

Chapter 1 : Pariah States" and Sanctions in the Middle East : Timothy Niblock :

Tim Niblock's book Pariah States and Sanctions in the Middle East examines the details and effectiveness of sanctions on "pariah states" from the end of the Cold War until The outcomes observed in this book will be applied to the Syrian case in this article.

It is the focus of a loud chorus of accusations – intolerant, repressive, brutal, anti-democratic, and anti-woman – you name it. It would be unfair to single out the Islamic State as uniquely discriminatory against women, as there is a growing sense of dissatisfaction amongst women in even the most democratic nations, including the United States. And to top it all, Iran is anti-Western. Most of these allegations have long been repeated by War Hawks and Iranian exiles now living in the West, and subsequent US administrations. Iran is also in the crossfire for its alleged operational nuclear program, especially under the Trump Administration. Few care to discuss that it was non operations, and at least the Europeans were not concerned. Fewer even bother to ask any more, or even wonder why all the sabre-rattling: Just look what has happened in Nicaragua, Iraq and many other places. As before Trump the policy continues, how can Iran be stopped from getting a nuclear bomb? The first actions of the new US administration was to derail all the negotiations and even put the US back to having to consider a military action, aside from putting sanctions back on Iran. What counterbalancing actions should Washington take? Little is said in the MSM how the US supports Saudi Arabia, turns a blind eye, in the destruction of Yemen in mass genocide through disease and starvation. Many of the problems faced by the US with Iran has more to do with the regional manoeuvring by Israel and Saudi Arabia over their own interests, not the interests of the United States and its allies. Only now people are starting to realize that the US under both the current and previous administration, supported terrorists groups, and rather openly, especially in the case of Syria and the so called moderate opposition to Assad. Most of the problems now faced are self imposed and political rhetoric and campaign financing get into the way of engaging US diplomacy. Neither is it the only state where opponents of the regime are imprisoned or murdered, or subjected to other human rights abuses. The US continues to support governments which treat their opponents in the same way, not least that of Iran under the Shah and let us not forget Egypt and Jordan. Nor does being anti-Western automatically make you a pariah if it suits the West – Saddam Hussein, of all people, was funded by the US to wage war on Iran in the 80s to try and remove its Islamic regime, despite the mutual hostility between Iraq and the West which was manifest in propaganda even then. There are two reasons why Iran, above all, is officially treated as a leper, despite the oil resources everyone wants a piece of. They tell us a lot about how power politics and US foreign policy is actually conducted, and why that has to change, for the benefit of all nations, including the perpetrators of these diplomatic atrocities and human right violations in the name of democracy and Western values. Indeed, he had no choice but to be, as in the West powers intervened to destroy the democratically elected government of the popular Dr. The Shah himself would have been removed and replaced with a foreign nominee had he not gone along with this coup and allowed the CIA to establish the notorious SAVAK security force to keep his opponents at bay. However he was prevailed upon by his advisors to accept him as the least of several competing evils, and continue supporting him for strategic and energy supply even after the Shah led the OPEC boycott, which seriously damaged Western industrial production. The Shia clerics had always been an influential force with the grassroots, and the communist Tudeh Party retained a popular base despite considerable repression. Greater wealth had made them think their opinions were more valuable, the driving factor behind most genuine civil wars and revolutions. But no one thought that all these forces would act together, much less under the leadership of an exiled cleric in his seventies. No Western diplomat or government advisor saw the revolution coming, or then thought that it would succeed. Other revolutions have been fomented by the West to begin with Ukraine providing two good recent examples or have resulted from failures the West understood. But the convergence of forces which overthrew the Shah in 1979 was unforeseen and incomprehensible, and therefore its outcome, which Iran still lives with today, must be fundamentally wrong in the eyes of the West. All the elements of the modern Islamic Republic of Iran are present and understood, individually, in other states. They

