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Chapter 1 : On Naive and Sentimental Poetry - German Literature

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The two men eventually succeeded in achieving a meeting of the minds and their consequent correspondence and collaboration is of great importance to German literature. The essay is an early and influential effort to sort out types of artists, as makers and as psychologies. As can be seen in *The Aesthetic Education of Man*, Schiller was a student of human psychology and feelings and was an astute observer of states of mind long before the profession of psychology was established. Once again, Schiller returned to the ideal period of ancient Greece when humans lived in harmony with nature. The Commons were closing in the name of profit. The Industrial Revolution was also spreading across England, with factories springing up in the countryside, already belching smoke and cinders. The German territories were, as yet, undisturbed; but Schiller seemed to have sensed something coming, for, like his counterpart, Caspar David Friedrich, began to contemplate nature as if it were a quality with psychological implications. So soon as the last is added to the first, and not before, nature is changed into the naive. In establishing between psychological types, Schiller paved the way for later thinkers, such as Freud and Jung, Nietzsche and Dilthey, and James. The essay was an examination of the human being and the human condition in a world that is so modern it had yet to be defined, discussed or understood. Metallurgy and agriculture were the two arts which produced this great revolution. The poets tell us it was gold and silver, but, for the philosophers, it was iron and corn, which first civilised men, and ruined humanity. Like Engels would posit a hundred years later, classes emerge when the establishment of agriculture, which, in turn, evolves into private property. Both Rousseau and Engels searched for and located an original sin which precipitated the Fall. Rousseau wrote with bitter words, Such was, or may well have been, the origin of society and law, which bound new fetters on the poor, and gave new powers to the rich; which irretrievably destroyed natural liberty, eternally fixed the law of property and inequality, converted clever usurpation into unalterable right, and, for the advantage of a few ambitious individuals, subjected all mankind to perpetual labour, slavery and wretchedness. Trapped in the social system, blindly following its customs and mores, we are alienated from nature and the natural. We have lost our sense of oneness, our feelings of harmony with our world. Worse yet, we are alienated from ourselves, divided within our own minds, disconnected from the totality of our own being. In our alienated condition—alienated from ourselves and from our fellow human beings—we can only respond to nature through the distorting filters of civilization. Such unity with us and nature must wait until we reach our own natural state of harmony within ourselves and our natural environment. This modern concept of the alienated human being seeking a lost unity would be of great consequence to nineteenth and twentieth Century thought. The author of *Frankenstein*, Mary Shelley, writing somewhat later than Schiller, also warned that we have become estranged and alienated from ourselves and from nature. Alienation will become a major theme and perhaps the definition of the condition of Modernity itself. Thus aesthetic philosophy becomes a moral philosophy and art becomes an arena for self-actualization, a way of thought to counter the evils of artificiality and civilization. Art becomes a way of reacting to ourselves and a means of responding to nature. Nature takes on a dual meaning: Art also seems to assume duality, being equated at times with that which is artificial, in other words with a wide range of artifacts, works, and activities, while, at other times, art is the natural product of a creative process. Art was a means of restoring a natural balance in personality. Art was a journey towards a purer morality and an exposition of the nature of artistic genius that rises above artificial rules and ideas on morality. The role of free play of imagination in art and the artist as a genius is indebted to Kant. Every true genius must be naive or it is not genius. Unaware of the rules, the crutches of weakness, the taskmaster of perversity, guided only by nature or instinct, its protecting angel, it walks calmly and safely through all the snares of false taste, in which, if it be

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not so prudent as to avoid it already from the distance, the non-genius will be unfailingly ensnared. Indeed, the latter sometimes happens to the great geniuses, but only because these have their fanciful moments, when protecting nature abandons them, because the power of example overpowers them, or the corrupted taste of their time leads them astray. So long as we were merely children of nature, we were happy and perfect; we have become free and have lost both. The sensuous man laments only the loss of the first; the moral one can mourn only for the loss of the other. Therefrom arise two entirely different kinds of poetry, through which the entire province of poetry is exhausted and measured out. We feel, in reading Schiller, we are witnessing a tragedy of a society drifting towards complete alienation of human from nature and of human from human. The latter reflects upon the impression—the object is here connected with an idea, and only in this connection does his poetical force rest. The sentimental poet then can see nature only as an idea. Once again, we see the dialectical at work in Schiller, with human evolution being divided into two stages: The question is where would the sentimental artist eventually achieve the synthesis and the answer is distinctly non-Kantian. The sentimental artist would have to work at the level of the culture in the real world, a solution worked out in *Aesthetic Education*. Like Kant, Schiller must present a structure or a model, and, while the essay itself proceeds from thesis to antithesis and synthesis. The sentimental artist himself was divided into three parts as well—satire, elegy, and idyll, genres of poetry. A decade later, his avant-garde successor, Manet was obviously the satirical sentimental artist. These various positions or approaches on the part of these artists are modern ways to deal with the modern estrangement from nature—the satirical artist looks away from the natural and dives deeply into the artificial, while the elegiac artist confronts nature and attempts to inhale its perfumes. In his two part essay, Schiller does not sum up his argument, he merely stops writing and one can select a passage in the second part as a suitable last word: Nature has shown favor to the naive poet, to act always as an undivided unity, to be in every moment a self-reliant and perfect whole and to represent men in reality, according to their full value. To the sentimental one it has lent the power, or rather imprinted a living instinct, to reestablish out of himself that unity, which has been annulled in him by abstraction, to complete humanity in himself and to pass from a limited state to an infinite. To give human nature its full expression, is, however, the common task of both, and without that, they would not be able to be called poets at all; but the naive poet has always the advantage of sensuous reality over the sentimental, whilst he achieves that as a real fact, which the other only strives to attain.

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Chapter 2 : Naive and Sentimental Poetry - On the Sublime by Friedrich Schiller

Naive and sentimental poetry, and, On the sublime by Friedrich Schiller, , F. Ungar Pub. Co. edition, in English.

