptive sense. Because, as will be explained in the following section, all moralities in the normative sense not only include prohibitions on harming others but also are such

that all rational persons would endorse that morality, ethical egoism is not a morality in the normative sense either. Sidgwick does this, but he is decidedly in the minority in this respect. However, that fact that an individual adopts a moral code of conduct for his own use does not entail that the person requires it to be adopted by anyone else. An individual may adopt for himself a very demanding moral guide that he thinks may be too difficult for most others to follow. He may judge people who do not adopt his code of conduct as not being as morally good as he is, without judging them to be immoral if they do not adopt it. For it may be that the individual would not be willing for others to try to follow that code, because of worries about the bad effects of predictable failures due to partiality or lack of sufficient foresight or intelligence. Many moral skeptics would reject the claim that there are any universal ethical claims, where the ethical is a broader category than the moral. But another interesting class of moral skeptics includes those who think that we should only abandon the narrower category of the moral—partly because of the notion of a code that is central to that category. These moral skeptics hold that we should do our ethical theorizing in terms of the good life, or the virtues. Elizabeth Anscombe gave expression to this kind of view, which also finds echoes in the work of Bernard Williams. On the other hand, some virtue theorists might take perfect rationality to entail virtue, and might understand morality to be something like the code that such a person would implicitly endorse by acting in virtuous ways. In that case, even a virtue theorist might count as a moral realist in the sense above. But this appearance is deceptive. And the act-consequentialist J. Smart is also explicit that he is thinking of ethics as the study of how it is most rational to behave. His embrace of utilitarianism is the result of his belief that maximizing utility is always the rational thing to do. On reflection this is not surprising. What is that to me? Even fewer think this option remains open if we are allowed to add some additional conditions beyond mere rationality: Definitions of morality in the normative sense—and, consequently, moral theories—differ in their accounts of rationality, and in their specifications of the conditions under which all rational persons would necessarily endorse the code of conduct that therefore would count as morality. These definitions and theories also differ in how they understand what it is to endorse a code in the relevant way. Some hold that morality applies only to those rational beings that have certain specific features of human beings: These features might, for example, include fallibility and vulnerability. Other moral theories claim to put forward an account of morality that provides a guide to all rational beings, even if these beings do not have these human characteristics, e. Among such theorists it is also common to hold that morality should never be overridden. That is, it is common to hold that no one should ever violate a moral prohibition or requirement for non-moral reasons. Though common, this view is by no means always taken as definitional. Sidgwick despaired of showing that rationality required us to choose morality over egoism, though he certainly did not think rationality required egoism either. More explicitly, Gert held that though moral behavior is always rationally permissible, it is not always rationally required. Foot seems to have held that any reason—and therefore any rational requirement—to act morally would have to stem from a contingent commitment or an objective interest. And she also seems to have held that sometimes neither of these sorts of reasons might be available. Indeed, it is possible that morality, in the normative sense, has never been put forward by any particular society, by any group at all, or even by any individual. That is, one might claim that the guides to behavior of some societies lack so many of the essential features of morality, in the normative sense, that it is incorrect to say that these societies even have a morality in a descriptive sense. This is an extreme view, however. A more moderate position would hold that all societies have something that can be regarded as their morality, but that many of these moralities—perhaps, indeed, all of them—are defective. That is, a moral realist might hold that although these actual guides to behavior have enough of the features of normative morality to be classified as descriptive moralities, they would not be endorsed in their entirety by all moral agents. Moral realists do not claim that any actual society has or has ever had morality as its actual guide to conduct. In the theological version of natural law theories, such as that put forward by Aquinas, this is because God implanted this knowledge in the reason of all persons. In the secular version of natural law theories, such as that put forward by Hobbes, natural reason is sufficient to allow all rational persons to know what morality prohibits, requires, etc. Natural law theorists also claim that morality applies to all rational persons, not only those now living, but also those who lived in the past. In contrast to natural law theories, other moral theories

do not hold quite so strong a view about the universality of knowledge of morality. Still, many hold that morality is known to all who can legitimately be judged by it.

Chapter 3 : What is the Difference Between Ethics and Morals?

It argues that nursing is an inherently moral practice and that this places moral obligations on individual nurses to cultivate the sort of disposition necessary to ensure their actions enable, rather than diminish, human flourishing.

Ancient Greek Philosophy We can start with the Greeks, and this means starting with Homer, a body of texts transmitted first orally and then written down in the seventh century BCE. So what does the relation between morality and religion look like in Homer? The first thing to say is that the gods and goddesses of the Homeric poems behave remarkably like the noble humans described in the same poems, even though the humans are mortal and the gods and goddesses immortal. Both groups are motivated by the desire for honor and glory, and are accordingly jealous when they receive less than they think they should while others receive more, and work ceaselessly to rectify this. The two groups are not however symmetrical, because the noble humans have the same kind of client relation to the divinities as subordinate humans do to them. This includes, for example, sanctuaries devoted to them, dedications, hymns, dances, libations, rituals, prayers, festivals and sacrifices. There is a clear analogy with purely human client-relations, which are validated in the Homeric narrative, since the poems were probably originally sung at the courts of the princes who claimed descent from the heroes whose exploits make up the story. The gods and goddesses are not, however, completely at liberty. It is sometimes said that the Presocratic philosophers come out of Homer by rejecting religion in favor of science. When Anaximenes around talks of air as the primary element differing in respect of thinness and thickness, or Heraclitus explains all change as a pattern in the turnings of fire igniting in measures and going out in measures, they are not giving stories with plot-lines involving quasi-human intentions and frustrations DK 13, A 5, DK 22, B But it is wrong to say that they have left religion behind. Heraclitus puts this enigmatically by saying that the one and only wisdom does and does not consent to be called Zeus DK 22, B He is affirming the divinity of this wisdom, but denying the anthropomorphic character of much Greek religion. The sophists, to whom Socrates responded, rejected this tie between human law and divine law and this was in part because of their expertise in rhetoric, by which they taught their students how to manipulate the deliberations of popular assemblies, and so change the laws to their own advantage. The most famous case is Protagoras c. Protagoras is not correctly seen here as skeptical about morality or religion. But as Plato c. His view of what this justice is, namely the interest of the stronger, is disputed by Plato. But the claim that justice operates at both the divine and human levels is common ground. Euthyphro is taking his own father to court for murder, and though ordinary Greek morality would condemn such an action as impiety, Euthyphro defends it on the basis that the gods behave in the same sort of way, according to the traditional stories. Socrates makes it clear that he does not believe these stories, because they attribute immorality to the gods. This does not mean, however, that he does not believe in the gods. He points to the spirit who gives him commands about what not to do Apology, 31d , and we learn later that he found it significant that this voice never told him to stop conducting his trial in the way that in fact led to his death Ibid. Socrates interpreted this as an invitation from the gods to die, thus refuting the charge that, by conducting his trial in the way he did, he was guilty of theft " i. Socrates makes it clear that his view is the second though he does not argue for this conclusion in addressing this question, and he is probably relying on the earlier premise, at Euthyphro, 7c10f, that we love things because of the properties they have. But his view is not an objection to tying morality and religion together. He hints at the end of the dialogue Euthyphro, 13de that the right way to link them is to see that when we do good we are serving the gods well. Plato probably does not intend for us to construe the dialogues together as a single philosophical system, and we must not erase the differences between them. But it is significant that in the Theaetetus b , Socrates says again that our goal is to be as like the god as possible, and since the god is in no way and in no manner unjust, but as just as it is possible to be, nothing is more like the god than the one among us who becomes correspondingly as just as possible. In several dialogues this thought is connected with a belief in the immortality of the soul; we become like the god by paying attention to the immortal and best part of ourselves e. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul is also tied to the doctrine of the Forms, whereby things with characteristics that we experience in this life e. This train of thought sees the