could also be understood in Iran, and form the basis for some sort of dialogue, even if it is between bitter opponents. But Iran has never been forgiven for showing the West up to be both ignorant of reality and a political failure. Getting there the wrong way The second reason Iran is a pariah is that not only was the revolution not expected, it did not add up. But in Western thinking that cannot happen. The West is not just the biggest and best political bloc, in its own estimation, but the one with the highest values. Therefore, according to its own logic, everyone who does not do as the West says is backward and expendable. If the human race is to progress everyone must eventually evolve Western thinking and practice, and if a government claims to be trying to make that happen, however falsely, it should be supported. The Revolution was in no way progressive by purported Western standards, and nor did it pretend to be. Its point was to replace the so called modern Western values being introduced by the Shah with Islamic values the population were more comfortable with, but which were seen as a return to the dark ages by Western governments. Nor did it introduce a modern interpretation of Islam, but a conservatism which denounced what the West regarded as social achievements, such as greater female involvement in decision making, secular education and more liberal attitudes towards dress and sexual relations. If they do, the backward turn must result in social and political collapse. So what does the case of Iran tell us about what sort of common language with the West a state should develop if it wants to avoid becoming another international pariah? Firstly, all states have to accept that the West is more advanced in intellectual and political terms as well as material ones. Much of what the West has today derives from non-Western sources, despite US claims that Thomas Edison invented practically everything. But the contemporary version must somehow be superior, because it is Western. The people of Argentina will tell you how much better life was in the days of hyperinflation than they were after the IMF imposed a rescue package to Westernise its financial arrangements, structural adjustment, and this is not an isolated case. The West does not believe its own values or it would respect them elsewhere and allow other countries to have them. The West saw what happened when Soviet rule was imposed on countries which would never be suited to such a system. So to remain a friend of the West, you have to go along with the big lie, in the hope that Western political and financial support will somehow make the lie irrelevant. Secondly, to develop a common language with the West you must be predictable. A radical change of policy or practice which was not previously dictated or explained by the West is too much of a threat even in democratic states. The policy that continues in the US towards Iran and the region is one based on the unending post vendetta with Iran over the hostage crisis and its unwillingness to accept the popular uprising to get the Americans out. It is also based on the mentality of good vs. Evil and once bad, then always bad, and this is much the same as trying to put modern Russia in the same light as the former USSR. At least the US will never admit it that it was totally caught off guard, much like Stalin when the Germans invaded. This is the fault of the West, not Iran. But the West is not going to change its ways to suit lesser powers, so deviants have to be punished. Any state can be declared a pariah at any time, as all embarrass the West every time they get something right and the West gets it all wrong. That is why every country which does things differently, and successfully, such as Russia, is a threat.

Chapter 2 : Holdings : "Pariah states" & sanctions in the Middle East : | York University Libraries

*Pariah States & Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan (Middle East in the International System) [Tim Niblock] on calendrierdelascience.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. UN sanctions have become an increasingly popular weapon in the political armoury of the international community - a supposedly effective means.*

Iran When people talk about pariah states, which are regarded as automatically acting wrongly and who must be opposed for the sake of it, the Islamic Republic of Iran is always one of the first names mentioned, inter alia, amongst a long list of accompanying alleged wrongdoings. It is the focus of a loud chorus of accusations – intolerant, repressive, brutal, anti-democratic, and anti-woman – you name it. It would be unfair to single out the Islamic State as uniquely discriminatory against women, as there is a growing sense of dissatisfaction amongst women in even the most democratic nations, including the United States. And to top it all, Iran is anti-Western. Most of these allegations have long been repeated by War Hawks and Iranian exiles now living in the West, and subsequent US administrations. Iran is also in the crossfire for its alleged operational nuclear program, especially under the Trump Administration. Few care to discuss that it was non operations, and at least the Europeans were not concerned. Fewer even bother to ask any more, or even wonder why all the sabre-rattling: Just look what has happened in Nicaragua, Iraq and many other places. As before Trump the policy continues, how can Iran be stopped from getting a nuclear bomb? The first actions of the new US administration was to derail all the negotiations and even put the US back to having to consider a military action, aside from putting sanctions back on Iran. What counterbalancing actions should Washington take? Little is said in the MSM how the US supports Saudi Arabia, turns a blind eye, in the destruction of Yemen in mass genocide through disease and starvation. Many of the problems faced by the US with Iran has more to do with the regional manoeuvring by Israel and Saudi Arabia over their own interests, not the interests of the United States and its allies. Only now people are starting to realize that the US under both the current and previous administration, supported terrorists groups, and rather openly, especially in the case of Syria and the so called moderate opposition to Assad. Most of the problems now faced are self imposed and political rhetoric and campaign financing get into the way of engaging US diplomacy. Neither is it the only state where opponents of the regime are imprisoned or murdered, or subjected to other human rights abuses. The US continues to support governments which treat their opponents in the same way, not least that of Iran under the Shah and let us not forget Egypt and Jordan. Nor does being anti-Western automatically make you a pariah if it suits the West – Saddam Hussein, of all people, was funded by the US to wage war on Iran in the 80s to try and remove its Islamic regime, despite the mutual hostility between Iraq and the West which was manifest in propaganda even then. There are two reasons why Iran, above all, is officially treated as a leper, despite the oil resources everyone wants a piece of. They tell us a lot about how power politics and US foreign policy is actually conducted, and why that has to change, for the benefit of all nations, including the perpetrators of these diplomatic atrocities and human right violations in the name of democracy and Western values. Indeed, he had no choice but to be, as in the West powers intervened to destroy the democratically elected government of the popular Dr. The Shah himself would have been removed and replaced with a foreign nominee had he not gone along with this coup and allowed the CIA to establish the notorious SAVAK security force to keep his opponents at bay. However he was prevailed upon by his advisors to accept him as the least of several competing evils, and continue supporting him for strategic and energy supply even after the Shah led the OPEC boycott, which seriously damaged Western industrial production. The Shia clerics had always been an influential force with the grassroots, and the communist Tudeh Party retained a popular base despite considerable repression. Greater wealth had made them think their opinions were more valuable, the driving factor behind most genuine civil wars and revolutions. But no one thought that all these forces would act together, much less under the leadership of an exiled cleric in his seventies. No Western diplomat or government advisor saw the revolution coming, or then thought that it would succeed. Other revolutions have been fomented by the West to begin with Ukraine providing two good recent examples or have resulted from failures the West understood. But the convergence of forces which overthrew the Shah in 1979 was unforeseen and

