

The Neoconservative Mind has 8 ratings and 0 reviews. This inspiring era in Phillies history comes alive with the personal reflections of Robin Roberts.

It means a group of guerrillas, activists, intellectuals, etc. Its activities can be out in the open, or they can be secret. The late, Irving Kristol, editor of *The Public Interest*, and Norman Podhoretz, editor of *Commentary*, were the founders of the neoconservative movement in the late s. In their youth during the s and s, they were followers of the communist Leon Trotsky. Having bought into the Bolshevik Revolution of , they saw socialism as an ideal that needed to be spread to the West. While they and their followers subsequently modified the Marxist roots of their ideology in favor of a more gradualist methodology, they always remained adamant supporters of collectivism for America. Are they outright socialists? The paradigm that neoconservatives have given their lives to is built upon a centralized mega-state running American society from Washington and also, as much as possible, the rest of the world. In other words, to adhere today to what Jefferson and Madison advocated is anachronistic foolishness. According to Kristol and his fellow neoconservatives, such a view must be phased out of our collective conscience. He believed that capitalism and individual rights are dangerous institutions. They must be constantly modified by a powerful state that redistributes wealth whenever necessary to mold market enterprises into an appropriately egalitarian social structure. In the neoconservative mind, freedom, while desirable, is not a primary political value. Machiavelli had the better idea; expediency is the best way to rule. People need to be manipulatively led by statist elites " via open dialogue and democracy if possible, but by deception, coercion and expediency when necessary. They are deceiving the people into believing that they are genuine conservatives, but like the socialists who were their mentors, they call themselves what they know the people want to hear. They are highly influential writers, scholars, pundits, publishers, institute heads, bankers, and corporate moguls. The Serpents What follows are eight of the more influential neoconservatives in America, past and present. These are not friends of freedom, but enemies. They need to be recognized for who they are, traitors to what America was meant to be. They need to be exposed and attacked as we would attack serpents who are slithering into our back yards to threaten our safety and our families. Immensely persuasive in the shaping of the movement. Vehemently promoted the invasion of Iraq, and to this day favors extensive intervention in the Middle East to bring about regime changes. Paul Wolfowitz The most hawkish advocate in the Bush administration and the architect of the Bush Doctrine. A visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, he is a former World Bank chief and Pentagon official who was closely involved in the decision to invade Iraq in He has been back and forth between academia and government for the entirety of his career. He is a widely recognized pundit and influential Washington political operative. Director at the Foreign Policy Initiative and member of numerous think-tanks in Washington as well as a Fox News regular. He serves also as a contributing editor at *The New Republic* and, thus, personifies the collectivist liberalism that infuses neoconservatism. They are statist ideological brothers. Frank Gaffney The director of the hawkish neoconservative Center for Security Policy, Gaffney has been a longtime advocate of interventionist U. A regular on Fox News. Charles Krauthammer A writer for *The Washington Post*, Charles Krauthammer, is considered to be the most influential neoconservative political columnist in America. There are, of course, many other prominent neoconservatives than just these eight. Socialist Roots of Neoconservatism By , socialism had become the new wave of the future in European universities. The Fabians were growing to power in Britain. And numerous socialist intellectuals were emigrating to America to begin subversion of the citadel of capitalism. One problem, however, confronted the invading intellectuals coming to our shores. The American people were vehemently resistant to socialism. This is classic Marxist strategy: Retain your fundamental collectivist principles, but change the methods of implementation to fit the situation. In the years between and the original neoconservatives like Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, and Sidney Hook were coming of age and developing their worldview. Thus socialists became progressives who then became liberals who promoted progressive policies. Tyrannical socialism could now be promoted as something liberal, benign,

and progressive. The Marxist vision was making great progress by eroding the individualism that had created and built America. Counterculture rebellion raged among millions of young people who came home from college to kill their donkey parents ideologically. Stability and sanity collapsed into a heap of drugs, nihilism, and contempt for conventional liberalism. Thus the neoconservative revolution was born via yet another name change. Ideologically the neoconservatives were still very much collectivists and statist. But the new name gave them a new life in which they felt they could thrive more successfully. Mega-statism with traditional values had always been their political vision; now it could be openly promoted as neoconservatism. The serpents had propagated. The Fifth Column had done its job. The American people conservative by nature fell for the hoax and loyally supported the neoconservative movement, assuming it was what would keep the country free when actually it was working to do just the opposite. It was smuggling America into statism. Thus both liberals and neoconservatives and their respective political parties – the Democrats and Republicans – are relentlessly moving our country into mega-statism today with full support from our professors, our media, and our people. Freedom and capitalism will then fall. They have been bamboozled. This means a free-market, not a mega-state. It means the protection of equal rights, not the conveyance of special privileges. It means a mind-our-own business foreign policy, not the pursuit of world hegemony. Tyranny is still tyranny whether it calls itself socialism, fascism, liberalism or neoconservatism.

Chapter 2 : The Conservative Mindset - Los Angeles Review of Books

"The Neoconservative Mind", review of They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons by Jacob Heilbrunn. VaÅ'sse, Justin. Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement (Harvard U.P.), translated from the French.

Some have described the relationship between the New York intellectual community and Strauss as inextricably intertwined Drury For certain, Strauss intrigued Kristol and other neoconservatives. But the starting points of their intellectual journeys were different. For the purposes of this essay, I will treat this distinction as important. For the conservative, writers from Burke on have highlighted the essential principles of what it means to be a conservative. These principles are rooted in various assumptions about human nature, God, reason, and history. From these maxims a conservative has the tools with which to make policy decisions on any topic. To this point, no agreed upon principles have upheld the neoconservative outlook. But a deficiency of the neoconservative position is a glaring one. If neoconservatism is as indebted to its predecessor as some think, the evidence will show as much. Neoconservatism generally would accept this maxim but with some qualification. On a strictly moral dimension, both conservatives and neoconservatives believe that human nature is flawed and they recognize the same enemy: Allan Bloom, a student of Strauss, was distressed by such a notion. This disease has particularly afflicted the academy where, put to the extreme, all morals and all cultures are suggested to be equal. For both, the transformation in the academy does not emanate from a change in the student body but from the content taught by their professors. One a more specifically religious level, there is some variation in the conservative and neoconservative vantage point. Religion for Kristol and Strauss played an important role as the moral center for any government. Liberal regimes, void of any public philosophy, will wither and decay. Unlike Burke or Buckley, all of the major neoconservative thinkers – Strauss, Kristol, Podhoretz, and Glazer among others – were Jewish, and most were not particularly observant. Kristol admired religion but rarely observed. Strauss was a self-identified agnostic. Podhoretz, who attended Jewish seminary for a short time at the behest of his father, was not religious at all. The Trotskyite beginnings of several of the neocons might explain their view that religion is transformative in societies. Although traditional conservatives would recognize that religion can provide such stability for society, Judeo-Christian thought fundamentally informs the foundations of conservatism. Original Sin as described in the Old Testament is not just an instructive guide about human nature but revealed truth. The Ten Commandments for the conservative is the objective moral code, passed down from generation to generation. And for the Christian, who believes that redemption lies in Christ in Heaven, he is not fooled by extreme or utopian attempts to recreate Heaven on earth. Institutions are the product of an incremental process that embodies the wisdom of prior generations. Neoconservatives generally accept this principle, but once again there exists room for some qualification. The New Class was composed of lawyers and bureaucrats, consultants and academics. They spoke in lofty goals of progressivism, egalitarianism and as spokesmen for the poor and working class. In the end, the language of compassion disguised their thirst for power and prestige Dorrien The New Class threatened the institutions of old by seeking to transform them to fit the politics of new. The rise of the New Class, and the response by neoconservatives, highlighted a subtle difference between neocons and conservatives, however. The concept of power was utilized little in conservative texts. Power was an afterthought, a given, that needed little examination. But for the Marxist and former Marxist, power sets the agenda, shapes the culture and influences politics and economics. The neoconservative agenda must be then to take the power away from the New Class – infiltrate think tanks, bombard Washington with their own managerial class and win the intellectual battles that conservatives had conceded to the liberal. The conservative movement had become but a disposition according to neoconservatives with no ties to policy-making and little influence on Capitol Hill. Who were the great conservative presidents, a neocon might ask? The institutions of society – the church, the government, rule of law – were defended passively at best. The neoconservative, not shy about his own desire for power, could pull the reigns back in the right direction. As Shadia Drury wrote: Prudence, experience and habit are more important than abstract logic and reason as guides to discover the truth. This principle is where we see