god or gods as like a magnet, drawing us to be like them by the power of their goodness or excellence. Mention of the divine is not merely conventional for Aristotle, but does important philosophical work. In the Eudemian Ethics 1022 he tells us that the goal of our lives is service and contemplation of the god. He thinks that we become like what we contemplate, and so we become most like the god by contemplating the god. Incidentally, this is why the god does not contemplate us; for this would mean becoming less than the god, which is impossible. As in Plato, the well-being of the city takes precedence over the individual, and this, too, is justified theologically. It is nobler and more divine to achieve an end for a city than for an individual NE 1099 Aristotle draws a distinction between what we honor and what we merely commend NE, 1102a There are six states for a human life, on a normative scale from best to worst: The highest form of happiness, which he calls blessedness, is something we honor as we honor gods, whereas virtue we merely commend. It would be as wrong to commend blessedness as it would be to commend gods NE, 1102a The activity of the god, he says in the Metaphysics, is nous thinking itself b The best human activity is the most god-like, namely thinking about the god and about things that do not change. This gives him a defense against the charge sometimes made against virtue theories that they simply embed the prevailing social consensus into an account of human nature. Aristotle defines ethical virtue as lying in a mean between excess and defect, and the mean is determined by the person of practical wisdom actually the male, since Aristotle is sexist on this point. He then gives a conventional account of the virtues such a person displays such as courage, literally manliness, which requires the right amount of fear and confidence, between cowardice and rashness. It is not clear whether the Nicomachean Ethics has a consistent view of the relation between the activity of contemplation and the other activities of a virtuous life see Hare, *God and Morality*, chapter 1, and Sarah Broadie, *Ethics with Aristotle*, chapter 7. But the connection of the highest human state with the divine is pervasive in the text. One result of this connection is the eudaimonism mentioned earlier. If the god does not care about what is not divine for this would be to become like what is not divine, the highest and most god-like human also does not care about other human beings except to the degree they contribute to his own best state. This degree is not negligible, since humans are social animals, and their well-being depends on the well-being of the families and cities of which they are members. Aristotle is not preaching self-sufficiency in any sense that implies we could be happy on our own, isolated from other human beings. But our concern for the well-being of other people is always, for him, contingent on our special relation to them. We therefore do not want our friends to become gods, even though that would be the best thing for them. Finally, Aristotle ties our happiness to our end in Greek, *telos*; for humans, as for all living things, the best state is its own activity in accordance with the natural function that is unique to each species. For humans the best state is happiness, and the best activity within this state is contemplation NE, 1177a The Epicureans and Stoics who followed Aristotle differed with each other and with him in many ways, but they agreed in tying morality and religion together. For the Epicureans, the gods do not care about us, though they are entertained by looking at our tragicomic lives rather as we look at soap operas on television. We can be released from a good deal of anxiety, the Epicureans thought, by realizing that the gods are not going to punish us. Our goal should be to be as like the gods as we can, enjoying ourselves without interruption, but for us this means limiting our desires to what we can obtain without frustration. They did not mean that our happiness is self-interested in any narrow sense, because they held that we can include others in our happiness by means of our sympathetic pleasures. The Stoics likewise tied the best kind of human life, for them the life of the sage, to being like the divine. The sage follows nature in all his desires and actions, and is thus the closest to the divine. Such commands come already in the first chapter of Genesis. In the second chapter God tells Adam that he is free to eat from any tree in the garden, but he must not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. When Eve and Adam disobey and eat of that fruit, they are expelled from the garden. There is a family of concepts here that is different from what we met in Greek philosophy. God is setting up a kind of covenant by which humans will be blessed if they obey the commands God gives them. Human disobedience is not explained in the text, except that the serpent says to Eve that they will not die if they eat the fruit, but will be like God, knowing good and evil, and Eve sees the fruit as good for food and pleasing to the eye and desirable for gaining wisdom. After they eat, Adam and Eve know that they are naked, and are ashamed, and hide from God. As the story goes on, and Cain kills Abel, evil

spreads to all the people of the earth, and Genesis describes the basic state as a corruption of the heart 6: Then there is the command to Abraham to kill his son, a deed prevented at the last minute by the provision of a ram instead Gen. Under Moses the people are finally liberated, and during their wanderings in the desert, Moses receives from God the Ten Commandments, in two tables or tablets Exod. The second table concerns our obligations to other human beings, and all of the commands are negative do not kill, commit adultery, steal, lie, or covet except for the first, which tells us to honor our fathers and mothers. The Greeks had the notion of a kingdom, under a human king though the Athenians were in the classical period suspicious of such an arrangement. But they did not have the idea of a kingdom of God, though there is something approaching this in some of the Stoics. This idea is explicable in terms of law, and is introduced as such in Exodus in connection with the covenant on Mt. The kingdom is the realm in which the laws obtain. This raises a question about the extent of this realm. The surrounding laws in the Pentateuch include prescriptions and proscriptions about ritual purity and sacrifice and the use of the land that seem to apply to this particular people in this particular place. But the covenant that God makes with Noah after the flood is applicable to the whole human race, and universal scope is explicit in the Wisdom books, which make a continual connection between how we should live and how we were created as human beings. For example, in Proverbs 8 Wisdom raises her voice to all humankind, and says that she detests wickedness, which she goes on to describe in considerable detail. The New Testament is unlike the Hebrew Bible, however, in presenting a narrative about a man who is the perfect exemplification of obedience and who has a life without sin. New Testament scholars disagree about the extent to which Jesus actually claimed to be God, but the traditional interpretation is that he did make this claim; in any case the Christian doctrine is that we can see in his life the clearest possible revelation in human terms both of what God is like and at the same time of what our lives ought to be like. He takes the commandments inside the heart; for example, we are required not merely not to murder, but not to be angry, and not merely not to commit adultery, but not to lust see Ezekiel Jesus tells us to love our enemies and those who hate and persecute us, and in this way he makes it clear that the love commandment is not based on reciprocity Matt 5: This event is understood in many different ways in the New Testament, but one central theme is that Jesus died on our behalf, an innocent man on behalf of the guilty. Jesus describes the paradigm of loving our neighbors as the willingness to die for them. And we are given the hope of future progress in holiness by the work of the Holy Spirit Rom. All of this theology requires more detailed analysis, but this is not the place for it. There is a contrast between the two traditions I have so far described, namely the Greek and the Judeo-Christian. The idea of God that is central in Greek philosophy is the idea of God attracting us, like a kind of magnet, so that we desire to become more like God, though there is a minority account by Socrates of receiving divine commands. In the Jewish and Christian scriptures, the notion of God commanding us is central. It is tempting to simplify this contrast by saying that the Greeks favor the good, in their account of the relation of morality and religion, and the Judeo-Christian account favors the right or obligation. It is true that the notion of obligation makes most sense against the background of command. The Middle Ages The rest of the history to be described in this entry is a cross-fertilization of these two traditions or lines of thought. In the patristic period, or the period of the early Fathers, it was predominantly Plato and the Stoics amongst the Greek philosophers whose influence was felt. The Eastern and Western parts of the Christian church split during the period, and the Eastern church remained more comfortable than the Western with language about humans being deified in Greek theosis.