incomprehensible, and therefore its outcome, which Iran still lives with today, must be fundamentally wrong in the eyes of the West. All the elements of the modern Islamic Republic of Iran are present and understood, individually, in other states. They could also be understood in Iran, and form the basis for some sort of dialogue, even if it is between bitter opponents. But Iran has never been forgiven for showing the West up to be both ignorant of reality and a political failure. Getting there the wrong way The second reason Iran is a pariah is that not only was the revolution not expected, it did not add up. But in Western thinking that cannot happen. The West is not just the biggest and best political bloc, in its own estimation, but the one with the highest values. Therefore, according to its own logic, everyone who does not do as the West says is backward and expendable. If the human race is to progress everyone must eventually evolve Western thinking and practice, and if a government claims to be trying to make that happen, however falsely, it should be supported. The Revolution was in no way progressive by purported Western standards, and nor did it pretend to be. Its point was to replace the so called modern Western values being introduced by the Shah with Islamic values the population were more comfortable with, but which were seen as a return to the dark ages by Western governments. Nor did it introduce a modern interpretation of Islam, but a conservatism which denounced what the West regarded as social achievements, such as greater female involvement in decision making, secular education and more liberal attitudes towards dress and sexual relations. If they do, the backward turn must result in social and political collapse. So what does the case of Iran tell us about what sort of common language with the West a state should develop if it wants to avoid becoming another international pariah? Firstly, all states have to accept that the West is more advanced in intellectual and political terms as well as material ones. Much of what the West has today derives from non-Western sources, despite US claims that Thomas Edison invented practically everything. But the contemporary version must somehow be superior, because it is Western. The people of Argentina will tell you how much better life was in the days of hyperinflation than they were after the IMF imposed a rescue package to Westernise its financial arrangements, structural adjustment, and this is not an isolated case. The West saw what happened when Soviet rule was imposed on countries which would never be suited to such a system. So to remain a friend of the West, you have to go along with the big lie, in the hope that Western political and financial support will somehow make the lie irrelevant. Secondly, to develop a common language with the West you must be predictable. A radical change of policy or practice which was not previously dictated or explained by the West is too much of a threat even in democratic states. The policy that continues in the US towards Iran and the region is one based on the unending post vendetta with Iran over the hostage crisis and its unwillingness to accept the popular uprising to get the Americans out. It is also based on the mentality of good vs. Evil and once bad, then always bad, and this is much the same as trying to put modern Russia in the same light as the former USSR. American politicians, businesses and the media have convenient memories; they are almost clueless of Iran and its rich but hectic history, as explained in one Guardian article. At least the US will never admit it that it was totally caught off guard, much like Stalin when the Germans invaded. This is the fault of the West, not Iran. But the West is not going to change its ways to suit lesser powers, so deviants have to be punished. Any state can be declared a pariah at any time, as all embarrass the West every time they get something right and the West gets it all wrong. The West does not believe its own values or it would respect them elsewhere and allow other countries to have them. That is why every country which does things differently, and successfully, such as Russia, is a threat.