some split between the conservatives and the neoconservatives, and between the Straussians and other neoconservatives. On one plain there is general agreement. As Michael Novak remarked: For all varieties of conservatism there is a general distrust of Enlightenment reasoning. Strauss was disillusioned, for instance, by the behavioral revolution in political science. This positivism was first value-neutral and second rendered little in terms of actual political knowledge. As such, Strauss, like conservatives before him, was fine with a pre-Enlightenment outlook on the world. Knowledge was passed on from great mind to great mind, and wisdom existed in the great books of history and literature. But for neoconservatives like Kristol, in order to impact and transform society, man had to confront modernity head-on. Burke, Oakeshott, and Buckley had avoided well the ideological debates that, they felt, crippled their liberal, Marxist, and fascist foes. Kristol was not enthused by much of the progress associated with the Enlightenment and the revolution in France – the emphasis on equality over liberty and the destruction of tradition and order. This answers part of the question as to why the neoconservatives have been more successful in accomplishing their policy agenda than conservatives have, whatever that agenda might be. The community or the group supercede the rights of the individual. Superficially it would seem as though conservatives and neoconservatives agree on this point. Upon closer examination it appears that neoconservatives are less concerned about this principle. On the one hand, the conservative and neoconservative worry about the ego and arrogance associated with individualism. The extreme individualist has no respect for the tenets of tradition, or the values of the community. Politically, communities are at the mercy of a federal government that erases community standards and puts in its place invented, secular principles. And while neoconservatives speak less so in the language of moral obligation, they nevertheless are skeptical of utilitarian morality. Individualism in the arena of the economic sector, however, has not troubled neocons as much. Capitalism is a preferred economic system for all conservatives compared to its merchantilist, socialist and totalitarian counterparts. It is also a system that is most compatible with the American political tradition Rossiter But for conservatives, capitalism is fundamentally immoral in some ways – its ripe with greed, predicated on commodification, morally depraved and has the potential to destroy communities. But neoconservatives reject most of these claims. Moreover, capitalism, when compared to its alternatives, is best equipped to remedy the morally, spiritually and culturally depraved society. Equality, Democracy and Participation Thus far I have sought to explain the differences between conservatism and neoconservatism by situating neoconservative thought in some of the basic maxims of conservatism. The fifth principle actually needs little prodding. Both conservatives and neoconservatives accept this generalization. Part of the neoconservatives drift to the right was the awareness that man could not be made equal except in terms of opportunity. Their support for Civil Rights, for instance, but not affirmative action recognizes this difference. But equality is wrapped up in notions of democracy and participation and some have wondered whether these notions mean very different things to conservatives and neoconservatives. Simply put, however, the conservative and neoconservative orientation to democracy is completely compatible. Conservatives in the Burkean tradition are sympathetic to democracy but highly skeptical. Neoconservatives are less skeptical but certain that full faith in democracy accomplishes little. The participatory democrat is concerned about the distribution of resources in an unequal society. Seeking alternate venues to achieve more equitable resources for all, participatory democrats seek to close the gap between participation and equality. Participatory, or workplace democracy, also is logical, in the sense that most of our lives are actually spent at work, and our electoral participation is limited to voting once every four years Dahl Surprisingly, the literature on participatory democracy was written largely in response to liberal conceptions of democracy. Bachrach and Botwinick were responding to the liberal view that participation is not in itself valuable for the full development of citizens Bachrach and Botwinick And Dahl wrote almost entirely without the conservative or neoconservative in mind. Some obvious conservative objections would arise to the participatory democratic case. Second, the view that democracy should be filtered through other sectors of society would also be suspect. If it could be demonstrated that, for example, a democratic workplace would be more productive and the means would justify the ends then certainly the neoconservative might listen. Thirdly, and most critically, participatory democracy would affront the divide between the private sector and the government. If the government could influence the way businesses operated, at what point would government intervention stop?

Some final comments are needed to further flesh out the conservative and neoconservative viewpoints. With respect to democracy, European conservatism is different than American conservatism in the sense that in America no feudal tradition or monarchy ever existed. Therefore, the particular order that Burke thought to keep in Europe for traditional reasons – the state church or the aristocracy – he never suggested for his American counterparts. It has no program. It cannot say to its supporters: Democracy is just one of several ways to produce a government. It is not valuable in and of itself. It is special only in what it can accomplish, simply a means to an end. The conservative is also elitist, fearing, as Burke did in the French Revolution, the pulses of the masses can change as quickly as the blowing wind. Elitists like Hayek were fearful of popular sovereignty and even more scared of majority rule. Kukathas

Chapter 3 : The Neoconservative Counterrevolution

*The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology (Mapping Racisms) [Gary Dorrien] on calendrierdelascience.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. The life and times of a powerful ideological force in America.*