Chapter 4 : Buddhism - Principles of Moral Thought and Action

Description: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice is a peer-reviewed journal which aims to publish the best work produced in all fields of ethics. It welcomes high quality submissions regardless of the tradition or school of thought from which they derive.

Rebecca Kukla The Great Debates 4. The Theory of Morality. University of Chicago Press, The Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Oxford University Press; , at 6. Oxford University Press; Oxford University Press; , at 3, emphasis added. They also acknowledge committed to morality. In defending the descriptive when it comes to actual concrete claim, they rely on commonsense naturalistic ethical reasoning. My support of this claim. Beauchamp and tional normative force to that which Childress invoke at least three kinds of we in fact believe, it leaves no room answers to this question. I want to normative force is thus grounded in rethink our understanding of what sort their instrumental utility. I begin with a critical cover but in conceptual analysis. What answers are problematic. It may or may theorizing from a naturalistic stance” not be true that the norms that instru- one that acknowledges inescapable mentally promote some separate goals constraints on our moral reasoning that of morality or that those that constitute are imposed in virtue of the kinds of our concept of morality are universally empirical beings that we happen to accepted; the question seems irrelevant be and how we actually find ourselves to justifying or substantiating their nor- reasoning and responding in everyday normative force. If we plump for 1, on the life, and 2 the commitment to the idea other hand, then we seem to be missing that despite our dramatic moral disagree- an argument. Is the commonness of ments, there is an important sense in a moral commitment supposed to be which we all inhabit a common moral evidence for its normative force? I also think that it is the sufficient basis for justification, because correct answer, in an unusual sense that the body of substantive judgments I develop later. But there is no direct and principles that cohere could argument for this in the text or in later themselves be morally unsatisfactory. As things nity of marauders circa , this creed stand, it is unclear on any of the three for pirates is a coherent, carefully delin- readings what normative work the com- eated set of rules. This body of sub- monness of common morality is doing stantive rules and principles is a moral for Beauchamp and Childress, even if outrage. We start in ethics, as else- judge people who have different moral where, with a particular set of beliefs” beliefs and practices than we do. This the set of considered judgments that zeal leads them to two confusions, one are acceptable initially without argu- of which I can clear up quickly, and the mentative support. We cannot justify other of which I discuss extensively every moral judgment in terms of below. The avenue of escape two things are sutured together. But is to accept some judgments as justified of course they are not. There could without recourse to other judgments. Any Second, they think that in order to moral certitude associated with these avoid a coherentism that leads to per- norms should derive from beliefs that vicious relativism, there must be some are acquired, tested, and modified over norms, grounded in our naturalistic time. This idea I take up in the and acceptable among pirates, fails the following section. Because it is coherent, we will not scope and more exceptions. Meanwhile, John Arras reminds within. Thus such methods alone are not us that when it comes to the necessary enough, and we need some fixed four- specification and balancing process, dational principles that are not them- Beauchamp and Childress do not believe selves justified in a coherentist fashion, in metaprinciples but rely on reflec- which can be used to critique and con- tive equilibrium. But, he argues, our strain local systems. If their naturalistic history of stability and you do not like the way the process of refinement. And these, presumably, will reflective equilibrium is going, if you be the principles that make up the com- think that it currently overlooks some mon morality. Thus holding some prin- cal role here yet. But even putting that ciples fixed may enhance rather than aside, I am not convinced that they can fix the ungroundedness of coherentist get out of the problem they think that justification. Nor am I convinced that pirates lem that Beauchamp and Childress think pose the kind of problem that they think they do, and thereby lay the ground- they pose. I take these points up in turn. Pirates had to live by from being at home within a familiar these rules. To a large extent, the nor- habitus. Beauchamp try to make our explicitly codified gen- and Childress focus their theoretical eral rules coherent with one another. Jackie Leach Scully does a lovely

that the coherentists have the problem job of explaining the notion: Moral life is quite frequently Much of our conscious understanding fraught with tensions and contradic- emerges from a prereflexive back- tions; although descriptive facts have to ground of meaning. Moreover, this be logically consistent with one another, background of meaning is carried my normative commitments do not. The eral rules, then we also notice that bodily understanding of the habitus is carried as a feel for the right pirates did not form a hermetically behavior. There is a sense of effort- sealed-off moral community. Although lessnessâ€”no perception of reality the habitus of each group is different, being organized, but rather a feeling these are not well-bounded; they are of obvious rightnessâ€”that results interpenetrating. No group is isolated, 80 The Great Debates but pirates in particular, by definition, to steal from merchant marines and interacted with nonpirates in systematic rape their women, then this is behav- ways. And so they had to have norms ior within the world of the merchant most likely a mix of implicit and marines, and they can judge it using explicit norms that governed not only the normative standards that shape that their interactions with one another but world. In sum, we have no prima facie reason Their way of life was thoroughly entan- to accept that pirates actually had a gled with the ways of life of merchant coherent moral system. And whether or marines, royal navy members, and not their moral system was coherent, the goodness knows whom else. I admit full moral resources of all the communi- to being no pirate scholar. And thus tent members of their own community there is nothing about pirates that unless they grasped the norms that drives us to insist on a body of non- governed ordering rum from bartend- negotiable moral principles, common ers and propositioning port prostitutes. We need to know ory. In doing so I take myself to owe whether the institutions of piracy were three things: First, we do not have mon morality helps ground or justify enough evidence to decide whether or particular moral judgments. This section not the moral system of seventeenth- takes up the first two debts, and the final century pirates was coherent. Second, section takes up the last. If we try to test the uni- moral systems are inextricably inter- versality of some rule, we have to twined. Third, because moral systems pick some discursive formulation of are thus entangled, the standard rela- it. Different formulations will vary in tivist worry that there is no justification their clarity and connotations to differ- for using imported, outside standards to ent audiences. It seems unlikely that judge a local moral system does not get we could come up with a formulation off the ground. Insofar as moral com- of any principle that everyone will sign munity A and B have high-bandwidth on to. If it is part of pirate life the rules, apply them differently, and 81 The Great Debates resolve conflicts between them differ- is common between almost all of us, ently. We cannot, therefore, read whether I am pushing, is notâ€”or at least not someone accepts a rule off of whether relevantlyâ€”the acceptance of a set of her particular actions accord with it, abstract moral principles, but an end- nor off of whether she agrees with a lessly complex yet remarkably stable particular formulation of it. Thus it is web of embodied normative responses, unclear how to distinguish, even in coping techniques, perceptual skills, theory, between disagreements over communicative rituals, ways of mak- whether a principle should be accepted ing public our desires and needs, and and disagreements over how to inter- so on. So the Of course, this shared understanding hypothesis that there are universally breaks down often. Peopleâ€”especially accepted rules is not only hard to test across large culture gapsâ€”accidentally but perhaps ill defined. Rarely, an outlier general rules. Other authors who have group of people comes into being whose claimed that moral reasoning always moral life depends essentially on remain- occurs within a habitus have typically ing truly insensate to the moral claims, emphasized the differences between local needs, and responses of some other habitus. For example, Jackie Scully21 group, as in Nazi Germany. My place in community. And certainly such differ- this article is not to explain this suc- ences exist and are morally and philo- cess, but just to note it. Perhaps our sophically important. But as we move shared biological features and needs though the human worldâ€”including to do some explanatory work; perhaps its distant reachesâ€”we are remarkably this shared space is just the sedimented good at successfully interacting with product of tens of thousands of years other people. We tions and their motives. We manage to might find many aspects of the pirate engage in transactions with others that lifestyle morally unacceptable. But they successfully institute binding promises, shared enough embodied normative convey invitations and gratitude, lead understanding with the nonpirates us to understand when others are resist- around them that they could barter, ing or suffering, and so on. In