Chapter 3 : "Pariah States" and Sanctions: The Case of Syria | Middle East Policy Council

A well-organized, brief account of the U.N. Security Council sanctions initiated in the s against Iraq, Libya, and Sudan. By treating the three cases separately, Niblock brings out interesting differences. Sanctions against Libya, for example, did not block its sale of oil. Sanctions against

If, as appears increasingly likely, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman ordered the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, then he has joined Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un among the ranks of rogue leaders who assassinate their critics on foreign soil. The disappearance of Khashoggi, a Post contributing columnist, is a horrific crime. His loss will be felt deeply for those who cherish freedom of expression and believe that all people, including those in the Arab world, deserve to be free. The crown prince, or MBS, as he is widely known, has possibly repaid those efforts by brutally killing a permanent U. His betrayal has now put Trump in an impossible bind. The president must now find a way to reconcile three sets of irreconcilable facts: There must be consequences. MBS is not going anywhere. Saudi Arabia is a monarchy. He is the son of the king. He has spent the past few years systematically eliminating his rivals and consolidating power. The idea that a new leader is going to emerge to replace him is not realistic. Be careful what you wish for. We need Saudi Arabia, less as a source of oil -- the fracking revolution has dramatically expanded our energy independence -- than as a counterweight to Iran, which is the main strategic menace to U. Saudi Arabia is our most important ally in countering that threat. No other country in the Middle East can play that role. A permanent breach with Saudi Arabia is not an acceptable outcome. How does Trump reconcile these three irreconcilable realities? The result is going to be unpleasant and unsatisfying. Many Democrats taking shots at the president as he tries to figure out a path forward need to check their hypocrisy. If you had a role in Middle East policy in the past eight years, that finger you are pointing at the Trump administration has blood dripping off it. So, what is going to happen? While we do need Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia also needs us. Moreover, the United States has other leverage. Congress has a say in our Middle East policy. It can impose costs on Saudi Arabia, by blocking military aid and arms sales. A bipartisan group of senators sent a letter to Trump calling for an investigation under the Magnitsky Act -- a U. Magnitsky sanctions would have real teeth, because members of the royal family love to travel outside the Arabian Peninsula, where they can do things they cannot do at home. If MBS wants to avoid a rupture in relations, then he must accept responsibility and make restitution. He must acknowledge that he understands the gravity of this mistake -- that he has made Saudi Arabia an international pariah, and is willing to do what is necessary to dig himself out of that hole through steps such as the release of political prisoners. And he must commit to stopping this kind of brutal behavior. Because his professed desire to modernize Saudi Arabia is incompatible with the medieval horrors that apparently took place in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Thiessen served as chief speechwriter to President George W. Bush and to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

Chapter 4 : "Pariah States" & Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan - Tim Niblock - Google Books

UN sanctions have become an increasingly popular weapon in the political armoury of the international community - a supposedly effective means, short of war, of bringing a transgressor state back in line. Tim Niblock challenges this view in a dispassionate analysis of the political, economic and.