There Schiller was broadly educated, including in medicine, and became an army doctor in . But his interests always lay in more humanistic subjects. Already in , he had published his first poem; soon thereafter, he began composing dramas. The play premiered in Mannheim in , achieved instant success, and quickly earned Schiller international fame. Schiller responded by fleeing to Mannheim to begin his literary career in earnest. As his fame grew, Schiller was appointed professor of history at the University of Jena where he lectured on both history and aesthetics. His political disillusionment was coupled with both a serious illness and a crisis of self-confidence in his playwriting. Schiller had already experimented with philosophical prose, but this crisis inspired him to turn his attention fully to philosophy in the hopes of both recovering his health through quiet contemplation and of gaining philosophical insights that would reignite his literary talents. He concludes that humans must possess two forms of reason: If theoretical reason is applied to concepts, it produces logical judgments. If it is applied to intuitions, it produces teleological judgments. Its principle is autonomy or freedom. If practical reason is applied to free actions, it produces moral judgments. Judging something beautiful implies that we have encountered the appearance of freedom in empirical experience. As Schiller puts it: But what would freedom in appearance actually look like, and how could we identify it? Schiller names two qualities that appear in the object itself that prompt us to judge it beautiful. As an example, Schiller contrasts a workhorse to a Spanish palfrey. The workhorse trots just as tiredly and clumsily as if it were still pulling a wagon, even when it is not pulling one. Its movement no longer springs from its nature but rather reveals the pulled weight of the wagon. This, Schiller says, is a kind of autonomy: The beauty of animals generally decreases the more they appear determined by gravity, not form: This analysis allows Schiller to extend his claim that aesthetic judgments are, like moral judgments, a product of practical, not theoretical, reason. Moral actions are self-determining because they follow the form of the moral law, never accounting for external factors. Schiller concludes that [s]elf-determination of the rational is pure determination of reason, morality; self-determination of the sense-world is pure determination of nature, beauty. Schiller articulates this distinction in Kantian terms: The qualities of being autonomous and heautonomous, Schiller claims, persist in the object whether it is being observed or not. This assertion allows Schiller to achieve his second goal of locating beauty in the object rather than only in the observing subject. A man has been beaten, robbed, and left to die on the side of the road. Four strangers offer assistance, but in each case, their offer is badly motivated: The fifth man by contrast offers, of his own accord, to abandon his own belongings and carry the wounded man to safety. In a word, Schiller concludes, a free action is a beautiful action, if the autonomy of the mind and autonomy of appearance coincide. For this reason the highest perfection of character in a person is moral beauty brought about by the fact that duty has become its nature. The status of his claim that beauty is freedom in appearance is also not clear: Using grace and dignity as concepts capable of bridging the divide between morality and aesthetics, Schiller in this essay grapples with a question formulated by Kant, namely how duty and inclination can combine in our assessment of moral worth. Grace is thus associated with but not synonymous with beauty: But it is also objective; it exists whether or not it is being perceived. Graceful actions, Schiller claims, present us with a paradox. On the one hand, as instances of freedom, they are deliberately undertaken movements. On the other hand, they appear to be natural and even instinctive. Schiller accounts for this paradox by distinguishing between two kinds of action. Our rational natures allow us to engage in voluntary actions in direct response to our free will. But we also undertake actions that, despite being directed by the will, appear involuntary. Grace thus describes the way we act as opposed to the reasons we give for our actions: Grace, in short, bridges the Kantian divide: In embodying this kind of perfection, grace provides evidence of a unity of the moral and aesthetic that Kantian philosophy, in the process of making its conceptual distinctions, provisionally disrupts. In addition to better

reflecting metaphysical truth, emphasizing the unity of the moral and the aesthetic, Schiller thinks, will produce better results. Brutally suppressing our sensual side will not be successful in the long run: The enemy who has been merely laid low can get up again, but the one who is reconciled has been truly overcome. Because humans are natural creatures, they are susceptible to pleasure and pain. But whereas other animals are motivated solely by this susceptibility, humans in addition have reason. In such a moment, harmony is impossible and the person in question cannot achieve moral beauty. The appearance of such a soul, its embodiment in action, is not grace but dignity. As an example, Schiller imagines someone whose extreme physical pain is evident in his body. The Pathetic, The Sublime, and the Tragic In several essays on tragedy, some of which predate his period of intense philosophical engagement, Schiller continued to refine his thoughts on human dignity in the face of suffering. In answer, Schiller draws on the Kantian distinction between reason and sensibility. The moral law, he continues, is objectively true and autonomously constructed, whereas our senses produce states we passively suffer. Because we know this, instances in which we respond to conflict by mastering our emotions in deference to the moral law give us pleasure. Struggle against our sensuous natures in order to act autonomously, in other words, allows us to witness what is most impressive about humans, namely our free will. That experience gives us pleasure: Because we recognize our ability to overcome our sensuous nature as the highest expression of our humanity, observing someone else struggle and triumph over her emotions makes us sympathize with her, and this sympathy also gives us pleasure. In this early essay, then, Schiller defines tragedy as the art that imitates nature in those actions most apt to arouse sympathy. Kant describes the sublime as an essentially mixed emotion: Schiller similarly reports that we call an object sublime if our sensuous nature feels its limits, but our rational nature feels its superiority, its freedom from limits. Thus, we come up short against a sublime object physically, but we elevate ourselves above it morally, namely, through ideas. The practically sublime, by contrast, concerns nature as an object of feeling, specifically as a source of danger and fear. But in being confronted by a storm or natural disaster, we also become aware of our power to remain calm in the face of danger. They thus allow us to acknowledge that as sensual beings, we are never safe from disease, loss, and death, but we know that we can face even our own annihilation with dignified calm. Human beings can also be what Schiller calls magnificent: The sublime, by contrast, shows humans succumbing to the fearful but not fearing it. But the basic requirements for a representation of the sublime remain the same: But despite the fact that the forces that can inflict violence on humans are legion, resistance is possible: Counterintuitively, this means accepting the suffering and, in the process, transforming it into voluntary submission. The fact that the sublime can provide this evidence of our autonomy, Schiller continues, means that it offers something beauty cannot. But such a person, if never tested, may never become aware of her moral powers. Here Schiller reiterates his claim that the beautiful and the sublime together complete human nature: Only if the sublime is married to the beautiful and our sensitivity to both has been shaped in equal measure, are we complete citizens of nature, without on that account being its slaves, and without squandering our citizenship in the intelligible world. When we encounter actual misfortune, we may find ourselves defenseless and easily overwhelmed. The more we practice this independence aesthetically, the more adept we will be at executing it in real life: The more suffering we see, the more freedom we stand to witness: Once the pathetic becomes sublime by eliciting this response of freedom, it ceases to be merely pathetic and becomes aesthetic. Any display of freedom in the face of suffering, even if that suffering is for an immoral cause, elicits our admiration. The self-sacrifice of Leonidas at Thermopylae, for instance, elicits both a positive moral and a positive aesthetic judgment: Judged from a moral perspective, this action portrays for me the moral law being carried out in complete contradiction of instinct. Judged aesthetically, it portrays to me the moral capability of a human being, independent of all coercion by instinct. The more morally a character acts, in other words, the more she adheres to a law; the more she adheres to a law, the less freely she acts and the less aesthetic interest she generates. It has also generated praise and critique in more contemporary theorizing. Recent history had shown with painful clarity that if the moral character of the people is not developed, even the most idealistic revolution will fail. A