these senses, not only dignity. This may not sound like moral did their habitus intersect with others, agreement in the traditional sense, if but in an important sense they shared a we are used to thinking of morality as a larger habitus with the nonpirate world set of abstract rules. But it is enabled by that made such transactions and under- and manifests a shared space of embod- standings possible. What our embodied practices and normative 82 The Great Debates responses, or how stable this overlap In the previous section I argued that must be, in order for us to count as our evidence for the existence of com- sharing a habitus. Thus the idea of try- mon morality, in my sense, is transcen- ing to establish the existence of a shared dental in the technical Kantian sense: Instead, the our widespread ability to engage in evidence that we share a habitus is concrete moral reasoning and norma- transcendentalâ€”that is, it is a condition tive transaction and response. Likewise, for the possibility of humans getting by I want to argue that its normative role in the world with one another, which in moral reasoning is likewise transcen- we basically do. But we saw with one another would have no prac- early on that any such independent jus- tical import at all. This or risk a naturalistic fallacy in taking is a kind of naturalistic transcendental norms to be automatically legitimate in evidence; our everyday observations virtue of their commonality. My sugges- about our basic ability to engage in nor- tion is that they were looking for the mative transactions with one another wrong kind of justification and method- make it clear that we jointly participate ological role for the norms of common in a reasonably stable shared normative morality. We do not convince ourselves life. We are rarely totally morally mys- of the independent security of these terious to one another. We can try to reason in abstraction must exist, given that we do in fact from it, but if we do, our moral con- manage to respond to and engage in nor- cepts will become practically empty, and mative transactions with one another. It is to out of it as a starting point for moral the normative status and methodologi- reasoning, not in the sense that we have cal role of common morality that I independently become convinced of the finally turn. It is the dition for the possibility of practically necessary place from which we start applicable moral reasoning with and our moral reasoning, but it is not nec- about one another. The universal accep- essarily where we end it. Everyone participates cover that we are all radically wrong in common morality, and its critical about what morality demands. There resources are likewise available to every- is no possibility of a sudden moral one. Hence common morality can be revolution, as any new norm can only used as a critical tool against abhorrent get a grip if it gels and intersects, in a local bodies of moral norms. There are practically sustainable way, with stable no hermetically insulated moral com- and widespread existing norms.

Chapter 5 : Interesting And Knowledgeable Questions Related To Ethics - ProProfs Quiz

moral decline is the fact that the living conditions of the modern world that emerged since sedentariness and the beginning of agriculture are completely different compared to those of SBHG due to cultural and technological developments.

Systematically individualize instructional variables to maximize the learning outcomes of individuals with exceptionalities 1. Identify and use evidence-based practices that are appropriate to their professional preparation and are most effective in meeting the individual needs of individuals with exceptionalities. Use periodic assessments to accurately measure the learning progress of individuals with exceptionalities, and individualize instruction variables in response to assessment results. Create safe, effective, and culturally responsive learning environments which contribute to fulfillment of needs, stimulation of learning, and realization of positive self-concepts. Participate in the selection and use of effective and culturally responsive instructional materials, equipment, supplies, and other resources appropriate to their professional roles. Use culturally and linguistically appropriate assessment procedures that accurately measure what is intended to be measured, and do not discriminate against individuals with exceptional or culturally diverse learning needs. Only use behavior change practices that are evidence-based, appropriate to their preparation, and which respect the culture, dignity, and basic human rights of individuals with exceptionalities. Support the use of positive behavior supports and conform to local policies relating to the application of disciplinary methods and behavior change procedures, except when the policies require their participation in corporal punishment. Refrain from using aversive techniques unless the target of the behavior change is vital, repeated trials of more positive and less restrictive methods have failed, and only after appropriate consultation with parents and appropriate agency officials. Do not engage in the corporal punishment of individuals with exceptionalities. Report instances of unprofessional or unethical practice to the appropriate supervisor. Recommend special education services necessary for an individual with an exceptional learning need to receive an appropriate education. Represent themselves in an accurate, ethical, and legal manner with regard to their own knowledge and expertise when seeking employment. Ensure that persons who practice or represent themselves as special education teachers, administrators, and providers of related services are qualified by professional credential. Practice within their professional knowledge and skills and seek appropriate external support and consultation whenever needed. Provide notice consistent with local education agency policies and contracts when intending to leave employment. Adhere to the contracts and terms of appointment, or provide the appropriate supervisor notice of professionally untenable conditions and intent to terminate such employment, if necessary. Advocate for appropriate and supportive teaching and learning conditions. Advocate for sufficient personnel resources so that unavailability of substitute teachers or support personnel, including paraeducators, does not result in the denial of special education services. Seek professional assistance in instances where personal problems interfere with job performance. Ensure that public statements made by professionals as individuals are not construed to represent official policy statements of an agency. Respond objectively and non-discriminatively when evaluating applicants for employment including grievance procedures. Resolve professional problems within the workplace using established procedures. Seek clear written communication of their duties and responsibilities, including those that are prescribed as conditions of employment. Expect that responsibilities will be communicated to and respected by colleagues, and work to ensure this understanding and respect. Promote educational quality and actively participate in the planning, policy development, management, and evaluation of special education programs and the general education program. Expect adequate supervision of and support for special education professionals and programs provided by qualified special education professionals. Expect clear lines of responsibility and accountability in the administration and supervision of special education professionals Professional Development Special Education Professionals: Maintain a personalized professional development plan designed to advance their knowledge and skills, including cultural competence, systematically in order to maintain a high level of competence. Maintain current knowledge of procedures, policies, and laws relevant to practice. Engage in the objective and systematic evaluation of