Thomas is an honors graduate and tutor of Middle East studies and international relations at Deakin University in Victoria, Australia. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called on Russia and China to "get off the sidelines"¹ and assist the rest of the international community in putting pressure on the regime. One of the only non-military options at the disposal of the Friends of Syria in dealing with the crisis is sanctions. Sanctions are a common option for states when dealing with "rogues" or "pariahs," and as such it is important to constantly re-evaluate them as a foreign-policy tool. The outcomes observed in this book will be applied to the Syrian case in this article. It will also attempt to provide potential remedies to what is perceived to be a limited and unpredictable foreign-policy tool in international relations. United Nations Security Council UNSC Resolution 1541, which sought to prevent "those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other countries and their citizens,"² did not outline any sanctions to impose on state sponsors of terrorism. The United States did this in under the George W. Bush administration with the Syria Accountability Act, which required the Syrian government to cease all support for international terrorist organizations, end its occupation of Lebanon, halt all state production of weapons of mass destruction WMD and end its facilitation of insurgency in Iraq. Some allowances were made for chartered flights to the United States from Syria. In terms of the uprising, there has been no Security Council resolution endorsing sanctions on Syria over its use of force, in spite of the efforts of the United States and the United Kingdom. Instead, individual international actors have taken it upon themselves to impose their own sanctions regimes. They reflect that sanctions after the Cold War were mostly ineffectual at maintaining international order, with one positive outcome and five negative ones: Conventional sanctions were typically able to contain the regimes they were targeting. This often resulted in the cessation of some destabilizing activity, as it forced the regime to focus on economic survival. However, for this to occur, the support of regional and neighboring states was required. There was no evidence directly linking economic sanctions to the achievement of Security Council objectives. On the rare occasion that these achievements were met, it is likely for other reasons. Niblock argues that sanctions were not the catalyst for any change in Libya and Iraq. In Sudan, change occurred, but only through diplomatic means. Authoritarian regimes actually consolidated power as a result of being targeted with economic sanctions. In states such as Libya, the population became more dependent on the government rather than overthrowing it. The government could exercise greater control of the population through rationing systems as the economic climate worsened. Furthermore, nationalist governments also bolstered their own ideological legitimacy with the population, "where external powers especially Western powers are seen as imperialist crusaders. The democratization of an authoritarian state became less likely in the economic climate that sanctions created. The reduction in available resources forced citizens to consider their own survival due to competition, as well as the general reduction in health and standards of living within the population. The political stability of the state was greatly affected and resulted in broader repercussions for the region. Sanctions delayed the prospect of regional cooperation. Niblock argues that "as long as a state is under UN sanctions, other regional states will be constrained from seeking collaborative links with it. It is worth noting that the uprising in Syria is still unfolding, and any positive or negative effects of the sanctions imposed could come to fruition. This is very unlikely, however. It is relatively clear that the conflict has escalated past the point at which sanctions could have any tangible effects on the behavior of the regime and bring about a peaceful resolution, especially with mounting tension between Syria and Israel over the Golan Heights. The United States has come to terms with the fact that Bashar al-Assad and the regime are not going quietly and has resorted to arming the rebels through covert means,¹⁵ essentially acknowledging the failure of economic sanctions. I Have Sanctions Isolated the Regime? The Syria Accountability Act has had little effect in isolating Syria from its peers, primarily because of Iran. Even

outside of the Middle East, Syria had its allies. Russia, which also has had a longstanding relationship with the Assad regime, has not been deterred by sanctions in its dealings with the Syrian government. Sanctions pertaining to the uprising have also had very little effect in isolating the regime politically. Before the uprising, relations between Syria and Turkey were improving. In , Syria and Turkey signed 51 bilateral protocols designed to promote "strategic relations The objectives of the Syria Accountability Act were for Syria to cease its support of international terrorist groups, withdraw its troops from Lebanon, stop developing WMD and end its support of insurgents in Iraq. It is likely that the sanctions played at least a minor role in this decision, as they contributed to significant pressure on the regime. However, the subsequent assassination of the former prime minister of Lebanon, Rafiq Hariri, in suggests that Syria continued to operate in Lebanon. It is relatively clear in this instance that the Syrian government was simply trying to find a way around sanctions policy without changing its political aims. Keeping in mind that multilateral sanctions in relation to the uprising have been limited due to the vetoes of Russia and China in the Security Council, the sanctions that have been employed thus far have had little effect. The Syria Accountability Act did not have the same strengthening effects on Syria that sanctions had on the regimes in Libya and Iraq. While there were obviously significant points of contention between Syria and the West, the regime did not overtly rally its population against Western ideas and culture. On the contrary, the Syrian economic sector underwent Western-style reforms in The fact that most of the sanctions in the Syria Accountability Act targeted the elites and the government also meant that there was no tangible increase in the reliance of the people on their government for welfare. The Alawites are a minority sect, and the government has typically kept legislation nonsectarian because of this. The government is going through the process of losing power, and U. The regime has been able to utilize militant supporters known as shabbiha²⁶ in an attempt to maintain power, but this is most likely in retaliation for the strengthening of the resistance, as opposed to a reaction to sanctions policy. Scholars Raed Safadi, Laura Munro and Radwan Ziadeh see the Syrian political structure under Bashar as "highly centralised and dirigiste,"²⁷ even after the economic liberalization policies of In a country where democratization was a distant prospect to begin with, the sanctions employed after did little to create conditions for political change. The president received 97 percent of the vote from the parliament when he was the only candidate. As a result, a democratic movement was no less likely after sanctions were imposed than before. This is indicated by the protests leading up to the uprising in Syria. However, during the uprising, sanctions have played a large role in the deterioration of the Syrian economy. The United States and the EU, desperate to find a peaceful solution, have resorted to blanket sanctions on oil. Urban districts experience regular fuel shortages and power outages, inflation has risen substantially, and the national stock market has plummeted by 40 percent since March The price of the dollar has nearly doubled. Fuel for cooking and heating is hard to come by. It may have been easier for the regime to withdraw from Lebanon and pursue its political aims in Beirut through the proxy of Hezbollah rather than bear further sanctions from the West. Syria was to face an independent United Nations enquiry into the assassination as a result of UNSC Resolution ,³² but this did not have the economic repercussions of the additional sanctions that would have been placed on the regime if they did not withdraw. It also continued to fund Sunni insurgents in the Iraq War, primarily to irritate Washington. Sanctions are the lesser of two evils from the perspective of the West, especially regarding regional stability. While acknowledging that the impacts of sanctions are not entirely negative, it is important to look at the limitations of sanctions as a foreign-policy tool. These need to be examined in two different contexts: The Syrian government perceived every attempt to change its actions as yet another means for the United States to involve itself in Middle Eastern affairs; the United States perceived every stubborn response on the part of the Syrians as confirmation that the state was a "pariah". They tolerated very little dissent and prohibited most forms of free expression. This was very unlikely at the time, with members of the Alawite sect occupying all positions of power. It would take the birth of social media and the success of several other revolutions in the region to incite widespread rebellion in Syria. This has yet to result in the overthrow of the regime. As much as the United States has used the pariah label against Syria, the term is accurate in describing how Syria sees his actions. Unconditional support for Israel and efforts to impose democracy on Afghanistan and Iraq have produced a view of the United States as a destructive force in the

