

Chapter 1 : William Franklin Sands - Wikipedia

*Our Jungle Diplomacy [William Franklin Sands, Joseph M. Lalley] on calendrierdelascience.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. This scarce antiquarian book is a facsimile reprint of the original.*

Security in the Euro-Atlantic jungle: The patterns that led us to think that these things existed have been disrupted. Instead, all sides of the US-Europe-Russia triangle might gain from considering what good security policy looks like in conditions of abnormality and disorder. Take the notion of the Euro-Atlantic security order. This is fine if it is simply a fancy way of describing whatever happens to be the current state of affairs. It is fine if it describes one vision of where we might want to get to-an ordered set of security arrangements throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. And it is fine if it is a term that seeks to defend and expand the elements of order that do exist. But the implicit proposition that there is an order to current Euro-Atlantic security arrangements does not sit well with reality. Second, so much of what we consider essential to our shared security now lies outside any agreed order. In many cases, there are not even tacit rules that might provide the sense of a security order-think of ambiguous cyberattacks or of interference actual or perceived in the domestic political affairs of other countries. The idea that there is an order to be upheld is still important. For example, it is still worthwhile to insist that international law prohibits the armed invasion of other countries and the alteration of borders by force. Countries, including Russia, still explain their actions in terms of recognised rules. There is some order in important areas of security. And at quite profound levels in our sense of security, there is no longer even an informal agreement on the rules of the game. It implies that we have moved from one fixed state into another fixed state, for example from partnership to containment in West-Russia relations. It has long been a standard pillar of Western analysis that Russia sees its own security interests best served through the destabilisation of others. And in our Trumpian world there are some who see disorder as also serving US security interests. A constant moving of the goal posts, new tactics, new demands and fresh disruption appear also to be a White House strategy to keep allies and opponents off balance. It might be the accelerating pace of Arctic ice melt. Or a spike in illegal migration flows from sub-Saharan Africa or Afghanistan. Or a new mutation of Islamist or other terrorism. Or a disruptive, and perhaps widely adopted, new technology. If we think that there is a European security order to be defended, or a new normal to be adjusted to, we will invest a lot of time and effort in that task rather than in figuring out how to cope with disorder and the unpredicted. If we see violations of a cherished order or disruptions of a familiar normal, we waste emotional energy in being upset by that. And we may waste political effort in trying to shore up an imagined status quo rather than in seeking new ways of coping. This is not to argue that it is a mistake or futile to try to enforce the spirit and not just the letter of the Vienna Document, to sanction Moscow for annexing Crimea or to try to negotiate supplemental agreements on Iran with the United States. But it is an argument for seeing such steps as a means to shape disorder to our advantage rather than to put the genie back in the bottle. It is an argument about avoiding a backwards-looking nostalgia for an ordered normality. It is, above all, an argument against complacency about the security costs and dangers-for all players in the Euro-Atlantic area-of the world they now inhabit. The Euro-Atlantic jungle Security complacency might seem to be a particularly European shortcoming. Russia shows no signs of complacency about its security, nor the United States about its own. It is the Europeans who seem to be suffering the greatest cognitive dissonance about the new security disorder. But it is not just Europe that has been on a year security summer holiday. Some creeping de facto annexation of Georgian territory here, some expeditions into Iraq and Afghanistan there-both Moscow and Washington, like European capitals, have tended for the past two decades or more to regard military action as discretionary, or at least to see national security challenges as less than existential. All sides are guilty of complacency about their shared, mutual security. There are multiple beasts-not all of which are governmental. There are lots of adaptive strategies for survival. Life is potentially nasty, brutish and short. With luck, things will not be as bad as that. Unlike most parts of the world, Europe has at least had the recent experience of negotiating security constraints. Is it simply a matter of nature red in tooth and claw, and every beast for itself? In a real jungle, there are no written agreements. But there are embedded instincts,