themselves, colleagues, services, and programs for the purpose of continuous improvement of professional performance. Advocate that the employing agency provide adequate resources for effective school-wide professional development as well as individual professional development plans. Participate in systematic supervised field experiences for candidates in preparation programs. Participate as mentors to other special educators, as appropriate. Professional Colleagues Special Education Professionals: Recognize and respect the skill and expertise of professional colleagues from other disciplines as well as from colleagues in their own disciplines. Strive to develop positive and respectful attitudes among professional colleagues and the public toward persons with exceptional learning needs. Collaborate with colleagues from other agencies to improve services and outcomes for individuals with exceptionalities. Collaborate with both general and special education professional colleagues as well as other personnel serving individuals with exceptionalities to improve outcomes for individuals with exceptionalities. Do not engage in conflicts of interest. Assure that special education paraeducators have appropriate training for the tasks they are assigned. Assign only tasks for which paraeducators have been appropriately prepared. Provide ongoing information to paraeducators regarding their performance of assigned tasks. Provide timely, supportive, and collegial communications to paraeducators regarding tasks and expectations. Parents and Families Special Education Professionals: Use culturally appropriate communication with parents and families that is respectful and accurately understood. Actively seek and use the knowledge of parents and individuals with exceptionalities when planning, conducting, and evaluating special education services and empower them as partners in the educational process. Maintain communications among parents and professionals with appropriate respect for privacy, confidentiality, and cultural diversity. Promote opportunities for parent education using accurate, culturally appropriate information and professional methods. Inform parents of relevant educational rights and safeguards. Recognize and practice in ways that demonstrate respect for the cultural diversity within the school and community. Respect professional relationships with students and parents, neither seeking any personal advantage, nor engaging in inappropriate relationships. Research Special Education Professionals: Do not knowingly use research in ways that mislead others. Actively support and engage in research intended to improve the learning outcomes of persons with exceptional learning needs. Protect the rights and welfare of participants in research. Interpret and publish research results with accuracy. Monitor unintended consequences of research projects involving individuals with exceptionalities, and discontinue activities which may cause harm in excess of approved levels. Advocate for sufficient resources to support long term research agendas to improve the practice of special education and the learning outcomes of individuals with exceptionalities. Case Management Special Education Professionals: Maintain accurate student records and assure that appropriate confidentiality standards are in place and enforced. Follow appropriate procedural safeguards and assist the school in providing due process. Provide accurate student and program data to administrators, colleagues, and parents, based on efficient and objective record keeping practices. Maintain confidentiality of information except when information is released under specific conditions of written consent that meet confidentiality requirements. Engage in appropriate planning for the transition sequences of individuals with exceptionalities. Advocate that special education professionals not be expected to accept non-educational support tasks routinely.

Chapter 6 : Ethical Principles & Practice Standards

Ethical practice refers to the standards of professional conduct that any industry professional is expected to uphold. From medicine to business, all industries have some form of ethical practice required of their professional members. The Free Dictionary defines ethical practices as set standards.

Under deontology, an act may be considered right even if the act produces a bad consequence, [35] if it follows the rule or moral law. According to the deontological view, people have a duty to act in a way that does those things that are inherently good as acts "truth-telling" for example , or follow an objectively obligatory rule as in rule utilitarianism. Kant then argues that those things that are usually thought to be good, such as intelligence , perseverance and pleasure , fail to be either intrinsically good or good without qualification. Pleasure, for example, appears to not be good without qualification, because when people take pleasure in watching someone suffer, they make the situation ethically worse. He concludes that there is only one thing that is truly good: Nothing in the worldâ€”indeed nothing even beyond the worldâ€”can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a good will. Pragmatic ethics Associated with the pragmatists , Charles Sanders Peirce , William James , and especially John Dewey , pragmatic ethics holds that moral correctness evolves similarly to scientific knowledge: Thus, we should prioritize social reform over attempts to account for consequences, individual virtue or duty although these may be worthwhile attempts, if social reform is provided for. Ethics of care Care ethics contrasts with more well-known ethical models, such as consequentialist theories e. These values include the importance of empathetic relationships and compassion. Care-focused feminism is a branch of feminist thought, informed primarily by ethics of care as developed by Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings. Noddings proposes that ethical caring has the potential to be a more concrete evaluative model of moral dilemma than an ethic of justice. Role ethics Role ethics is an ethical theory based on family roles. Confucian roles are not rational , and originate through the xin, or human emotions. Anarchism Anarchist ethics is an ethical theory based on the studies of anarchist thinkers. The biggest contributor to the anarchist ethics is the Russian zoologist, geographer, economist, and political activist Peter Kropotkin. Kropotkin argues that ethics itself is evolutionary, and is inherited as a sort of a social instinct through cultural history, and by so, he rejects any religious and transcendental explanation of morality. The origin of ethical feeling in both animals and humans can be found, he claims, in the natural fact of "sociality" mutualistic symbiosis , which humans can then combine with the instinct for justice i. This principle of treating others as one wishes to be treated oneself, what is it but the very same principle as equality, the fundamental principle of anarchism? And how can any one manage to believe himself an anarchist unless he practices it? We do not wish to be ruled. And by this very fact, do we not declare that we ourselves wish to rule nobody? We do not wish to be deceived, we wish always to be told nothing but the truth. And by this very fact, do we not declare that we ourselves do not wish to deceive anybody, that we promise to always tell the truth, nothing but the truth, the whole truth? We do not wish to have the fruits of our labor stolen from us. By what right indeed can we demand that we should be treated in one fashion, reserving it to ourselves to treat others in a fashion entirely different? Our sense of equality revolts at such an idea. Postmodernism This article or section possibly contains synthesis of material which does not verifiably mention or relate to the main topic. Relevant discussion may be found on the talk page. July Learn how and when to remove this template message The 20th century saw a remarkable expansion and evolution of critical theory, following on earlier Marxist Theory efforts to locate individuals within larger structural frameworks of ideology and action. This was on the basis that personal identity was, at least in part, a social construction. Post-structuralism and postmodernism argue that ethics must study the complex and relational conditions of actions. A simple alignment of ideas of right and particular acts is not possible. There will always be an ethical remainder that cannot be taken into account or often even recognized. Such theorists find narrative or, following Nietzsche and Foucault, genealogy to be a helpful tool for understanding ethics because narrative is always about particular lived experiences in all their complexity rather than the assignment of an idea or norm to separate and individual actions. Zygmunt Bauman says postmodernity is best described as modernity

without illusion, the illusion being the belief that humanity can be repaired by some ethic principle. Postmodernity can be seen in this light as accepting the messy nature of humanity as unchangeable. Hoy describes post-critique ethics as the "obligations that present themselves as necessarily to be fulfilled but are neither forced on one or are enforceable" , p. Hoy concludes that The ethical resistance of the powerless others to our capacity to exert power over them is therefore what imposes unenforceable obligations on us. That actions are at once obligatory and at the same time unenforceable is what put them in the category of the ethical. Obligations that were enforced would, by the virtue of the force behind them, not be freely undertaken and would not be in the realm of the ethical. Applied ethics Applied ethics is a discipline of philosophy that attempts to apply ethical theory to real-life situations. The discipline has many specialized fields, such as engineering ethics , bioethics , geoethics , public service ethics and business ethics. Specific questions[edit] Applied ethics is used in some aspects of determining public policy, as well as by individuals facing difficult decisions. The sort of questions addressed by applied ethics include: But not all questions studied in applied ethics concern public policy. For example, making ethical judgments regarding questions such as, "Is lying always wrong? People, in general, are more comfortable with dichotomies two opposites. However, in ethics, the issues are most often multifaceted and the best-proposed actions address many different areas concurrently. In ethical decisions, the answer is almost never a "yes or no", "right or wrong" statement. Many buttons are pushed so that the overall condition is improved and not to the benefit of any particular faction. Particular fields of application[edit].