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vicious cycle suggests that without the state there can be no morality and without morality there can be no state. In Letter Nine he offers his solution: The artist, then, is called upon to influence the world for the good, resisting the distractions of the present in the interest of humanity itself. Schiller exhorts his fellow artists to surround their contemporaries with the great and noble forms of genius, and encompass them about with the symbols of perfection, until semblance conquer reality, and art triumph over nature. But against what are we to assess historical definitions of art? Such an inquiry would seem to presuppose a concept of beauty; if that concept itself comes from historical examples, the question of how to evaluate art objectively remains unresolved. Schiller thus begins, in Letter 11, with an examination of human nature. The self Schiller associates with autonomous personhood, independence, and form; our condition he associates with embodiment, dependence, and matter. These two fundamentally opposed sides do, however, coexist in humans, resulting in the imperative that they be brought into harmony: In Letter 12, Schiller claims that humans are impelled towards the fulfillment of this imperative by two corresponding drives, the form drive [Formtrieb] and the sense drive [Sachtrieb]. It situates the human within time and so within change:

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Chapter 3 : Naive and sentimental poetry, and On the sublime (edition) | Open Library

*Translation of *Äœber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, and Äœber das Erhabene.**

These will not be Amazon-type reviews, with synopses, background research done on the author or the book itself, unless that strikes me as necessary or if the book inspired me to provide one when I read it. In general, these amount to assessments of in what ways I found the book helpful somehow. I may say stupid stuff, poorly informed stuff. I, in fact, only know of this essay because Jung begins his Psychological Types with an extended commentary on the first of the two essays above. Reading that impressed me with Schiller, though it remained some time before I hunted down a copy of his essay—readily available at this point on the Interwebs—but finding this particular translation from seems a windfall. First, there are, as a matter of fact, at least two radically opposed ways of viewing the world; and what has been shown of the poets is also true of men in general: I interrupt here briefly. So if his statement reads as confusing, suspend it in disbelief for the moment and follow what he offers next. But then comes the punch line. Of two conflicting hypotheses [i. I conclude that Schiller gives us an example of a truly beautiful soul in the terms that he means. The feeling of the sublime is a mixed feeling. It is a composition of melancholy which at its utmost is manifested in a shudder, and of joyousness which can mount to rapture and, even if it is not actually a pleasure, is far preferred by refined souls to all pleasure. This combination of two contradictory perceptions in a single feeling demonstrates our moral independence in an irrefutable manner. For since it is absolutely impossible for the very same object to be related to us in two different ways, it therefore follows that we ourselves are related to the object in two different ways; furthermore, two opposed natures must be united in us, each of which is interested in diametrically opposed ways in the perception of the object. By means of the feeling for the sublime, therefore, we discover that the state of our minds is not necessarily determined by the state of our sensations, that the laws of nature are not necessarily our own, and that we possess a principle proper to ourselves that is independent of all sensuous affects. Besides the philosophical interest of this, it 1 shows a point where our sense of powerlessness in the face of events, which is another way of saying an unchangeable necessity we can do nothing about except learn to accept it, may be contradicted and thus combated, and 2 specifically argues that only art aesthetic, and specifically sublime, work offers the space or the opportunity for creating the real ground of change, first of all by demonstrating people are not powerless before necessity. Aesthetic work created to be beautiful in the broadest sense—call it attractive or popular ultimate involves submission to necessity, imagined as the status quo. The violence of culture may be avoided, first and foremost, by turning the gesture of imposed violence into one we submit to voluntarily. This circumstance, of course, represents a resort in the face of a bad deal, but to maintain our dignity and the like, such submission at least seem necessary. But the whole matrix of these issues all rest on what Schiller calls necessity, and so they are all marked by violence or submission, so that all aesthetic work that aspires to the beautiful becomes either violence of submission before the status quo of necessity. The sublime, by contrast, offers a way out, and thus an alternative to violence or submission, to say nothing of the realization of human freedom and the moral choice of critical thinking. Because, on the one hand, one could read him as saying: Or, as I have been wont to say: Sure, but of course this sounds like a mere assertion, easily suspected as whistling in the dark. If, at the same time, I find the object compelling AND repelling, then whichever of those two responses has been determined by necessity, the other by definition cannot have been. Besides the fact of two contradicting states of mind, necessity itself cannot have two goals by definition. So destiny is not simply what I make of fate, but arises out of some tension of opposites, some presence of a contradiction that I find reassurance from from the contradiction itself in the exercise of or sheer awareness of my essential and dignifying human freedom. I want to know that my acts are chosen, not compulsions. Am I friends with you because I choose to be want to be or because I am compelled by circumstances to avoid the consequences of not being friends. Schiller shows us, in the power of a self-evident contradiction, where we may see our freewill demonstrated. If we would

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produce the beautiful understood most broadly , then we reprise the status quo ultimately, as either violence or noble submission. By contrast, the sublime offers the conditions by which we may resist and challenge the status quo, through the sort of fruitful experience of two minds that Schiller describes. Endnotes [1] Schiller, F. Two essays by Friedrich von Schiller: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co. JA Elias , pp.