The term was apparently coined in by an opponent, the socialist Michael Harrington. By and large, neoconservatives either repudiated the label or accepted it grudgingly. Nonetheless, the term usefully describes an ideological tendency represented by a close-knit group of influential political intellectuals. In the early s, the short-hand designation "neocon" was a standard part of the American political vocabulary. Most of the leading neoconservatives were in their forties or early fifties when they began their ideological transition. Many were Jewish and several prided themselves on being "New York intellectuals" no matter where they lived at the moment. All of the leading neocons engaged in cultural politics by writing books or articles, but they came from varied professional backgrounds. Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Jeane Kirkpatrick straddled the realms of scholarship and politics. Many of the older neoconservatives had briefly been radical socialists in their youth. By the s, they affirmed centrist liberalism in philosophy and practice. The sociologists Bell, Glazer, and Lipset formulated an influential interpretation of American politics in which a pragmatic, pluralist center was besieged by parallel threats from "extremist" ideologues: Communists and "anti-Communists" on the left and a "radical right" represented most visibly by Senators Joseph McCarthy and Barry Goldwater. This position did not preclude nudging the center slightly leftward. In the early s, for example, Podhoretz at Commentary published articles holding the United States partly responsible for the start of the Cold War. The future neocons began to reevaluate liberalism, which was itself in flux, in response to the domestic turmoil and international crises of the late s and early s. Great Society antipoverty programs seemed utopian in conception or flawed in implementation. New Left demonstrators not only disdained the civility they cherished, but also disrupted their classrooms. Feminist and gay activists challenged the bourgeois values they considered essential underpinnings of a democratic order. Although few future neoconservatives supported the Vietnam War, many believed that the United States lost more than it gained from detente with the Soviet Union. Jewish neoconservatives were especially upset by the growing anti-Semitism within the black community and the increasing criticism of Israel by the left. All of these trends, they contended, were at least tolerated by the "new politics" wing of the Democratic Party that won the presidential nomination for Senator George McGovern in . These disaffected liberals moved rightward with varying speed. As early as , Kristol and Bell founded Public Interest magazine to critically examine the flaws in Great Society programs. Bell and Glazer endorsed McGovern in . The next year, however, both joined Lipset, Podhoretz, Decker, Kirkpatrick, Novak, and Wattenberg in creating the Coalition for a Democratic Majority in order to save their party from the "new politics. Jimmy Carter, who won the nomination and the election, soon disappointed the neoconservatives. Despite their concerted efforts, none received a high-level appointment in his administration. Moreover, Carter enthusiastically practiced affirmative action, remained committed to detente, and sympathized with Third World nationalism. Jewish neoconservatives complained that he pressed Israel harder than Egypt while negotiating peace between the two countries in through . Such behavior was only part of a foreign policy that looked like weakness or a "new isolationism" at best, "appeasement" at worst. Writing in Commentary in , Kirkpatrick claimed that Carter not only overlooked human rights abuses by the Soviet Union, but also drove from power "friendly authoritarians" like the Shah of Iran, who were then succeeded by full-fledged "totalitarian" regimes. By , the increasingly visible neoconservative network had formulated a comprehensive critique of American politics, culture, and foreign policy. Essentially they updated the pluralist theory of the s to account for recent social changes and to justify their own turn rightward. According to this interpretation, the Democratic Party—and much of American culture—had been captured by "ideologues" whose ranks now included social radicals, black nationalists, self-indulgent feminists, and proponents of gay rights. These extremists scorned the values cherished by most Americans, that is, faith in capitalism, hard work, sexual propriety, masculine toughness, the nuclear family, and democracy. Indeed, disdain for democracy explained

both their snobbish rejection of middle-class life at home and their sympathy for communist or Third World tyranny abroad. Such views had wide currency not because they appealed to ordinary Americans, but because they were disseminated by a powerful "new class" of academics, journalists, and others in the cultural elite. Although a caricature in many respects, this interpretation of American life and recent politics attracted the attention of Republicans seeking to build a majority coalition. Ronald Reagan courted the neoconservatives during the presidential campaign and subsequently recruited many of them into his administration. Kirkpatrick was appointed ambassador to the United Nations, Novak served as lower level diplomat there, and Gershman headed the newly created National Endowment for Democracy. Second-generation neocons from the political rather than the intellectual world held important midlevel positions. Richard Perle, a former aide to Henry Jackson, became assistant secretary of defense. Other neocons served on government advisory boards dealing with education and foreign policy. Outside of the Reagan administration, neo-conservatism thrived in the more conservative climate of the s. In , Decker organized the Committee for the Free World, an international collection of writers, artists, and labor leaders dedicated to mounting a cultural defense against the "rising tide of totalitarianism. Kristol began publishing National Interest in to analyze foreign policy from a "realist" perspective. The centrist New Republic and many mainstream newspapers welcomed articles by neoconservatives. Success brought division and controversy. Moynihan, elected senator from New York in , drifted back into the ranks of liberal Democrats. Kristol thought the Reagan administration was too harsh on the welfare state. Leading the most avid cold warriors, Podhoretz denied that the Soviet Union was becoming more democratic in the late s and chided Reagan for pursuing detente in fact if not in name. The most bitter debates arrayed neoconservatives against traditionalist conservatives who sometimes called themselves paleocons. These two intellectual factions within the Reagan coalition were separated by background, worldview, and questions of patronage. The neoconservatives were disproportionately Jewish, accepted much of the welfare state, and enthusiastically endorsed efforts to defeat international communism. The paleocons were devoutly Christians, opposed activist government in principle, and expressed reservations about both internationalist foreign policy and the cultural impact of capitalism. Tensions became apparent in when Reagan chose neocon William Bennett instead of a traditionalist to chair the National Endowment for the Humanities. By , traditionalists were accusing neoconservatives of excessive devotion to Israel. Neocons countered with some warrant that paleoconservatives harbored anti-Semites in their ranks. These factional disputes obscured the fact that neoconservatives fitted better into a coalition led by Ronald Reagan, a former liberal Democrat, who still celebrated the New Deal and wanted above all to win the Cold War. By the early s at the latest, a coherent neoconservative movement no longer existed, even though many erstwhile neocons remained active. As the Cold War ended and memories of the volatile s faded, the serious scholars among them returned to scholarship. Bell, Glazer, and Lipset in particular wrote thoughtful analyses of American society. Moynihan served in the Senate until The most polemical neocons, notably Podhoretz and Kramer, persisted in attacking feminism, gay activism, and the alleged triumph of "political correctness" in higher education. Yet, after years of ideological cross-fertilization, such polemics were virtually indistinguishable from those of traditionalists. Second-generation neocons increasingly emphasized foreign policy, rarely defended the welfare state, and thus fit easily into the Republican coalitions that elected Presidents George H. Bush and George W. Oxford University Press, Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology. Temple University Press, Ehrman, John, The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs " New Haven , Conn.: Yale University Press, Gottfried, Paul, and Thomas Fleming. The Autobiography of an Idea. Lora, Ron, and William Henry Longton, eds. The Right in Contemporary America. Simon and Schuster, Cite this article Pick a style below, and copy the text for your bibliography.