The American Nurses Association (ANA) Center for Ethics and Human Rights was established to help nurses navigate ethical and value conflicts, and life and death decisions, many of which are common to everyday practice.

Made in the Image of God The most basic principle of the Christian moral life is the awareness that every person bears the dignity of being made in the image of God. He has given us an immortal soul and through the gifts of intelligence and reason enables us to understand the order of things established in his creation. God has also given us a free will to seek and love what is true, good, and beautiful. Sadly, because of the Fall, we also suffer the impact of Original Sin, which darkens our minds, weakens our wills, and inclines us to sin. Baptism delivers us from Original Sin but not from its effects—especially the inclination to sin, concupiscence. Within us, then, is both the powerful surge toward the good because we are made in the image of God, and the darker impulses toward evil because of the effects of Original Sin. Thus we speak of the value, dignity, and goal of human life, even with its imperfections and struggles. Human life, as a profound unity of physical and spiritual dimensions, is sacred. It is distinct from all other forms of life, since it alone is imprinted with the very image of its Creator. The Responsible Practice of Freedom The second element of life in Christ is the responsible practice of freedom. Without freedom, we cannot speak meaningfully about morality or moral responsibility. Human freedom is more than a capacity to choose between this and that. It is the God-given power to become who he created us to be and so to share eternal union with him. God gave us intelligence and the capacity to act freely. Ultimately, human freedom lies in our free decision to say "yes" to God. In contrast, many people today understand human freedom merely as the ability to make a choice, with no objective norm or good as the goal. The Understanding of Moral Acts Another important foundation of Christian morality is the understanding of moral acts. Every moral act consists of three elements: For an individual act to be morally good, the object, or what we are doing, must be objectively good. Some acts, apart from the intention or reason for doing them, are always wrong because they go against a fundamental or basic human good that ought never to be compromised. Direct killing of the innocent, torture, and rape are examples of acts that are always wrong. Such acts are referred to as intrinsically evil acts, meaning that they are wrong in themselves, apart from the reason they are done or the circumstances surrounding them. The goal, end, or intention is the part of the moral act that lies within the person. For this reason, we say that the intention is the subjective element of the moral act. If we are motivated to do something by a bad intention—even something that is objectively good—our action is morally evil. It must also be recognized that a good intention cannot make a bad action something intrinsically evil good. We can never do something wrong or evil in order to bring about a good. This is the meaning of the saying, "the end does not justify the means" Catechism of the Catholic Church, nos. When the existence of sin is denied it can result in spiritual and psychological damage because it is ultimately a denial of the truth about ourselves. The Formation of Conscience The formation of a good conscience is another fundamental element of Christian moral teaching. Conscience represents both the more general ability we have as human beings to know what is good and right and the concrete judgments we make in particular situations concerning what we should do or about what we have already done. Moral choices confront us with the decision to follow or depart from reason and the divine law. A good conscience makes judgments that conform to reason and the good that is willed by the Wisdom of God. A good conscience requires lifelong formation. Each baptized follower of Christ is obliged to form his or her conscience according to objective moral standards. The Word of God is a principal tool in the formation of conscience when it is assimilated by study, prayer, and practice. The prudent advice and good example of others support and enlighten our conscience. The authoritative teaching of the Church is an essential element in our conscience formation. Finally, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, combined with regular examination of our conscience, will help us develop a morally sensitive conscience. The Excellence of Virtues The Christian moral life is one that seeks to cultivate and practice virtue. An effective moral life demands the practice of both human and theological virtues. Human virtues form the soul with the habits of mind and will that support moral behavior, control passions, and avoid sin. Virtues guide our conduct according to the dictates of faith

and reason, leading us toward freedom based on self-control and toward joy in living a good moral life. Compassion, responsibility, a sense of duty, self-discipline and restraint, honesty, loyalty, friendship, courage, and persistence are examples of desirable virtues for sustaining a moral life. Historically, we group the human virtues around what are called the Cardinal Virtues. The four Cardinal Virtues are prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. There are a number of ways in which we acquire human virtues. They are acquired by frequent repetition of virtuous acts that establish a pattern of virtuous behavior. There is a reciprocal relationship between virtue and acts because virtue, as an internal reality, disposes us to act externally in morally good ways. Yet it is through doing good acts in the concrete that the virtue within us is strengthened and grows. The human virtues are also acquired through seeing them in the good example of others and through education in their value and methods to acquire them. Stories that inspire us to want such virtues help contribute to their growth within us. They are gained by a strong will to achieve such ideals. The Theological Virtues of faith, hope, and charity love are those virtues that relate directly to God. These are not acquired through human effort but, beginning with Baptism, they are infused within us as gifts from God. They dispose us to live in relationship with the Holy Trinity. Faith, hope, and charity influence human virtues by increasing their stability and strength for our lives. Each of the Ten Commandments forbids certain sins, but each also points to virtues that will help us avoid such sins. Virtues such as generosity, poverty of spirit, gentleness, purity of heart, temperance, and fortitude assist us in overcoming and avoiding what are called the seven deadly or Capital Sins—pride, avarice or greed, envy, anger, lust, gluttony, and sloth or laziness—which are those sins that engender other sins and vices. Love, Rules and Grace Our culture frequently exalts individual autonomy against community and tradition. This can lead to a suspicion of rules and norms that come from a tradition. This can also be a cause of a healthy criticism of a legalism that can arise from concentrating on rules and norms. Advocates of Christian morality can sometimes lapse into a legalism that leads to an unproductive moralizing. There is no doubt that love has to be the essential foundation of the moral life. But just as essential in this earthly realm are rules and laws that show how love may be applied in real life. In heaven, love alone will suffice. In this world, we need moral guidance from the Commandments, the Sermon on the Mount, the Precepts of the Church and other rules to see how love works. Love alone, set adrift from moral direction, can easily descend into sentimentality that puts us at the mercy of our feelings. Popular entertainment romanticizes love and tends to omit the difficult demands of the moral order. In our permissive culture, love is sometimes so romanticized that it is separated from sacrifice. Because of this, tough moral choices cannot be faced. The absence of sacrificial love dooms the possibility of an authentic moral life. Scripturally and theologically, the Christian moral life begins with a loving relationship with God, a covenant love made possible by the sacrifice of Christ. The Commandments and other moral rules are given to us as ways of protecting the values that foster love of God and others. They provide us with ways to express love, sometimes by forbidding whatever contradicts love. The moral life requires grace. The Catechism speaks of this in terms of life in Christ and the inner presence of the Holy Spirit, actively enlightening our moral compass and supplying the spiritual strength to do the right thing. The grace that comes to us from Christ in the Spirit is as essential as love and rules and, in fact, makes love and keeping the rules possible.

Chapter 8 : Morality - Wikipedia

Professional ethical principles and practice standards reinforce respect of diverse characteristics and needs of individuals with exceptionalities and their families.