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Chapter 4 : Sublime Borders: Schiller's Will and Nietzsche's Will-to-Power

*Naive and Sentimental Poetry and On the Sublime: Two Essays (Milestones of Thought) [Friedrich von Schiller, Julius A. Elias] on calendrierdelascience.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers.*

This treatise first appeared in three segments with other writings: There are moments in our life, when we dedicate a kind of love and touching respect to nature in its plants, minerals, animals, landscapes, just as to human nature in its children, in the morals of country folk and of the primeval world, not because it is pleasing to our senses, not even because it satisfies our understanding or taste the opposite can often occur in respect to both, but rather merely because it is nature. Every fine man, who does not altogether lack feeling, experiences this, when he walks in the open, when he lives upon the land or tarries beside monuments of ancient times, in short, when he is surprised in artificial relations and situations with the sight of simple nature. It is interest, not seldom elevated to need, which lies at the foundation of many of our fancies for flowers and animals, for simple gardens, for walks, for the country and its inhabitants, for many products of remote antiquity, etc. This kind of interest in nature takes place, however, only under two conditions. First, it is entirely necessary, that the object which infuses us with the same, be nature or certainly be held by us therefor; second, that it in the broadest meaning of the word be naive, i. So soon as the last is added to the first, and not before, nature is changed into the naive. Nature in this mode of contemplation is for us nothing other than voluntary existence, subsistence of things through themselves, existence according to its own unalterable laws. This conception is absolutely necessary, if we should take interest in such phenomena. If one could give to an artificial flower by means of the most perfect deception, the appearance of nature, if one could carry the imitation of the naive in morals up to the highest illusion, so would the discovery, that it be imitation, completely destroy the feeling of which we are speaking. What would even a plain flower, a spring, a mossy stone, the chirping of birds, the buzzing of bees, etc. What could give it any claim upon our love? It is not these objects, it is an idea represented through them, which we love in them. We love in them the quietly working life, the calm effects from out itself, existence under its own laws, the inner necessity, the eternal unity with itself. They are what we were; they are what we ought to become once more. We were nature as they, and our culture should lead us back to nature, upon the path of reason and freedom. They are therefore at the same time a representation of our lost childhood, which remains eternally most dear to us; hence, they fill us with a certain melancholy. At the same time, they are representations of our highest perfection in the ideal, hence, they transpose us into a sublime emotion. But their perfection is not their merit, because it is not the work of its choice. They afford us, therefore, the entirely peculiar pleasure, that they, without shaming us, are our model. A constant divine appearance, they surround us, but more refreshingly than dazzlingly. What constitutes their character is precisely that which is lacking in ours to be complete; what distinguishes us from them is precisely that which is missing in them to be divine. We are free, and they are necessary; we change, they remain the same. We therefore perceive in them eternally that which is missing from us, but after which we are required to strive, and which, although we never attain it, we nevertheless may hope to approach in an infinite progress. We perceive in ourselves an advantage, which is wanting in them, but of which they can partake either never at all, such as those lacking in reason, or not other than if they go our way, such as in childhood. They provide us accordingly with the sweetest enjoyment of our human nature as idea, although they must necessarily humble us in regard to every determined state of our human nature. Since this interest in nature is grounded upon an idea, so can it appear only in souls, which are susceptible to ideas, i. By far the majority of men merely affect it, and the universality of this sentimental taste to our times, which is expressed, especially since the appearance of certain writings, in sentimental journeys, such gardens, walks, and other fancies of this kind, is yet by no means proof of the universality of this manner of perception. Nevertheless, nature will always express something of this effect even on those most lacking in feeling, because the predisposition to morality, which is common to all men, is already sufficient thereto and we are all driven to it in the idea, irrespective of