communities of interest, collaborative behaviours and understood codes of conduct. The following three non-exhaustive, non-exclusive, obvious guiding thoughts are an exercise in instructive entertainment that offers a couple of conclusions. Attend to what other beasts do, not what they say. This is a sad rule for a diplomat, because words really do matter in terms of predictability and trust. But the Kremlin and the White House lie, and European rhetorical fantasies are now more corrosive of security trust and predictability than they are helpful. In terms of what is going on, the picture is in some limited respects more hopeful than these inflated words would suggest. On the battlefield, where it matters to the lives of soldiers and civilians, on the ground in Syria and in the airspace above, the United States and Russia appear to have reached some rough and ready understandings and have created the mechanisms to operationalise them. On economic sanctions, where it matters as a litmus test of political will, the Kremlin has unexpectedly failed to push back against the EU on Eastern Ukraine, let alone Crimea. And yet, for states with good enough intelligence or analysts, it is apparent that all the major Euro-Atlantic players among whom we should probably now include China are playing ever less for a win-win outcome and ever more defensively, including the offensive aspects of a strong defence. There is a largely unconstrained and destabilising arms race between Moscow, Washington and Beijing. Both Washington and Moscow are plainly deterred by the risk of large-scale casualties, which continues to make them vulnerable to asymmetric approaches by lesser players. There is food for thought here for all the beasts in the jungle. If we strike at them, they strike back. And in the jungle, there are always unintended consequences. When beasts negotiate shared access to the waterhole, very different sorts of creatures can rub shoulders side-by-side. But if one animal starts throwing its weight or its claws around, others are likely to find ways to retaliate. The lesson is to be very cautious about what we plan for, especially if it is likely to be seen by another beast as an offensive move. In the jungle there is much to be said for keeping your claws sharp, or your hooves strong, while keeping your head down and getting on with life. Deter, but think twice before you coerce. For example, Russia has historically shown an appallingly poor understanding of NATO, despite all its access to information. It would be a terrible mistake if the Russian security establishment were now to assume that NATO was falling apart. Similarly, despite all their intelligence assets, the United States and its allies have shown an appallingly poor understanding of arenas like Afghanistan and Iraq to their great cost. And Europe has arguably shown appallingly little understanding that the United States is a place where 42 percent of registered voters still give President Trump a favourable rating. A pack of small flesh eaters can bring down even the largest beasts. So can poisoned bait. And a small furry animal may still get stepped on, no matter how cute it might think it is. Conclusions This has been a light-hearted review to make some serious points. What practical recommendations flow from these ideas for decision makers? A first recommendation is to avoid being glib or quick about choosing how to frame the security questions which most need answers. Is it adequate to ask how to maintain, restore or create an ideal European security architecture? Perhaps the metaphor is more complex and organic than that. A second is to become much less complacent about security, for players in every corner of the Euro-Atlantic area. Is it so safe for great powers to replay the Cold War, but in the 21st century, relying on military strength more than other aspects of security like economic reform or domestic investment? A third is to be much more cautious about the consequences of our actions. Did President Erdogan really compute the economic and political costs of shooting down a Russian fighter in November? Can President Trump safely assume that Russia will be able to distinguish a low-yield nuclear warhead from a high-yield one if both types are deployed on US strategic missiles? A fourth recommendation is to invest much more heavily in understanding our adversaries and security environment. This should be true for small states as well as large ones. Many states of all sizes are good at assembling information; far fewer achieve understanding; fewer still manage to make good decisions based on that understanding. Jungle animals do better. A corollary and fifth recommendation is to invest much more heavily in security dialogue with potential adversaries as a way of navigating through the jungle. This may do nothing to change their minds, but it will at least improve our understanding of the situation. And it may open more possibilities for mutually beneficial negotiation. If we burn it down, everyone suffers, including ourselves. These are very general recommendations, but they are entirely practical ones. Only the patient application of a changed approach to our security ecology and its

sustainability will make things less costly and less dangerous. This article was first published in the Riga Dialogue Afterthoughts by the Latvian Institute of International Affairs The opinions articulated above also do not necessarily reflect the position of the European Leadership Network or any of its members.

Chapter 2 : Our Jungle Diplomacy : William Franklin Sands :

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He was the grandson of Benjamin Franklin and Henrietta M. Members of his family have played prominent roles in every war since the American Revolution. Sands was educated at the College de St. Between he served as adviser to Emperor Gojong of Korea , succeeding Clarence Greathouse and General Charles Legendre , both of whom had died in Seoul in It was during this period, in , that Sands received the Cross of the Legion of Honor of France and was made a chevalier of that order for protecting French missionaries during an uprising on the island of Jeju. He was also decorated by the Korean emperor for his assistance in stamping out this uprising without loss of life. He reentered the U. He was sent to Panama in this capacity in as first secretary of legation under Charles E. He noted that the Japanese took US foreign policy in the region as a precedent to justify their own imperialistic plans in Asia. The book moves from this premiseâ€¦to the somewhat startling conclusion that we are responsible for Japanese imperialismâ€¦A similar lack of proportion and balance would seem to characterize the conclusionâ€¦that we are still the Big Bad Wolf of the Western Hemisphere. Two years after arriving in Panama, Sands proceeded to Guatemala in a similar capacity, and in became the first secretary of the embassy in Mexico. In he became envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Guatemala. While in Ecuador, Sands made a study of the Alfaro-Estrada revolution. When that was settled, Basil Miles of the U. State Department sent him a cable asking him to help organize the relief of the German and Austrian prisoners of war in Russia - about 1,, prisoners of war and over , interred civilians. University of North Carolina Press, There are four collections, which consist of manuscripts, notebooks, correspondence, and articles. The diplomatic papers in these collections are made up of notebooks that he kept while serving in Korea, Japan, Central America, and Russia. Many of his early letters tell of events such as the Boxer Rebellion and the Russo-Japanese war, as well as of political unrest in Central America and the events surrounding the building of the Panama Canal. The papers also contain articles written by Sands for Journals such as The Commonweal. Keating of Philadelphia , on August 17, Sands died on June 17, The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography. Volume 10 , p. University of North Carolina Press. Contemporary Biographical Sketches, [].