Chapter 4 : calendrieldelascience.com - The Neoconservative Mind

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See Article History Neoconservatism, variant of the political ideology of conservatism that combines features of traditional conservatism with political individualism and a qualified endorsement of free markets. Neoconservatism arose in the United States in the 1950s among intellectuals who shared a dislike of communism and a disdain for the counterculture of the 1960s, especially its political radicalism and its animus against authority, custom, and tradition. Intellectual influences Among their intellectual ancestors neoconservatives count the ancient Greek historian Thucydides for his unblinking realism in military matters and his skepticism toward democracy, as well as Alexis de Tocqueville, the French author of *Democracy in America* (1835), who described and analyzed both the bright and the bad sides of democracy in the United States. Culture and religion In its respect for established institutions and practices, neoconservatism resembles the traditional conservatism of the 18th-century Irish statesman Edmund Burke. Neoconservatives, however, tend to pay more attention than traditional conservatives to cultural matters and the mass media—to music, art, literature, theatre, film, and, more recently, television and the Internet—because they believe that a society defines itself and expresses its values through these means. Western and particularly American society, they charge, has become amoral, adrift, and degenerate. As evidence of the moral corruption of Western culture, they cite violent and sexually explicit films, television programs, and video games, and they point to popular music that is rife with obscenities that have lost their capacity to shock and disgust. Actions once regarded as shameful are now accepted as normal. For example, most people in the West now consider it perfectly acceptable for unmarried men and women to live together and even to have children. Such degenerate behaviour, say neoconservatives, indicates a broader and deeper cultural crisis afflicting Western civilization. The American political scientist James Q. Wilson, for example, traced the crisis to the 18th-century European Enlightenment, which encouraged people to question established authority, to criticize religion, and to reject traditional beliefs. Whatever its source, neoconservatives maintain that this degeneration represents a real and present danger to Western civilization. People without a sense of something larger than themselves, something transcendent and eternal, are apt to turn to mindless entertainment—including drugs and alcohol—and to act selfishly and irresponsibly. Religion at its best is a kind of social cement, holding families, communities, and countries together. At its worst, however, religion can be fanatical, intolerant, and divisive, tearing communities apart instead of uniting them. Most neoconservatives thus believe that the principle of the separation of church and state, as enshrined in the First Amendment to the U. S. Constitution, is a good idea. They also believe, however, that it has been pursued to extremes by adherents of modern liberalism, who are bent on banishing religion from public life, resulting in a backlash from religious-right conservatives. Neoconservatives also hold that the modern liberal ideal of cultural diversity, or multiculturalism—the principle of not only tolerating but also respecting different religions and cultures and encouraging them to coexist harmoniously—tends to undermine the traditional culture of any country that tries to put it into practice. These trends, they believe, are likely to produce a conservative backlash, such as those that took place in Denmark and the Netherlands, where anti-immigrant political parties became increasingly popular in the 1970s and early 1980s. Economic and social policy In economics, neoconservatives believe that markets are an efficient means of allocating goods and services. They are not, however, wholehearted advocates of free-market capitalism. As Kristol remarked, capitalism deserves two cheers, not three, because its innovative character produces almost-constant social upheavals and disruptions. Capitalism presupposes a willingness to save, to invest, and to defer gratification; at the same time, through advertising and marketing techniques, it encourages people to indulge themselves, to live on credit, and to pay little heed to the farther future. Unregulated capitalism, moreover, creates great wealth alongside dire poverty; it richly rewards some people while leaving others behind. And since great disparities of wealth make the wealthy contemptuous of the poor

and the poor envious of the rich, capitalism can create conditions that cause class conflict, labour unrest, and political instability. At the same time, however, neoconservatives warn that well-intentioned government programs can produce unintended and unfortunate consequences for the people they are meant to help. More particularly, neoconservatives argue that social welfare programs can and often do create dependency and undermine individual initiative, ambition, and responsibility. Such programs should therefore aim to provide only temporary or short-term assistance. Nor should the goal of social programs and tax policy be to level the differences between individuals and classes. Neoconservatives claim to favour equality of opportunity, not equality of outcome. While favouring the existence of the welfare state, they also believe that it should be scaled back, because it has become, in their view, too large, too bureaucratic and unwieldy, and too generous. In domestic policy theirs has been an insistent and influential voice. Foreign policy Neoconservatives have been especially influential in the formulation of foreign and military policy, particularly in the administrations of Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H. Bush, and George W. They contend that power—military, economic, or political—that is unused is for all practical purposes wasted. The military might of the United States should be employed around the world to promote American interests. Neoconservatives wish, in the words of Pres. The all-too-real result of such cynical anti-idealism was another and even bloodier second world war. Thus, idealism, far from being impractical, can produce politically practical and even admirable results. From the s, neoconservative idealism took the form of an assertive and interventionist foreign policy that targeted anti-American regimes and leftist movements abroad. Sharp increases in U. Meanwhile, communist-led rebel movements in Latin America were crushed with the help of U. In the George W. Bush administration, neoconservative officials in the Pentagon and the Department of State helped to plan and promote the Iraq War. Criticism Critics contend that, for all their purported idealism and their talk about democracy, neoconservatives have been all too willing to prop up pro-American but deeply undemocratic regimes throughout the world. With respect to domestic policy, neoconservatives are acutely aware of the possible unintended consequences of well-intended programs. But with respect to foreign policy, such skeptical awareness, according to critics, is almost entirely absent. In the months leading up to the Iraq War, for example, neoconservative planners seemed completely unaware that the invasion and occupation of Iraq might produce horrific consequences, such as large-scale sectarian violence and civil war. Such criticism has led some neoconservatives, such as Fukuyama and Michael Lind, to renounce neoconservatism and to become ardent and outspoken critics. Such criticisms notwithstanding, neoconservatism remains an influential ideology.

Chapter 5 : The Neoconservative Mind | Orange Catholic

of the s that formed the background of t h e neoconservative movement, "one is struck by their grandiosity and the conviction of self-importance on the part of a tiny group of obscure.

In a book-length study for Harvard University Press, historian Justin Vaisse writes that Lipset and Goldberg are in error as "neoconservative" was used by socialist Michael Harrington to describe three men "noted above" who were not in SDUSA and neoconservatism is a definable political movement. Bush, [18] [19] with particular emphasis on a perceived neoconservative influence on American foreign policy, as part of the Bush Doctrine. Jackson, inspiration for neoconservative foreign policy during the s Through the s and early s, the future neoconservatives had endorsed the American civil rights movement, racial integration and Martin Luther King Jr. Many were particularly alarmed by what they claimed were antisemitic sentiments from Black Power advocates. Following Shachtman and Meany, this faction led the SP to oppose immediate withdrawal from the Vietnam War, and oppose George McGovern in the Democratic primary race and, to some extent, the general election. They also chose to cease their own party-building and concentrated on working within the Democratic Party, eventually influencing it through the Democratic Leadership Council. Commentary published an article by Jeane Kirkpatrick, an early and prototypical neoconservative, albeit not a New Yorker. They were on the political left, but strongly opposed Stalinism and some were Trotskyists. During the Cold War they continued to oppose Stalinism and to endorse democracy. The great majority became liberal Democrats. The influential bestseller *The Real Majority* by Ben Wattenberg expressed that the "real majority" of the electorate endorsed economic interventionism, but also social conservatism; and warned Democrats it could be disastrous to adopt liberal positions on certain social and crime issues. After the anti-war faction took control of the party during and nominated George McGovern, the Democrats among them endorsed Washington Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson instead for his unsuccessful and campaigns for president. Neoconservatives organized in the American Enterprise Institute and The Heritage Foundation to counter the liberal establishment. Nevertheless, the origins of their ideology on the left are still apparent. The fact that most of the younger neocons were never on the left is irrelevant; they are the intellectual and, in the case of William Kristol and John Podhoretz, the literal heirs of older ex-leftists. Leo Strauss and his students[edit] C. Bradley Thompson, a professor at Clemson University, claims that most influential neoconservatives refer explicitly to the theoretical ideas in the philosophy of Leo Strauss, [38] although there are several writers who claim that in doing so they may draw upon meaning that Strauss himself did not endorse. Neoconservatism draws on several intellectual traditions. Some have attributed them to political science Professor Leo Strauss "His solution was a restoration of the vital ideas and faith that in the past had sustained the moral purpose of the West. West argues that for Strauss the American Founding Fathers were correct in their understanding of the classics in their principles of justice. For Strauss, political community is defined by convictions about justice and happiness rather than by sovereignty and force. He repudiated the philosophy of John Locke as a bridge to 20th-century historicism and nihilism and defended liberal democracy as closer to the spirit of the classics than other modern regimes.