how great the distance of our own acts is from the simplicity and truth of nature. This sentimentality in respect to nature is especially strongly and most universally expressed at the instigation of such objects, which stand in a close connection with us and bring nearer to us the retrospective view of ourselves and the unnatural in us, as for example, with children or childlike nations. One errs, if one believes, that it be merely the conception of helplessness, which sees to it that we dwell on children with so much emotion in certain moments. That may perhaps be the case in respect to those, who in the face of weakness are accustomed never to feel something other than their own superiority. But the feeling of which I speak it takes place only in quite peculiar moral dispositions and is not to be mistaken for that which the joyous activity of children arouses in us, is more humiliating than favorable to self-love; and if, indeed, an advantage comes thereby into view, so is this by no means on our side. Not because we look down upon the child from the height of our force and perfection, but rather because, from the limitation of our condition, which is inseparable from the determination, which we have once obtained, we look up to the boundless determinability in the child and to his pure innocence, we fall into emotion, and our feeling in such a moment is too evidently mixed with a certain melancholy than that this source of the same were mistaken. In the child, the predisposition and determination is represented, in us the fulfillment, which always remains infinitely far behind the former. Hence, the child is to us a vivid representation of the ideal, not indeed of the fulfilled, but of the commissioned, and it is therefore by no means the conception of its poverty and limits, it is quite to the contrary the conception of its pure and free force, its integrity, its infinity, which moves us. To the men of morality and feeling, a child will for that reason be a sacred object, an object namely, which through the greatness of an idea annihilates every greatness of experience; and which, whatever it may lose in the judgment of the understanding, gains again in the judgment of reason in ample measure. Precisely from this contradiction between the judgment of reason and of understanding, issues forth the quite peculiar phenomenon of the mixed feeling, which the naive way of thinking excites in us. It combines the childlike simplicity with the childish; through the latter it exposes a vulnerable point to the understanding and calls forth that smile, whereby we make known our theoretical superiority. So soon, however, as we have reason to believe, that the childish simplicity be simultaneously a childlike one, that consequently the source thereof be not want of understanding, no incapacity, but rather a higher practical strength, a heart full of innocence and truth, which out of inner greatness disdains the help of art, so is the former triumph of the understanding past, and the mockery of simpleness passes over into admiration of simplicity. We feel ourselves compelled to esteem the object, at which we previously have smiled, and, whilst we at the same time cast a look into ourselves, to lament that we are not similar to the same. So arises the quite peculiar phenomenon of a feeling, in which joyous mockery, respect, and melancholy flow together. In the first case, it is the naive of surprise and amuses; in the other, it is the naive of conviction and is moving. With regard to the naive of surprise, the person must be morally capable of denying nature; with regard to the naive of conviction, he may not be, nevertheless, we may not think of him as physically incapable thereof, if it shall produce a naive impression upon us. Hence, the actions and conversations of children give us the pure impression of the naive only so long as we do not remember their inability for art, and in general, only consider the contrast between their naturalness and artificiality in us. The naive is a childlikeness, where it is no longer expected, and precisely for that reason, can not be attributed to real childhood in the strictest sense. In both cases, however, with regard to the naive of surprise as with regard to that of conviction, nature must be right, art, however, wrong. First, the concept of the naive is completed through this latter determination. Emotion is also nature, and the rule of decency is something artificial; yet the triumph of emotion over decency is by no means naive. On the contrary, should the same emotion triumph over affectation, over false decency, over dissimulation, so bear we no hesitation to call it naive. Not the insufficiency, but rather the inadmissibility of the latter must procure the victory of the form; for the former is want, and nothing which originates from want can produce respect. Indeed, it is with regard to the naive of surprise, always the superiority of emotion and a want of reflection, which makes nature recognizable; but this want and that superiority still do not entirely constitute the naive, but rather merely provide the occasion, so

that nature follows unhindered its moral nature, i. The naive of surprise can only fall to man, and indeed only to man, insofar as, in this moment, he is no longer pure and innocent nature. It supposes a will, which does not agree with that which nature does by its own hand. Such a person, if one brings him to his senses, will be alarmed about himself; the naively minded, on the contrary, will be surprised at the men and at their astonishment. Since, therefore, here not the personal and moral character, but rather merely the natural character set free by emotion confesses the truth, so we attribute to man no merit for this sincerity, and our laughter is well-deserved derision, which is held back through no personal high estimation of the same. Since, nevertheless, it is here still the sincerity of nature, which breaks through the veil of falsehood, so is contentment of a higher kind combined with the malicious enjoyment of having caught a man; for nature in contrast to affectation, and truth in contrast to deceit must excite respect every time. We therefore also feel in respect to the naive of surprise a really moral pleasure, although not in regard to a moral character. In the one as in the other case, nature is right, that it speaks the truth; but in the latter case, nature is not merely right, but rather the person has honor as well. In the first case, sincerity of nature always disgraces the person, because it is involuntary; in the second, it always redounds to the merit of the person, even supposing, that that which it declares, may bring him disgrace. We ascribe a naive conviction to a man, if, in his judgment of things, he overlooks their artificial and affected relations and keeps merely to simple nature. Everything which can be judged thereof within healthy nature, we require of him and only release him absolutely from that which presupposes a removal from nature, be it either in thinking or feeling, at least knowledge of the same. It sees only the need and the nearest means to satisfy it; such an extension of the right of property, whereby a part of mankind can perish, is not grounded in mere nature. The action of the child is therefore a humiliation of the real world, and our heart confesses that also, through the pleasure which it feels over this action. If a man without knowledge of the world, but otherwise of a good sense, confesses his secrets to another, who deceives him, but knows how to skillfully dissemble and lends him through his sincerity itself the means to injure him, so do we find that naive. We laugh at him, but can nevertheless not keep from esteeming him highly on that account. For his trust in others springs from the honesty of his own inner convictions; at least, he is only naive insofar as this is the case. The naive way of thinking can accordingly never be a property of a corrupted man, but rather belongs only to children and childlike-minded men. These latter often act and think naively in the midst of the artificial relations of the great world; they forget out of their own beautiful human nature, that they have to do with a corrupt world, and conduct themselves even in the courts of kings with an ingenuousness and innocence as one finds only in the world of shepherds. It is, besides, not at all so easy, to distinguish the childish innocence from the childlike always correctly, whilst there are actions, which hover on the outermost boundaries between both, and with which we are left absolutely in doubt, as to whether we should laugh at the simpleness or esteem highly the noble simplicity. A very noteworthy example of this kind one finds in the history of the government of Pope Adrian VI, which Mr. This pope, a Netherlander by birth, administered the pontificate in one of the most critical moments for the hierarchy, when an embittered party laid bare the weak points of the Roman Church without any forbearance, and the opposite party was interested in the highest degree in concealing them. It was, after all, this, which placed the predecessors and successors of Adrian in the least embarrassment. With uniformity, they followed the once-adopted Roman system, to concede nothing anywhere. But Adrian actually had the upright character of his nation and the innocence of his former position. From the narrow sphere of the learned he was elevated to his sublime post, and even in the height of his new honors, had not become untrue to that simple character. The abuses in the Church moved him, and he was much too honest, to dissimulate publicly, what he confessed in silence. In consequence of this way of thinking, he allowed himself in the instruction, which he gave to his legate in Germany, to be misled into confessions, which had hitherto been heard from no pope and ran directly contrary to the principles of this court: We all have deviated, and for a long time there has been none among us, who would have done something good, not even one. This most imprudent step of the pope would, however, be worthy of our complete respect and admiration, if we could only convince ourselves, that it had really been naive, i. But we