Chapter 3 : Language and diplomacy | DiploFoundation

A primary source is a work that is being studied, or that provides first-hand or direct evidence on a topic. Common types of primary sources include works of literature, historical documents, original philosophical writings, and religious texts.

Following the peace of Westphalia in Europe in the seventeenth century, it was around language, the vernacular, that the modern state system arose. Language, which was always an important component of the personality of men and nations, became yet more important: In Moslem culture and civilization the centrality of the Arabic language cannot be over-emphasised. The miracle of the Holy Quran is associated with the very essence, structure, nuances and rendition of the Arabic language itself. The language of diplomacy is yet a further refinement of language as a medium of communication. For words, however innocent or neutral they may look on paper or when standing alone, can be quite explosive, emotive, calming, agitating or even revolutionary. Words, which can mean different things to different people, or even change from place to place, or from time to time, carry not only sound but intention. They can please, cajole or wound. The preamble to the Communist Manifesto begins by saying: Words carry ideas that, in the thinking of Plato, are more permanent than objects, for only words can accomplish that powerful mixture between myth and reality that sometimes moves men to noble sacrifice, even martyrdom or the abyss of meanness. Not only by language but also by gestures, body language, smiles, frowns or grimaces is man distinguished from other creatures by his ways of communication. Some people sometimes speak with their face! Even the tone of how a thing is said is declamatory. Yet with all this sophistication in communication, language is often a cause for misunderstanding and conflict. The selection of words or phrases, their structure, indeed how these are rendered, is sometimes a communication within a communication. The range of how things are said is wide in almost every language and is much wider in some like Arabic which leaves much room for choice. This eclecticism in many respects contains the essence of communication. Ambiguity, sometimes by choice, sometimes constructive, and yet sometimes deliberately obfuscating and confusing is a characteristic of human beings. Gestures among other creatures are straightforward, leaving little room for misunderstanding though none may have been intended. Sometimes what is not said or communicated is just as devastating or eloquent. Just ponder the Western conspiracy of silence regarding what Israel is doing in its disregard of international law and United Nations resolutions in dealing with its conflict with the Palestinians. Diplomatically speaking, such silence is infinitely more eloquent than words. According to an Arabic saying, "If words are sometimes silver, silence is made of gold. Its formalisation into special patterns, with a chosen cadence and sometimes repetitive pattern is, and has been designed to oil the joints of relationships between people and nations. Couching it in a formalised pattern is designed convey several messages at once. Among these messages is to soften their negative impact when such is intended; leaving a face saving room for the opposing party to respond in kind, while protecting the deliverer, the messenger, the ambassador from the responsibility of their impact. Ideally they are intended to protect the messenger from being killed. This mixture between form and content wrapped in certain ceremony is designed to add weight to the message while protecting the messenger. This ceremonial language between different parties has its roots in traditions within nations and states. The patterns of the Arab culture for example can be found not only in dress, music, dance, party, but more importantly in speech patterns too. Such patterns are not only in the exchange of greetings at various occasions of the day or life, but in the popular extensive reliance on the quotation of proverbs which while conveying a particular message exonerate the speaker from any responsibility for whatever judgment or impact these may make. The ordinary speech of every day life is peppered and often salted with traditional forms and patterns that govern behaviour while at the same time laying out the parameters of exchange. At times it appears that saying the right thing at the right time is just as important as telling the truth whatever that may be. Again the Arab emphasis is not only to convey the message but more importantly to keep the dialogue alive. The idea of a language of diplomacy however is that it should not be culture-bound but an attempt at transcending such boundaries to create a quasi neutral vehicle of exchange; a vehicle of exchange that conveys the message while appearing least ego damaging. This is as important today as it was in earlier times when the exchange of