Ethics and Community Principles of Moral Thought and Action One of the fundamental Buddhist principles of moral thought and action is karma. A related concept fundamental to Buddhism is merit. Acts of generosity toward and support of Buddhist monks are channeled by the monks toward advancement for the giver in future rebirths or toward improving the lot of deceased relatives. The motivation for following the Four Noble Truths is not to "be good" per se, but to facilitate the realization the Buddhists call enlightenment. The English translation of the terms within the path does nothing to dispel the impression that the Eightfold Path is a series of moral injunctions – "right effort," "right livelihood," etc. Even in the early texts, the Buddha often mentioned "do not's" when discussing the Eightfold Path. The eight items in the Eightfold Path are often divided into three categories: These classifications are aids to remembering and understanding the nature of each item in the list. It is important to note that the Eightfold Path is not a series of consecutive steps like the 12 steps of Alcoholics Anonymous. In a sense, each is a path in and of itself. For example, it is not necessary to establish "right understanding" before undertaking "right livelihood. Recalling that the first step in dependent arising is ignorance, it is not surprising that the first item the Buddha mentioned in listing the Eightfold Path was right understanding. To cultivate right thought is to avoid unhealthy states of mind that give rise to suffering, such as greed or anger or hatred. This path is not just about avoidance, however; often called right aspiration, it involves actively cultivating compassionate thoughts and positive wishes for others. Right conduct Shila 3. The Buddha taught that wrong speech included lying, slander, harsh words, and gossip. As in the previous case, it is not enough simply to avoid these; one must also cultivate speech that is kind and compassionate. Actions that are not "right" are those that are forbidden by the five precepts: Instead, one must act with respect, generosity, self-control, honesty, and compassion. One should not pursue an occupation that harms or exploits others, nor should one be motivated by a big salary or hope to earn more than one needs. Right practice Samadhi 6. This effort need not involve straining or struggling. Instead of trying to prevent wrong thoughts or speech, for example, one can, when they occur, simply let them go. One could try to understand them without allowing them to fester, or one could visualize the negative consequences if they are allowed to persist. Another method is to consciously cultivate more productive mental states. In addition, mindfulness is awareness of the nature of the world and its operations. This involves a one-pointed focus on spiritual realization. It is a way of avoiding distractions and disruptive emotions and directing the mind toward productive action. The Buddha taught specific practices to cultivate right concentration, forms of meditation that encouraged either tranquility or insight. The Eightfold Path, along with the concepts of merit and karma, while originally directed toward the ultimate goal of enlightenment, serve also as behavioral guidelines. Within the Buddhist world, these concepts effectively inspire moral behavior and foster social harmony. Describe the relationship of merit and karma. Describe how the eight items of the Eightfold Path are categorized. How do they relate to one another? Try our 3 most popular, or select from our huge collection of unique and thought-provoking newsletters. You can opt out of these offers at any time.

Chapter 9 : The Definition of Morality (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

With a clear presentation, Ethics: Theory and Practice educates readers about ethical theory and has them apply what they learn to specific classic and contemporary moral problems (lying, cheating, establishing ethical business practices, honoring ethical obligations in medicine, etc.).

This article has been cited by other articles in PMC. Abstract Moral distress in health care has been identified as a growing concern and a focus of research in nursing and health care for almost three decades. Researchers and theorists have argued that moral distress has both short and long-term consequences. Moral distress has implications for satisfaction, recruitment and retention of health care providers and implications for the delivery of safe and competent quality patient care. In over a decade of research on ethical practice, registered nurses and other health care practitioners have repeatedly identified moral distress as a concern and called for action. However, research and action on moral distress has been constrained by lack of conceptual clarity and theoretical confusion as to the meaning and underpinnings of moral distress. The goal of the symposium was to develop an agenda for action on moral distress in health care. We sought to develop a plan of action that would encompass recommendations for education, practice, research and policy. The papers in this special issue of HEC Forum arose from that symposium. In this first paper, we provide an introduction to moral distress; make explicit some of the challenges associated with theoretical and conceptual constructions of moral distress; and discuss the barriers to the development of research, education, and policy that could, if addressed, foster action on moral distress in health care practice. The following three papers were written by key international experts on moral distress, who explore in-depth the issues in three arenas: In the fifth and last paper in the series, we highlight key insights from the symposium and the papers in the series, propose to redefine moral distress, and outline directions for an agenda for action on moral distress in health care. Moral distress, Healthcare, Ethical practice, Recruitment, Retention Researchers have shown that moral distress is a wide spread problem for health care providers including nurses, pharmacists, social workers, physicians, and health care managers in a wide range of acute and community health care settings Brazil et al. Moral distress is defined variously in different studies. Moral distress, regardless of being understood differently in different studies, has been shown to have negative consequences, contributing to emotional distress e. Hamric and colleagues have suggested that when nurses experience moral distress they may respond in at least one of three ways Epstein and Hamric ; Hamric Research on moral distress has been plagued by a lack of conceptual and theoretical clarity that in turn, has hampered action on moral distress in education, policy and practice. Writing in an Irish context, McCarthy and Deady suggest that moral distress is a useful concept in nursing but that nursing discourse on moral distress has been confusing and counterproductive. They raise two concerns: McCarthy and Deady suggest that the concept of moral distress has perpetuated the meta-narrative of the moral suffering of nurses and the nurse as a victim. They observe that moral distress has been used with various understandings of preconditions for the development of such distress and conflated with psychological distress. These authors argue that we need a more critical stance towards moral distress and additional explorations of moral distress in relation to the ethical dimensions of practice. They suggest the need for an overhaul of the concept of moral distress including examination of philosophical perspectives informing moral decision making and accompanying emotional responses. Based on our own qualitative and quantitative work in relation to moral distress and ethical climates we heartily concur Pauly et al. Our research has highlighted concerns about moral distress in everyday nursing practice, and the limitations of the current state of knowledge development in relation to moral distress. In response to these emerging concerns, we convened a two day symposium on moral distress in health care Pauly et al. We invited key experts in the field to act as provocateurs in each of the following areas for action: We structured the sessions to be interactive and invited commentary in order to further dialogue on moral distress and promote the development of an agenda for action on moral distress. Over 75 people attended including international participants and representatives from a broad range of disciplines. The series of papers in this special issue of HEC Forum arose from this symposium. The purpose of this initial paper in the series is to examine the issues related to lack of conceptual