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have some reason to believe, that he did not regard this step as so impolitic at all, and in his innocence went so far as to hope to have won something very important to the advantage of his Church through his flexibility. He did not imagine merely having to take this step as an honest man, but rather, being able to take responsibility for it also as pope, and whilst he forgot, that the most artificial of structures could only be absolutely supported by a continued denial of the truth, he committed the unpardonable error of adhering to instructions applied in an entirely contrary situation, which would have been valid in a natural circumstance. To be sure, this alters our judgment very much; and although we can not renounce our respect for the honesty of the heart, from which this action flows, so is this latter not a little weakened by the reflection, that nature in art and the heart in the head would have had a too weak adversary. Every true genius must be naive or it is not genius. Unaware of the rules, the crutches of weakness, the taskmaster of perversity, guided only by nature or instinct, its protecting angel, it walks calmly and safely through all the snares of false taste, in which, if it be not so prudent as to avoid it already from the distance, the non-genius will be unfailingly ensnared. It is only given to the genius, to be always at home outside the known and to enlarge nature, without going beyond it. Indeed, the latter sometimes happens to the great geniuses, but only because these have their fanciful moments, when protecting nature abandons them, because the power of example overpowers them, or the corrupted taste of their time leads them astray. The most complicated problems the genius must solve with unpretentious simplicity and facility; the egg of Columbus holds good for judgment of genius. Thereby alone does it legitimize itself as genius, that it triumphs over complicated art through simplicity. It does not proceed according to known principles, but rather according to sudden ideas and feelings; but its sudden ideas are inspirations of a God everything that healthy nature does is divine, its feelings are laws for all times and for all generations of men. The childlike character, which the genius imprints on it works, it shows also in its private life and its morals. It is bashful, because nature is always so; but it is not decent, because only corruption is decent. It is intelligent, for nature can never be the opposite; but it is not cunning, for only art can be that. It is true to its character and its inclinations, but not so much because it has principles, as because nature, in all its oscillations, always returns to its last place, always brings back the old wants. It is modest, yes shy, because genius always remains a mystery to itself; but it is not anxious, because it does not know the dangers of the road on which it walks. Yes, what seems to be still far more difficult, even the great statesman and general, so soon as they are great through their genius, will display a naive character. The Duke of Marlborough, Turenne, Vendome all show us this character. To the other sex, nature has assigned its greatest perfection in the naive character. After nothing does the womanly desire to please strive so much as after the appearance of the naive; sufficient proof, even if we were to have no other, that the greatest power of the sex reposes in this property.

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Chapter 5 : Schiller's On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry

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When encountering that which is terrible or unfathomable in nature, man experiences a sense of crushing expansion. By divorcing ourselves from the physical fetters which normally bind us to the practical and concrete, we instead identify with our purely cognitive faculties which retain their independence over and above a tumultuous reality. Thus we are simultaneously forced into a state of transcendental expansion. Would this be even possible if the borders of our imagination were at the same time the borders of our power of apprehension? Schiller maintains that our freedom to choose as we will is a necessary precondition for any truly moral system. And yet, it is seemingly undeniable that there are instances in which our hand is forced; instances in which the world overrides our decisions. But if Nietzsche is intent on undermining the border between man and world, how can he continue to employ its ethical consequences? An examination of Schiller and Nietzsche side-by-side will open the door, so to speak, to a new understanding of the sublime border. Schiller operates under Kantian notions of noumena and phenomena, freedom of will, autonomy, and the elevated status of understanding over imagination. However, if Kant saw freedom as a mere prerequisite for his categorical imperative, Schiller views it as the essential characteristic of our humanity. Given the primacy of freedom, it is no coincidence that Schiller does not "cannot" rest until the tension that invariably arises between free will and the outside world has been dispelled. It is in response to this problem that Schiller introduces his concept of will [Wille] in the opening to *On the Sublime: In the Critique of Judgment*, Kant develops his aesthetic theory as a synthesis of pure and practical reason. Roughly put, Kant notices that we attribute beauty to things which exhibit a sense of purpose what he refers to as purposiveness, although just what that purpose is cannot be conceptually located. It is this imaginative freedom, a loosening of conceptual constraints, which is largely responsible for the pleasurable experience. And yet, not all aesthetic experience is so pleasant. Upon concluding his analysis of pleasurable beauty, Kant moves on to account for the violent opposition which results from the sublime. When we encounter the sublime whether it be something as concrete as the Alps or as theoretical as infinity, we encounter something which cannot be fully grasped by our imagination. This leads to those feelings of human inferiority previously mentioned. Nonetheless, the sublime is not simply frightening, but rather puts us in a state of compelling awe. Although we may not be able to physically come to terms with the sublime, it can nonetheless be neatly conceptualized and filed away by our intellect. By means of this duality, Kant is able, perhaps for the first time, to account for both the terrible and elevational elements of the sublime. In his crusade for freedom, Schiller came to notice two sorts of freedom: When life proceeds according to plan, falling in line with our every desire, we are free to follow our will. For Schiller, this is a beautiful freedom. It is agreeable, calm, and steady. But what happens when nature seems determined to destroy everything you set your mind to? For all of your planning, nature swoops in and lays everything flat. For this, there is a sublime freedom. Our freedom is sublime when things do not turn out the way we wish, but when in the face of it all, we retain our moral agency. It is sublime when all sensuality is chaotic, but our cognitive powers escape unscathed. We need not seek accord with nature, for nature cannot help but accord. Either he is superior to nature as a force, or he is at one with her. The morally cultivated man is he who embodies both the beautiful and the sublime, the comic and the tragic. There are therefore two eventualities. Since this newfound identity is wholly autonomous, there can be no natural disturbance. Moreover, Nietzsche has Zarathustra unambiguously proclaim: For Nietzsche this is a crises of nihilism, while for Schiller is a struggle for freedom. But for both, the answer is the same: Because we are afraid of the irrationality of nature, we desperately seek to rise above it. It makes no difference whether this god is a deity or an aesthetic ideal, for Nietzsche it is symptomatic of a certain cowardice. As he hints in