letters took weeks and sometimes months to be delivered. The changing nature of diplomacy in the modern age as a consequence of means of mass communication and transportation has not lessened the need for language to be "diplomatic", polite. Diplomatic language has to be diplomatically "correct". Somehow it becomes more acceptable. He can telephone, fax or e-mail his message. The frequency of the meetings of heads of states in a binational fashion, in Summit, or at international fora are changing the content, the form and the language of diplomacy in ways whose end results are yet unseen and unfathomed. Whether it will be necessary, in the future, to have ambassadors or even foreign ministers is a question worth thinking about. Today in most countries of the world, it is the head of state who lays down the parameters of foreign policy in both content and form. The treaty was between the two kingdoms of Ebla and Hamazi. The language of diplomacy, as one form of what Arabs call *adab al-hiwar*, the proper etiquette of dialogue, has not been successful in resolving problems nor indeed in oiling the points of contact of human intercourse. This is obvious not only when considering the violent human history over the past few millennia, but in the fact that even today erudite intellectuals continue to speak in terms of clash rather than a dialogue of civilizations. Thus far the art of noble dialogue remains that for poets, litterateurs and intellectuals. That is perhaps due to the strange primeval strain in human nature that causes people to take more seriously the language of hatred and conflict than that of civility and ideals. In fact, those who emphasise harmonious relations or adherence to humanitarian principles in the political sphere are dismissed as "idealists" and are taken less seriously than the so-called "realists". Machiavelli preached that "A prince should therefore have no other aim or thought, nor take up any other thing for his study, but war and its organisation and discipline, for that is the only art that is necessary to one who commands. Our entire age is of uncertainty and violence. Each in his field further shrunk the parameters of reason, they shook to the core the certainty propagated by the Age of Enlightenment emphasising the role of reason. Their conclusion was that man, after all, was governed by forces beyond his control. Violence and war can thus be rationalised as if they were outside the pale of the will of man. What makes the matter the more pertinent is the fact that entire cultures throughout the world are undergoing a process of transition, with one foot firmly planted in the past, and the other tentatively and fearfully exploring the future. This dialectic between tradition and modernity is more acute and at times more violent in certain civilisations than others. Yet in all, physical and verbal violence is a fact of living. Also of relevance to this global upheaval is the paucity of vision of leadership. Few are those in our age that are able to step outside their prejudices and intellectual climate, or that have the courage to accept differences in humane terms. That is why the formalised language of diplomacy is more needed now than ever before. Where power remains the coin of international relations and where in the words of the British political philosopher Thomas Hobbes that for most of humanity, life remains in setting closer to that of a jungle in a state of nature and where everyman is against everyman, there must be more emphasis on the resort to the language of diplomacy. And now with a single giant, super power that makes all other nations seem diminutive by comparison, that need is greater. In fact it would appear that for the medium size or small powers, the need to rely on diplomacy is much greater than that of the great powers. This appears to be the most important tool to protect the interests of the smaller nations. It is the combination of logic and science on the one hand with the gift of proper language packaging and presentation necessary to convince others. The power of language rests on the fact that it contains ideas: Ideas can be suppressed, or go underground but unlike a statue or any other material things they cannot be shattered. They can only be met and dealt with by other ideas. Historically it is the magic of words that bewitched, enthralled and sometimes intoxicated people and led them to great or mean deeds. The language of diplomacy, often like poetry, has the ability to move people from mood to mood. Whether demagogy or whether giving expression to noble ideologies, theories, or even religious creeds, ordinary language or that of diplomacy has a momentum and an inner driving force that is ageless. Columbia University Press, , Oxford University Press, ,

(as well as Guatemala, Mexico, Korea.

Chapter 5 : our jungle | eBay

Mr. Sands served for a number of years in the United States diplomatic service in Japan, Central America and Ecuador. He has some pertinent things to say about the mistakes of our foreign policy and the inadequacies of our diplomatic personnel.

Chapter 6 : Jungle diplomacy: Nice doesn't always work | The Seattle Times

In Our Jungle Diplomacy, Sands pointed out that United States policy in South America was creating a perception among Latin Americans that the U.S. was intending to absorb their continent. He noted that the Japanese took US foreign policy in the region as a precedent to justify their own imperialistic plans in Asia. [4].

Chapter 7 : Joseph G. Dwyer, Our Jungle Diplomacy - PhilPapers

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Chapter 9 : Our Jungle Diplomacy by William Franklin Sands

Americans all: good neighbor cultural diplomacy in World War II / Darlene J. Sadlier. F S16 Our jungle diplomacy / by William Franklin Sands, in collaboration with Joseph M. Lalley.