region in the eyes of the Syrian regime. Bush and Ariel Sharon. They did not wish to endorse what they saw as regional destabilization. Imposing sanctions on Syria for its dealings with militant groups was as likely to induce political change in the regime as would Syrian sanctions on the United States for its actions. Not only was the purpose of both U. The demands of Security Council Resolution , which outlined a plan to remove all Syrian forces from within Lebanese borders, were not entirely supported by the Lebanese. The international community was attempting to bring normative change, not only to a "pariah state," but also to another state perceived to be under its influence. The Lebanese factor added more variables to the Syrian case and diluted the effectiveness of sanctions. The international community has not yet been able to tailor a global sanctions policy in the Security Council, mainly due to the reluctance of Russia and China. UN policy observer Jeffery Laurenti noted that U. The very nature of the conflict has limited the effectiveness of sanctions. According to the United Nations, more than 18, people had been killed as of September ,43 but it is unknown what proportion are Syrian government troops, rebels or civilians. Most information about the conflict comes in the form of amateur video, rebel testimony and Syrian state TV. Furthermore, very few sources of information have been verified by UN observers and the few media correspondents in Syria. As such it is very difficult for the international community to ascertain the nature of the fighting, let alone whether sanctions are having positive or negative effects. In a situation where sanctions need to be tweaked as the circumstances change, the lack of corroborated information is a distinct drawback. As they did in the post-Cold War period, non-targeted sanctions risk harming the civilian population. Their use in the case of the uprising would cause even further damage, as it would significantly hinder the rebel cause. This is evident in the employment of U. The international community is therefore limited to targeted sanctions if it wishes the rebel cause to succeed. As the conflict continues, both sides are becoming increasingly desperate. This is a problem, as sanctions are based on the notion that the targeted states and officials will act rationally. Defence Secretary Leon Panetta and other political officials often expressed concern that the Assad regime would employ chemical weapons in order to maintain its grip on power, and that the conflict was "rapidly spinning out of control. Therefore, a targeted state will only comply if the negative effects outweigh the benefits of the policies that sanctions have endeavored to change. Niblock argues that the resistance to sanctions is not necessarily due to an ill regard for international law and order, but more about a resistance to international law and institutions being used as a tool of U.

Chapter 5 : Iran: Why Can't The US Deal With "Pigeonholed Pariah States?" | The Iranian

In an analysis of the political, economic, and psychological impact of sanctions in the Middle East, Niblock (Middle East studies, U. of Exeter) challenges the view that they are leading to the acquiescence of states who have so far declined the blessings of western civilization and the World Bank.