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Human, All Too Human, morality is an essentially religious construct, and must therefore also be purged from our aesthetic lexicon: It begins with a by now familiar description of the sublime experience. Nietzsche goes on to describe a scene of picturesque beauty and sublimity. You teach man how to cease to be a man—shall he become as you are, pale, brilliant, dumb, immense, reposing calmly upon himself? He does not object from epistemological grounds, nor from psychological, aesthetic, or metaphysical grounds. He rejects the sublime because it dehumanizes man. In his idealization of the sublime, man has become exalted above himself. As such, he pits himself against all previous theorists including, of course, Schiller. We are left with a problem: In order to begin to resolve this problem, we need to take a closer look at how Nietzsche himself evaluates the existence of nature all together. In this particular aphorism, Nietzsche recounts the evolution of western metaphysics; from Greek attempts to provide a full account of the true nature of the world up until our current, perspectival retreats into principled ignorance. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one. All that is left is the world as each of us experiences it; that is, we are left with interpretations, none of which is the true appearance. On this theory, the belief in an objective world-in-itself resulted from the Socratic estrangement of reason from art. We asked how such a position can possibly operate outside of the sublime. But this was because, until now, we had assumed that a rejection of the sublime border must ultimately lead to submission. For if we are not exalted above nature, then we must remain subject to its power. The world we experience is only an element of the self. Instead of rising above nature in an act of affirmation, we must incorporate the world into ourselves and re create it. What we are left with is a complete reevaluation of the spirit behind amor fati. The doctrine of amor fati is not interested in reconciling two opposing parties. We need not overpower nor make peace with the world; the world is at is it for we have allowed it to be so. The forces of nature are the forces of our will-to-power. Amor fati is not nature-affirmative, but rather self-affirmative. It is loving the narrative which we alone have created; loving it, for it is our own. Both Schiller and Nietzsche recognize that in order to avoid bitter opposition, a more affirmative stance must be obtained. Rather than repeatedly hitting against it head-on, Schiller charts a course along the wall: Daniel Rhodes earned his B. Notes from the Underground. Critique of the Power of Judgment. Schiller and the Ideal of Freedom. Basic Writings of Nietzsche. Human, all too human: A book for free spirits. The Dawn of Day. Naive and Sentimental Poetry; and, On the Sublime:

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Chapter 6 : Friedrich Schiller (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

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Schiller later related how his rebellion against the suffocating rigidity and isolation of Karlsschule paradoxically fostered his love of poetry. He remained at the school for eight years, focusing first on law, then on medicine. After his second medical dissertation, "On the Connection of the Animal Nature of Man with his Spiritual Nature," was accepted, he became a regimental physician in Stuttgart. There, he completed his first drama, *The Robbers*, the staging of which a year later in Mannheim brought him immediate acclaim and confirmation of his literary gifts. For most of the rest of his life he would suffer considerable financial hardship and extremely poor health. Nevertheless, from then on he managed to complete three plays *Fiesco*, *Intrigue and Love*, and *Don Carlos*, to compose several poems and his *History of the Revolt of the Netherlands*, which celebrated religious tolerance, won him a professorship albeit unsalaried in history at the University of Jena in 1793, and over the next two years he produced the enormously successful *History of the Thirty Years War*. This progressive view of history collided, however, with a longing for a lost harmony that he thought art alone can provide compare his nostalgic elegy of "The Gods of Greece," with his stirring, forward-looking call to his caste in the poem "The Artists". Following his marriage to Charlotte von Lengefeld in 1794 and an almost fatal bout with pneumonia a year later, Schiller was given the opportunity to pursue these interests in earnest thanks to a three-year pension provided by Prince Friedrich Christian von Schleswig-Holstein-Augustenburg of Copenhagen. Over the next four years Schiller composed several essays on aesthetics. The organ for many of these essays was the journal *Die Horen*, founded by Schiller with the help of many of the leading figures in German letters at the time, among them Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Wilhelm von Humboldt, with whom Schiller developed close friendships that had a lasting influence on his work. The aborted project of the "Kallias-Letters"; published attempts in Kantian terms to establish something Kant declared impossible: In the "Kallias-Letters" Schiller accordingly construes beauty as "freedom in the appearance" of something, an appearance that is the natural or artistic, dynamic counterpart to moral autonomy. Though Schiller accepts the suggestion in correspondence with Kant, he ultimately finds the distinction unpersuasive. As Schiller puts it in the opening lines of "On the Pathetic," "Portrayal of suffering" as mere suffering "is never the end of art, but as a means to this end it is of the utmost importance to art. In this work hereafter Letters Schiller frames an argument for the necessity of an aesthetic education against the backdrop of a dire assessment of contemporary culture. Echoing Jean-Jacques Rousseau and anticipating Karl Marx, the assessment emphasizes the stupefying fragmentation and lifeless mechanism of society. The French Revolution had demonstrated only too well the failure of political reform without a moral transformation of the citizenry, that is, a transformation of individuals into citizens. As for reason, if it is the answer, Schiller asks, why in an "enlightened age" are we still barbarians? With art as the sole remaining alternative Schiller announces his central thesis, "If man is ever to solve the problem of politics in practice he will have to approach it through the problem of the aesthetic, because it is only through beauty that man makes his way to freedom" [Letter 2,], p. Though Schiller sometimes does. In a footnote to Letter 19 Schiller acknowledges the possible misunderstandings caused by these two notions of freedom. Though the example set by the Greeks, Schiller submits, provides reason not to despair, he is well aware that experience and the historical record seem to speak volumes against the thesis. Still, they do so only if there is no transcendental path to a nonempirical, purely rational concept of beauty. Schiller accordingly proposes just such a path that takes its bearings from "the sheer potentialities" of human nature, potentialities that he juxtaposes with "what is absolute and unchanging" and the "necessary conditions" of human life. Though he feels no need to justify the considerable presuppositions built into this precarious move, what no doubt justifies it in his mind is a fundamental analogy running throughout the Letters, namely, the analogousness of individual and political self-production to