Chapter 6 : Neoconservative (Nazi) Mind Control was used by Bush, page 1

THE NEOCONSERVATIVE MIND They Knew They Were Right The Rise of the Neocons Jacob Heilbrunn New York: Doubleday, Reviewed by Kevin MacDonald By now the history of the neoconservative movement is a bit of a

The leading Republican candidates, including frontrunners Donald Trump and Ted Cruz, have resorted to showmanship and grandstanding to make their case for the party nomination. Their harsh, uncouth rhetoric stands in marked contrast to the writings of Russell Amos Kirk, a founding father of modern American conservatism. Buckley, Barry Goldwater, F. Hayek, Eric Voegelin, and Leo Strauss " have received more attention. In this regard, Kirk is the victim of his virtues: Birzer, a professor at Hillsdale College who holds a chair named for Kirk, fills a need with his lucid and ambitious biography. One need not identify as a conservative to appreciate his polished charm and idiosyncrasies. A plump, bespectacled gentleman who feigned disdain for technology, Kirk was something of a spiritualist with a penchant for the weird. He considered himself a Stoic before he had converted to Catholicism, a regeneration that makes sense in light of the relation of Stoic to Pauline thought. As a young man Kirk spent four years in the military. His feelings about this experience were conflicted. He suffered from a blend of ennui and disenchantment but occupied his free time with reading, writing, and studying. He was horrified by the use of atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where the United States had decimated the most flourishing Western cultural and religious centers in the Japanese Empire, just as he was by the internment of Japanese Americans. The tremendous violence of the 20th century, occasioned by the rise of Nazism, communism, and fascism, impressed upon Kirk a sense of tragedy and fatalism. Hard to place along the left-right spectrum, he was as critical of big corporations and the military as he was of big government and labor. When Kirk inserted himself into political debates he supported Republican politicians, becoming temporarily more interventionist in his foreign policy before returning to a form of Taftian isolationism, but he always remained more worried about reawakening the moral imagination than in having the right candidates elected to office. His was a long view of society, one without a fixed teleology or secular eschatology, and skeptical of utopian thought. Eliot, Sir Walter Scott, George Santayana, and most of the American Founders, Kirk was also versed in the libertarianism of Albert Jay Nock and Isabel Paterson, whose ideas he admired as a young man but vehemently rejected throughout his mature years. Burke and Babbitt, more than any other men, shaped his political philosophy. And his irreducible imagination made room for mysticism and a curious interest in ghosts. Kirk was wary about the Enlightenment, as was Burke, because the scientism of that period tended to oversimplify inherently complex human nature and behavior. Kirk also thought the Enlightenment philosophes had broken too readily from the tested traditions of the past that shaped human experience. Kirk fell in love with the University of St. Andrews, however, where he took his doctorate and wrote a lengthy dissertation on Edmund Burke that would later become his magnum opus, *The Conservative Mind*. Kirk revised *The Conservative Mind* throughout his life, adding new permutations and nuances in an attempt to ensure the continued resonance of his cultural mapping. The almost instant success of *The Conservative Mind* made Kirk an unlikely celebrity. The book featured sharply etched portraits of men Kirk considered to be representatives of the conservative tradition. Regrettably, and perhaps tellingly, Kirk tended to ignore the contributions of women, passing over such apposite figures as Julian of Norwich or Margery Kempe, with whom he, as a mystic Catholic anglophile, had much in common. Kirk shared more with these women, in fact, than he did with Coleridge or Thomas Babington Macaulay, who appear in *The Conservative Mind*. Kirk was also woefully uneducated about American pragmatism. Conservatism, for Kirk, consisted of an attitude or mindset, not an explicit or detailed political program. It was something more " an aestheticized bricolage cannibalized from Burke and Eliot and others, with inspirational and ritualistic value. It has never gone out of print. Kirk is sometimes accused of being contradictory, holding simultaneously incompatible positions, in part because he lauded apparent antagonists such as John C. Calhoun and Abraham Lincoln. He recognized that change was necessary, but thought it should be guided by prudence and historical sensitivity. For a history buff, Kirk could be positively ahistorical and uncritical, ignoring the nuances and particularities of events that shaped the lives of his heroes.

Yet Kirk loathed Emerson and praised Coleridge and saw no inconsistency in doing so. Kirk was not alone during the s. Kirk sided with Buckley, for instance, in banishing from the pages of National Review any writers associated with the John Birch Society. Kirk despised the egoism of Ayn Rand, scorned the label neoconservative, and did not take kindly to the doctrines of Irving Kristol. Strauss is sometimes treated as the fount of neoconservatism, given that his students include, among others, Allan Bloom, Harry Jaffa, and Paul Wolfowitz. But Kirk never would have considered the esoteric and conscientious Strauss to be in a league with neoconservative provocateurs like Midge Decter and Norman Podhoretz, who indicted Kirk for anti-Semitism after Kirk, in a speech before the Heritage Foundation, stated that some neoconservatives had mistaken Tel Aviv for the capital of the United States — a tactless comment that was blown out of proportion. When our politicians lack a responsible and meaningful awareness of the residual wisdom of the ages, we get the leadership and politics we deserve. Would that we had more Russell Kirks around to remind us of the enduring things that, in times like these, are hard to find and difficult to believe in.

David Brooks penned an opinion piece for the New York Times arguing that the trouble Republicans and the Romney campaign have relating to everyday Americans is that, within the Republican Party, traditional conservatism has been all but forgotten, and economic conservatism has been ascendant.

Conflict of values[edit] Pat Buchanan is a leading example of paleoconservatism. The phrase Paleoconservative "old conservative" was originally a tongue-in-cheek rejoinder used in the s to differentiate traditional Conservatives from Neoconservatives and Straussians. Pat Buchanan calls Neoconservatism "a globalist , interventionist , open borders ideology". In , essayist Lionel Trilling said that liberalism is the "sole intellectual tradition" in the United States. He dismissed Old Right conservatives as expressing "irritable mental gestures which seek to resemble ideas". The Neoconservative movement, as it rose in the s, articulated a different vision from the Old Right. While Neoconservatives were not opposed to the New Deal as were the Old Right, they thought the subsequent developments in the Great Society and the New Left went too far. Neoconservatives embraced an interventionist foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East. They espoused especially strong support for Israel and believe the United States should help ensure the security of the Jewish state. In , James Burnham commented that the Neoconservatives still clung to "what might be called the emotional gestalt of liberalism, the liberal sensitivity and temperament. These were "courage, duty, discipline, and especially self-discipline, loyalty, endurance, [and] yes, patriotism. Ryn warned of the uncritical advocacy of democracy and abstract universalist principles among so-called Conservatives, including Michael Novak , Allan Bloom , Ben Wattenberg , and Richard John Neuhaus. These sentiments, Ryn argued, were more akin to leftism than to Conservatism. In the ensuing controversy Ryn was attacked at length in National Review by the democratic socialist Sidney Hook , as well as by others aligning themselves with the exceptional notion that America is called by history to advance its principles in the world. In Ryn argued in a book, *The New Jacobinism*, that Neoconservatism bears a close resemblance to the ideas behind the French Revolution. The French Jacobins of the late s appointed France the agent of universal principles; the new Jacobins of the late s had similarly selected the United States for the task of transforming the world. Ryn thus warned of the dangers of ideological imperialism. The late Samuel T. Francis , a leading Paleoconservative intellectual and a white supremacist, wrote that during this time, Old Conservatives who welcomed the Neocons into their ranks soon found that their new allies often displayed the habit of telling them what was and what was not "permissible" to say and how to say it. Criticizing affirmative action was also acceptable, but criticism of unconstitutional civil rights legislation, the Civil rights movement , or Martin Luther King Jr. Taft , and even Barry Goldwater tended to disappear or earn scorn in Neoconservative journals, while Harry Truman , George Marshall , Hubert Humphrey , and Henry Jackson developed into idols before whom conservatives were supposed to bend the knee. Weaver and Russell Kirk , began to disappear. They believe in an aggressive U. Neoconservatives tend to want more efficient government agencies; Paleoconservatives want fewer government agencies. Neocons do not like the concentration of services in the welfare state and are happy to study alternative ways of delivering these services. But they are impatient with the Hayekian notion that we are on " the road to serfdom. People have always preferred strong government to weak government, although they certainly have no liking for anything that smacks of overly intrusive government. Though they find much to be critical about, they tend to seek intellectual guidance in the democratic wisdom of de Tocqueville , rather than in the Tory nostalgia of, say, Russell Kirk. Paul Gottfried argued that the neocons funded their efforts using funding originally intended to fight the New Deal or the Great Society. Samuel Francis wrote, Contemporary Paleoconservatism developed as a reaction against three trends in the American Right during the Reagan administration. First, it reacted against the bid for dominance by the Neoconservatives, former Liberals who insisted not only that their version of Conservative ideology and rhetoric prevail over those of older Conservatives, but also that their team should get the rewards of office and patronage and that the other team of the older Right receive virtually nothing. This silence about the Paleocons was the result, in part, of the abysmal ignorance of the writers of most such articles but also of the hidden purpose that lurked beneath