and theoretical clarity in work on moral distress in health care. Specially, we raised issues about the framing of moral distress in relation to individual and structural factors. In this paper, we provide an introduction to the concept of moral distress and make explicit some of the challenges associated with theoretical constructions of moral distress and the way in which these challenges have hampered action on moral distress in policy, research, practice and education. We argue that conceptual and theoretical clarity are key to development of an agenda on moral distress to guide policy, practice, education and research. This is particularly relevant to developing interventions, teaching practitioners, and guiding measurement and intervention research. Jameton first coined the term moral distress to capture the inability of nurses to act on what they believe is the right thing to do because of institutional constraints. As a follow-up to his initial work, Jameton suggested that individuals may experience initial and reactive moral distress. Reactive moral distress is a response to not acting on initial frustration experienced when encountering institutional obstacles and value conflicts. Based on their research with nurses, pharmacists, physicians and other clinical staff, these authors found that health care providers reported moral distress when they had to make difficult choices between following rules or following their conscience. Thus, they acted and made choices, but still experienced distress related to ethical dimensions of practice. This revised definition brings a clearer focus on both individual and structural factors in defining moral distress. Of note, they delineated the negative effects of unresolved moral distress: moral residue that can linger and impact practice overtime. Epstein and Hamric propose that moral residue unresolved and reactive moral distress is more common than has been previously recognized and likely exacerbated by problematic unit, team or institutional conditions. Webster and Baylis also observed that resolution of moral distress is a possible means of strengthening ethical practice in the future. In a review of moral distress literature, Hanna suggested that successful management of moral distress can be an opportunity for personal transformation and growth. However, we would add that successful management of moral distress by the individual requires attention to the broader structural conditions in which moral distress arises and can be resolved. For example, organizational and institutional supports are required to provide opportunities for resolution and attention to conditions are needed to prevent moral distress. Clearly, the relationships amongst individual experiences of moral distress, structural determinants of moral distress, moral agency and ethical action are not well understood. As described above, much of our understanding of moral distress is from reading of North American literature. Internationally, there is a body of work on moral distress, particularly emanating from the Scandinavian countries, that uses different terminologies to refer to what appear to be similar concepts Glasberg et al. While some of the differences might relate to translation alone, a greater understanding and integration of North American, Scandinavian and European concepts could be helpful to enhancing conceptual clarity of moral distress. The proliferation of writing and research on moral distress suggests that the phenomenon is an international concern, but there has been little work to assess the extent and degree to which this is the case or to examine structural conditions that give rise to different experiences of moral distress among health care providers. In the next paper, Hamric highlights problems associated with the lack of consistent definitions and suggests the need for a more universal definition of moral distress to guide quantitative research in this area. Further Hamric raises concerns about taking up Western-centric approaches to researching moral distress and the need for a cultural specific lens in moral distress research. For example, in their research with Ugandan nurses, Harrowing and Mill highlight the importance of the cultural context in shaping experiences of moral distress. Exploration of moral distress in various cultural contexts, guided by clearly explicitly theoretical and conceptual understandings of moral distress, is needed.

Empirical Research Tensions From our review and analysis of existing research, and the conceptual and theoretical issues outlined above, we have identified at least four challenges related to undertaking research on moral distress. These include 1 the fact that research on moral distress has been conducted predominantly with nurses in acute care in a North American context; 2 the predominance of quantitative studies of moral distress, particularly using one tool developed in a specific context; 3 the variable and limited attention to relationships among moral distress, moral agency and ethical climate; and 4 the limited attention to interventions or action to address concerns related to moral distress. Moral distress has been an issue and concern in nursing for over two decades and thus, has been a focus of considerable nursing research Wilkinson Most research on moral

distress has focused on moral distress in nursing, most often in acute care settings. Some have observed that nurses are in less powerful positions in the health care hierarchy, so it may be that the phenomena of moral distress has emerged as a focus of concern more commonly because nurses are often conceptualized as victims Hamric ; Hamric and Blackhall ; Ulrich et al. Researchers have undertaken a few investigations of moral distress from the perspective of managers, students, physicians, pharmacists and other health care providers in a variety of community and acute care settings Brazil et al. These investigations suggest that moral distress is experienced by other health care providers and in other settings. In particular, specific situations that give rise to moral distress vary based on position and profession; and the extent and degree of moral distress experienced varies across disciplines. In nursing, research on moral distress has focused on quantitatively measuring the extent and nature of moral distress among nurses in acute care settings Cavaliere et al. The MDS has been used widely in North America to examine perceptions of the degree and extent of moral distress Corley et al. Alternative measures have been used or are being developed. One such measure, called an ethics thermometer Wocial was introduced at the symposium. In her article in this issue, Hamric specifically addresses in depth critical issues related to the development of instruments to measure and monitor moral distress. Clarity and further theoretical development as to the role of individual and structural factors in the development of measures of moral distress are needed. Researchers studying moral distress have paid variable attention to institutional factors. For example, some studies of moral distress have incorporated measures of ethical climate. Perceptions of moral distress have been found to vary with perceptions of the ethical climate, one aspect of the organizational culture Corley et al. Researchers have argued that positive ethical climates are necessary to support professional nursing practice and resolution of moral distress McDaniel , ; Olson , ; Olson and Hooke In a series of studies, our research team found that nurses often found it difficult to enact their professional and ethical values as a consequence of constraints within their practice environments Rodney ; Rodney and Street ; Rodney et al. While organizational climates in health care have been implicated in the development of moral distress, much of the research on quality practice environments and workplaces has not included an explicit focus on ethical dimensions of the workplace Aiken et al. If researchers are to account for both individual and structural factors, then the relationships among moral distress, moral agency and ethical climate must be theorized more fully. In summary, current research is plagued by differing conceptualization of moral distress and, as identified at the outset, this variation has led to a situation in which research has variously emphasized individual and structural factors. However, there has been little discussion as to what structural interventions are required. As Hamric highlights in her paper, there has been limited research on interventions and it is not yet clear what kind of interventions should be pursued. We urge that conceptualization of moral distress and clarity as to the theoretical underpinnings of moral distress in relation to individual and structural factors is urgently needed to inform coherent and actionable recommendations for addressing negative consequences of moral distress. Limited Engagement with Policy and Politics Conceptualizing moral distress as both an individual and structural concern brings to the fore the importance of policy and political influences that shape the context of nursing and health care practice. In work on moral distress, there has been relatively limited engagement with the role of policy or political influences that shape institutional constraints. We see this as a critical area for future work and necessary for an agenda for action on moral distress. Participants in our research have highlighted the role of policy in shaping practice and fostering feelings of helplessness and powerlessness in the face of current policy and political environments Storch et al. Changes to policy and practice can enhance ethical nursing practice and such changes are needed to support positive resolution of moral distress. For example, in our own research, participants frequently highlighted the importance of talking to peers in the resolution of moral distress, yet they found that organizational constraints such as workload and narrow definitions of efficiency mitigate against such opportunities Rodney et al. There is a need for translation of existing research and identification of priorities to guide future research that can inform recruitment and retention strategies in health care. How do nursing and other health care leaders understand moral distress? Attention to moral distress is relevant to the development of a strong, vibrant and healthy workforce and the prevention of the common negative outcomes associated with moral distress in the workplace. A healthy workforce is essential to ensuring safe

competent and ethical care. Investment in provision of resources for resolution of ethical concerns has been argued to be cost effective Hart Work on moral distress is particularly salient to work on quality practice environments and patient safety initiatives. Hamric suggests that in addressing moral distress, action is needed at three levels: A relatively unexamined area is that of the impact of structural inequities on the development of moral distress. For example, how do classed, gendered or racialized processes play out organizationally in the development of moral distress among different disciplines and positions within the hierarchy? Limited Attention to Ethics Education Educators in health care frequently identify ethics education as a key competency for practice and educators are often called upon as a resource for practitioners to enhance their ethics competencies. Much of the emphasis in ethics education of nurses and other health care providers in the past has been on the development of moral reasoning and the ability to draw on and apply ethical frameworks for decision making Husted and Husted Often the emphasis has been on ethical dilemmas as opposed to navigating the ethical terrain in everyday practice.