artistic production. In each case the reality in question can be conceived as the product of shaping something natural provided by experience, according to an idea that is, at least in regard to the initiative in question, irreducible to the respective experience of nature. On the basis of this same analogy, the integrity of the reality the production in question demands that both nature and the idea—or, analogously, feeling and principle, the human condition and the human person—be given their due. Corresponding to this dual necessity are two basic laws of human nature, namely, "to externalize all that is within it, and give form to all that is outside it," and two basic drives: While the sensuous drive acts as a physical constraint and the formal drive as a moral constraint, the "task" of culture, Schiller submits, is to amplify each drive to the point where they have a moderating effect on one another. Schiller acknowledges the utopian character of the task. Still, he submits that there are moments in life when feeling and thinking merge, when human beings are able to realize both drives in a complementary way. These are the moments when human beings play. As Schiller famously puts it, "[M]an only plays when he is in the fullest sense of the word a human being, and he is only fully a human being when he plays" [Letter 15,] p. In Letter 27 Schiller gives a genealogy of play, from the physical play of an overflowing nature to the free play of human fantasy and association, culminating in aesthetic play with the capacity to transform sexual desire. The play drive, as Schiller calls it, reconciles the otherwise competing sensuous and formal drives through its preoccupation with an object that combines their respective objects, life and form. In this way Schiller introduces his definition of beauty as a living form that is the object of the play drive. Precisely by yielding these moments of play, beauty is both a regenerative means to and a symbol of the consummate freedom that is, in his eyes, the destiny of humankind. Beauty here is not an empty purposeless form and the experience of it is not merely a matter of taste or the play of human faculties. Instead, it is a living form that embodies in a concrete, autonomous way the unity of feeling and principle, of sense and reason. So conceived, beauty has a vitality that transcends human subjectivity without leaving it behind and yet, for this reason, holds an incomparable historical promise for humanity. Further complicating matters, he gives an account of an "aesthetic condition" as a necessary means of predisposing human beings to a moral condition, "Man in his physical condition merely suffers the dominion of nature; he emancipates himself from this dominion in the aesthetic condition, and he acquires mastery over it in the moral" [Letter 24,] p. Still, if the aesthetic condition is now depicted as necessary for the transition to morality, its necessity is not something that one can leave behind. Beauty continues to be living proof "that a human being need not flee matter in order to manifest herself as spirit" [Letter 25,], p. The transition from the aesthetic condition to the moral condition is supposedly far easier than the transition to the former from the physical condition. Hence, Schiller devotes his final remarks Letters 26—28 to the role of "aesthetic semblance" in the former transition. Basic needs must be met, he notes, before aesthetic semblance can be indulged, though such indulgence is also a natural development of seeing and hearing. These two senses do not simply receive but help produce their objects. In the process, the play-drive develops, as people find enjoyment in mere semblance, as does the mimetic drive to shape and form this or that semblance into something relatively self-sufficient though only relatively since it is a human product and subject to human dictates. As these drives develop, the realm of beauty expands but also gives further definition to the boundaries between semblance and reality. Moreover, only in this world of semblance does the artist enjoy sovereign rights. What makes the artist an artist and renders semblance aesthetic is a certain honesty no pretense of being real and autonomy dispensing with all support from reality. In the end, the aesthetic semblance is self-reflexive and self-redeeming. In an important respect art is the semblance of semblance, the illusion of illusion. The aesthetic education overturns a deficient, actual stage of human nature because art is capable of articulating ever higher human possibilities. Moreover, these are possibilities at the crossroads of the individual and the species. Herein lies yet another side to the promise of beauty discussed earlier. Only in an aesthetic state Staat can we confront each other, not as enforcers of our respective rights "the fearful kingdom of forces" or as executors of our wills "the sacred kingdom of laws" , but as free and equal citizens, "the third joyous kingdom of play and of semblance" , [Letter 27,], p. Naive poets, typified by ancient authors such as Homer, write

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effortlessly in a straightforward way without intruding themselves onto the scene, whereas "sentimental" self-conscious poets, so typical among modern writers like Ariosto, express their feelings about the scenes they depict. Characterizing the difference in terms of nature, Schiller explains, "The poet either is nature or will seek it. Thus, sentimental poets, in contrast to naive poets, are acutely aware of the difference between reality and their ideas and idealizations. Thus conflicted in their mode of feeling, they either mock reality in pathetic or playful satires, mourn the absence or loss of the ideal in elegies, or "most difficult of all" celebrate its future realization in idylls. Moreover, he construes the difference between these notions at times historically, at other times theoretically, to designate antithetical kinds of poetic consciousness in some contexts, and contrary traits within a single poet in others. For example, Goethe is a modern naive poet who is nonetheless capable of treating a theme "sentimentally," as in his novel Sorrows of the Young Werther. Nevertheless, in the first two parts of the essay, Schiller manages to accord each of these divergent literary modes its due, while conceding "that neither the naive nor the sentimental character, considered in itself, can completely exhaust the ideal of beautiful humanity, an ideal that can only emerge from the intimate union of both" [], p. Accordingly, in the third and final part of the essay, Schiller inscribes the difference between naive and sentimental poetry in a psychological profile of the difference between realists and idealists, that is, those who allow themselves to be determined in the end by nature or reason, respectively, be it in the form of the competing theoretical demands of common sense and speculation or the rival practical demands of happiness and nobility. One particularly noteworthy exception is the criticism of naturalism in the preface to the book version of the *Bride of Messina* in , titled "On the Use of the Chorus in Tragedy," an essay utilized by Friedrich Nietzsche in *The Birth of Tragedy* in

Chapter 7 : Editions of Naive and Sentimental Poetry - On the Sublime by Friedrich Schiller

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Chapter 9 : Reading Schedule " History of Literary Theory and Criticism

This treatise first appeared in three segments with other writings: in in the second issue of Die Horen (November), under the title On the Naive; in in the twelfth issue of Die Horen (December), under the title The Sentimental Poet; and in the January issue of Die Horen in , under the title Conclusion of the Treatment of the Naive and Sentimental Poet, Including Some Remarks on a.