much of what they wrote. That purpose was not so much to "deconstruct" and "expose" the Neocons as to define them as the real Conservative opposition, the legitimate though deplorable and vicious "right" against which the polemics and political struggle of the left should be directed. The reason the left prefers the neocon "right" to a paleo alternative is, quite simply, that the neocons are essentially of the left themselves and, thus, provide a fake opposition against which the rest of the left can shadowbox and thereby perpetuate its own political and cultural hegemony unchallenged by any authentic right. If they saw serious criticism in return, they issued charges of anti-Semitism. Their abstract moral principles, summarized as "virtue," constitute a break with older Western values.

Trade[edit] Neoconservative view: Neocons strongly support free trade as a way to spread American values throughout the world. Neocons also support globalization. Neocons believe in free market capitalism and believe in an open market and oppose tariffs. Paleocons devoutly support fair trade. Paleocons support the Republicans old stance of tariffs and protectionism. They believe free trade has failed the American worker and American manufacturing companies. Paleocons claim the trade deficit has skyrocketed under free trade. They believe free trade agreements codify protectionist policies at the global level. Paleocons strongly oppose global legislation.

Immigration[edit] Neoconservative view: Neocons support amnesty for illegal immigrants living in the United States, and support fixing and simplifying the legal immigration system. As such, President George W. Paleocons oppose illegal immigration and sometimes support reducing or eliminating legal immigration for certain periods of time or from certain areas. They believe the United States should enforce stricter border controls.

Foreign policy[edit] Neoconservative view: Neocons call for an aggressive foreign policy that can include preemptive war. Neocons support Nation-building , even if it is done unilaterally. They also support a strong military and higher military spending. Neocons support a Wilsonian-type of foreign policy. Neocons believe that the United States should act as the "world police" to continue promoting democracy. Paleocons believe in going to war only if the United States is attacked or is directly threatened. Paleocons do agree with Neocons on a strong national defense, but Paleocons believe that the military budget does need to be cut down as it is too wasteful. Paleocons are also typically resistant to the idea of direct military intervention in the absence of existentially threatening circumstances. They are also very skeptical of multilateralism and supranational unions and support less involvement or complete withdrawal from NATO and the UN.

The constitution[edit] Neoconservative view: Many Neocons believe that the Constitution can be changed at will and is a living document. Paleocons believe that the Constitution is a document that is supposed to be interpreted the way and during the time it was written and that the Constitution is not to be violated. Paleocons could be referred to as "Constitutional Conservatives". Neocons support cutting the size of federal agencies in terms of economic issues but support increases for the military. Paleocons are strong supporters of a limited federal government. Paleocons support abolishing many government agencies to create a smaller federal government.

Taxation and budget[edit] Neoconservative view: Neocons support tax cuts but tend to increase government and deficit spending, mainly due to military spending. Bush, the deficit increased massively over a period of 8 years. Paleocons support tax cuts and call to decrease government and deficit spending. Many Paleocons are budget "hawks". These are people who strongly support a balanced federal government.

Welfare[edit] Neoconservative view: Neocons support mild forms of welfare. Roosevelt during the Great Depression years. Paleocons support dismantling welfare programs altogether.

Big business[edit] Neoconservative view: Neocons massively support big business. Neocons support corporatism and corporate welfare. Paleocons are skeptical of big business just like they are of big government. Paleocons support cutting corporate welfare because of their stance on government spending.

Federal reserve[edit] Neoconservative view: Neocons support keeping the Federal Reserve in place. Paleocons support abolishing the Fed and support bringing back a constitutional monetary system and the gold standard. Neocons are against outright drug legalization and strongly support the War on Drugs. Paleocons are also against outright drug legalization but oppose the War on Drugs. They see it as a waste of taxpayer money and believe it has failed to achieve the desired results.

Foreign aid[edit] Neoconservative view: Neocons support giving foreign aid to other countries, as it furthers their goals of international democracy promotion. Paleocons oppose all forms of foreign aid to cut government spending, including supporting cuts to the State Department.

Politics and Jewish identity[edit] Some

Paleocons say they are honest Conservatives who were bullied and smeared by a corrupt ideology tied to Social democracy and globalism. This became an element in the dispute with the Paleocons. He said that these neocons equated Conservatism with country club exclusion, racism, and the " Protestant hinterlands. They emphasized the pluralism and openness of America and claimed that Americanism was less a matter of biological descent and European culture than of civic values and political ideology. Just as the neoconservatives stressed the ideological content of American diplomacy and asserted that American political ideology had well-nigh universal applicability, so they underscored the plastic character of American identity. Anyone was potentially a good American just as long as he or she affirmed the fundamental American political precepts of the Declaration of Independence , the Bill of Rights , and the Gettysburg Address. The Neoconservatives, the traditionalists responded, exaggerated the appeal of American political principles to the rest of the world, and they underestimated the powerful hold which culture has, or should have, on its citizens. National Endowment for the Humanities[edit] The beginning rift is often traced back to a dispute over the directorship of the National Endowment for the Humanities by the incoming Republican administration in

Chapter 8 : Neoconservatism - Conservapedia

A neoconservative (also spelled "neo-conservative"; colloquially, neocon) in American politics is someone presented as a "conservative" but who actually favors big government, globalism, interventionism, and a hostility to religion in politics and government.

Megan Erickson If New Leftists gave shape to one side of the culture wars, those who came to be called neoconservatives were hugely influential in shaping the other. Neoconservatism, a label applied to a group of prominent liberal intellectuals who moved right on the American political spectrum during the sixties, took form precisely in opposition to the New Left. Neoconservatives articulated this reaction best. In assuming such a duty, neoconservatives set themselves up for a hostile response. Fortunately for them, their prior experiences had prepared them well for the task. During their flirtations with Trotskyism in the s, when tussles with other radical students seemed like a matter of life and death, future neoconservatives developed habits of mind that never atrophied. They held on to their combative spirits, their fondness for sweeping declarations, and their suspicion of leftist dogma. Such an epistemological background endowed neoconservatives with what seemed like an intuitive capacity for critiquing New Left arguments. They were uniquely qualified for the job of translating New Left discourses for a conservative movement fervent in its desire to know its enemy. In Kristol started a new journal along with his fellow New York intellectual and former *Alcove No.* Originally Kristol and Bell sought to position their journal above the ideological fray. This was made clear by its title, , which derived from a telling Walter Lippmann passage: In fact, *The Public Interest* was instrumental in undermining the liberal idea that government policy could solve problems related to racism and poverty. It consistently featured influential scholars who considered such notions naive and ultimately dangerous in their proclivity to make things worse. *The Function of Public Welfare*. But a mere two years later Kristol was dining at the White House with Nixon, the two men brought together by their shared hatred of the New Left. Although the McGovern nomination represented a breaking point for Kristol and many other Cold War liberals, their frustration with the increasing influence of the New Left had been bubbling toward the surface for years. In his controversial report , officially titled *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action* , Moynihan argued that the equal rights won by blacks in the legal realm “ fruits born of the civil rights movement “ brought newfound expectations of equal results. But achieving equal results would prove more difficult because blacks lacked the cultural conditioning necessary to compete with whites. For hard-boiled skeptics like Moynihan, the idea that culture impeded liberal reform efforts was an illuminating lens through which to view black poverty. The Moynihan Report quickly became a national sensation. In part this was due to the violent race riot that exploded in Watts that summer: You go to school most of your life and have a lot of book learning but you know as much about the Negro as I know about Eskimos. There has never been a Negro family to deteriorate, that is, not a family as white people know a family. The prescription is therefore to change the deviance, not the system. They also repudiated the corollary assumption that assimilation to prescribed norms “ to normative America “ was the only path to equality. The behavior of poor blacks, whether actually dysfunctional or not “ and Ryan raised concerns about the validity of this claim “ was nothing more than a red herring. An era of bad manners is certainly begun. Like Kristol and the other New York intellectuals, Podhoretz grew up in Brooklyn, raised by working-class Jewish immigrants. In contrast, however, Podhoretz had attended Columbia University. In the s Podhoretz joined Kristol as a leading light of the conservative intellectual movement. But to reach this final destination the two traveled somewhat different roads. Unlike the *Alcove No.* He positioned himself as a Cold War liberal throughout most of the s, but in contrast with the focus of the former Trotskyists, anticommunism was not yet his chief concern at that time. And like Kristol, Podhoretz gave off early signals that such a break was coming. He pointed to his childhood memories of the black children in his Brooklyn neighborhood: In writing this piece, Podhoretz claimed his intention was merely to demonstrate the difficulties presented by racial integration. But plenty of readers interpreted it differently. He even took a hiatus from *Commentary*. During this interlude, he had what he later described in religious terms as a conversion experience. By the time he returned to his editorial desk in ,

Podhoretz was an unapologetic neoconservative. He earnestly commenced an ideological offensive against the New Left, the counterculture, and all that he deemed subversive about the sixties. In one of his first post-conversion editorials, Podhoretz argued that the lesson to learn from the sixties was that heady political optimism was more damaging than the pessimism that had pervaded the s. In contrast, New Leftists “ student radicals, feminists, and black militants ” responded to a set of particular, personal, and subjective signals. Where else could Jews from working-class backgrounds achieve so much, they wondered. For neoconservatives, these ideas were powerful tools for understanding the anti-American turn taken by those in academia, media, fine arts, foundations, and even some realms of government, such as the social welfare and regulatory agencies. Intellectuals of the older right, in contrast, never worked to get inside the mind of the New Left. More commonly they understood the New Left simply as liberalism followed to its logical conclusion. Unlike traditionalist conservative thinkers who conflated liberalism with the New Left, neoconservatives believed the New Left had infected the liberal intellectual culture they loved. That they detected such a change was one of the central reasons for their political conversion; it was one of the primary reasons neoconservatives proved so useful to the modern American conservative movement. By siding against contemporary intellectual mores, Bellow and the neoconservatives aligned with the more authentic sensibilities of average Americans. In other words, the neoconservative mind was the intellectualization of the white working-class ethos. As a *Commentary* writer put it: Take academics as a case study. By the sixties, the university credential system had become the principal gateway to the professional world, a sorting mechanism for white-collar hierarchy. The number of faculty members in the United States increased from 48, in to over , in In Glazer took a position in the University of California sociology department. Teaching on the Berkeley campus perfectly positioned him to observe the radicalization of the student movement, from the Free Speech Movement to the antiwar movement of the later sixties. In Glazer argued that student protests menaced the freedoms that had historically thrived at universities. An attack on the university was an attack on them. For this reason, student uprisings arguably did more than any other issue to galvanize formerly liberal intellectuals against the New Left. In political scientist John Bunzel authored a critical article for *The Public Interest* about the newly formed black studies program at San Francisco State College, where he taught. Of course neoconservatives typically made their case against quotas in nonethnic and nonracial terms. Moynihan, as a Catholic, addressed the issue in a way his Jewish intellectual friends could not. They are not but three percent of the population. As a result, Moynihan and other neoconservatives reasoned that race and ethnic based policies, particularly proportional policies, would only hurt Jews. Yet far from being ugly racists on the order of Bull Connor, the Birmingham commissioner of public safety whose name became synonymous with the southern white defense of Jim Crow when he unleashed attack dogs and water cannons on nonviolent civil rights activists in , urbane New York intellectuals frowned upon provincial bigotry. And yet the neoconservative belief that black Americans could overcome racism if only they would work hard “ if only, in other words, they would heed the example of Jewish Americans ” belied their cosmopolitan pretensions. In this, neoconservatives viewed America through the lens of the typical assimilated immigrant, more learned, for sure, but still typical. In this neoconservative racial thought melded with microeconomic forms of social analysis that were gaining a foothold in academic and policy circles. Neoconservatives, in other words, turned the cultural radicalism of the New Left on its head by arguing that adversarial ideologies made for both bad culture and bad economics. They interpreted New Left movements as both hostile to traditional American values and dangerously anticapitalist. Neoconservatives tapped into a powerful American political language that separated those who earn their way from those who do not. Nash convincingly argues, the conservative turn taken by the Jews at *Commentary* demonstrated that Jews were more of the mainstream than ever before. This shouting match between the New Left and the neoconservatives “ this dialectic of the cultural revolution known as the sixties ” helped bestow upon America a divide that would become known as the culture wars. Reprinted with permission from *A War for the Soul of America*: Published by the University of Chicago Press.

Chapter 9 : War and the Neoconservative Mind - Taki's Magazine - Taki's Magazine

*Three years later, Russell Kirk's *The Conservative Mind* challenged this thesis by arguing that American Conservatism had a long and distinguished pedigree in the history of ideas. [3] Former Dep. Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz is considered to be [weasel words] one of the most influential neoconservatives of the 21st century.*

The Neoconservative Mind Michael Harrington at Dissent magazine came up with the term "neoconservatives. When asked about the proper role of morality in politics, Marx reportedly burst out laughing. Orthodox Judaism was orthodox because it emphasized the primacy of the Law and was unapologetically institutionalized. The distinguishing mark of an institutionalized orthodoxy was that it made peace with the world as it was. The early church attracted a following because it appealed to Jews who resented the Law and to others who were already alienated from the world. While Judaism and Islam both regarded the demands of commerce as morally unobjectionable, the opposite assumption was plainly evident in the New Testament. Kristol explained that orthodoxies engendered a Stoic attitude toward the evils of the world. They offered spiritual consolation for afflictions that could not be explained or alleviated. When Kristol urged the clergy to become more interested in religion than politics, it was this kind of religion that he had in mind. Faced with the destructive logic of its own gnosticism, the Christian church transmuted its teachings into an institutionalized orthodoxy. This preoccupation with the presume social mission of the church undermined the historical achievement of Christian orthodoxy. Their vision was technocratic. Modern social scientists eschewed the moral question about the nature of a good society. Their essentially managerial conception of democracy filled modern textbooks in sociology, political science, economics, and journalism. But the purpose of any worthy political regime, Kristol insisted, was to strive toward some conception of the good life and the good society. To attain the kind of democracy described in the textbooks, on the other hand, would be to construct a procedurally fair and well-functioning system that failed to explain why anyone should care about it. Kristol argued that every administration quickly lost its sense of direction in the foreign policy area. The goal was American liberal internationalism was for the United States to have no foreign policy at all. The American creed subordinated American interests to the supposed interest of a phony world community. In either case, Kristol argued, this solution would be more tolerable for Israel than its current futile attempt to police the occupied West Bank. His faith in the importance of literature explained his disgust with nearly everything he read. Jewishness inhered simply in the activities of Jews themselves, rather than any theology, ideology, or ethos that might be offered to define them. Podhoretz believed that "A new conservatism was The United States was morally worthy of playing the dominant role in the world, Podhoretz insisted, because America was the least repressive nation in the world. This was not to assume that America was always morally required to repel communist advances wherever they occurred. Vietnam was a good example. The purpose was honorable, but the price was too high. Fackenheim argued that it meant, above all, to be a witness to the Holocaust. It was not that the Holocaust provided a new purpose for Jewish life. To ascribe a purpose to Auschwitz, religious or not, was blasphemous. But if it was forbidden to ascribe a purpose to Auschwitz, it was utterly necessary to make a response to it. The Voice of Auschwitz called religious and nonreligious Jews alike. It was not a redemptive, but a commanding Voice, which declared: After Auschwitz, Fackenheim argued, the most heinous sin for a Jew was to be an accomplice to the further destruction of the Jewish people. In mid, Podhoretz was still claiming that Gorbachev was a crafty Leninist who had figured out how to strengthen the Soviet empire and disarm the West. His touchstone was the theory of totalitarianism. For Podhoretz, it was axiomatic that totalitarian systems were fundamentally unlike all other political structures. The rulers of totalitarian regimes had no room for capacity to seriously reassess the national interest, Podhoretz claimed. It was ludicrous to think that Gorbachev would undermine the basis of his rule by opening the Soviet system or dismantling the Soviet empire. It loosened the bonds of family ties to enable individuals to become successful. It was devoted to material success and to controlling self and society through reason. The thickness of ethnic culture was a bulwark against utopianism and other deracinated WASP enthusiasms. Having reached middle age, Mr. Blow accepted the fact that his wife would never become more attractive and

that his job as an assistant advertising manager would never become more interesting or rewarding. He looked back on his life and decided that his earlier dreams to fornicate with many beautiful women and write the great American novel had been immature. This was what society called maturity. The rationalization that society venerated as maturity was one of the most powerful control mechanisms by which society imprisoned its inmates, he argued. The essence of bad faith was to pretend that something voluntarily chosen was necessary. For all of its railing against authority and centralized power, the Movement was driven by its contempt for ordinary people to embrace an incipiently totalitarian conception of politics. The participatory ideal of the New Left violated the fundamental precept of any humane politics, which is to leave people alone. Those who moaned about the loss of citizenship under modern democracy failed to appreciate that most people were commendably disinterested in politics. They observed that it was primarily in the modern social sciences that the experience of relativity and the necessity of a pragmatic outlook had been theoretically elaborated. The plurality of world views and the constructed character of social knowledge did not preclude the possibility that one world view was true. The difference was that one became aware of having chosen certain beliefs. To comprehend the reality of pluralism and relativity was to lose the intellectual innocence plaintively claimed by most conservatives. They noted that Lutheranism was the most socially and politically conservative of the major Christian traditions. While recognizing that the church was required to involve itself in the public realm, the Lutheran tradition was characterized by a deep mistrust of perfectionism and utopianism of any kind. The Bergers shared this attitude. Lutheranism opposed not only the utopianism of the political Left, but also the perfectionist absolutism of Protestant fundamentalism. The Bergers claimed that modern mainline Christianity was distorted by its introjection of the absolute moral ends of the gospel into the public realm. Modern churches blurred the distinction between the realm of the gospel and the Spirit and realm of the law and the sword. Like the liberals, their politics was therefore utilitarian, instrumental, self-promoting, and power-oriented. The modern battle between the conservatisms thus replayed the conflict between Burke and Bentham. America belonged to and was defined by the WASPs. Podhoretz entered Columbia in under a 17 percent quota for Jews. To their own surprise, however, the neoconservatives prospered in the land of the Americans, and became its apologists. Their movement began as a counterprotest against a later generation of ungrateful American children. Their own lives revealed the worthiness - even the superiority - of the American idea. Or were they poor? Generation after generation, the poor have streamed into America and been lifted out of poverty. It tapped the wellspring of American conservatism. Kristol recalled that Podhoretz and Decker chided him throughout the s for capitalist boosterism. For the, as for Novak, a residual identification with trade unionism and social democratic anticommunism had precluded any explicit apologetics for capitalism. The neoconservatives overcame their vestigial anticapitalism in the late s, however. This conversion allowed them to give voice to certain quietly kept sentiments forbidden in progressive intellectual circles. The fatal weakness of the feminized imagination, he argued, was its defining reluctance to exercise power. The feminized mind always looked for ways to transcend or avoid power politics, and when it failed, it exercised power only with a bad conscience. Nuechterlein explained that the triumph of feminization in the s was engineered by modern feminism and sealed by the collapse of socialist and Keynesian ideologies. Feminism provided a sustaining vocabulary for progressives while they struggled to replace their discredited ideologies and programs. And they pretend even in wartime that they are neutral, above the fray, on Mount Olympus. The freedom to tell the truth depends on who is in power. Their freedom, as it did in World War II, rests on a victory for our side. What do they think? I am not neutral. Most of them were disinclined for the same reason to believe that a culture war was enough. It was axiomatic for them that America needed a foreign policy mission that served its most expansive international visions. The United States was obliged to wage an economic, political, and military crusade for world democracy. The Movement produced currents that challenged hierarchy at every turn. The exhortation to question authority was taken seriously by movements unimagined by the liberalism of the s.